THE SOPHISTA;

A

DIALOGUE

ON BEING.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE SOPHISTA.

THE following is the preface of Proclus [1] to this dialogue, as preſerved in the Greek Scholia on Plato, publiſhed by Ruhnkenius. "Plato not only calls a certain man a Sophiſt, but alſo Love [2], Pluto, and Jupiter, and ſays that the ſophiſtical art is all-beautiful; whence we may conjecture that the dialogue has a more noble ſcope than it appears to poſſeſs. For, according to the great Jamblichus, its ſcope is concerning the ſublunary demiurgus [3]; ſince this Divinity is the fabricator of images, and the purifier of ſouls, always ſeparating them from contrary reaſons, being a tranſmuter, and a mercenary hunter of rich young men. While he receives ſouls coming from on high replete with productive principles, he takes from them a reward, viz. the fabrication of animals, in ſuch a way as is accommodated to the nature of mortals. This Deity gives himſelf to non-being, becauſe he fabricates material beings, and embraces matter,—a thing which is truly falſe. At the ſame time, however, he looks to true being. He is alſo many-headed, hurling forth many eſſences and lives, through which he furniſhes the variety of generation. The ſame power is likewiſe a magician, in conſequence of alluring ſouls by natural reaſons, ſo that they are with difficulty divulſed from generation. For Love, alſo, and Nature, are called by ſome magicians,

[1] Ficinus, who has given a verſion of this preface, aſcribes it to Proclus, and doubtleſs from good authority.

[2] This word is wanting in Ruhnkenius, and is ſupplied from the verſion of Ficinus.

[3] Viz. Pluto.

on account of the ſympathy and antipathy in things which have a natural ſubſiſtence. Now, therefore, Plato wiſhes to inſtruct us in an all-various ſophiſt. For a philoſopher is a ſophiſt, as imitating the celeſtial and alſo the ſublunary demiurgus: for the diviſive art imitates the progreſſion of things from *the one*, and the ſublunary the celeſtial demiurgus; and on this account he is a ſophiſt. A ſophiſt alſo among men is ſo called, becauſe he imitates great things: and hence Plato denominates the ſophiſt many-headed. The Elean gueſt is analogous to the ſuperceleſtial and exempt father of the artificers of things, but his hearers to demiurgic intellections, one of theſe being analogous to the intellection of Jupiter, and the other to angelic intelligence, as being Mercurial and geometrical. And becauſe fabrication proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, on this account the Elean gueſt firſt converſes with Theodorus, and afterwards converts himſelf to Socrates in particular [1]." Thus far Proclus.

Plato in this dialogue preſents us with ſix definitions of a ſophiſt; but as definition cannot be obtained without diviſion, for the latter is the principle of the former, hence he divides the genus of the ſophiſt by its proper differences, from which, in conjunction with genus, ſpecies is compoſed and de-

[1] I give the original of this fragment of Proclus for the ſake of the learned Platonical reader, who may not have theſe Greek Scholia in his poſſeſſion: for, to a genuine Platoniſt, every thing written by Proclus muſt be invaluable. Ὁτι σοφιστην καλει ὁ Πλατων και τον . . . . (ſupple Ερωτα) και τον Αιδην, και τον Δια, και παγκαλην λεγει ειναι την σοφιστικην τεχνην· ὁθεν ὑπονοημεν, ὁτι γλαφυρωτερου σκοπον εχεται ὁ διαλογος. Εστι γαρ κατα τον μεγαν Ιαμβλιχον σκοπος νυν περι του ὑπο σεληνην δημιουργου. Ὁυτος γαρ ειδωλοποιος, και καθαρτης ψυχων, εναντιων λογων αει χωριζων, μεταβλητικος, και νεων πλουσιων εμμισθος θηρευτης, ψυχας ὑποδεχομενος πληρεις λογων ανωθεν ιασας, και μισθον λαμβανων παρ' αυτων, την ζωοποιον την κατα λογου των θνητων. Ὁυτος ενδεδεται τῳ μη οντι, τα ενυλα δημιουργων, και τοως αληθως ψευδος ασπαζομενος, την ὑλην. Βλεπει δε εις το οντως ον. Ὁυτος εστιν ὁ πολυκεφαλος, πολλας ουσιας και ζωας προβεβλημενος, δι' ὡν κατασκευαζει την ποικιλιαν της γενεσεως. Ὁ δ' αυτος και γοης, ὡς θελγων τας ψυχας τοις φυσικοις λογοις, ὡς δυσαποσπαστως εχειν απο της γενεσεως. Και γαρ ὁ ερως γοης, και ἡ φυσις ὑπο τινων μαγος κεκληται δια τας συμπαθειας και αντιπαθειας των φυσει. Νυν ουν τον παντοδαπον σοφιστην βουλεται διδασκειν. Και γαρ και ὁ φιλοσοφος σοφιστης, ὡς μιμουμενος τον τε ουρανιον δημιουργον και τον γενεσιουργον. Και ἡ διαιρετικη μιμειται την απο του ενος των οντων προοδον, και ὁ γενεσιουργος τον ουρανιον δημιουργον. διο και σοφιστης, και αυτος δε ὁ σοφιστης ανθρωπος ων δια το τα μεγαλα μιμεισθαι, σοφιστης καλειται· ὁθεν και τον σοφιστην πολυκεφαλον ειρηκεν. Ὁ δε ξενος εις τυπον του πατρος των δημιουργοντων νοεισθω ὑπερουρανιος και εξηρημενος· οἱ δε ακροαται εις τας δημιουργικας νοησεις, ὁ μεν εις την του Διος, ὁ δε εις την αγγελικην, ὡς Ερμαϊκος και γεωμετρικος. Και επει ἡ δημιουργια εκ του ατελους εις το τελειον, δια τουτο πρωτον ὁ ξενος τῳ Θεοδωρῳ συγγινεται· ειτα δι' επιστροφης τῳ διῳ (lege ιδιῳ) Σωκρατει.

fined. He alſo ſhows, conformably to what is delivered in the Parmenides, that *being* is ſubordinate to *the one*; and enumerates five genera of *being*, viz. *eſſence*, *ſame*, and *different*, *permanency* and *motion*. He likewiſe teaches us that true eſſence belongs to incorporeal, and imaginable to corporeal natures; and is indignant with thoſe who deny that there are forms ſuperior to ſenſibles, and alſo with thoſe who contend that all things are either alone permanent, or alone in motion. Beſides all this, he diſputes concerning ſcience and opinion, true and falſe diſcourſe, verb and noun, ſo far as they appear to pertain to the diſcuſſion of *being*. He likewiſe obſerves, that the ſophiſt is concealed from our view, becauſe he is involved in the darkneſs of non-entity, and that a philoſopher alſo is not eaſily diſcerned on account of the ſplendor of being with which he is ſurrounded: "for the eyes of vulgar ſouls (ſays he) are unable to ſupport the view of that which is divine."

In order, however, to underſtand the moſt abſtruſe part of this dialogue, it is neceſſary to refer the reader to our copious Notes and Introduction to the Parmenides: for he whoſe mental eye has gained a glimpſe of the ineffable light of *ſupereſſential unity*, will more eaſily perceive the ſplendors of *being*.

I only add, that Plato in this dialogue has given a moſt beautiful ſpecimen of that part of his dialectic [1] called diviſion; a branch of the maſter ſcience in which he and the moſt illuſtrious of his diſciples were eminently ſkilled, and by which they were enabled to diſcover all the connecting media in the vaſt ſeries of being, and to aſcend from that which is laſt in the univerſe to the ineffable principle of all things.

[1] For an ample account of this maſter ſcience ſee the Introduction to the Parmenides.

THE

THE SOPHISTA.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS, SOCRATES, || An ELEAN GUEST, or STRANGER, And THEÆTETUS.

WE are come, Socrates, according to our agreement yeſterday, as good manners require, and have brought with us this gueſt, who is an Elean by birth, but very different from the aſſociates of Parmenides and Zeno: he is however a great philoſopher.

Soc. Perhaps, therefore, Theodorus, according to the aſſertion of Homer [1], you are conducting a certain God, and not a ſtranger. For he ſays, that both other Gods, and eſpecially the hoſpitable deity, are converſant with men who participate of juſt ſhame, and that they inſpect the inſolent and the equitable conduct of men. So that perhaps he who now follows you, is one of the natures ſuperior to man, who attends you in order to behold and confute us who diſpute badly, as being himſelf a certain reprehending God.

THEO. This is not the manner of this gueſt, Socrates, but he is more modeſt than thoſe that are ſtudious of contention. And he appears to me, as being a man, not to be a God, but to be divine: for ſo I denominate all philoſophers.

[1] Odyſſ. lib. vii. ver. 485, &c. See the Apology for the Fables of Homer, vol. i. p. 163 of this work. It is well obſerved by the Greek Scholiaſt on this place, that Socrates now, conſiſtently with what he aſſerts in the Republic, reprobates theſe verſes of Homer, but in a milder manner, in conſequence of becoming an aſſociate with the Elean gueſt.

Soc. And you do well in calling them ſo, my friend. But indeed the genus of philoſophers is not much more eaſily diſtinguiſhed, as I may ſay, than that of divinity. For thoſe who are not fictitiouſly but truly philoſophers, appear through the ignorance of others to be of an all-various nature, while they wander about cities, and behold from on high the life of inferior natures. And to ſome they appear to deſerve no honour, but by others they are conſidered as worthy of all honour. And ſometimes they appear to be politicians, but at other times Sophiſts; and ſometimes, in the opinion of certain perſons, they are conſidered to be perfectly inſane. I would gladly, therefore, inquire of this our gueſt, if agreeable to him, what his familiars the Eleans think of theſe things, and how they denominate them.

THEO. What things do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. The ſophiſt, politician, and philoſopher.

THEO. What, and of what kind, is the doubt about theſe, which you would wiſh to have diſſolved?

Soc. This: Whether they denominate all theſe, one or two. Or as there are three names, whether they alſo make a diſtribution into three genera, and aſcribe the reſpective names to the reſpective genera.

THEO. But I think that he will not enviouſly refuſe to diſcuſs theſe things. Or how ſhall we ſay, gueſt?

GUEST. In this manner, Theodorus. For I ſhall not enviouſly refuſe, nor is it difficult to inform you, that they think theſe are three genera: but to define clearly what each of them is, is not a ſmall nor an eaſy work.

THEO. You have perhaps, Socrates, fallen upon queſtions ſimilar to thoſe which we were aſking this our gueſt before we came hither. But he then gave us the ſame anſwers as he juſt now gave you: for he ſaid, that he had ſufficiently heard, and did not forget them.

Soc. You ought, therefore, to gratify us, O gueſt, with reſpect to our firſt queſtion: But tell us thus much, whether you are accuſtomed to diſcuſs by yourſelf in a long diſcourſe, that which you wiſh to evince, or by interrogations, which I once heard Parmenides employing, and at the ſame time delivering all-beautiful arguments, I being then a young and he a very elderly man.

GUEST. If any one anſwers, Socrates, without difficulty, and in a placid manner

manner, it is more eaſy to diſcourſe with ſuch a one by interrogating; but if not, it is better to diſcourſe by oneſelf.

Soc. You are at liberty, therefore, to chooſe whichever of theſe you pleaſe: for we ſhall all of us obey you without reluctance. But I would adviſe you to chooſe ſome young man for this purpoſe, either Theætetus here, or any other that you may think proper.

Guest. I am aſhamed, Socrates, that, converſing with you now for the firſt time, I have not given word for word, but, making a long diſcourſe either by myſelf or to another, I have acted as if I had been framing a demonſtration. For in reality no one ſhould expect that the preſent queſtion can be ſolved with the greateſt facility: for it requires a very long diſcuſſion. On the contrary, not to gratify you, and thoſe that are now aſſembled, eſpecially ſince you have aſked in ſo modeſt a manner, would, as it appears to me, be inhoſpitable and ruſtic; ſince, from what I have before ſaid, and from what you have now urged me to do, I ſhall have Theætetus here as my aſſociate in the diſcuſſion.

Theæ. By thus acting indeed, O gueſt, as Socrates ſays, you will gratify all of us.

Guest. It appears then, Theætetus, that nothing further muſt be ſaid againſt theſe things. And as it ſeems, after this, I muſt addreſs myſelf to you. But if being weary through the length of the diſcourſe you ſhould become indignant, do not blame me, but theſe your companions, as the cauſe of this.

Theæ. I am far from thinking that this will be the caſe: but if a thing of this kind ſhould take place, then we can call upon the nameſake of Socrates here, who is of the ſame age with me, and is my aſſociate in gymnaſtic exerciſes, and who is not unaccuſtomed to accompliſh many laborious things in conjunction with me.

Guest. You ſpeak well. Deliberate, therefore, about theſe things by yourſelf, in the courſe of the diſputation: but now conſider in common with me, beginning in the firſt place (as it appears to me) from the ſophiſt; and let us evince by our diſcourſe what he is. For now both you and I have only the name in common reſpecting this thing: but perhaps each of us thinks differently as to the thing denominated. But it is always requiſite reſpecting every thing, rather to conſent through reaſons to the thing itſelf, than to the name alone without reaſon. However, with reſpect to the tribe which

which we now take upon us to inveſtigate, it is by no means eaſy to apprehend what a ſophiſt is. It appears however to all men, and is an antient opinion, that whoever wiſhes to labour through great things well, ſhould exerciſe himſelf in ſuch as are ſmall and more eaſy, before he attempts ſuch as are the greateſt. Now, therefore, as we are of opinion that the genus of a ſophiſt is difficult to inveſtigate, I would adviſe, Theætetus, that we ſhould firſt of all conſider the method of this inveſtigation, in ſomething more eaſy: unleſs you are able to ſhow a more expeditious way.

THEÆ. But I am not able.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, that, adducing a vile thing, we ſhould eſtabliſh it as a paradigm of a greater thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But what if we propoſe a thing well known, and of a trifling nature, but which will contribute as well as any thing to the apprehenſion of greater things? as for inſtance a fiſherman. Is he not known to every one? and is it not likewiſe certain, that he does not deſerve much ſerious conſideration?

THEÆ. It is ſo.

GUEST. Yet I ſuſpect he will furniſh us with a method, and reaſoning proceſs, not unadapted to our deſign.

THEÆ. In this caſe, therefore, it will be well.

GUEST. Come then, let us begin from this: and inform me, whether we ſhould conſider a fiſherman, as one endued with art, or as without art, but poſſeſſing another power.

THEÆ. We muſt by no means conſider him as without art.

GUEST. But there are nearly two ſpecies of all arts.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. Agriculture, and the care reſpecting every mortal body, together with that pertaining to every thing compoſite and plaſtic, which we denominate an utenſil, and in conjunction with theſe the imitative power, all which may be juſtly called by one name.

THEÆ. How ſo? and by what name?

GUEST. When any one afterwards leads into exiſtence that which was not before, then we ſay that he who leads makes, and that the thing led is made.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But all the particulars which we juſt now mentioned poſſeſs a power adapted to this.

THEÆ. They do.

GUEST. In a ſummary way, therefore, we ſhall denominate them effective.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. But after this, the whole ſpecies of diſcipline and knowledge, together with the ſpecies of gain, conteſt and hunting, may be called a certain art of acquiring, ſince no one of theſe fabricates any thing, but procures things which are and have been, partly ſubjecting them to its power by words and actions, and partly conceding them to thoſe by whom they are received.

THEÆ. They may be ſo called: for it is proper.

GUEST. Since all arts, therefore, conſiſt either in acquiring or in effecting, in which of theſe, Theætetus, ſhall we place the art of fiſhing?

THEÆ. Doubtleſs in the art of acquiring.

GUEST. But are there not two ſpecies of the art of acquiring? the one being a commutation between thoſe that are willing, through gifts, buying, and wages? But the other will be a mancipation, effected either by deeds or words.

THEÆ. It appears this muſt be the caſe, from what has been ſaid.

GUEST. But what? Muſt not mancipation alſo receive a twofold diviſion?

THEÆ. After what manner?

GUEST. The one being apparent, and wholly agoniſtic; but the other being occult, and wholly conſiſting in hunting.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. It is likewiſe abſurd, not to give hunting a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. Inform me how.

GUEST. One member of the diviſion conſiſts of the inanimate, and the other of the animated kind.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly: for there are both theſe.

GUEST. How, indeed, is it poſſible there ſhould not? And it is requiſite that we ſhould leave the hunting of inanimate things without a name, and that we ſhould likewiſe diſmiſs the conſideration of certain parts of the art of ſwimming, and other trifling things of this kind; and denominate the

the other part, which is the hunting of animated natures, the hunting of animals.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. But is it not juſtly ſaid, that there is a twofold ſpecies of the hunting of animals? one being the hunting of the pedeſtrian kind, which is diſtinguiſhed by many ſpecies and names, but the other of every ſwimming animal, and which is denominated hunting in water?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But of the ſwimming diviſion, we ſee that one kind cuts the air with wings, and that the other is aquatic.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But all the hunting of the winged tribe is called fowling.

THEÆ. It is ſo.

GUEST. But nearly that of all the aquatic tribe, fiſhing.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But what? Muſt we not divide this hunting into two greateſt parts?

THEÆ. What are theſe parts?

GUEST. According to which we either fiſh with nets, or by percuſſion.

THEÆ. How do you ſay? And how do you divide each?

GUEST. That every thing which on all ſides encloſing reſtrains any thing for the ſake of impediment, is fitly denominated a net.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But do you call a bow-net, dictuon [1], a ſnare, and a caſting-net, any thing elſe than nets?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

GUEST. We muſt ſay, therefore, that this hunting with nets is a part of fiſhing, or ſomething of this kind.

THEÆ. We muſt.

GUEST. But that which is accompliſhed with hooks and darts, by percuſſion, and which is different from the other kind of fiſhing, it will be proper that we ſhould now call by one word, percutient-hunting, unleſs you, Theætetus, have any thing better to ſay.

[1] The *dictuon* was a larger and wider kind of net.

THEÆ. Let us pay no attention to the name: for this is ſufficient.

GUEST. Of percutient-hunting, therefore, one kind is I think nocturnal, being effected by the light of fire; and on this account it happens to be called igniferous.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But the other kind is diurnal, and is effected with tridents hooked on the extremities of rods; the whole of this being aduncous fiſhing.

THEÆ. It is indeed ſo called.

GUEST. Of aduncous-percutient-fiſhing, therefore, that kind which is effected by darting the tridents into the water from on high, is I think called by ſome tridental fiſhing.

THEÆ. So certain perſons ſay.

GUEST. Only one ſpecies then, as I may ſay, remains.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. A percuſſion contrary to this, effected indeed with a hook, but not caſually ſtriking any part of the body, as in fiſhing with tridents, but piercing only the head and mouth of the fiſh, and drawing it upwards with rods and reeds. By what name, Theætetus, ſhall we ſay this ought to be called?

THEÆ. By that of aduncous fiſhing with rods: and we now appear to have accompliſhed that which we propoſed to diſcuſs.

GUEST. Now, therefore, you and I have not only accorded in giving a name to fiſhing, but we have likewiſe ſufficiently explained the manner in which it is conducted. For, of the whole art, one half we ſaid conſiſted in acquiring; and the half of this in manual ſubjugation; and again the half of this in hunting. Likewiſe that the half of hunting conſiſted in the capture of animals; and that the half of the capture of animals was hunting in water. That again, of hunting in water, the downward diviſion of the whole was fiſhing; that the half of fiſhing was percutient; that the half of percutient fiſhing was performed with a hook: and laſtly, that the half of this conſiſted in drawing that which is downwards upwards; and that, thence deriving its name, it is called aduncous fiſhing with rods.

THEÆ. This, therefore, has been in every reſpect ſufficiently ſhown.

GUEST. Come then, let us endeavour according to this paradigm to diſcover what a ſophiſt is.

THEÆ. By all means.

GUEST. And this indeed was the firſt object of inquiry in the example juſt adduced, whether a fiſherman is to be conſidered as a rude character, or as one endued with a certain art.

THEÆ. It was.

GUEST. And now, Theætetus, ſhall we call a ſophiſt a rude character, or one in every reſpect ſkilful?

THEÆ. We muſt by no means call him a rude character. For I underſtand what you ſay, that he who is ſo called ought not to be unſkilful, but endued with a certain art.

GUEST. But with what art ought we to conſider him endued?

THEÆ. I aſk you the ſame queſtion.

GUEST. By the Gods, then, are we ignorant that one of theſe men is allied to the other?

THEÆ. Which men?

GUEST. The fiſherman and the ſophiſt.

THEÆ. In what reſpect are they allied?

GUEST. Both of them appear to me to be hunters.

THEÆ. Of what is this latter character a hunter? for we have ſpoken of the other.

GUEST. We divided the whole of hunting into the ſwimming and the pedeſtrian.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And we diſcuſſed, indeed, the particulars reſpecting the ſwimming part of aquatic natures; but we omitted the pedeſtrian diviſion, and ſaid that it was multiform.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Thus far, therefore, the ſophiſt and the fiſherman equally proceed from the art of acquiring.

THEÆ. They appear ſo indeed.

GUEST. Some however, abandoning the hunting of land animals, betake themſelves to the ſea, to rivers and lakes, and hunt animals in theſe.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But ſome ſubjugate animals on the earth, and in rivers, as in meadows abounding with riches and youthfulneſs.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Of pedeſtrian hunting there are two greateſt parts.

THEÆ. Of what kind is each of theſe parts?

GUEST. One is the hunting of tame, and the other of ſavage animals.

THEÆ. Is there any hunting then of tame animals?

GUEST. Either man is a tame animal, (adopt what I ſay as you pleaſe,) or no animal is tame; or ſome other animal is tame, but man is a ſavage animal: or you may ſay that man indeed is a tame animal, but you may think that there is no hunting of men. Adopt whichever of theſe diviſions is moſt agreeable to you.

THEÆ. But I think, O gueſt, that we are a tame animal, and I ſay that there is a hunting of men.

GUEST. We muſt ſay then that there is alſo a twofold hunting of tame animals.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. By defining prædatory hunting, that which reduces into bondage, and tyrannic hunting, to be all of them violent hunting.

THEÆ. Well defined.

GUEST. But that which pertains to judicial caſes, popular harangues, and diſcourſe, may ſummarily be called a certain art of perſuaſion.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But of this art of perſuaſion we ſay there are two kinds.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. One of them is private, and the other public.

THEÆ. There are theſe two ſpecies.

GUEST. Again, with reſpect to the hunting of private perſuaſion, one kind is effected by wages, and another by gifts.

THEÆ. I do not underſtand you.

GUEST. It ſeems you have never attended to the hunting of lovers.

THEÆ. In what reſpect?

GUEST. In this, that beſides other things they beſtow gifts on thoſe they have caught.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. Let this then be a ſpecies of the amatory art.

THEÆ. By all means.

GUEST. But with reſpect to that ſpecies of the hunting of perſuaſion which is effected by wages, that part of it which converſes with others through favour, and entirely procures enchantments through pleaſure, that it may thence alone receive aliment as its reward, this I think we all of us call adulation, or a certain art adminiſtering to pleaſure.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But another part of it profeſſes to converſe for the ſake of virtue, and requires money for its reward. Ought not this part, therefore, to be called by another name?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Endeavour to tell me this name.

THEÆ. It is evident. For we appear to me to have found a ſophiſt; and I think this name is adapted to this other part of the object of our inveſtigation.

GUEST. According to the preſent reaſoning, as it ſeems, Theætetus, the profeſſion of a ſophiſt muſt be called an art, ſervile, ſubjugating, and venatic; hunting pedeſtrian, terreſtrial, and tame animals; or, in other words, privately bringing men into captivity for pecuniary rewards, and enſnaring rich and noble young men, through an opinion of erudition.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Further ſtill, let us conſider as follows:—For the object of our preſent inveſtigation does not participate of a certain vile art, but of one various in the extreme. For, from what has been before ſaid, we may conjecture that it does not belong to that kind of art which we juſt now mentioned, but to another kind.

THEÆ. What is that kind?

GUEST. There were in a certain reſpect two ſpecies of the art of acquiring, the one conſiſting in hunting, and the other flowing from contracts.

THEÆ. There were.

GUEST. We ſay, therefore, that there are two ſpecies of contracts, the one conſiſting in beſtowing, and the other in buying and ſelling.

THEÆ. There are ſo.

GUEST. And again, we ſay that the ſpecies of contracts which conſiſts in buying and ſelling, muſt receive a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST.

GUEST. He who expoſes his own works to ſale may be called a ſeller of his own property; but he who ſells the works of others, an exchanger.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But what? Is not that exchange which takes place in the ſame city, and which is nearly the half of the whole of exchange, denominated cauponary?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And is not the other half that which takes place by buying and ſelling in different cities, and which we call emporic?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And do we not perceive, that of emporic exchange, one part pertains to the nutriment of the body, and the other to the diſcipline of the ſoul, exchanging erudition for money?

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. That part which pertains to the ſoul we are, perhaps, unacquainted with: for the other part we underſtand.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But we ſay that he who buys muſic in one city by learning, and ſells it in another by teaching, and who acts in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to painting, enchantment, and many other things pertaining to the ſoul, as well ſerious as jocoſe,—we ſay that ſuch a one traffics no leſs than he who ſells meats and drinks.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. Will you not, therefore, ſimilarly denominate him who wanders about different cities in order to exchange diſciplines for money?

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But of this merchandize pertaining to the ſoul, may not one part be moſt juſtly called demonſtrative; and may not the other part, though ridiculous, yet, ſince it is no leſs the ſelling of diſciplines than the former, be called by a name which is the brother to that of ſelling?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But in this traffic of diſciplines, he who ſells the diſciplines of other arts muſt be called by a name different from him who ſells the diſciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. For he who ſells the diſciplines of other arts may be aptly called a ſeller of arts; but conſider by what name he ſhould be called who ſells the diſciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. By what other name can he be called without error, except that which is the object of our inveſtigation at preſent, a ſophiſt?

GUEST. By no other. We may, therefore, now collect as follows: that, by a ſecond inveſtigation, a ſophiſt has appeared to us to be an exchanger, a buyer and ſeller, a merchant reſpecting diſcourſes, and one who ſells the diſciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. In the third place, I think that you in like manner will call him a ſophiſt, who being ſettled in a city, partly buys and partly himſelf fabricates diſciplines, which he ſells in order to procure the neceſſaries of life.

THEÆ. Why, indeed, ſhould I not?

GUEST. You will, therefore, call him a ſophiſt who is converſant in acquiring, who traffics, and ſells either his own inventions, or thoſe of others, about the diſciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Neceſſarily ſo. For it is requiſite to aſſent to reaſon.

GUEST. Let us ſtill further conſider, whether the genus which we are at preſent inveſtigating is ſimilar to a certain thing of this kind.

THEÆ. Of what kind?

GUEST. Of the art of acquiring, a certain part appeared to us to be agoniſtic.

THEÆ. It did.

GUEST. It will not, therefore, be improper to give it a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. Inform me how you divide it.

GUEST. One part is defenſive, and the other offenſive.

THEÆ. It is ſo.

GUEST. Of the offenſive part, therefore, that which takes place when bodies fight againſt bodies may be fitly called violence.

THEÆ. It may.

GUEST. But what elſe, Theætetus, can that which takes place when arguments oppoſe arguments be called, except contention?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

GUEST. But as to contentions, there muſt be a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. In what reſpect?

GUEST. For, ſo far as contention takes place through employing prolix arguments againſt prolix arguments in public concerning things juſt and unjuſt, it is judicial.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But when it takes place in private, by a diſtribution into minute parts, through queſtion and anſwer, are we accuſtomed to call it any thing elſe than contradiction?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

GUEST. But of contradiction, that part which is employed about contracts, and which ſubſiſts caſually, and without art, is to be placed as a ſeparate ſpecies, ſince reaſon diſtinguiſhes it from other kinds of contradiction; but it has neither been aſſigned a name by any of the antients, nor does it deſerve to be denominated by us at preſent.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. For it is divided into parts extremely ſmall and all-various. But that which proceeds according to art, and diſputes about things juſt and unjuſt, and univerſally about other particulars, we are accuſtomed to call contentious.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But of the contentious diviſion, one part diſſipates poſſeſſions, and the other accumulates wealth.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We ſhould, therefore, endeavour to diſcover by what name each of theſe ought to be called.

THEÆ. It is proper to do ſo.

GUEST. It appears then to me, that he who, through delighting in the ſtudy of contention, neglects his affairs, and is always hunting after trifling queſtions, cannot be called any thing elſe than a man of words.

THEÆ. He may, indeed, be called ſo.

GUEST. But do you now, in your turn, endeavour to inform me how he is to be denominated who endeavours to acquire wealth from private contention.

THEÆ. Can any one with rectitude call him any thing elſe than that wonderful character the ſophiſt, which we inveſtigate, and who now again for the fourth time preſents himſelf to our view?

GUEST. As reaſon, therefore, again ſhows us, a ſophiſt is nothing elſe than that pecuniary genus which is converſant with the art of contention, with contradiction, controverſy, hoſtile oppoſition, and with the agoniſtic art, and that of acquiring.

THEÆ. He is altogether ſo.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, therefore, that it is truly ſaid, this wild beaſt is a various animal, and that, according to the proverb, he is not to be caught with the other hand?

THEÆ. It will, therefore, be proper to uſe both hands.

GUEST. It will be proper, and we muſt do ſo to the utmoſt of our power. But inform me, whether we have any ſervile names?

THEÆ. We have many. But reſpecting which of the many do you aſk me?

GUEST. Such as when we ſay to waſh, to diſtribute, to boil, and to ſeparate.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And beſides theſe, to card wool, to draw down, to comb, and ten thouſand other ſuch-like words which we meet with in the arts. Or do we not?

THEÆ. Which among theſe do you wiſh to ſerve throughout, as an inſtance of what you mean to evince?

GUEST. All the names that have been mentioned are in a certain reſpect diviſive.

THEÆ. They are.

GUEST. According to my reaſoning, therefore, ſince there is one art in all theſe, we ſhould call them by one name.

THEÆ. By what name?

GUEST. Segregative.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. Conſider, again, whether we are able to perceive two ſpecies of this?

THEÆ. You ſeem to urge me to a rapid conſideration.

GUEST. And, indeed, in all theſe ſegregations, the worſe was ſeparated from the better, and the ſimilar from the ſimilar.

THEÆ. It appears that it was nearly ſo ſaid.

GUEST. Of the latter of theſe ſegregations, therefore, I cannot tell the name; but I can of that which leaves the better and rejects the worſe.

THEÆ. Inform me what it is.

GUEST. The whole of this ſeparation (as I conjecture) is called by all men a certain purification.

THEÆ. It is ſo called.

GUEST. Does not, therefore, every one ſee that the cathartic ſpecies is twofold?

THEÆ. Yes. If any one, perhaps, thinks about it at leiſure; for I do not ſee it at preſent.

GUEST. And, indeed, it is proper to comprehend in one name the many ſpecies of purgations pertaining to the body.

THEÆ. What kind of purgations do you mean? and by what name ought they to be called?

GUEST. The inward purgations of the bodies of animals, by gymnaſtic and medicine, which purify by rightly ſeparating; and thoſe which operate externally, and which it is vile to mention, viz. ſuch as baths afford; and likewiſe the purgations of inanimate bodies, by means of the fuller's art, and the whole art of adorning the body, which occaſions attention to things of a trifling nature,—all theſe appear to be allotted many and ridiculous names.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. Entirely ſo, indeed, Theætetus. But the order of reaſoning cares neither more nor leſs, whether wiping with a ſponge purifies in a ſmall degree, but the drinking a medicine is more advantageous to us, by the purification it affords. For, that it may underſtand all arts, by endeavouring to apprehend what is allied, and what not, it equally honours the ſeveral arts, and is of opinion that ſome are not more ridiculous than others according to ſimilitude. It likewiſe conſiders hunting, effected through military diſcipline, as in no reſpect more venerable than ſearching after vermin, but for the moſt part more futile. And now, indeed, which was what you aſked, we have comprehended in one name all the powers which are allotted the purification either of an animated or inanimate body; but it is of no conſequence to the preſent diſputation what name may appear to be more becoming, if it be only placed ſeparate from the purgations of the ſoul, and include

in itſelf all ſuch things as purify the body. For the order of reaſoning now endeavours to ſeparate the purification of the dianoëtic part from other purgations, if we underſtand what it wiſhes to accompliſh.

THEÆ. But I do underſtand, and I grant that there are two ſpecies of purification; one ſpecies reſpecting the ſoul, and the other, which is ſeparate from this, reſpecting the body.

GUEST. You ſpeak in the moſt beautiful manner. Attend to me, therefore, in what follows, and endeavour to give a twofold diviſion to what has been ſaid.

THEÆ. Wherever you may lead, I will endeavour to diſtribute in conjunction with you.

GUEST. Do we not ſay, then, that depravity in the ſoul is ſomething different from virtue?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And we likewiſe ſaid, that purification conſiſts in rejecting what is depraved, and preſerving what remains.

THEÆ. We did ſay ſo.

GUEST. So far, therefore, as we ſhall diſcover an ablation of depravity in the ſoul, we ought to call it purgation.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. Two ſpecies of depravity in the ſoul muſt be eſtabliſhed.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. The one is like diſeaſe in the body, but the other reſembles inherent baſeneſs.

THEÆ. I do not underſtand you.

GUEST. Perhaps you do not think that diſeaſe is the ſame with ſedition.

THEÆ. Again, I am not able to anſwer this queſtion.

GUEST. Whether do you think ſedition is any thing elſe than the corruption of natural alliance through a certain diſcord?

THEÆ. It is nothing elſe.

GUEST. And is baſeneſs any thing elſe than entire deformity, ariſing from the immoderation of things of one kind?

THEÆ. It is nothing elſe.

GUEST. What then, do we not ſee in the ſoul of the depraved that opi-

nions

nions differ from deſires, anger from pleaſures, reaſon from pain, and all theſe from each other?

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But all theſe are neceſſarily allied to each other.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We ſhall ſpeak rightly, therefore, in calling depravity the ſedition and diſeaſe of the ſoul.

THEÆ. We ſhall ſpeak moſt rightly.

GUEST. But what, when we ſee ſuch things as participate of motion, and propoſe to themſelves a certain end, wander from and miſs the mark according to every impulſe, do we ſay that they are affected in this manner through ſymmetry to each other, or, on the contrary, through a privation of ſymmetry?

THEÆ. It is evident that this happens through a privation of ſymmetry.

GUEST. But we know that every ſoul is involuntarily ignorant of any thing.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But ignorance is nothing elſe than a delirium of the ſoul, which, while it is impelled to truth, wanders in its apprehenſion of things.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We muſt conſider, therefore, a ſoul involved in ignorance as baſe and deformed.

THEÆ. So it appears.

GUEST. It ſeems, therefore, that there are theſe two genera of evils in the ſoul; one of which is called by the multitude depravity, and is moſt evidently a diſeaſe.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But the other the multitude call ignorance, but they are unwilling to acknowledge that this is a vice in the ſoul.

THEÆ. It muſt by all means be granted, though when you juſt now ſpoke I was doubtful of it, that there are two genera of vice or depravity in the ſoul; and that we ought to conſider timidity, intemperance, injuſtice, and every thing elſe of this kind, as a diſeaſe in us; but the paſſion of abundant and all-various ignorance as baſeneſs.

GUEST.

GUEST. In the body, therefore, are there not two certain arts about theſe two paſſions?

THEÆ. What are theſe arts?

GUEST. About baſeneſs, gymnaſtic; but about diſeaſe, medicine.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. About inſolence, therefore, injuſtice, and timidity, is not chaſtizing juſtice naturally the moſt adapted of all arts?

THEÆ. It is likely, as I may ſay, according to human opinion.

GUEST. But, can any one ſay that there is a more proper remedy for all ignorance than erudition?

THEÆ. No one can.

GUEST. Muſt we ſay, therefore, that there is only one kind of erudition, or that there are more kinds than one? But take notice, that there are two greateſt genera of it.

THEÆ. I do take notice.

GUEST. And it appears to me that we ſhall very rapidly diſcover this.

THEÆ. In what manner?

GUEST. By perceiving that ignorance has a certain twofold diviſion. For, being twofold, it is evident that it neceſſarily requires a twofold mode of inſtruction, correſponding to the members of its diviſion.

THEÆ. What then? Is that apparent which is the object of your preſent inveſtigation?

GUEST. I perceive, indeed, a great and ponderous ſpecies of ignorance, which outweighs all its other parts.

THEÆ. Of what kind is it?

GUEST. When he who is ignorant of a thing appears to himſelf to know it. For it appears that through this all the deceptions in our dianoëtic part take place.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And I think that to this ſpecies of ignorance alone the name of ruſticity ſhould be given.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. How, therefore, do you think that part of erudition ſhould be called which liberates from this ſpecies of ignorance?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I think, indeed, O gueſt, that the other part is denominated demiurgic erudition, but that this is called by us diſcipline.

GUEST. It is nearly ſo denominated, Theætetus, by all the Greeks. But this alſo muſt be conſidered by us, whether the whole of this is indiviſible, or poſſeſſes a certain diviſion which deſerves to be named.

THEÆ. It is requiſite to conſider this.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, to me, that this may be ſtill further divided.

THEÆ. According to what?

GUEST. Of the erudition which is effected by diſcourſe, one way appears to be more rough, and another part of it more ſmooth.

THEÆ. Of what kind do we call each of theſe?

GUEST. The one antient and paternal, which men formerly adopted towards their children, and many uſe at preſent, viz. as often as children do wrong, partly ſeverely reproving, and partly mildly admoniſhing them. But the whole of this may be called with the utmoſt propriety admonition.

THEÆ. It may ſo.

GUEST. But ſome are of opinion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himſelf wiſe is willing to learn thoſe things in which he conſiders himſelf as ſkilled; but that the admonitory ſpecies of diſcipline makes very ſmall advances with great labour.

THEÆ. And they think right.

GUEST. They likewiſe adopt another mode in order to diſcloſe this opinion.

THEÆ. What mode?

GUEST. By inquiring into thoſe particulars about which a man thinks he ſays ſomething to the purpoſe, when at the ſame time this is far from being the caſe. In the next place, they eaſily explore the opinions of thoſe that err, and, collecting them together by a reaſoning proceſs, render them the ſame with each other: and after this they evince that theſe opinions are contrary to themſelves, reſpecting the ſame things, with reference to the ſame, and according to the ſame. But thoſe whoſe opinions are thus explored, on ſeeing this, are indignant with themſelves, and become milder to others; and after this manner are liberated from mighty and rigid opinions; which liberation is of all others the moſt pleaſant to hear, and the moſt firm to him who is the ſubject of it. For, O beloved youth, thoſe that purify

theſe

theſe think in the ſame manner as phyſicians with reſpect to bodies. For phyſicians are of opinion, that the body cannot enjoy ſalubrious food till ſome one removes the impediments it contains. In like manner, theſe mental purifiers think that the ſoul can derive no advantage from diſciplines accommodated to its nature, till he who is confuted is aſhamed of his error, and, the impediments of diſciplines being expelled, viz. falſe opinions, he becomes pure, and alone thinks that he knows the things which he does know, and not more than he knows.

THEÆ. This is the beſt and the moſt modeſt of habits.

GUEST. Hence, Theætetus, we muſt ſay, that confutation [1] is the greateſt and the chief of all purifications; and that he who is not confuted, even though he ſhould be the great king himſelf, ſince he would be unpurified in things of the greateſt conſequence, will be rude and baſe with reſpect to thoſe things in which it is fit he ſhould be moſt pure and beautiful, who wiſhes to become truly happy.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But by whom ſhall we ſay this art is employed? For I am afraid to ſay it is uſed by the ſophiſts.

THEÆ. On what account?

GUEST. Leſt we ſhould honour them more than is fit.

THEÆ. But yet what has been juſt now ſaid appears to be adapted to a certain character of this kind.

GUEST. So likewiſe a wolf reſembles a dog, a moſt ſavage a moſt mild animal. But he who wiſhes to be free from deception ought to guard againſt ſimilitude above all things: for it is a genus of the greateſt lubricity. But, at the ſame time, let theſe things be admitted; for I think it is not proper to diſpute about ſmall terms, at a time when theſe ought to be carefully avoided.

THEÆ. It is not proper.

GUEST. Let, therefore, a ſpecies of the ſeparating art be cathartic: and let a part of the cathartic ſpecies be limited to the ſoul. But of this let a part be doctrinal; and of the doctrinal let diſcipline be a part. But of diſcipline,

[1] Plato here alludes to the third energy of the dialectic method, the end of which is a purification from twofold ignorance. See the Introduction to the Parmenides.

that confutation which takes place about a vain opinion of wiſdom ſhould be called, as it appears from our preſent diſcourſe, nothing elſe than that ſophiſtic art which is of a noble race.

THEÆ. It ſhould be ſo called. But I am dubious, what, out of many things which preſent themſelves, it is fit truly and ſtrenuouſly to call a ſophiſt.

GUEST. You are very properly dubious. But indeed it is proper to think, that even a ſophiſt himſelf will now very much doubt, by what means he may eſcape our arguments. For the proverb rightly ſays, It is not eaſy to avoid all things. Now, therefore, let us attack him with all our might.

THEÆ. You ſpeak well.

GUEST. But, in the firſt place, let us ſtop as it were to take breath, and reaſon among ourſelves, at the ſame time mutually reſting when we are weary. Let us conſider, then, how many forms the ſophiſt aſſumes. For we appear from our firſt inveſtigation to have diſcovered, that he is a mercenary hunter of the youthful and rich.

THEÆ. We do ſo.

GUEST. But from our ſecond inveſtigation it appears, that he is a certain merchant in the diſciplines of the ſoul.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And did he not, in the third place, appear to be a huckſter about theſe ſame things?

THEÆ. He did. And did we not, in the fourth place, find him to be one who ſells us his own inventions?

GUEST. You properly remind me. But I will endeavour to remember the fifth particular. For, in the next place, we found him to be one who ſtrives in the agoniſtic exerciſe about diſcourſes, and who is defined from the art of contention.

THEÆ. We did ſo.

GUEST. The ſixth form is indeed ambiguous; but at the ſame time we muſt admit it, and grant that a ſophiſt is a purifier of ſuch opinions as are an impediment to diſciplines reſpecting the ſoul.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Do you therefore perceive, that, when any one appears to poſſeſs a ſcientific

a ſcientific knowledge of many things, and is called by the name of one art, this is not a ſound phantaſm? It is indeed evident, that he who is thus affected with reſpect to any art cannot behold that particular thing to which all theſe diſciplines look. Hence he who poſſeſſes a multitude of diſciplines ſhould be called by many names, inſtead of one name.

THEÆ. This appears to be in the higheſt degree natural.

GUEST. Leſt, therefore, the ſame thing ſhould happen to us through indolence in this inveſtigation, let us repeat, in the firſt place, one of the things which we ſaid reſpecting the ſophiſt: for one of theſe appears to me eſpecially to indicate him.

THEÆ. Which of them?

GUEST. We ſaid that he was in a certain reſpect a contradictor.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And does he not alſo become a teacher of this to others?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us now, therefore, conſider, about what it is that ſophiſts ſay they make others contradictors. But let our conſideration from the beginning be as follows. With reſpect to divine things which are unapparent to the many, do ſophiſts ſufficiently impart the power of contradiction?

THEÆ. This is indeed aſſerted of them.

GUEST. But what with reſpect to things apparent, ſuch as earth and heaven, and the particulars pertaining to theſe?

THEÆ. What of them?

GUEST. For, in private converſations, when any thing is aſſerted in general reſpecting generation and eſſence, we ſay that the ſophiſts are ſkilled in contradicting, and that they are able to render others like themſelves.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But what, with reſpect to laws, and all political concerns, do they not alſo promiſe to make men contentious in theſe?

THEÆ. No one, as I may ſay, would diſcourſe with them unleſs they promiſed this.

GUEST. But writings containing ſuch contradictions as ought to be urged

againſt the profeſſors of the ſeveral arts, may every where be procured by him who wiſhes to learn the art of contradiction.

THEÆ. You appear to me to allude to the writings of Protagoras reſpecting wreſtling and the other arts.

GUEST. And to the writings of many others, O bleſſed man. But is not the art of contradicting, ſummarily a certain power, ſufficient to bring all things into controverſy?

THEÆ. It appears, therefore, that nearly nothing is omitted.

GUEST. But by the Gods, O boy, do you think this is poſſible? For perhaps you young men behold this more acutely, but we more dully.

THEÆ. In what reſpect? and why do you particularly aſſert this? For I do not underſtand your preſent queſtion.

GUEST. I aſked, if it were poſſible for any one man to know all things.

THEÆ. If it were poſſible, our race, O gueſt, would be bleſſed.

GUEST. How, therefore, can any one deſtitute of ſcience be able, by contradicting, to urge any thing found againſt him who is endued with ſcience?

THEÆ. He cannot in any reſpect.

GUEST. What then is it which will be wonderful in the ſophiſtic power?

THEÆ. About what?

GUEST. The manner by which ſophiſts are able to produce an opinion in young men, that they are the wiſeſt of all men in all things? For it is evident that, unleſs they contradicted rightly, or at leaſt appeared to do ſo to young men, and, when appearing to do ſo, unleſs they were conſidered to be more wiſe through their contentions, they would be without employment, and, as you ſaid, no one would give them money to become their diſciple.

THEÆ. Doubtleſs no one would.

GUEST. But now men are willing to do this.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. For I think the ſophiſts appear to have a ſcientific knowledge of thoſe particulars about which they employ contradiction.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But do they employ contradiction in all things? Shall we ſay ſo?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. They appear, therefore, to their diſciples to be wiſe in all things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But yet they are not: for this ſeems to be impoſſible.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. A ſophiſt, therefore, appears to us to poſſeſs doxaſtic, and not true ſcience, about all things.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo. And what has been now ſaid, reſpecting ſophiſts, ſeems to be moſt rightly ſaid.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, aſſume a clearer paradigm reſpecting them.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. This. But endeavour to attend to what I ſay, and anſwer me in the beſt manner you are able.

THEÆ. Of what kind is the paradigm?

GUEST. Juſt as if any one ſhould aſſert that he neither ſays any thing, nor contradicts, but that he makes and cauſes all things to be known by one art.

THEÆ. What is your meaning in all this?

GUEST. You are obviouſly ignorant of the beginning of what is ſaid: for, as it ſeems, you do not underſtand the word *all*.

THEÆ. I do not.

GUEST. I ſay then that you and I are in the number of all things, and beſides us, other animals and trees.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. If any one ſhould aſſert that he would make you and me, and all other living things.

THEÆ. Of what making do you ſpeak? For you do not mean a huſbandman, becauſe the artificer you mention is a maker of animals.

GUEST. I do ſay ſo. And beſides this, he is the maker of the ſea, the earth, the heavens, the Gods, and all other things. And as he rapidly makes each of theſe, ſo he ſells each for a ſmall price.

THEÆ. You ſpeak in jeſt.

GUEST. What then? May not he alſo be ſaid to jeſt, who aſſerts that he knows all things, and profeſſes himſelf able to teach another all things, for a ſmall ſum of money, and in a ſhort time?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But have you any ſpecies of jeſting more artificial and agreeable than the imitative?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I have not. For you have mentioned a very ample ſpecies, which comprehends all things in one, and is nearly moſt various.

GUEST. Do we not, therefore, know that he who profeſſes himſelf able to make all things by one art, in conſequence of fabricating imitations and homonyms of things, by the art of painting, is able to deceive ſtupid young men and boys, by ſhowing them his pictures at a diſtance, and induce them to believe that he is ſufficient to effect whatever he pleaſes?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what as to diſcourſes, will it not appear to us that there is another certain art reſpecting theſe, by which ſeducers, as if employing certain incantations, are able to draw young men far away from the truth, by bewitching their ears with their diſcourſes, and exhibiting to them images of every thing, inſtead of realities; ſo as to cauſe themſelves to appear to ſpeak the truth, and to be the wiſeſt of all men in all things?

THEÆ. Why ſhould there not be another certain art of this kind?

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, neceſſary, Theætetus, that many of thoſe who then hear theſe things, after through the courſe of time they have arrived at the perfection of manhood, and conſider the things themſelves nigh at hand, and are compelled through paſſions clearly to handle realities, will then abandon their former opinions, and be induced to conſider thoſe things as ſmall, which once appeared to them to be great, thoſe things difficult which they once conſidered eaſy, and thus at length entirely ſubvert all the phantaſms produced by diſcourſe, through the works which take place in actions?

THEÆ. It appears ſo to me, as far as my age is capable of judging. For I am of opinion, that as yet I rank among thoſe who are far diſtant from the truth.

GUEST. All we, therefore, who are preſent will endeavour to aſſiſt you. And now we ſhall endeavour, free from paſſion, to approach as near as poſſible to the truth. With reſpect to a ſophiſt, then, inform me whether this is clear, that he ranks among enchanters, being an imitator of things? or muſt we yet doubt whether he poſſeſſes in reality the ſciences of thoſe things reſpecting which he appears able to contradict?

THEÆ. But how can we doubt this, O gueſt? For it is nearly evident from what has been ſaid that he is one of thoſe who participate parts of erudition.

GUEST.

GUEST. He muſt be conſidered, therefore, as a certain enchanter and mimic.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Come then: for we muſt now no longer drop our prey; as we have now nearly encloſed the ſophiſt in a certain net of reaſoning; ſo that he cannot hereafter eſcape from this.

THEÆ. From what?

GUEST. That he is one of thoſe who work miracles.

THEÆ. This alſo is my opinion reſpecting him.

GUEST. It ſeems, therefore, that we ſhould divide with the utmoſt celerity the image producing art; and that, entering into it, if the ſophiſt evidently waits for us, we ſhould apprehend him conformably to the royal mandate, and, delivering him up, exhibit our prey to the king: but that, if he enters into the parts of the imitative art, we ſhould follow him, always dividing the part which receives him, till we apprehend him. For neither will he, nor any other genus, ever be able to fly from him who can purſue every particular through all things according to method.

THEÆ. You ſpeak well. And in this manner, therefore, we muſt act.

GUEST. According to the ſuperior mode of diviſion, I now appear to myſelf to ſee two ſpecies of the imitative art; but in which of theſe we ſhould place the idea which is the object of our inveſtigation, it does not yet appear to me poſſible to know.

THEÆ. But firſt of all inform me by diviſion what theſe two ſpecies are.

GUEST. I ſee that one indeed is the aſſimilative [1] art. But this eſpecially takes place, when any one according to the commenſurations of a paradigm, in length, depth, and breadth, and beſides this by the addtiion of convenient colours, gives birth to a reſemblance.

THEÆ. What then, do not all thoſe that imitate any thing endeavour to do this?

GUEST. Not ſuch as faſhion or paint any great work. For, if they ſhould impart the true ſymmetry of things beautiful, you know that the upper parts would appear ſmaller than is fit, and the lower parts greater, in conſequence of the former being ſeen by us at a diſtance, and the latter nigh at hand.

[1] See the Notes to the tenth book of the Republic.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Do not therefore artiſts, bidding farewell to truth, neglect real ſymmetry, and accommodate to images ſuch commenſurations as are only apparently beautiful?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, juſt to call the one ſpecies, ſince it is a likeneſs, an image?

THEÆ. Perfectly ſo.

GUEST. And is it not juſt to call the other ſpecies aſſimilative?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. We muſt, therefore, call the other part of the imitative art, as we ſaid above, aſſimilative.

THEÆ. We muſt ſo call it.

GUEST. But what ſhall we call that which appears indeed ſimilar to the beautiful, but, when inſpected by him who is endued with a power ſufficient for the purpoſe, is found not to reſemble that to which it appears to be ſimilar? Muſt we not call it a phantaſm, ſince it appears to be but is not ſimilar?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Is not this part abundantly to be found in painting, and in the whole of the imitative art?

THEÆ. It is impoſſible it ſhould not.

GUEST. But may we not with the greateſt rectitude call that art which produces a phantaſm, and not an image, phantaſtic?

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. I have already, therefore, ſaid that theſe were two ſpecies of the image-producing art, viz. the aſſimilative and phantaſtic.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But neither am I able now to ſee clearly, that of which I was then dubious, viz. in which of theſe ſpecies the ſophiſt is to be placed. For this is truly a wonderful man; and it is extremely difficult to diſcern him; ſince even now, in a very excellent and elegant manner, he has fled into a ſpecies which it is almoſt impoſſible to inveſtigate.

THEÆ. It ſeems ſo.

GUEST. Do you then aſſent to this in conſequence of underſtanding it?

or

or does a certain uſual impetus ariſing from diſcourſe induce you to a rapid coincidence of ſentiment?

THEÆ. How, and with a view to what, do you ſay this?

GUEST. O bleſſed man, we are truly engaged in a ſpeculation perfectly difficult. For that this thing ſhould appear and ſeem to be, and yet is not; and that a man ſhould aſſert certain things, and yet not ſuch as are true,—all theſe things have always been ſubjects of the greateſt doubt in former times, and are ſo at preſent. For it follows, that he who ſpeaks in this manner muſt either ſpeak falſely, or be of opinion that ſuch things truly are; and thus ſpeaking, Theætetus, it is extremely difficult for him not to contradict himſelf.

THEÆ. Why ſo?

GUEST. Becauſe ſuch a mode of ſpeaking dares to admit that non-being is: for otherwiſe it would not be falſe, which it is. But the great Parmenides, O boy, while we were yet boys, both from the firſt and to the end, rejected this mode of ſpeaking. For, both in proſe and verſe, he every where ſpeaks as follows: "Non-beings can never, nor by any means, be. But do thou, when inquiring, reſtrain thy conceptions from this path." The truth of this, therefore, is teſtified by him, and this aſſertion will the moſt of all things become evident, if moderately diſcuſſed. Let us, therefore, if it is not diſagreeable to you, conſider this in the firſt place.

THEÆ. You may do as you pleaſe with reſpect to me. But do you conſider what it is beſt to inveſtigate, and in this path lead me.

GUEST. It will be proper ſo to do. Tell me, then: Dare we to pronounce that which in no reſpect is?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible we ſhould not?

GUEST. Not for the ſake of contention, therefore, nor jeſting, but ſeriouſly, every one who hears us ought to join with us in conſidering the import of this word *non-being*. But can we think that he who is aſked this queſtion would know where to turn himſelf, or how to ſhow what non-being is?

THEÆ. You aſk a difficult queſtion, and to me, as I may ſay, entirely impervious.

GUEST. This, however, is evident, that non-being cannot be attributed to any thing which ranks among beings.

THEÆ. For how could it?

GUEST. Since, therefore, it cannot be attributed to being, neither can any one rightly attribute it to any thing.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

GUEST. This alſo is evident to us, that this word *ſomething* is every where predicated of a certain being. For it is impoſſible to ſpeak of it alone, as if it were naked and ſolitary with reſpect to all beings.

THEÆ. It is impoſſible.

GUEST. Thus conſidering, therefore, muſt you not agree with me, that he who ſpeaks of ſomething muſt neceſſarily ſpeak of one certain thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. For you would ſay, that the word *ſomething* is a ſign of one thing, and that *certain-things* is a ſign of many things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But it is moſt neceſſary, as it appears, that he who ſpeaks of that which is not ſomething muſt entirely ſpeak of nothing.

THEÆ. This is moſt neceſſary.

GUEST. Muſt it not therefore follow, that neither this is to be granted, that he who ſpeaks of ſomething ſpeaks of that which is not even one thing, or nothing? But neither muſt we ſay that he ſpeaks who endeavours to enunciate non-being.

THEÆ. The doubts, therefore, in which our diſcourſe is involved ſhould come to an end.

GUEST. You do not as yet ſpeak of ſomething great. For, O bleſſed man, the greateſt and firſt of doubts ſtill remains about theſe things: for it is a doubt which takes place about the principle of non-being.

THEÆ. Tell me how, and do not be remiſs.

GUEST. To that which is, ſomething elſe belonging to beings may happen.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But ſhall we ſay, that any thing belonging to beings can ever be preſent to that which is not?

THEÆ. How can we?

GUEST. But do we not rank the whole of number among beings?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly, if we rank any thing elſe among beings.

GUEST. We ſhould, therefore, neither attempt to attribute the multitude of number, nor *the one*, to non-being.

THEÆ. Reaſon ſhows that we cannot with propriety.

GUEST. How, therefore, can any one enunciate by the mouth, or altogether comprehend by the dianoëtic power, non-beings, or non-being ſeparate from number?

THEÆ. Tell me why not.

GUEST. When we ſay non-beings, do we not endeavour to adjoin the multitude of number?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And when we ſay non-being, do we not endeavour to adjoin *the one?*

THEÆ. Moſt clearly ſo.

GUEST. And beſides this we ſay, that it is neither juſt nor right to endeavour to adapt being to non-being.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt truly.

GUEST. Do you not, therefore, perceive, that non-being can neither be rightly enunciated, nor ſpoken, nor yet be cogitated, itſelf by itſelf, but that it is incomprehenſible by thought, ineffable, non-vocal, and irrational?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Did I, therefore, juſt now ſpeak falſely when I ſaid, that I could produce the greateſt doubt reſpecting it?

THEÆ. What then, can we mention any doubt greater than this?

GUEST. Do you not ſee, O wonderful youth, from what has been ſaid, that non-being leads him who confutes it into ſuch perplexity, that in the very attempt to confute it he is compelled to contradict himſelf?

THEÆ. How do you ſay? Speak yet clearer.

GUEST. There is no occaſion to conſider any thing clearer in me. For, when I adopted the poſition, that non-being ought to participate neither of *the one*, nor of *many*, both a little before, and now, I employed the term *the one*. For I enunciated non-being. Do you perceive this?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And again, a little before, I ſaid that non-being was non-vocal, ineffable, and irrational. Do you apprehend me?

THEÆ. I do. For how is it poſſible I ſhould not?

GUEST. When, therefore, I endeavoured to adapt being to non-being, did I not aſſert things contrary to what I had before advanced?

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. And in conſequence of attributing this to it, did I not ſpeak of it as one thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And beſides this, while I called it irrational, ineffable, and non-vocal, did we not make theſe aſſertions as pertaining to one thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For we have ſaid, that he who ſpeaks of non-being in a proper manner, ought neither to define it as one, nor many, nor give it any appellation whatever: for it is impoſſible to denominate it, without at the ſame time calling it one thing.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. What then will ſome one ſay of me? For, both formerly and now, he will find me vanquiſhed in this contention reſpecting non-being. So that, as I have already ſaid, you muſt not expect me to ſpeak properly on this ſubject. But come, let us now conſider this affair in you.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Endeavour in a becoming and generous manner, as being a young man, and with all your might, to aſſert ſomething about non-being, conformable to right reaſon, without adding to it either eſſence, or *the one*, or the multitude of number.

THEÆ. It certainly would be great raſhneſs in me to engage in a conteſt in which you have been vanquiſhed.

GUEST. But, if it is agreeable to you, we will diſmiſs you and me; and till we meet with ſome one who is able to accompliſh this, we will ſay that a ſophiſt more than any other perſon conceals himſelf in an impervious place.

THEÆ. Very much ſo, indeed.

GUEST. If, therefore, we ſhould ſay that he poſſeſſed a certain phantaſtic art from this uſe of words, he would eaſily attack us, and turn the diſcourſe to the very contrary of what is aſſerted. For, while we call him a maker of images,

images, he will immediately aſk us what we aſſert an image to be. Conſider therefore, Theætetus, what anſwer we ſhould give to this queſtion of the ſophiſt.

THEÆ. It is evident we ſhould ſay that images are ſuch things as are ſeen in water and mirrors, and beſides this, ſuch things as are painted and carved, and every thing elſe of this kind.

GUEST. It ſeems, Theætetus, that you have never ſeen a ſophiſt.

THEÆ. Why ſo?

GUEST. He would appear to you to wink, or to be entirely deprived of eyes.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. He would laugh at you for anſwering him by appearances in mirrors, and by pictures and carvings, when you ſpeak to him as being yourſelf endued with ſight; and he will pretend that he knows nothing about mirrors, or water, or even ſight itſelf, but that he alone interrogates you about this one thing.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. That which in all the particulars you have mentioned you think fit to call by one name, pronouncing the word image in all of them, as being one thing. Speak, therefore, and give aſſiſtance, and do not yield to the man.

THEÆ. But what, O gueſt, can we ſay an image is, except that which, being itſelf ſomething different, approaches to a true ſimilitude to another thing?

GUEST. When you ſay an image is ſomething different, do you mean that it is truly different, or do you aſſert this of ſomething elſe?

THEÆ. It is by no means truly different, but only appears to be ſo, or is ſimilar.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, call real being that which is true?

THEÆ. I do.

GUEST. But is not that which is not true contrary to the true?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. When, therefore, you ſay that which is ſimilar is at the ſame time not true, you aſſert that it is not. It has however a being.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. You ſay that it truly *is* not.

THEÆ. It certainly *is* not; but it is truly an image.

GUEST. That, therefore, which we called an image of being, is not truly being, and that which is not truly being, truly is.

THEÆ. Non-being appears to poſſeſs a certain connection of this kind with being, and that in a very wonderful manner.

GUEST. How is it poſſible it ſhould not appear wonderful? You now, therefore, perceive that the many-headed ſophiſt, through this alternation, compels us unwillingly to confeſs that *non-being* in a certain reſpect *is*.

THEÆ. I ſee it, and very much ſo.

GUEST. How, then, ſhall we define this art, ſo that we may be conſiſtent with ourſelves?

THEÆ. What is it you are afraid of, that you ſpeak in this manner?

GUEST. When we ſaid that he was a deceiver about a phantaſm, and that his art was a certain deception, whether ſhall we ſay that our ſoul then opined falſely, through his art; or what ſhall we ſay?

THEÆ. This very thing. For what elſe can we ſay?

GUEST. But is falſe opinion that which opines things contrary to things which are?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. You ſay, therefore, that falſe opinion opines things which are not.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. Whether does it opine that non-beings are not, or that things which have no ſubſiſtence whatever, in a certain reſpect are?

THEÆ. If any one is ever deceived, and in the ſmalleſt degree, it is neceſſary he ſhould opine that non-beings in a certain reſpect are.

GUEST. And will he not alſo opine, that things which entirely are, in no reſpect are?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And this alſo falſely?

THEÆ. And this too.

GUEST. And falſe ſpeech, in my opinion, will think after the ſame manner, aſſerting that beings are not, and that non-beings are.

THEÆ. For how can it otherwiſe become falſe?

GUEST. Nearly, no otherwiſe. But the ſophiſt will not ſay ſo. For by what poſſible device can any one of a ſound mind admit the things which have

have been previouſly granted, ſince they are non-vocal, ineffable, irrational, and incomprehenſible by the dianoëtic power? Do we underſtand what the ſophiſt ſays, Theætetus?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible we ſhould not? For he ſays that our former aſſertions are contrary to the preſent, ſince we have falſely dared to aſſert that non-being ſubſiſts in opinion and diſcourſe. He likewiſe adds, that we have often been compelled to adapt being to non-being, though we have juſt now acknowledged, that this is in a certain reſpect the moſt impoſſible of all things.

GUEST. You rightly recollect. But we ſhould now conſult what we ought to do reſpecting the ſophiſt. For, if we ſhould attempt to inveſtigate him, by placing him in the art of deceivers and enchanters, you ſee that many doubts will ariſe.

THEÆ. Many, indeed.

GUEST. We have, therefore, only diſcuſſed a ſmall part of them, ſince they are, as I may ſay, innumerable.

THEÆ. But if this is the caſe, it appears to be impoſſible to apprehend a ſophiſt.

GUEST. What then, ſhall we thus effeminately deſiſt from our undertaking?

THEÆ. I ſay we ought not, if there is the leaſt poſſibility of apprehending this man.

GUEST. You will, therefore, pardon, and, as you juſt now ſaid, be ſatisfied, if we make but a ſmall proficiency in ſo arduous an affair.

THEÆ. How is it poſſible I ſhould not?

GUEST. I, therefore, in a ſtill greater degree requeſt this of you.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That you do not think I am become, as it were, a certain parricide.

THEÆ. Why do you requeſt this?

GUEST. Becauſe it will be neceſſary for us to examine with our opponents the diſcourſe of our father Parmenides, and to compel non-being in a certain reſpect to be, and again being, in a certain reſpect not to be.

THEÆ. It appears that a thing of this kind muſt be contended for in our diſcourſe.

GUEST. For how is it poſſible this ſhould not appear, and, as it is ſaid, even

even to a blind man? For, while theſe things are neither confuted, nor aſſented to, no one can ſpeak either about falſe aſſertions, or about opinion, whether reſpecting reſemblances, or images, or imitations, or phantaſms, or of the arts converſant with theſe, without being ridiculous in conſequence of being compelled to contradict himſelf.

THEÆ. Moſt true.

GUEST. Hence, we muſt dare to oppoſe the paternal diſcourſe; or we muſt entirely diſmiſs it, if a certain ſluggiſhneſs reſtrains us from oppoſing it.

THEÆ. But nothing will in any reſpect hinder us from oppoſing it.

GUEST. I ſtill, therefore, requeſt a third, and a trifling thing of you.

THEÆ. Only ſay what it is.

GUEST. I juſt now ſaid that I was always wearied in the confutation of things of this kind, and that I am ſo at preſent.

THEÆ. You did ſay ſo.

GUEST. I am afraid leſt I ſhould appear to you to be inſane, in conſequence of what I have ſaid, and from immediately transferring myſelf upwards and downwards. For we ſhall enter on the confutation of the paternal diſcourſe, for your ſake, if we happen to confute it.

THEÆ. As you will not, therefore, by any means be conſidered by me as acting in a diſorderly manner by entering on this confutation, and demonſtration, on this account engage boldly in this affair.

GUEST. Come then, whence ſhall we begin this very dangerous diſcourſe? For it appears, O boy, to be moſt neceſſary for us to proceed in the following path.

THEÆ. What is that path?

GUEST. That we ſhould firſt of all conſider thoſe things which now appear to be clear, leſt we immediately deſiſt from our undertaking, deterred by its difficulty; and that we ſhould proceed in an eaſy manner, by mutually aſſenting to each other, as if we were engaged in a ſubject which may be eaſily diſcuſſed.

THEÆ. Speak more clearly.

GUEST. Parmenides appears to me to have ſpoken with eaſe, and whoever elſe has attempted to determine the number and quality of beings.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. It ſeems to me that each of them has related a fable to us, as being boys.

boys. One of them, by aſſerting that the things which have a ſubſiſtence are three [1]; but that ſome of them ſometimes oppoſe each other in a hoſtile manner; and at other times becoming friends, unite in marriage, bring forth, and adminiſter aliment to their offspring. But another of theſe ſays that beings are only two, viz. the moiſt and the dry, or the hot and the cold; and theſe he aſſociates with each other. But the Eleatic ſect among us, which derives its origin from Zenophanes, and from others ſtill prior to him, by denominating all things one, diſcuſſes its doctrines in fables. But the Iades [2], and certain Sicilian muſes poſterior to theſe, have thought it more ſafe to connect theſe with each other, and to ſay that being is both many and one, but is held together by ſtrife and friendſhip [3]. For that which is diſcordant always unites with ſomething elſe, as the more vehement muſes aſſert. But the more effeminate muſes always looſen *the many* from *the one*; and aſſert that the univerſe is alternately one, and in friendſhip with itſelf, through Venus; and many, and hoſtile to itſelf, through a certain ſtrife. But with reſpect to all theſe aſſertions, whether they are true or falſe, to oppoſe ſuch illuſtrious and antient men is difficult and raſh. This, however, may be aſſerted without envy.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That they very much deſpiſed us who rank among the multitude. For each of them finiſhes his own work, without being at all concerned whether we can follow them in what they aſſert.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

[1] Of the antient philoſophers that phyſiologized, ſome ſaid that the firſt beings were three in number, *the hot* and *the cold* as extremes, but *the moiſt* as the medium, which ſometimes conciliates the extremes, and ſometimes not; but they did not place *the dry* in the rank of a principle, becauſe they thought it ſubſiſted either from a privation or a concretion of moiſture. On the other hand, the followers of Anaxagoras aſſerted that there were four elements, two of which, viz. *heat* and *cold*, ranked as agents, but the other two, *dryneſs* and *moiſture*, as patients. Heraclitus and Empedocles aſſerted that there is one matter of the univerſe, but different qualities, with which this matter ſometimes accords, and at others is diſſonant. Heraclitus, however, was of opinion that the world, together with a certain diſcordant concord, was nearly always ſimilar, though not entirely the ſame: for all things are in a continual flux. But Empedocles aſſerted that the ſubſtance of the world remained the ſame, but that in one age all things were diſſolved into chaos through diſcord, and in another were adorned through concord.

[2] Viz. the Ionians. [3] This was the doctrine of Empedocles.

GUEST. When any one of them aſſerts that *the many* is, or was, or is generated, or that this is the caſe with two or one, and that the hot is mingled with the cold, externally adducing for this purpoſe ſeparations and concretions,—by the Gods, Theætetus, do you underſtand what they mean by each of theſe aſſertions? Indeed, when I was younger, I was confident that I accurately underſtood that of which we are now dubious, when any one ſpoke of non-being; but now you ſee in what difficulties we are involved through doubting about it.

THEÆ. I do ſee.

GUEST. Perhaps, therefore, receiving in no leſs a degree the ſame paſſion in our ſoul reſpecting being, we ſay that it is eaſy to underſtand it when it is enunciated by any one, but that this cannot be aſſerted of non-being, though we are ſimilarly affected with reſpect to both.

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. And this very ſame thing has been ſaid by us reſpecting the other particulars which we mentioned before.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We will conſider, therefore, after this reſpecting many things, if it is agreeable to you; but let us now firſt ſpeculate about that which is the greateſt and principal thing.

THEÆ. Of what are you ſpeaking? Or do you ſay that we ought in the firſt place to inveſtigate being, and conſider what they aſſert who are thought to evince ſomething about it?

GUEST. You clearly apprehend me, Theætetus. For I ſay that we ought to proceed in the ſame manner as if thoſe I juſt now mentioned were preſent, and to interrogate them as follows: Ye who aſſert that the hot and the cold, or any two ſuch things, are all things, what is it you affirm to ſubſiſt in both theſe, when you ſay that both are, and that each is? What are we to underſtand by this term of yours *to be?* Is it a third thing different from thoſe two, and are we to eſtabliſh three things as conſtituting the all, and no longer two things, according to your hypotheſis? For, while you call either of the two *being*, you cannot ſay that both ſimilarly *are*. For each would nearly be one thing, and not two.

THEÆ. You ſpeak the truth.

GUEST. Are you, therefore, willing to call both of them being?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But, O friends, we ſhall ſay, thus alſo you will moſt clearly call two things one.

THEÆ. You ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude.

GUEST. Since, therefore, we are thus involved in doubt, will you ſufficiently unfold to us what you wiſh to ſignify when you pronounce *being?* For it is evident that you have had a knowledge of theſe things for ſome time paſt: but we, indeed, at firſt thought we knew them, but now we are dubious. Inſtruct us, therefore, firſt of all in this, that we may not think we learn the things aſſerted by you, when the very contrary to this takes place. By ſpeaking in this manner, and making this requeſt, both to theſe, and to ſuch others as aſſert that *the all* is more than one thing, ſhall we, O boy, err?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But what with reſpect to thoſe who aſſert that *the all* is one, ought we not to inquire of them, to the utmoſt of our power, what they call *being?*

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. To this queſtion, therefore, they may anſwer: Do you ſay there is one thing alone? We do ſay ſo. Or will they not ſpeak in this manner?

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST. What then, do you call *being* any thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. Do you call it *the one* [1], employing two names reſpecting the ſame thing? Or how do you ſay?

THEÆ.

[1] Plato here dividing *the one* and *being* from each other, and ſhowing that the conception of *the one* is different from that of *being*, evinces that what is moſt properly and primarily one is exempt from *the one being*. For *the one being* does not abide purely in an unmultiplied and uniform hyparxis. But *the one* withdraws itſelf from all addition; ſince by adding any thing to it you diminiſh its ſupreme and ineffable union. It is neceſſary, therefore, to arrange *the one* prior to *the one being*, and to ſuſpend the latter from the former. For, if *the one* in no reſpect differs from *the one being*, all things will be one, and there will not be multitude in beings, nor will it be poſſible to name things, leſt there ſhould be two things, the thing itſelf, and the name. For all multitude being taken away, and all diviſion, there will neither be a name of any thing, nor any diſcourſe about it, but the name will appear to be the ſame with the thing. Nor yet will a name be the name of a thing, but a name will be the name of a name, if a thing is the ſame with a name, and a name the

THEÆ. What anſwer will they give to theſe things, O gueſt?

GUEST. It is evident, Theætetus, that he who lays down this hypotheſis will not be able with perfect eaſe to anſwer the preſent queſtion, or any other whatever.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. To acknowledge that there are two names, while eſtabliſhing nothing but one thing, is ridiculous.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And this alſo is ridiculous, to aſſent in every reſpect to him who aſſerts that there is a name to a thing of which no account can be given.

THEÆ. In what manner?

GUEST. He who eſtabliſhes a name different from a thing, ſpeaks of two certain things.

THEÆ. He does.

GUEST. And beſides this, if he aſſerts that a name is the ſame with a thing, he is either compelled to ſay that it is the name of nothing; or, if he ſays it is the name of ſomething, it muſt happen that a name is alone the name of a name, but of nothing elſe.

THEÆ. It muſt ſo.

GUEST. And *the one* muſt be *the one being* alone of *one*, and this muſt be *the one being* of a name.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. But what, do they ſay that which is a whole is different from one being, or the ſame with it?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly, they will and do ſay ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, a whole is, as Parmenides [1] ſays, "that which is every

ſame with a thing; and a thing alſo will be a thing of a thing. For all the ſame things will take place about a thing as about a name, through the union of thing and name. If theſe things, therefore, are abſurd, both *the one* and *being* have a ſubſiſtence, and *being* participates of *the one*. And hence *the one* is not the ſame as *the one being*. See the Introduction and Notes to the Parmenides.

[1] The following extract from the Commentaries of Simplicius on Ariſtotle's Phyſics, p. 31, contains an admirable account of the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the firſt being:

"That Parmenides did not conſider *the one being*, τὸ ἓν ὄν, to be any thing among things generated and corrupted, is evident from his aſſerting that *the one* is unbegotten and incorruptible. And, in ſhort, he was far from thinking that it is corporeal, ſince he ſays it is indiviſible; for thus he

every where ſimilar to the bulk of a perfect ſphere, entirely poſſeſſing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more ſtable than this:"— if this be the caſe, it is neceſſary that being ſhould have a middle and an extremity.

he ſpeaks: 'nor is it diviſible, ſince the whole is ſimilar.' Hence, neither can what he ſays be adapted to the heavens, according to the aſſertions of ſome, as we are informed by Eudemus, who were led to this opinion from that verſe of Parmenides,

παντοθεν ευκυκλου σφαιρης εναλιγκιον ογκω,

i. e. 'on all ſides ſimilar to the bulk of a perfect ſphere:' for the heavens are not indiviſible, nor a ſphere ſimilar to that which Parmenides mentions, though they form a ſphere the moſt accurate of all ſuch as are phyſical. It is alſo evident that neither does Parmenides call *the one being* pſychical, becauſe he ſays that it is immovable; for the pſychical eſſence, according to the Eleatics, poſſeſſes motion. He likewiſe ſays, that the whole of this *one being* is preſent at once, επει νυν εστιν ὁμου παν, and that it ſubſiſts according to the ſame, and after the ſame manner.

Ταυτον εν ταυτῳ τε μενον, καθ' ἑαυτο τε κειται.

'Same in the ſame abides, and by itſelf ſubſiſts.' And it is evident that it poſſeſſes the whole at once, and according to the ſame, in eſſence, power, and energy, ſince it is beyond a pſychical hypoſtaſis. Neither does he ſay that it is intellectual: for that which is intellectual ſubſiſts according to a ſeparation from the intelligible, and a converſion to it. But, according to him, in *the one being* intellection, intelligible, and intellect, are the ſame: for thus he writes—

Ταυτον δε εστι νοειν τε, και ου ενεκεν εστι νοημα.

i. e. 'Intellection, and that for the ſake of which intellectual conception ſubſiſts, are the ſame.' He adds, ου γαρ ανευ του εοντος, 'for it is not without *being*,' i. e. the intelligible, in which, ſays he, you will find intellection has not a ſubſiſtence ſeparate from being. Further ſtill, the intellectual is ſeparated into forms, as the intelligible pre-aſſumes unitedly, or, in other words, cauſally comprehends the ſeparation of forms. But where there is ſeparation, there difference ſubſiſts, and where this is, there non-being alſo is at the ſame time apparent. Parmenides however entirely exterminates non-being from being: for he ſays, 'non-beings never are, nor do they ſubſiſt in any reſpect; but do thou, inveſtigating in this path, reſtrain thy intellectual conception.' Neither likewiſe, according to him, is *the one being* a thing of poſterior origin, ſubſiſting in our conceptions, from an ablation of ſenſibles; for this is neither unbegotten nor indeſtructible. Nor is it that which is common in things: for this is ſenſible, and belongs to things doxaſtic and deceitful, about which he afterwards ſpeaks. Beſides, how could it be true to aſſert of this, that it is at once all things, or that it contracts in itſelf intellect and the intelligible? Shall we ſay, therefore, that he calls *the one being* an individual ſubſtance? But this indeed is more diſſonant. For an individual ſubſtance is generated, is diſtinguiſhed by difference, is material and ſenſible, and is different from accident. It is alſo diviſible and in motion. It remains, therefore, that the Parmenidean *one*

extremity. And having theſe, it muſt unavoidably have parts. Or how ſhall we ſay?

THEÆ. Juſt ſo.

GUEST. But, indeed, nothing hinders but that, when it is divided, it ſhould have the paſſion of *the one*, in all its parts, and that thus *the one* ſhould be every being, and a whole.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But is it not impoſſible that that which ſuffers theſe things ſhould be *the one?*

THEÆ. Why?

GUEST. Becauſe, according to right reaſon, that which is *truly one* ſhould be ſaid to be entirely without parts.

THEÆ. It muſt indeed neceſſarily be ſo.

GUEST. But ſuch a thing as we have juſt now mentioned, in conſequence of conſiſting of many parts, would not harmonize with *the one.*

THEÆ. I underſtand you.

GUEST. But whether will the whole having the paſſion of *the one*, be thus one, and a whole, or muſt we by no means ſay that *the one* is a whole?

THEÆ. You propoſe a difficult choice.

GUEST. You ſpeak moſt true. *For, ſince in a certain reſpect being is paſſive*

being muſt be the intelligible, the cauſe of all things: and hence it is intellect and intellection, in which all things are unitedly and contractedly comprehended according to one union, in which alſo there is one nature of *the one* and *being*. Hence Zeno ſays, that he who demonſtrates *the one* will likewiſe aſſign being, not as rejecting *the one*, but as ſubſiſting together with being. But all the above-mentioned concluſions accord with *the one being:* for it is without generation and indeſtructible, entire and only-begotten. For that which is prior to all ſeparation will not be ſecondary to any other being. To this likewiſe it pertains to be all things at once, and to have no connection with non-being. The undivided alſo, and the immovable according to every form of diviſion and motion, a ſubſiſtence perfectly uniform, and *termination*, for it is the *end* of all things, accord with this *one being*. If beſides it is that for the ſake of which intellection ſubſiſts, it is evidently intelligible: for intellection and intellect are for the ſake of the intelligible. And if intellection and the intelligible are the ſame in it, the tranſcendency of its union will be ineffable."

After this, Simplicius, in order to give credibility to what he has ſaid of Parmenides, and on account of the books of that philoſopher being very rare in his time, the ſixth century, has preſerved a conſiderable number of his verſes, which are well worthy the attention of the learned and philoſophical reader. He then adds as follows: "We muſt not wonder if Parmenides ſays that

paſſive to the one, it does not appear to be the ſame with the one, and all things will be more than one. Is it not ſo?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But likewiſe if *being* is a non-whole on account of its becoming paſſive to whole, but yet is whole itſelf, *being* in this caſe will happen to be indigent of itſelf.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And *being*, according to this reaſoning, ſince it is deprived of itſelf, will be *non-being*.

THEÆ. It will ſo.

GUEST. And thus again all things will be more than one, ſince being and the whole are allotted their proper nature, each ſeparate from the other.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And if the whole has in no reſpect a ſubſiſtence, theſe ſame things will take place with reſpect to *being*; and beſides, *being* not having a ſubſiſtence, neither will it at any time have been generated.

THEÆ. Why not?

GUEST. Whatever is generated is always generated a whole. So that he who does not place in the rank of beings, *the one* or the *whole*, ought neither to denominate eſſence, nor generation, as that which has a being.

that *the one being* is ſimilar to the bulk of a perfectly round ſphere: for, on account of his poetry, he touches on a certain mythological fiction. In what, therefore, does this differ from that aſſertion of Orpheus, It is of a white texture? And it is evident that ſome of the aſſertions of Parmenides accord with other things poſterior to being. Thus, for inſtance, the unbegotten and the indeſtructible are adapted to both ſoul and intellect; and the immovable and abiding in ſameneſs to intellect. But all the aſſertions at once, and genuinely underſtood, accord with *the one being*. For though according to a certain ſignification the ſoul is unbegotten, and alſo intellect, yet they are produced by the intelligible. Likewiſe this one or firſt being is properly immovable, in which motion is not ſeparated according to energy. An abiding in ſameneſs alſo properly pertains to being. But ſoul and much-honoured intellect proceed from that which abides, and are converted to it. It is likewiſe evident that ſuch things as are ſaid to pertain to being pre-ſubſiſt in it unitedly, but are unfolded from it with ſeparation. And it ſeems indeed that *the one being* is delivered by Parmenides as the firſt cauſe, ſince it is at once, one and all, and the laſt boundary. But if he does not ſimply call it *one*, but *the one being*, and only-begotten, and a boundary but finite, perhaps he indicates that the ineffable cauſe of all things is eſtabliſhed above it." Simplicius concludes with obſerving, that the objections both of Plato and Ariſtotle to the aſſertions of Parmenides are philanthropic, and were made by thoſe philoſophers to prevent his doctrine from being perverted.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. It appears that this is entirely the caſe.

GUEST. Likewiſe, that which is not a whole ought not to be any quantum whatever. For, being a certain quantum, ſo far as it is ſo, it muſt neceſſarily be a whole.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, that every one will be involved in ten thouſand other inſoluble doubts, who ſays that *being* is alone either two or one.

THEÆ. This is nearly evident by the things which have juſt now been ſhown. For greater and more difficult doubts will always follow each other in a connected ſeries, reſpecting what has been above aſſerted.

GUEST. But we have not yet diſcuſſed the aſſertions of thoſe who accurately diſcourſe about *being* and *non-being*. At the ſame time, what we have already ſaid is ſufficient. But let us again conſider thoſe who ſpeak inaccurately about theſe, that we may perceive from all things, that it is in no reſpect more eaſy to ſay what *being* is, than what *non-being* is.

THEÆ. It will be, therefore, requiſite to conſider thoſe.

GUEST. Indeed, there appears to be among theſe a certain gigantic war as it were, through the doubts in which they are mutually involved reſpecting eſſence.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. Some of theſe draw down all things from heaven and the inviſible region to earth, ſeizing in *reality*, for this purpoſe, rocks and oaks. For, in conſequence of touching all ſuch things as theſe, they ſtrenuouſly contend that that alone has a being which can be ſeen and handled [1], and this they define to be body and eſſence. But if any one ſays that there are other things which are without a body, they perfectly deſpiſe the aſſertion, and are unwilling to hear of any thing that is not corporeal.

THEÆ. You ſpeak of *dire* men: but I alſo have frequently met with ſuch.

GUEST. On the contrary, the opponents of theſe men *very religiouſly* contend ſupernally from the inviſible region, and compel certain intelligible and incorporeal ſpecies to be true eſſence: but by their arguments they

[1] Is not this the doctrine of thoſe who are called experimental philoſophers? If ſo, the fable of the Giants is unfolded in thoſe men.

break

break into ſmall pieces the bodies of the others, and that which is denominated by them truth, at the ſame time calling it flowing generation inſtead of eſſence. But *between theſe, Theætetus, an immenſe conteſt always ſubſiſted.*

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Let us now, therefore, receive from each a particular account of the eſſence eſtabliſhed by each.

THEÆ. But how can we receive it?

GUEST. From thoſe that place eſſence in forms we may eaſily receive it: for they are more mild. But from thoſe who violently draw all things to body we ſhall receive it more difficultly. And perhaps it will be nearly impoſſible to do ſo. It appears to me, however, that we ſhould act in the following manner with reſpect to them.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. It will be beſt, if poſſible, to make them in reality better: but if this is impoſſible, we muſt be content with making them ſo in our diſcourſe, and ſuppoſe them to anſwer more equitably than at preſent they would be willing to do. For that which is aſſented to by better men poſſeſſes more authority than that which is aſſented to by worſe men. However, we pay no attention to theſe things, but explore the truth.

THEÆ. Moſt right.

GUEST. Order them, therefore, as being made better to anſwer you, and to unfold the meaning of that which they aſſert.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. Do they, therefore, ſay, that what they call a mortal animal is any thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly they do.

GUEST. And do they not acknowledge that this is an animated body?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And, admitting this, do they alſo acknowledge that ſoul is ſomething?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. Do they likewiſe aſſert that one ſoul is juſt, and another unjuſt; and that one is wiſe, and another unwiſe?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But does not every ſoul become ſuch through the habit and preſence

preſence of juſtice, and the contrary, through the habit and preſence of the contraries to theſe?

THEÆ. Theſe things alſo they will aſſent to.

GUEST. But will they ſay that that is altogether any thing, which is able to be preſent to and abſent from any thing?

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST. Since, therefore, juſtice is ſomething, and likewiſe prudence, and every other virtue, and the contraries to the virtues, together with ſoul in which theſe ſubſiſt, whether will they ſay that each of theſe is viſible and tangible, or that all of them are inviſible?

THEÆ. They will nearly aſſert that no one of theſe is viſible.

GUEST. But what? Will they ſay that any one of things of this kind has a body?

THEÆ. They will not give the ſame anſwer to the whole of this queſtion: but ſoul itſelf will appear to them to poſſeſs a certain body; but with reſpect to prudence, and the other things about which you juſt now inquired, they will be reſtrained by ſhame from daring ſtrenuouſly to aſſert, that they are either nothing, or that all of them are bodies.

GUEST. The men, Theætetus, are clearly become better. For ſuch of them as are Spartans or natives would not be aſhamed to aſſert this, but would contend that whatever cannot be graſped by the hands is altogether nothing.

THEÆ. You nearly ſpeak their conceptions.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again aſk them. For, if they are willing to grant that even any trifling thing is incorporeal, it is ſufficient. For we aſk them reſpecting that which is connate with incorporeal, and at the ſame time with corporeal natures, what it is they look to, when they ſay that both of them have a being.

THEÆ. Perhaps they would not be able to give an anſwer, if they ſhould ſuffer any thing of this kind.

GUEST. Conſider whether, in conſequence of our propoſing this queſtion, they will be willing to admit and acknowledge that being is a thing of this kind.

THEÆ. Of what kind? Speak, and perhaps we ſhall underſtand.

GUEST. I ſay then that whatever poſſeſſes any power, whether of doing

any thing naturally, or of ſuffering though in the leaſt degree from the vileſt thing, and though this takes place but once,—every thing of this kind truly is. For I define being to be nothing elſe than power.

THEÆ. But ſince they cannot at preſent ſay any thing better than this, they muſt admit it.

GUEST. It is well ſaid: for perhaps afterwards both we and they may think differently. Let this then now remain acknowledged by them.

THEÆ. Let it remain.

GUEST. Let us now proceed to the others, the friends of forms. And do you unfold to us their ſentiments.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. Do you then ſay that generation is one thing, and eſſence another, ſeparating them from each other?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. And do you admit that by our body we communicate with generation, through ſenſe, but that by our ſoul we communicate with true eſſence, through the reaſoning power? Do you likewiſe ſay, that true eſſence always ſubſiſts ſimilarly according to the ſame, but that generation ſubſiſts differently at different times?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But, O beſt of men, what do you call the communion which ſubſiſts between theſe two? Is it that which we juſt now mentioned?

THEÆ. What was that?

GUEST. Paſſion or action ariſing from a certain power, from the concurrence of things with each other. Perhaps you, Theætetus, do not know what anſwer they would give to this queſtion; but perhaps I do, through my familiarity with them.

THEÆ. What anſwer then would they give?

GUEST. They would not grant us that which was juſt now ſaid to the earth-born men reſpecting eſſence.

THEÆ. What was that?

GUEST. We eſtabliſhed this to be a ſufficient definition of beings, viz. when a power though the ſmalleſt is preſent to any thing, either of acting or ſuffering.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. To this they will ſay, that a power of acting and ſuffering is preſent with generation, but that no power of this kind is adapted to eſſence.

THEÆ. They will, therefore, ſpeak to the purpoſe.

GUEST. To this, however, we muſt ſay, that we require to hear from them ſtill more clearly, whether they acknowledge that the ſoul knows, and that eſſence is known.

THEÆ. They certainly ſay ſo.

GUEST. But what? Do you ſay that to know, or to be known, is action, or paſſion, or both? Or do you ſay that action is one thing, and paſſion another? Or that neither of theſe participates in no reſpect of the other? It is evident, indeed, that neither participates of the other. For, if they admitted this, they would contradict what they aſſerted above.

THEÆ. I underſtand you.

GUEST. For if to know was to do ſomething, it would neceſſarily happen that what is known would ſuffer, or become paſſive. And thus, according to this reaſoning, eſſence being known by knowledge, would, ſo far as it is known, be moved, through becoming paſſive; which we ſay cannot take place about a thing at reſt.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. What then, by Jupiter, ſhall we be eaſily perſuaded that true motion, life, ſoul [1], and prudence, are not preſent to that which is *perfectly being*, and that it neither lives, nor is wiſe, but abides immovable, not poſſeſſing a venerable and holy intellect?

THEÆ. But it would be a dire thing, O gueſt, to admit this.

GUEST. Shall we ſay then that it poſſeſſes intellect, but not life?

THEÆ. And how?

GUEST. Or ſhall we ſay that both theſe reſide in it, but that it does not poſſeſs theſe in ſoul?

THEÆ. But after what other manner can it poſſeſs theſe?

GUEST. Shall we then ſay that it poſſeſſes intellect, life, and ſoul, but that, though animated, it abides perfectly immovable?

[1] All theſe are *cauſally* contained in the firſt being, becauſe it is better than all theſe.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. All theſe things apppear to me to be irrational.

GUEST. We muſt therefore grant, that both that which is moved, and motion, are beings.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. It follows therefore, Theætetus, that intellect will never in any reſpect be preſent to any thing immovable.

THEÆ. It does follow.

GUEST. But, indeed, if we grant that all things are borne along and moved, we ſhall by ſuch an aſſertion take away ſameneſs from beings.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. Does it appear to you that that which ſubſiſts according to the ſame, and in a ſimilar manner, and about the ſame, can ever ſubſiſt without *permanency?*

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But do you perceive that intellect ever was, or is, without theſe?

THEÆ. In the ſmalleſt degree.

GUEST. But beſides this, we ſhould oppoſe, by every poſſible argument, him who entirely taking away ſcience, or prudence, or intellect, ſtrenuouſly endeavours to introduce any thing elſe.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But it is perfectly neceſſary, as it appears, that the philoſopher, and he who honours theſe things in the higheſt degree, ſhould not aſſent to thoſe who, aſſerting that there is either one, or many ſpecies of things, conſider the univerſe as ſtanding ſtill: nor yet ſhould he by any means hear thoſe who affirm that being is every where moved; but, according to the opinion even of boys, he ſhould call things immovable, and things moved, conſidered as ſubſiſting together, being, and the all.

THEÆ. Moſt true.

GUEST. Do we not, then, now appear to have equitably comprehended being in our diſcourſe?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Now therefore, Theætetus, as it appears to me, we are ſtrangely involved in doubt.

THEÆ. How ſo? and why do you aſſert this?

GUEST.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, O bleſſed man, that we are at preſent in the greateſt ignorance reſpecting being, and yet we have appeared to ourſelves to ſay ſomething about it?

THEÆ. I do perceive it; but I do not altogether underſtand in what reſpect we have deceived ourſelves.

GUEST. Conſider more clearly, whether, in conſequence of aſſenting to theſe things, any one may juſtly interrogate us, in the ſame manner as we interrogated thoſe who ſaid that the whole of things conſiſted of the hot and the cold.

THEÆ. Remind me what theſe interrogations were.

GUEST. By all means: and I will endeavour to do this by aſking you the ſame queſtion as I then aſked them, that we may at the ſame time make ſome advance in our inquiry.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Do you not then ſay, that motion and permanency are contrary to each other?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And do you not likewiſe ſay, that both and each of them ſimilarly are?

THEÆ. I do.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, ſay, that both and each are moved, when you admit that they are?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But do you ſignify that they ſtand ſtill, when you ſay that both are?

THEÆ. But how can I?

GUEST. You may, therefore, place in your ſoul being, as a third thing different from theſe, conſidering it as comprehending under itſelf permanency and motion; and looking to the communion of theſe with eſſence, you may thus aſſert that both of them are.

THEÆ. We ſeem to propheſy that being is a certain third thing, when we ſay that there are motion and permanency.

GUEST. Being, therefore, is not both motion and permanency, but ſomething different from theſe.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Hence being, according to its own nature, neither ſtands ſtill, nor is moved.

THEÆ. It is nearly ſo.

GUEST. Where then ought he to turn his thoughts, who wiſhes to eſtabliſh in himſelf any clear conceptions reſpecting being?

THEÆ. Where?

GUEST. I do not think it is yet eaſy for him to turn his thoughts any where. For, if being is not moved, why does it not ſtand ſtill? Or how is it poſſible, if it in no reſpect ſtands ſtill, that it ſhould not be moved? But being has now appeared to us without both theſe. Is this, however, poſſible?

THEÆ. It is the moſt impoſſible of all things.

GUEST. In the next place, therefore, it will be juſt to call to mind this.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That being aſked reſpecting the name of non-being, we were involved in the greateſt doubt reſpecting what it ought to be. Do you remember?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Are we, therefore, now involved in leſs doubt reſpecting being?

THEÆ. If it be poſſible to ſay ſo, O gueſt, we appear to be involved in greater doubt.

GUEST. Let this ambiguity then reſt here. But ſince both being and non-being equally participate of doubt, we may now hope, that if one of them ſhall appear to be more obſcure, or more clear, the other likewiſe will appear to be the ſame: and again, that if we ſhould not be able to perceive one of them, the other will alſo be inviſible to us. And thus we ſhall purſue the diſcourſe reſpecting both of them in the moſt becoming manner we are able.

THEÆ. It is well ſaid.

GUEST. Let us relate, then, after what manner we denominate this ſame thing by many names.

THEÆ. Adduce for this purpoſe a certain paradigm.

GUEST. In ſpeaking of man, we give him various appellations, and attribute to him colour, figure, magnitude, virtue, and vice; in all which, and

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ten thouſand other particulars, we not only ſay that man is, but that he is good, and an infinity of other things: and we act in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other particulars; for, conſidering each as one thing, we again call it many things, and by many names.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Whence, I think, we have given a feaſt to young men, and to thoſe who ſtudy in old age. For it is eaſy for every one immediately to object, that it is impoſſible for *the many* to be *one*, and *the one many*. Hence, they will exult, not ſuffering us to ſay that a man is good, but that good is good, and man man. For I think, Theætetus, that you have often met with young men who ſeriouſly apply themſelves to things of this kind, and ſometimes with men advanced in years, who, through the poverty of their poſſeſſions with reſpect to wiſdom, admire ſuch things as theſe, and who think themſelves all-wiſe for having diſcovered this.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. That our diſcourſe, therefore, may extend to all who have ever aſſerted any thing reſpecting eſſence, let what we ſhall now ſay in the way of interrogation be underſtood as addreſſed as well to theſe as to thoſe others whom we have above mentioned.

THEÆ. What is it you are now going to ſay?

GUEST. Whether we ſhould neither conjoin eſſence with motion and permanency, nor any thing elſe with any thing elſe, but, as if things were unmingled, and it were impoſſible for them to communicate with each other, we ſhould conſider them as ſeparate in our diſcourſe? Or whether we ſhould collect all things into the ſame, as if they were able to communicate with each other? Or conſider this as the caſe with ſome things, but not with others? Which of theſe, Theætetus, ſhall we ſay is to be preferred?

THEÆ. I indeed have nothing to anſwer to theſe things. Why, therefore, do you not, by anſwering to each particular, conſider what follows from each?

GUEST. You ſpeak well. We will ſuppoſe them, therefore, if you pleaſe, to ſay, in the firſt place, that nothing has any power of communicating with any thing, in any reſpect. Will it not, therefore, follow, that motion and permanency in no reſpect participate of eſſence?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. They certainly will not.

GUEST. But what? Will any one of them be, and at the ſame time have no communication with eſſence?

THEÆ. It will not.

GUEST. From conſenting to this, all things, as it ſeems, will become rapidly ſubverted, as well the doctrine of thoſe who contend that all things are moved, as of thoſe who contend that all things ſtand ſtill, together with the dogmas of thoſe who aſſert that ſuch things as ſubſiſt according to forms or ſpecies ſubſiſt ſimilarly according to the ſame. For all theſe conjoin being with their doctrines, ſome aſſerting that things are truly moved, and others that they truly ſtand ſtill.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Such, likewiſe, as at one time unite all things, and at another time ſeparate them, whether dividing from one thing into things infinite, or into things which have finite elements, and compoſing from theſe, and whether they conſider this as partially, or as always taking place,—in all theſe caſes they will ſay nothing to the purpoſe, if there is in no reſpect a mixture of things.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Further ſtill, we ourſelves ſhall have diſcourſed the moſt ridiculouſly of all men, who permitting nothing pertaining to the communion of the paſſion of *different*, have yet uſed the appellation *the other*.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. They are in a certain reſpect compelled to employ the term *to be*, about all things, likewiſe the terms *ſeparate*, *others*, and *by itſelf*, and ten thouſand others, from which being unable to abſtain, and finding it neceſſary to inſert theſe expreſſions in their diſcourſes, they do not require any other confutation, but, as it is ſaid, they have an enemy and an adverſary at home, vociferating within, and always walk as if carrying about with them the abſurd Eurycles [1].

THEÆ. You very much ſpeak of that which is like and true.

[1] "This is a proverb, ſays the Greek Scholiaſt on this dialogue, applied to thoſe who prophefy evil to themſelves. For Eurycles appeared to have a certain dæmon in his belly, exhorting him to ſpeak concerning future events; whence he was called a ventriloquiſt."

GUEST. But what if we ſhould permit all things to have the power of communicating with each other? This, indeed, I myſelf am able to diſſolve.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Becauſe motion itſelf would entirely ſtand ſtill, and again, permanency itſelf would be moved, if they were mingled with each other. But this indeed is impoſſible from the greateſt neceſſity, that *motion* ſhould ſtand ſtill, and *permanency* be moved.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. The third thing, therefore, alone remains.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. For one of theſe things is neceſſary, either that all things ſhould be mingled together, or nothing; or that ſome things ſhould be willing to be mingled with each other, and that other things ſhould be unwilling.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And two of the members of this diviſion cannot be found.

THEÆ. They cannot.

GUEST. Every one, therefore, who wiſhes to anſwer rightly ſhould adopt that which remains of the three.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But ſince ſome things are willing to be mingled, and others not, they will nearly be affected in the ſame manner as letters. For ſome of theſe are incongruous with reſpect to each other, but others mutually harmonize.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For vowels being in a particular manner the bond, as it were, of the other letters, pervade through all of them, ſo that without ſome one of theſe it is impoſſible for any two of the others to accord with each other.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. Does every one, therefore, know what letters will communicate with each other? or is art requiſite in order to accompliſh this ſufficiently?

THEÆ. Art is requiſite.

GUEST. What kind of art?

THEÆ. The grammatic.

GUEST. And is not this the caſe with reſpect to ſharp and flat ſounds? I mean,

mean, Is not he who knows by art what ſounds are conſonant or diſſonant; a muſician, but he who is ignorant of this not ſo?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. And in other arts, and the privation of arts, we ſhall find other ſuch circumſtances take place.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Since then we have acknowledged, that the *genera* [1] *of being* are mixed

[1] Of the ſciences, ſome look to one ſcientific object, as medicine to health, but others extend to more than one, as arithmetic to philoſophy, to a polity, to the tectonic art, and to many others; and others contribute to all arts, not the fabricative only, but alſo ſuch as are theoretic, ſuch as is the *diviſive* art, of which Socrates ſpeaks in the Philebus. As, therefore, in the ſciences ſome are moſt total, and others partial, ſo in intelligible cauſes ſome are altogether partial, alone being the leaders of a peculiar number of one ſpecies, but others extend themſelves to many, as *equal*, *ſimilar*, and *whole*; for *whole* ſo far as *whole* is not common to all things, ſince a *part* ſo far as a *part* is not a *whole*: and others extend themſelves to all things, becauſe all things participate of them ſo far as they are beings, and not ſo far as they are vital, or animated, or poſſeſs any other idiom, but according to the appellation itſelf of being. Becauſe, therefore, *being* is the firſt among intelligible cauſes, it has the moſt total order among the genera; and theſe are five in number, viz. *eſſence*, *ſame*, *different*, *motion*, *permanency*. For every being is *eſſentialized*, is *united* itſelf to itſelf, is *ſeparated* from itſelf and other things, *proceeds* from itſelf, and its proper principle, and participates of a certain *permanency*, ſo far as it preſerves its proper form. Whether, therefore, it be intelligible, or ſenſible, or a thing ſubſiſting between theſe two, it is compoſed from theſe genera. For all things are not vital, or wholes, or parts, or animated; but of theſe genera all things participate. Likewiſe *eſſence* not ſubſiſting about a thing, neither will any thing elſe be there; for eſſence is the receptacle of other things. Without the ſubſiſtence of *ſameneſs*, that which is a whole will be diſſipated; and *difference* being deſtroyed there will be one thing alone without multitude. In like manner, *motion* and *permanency* not ſubſiſting, all things will be unenergetic and dead, without ſtability, and tending to non-entity. It is neceſſary, therefore, that each of theſe ſhould be in all things, and that *eſſence* ſhould rank as the firſt, being as it were the Veſta and monad of the genera, and arranged analogous to *the one*. After eſſence, *ſameneſs* and *difference* muſt ſucceed, the former being analogous to *bound*, and the latter to *infinity*; and next to theſe *motion* and *permanency*. Of theſe genera too, ſome are particularly beheld about the *powers*, and others about the *energies* of beings. For every being ſo far as it is a being participates of a certain *eſſence*, as it is ſaid in this dialogue, and in the Parmenides. But every eſſential power is either under *ſame*, or under *different*, or under both. Thus for inſtance heat, and every *ſeparative* power, ſubſiſts under *different*, but coldneſs, and every *collective* power, is under *ſame*. And if there is any thing which ſubſiſts between theſe, it is under both *ſame* and *different*. For every energy is either *motion* or *permanency*, or in a certain reſpect both; ſince the energy of intellect may be rather ſaid to be *permanency* than *motion*, and in like manner every energy which preſerves the energizing nature in the ſame condition, or that about which it energizes. But the motion of

mixed with each other, after the ſame manner, ought not he neceſſarily to proceed in his diſcourſe ſcientifically, who is about to ſhow what genera mutually accord, and what do not admit each other? Likewiſe, whether theſe genera ſo hold together through all things as to be capable of being mutually mingled? And again in their diviſions, if there is another cauſe of diviſion through wholes?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible ſcience ſhould not be requiſite for this purpoſe, and nearly, perhaps, the greateſt of all ſciences?

GUEST. What then, again, Theætetus, ſhall we call this ſcience? Or, by Jupiter, have we ignorantly fallen upon the ſcience of the liberal? And do we appear, while inveſtigating a ſophiſt, to have firſt found a philoſopher?

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Do we not ſay, that to divide according to genera, and neither to think the ſame ſpecies different, nor a different ſpecies the ſame, is the buſineſs of the dialectic ſcience?

THEÆ. We do ſay ſo.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is able to do this, ſufficiently perceives one idea [1] every way extended through many things, the individuals of which

bodies into each other does not abide in *ſame*, but departs from that in which it ſubſiſts; and that which changes the energizing nature in the *ſame* and about the *ſame*, is *ſtable motion*. Every thing, therefore, by its very being participates of this triad, *eſſence*, *power*, and *energy*, on account of theſe five genera.

[1] Here genus is ſignified by *one idea extended through many*: for genus is not an aggregate of ſpecies, as a whole of parts, but it is preſent to every ſpecies, to which it is at the ſame time prior. But every ſpecies ſubſiſting ſeparate from other ſpecies, and from genus itſelf, participates of genus. By *many ideas different from each other, but externally comprehended under one idea*, which is genus, ſpecies are ſignified: externally comprehended, indeed, genus being exempt from ſpecies, but comprehending the cauſes of ſpecies: for genera, truly ſo called, are both more antient and more eſſential than the ſpecies which are ranked under them. Of genera, alſo, ſome have a ſubſiſtence prior to ſpecies, but others ſubſiſt in them according to participation. To perceive theſe two, therefore, viz. one idea extended through many, the individuals of which ſubſiſt apart from each other, is the province of the *diviſive* power of dialectic; but the other two pertain to the *definitive* power of this art: for definition perceives one idea through many wholes conjoined in one, and collects into one definitive conception many ideas, each ſubſiſting as a whole. It alſo connects them with each other, and perfects one idea from the aſſumption of all wholes; conjoining the many in one. Beſides this, it conſiders the many which it has collected in one, lying apart, and the whole which is produced from them.

are

are placed apart from each other, and many ideas different from each other externally comprehended under one, and one idea through many wholes conjoined in one; and laſtly, many ideas, every way divided apart from each other. This is to know ſcientifically, how to diſtinguiſh according to genus, in what reſpect particulars communicate, and how far they do not communicate with each other.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But I think you do not give dialectic to any other than one who philoſophizes purely and juſtly.

THEÆ. For how is it poſſible to give it to any other?

GUEST. If we ſeek, indeed, we ſhall find a philoſopher in a place of this kind, both now and hereafter, though it is alſo difficult to ſee this character clearly; but the difficulty of perceiving a ſophiſt is of a different kind from that with which the perceiving a philoſopher is attended.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. The former flying into the darkneſs of non-being, and by uſe becoming adapted to it, is with difficulty perceived through the obſcurity of the place. Is it not ſo?

THEÆ. So it ſeems.

GUEST. But the philoſopher through reaſoning, being always ſituated near the idea of being, is by no means eaſily diſcerned, on account of the ſplendor of the region. For the eyes of vulgar ſouls are unable to ſupport the view of that which is divine.

THEÆ. It is likely that theſe things ſubſiſt in this manner, no leſs than thoſe.

GUEST. About this particular, therefore, we ſhall perhaps at another time conſider more clearly, if it be permitted us. But, with reſpect to the ſophiſt, it is evident that we ſhould not diſmiſs him till we have ſufficiently ſurveyed him.

THEÆ. You ſpeak well.

GUEST. Since then it is acknowledged by us, that ſome of the genera of being communicate with each other, and that ſome do not, and that ſome communicate with a few, and others with many things, and others again are not hindered from communicating through all things with all things;—this being the caſe, let us, in the next place, following the order of diſ-

courſe,

courſe, ſpeculate not about all ſpecies, leſt we ſhould be confounded by their multitude,—but, chooſing certain of thoſe which are called the greateſt, let us, in the firſt place, conſider the qualities of each, and, in the next place, what communion of power they poſſeſs with each other, that we may not in any reſpect be indigent of diſcourſe about being and non-being (though we may not be able to comprehend them with perfect perſpicuity), as far as the condition of the preſent ſpeculation admits. If, therefore, while we are aſſimilating non-being, we ſhould ſay that it is truly non-being, we ſhould be exculpated.

THEÆ. It would indeed be proper that we ſhould.

GUEST. But the greateſt of all the genera which we have now mentioned are, being itſelf, permanency, and motion.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. And we have ſaid that the two latter are unmingled with each other.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But being is mingled with both: for both after a manner are.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Theſe things then become three.

THEÆ. Certainly.

GUEST. Is not, therefore, each of theſe different from the other two, but the ſame with itſelf?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. What then ſhall we now ſay reſpecting ſameneſs and difference? Shall we ſay that they are two certain genera, different from the other three, but yet always mingled with them from neceſſity? And thus are we to conſider about five, and not three genera only? Or are we ignorant that we have denominated this ſameneſs and difference, as ſomething belonging to the other three?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But, indeed, motion and permanency are neither different nor ſame.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. That which we in common call motion and permanency can be neither of theſe.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Why?

GUEST. Becauſe motion would be permanent, and permanency be moved. For, with reſpect to both, the one becoming the other, would compel that other to change into the contrary to its nature, as participating of the contrary.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But yet both participate of ſame and different.

THEÆ. They do.

GUEST. We muſt not, therefore, ſay that motion is either ſame or different, nor yet muſt we aſſert this of permanency.

THEÆ. We muſt not.

GUEST. Are, therefore, being and ſameneſs to be conſidered by us as one certain thing?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But if being and ſameneſs ſignify that which is in no reſpect different, when we again aſſert of motion and permanency, that both are, we thus denominate both of them the ſame, as things which have a being.

THEÆ. But, indeed, this is impoſſible.

GUEST. It is impoſſible, therefore, that ſameneſs and being ſhould be one thing.

THEÆ. Nearly ſo.

GUEST. We muſt place ſameneſs, therefore, as a fourth ſpecies, in addition to the former three.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But what? Muſt we not ſay that difference is a fifth ſpecies? Or is it proper to think that this, and being, are two names belonging to one genus?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But I think you will grant, that of beings, ſome always ſubſiſt themſelves by themſelves, but others in relation to other things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But different is always referred to different. Is it not?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But this would not be the caſe unleſs being and difference widely

differed from each other. But if difference participated of both ſpecies, as is the caſe with being, there would be ſome one among things different, which would be no longer different with reference to that which is different. But now it happens from neceſſity, that whatever is different is ſo from its relation to that which is different.

THEÆ. It is as you ſay.

GUEST. We muſt ſay, then, that the nature of different muſt be added as a fifth to the ſpecies of which we have already ſpoken.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And we muſt likewiſe ſay that it pervades through all theſe. For each one of the others is different, not through its own nature, but through participating the idea of difference.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But we may thus ſpeak reſpecting each of the five genera.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. In the firſt place, that motion is entirely different from permanency. Or how ſhall we ſay?

THEÆ. That it is ſo.

GUEST. It is not, therefore, permanency.

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But it *is*, through participating of being.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. Again, motion is different from ſameneſs.

THEÆ. Nearly ſo.

GUEST. It is not, therefore, ſameneſs.

THEÆ. It is not.

GUEST. And yet it is ſame, in conſequence of all things participating of ſameneſs.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. It muſt be confeſſed, therefore, that motion is both ſame, and not ſame, nor muſt we be indignant that it is ſo. For, when we ſay that it is both ſame, and not ſame, we do not ſpeak of it in a ſimilar manner; but when we ſay it is ſame, we call it ſo, through the participation of ſameneſs with reſpect to itſelf; and when we ſay it is not ſame, we call it ſo through

its communion with different, through which, ſeparating it from ſame, it becomes not ſame, but different. So that it is again rightly ſaid to be not ſame.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, motion itſelf ſhould in any reſpect participate of permanency, there would be no abſurdity in calling it ſtable.

THEÆ. Moſt right, ſince we have acknowledged that ſome of the genera are willing to be mingled with each other, and others not.

GUEST. And, indeed, we arrived at the demonſtration of this prior to what we have evinced at preſent, by proving that the thing ſubſiſts after this manner.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we may again ſay that motion is different from different, juſt as it is different from ſameneſs and permanency.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. It is, therefore, in a certain reſpect, not different and different, according to this reaſoning.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. What then follows? Shall we ſay it is different from three of the genera, but not from the fourth? acknowledging that the genera are five, about which, and in which, we propoſe to ſpeculate?

THEÆ. And how?

GUEST. For it is impoſſible to grant that they are fewer in number than they now appear to be. We may, therefore, ſafely contend, that motion is different from being.

THEÆ. We may, moſt ſafely.

GUEST. It clearly follows, therefore, that motion is truly non-being, and at the ſame time being, ſince it participates of being.

THEÆ. Moſt clearly.

GUEST. Non-being, therefore, is neceſſarily in motion, and in all the genera. For, in all of them, the nature of different rendering them different from being, makes each to be non-being. Hence, we rightly ſay that all of them are non-beings; and again, becauſe they participate of being, that they are, and are beings.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. About each of the ſpecies, therefore, there is much of being, but there is alſo non-being infinite in multitude.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Muſt not, therefore, being itſelf be ſaid to be different from the others?

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. Being, therefore, is not ſo many in number as the others; for, not being them, it is itſelf one, but is not other things, which are infinite in number.

THEÆ. This is nearly the caſe.

GUEST. We ought not, therefore, to be indignant at theſe things, ſince the genera have naturally a mutual communion. But if ſome one does not admit theſe things, yet, as we have been perſuaded by the former aſſertions, in like manner we ought to be perſuaded by theſe.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt juſtly.

GUEST. We may alſo ſee this.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. When we ſay non-being, we do not, as it appears, ſay any thing contrary to being, but only that which is different [1].

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. Juſt as when we ſay a thing is not great, do we then appear to you to evince by this word that which is ſmall rather than that which is equal?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible we ſhould?

GUEST. We muſt not, therefore, admit that the contrary to a thing is ſignified, when negation is ſpoken of; but thus much only muſt be aſſerted, that the terms not, and neither, ſignify ſomething of other things, when placed before names, or rather before things, about which the names of the negations afterwards enunciated are diſtributed.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. This alſo we may conſider by a dianoëtic energy, if it is agreeable to you.

[1] By *non-being*, therefore, in this place, Plato means *difference*, one of the five genera of being,

THEÆ.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. The nature of different appears to me to be cut into ſmall parts, in the ſame manner as ſcience.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. This nature itſelf is one; but a part of it reſiding in any thing and being individually defined, poſſeſſes a private appellation of its own; on which account there are ſaid to be many arts and ſciences.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Do not, therefore, the parts of the nature of different, which is itſelf one thing, ſuffer this very ſame thing?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo. But we muſt ſhow how this takes place.

GUEST. Is there any part of different oppoſite to the beautiful?

THEÆ. There is.

GUEST. Muſt we ſay that this part is nameleſs, or that it has a certain name?

THEÆ. That it has a name. For every thing which we ſay is not beautiful, is not different from any thing elſe than the nature of the beautiful.

GUEST. Come, then, anſwer me the following queſtion.

THEÆ. What queſtion?

GUEST. When any thing is defined as belonging to one particular genus, and is again oppoſed to a certain eſſence, does it happen that thus it is not beautiful?

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. But the oppoſition of being to being happens, as it ſeems, to be not beautiful.

THEÆ. Moſt right.

GUEST. What then? Does it follow from this reaſoning that the beautiful belongs more to beings, and the non-beautiful leſs?

THEÆ. It does not.

GUEST. We muſt ſay, therefore, that the non-great and the great ſimilarly are.

THEÆ. Similarly.

GUEST. Hence, too, we muſt aſſert of the juſt and the non-juſt, that the one in no reſpect *is* more than the other.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And the ſame muſt be ſaid of other things, ſince the nature of different appears to rank among beings. But difference having a ſubſiſtence, it is neceſſary to place the parts of it as no leſs having ſubſiſtence.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. As it appears, therefore, the oppoſition of a part of the nature of different, and of the parts of being, are no leſs eſſence, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, than being itſelf; nor do they ſignify that which is contrary to being, but only ſomething different from it.

THEÆ. It is moſt clear.

GUEST. What then ſhall we call it?

THEÆ. It is evident that non-being, which we have ſought after on account of a ſophiſt, is this very thing.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, as you ſay, is it no more deficient of eſſence than the others? And ought we now boldly to ſay, that non-being poſſeſſes its own nature firmly, in the ſame manner as the great was found to be great, and the beautiful beautiful, and the non-great to be non-great, and the non-beautiful non-beautiful? Shall we in like manner ſay, that non-being was and is non-being, as one ſpecies which muſt be numbered among many beings? Or muſt we ſtill, Theætetus, be diffident about this?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. Do you perceive, therefore, how diſobedient we have been to the prohibition of Parmenides?

THEÆ. In what reſpect?

GUEST. We have wandered beyond the limits he appointed us, by thus continuing ſtill further to explore and evince.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Becauſe he ſays, "Non-beings never, and by no means are; but do you, while inveſtigating, reſtrain your conceptions from this path."

THEÆ. He does ſpeak in this manner.

GUEST. But we have not only ſhown that non-beings are, but we have demonſtrated what the form of non-being is. For, having evinced that the nature of different has a ſubſiſtence, and that it is divided into ſmall parts, which are mutually diſtributed through all things, we then dared to ſay, that the part of it which is oppoſed to the being of every thing, is itſelf truly non-being.

THEÆ. And to me, O gueſt, we appear to have ſpoken with the greateſt truth.

GUEST. Let no one, therefore, ſay, that we, having evinced that non-being is contrary to being, dare to aſſert that it *is*. For we ſome time ſince bade farewell to him who aſks whether that which is contrary to any thing has a ſubſiſtence, and poſſeſſes a certain reaſon, or is entirely irrational. But, with reſpect to that which we now call non-being, either ſome one who is not perſuaded by our arguments ſhould confute us, as not having ſpoken well; or, if he cannot do this, he muſt alſo ſay as we ſay, that the genera are mingled with each other, and that being and different pervading through all things, and through each other, different participating of being, *is* through this participation, not being that of which it participates, but ſomething elſe. But, being different from being, it clearly follows that it is neceſſarily non-being. And again, *being*, in conſequence of participating of difference, will be different from the other genera: but being different from all of them, it is not any one of them, nor all the others, nor any thing beſides itſelf. So that, without doubt, being is not ten thouſand things in ten thouſand things: and, in like manner, each and all of the other genera are multifariouſly diſtributed, but are not themſelves multifarious.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And if any one does not believe in theſe contrarieties, he ſhould conſider, and aſſert ſomething better than has been now ſaid. Or if ſome one, in conſequence of finding this to be a difficult ſpeculation, rejoices, drawing the arguments from one ſide to another, ſuch a one, as our preſent reaſoning aſſerts, is not engaged in a purſuit which deſerves much ſerious attention. For *this* neither poſſeſſes any thing elegant, nor is difficult to diſcover; but *that* is difficult, and at the ſame time beautiful.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That of which we have ſpoken above; I mean that, omitting theſe particulars, we may be able to confute any one who aſſerts that different is ſame, or ſame different. For, to ſhow that ſame is different, and different ſame, that the great is ſmall, and the ſimilar diſſimilar, and to rejoice in thus introducing contraries in diſcourſe, is not a true confutation, but is evidently the province of one who has but a ſlight apprehenſion of the thing, and is recently born.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. For, O excellent young man, to endeavour to ſeparate every thing from every thing, is both inelegant, and the province of one rude and deſtitute of philoſophy.

THEÆ. Why ſo?

GUEST. To diſſolve each thing from all things, is the moſt perfect abolition of all diſcourſe. For diſcourſe ſubſiſts through the conjunction of ſpecies with each other.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Conſider, therefore, how opportunely we have now contended with men of this kind, and compelled them to permit one thing to be mingled with another.

THEÆ. With a view to what?

GUEST. To this, that diſcourſe may be one certain thing belonging to the genera of being. For, if we are deprived of this, we ſhall, for the moſt part, be deprived of philoſophy. And further ſtill, it is requiſite at preſent that we ſhould mutually conſent to determine what diſcourſe is. But, if it is entirely taken away from us, we can no longer ſpeak about any thing. And it will be taken away, if we admit that things are not in any reſpect mingled with each other.

THEÆ. Right. But I do not underſtand why we ſhould now mutually conſent to determine what diſcourſe is.

GUEST. But, perhaps, you will eaſily underſtand by attending to this.

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. Non-being has appeared to us to be one of the other genera, and to be diſperſed through all beings.

THEÆ. It has ſo.

GUEST. After this, therefore, we ſhould conſider whether it is mingled with opinion and diſcourſe.

THEÆ. On what account?

GUEST. Becauſe, if it is not mingled with theſe, it muſt neceſſarily follow that all things are true: but, if it is mingled with theſe, falſe opinion and falſe diſcourſe muſt be produced. For to opine, or ſpeak of non-beings, is itſelf falſehood ſubſiſting in the dianoëtic part and diſcourſe.

THEÆ. It is ſo.

GUEST.

GUEST. But, being falſehood, it is deception.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. And deception ſubſiſting, all things muſt neceſſarily be full of reſemblances, images, and phantaſy.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we have ſaid that the ſophiſt flies into this place, while he denies that there is any ſuch thing as falſehood. For he aſſerts that no one can either think or ſpeak of non-being; becauſe it in no reſpect participates of eſſence.

THEÆ. Theſe things were ſaid by us.

GUEST. But now it has appeared that non-being participates of being. So that in this reſpect perhaps he will no longer oppoſe us. Perhaps however he will ſay, that of ſpecies, ſome participate of non-being, and others not; and that diſcourſe and opinion rank among thoſe things which do not participate it. So that he will again contend with us, that the image-making and phantaſtic art, in which we have ſaid he is concealed, has no ſubſiſtence; ſince opinion and diſcourſe have no communion with non-being. He will likewiſe aſſert that falſehood has not any kind of ſubſiſtence, ſince this communion of things is no where to be found. Hence we muſt inveſtigate the nature of diſcourſe, opinion, and phantaſy, that, theſe becoming apparent, we may perceive their communion with non-being; and, perceiving this, may evince that there is ſuch a thing as falſehood; and, having evinced this, may bind the ſophiſt in it, if he is found to be guilty; or, liberating him, inveſtigate in ſome other genus.

THEÆ. That, O gueſt, which we ſaid at firſt about the ſophiſt, appears to be very true—I mean, that he is a genus difficult to apprehend. For he appears to be full of problems; nor can any one arrive at his retreats, till he has firſt vanquiſhed the obſtacle which he throws in the way. For now we have ſcarcely overcome the obſtacle which he hurled forth, I mean that non-being is not, and he immediately throws in our way another. Hence it is requiſite to ſhow that there is falſehood, both in diſcourſe and opinion, and after this perhaps ſomething elſe, and another thing after that, and ſo on, as it appears, without end.

GUEST. He, O Theætetus, who is able to make advances continually, though

though in a ſmall degree, ought to proceed boldly in this affair. For what will he be able to accompliſh in other things, who is without ardor in theſe? For he who either effects nothing in theſe, or is repelled backwards, will ſcarcely (according to the proverb) ever take the city. But now, O good man, ſince as you ſay this is accompliſhed, we ſhall have captured the greateſt wall, and the reſt will be eaſy and trifling.

THEÆ. You ſpeak well.

GUEST. Let us then now, in the firſt place, as we ſaid, conſider diſcourſe and opinion, that we may more clearly ſhow, whether non-being touches upon theſe, or whether both theſe are in every reſpect true, and neither of them at any time falſe.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Come then, let us again ſpeculate about nouns, in the ſame manner as we did about ſpecies and letters. For that which is the object of our preſent inveſtigation appears in a certain reſpect to have a ſimilar ſubſiſtence.

THEÆ. What is it you wiſh to be conceived reſpecting nouns?

GUEST. Whether all of them harmonize with each other; or ſome accord, but others do not.

THEÆ. It is evident that ſome accord, and others do not.

GUEST. Perhaps your meaning is this, that ſuch nouns as in an orderly ſucceſſion aſſert and evince ſomething, mutually accord; but that ſuch as ſignify nothing by continuity, do not mutually accord.

THEÆ. How do you mean? and what is it you ſay?

GUEST. What I thought you would both underſtand and aſſent to. For there is a twofold genus of vocal declarations reſpecting eſſence.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. One, which is called nouns, and the other verbs.

THEÆ. Speak of each.

GUEST. That which is a declaration in actions, we call a verb.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But a mark or ſign of voice impoſed on the agents themſelves, we call a noun.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST.

GUEST. From nouns, therefore, alone, enunciated in continued ſucceſſion, a ſentence is never produced; nor yet again from verbs enunciated without nouns.

THEÆ. Theſe things I have not learned.

GUEST. But it is evident that you juſt now acknowledged this, when looking to ſomething elſe. For this is what I wiſhed to ſay, that when theſe are enunciated in continued ſucceſſion, a ſentence is not produced.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. As, for inſtance, walks, runs, ſleeps, and ſuch other words as ſignify actions, all which when any one enunciates in continued ſucceſſion, he will not by this means produce a ſentence.

THEÆ. For how can he?

GUEST. Again, therefore, when any one ſays, a lion, a ſtag, a horſe, and ſuch other nouns as ſignify agents themſelves, a ſentence will not yet be produced by this continuity. For the things enunciated do not evince action, or a privation of action, or the eſſence of a thing which is, or which is not, till verbs are mingled with nouns. But when they are harmonized, a ſentence is immediately produced, and the firſt connection of theſe is nearly the firſt ſentence, though it ſhould be the ſhorteſt poſſible.

THEÆ. How is this?

GUEST. When any one ſays, A man learns, would you not ſay that this is the ſhorteſt and firſt ſentence?

THEÆ. I ſhould.

GUEST. For he then evinces ſomething reſpecting things which actually are, or are riſing into being, or have been, or will be. Nor does he denominate only, but he finiſhes ſomething connecting verbs and nouns. Hence we ſay that he ſpeaks, and does not alone denominate, and to this connection we give the name of diſcourſe.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. And thus as we ſaid reſpecting things, that ſome harmonized with each other, and that others did not, ſo likewiſe with reſpect to the ſigns of voice, ſome do not harmonize, but others do, and produce diſcourſe.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Further ſtill, attend to this trifling thing,

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. That diſcourſe when it takes place muſt neceſſarily be a diſcourſe about ſomething: for it is impoſſible that it can be about nothing.

THEÆ. It muſt.

GUEST. Ought it not, therefore, to be of ſome particular kind?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us then give diligent attention.

THEÆ. For it is requiſite.

GUEST. I will, therefore, enunciate to you a ſentence, in which a thing is conjoined with action, through a noun and a verb: but do you inform me of what it is a ſentence.

THEÆ. I will, as far as I am able.

GUEST. Theætetus ſits:—is this a long ſentence?

THEÆ. It is not; but a moderate one.

GUEST. It is now your buſineſs to ſay what it is about, and of whom it is a ſentence.

THEÆ. It is evident that it is about me, and of me.

GUEST. But what again with reſpect to this?

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. Theætetus, with whom I now diſcourſe, flies.

THEÆ. Reſpecting this alſo, no one can ſay but that it is about me, and of me.

GUEST. But we ſaid it was neceſſary that every ſentence ſhould be of ſome particular kind.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. But of what kind muſt each of the ſentences juſt now mentioned be?

THEÆ. One muſt be falſe, and the other true.

GUEST. But that which is true aſſerts things reſpecting you as they are.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But that which is falſe aſſerts things reſpecting you different from what they are.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. It ſpeaks, therefore, of things which are not, as if they were.

THEÆ. Nearly ſo.

GUEST. And it ſpeaks of things which have a ſubſiſtence, but which do

not belong to you. For we ſay, that about every thing there are many things which have a ſubſiſtence, and many things which have no ſubſiſtence.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. In the firſt place, therefore, it is moſt neceſſary, that the latter ſentence which I enunciated reſpecting you ſhould be one of the ſhorteſt, according to the definition we have given of a ſentence.

THEÆ. This muſt now be acknowledged by us.

GUEST. In the next place, it muſt be confeſſed that it is a ſentence of ſomething.

THEÆ. It muſt.

GUEST. But if it is not of you, it is not of any thing elſe.

THEÆ. For how ſhould it?

GUEST. But if it is not of any thing, it cannot in any reſpect be a ſentence. For we have ſhown that it belongs to things impoſſible, that diſcourſe ſhould exiſt, and yet be a diſcourſe of nothing.

THEÆ. Moſt right.

GUEST. When, therefore, *other* things are aſſerted of you, as if they were the *ſame*, and things which *are not*, as things which *are*, ſuch a compoſition of verbs and nouns becomes altogether, as it appears, a really and truly falſe diſcourſe.

THEÆ. Moſt true.

GUEST. But what with reſpect to the dianoëtic energy, opinion, and phantaſy, is it not now evident that all theſe genera, as well the falſe as the true, are produced in our ſouls?

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. You will eaſily underſtand, if you firſt of all apprehend what each of them is, and in what they differ from each other.

THEÆ. Only inform me.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, the dianoëtic energy and diſcourſe the ſame, except that the former is an inward dialogue without voice, of ſoul with itſelf?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But the fluxion from the dianoëtic energy through the mouth, proceeding with ſound, is called diſcourſe.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. We perceive this alſo in diſcourſe.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. Affirmation and negation.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. When, therefore, this takes place in the ſoul according to the dianoëtic energy, accompanied with ſilence, can you call it any thing elſe than opinion?

THEÆ. How can I?

GUEST. But, when again, a certain paſſion of this kind is preſent, not according to the dianoëtic energy, but through ſenſe, can it be rightly denominated any thing elſe than phantaſy?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

GUEST. Since, then, diſcourſe is both true and falſe, and it appears that the dianoëtic energy is a dialogue of the ſoul with itſelf, but opinion the concluſion of the dianoëtic energy, and phantaſy the mixture of ſenſe and opinion with each other, it is neceſſary, ſince theſe are allied to diſcourſe, that ſome of them ſhould be ſometimes true, and ſometimes falſe.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Do you perceive, therefore, that we have found more eaſily than we expected, that opinion and diſcourſe are ſometimes falſe? For juſt now we were afraid, leſt by inveſtigating this matter we ſhould attempt a work which it is perfectly impoſſible to accompliſh.

THEÆ. I do perceive.

GUEST. Let us not, therefore, deſpair as to what remains; but, ſince theſe things are rendered apparent, let us recall into our memory thoſe diviſions according to ſpecies which we mentioned before.

THEÆ. Of what kind were they?

GUEST. We divided image-making into two ſpecies; the one aſſimilative, and the other phantaſtic.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And we ſaid we were dubious in which of theſe we ſhould place the ſophiſt.

THEÆ. Theſe things were ſaid by us.

GUEST. And while we were doubting about this, we were oppreſſed with a ſtill darker vertigo, in conſequence of that aſſertion which is dubious to all men,

men, that there can be no ſuch thing as either a reſemblance, or an image, becauſe that which is falſe has never in any reſpect any ſubſiſtence whatever.

THEÆ. You ſpeak the truth.

GUEST. But now ſince diſcourſe has become apparent, and likewiſe falſe opinion, it is poſſible there may be imitations of things, and that from this diſpoſition the art of deceiving may be produced.

THEÆ. It is poſſible.

GUEST. And was it not alſo acknowledged by us above, that the ſophiſt is converſant with theſe?

THEÆ. It was.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again endeavour, by always biſecting the propoſed genus, to proceed to the right hand part of the ſection, attending to its communion with the ſophiſt, till, having taken away all his common properties, and leaving the nature peculiar to him, we may be able eſpecially to exhibit this to ourſelves, and afterwards to thoſe who are naturally moſt proximate to the genus of this method.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Did we not, therefore, begin dividing the effective art, and the art of acquiring?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And the art of acquiring preſented itſelf to us in hunting, conteſts, merchandize, and ſuch-like ſpecies.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But now, ſince the imitative art comprehends the ſophiſt, it is evident that the effective art muſt firſt receive a twofold diviſion. For imitation is a certain making. We ſaid, indeed, it was the making of images, and not of things themſelves. Did we not?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But, in the firſt place, let there be two parts of the effective art.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. The one is divine, the other human.

THEÆ. I do not yet underſtand you.

GUEST. If we remember what was ſaid at firſt we aſſerted that the whole of the effective art was a power cauſing things to exiſt afterwards which were not before.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. We do remember.

GUEST. But, with reſpect to all mortal animals, and plants which are produced in the earth from ſeeds and roots, together with ſuch inanimate natures as ſubſiſt on the earth, whether they are bodies which can be liquefied, or not, can we ſay that they were afterwards generated, when before they were not, by any other than a certain fabricating God? Or ſhall we employ the dogma and aſſertion of many?

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. That nature generates theſe from a certain fortuitous cauſe, and which operates without thought. Or ſhall we ſay that they are produced in conjunction with reaſon and divine ſcience, originating from Deity itſelf?

THEÆ. I, perhaps, through my age, often change my opinion. However, at preſent looking to you, and apprehending that you think theſe things were produced by Divinity, I think ſo too.

GUEST. It is well, Theætetus. And if we thought that in ſome future time you would be of a different opinion, we ſhould now endeavour to make you acknowledge this by the force of reaſon, in conjunction with neceſſary perſuaſion; but ſince I know your nature to be ſuch, that, without any arguments from us, you would of yourſelf arrive at that concluſion to which I have drawn you, I ſhall diſmiſs the attempt; for it would be ſuperfluous. But I adopt this poſition, that things which are ſaid to ſubſiſt from nature are produced by a divine art: but that the things which are compoſed from theſe by men, are produced by human art: and that, according to this poſition, there are two genera of the effective art, one of which is human, and the other divine.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But, ſince there are two genera, biſect each of them.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Juſt as the whole of the effective art was then divided according to breadth, ſo now let it be divided according to length.

THEÆ. Let it be ſo divided.

GUEST. And thus all its parts will become four; two of which indeed, with reference to us, will be human; and two again, with reference to the Gods, divine.

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST.

GUEST. But with reſpect to theſe, as being again divided in a different manner, one part of each diviſion is effective, but the remaining parts may be nearly called repreſentative. And hence, again, the effective art receives a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. Inform me again how each is to be divided.

GUEST. With reſpect to ourſelves and other animals, and the things from which they naturally conſiſt, viz. fire and water, and the ſiſters of theſe, we know that each of theſe productions is the offspring of Divinity. Do we not?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. After theſe the images of each, and not the things themſelves, follow; and theſe are produced by a dæmoniacal artifice.

THEÆ. What kind of images are theſe?

GUEST. Phantaſms which occur in ſleep, and ſuch as appearing in the day are called ſpontaneous; as, for inſtance, ſhadow, when darkneſs is generated in fire: but this is twofold, when domeſtic and foreign light concurring in one about ſplendid [1] and ſmooth bodies, and producing a ſenſation of ſeeing contrary to accuſtomed viſion, effect by theſe means a ſpecies.

THEÆ. Theſe works, therefore, of divine making are two, viz. the things themſelves, and the image which follows each.

GUEST. But what? Shall we not ſay that our art, by architecture, makes a houſe, but by painting, that other thing, the image of the houſe, which is, as it were, a human dream effected by men awake?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Hence, by giving a twofold diviſion after this manner to other things, we ſhall again find twofold works of our effective action, and we muſt call the one *auturgic*, or the thing itſelf effected, but the image, repreſentative.

THEÆ. I now underſtand you better, and I admit theſe two ſpecies of the effective art, with a twofold diviſion, viz. the divine and human according to one ſection; and the thing itſelf effected, and the offspring of certain imitations, according to the other.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, recollect, that of the image-producing art we

[1] See the latter part of the Introduction to the Timæus.

ſaid,

ſaid, one kind would be aſſimilative, and the other phantaſtic, if it ſhould appear that the falſe is truly falſe, and one certain thing belonging to beings.

THEÆ. We did ſay ſo.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, apparent, that we have now indubitably enumerated two ſpecies?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. We muſt, therefore, again give a twofold diſtribution to the phantaſtic ſpecies.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. One kind being that which is effected through inſtruments, but the other being the phantaſm of that which exhibits itſelf as the inſtrument of the efficient.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. I think, when any one employing your figure cauſes body to appear ſimilar to body, or voice to voice, this is particularly called an imitation belonging to the phantaſtic ſpecies.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. Calling this then imitative, we will divide it; but we will diſmiſs the whole of the other member, as being now weary, and we will permit ſome other perſon to collect it into one, and give it a proper denomination.

THEÆ. Let the member then you ſpeak of be divided, and let us diſmiſs the other.

GUEST. And indeed, Theætetus, it is fit to think that this alſo is twofold; but take notice on what account.

THEÆ. Say.

GUEST. Of thoſe who imitate, ſome knowing that which they imitate do this, but others not knowing it. Though, can we place any diviſion greater than that of ignorance and knowledge?

THEÆ. We cannot.

GUEST. Will not, therefore, that which we juſt now ſpoke of be an imitation of thoſe that are endued with knowledge? For this man, knowing you, imitates your figure.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. But what ſhall we ſay reſpecting the figure of juſtice, and, in ſhort, of the whole of virtue? Do not many, though they are ignorant, think that they know this, and, while they imitate that which ſeems to them to be the figure of juſtice, endeavour, both in words and works, to make it appear that it is inherent in them?

THEÆ. Very many, indeed.

GUEST. Are they not, therefore, diſappointed in their expectations of appearing to be juſt, as they are not ſo in any reſpect? Or does the very contrary to this take place?

THEÆ. The very contrary takes place.

GUEST. I think then we muſt ſay that this imitator is different from the other, he who is ignorant from him who knows.

THEÆ. We muſt.

GUEST. Whence, then, can any one derive a name adapted to each? Or is it evident that it is difficult? Becauſe a certain antient cauſe of the diviſion of genera into ſpecies was unknown to our anceſtors, ſo that none of them attempted to divide; and on this account they were neceſſarily very much in want of names. But at the ſame time, though it may be a bolder aſſertion, for the ſake of diſtinction, we ſhall call the imitation which ſubſiſts with opinion *doxomimetic*; but that which ſubſiſts in conjunction with ſcience, a certain hiſtoric imitation.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. The other of theſe appellations, therefore, muſt be uſed: for a ſophiſt was not found to be among the ſcientific, but among imitators.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. Let us then conſider this *doxaſtic imitator*, or one who imitates from opinion, as if he were iron, and ſee whether he is ſound, or whether he contains in himſelf ſomething twofold.

THEÆ. Let us conſider.

GUEST. He is, therefore, very copious. For, of ſophiſts, one is fooliſh, thinking that he knows the things which he opines: but the figure of another, through his rolling like a cylinder in diſcourſe, is replete with abundance of ſuſpicion and fear, that he is ignorant of thoſe things which he feigns himſelf to know before others.

THEÆ. There are both theſe kinds of ſophiſts, as you have ſaid.

GUEST. May we not, therefore, place one of theſe as a ſimple, and the other as an ironical imitator?

THEÆ. It is proper ſo to do.

GUEST. And again, ſhall we ſay that the genus of this is one or two?

THEÆ. Do you ſee whether it is or not.

GUEST. I conſider; and two imitators appear to me: one employing irony among the multitude publicly, and in prolix diſcourſes; and the other compelling the perſon who converſes with him to contradict himſelf, and this privately, and by ſhort diſcourſes.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt rightly.

GUEST. What then did we evince the imitator to be who employs prolix diſcourſes? Did we evince him to be a politician, or a popular ſpeaker?

THEÆ. A popular ſpeaker.

GUEST. But what did we call the other,—a wiſe man, or ſophiſtic?

THEÆ. To call him a wiſe man is impoſſible, ſince we have placed him as one who is ignorant; but as he is an imitator of a wiſe man, he muſt evidently receive a ſimilar appellation. And I now nearly underſtand that this character ought truly to be called one who is in every reſpect a real ſophiſt.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, bind together his name, as we did before, connecting every thing from the end to the beginning?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. He, therefore, who compels thoſe that converſe with him to contradict themſelves, who is a part of the ironic genus, and a doxaſtic imitator, who likewiſe belongs to the phantaſtic genus, which proceeds from the repreſentative art, who is to be defined to be not a divine but a human production, and who by the artifice of his diſcourſes belongs to the wonder-working diviſion; he who ſays that a real ſophiſt is of this ſtock and conſanguinity will, as it appears, ſpeak moſt truly.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

THE END OF THE SOPHISTA.

THE