ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE PARMENIDES.

FROM THE MS. COMMENTARY* OF PROCLUS ON THAT DIALOGUE.

THE beginning of this admirable Commentary, which is dedicated to Aſclepiodotus the phyſician, is as follows:—"I beſeech all the Gods and Goddeſſes to lead my intellect to the propoſed theory, and, enkindling in me the ſplendid light of truth, to expand my dianoëtic power to the ſcience of beings, to open the gates of my ſoul to the reception of the divine narration of Plato, and, conducting, as to a port, my knowledge to the moſt ſplendid of being, to liberate me from an abundance of falſe wiſdom, and the wandering about non-beings, by a more intellectual converſe with real beings, through which alone the eye of the ſoul is nouriſhed and watered, as Socrates ſays in the Phædrus. And may the intelligible Gods impart to me a perfect intellect; the intellectual, an anagogic power; the ſupermundane rulers, an energy indiſſoluble and liberated from material knowledge; the governors of the world, a winged life;

* Though I have already cited largely from this admirable Commentary, yet I rejoice in the opportunity which is afforded me of making the following additions from it. There is not, perhaps, among the writings of the antients any one which, on the whole, is ſo well calculated to lead the lover of wiſdom gradually to a knowledge of the moſt ſublime, arduous, and felicitous doctrines of the philoſophy of Plato. Ineſtimably great are the benefits which I have derived from the ſtudy of it; and it is my earneſt wiſh that the reader of theſe and the preceding extracts may be able to ſtrengthen this teſtimony of its excellence by his own experience. For, if I may be allowed to propheſy, this Work, if not at preſent, will at ſome future period be the ſource of the greateſt good to mankind, and will be admired and ſtudied as it deſerves, while the duration of writings of a different kind, though now ſo popular, will, when compared with the extent of this, be fleeting like that of morning dreams.

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the angelic choirs, a true unfolding into light of divine concerns; beneficent dæmons, a plenitude of inſpiration from the Gods; and heroes, a magnanimity permanently venerable and elevated! And, in ſhort, may all the divine genera perfectly prepare me for the participation of the moſt inſpective and myſtic theory which Plato unfolds to us in the Parmenides, with a profundity adapted to the things themſelves! And mayeſt thou*, who art truly agitated with divine fury, in conjunction with Plato, who wert my aſſociate in the reſtoration of divine truth, my leader in this theory, and the true hierophant of theſe divine doctrines, fill me with thy moſt pure intellectual conceptions! FOR, WITH RESPECT TO THIS TYPE OF PHILOSOPHY, I SHOULD SAY, THAT IT CAME TO MEN FOR THE BENEFIT OF TERRESTRIAL SOULS; THAT IT MIGHT BE INSTEAD OF STATUES, INSTEAD OF TEMPLES, INSTEAD OF THE WHOLE OF SACRED INSTITUTIONS, AND THE LEADER OF SAFETY BOTH TO THE MEN THAT NOW ARE, AND TO THOSE THAT SHALL EXIST HEREAFTER†.—Ευχομαι τοις θεοις πασι και πασαις, ποδηγησαι μου τον νουν εις την προκειμενην θεωριαν, και φως εν εμοι στιλπνον της αληθειας αναψαντας αναπλωσαι την εμην διανοιαν επ' αυτην την των οντων επιστημην, ανοιξαιτε τας της ψυχης της εμης πυλας εις υποδοχην της ενθεου του Πλατωνος υφηγησεως, και ορμισαντας μου την γνωσιν εις το φανοτατον του οντος, παυσαιμε της παλλης δοξοσοφιας, και της περι τα μη οντα πλανης, τη περι τα οντα νοερωτατη διατριβη, παρ' ων μονον το της ψυχης ομμα τρεφεται τε και αρδεται καθαπερ φησιν ὁ εν τω Φαιδρω Σωκρατης. ενδυναι τε μοι, νουν μεν τελεον, τοις νοητοις θεοις· δυναμιν δε αναγωγον, τοις νοεροις· ενεργειαν δε αλυτον και αφειμενην των υλικων γνωσεων, τοις υπερ των οντων ὁλων ηγεμοναις· ζωην δε επτερωμενην, τοις τον κοσμον λαχουσι· εκφανσιν δε των θειων αληθην, τοις αγγελικοις χορους· αποπληρωσιν δε της παρα, θεων επιπνοιας, τοις αγαθοις δαιμοναις· μεγαλοφρονα δε και σεμνην και υψηλην κατα στασιν, τοις ηρωσι. παντα δε απλως θεια γενη, παρασκευην ενθηναι μοι τελεαν εις την μετουσιαν της εποπτικωτατης του Πλατωνος και μυστικωτατης θεωριας, ην εκφαινει μεν ημιν αυτος εν τω Παρμενιδη μετα της προσηκουσης τοις πραγμασι βαθυτητος. ανηπλωσε δε ταις εαυτου καθαρωταταις επιβολαις ὁ τω Πλατωνι μεν συ βακχευσας ως αληθως και ὁμοστιος καταστας (lege ὁμοστοιχος καταστατης) της θειας αληθειας, της δε θεωριας ημιν γενομενος ταυτης ηγεμων, και των θειων

* Proclus here invokes his preceptor Syrianus; by which it appears that this Commentary was written after the death of that great philoſopher.

† This concluding ſentence forms the motto to this tranſlation of Plato's works.

τουτων λογων οντως ἱεροφαντης. ὁν εγω φαιην αν φιλοσοφιας τυπον εις ανθρωπους ελθειν επ' ευεργεσια των τηδε ψυχων, αντι των αγαλματων, αντι των ἱερων, αντι της ὁλης ἀγιστειας αυτης, και σωτηριας αρχηγον τοις γε νυν ουσιν ανθρωποις και τοις εισαυθις γενησομενοις.

Page 37. *When we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, &c.*

The Italic philoſophers, ſays Proclus, being converſant with the ſpeculation of the forms of beings, concerned themſelves but little with the philoſophy of objects of opinion; but thoſe of Ionia paid little attention to the theory of intelligibles, but minutely conſidered nature, and the works of nature. Socrates and Plato, however, participating of both theſe philoſophies, gave perfection to the ſubordinate, and unfolded the more elevated. This, indeed, Socrates manifeſts in the Phædo, when he ſays, that formerly he was a lover of phyſiology, but that afterwards he recurred to forms and the divine cauſes of beings. Hence, that which they demonſtrate in their philoſophy, by giving perfection both to the Ionic and Italic doctrines, this Plato appears to me to have indicated by the preſent circumſtance; and what is wonderful in it, and ſufficiently explanatory of the things which are here diſcuſſed, thoſe from Ionia come to Athens, that they may partake of more perfect dogmas: but thoſe from Athens do not for the ſame reaſon go to Italy, that they may partake of the Italic philoſophy; but, on the contrary, being at Athens, they there communicate their proper dogmas. Thus, alſo, thoſe who are able to look to beings themſelves, will perceive that things firſt are every where preſent with unimpeded energy, as far as to the laſt of things, through ſuch as are middles; that ſuch as are laſt are perfected through middles; and that middles receive into themſelves that which is imparted by firſt natures, but move and convert to themſelves ſuch as are laſt. Let, therefore, Ionia be a ſymbol of nature; but Italy of an intellectual eſſence; and Athens of that which has a middle ſubſiſtence, through which, to excited ſouls, there is an aſcent from nature to intellect. This, therefore, Cephalus immediately ſays in the Introduction, that coming from Clazomenia to Athens for the ſake of hearing the diſcourſes of Parmenides, he met in the forum with Adimantus and Glauco, and through theſe becoming acquainted with Antiphon, heard the diſcourſes, which he related as he had learnt them from Pythodorus, who had heard them from Parmenides. Through this alſo it is indicated,

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ſhat he who is to be led back to an intelligible eſſence ought, in the firſt place, to be excited from body, and to fly from a communion with it: for the body is the habitation of the ſoul. In the next place, that he ſhould connect himſelf with the allotment of Minerva among wholes, through the participation of which allotment, it is no longer wonderful that the ſoul ſhould become a ſpectator of firſt entities, and through theſe arrive at the inſpection of the unities of beings. But if you are not only willing to ſpeak in this manner, but ſtill more univerſally, you may ſay, that the Gods who govern nature, and the all-various powers of material forms, and who alſo contain the whole of indiviſible and ſenſible reaſons, are ſuſpended from the firſt cauſe, and, being illuminated by Minerva, are converted to the intellectual region, and haſtily withdraw themſelves from the mundane ſyſtem; for this alſo is ſaid to be the habitation of the Gods which it contains. By this converſion, alſo, they are led to the united multitude of beings, and there, through divine power, proceed to the monad of all multitude. For what is here ſaid by Plato affords an image of theſe things to thoſe that are not entirely unacquainted with ſuch-like ſpeculations. For every phyſical form is worſe than multitude; but the multitude above this is, indeed, as it is ſaid to be, multitude, but alſo participates of a coordinate unity. But prior to this is the exempt one, to which there is an aſcent through the duad as a medium. The departure, therefore, from Clazomenia evinces an energy exempt from phyſical reaſons; but the meeting with Adimantus and Glauco in the forum indicates the dominion of the duad in united multitude; and the aſſociation with Antiphon through theſe, the returning to their unity, by which they derive perfection, and a plenitude of divine goods. For in every order of Gods there is a monad, and the dominion of the duad, and the whole of diſtributed is conjoined with the monad, through united multitude, and the duad it contains, which is the mother, and, as it were, root of this multitude.

Theſe things, as I have ſaid, afford an image of the Gods themſelves, and will preſent to thoſe who are willing to follow the analogy, an abundance of conception. For you may obſerve that the Clazomenians are many, but that Adimantus and Glauco are two; and through theſe two the many communicate with Antiphon, who is one. And it is evident that every where the multiplied enjoys the monad through the duad; that things ſecondary are always ſuſpended from the natures prior to them; and that

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all are extended to the one Parmenidean intellect. For the Clazomenians are in want of Adimantus and Glauco; theſe lead the Clazomenians to Antiphon; Antiphon fills them with the diſcourſes of Pythodorus; and Pythodorus is the meſſenger of the converſation of Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates. Theſe two again are united to Parmenides, and wiſh to adhere to his doctrine; Socrates, indeed, looking to the multitude of forms, but Zeno uniting this multitude, and haſtening to *the one* itſelf. We may alſo contemplate their order as follows:—Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates, preſerve an image of the whole of the divine order; but thoſe that follow are aſſimilated to the ſecondary genera. And Pythodorus, indeed, may be ranked according to the ſummit of dæmons, announcing and tranſmitting to ſecondary ſuch things as proceed from primary natures. For both theſe pertain to this ſummit; the one as to that which is filled, the other as to that which fills. But Antiphon may be ranked according to the dæmoniacal order itſelf. For this order uſes appetite and impulſes, and, in ſhort, aſſumes a ſecondary life. Hence, he is repreſented as ſkilled in the equeſtrian art. He, therefore, is filled from thoſe that are firſt, but fills thoſe after him with an anagogic converſation from more elevated natures. But the Clazomenians are analogous to ſouls converſant with generation, who require, indeed, the aſſiſtance of proximate dæmons, but all of them aſpire after that which is on high, and the participation of divine diſcourſe. Hence, leaving their habitation the body, they proceed from ignorance to intellectual prudence, for this is Athens, and, in the firſt place, are united to the dæmons above them, to whom the fourth and the duad pertain, and an aſcent through the duad to the monad. But, in the ſecond place, they are extended through theſe to certain angels and Gods: for all aſſociation and converſe between men and Gods, both when aſleep and when awake, are through dæmons, as Diotima ſays in The Banquet. Again, therefore, according to another mode, we may tranſfer the analogy from things to perſons: and it is neceſſary, prior to the myſtic theory of things themſelves, to exerciſe our dianoëtic power in theſe as in images. For the men alſo immediately meeting with Adimantus and Glauco, the brothers of Antiphon, on their coming to Athens, poſſeſſes an image of another theological conception, that aſcending ſouls derive much aſſiſtance from good fortune, which coarranges them with ſuch things as are proper, and where, and in ſuch a manner as is proper; and alſo that we

do not alone require the gifts of good fortune in externals, but in the anagogic energies of the ſoul. Hence Socrates ſays in the Phædrus that mania about the objects of love is given to the lover by the Gods with the greateſt good fortune. And deducing ſouls from the intelligible, he ſays that different ſouls deſcend into bodies with different fortunes. Prior to bodies, therefore, they experience the gifts of fortune, and are governed by it, and led to that which is adapted to their nature. Very properly, therefore, are returning ſouls here ſaid to be conjoined with the cauſes which give perfection to them through a certain fortune. And you may again ſee how here alſo the order of the perſons is preſerved: for they meet with Adimantus and Glauco. But that of theſe men Glauco was the more perfect, Socrates manifeſts in The Republic; for he there ſays, that he always admired the nature of Glauco. So that, if Adimantus was the inferior, he very properly ſays that they met with Adimantus and Glauco: for the imperfect is firſt connected with the more imperfect, and through theſe partakes of the more perfect.

The very firſt ſentence alſo manifeſts the character of the dialogue; for it is void of the ſuperfluous, is accurate and pure. And indeed conciſe, pure, and ſpontaneous language is adapted to intellectual projections. Nor does Plato alone preſerve this propriety of diction, but Parmenides alſo in his poetry, though the poetic form of compoſition is accuſtomed to uſe metaphors, figures, and tropes; but at the ſame time he embraces the unadorned, the ſimple, and the pure form of enunciation. This is evident from ſuch like expreſſions, as "being approaches to being" (εον γαρ εοντι πελαζει); and again, "ſince they now ſubſiſt together (επει νυν εστιν ὁμου); likewiſe, "it is not fit that there ſhould be any thing, either greater or ſmaller;" (ουτε τι μειζον, ουτε τι βαιοτερον πελεν χρεων εστι:) and every thing elſe of this kind. So that it rather appears to be proſe than poetical language. It is evident, therefore, in this Introduction of Plato, firſt, that he has choſen a rapid form of diction; for this is adapted to the things themſelves. In the ſecond place, he has attended to conciſeneſs, together with the figure of the impetuous, which entirely binds together the diction, and rapidly gives completion to the conception. And, in the third place, he proceeds through the moſt neceſſary words, cutting off all ſuch particulars from the narration, as ſome one for the ſake of ornament might ſophiſtically add.

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P. 38. *And upon our begging him to relate the diſcourſes, &c.*

The requeſt of the Clazomenians repreſents the genuine adherence of ſouls to their proper leaders. For they can no otherwiſe obtain a union and revolve in conjunction with the Gods, than through theſe dæmons. But a knowledge of them, in the firſt place, precedes the requeſt: for how can they make a requeſt of thoſe of whoſe nature they are ignorant, and alſo of the benefits of which they are the leaders? In the next place, a deſire of the participation of them ſucceeds. For it is neceſſary to aſpire after the things of which we are in want, ſince without aſpiring we ſhall not be in the order of thoſe that are indigent. But the unwillingneſs of Antiphon to comply, preſents us with an image of the occult and ineffable power of divine cauſes. For a divine nature, wherever it may be, is with difficulty apprehended and known, and is ſcarcely unfolded to ſouls, even when they genuinely receive its participation, and a communion with it. For they require to be accuſtomed to the divine ſplendour which divine dæmons exhibit to ſouls extended to them, and haſtening through them to perceive every thing divine. But to ſouls firmly and ſtably receiving them, theſe dæmons expand and unfold divine truth. And this is the narration: an expanding and unfolding of things concealed, and an anagogic perfection imparted to ſouls from divine dæmons.

P. 38. *Antiphon, therefore, ſaid that Pythodorus related, &c.*

It appears to me, ſays Proclus, that the reduction of all the perſons to Parmenides, indicates much of the truth of the things themſelves. For all the multitude and all the orders of beings are united about their divine cauſe. And this is indicated to the more ſagacious, by ſaying in ſucceſſion, Antiphon, Pythodorus, Zeno, Parmenides. The mention alſo of the Panathenæa contributes to the whole deſign of the dialogue: for we learn from hiſtory, that in the celebration of this feſtival the Athenians dwelt together. Again, therefore, here alſo the multitude is united and coarranged about the Goddeſs who preſides over the city. But this was the end of the dialogue, to ſuſpend all things from *the one*, and clearly to ſhow that every thing is thence derived. The aſſertion too, that theſe men did not come to Athens, but to the Panathenæa, is no ſmall praiſe. They came, therefore, for the ſake of the Goddeſs and the feſtival,

and not for oſtentation, nor to philoſophize in a popular way, which is rejected by the Pythagoreans. For a thing of this kind is the buſineſs of a ſophiſt, and of men intent on gain.

P. 38. *That Parmenides was very much advanced in years, &c.*

An elderly man among the Greeks was limited by ſeventy years. Parmenides, therefore, was very elderly. But he was called an old man who paſſed beyond this decad. The countenance alſo of Parmenides was graceful through his life: for a certain elegance and venerableneſs deſcends from the ſoul in worthy men, and extends as far as to the body. Theſe things, however, may be much more perfectly ſurveyed in the ſoul itſelf. Thus, for inſtance, the ſoul poſſeſſes the elderly, from being full of intellect and ſcience. For it is uſual to call intellectual diſciplines, and thoſe which embrace the whole of nature, hoary, as it is evident from the Timæus, in which thoſe ſouls are called juvenile with whom there is no hoary diſcipline, viz. who do not according to their ſummit participate of intellectual light. For the black belongs to the worſe, as the white to the better coordination. But the ſoul is καλη δε και αγαθη την οψιν*, as extending its eye to intelligible *beauty*, and to the *goodneſs* which gives ſubſiſtence to all things, and through the participation of which all things are *good*. We may ſtill, however, more perfectly ſurvey theſe things in the Gods, according to analogy. For where do the *elderly* and the *hoary* ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner as in them? Which are likewiſe celebrated by theologiſts among the paternal Gods. Where, alſo, are *the beautiful* and *the good*, ſuch as they poſſeſs? Plato alſo, in ſaying unitedly καλον καγαθον, ſpeaks in a manner the moſt adapted to thoſe natures in whom *the one* and *the good* are the ſame.

P. 38. *But that Zeno was nearly forty years old, &c.*

Such was Zeno, perhaps indeed *graceful* and *tall* in his perſon, but much more ſo in his diſcourſes. For ſuch things as Parmenides delivered in an intorted and contracted manner, theſe Zeno evolved, and extended into *long* diſcuſſions. And hence the ſcurrilous Timon calls him either-tongued, as being at the ſame time ſkilled in confutation and narration. If alſo he is ſaid to have been beloved by Parmenides, the

* i. e. Literally of a *beautiful* and *good* aſpect.

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aſcent indeed to both was to one and the ſame divinity: for this is the peculiarity of the truly amatory art. But if you are willing to ſpeak more perfectly, and to ſay that in the Gods themſelves things ſecondary are contained in ſuch as are firſt, and that all things, in ſhort, are conjoined to being itſelf from which the progreſſion and extenſion to beings are derived, you will not, I think, be very remote from the truth.

P. 38. *He likewiſe ſaid that he met with them together with Pythodorus, &c.*

Let their meeting with Pythodorus be a ſymbol to thoſe who look to paradigms of the Gods becoming firſt unfolded into light through angels, and in the order of angels: for a houſe is a ſymbol of the order of each. But this meeting being beyond the walls, ſignifies the exempt and incomprehenſible nature of the Gods. As, therefore, all appear collected in the houſe of Pythodorus, ſome from the city, and others elſewhere, ſo alſo the governors of the world and the intelligible Gods become apparent in angels, and are known by us through the eſſence of theſe.

P. 38. *Where alſo Socrates came, &c.*

Here we may perceive how Socrates, through a diſpoſition naturally good in the extreme, earneſtly follows theſe divine men, and how he does not aſſociate with ſophiſts and the wiſe for the ſame cauſes. For he aſſociates with the former in order to confute their ignorance and pride, but with the latter in order to call forth their ſcience and intellect. Here, therefore, he becomes the leader of the lovers of philoſophy: for all of them deſire to hear, but they obtain their deſire together with and through him. But theſe things as well as the former are images of the Gods. Socrates was young, a young leader, Plato all but repeating what he ſays in the Phædrus, "the mighty leader Jupiter firſt proceeds, and the army of Gods and dæmons follows him." For intellect being every where allotted a convertive order, leads upwards, and together with itſelf converts all the multitude ſuſpended from it. Socrates alſo being young is a ſymbol of the youthfulneſs which is celebrated in the Gods. For theology calls Jupiter himſelf and Bacchus *boys* and *young*; and, in ſhort, theologiſts thus call the intellectual when compared with the intelligible and paternal. But the deſire of the writings of Zeno ſymbolically manifeſts how

here thoſe which are the third in order, firſt participate of the powers which are emitted in thoſe of the middle rank, but afterwards are conjoined with their ſummits, and have communion with their intelligibles.

P. 38. *Zeno himſelf read to them, &c.*

Plato here affords us a wonderful indication of divine concerns; and he who is not aſleep to analogies will ſee in theſe images a ſublime theory. For, in the firſt place, Parmenides not being preſent at the beginning, but when the diſcourſe was finiſhed, is a ſymbol of more divine cauſes unfolding themſelves to ſubordinate, after a perfect participation of proximate natures, but not before. The diſcourſe of Zeno therefore, being completed, the great Parmenides appears; and together with him Pythodorus and Ariſtotle enter, of which two the former is Zenonic, but Ariſtotle is in a certain reſpect coarranged with Parmenides; for he diſpoſes, together with him, the hypotheſes, doing nothing elſe than anſwering. But here Parmenides, as we have often ſaid, is analogous to that which is every where firſt among divine natures, whether it be the firſt being, or the intelligible, or in whatever other way you may think fit to denominate it: for this is in all the divine orders, and in each of the Gods. Hence he fills all that hear him with divine conceptions, imitating that order which adorns all things, firſt, middle, and laſt: for he gives perfection to Zeno, the middle being every where from that ſummit: but he perfects Socrates through both himſelf and Zeno; juſt as there the progreſſion of third is through firſt and middle natures. He alſo perfects Pythodorus, but not ſimply from himſelf alone, but in conjunction with Zeno and Socrates. But he gives perfection to Ariſtotle laſt of all, and from himſelf alone. For ſomething is imparted from Parmenides as far as to the laſt habit, to which the energy and power of Zeno do not proceed. Juſt as the production of the firſt being naturally extends further than that of life. But Zeno is himſelf filled from Parmenides, but fills in one way Pythodorus as his diſciple, but in another way Socrates as one that explores together with him. Pythodorus, too, is not only able to participate of Zeno, but alſo of Socrates. For, in divine natures, the middle extends its energy to that which is poſterior to itſelf, and proceeds through all things, imparting mere aptitude to the laſt of its participants, which

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it again perfects in conjunction with the natures proximately ſuſpended from it. So that the former participation indicates the imperfect repreſentation of things firſt, which it imparts energizing prior to ſecondary natures. But the ſecond participation indicates a perfection of repreſentation ſubſiſting through things proximate. And Socrates, who is the third, gives completion to the triad which pervades through all numbers, and ſubſiſts analogous to the intellect which is there, or in whatever other way you may be willing to denominate it. Hence he firſt participates of the doctrines of Zeno, and is conjoined through him with Parmenides; juſt as in the Gods, the intellect in each is proximately filled with a certain divine life, but through this is united with the intelligible itſelf, and its proper hyparxis. But Pythodorus, as being arranged according to the unfolding genus, is the diſciple of Zeno, and participates of the prolific doubts of Socrates. For the Gods give ſubſiſtence to angels from middle and third powers, and not from ſuch as are firſt; for theſe are generative of Gods. And Ariſtotle is analogouſly arranged to ſouls which through a divine afflatus are often conjoined with the moſt divine natures, but afterwards fall from this bleſſedneſs. For it is nothing wonderful, that a ſoul which is now entheaſtically diſpoſed ſhould again chooſe an atheiſtical and dark life. But he is filled from Parmenides alone; ſince in the Gods alſo, it is the property of ſuch as are firſt to impart to ſouls of this kind a certain participation of divine light, through tranſcendency of power. Thus theologiſts denominate an intellectual life Saturnian, but not Jovian, though the aſcent is through the mighty Jupiter. But as Jupiter, being filled from his father, and aſcending to him as to his proper intelligible, elevates alſo that which is poſterior to himſelf; in like manner ſouls, though they make their aſcent together with Jupiter, yet that intellectual life fills the middle and third orders of them, and, in the laſt place, ſouls which energize enthuſiaſtically about it. Nor ſhould you wonder if divine natures have ſuch an order with reſpect to each other, ſince you may alſo behold in philoſophers themſelves, how he who among theſe is more perfect is alſo more powerful, and benefits a greater number. Thus Cebes or Simmias benefits himſelf alone, or ſome other ſimilar to himſelf; but Socrates benefits himſelf, and theſe, and Thraſymachus. In like manner Parmenides, being more powerful, benefits him who has the leaſt aptitude of thoſe that are aſſembled. But he manifeſts the obſcurity of the participation by calling him the youngeſt of thoſe that are preſent; which is a

ſymbol.

ſymbol of an imperfect habit; and by adding that he afterwards became one of the thirty tyrants; whence alſo we juſtly conſidered him as analogous to thoſe ſouls that once lived enthuſiaſtically, and in conjunction with angels, juſt as he makes his entrance together with Pythodorus, but who afterwards fall from this power. For Pythodorus remains in his proper habits, ſo that he alſo partakes of another converſation; juſt as the angelic tribe always remains wholly beneficent, and fills ſecondary with the participation of divine natures. But Ariſtotle inſtead of a philoſopher becomes a tyrant. For ſouls which poſſeſs a life of this kind according to habitude and not eſſentially, ſometimes depart from this order, and deſcend into the realms of generation: for a tyranny is a ſymbol of the life in generation; ſince ſuch a life becomes ſituated under the throne of Neceſſity, in conſequence of being led under paſſive, unſtable and diſordered appetite. For Ariſtotle having been one of the thirty tyrants that governed Athens, contains a repreſentation of a gigantic and earth-born life, which rules over Minerval and Olympian goods. When reaſon and intellect take the lead in ſuch ſouls, then Olympian benefits and thoſe of Minerva have dominion, and the whole life is royal and philoſophic; but when multitude, or in ſhort that which is worſe and earth-born, holds the reins of empire, then the whole life is a tyranny. If, therefore, Plato ſays that Ariſtotle was one of the thirty tyrants, it will appear to be the ſame as if he had ſaid, that he is analogous to ſouls who at one time energize enthuſiaſtically, and at another rank among the earth-born race, and who, by ſubmitting their life to thoſe moſt bitter tyrants the paſſions, become themſelves tyrants over themſelves. And perhaps the philoſopher manifeſts through theſe things, that it is not impoſſible for the ſame ſoul to evolve different lives, and at one time to philoſophize, and at another to live tyrannically; and again to paſs from a tyrannic to a philoſophic life.

P. 38. *If beings are many, it is requiſite that the ſame things ſhould be both ſimilar and diſſimilar, &c.*

Through theſe and the other arguments of Zeno it is ſhown that it is impoſſible for the many to have a ſubſiſtence when deprived of *the one*. Beginning from hence too, we ſhall find a conciſe way to the firſt principle of things. It is neceſſary, therefore, that there ſhould either be many principles not participating of a certain one, or that there

here ſhould be one principle only void of multitude, or many principles participating of *the one*, or one containing multitude in itſelf. But if there are many principles deſtitute of *the one*, all ſuch abſurdities will happen, as the arguments of Zeno adduce to thoſe who aſſert that beings are many without *the one*. If there are many principles, but which participate of a certain one, i. e. which have a certain one conſubſiſtent with them, that participated one muſt proceed to its participants from another one which has a prior ſubſiſtence: for every one which is ſomething belonging to other things proceeds from that which is ſimply one. But if there is one principle poſſeſſing in itſelf multitude, it will be a whole, and will conſiſt from the many parts or elements which it contains. And this will not be the truly one, but a paſſive one, as we learn from the Sophiſta. In conſequence of this, too, it will neither be ſimple nor ſufficient, things which it is neceſſary the principle ſhould poſſeſs. It is neceſſary, therefore, that there ſhould be one principle of all things void of multitude. And thus much we may collect from all the arguments of Zeno.

We may alſo obſerve that Socrates again imitates his paradigm intellect, expanding himſelf and his intellections to Zeno, and calling forth his ſcience. For in the paradigms of theſe men the ſubordinate ſuſpend the whole of their energy from the middle natures, and, through an expanſion of their proper powers, are ſupernally filled with more perfect goods.

P. 39. *Is it not then the ſole intention of your diſcourſes to evince by conteſting, &c.*

Parmenides, eſtabliſhing himſelf in *the one*, and ſurveying the monad of all beings, does not convert himſelf to multitude and its diſſipated ſubſiſtence; but Zeno flies from multitude to *the one*, and takes away multitude. For the former of theſe two is ſimilar to one purified, elevated, and having laid aſide the multitude in himſelf; but the latter to one aſcending, and laying aſide multitude, and this becauſe he is not entirely ſeparated from it. Hence contention (το διαμαχεσθαι) is adapted to him; for he does not yet poſſeſs a tranquil life, ſeparated from impediments; nor, as it oppoſes multitude, does it yet end in *the one* alone. But this contention, and this ending through many arguments in the ſame negative concluſion, manifeſt to Socrates that the many do not ſubſiſt ſeparate from *the one*: for Plato aſſimilates the path

through negations to a battle. Thus in the Republic he exhorts to diſcourſe about *the good*, as if piercing through a battle, thinking it fit to ſpeak of it in no other way than through negative concluſions. And here it is neceſſary, indeed, not to conſider the word *contending* careleſsly; but through this we ſhould make it known, that both in this place, and in the Republic, *contention* is intended by Plato to ſignify *negations*. As each of the arguments too of Zeno is ſelf-perfect, and demonſtrative of the concluſion, this is the peculiarity of ſcientific power.

P. 40. *Do you think that there is a certain form of ſimilitude, &c.*

Parmenides leading upwards all beings to the exempt one being, or being itſelf, and withdrawing his conceptions from that which is multiplied and diſtributed, to the one monad of all the multitude of beings, the many on the contrary give the multitude of beings a precedency to intellect and union, and do not even conſider being itſelf as the principle; butt hey aſſert that diſtributed multitude ſimply ſubſiſts, and receives a proceſſion into being ſeparate from being itſelf. That thus thinking, however, they defame the doctrine of Parmenides, is evident. For, Parmenides being of opinion that being ſhould be conſidered as alone characterized by unity, ſeparate from multitude, they on the contrary eſtabliſh multitude deprived of unity; though indeed it is impoſſible that multitude ſhould not art i cipate of *the one*: for every multitude is of *the one*. All multitudes, therefore, and all the bulks of bodies, are vanquiſhed by the participation of unity. Hence if multitude requires *the one*, but *the one* is unindigent of multitude, it is better to call being one, than the many alone ſubſiſting by themſelves ſeparate from the participation of *the one*. And Parmenides indeed, evincing that being is one, gives ſubſiſtence alſo to the multitude of beings, not only to that of ſenſibles, but likewiſe to the multitude of intelligibles: for in theſe there is a divine number of all things united to each other. Empedocles alſo afterwards perceiving this, as being himſelf a Pythagorean, calls the whole of an intelligible nature a ſphere, as being united to itſelf, and aſſerts that it attracts to itſelf, through beauty, the beautifying and uniting God. For all things there, loving and deſiring each other, are eternally united to each other. Their love alſo is intelligible, and their aſſociation and mixture are ineffable. But the many being exiles from union, and the monad of beings, and through

through their life, which is divifible and diſtributed, being drawn down to multitude, to multiform opinions, to indefinite phantaſies, to paſſive ſenſes and material appetites, conſider the manies themſelves ſeparate from their union, and do not ſee in what manner theſe manys are vanquiſhed, through the coordinated monads which they contain, how things indefinite are ſubject to definite meaſures, and how diſſipated natures ſubſiſt in ſympathy and in union through the participation of things common; and not perceiving this, they wander from the truth, and baſely revile and deride the doctrine of Parmenides. Zeno, therefore, knowing that they were thus affected, becomes indeed a corrector of multitude, but a leader to intellect from folly, and a guardian of the doctrine of his preceptor. And at firſt he perſuades to recur from theſe multitudes to the unities in the many, and to behold how this multitude, though tending to infinity, is at the ſame time vanquiſhed by the monad of beings, and is held together by a certain unity which it contains. But he perſuades, aſſuming an hypotheſis pleaſing to the vulgar, viz. the ſubſiſtence of multitude deprived of unity: for thus their aſſertion is eaſily confuted; ſince, if they had eſtabliſhed the many together with *the one*, they would not as yet be confuted through his arguments. Parmenides alſo himſelf manifeſts in his hypotheſis, that he is accuſtomed to ſhow that the ſame thing is ſimilar and diſſimilar, no otherwiſe than by receiving *the many* ſeparate from *the one*.

Zeno, therefore, as we have ſaid, conſiders theſe many deprived of *the one*, which accedes to, and is contained in them. Nor yet does he conſider intelligibles alone, nor ſenſibles alone, but, in ſhort, all ſuch things as are ſaid to be many in the intelligible and ſenſible orders. For it is the province of a more perfect and principal ſcience to extend the ſame method to all things of a ſimilar form, and to ſurvey in all things that which is analogous. Whether, therefore, there is intelligible, or ſenſible, or intellectual, or dianoëtic multitude, all this is aſſumed at preſent. Hence it is requiſite to diſcover how multitudes are no where to be found deprived of *the one*. For, if they were deprived of *the one*, they would be at the ſame time ſimilar and diſſimilar; ſince things which do not participate of *one* and the ſame are diſſimilar to each other; and again, according to this very thing, they communicate with each other, viz. by not participating of *the one*. But things which poſſeſs ſomething common and the ſame are ſimilar; ſo that the ſame things are both ſimilar and diſſimilar. If, therefore, the many are without a participation of *the one*, according to this one thing, the non-participation

ticipation of *the one*, they will be both ſimilar and diſſimilar; viz. conſidered as poſſeſſing this in common they will be ſimilar, but conſidered as not poſſeſſing *the one* they will be diſſimilar: for, becauſe they are paſſive to this very thing, the non-participation of *the one*, they are ſimilar; ſo that the ſame things are both ſimilar and diſſimilar. For, in ſhort, the poſſeſſion of nothing common is itſelf common to them: and hence the aſſertion ſubverts itſelf. Indeed, the things which are ſhown to be both ſimilar and diſſimilar are again ſhown to be neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar. For, if they do not participate of *the one*, they are, in ſhort, not ſimilar; ſince ſimilars are ſimilar by the participation of a certain one; for ſimilitude is a certain oneneſs. And again, if they do not participate of *the one*, this is common to them; but things of which there is ſomething common, theſe according to this very thing are not diſſimilar. So that the many are neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar. It is impoſſible, therefore, that multitude can ſubſiſt deprived of *the one*, becauſe ſo many abſurdities happen to thoſe who adopt ſuch an hypotheſis. For it is a dire thing that contradiction ſhould concur; but more dire that this ſhould be the caſe with contraries; and it is the moſt dire of all things that both contraries and contradictions ſhould be conſequent to the aſſertion. By ſhowing, therefore, that the ſame thing is ſimilar and diſſimilar, we have collected contraries; but by ſhowing that the ſame thing is ſimilar and not ſimilar, and neither of theſe, we have collected contradictions. For the ſimilar is a contradiction to the not ſimilar, and the diſſimilar to the non-diſſimilar.

Hence alſo we may be able to evince that it is impoſſible there ſhould be many firſt principles. For, with reſpect to theſe many principles, whether do they participate of one thing, or not of one thing? For, if they participate, that which they participate will be prior to them, and there will no longer be many principles, but one principle. But if they do not participate, they will be ſimilar to each other, in conſequence of this non-participation being common to them, and diſſimilar ſo far as they do not participate of a certain common one. But this is impoſſible, that the ſame things according to the ſame ſhould be both ſimilars and diſſimilars. In like manner we may collect that theſe many principles are neither ſimilars nor diſſimilars. But if they were participants of a certain one, we could not collect that they are diſſimilars according to the participation of this one, but only that they are ſimilars: and thus we ſhall ſubvert the ſubſiſtence of many firſt principles.

Through this method, therefore, Zeno evinces that it is impoſſible to ſeparate the many

many from *the one*, and riſes from multitude to the monads of the many, that we may perceive what the nature is of the exempt unities of things. For the coordinated monads are images of thoſe that are uncoordinated. But Socrates agitating the diſcourſe about ideas; ſuppoſing things common to have a ſubſiſtence themſelves by themſelves, and ſurveying another multitude in them, thinks it proper that Zeno ſhould alſo transfer this method to forms, and make it apparent in theſe, how the ſimilar is diſſimilar, and the diſſimilar ſimilar. And ſhortly after Proclus further obſerves as follows:

Socrates, before he enters on the doubts in which a formal eſſence is involved, aſks Zeno whether he admits that forms have a ſubſiſtence, and whether or not he is among thoſe who embrace this cauſe as well as himſelf; and, in ſhort, what opinion he has concerning them. For the Pythagoreans were contemplators of forms; and Socrates himſelf manifeſts this in the Sophiſta, calling the wiſe men in Italy, the friends of forms. But he who eſpecially venerates and clearly eſtabliſhes forms is Socrates, from the inveſtigation concerning definitions diſcovering the nature of the things defined; and paſſing from theſe as images to formal cauſes themſelves. He, therefore, in the firſt place, aſks if Zeno alſo himſelf admits that there are forms, and venerates this eſſence of all things, ſubſiſting from and eſtabliſhed in itſelf, and not requiring any other ſeat, which he characterizes by the words *itſelf by itſelf* (αυτο καθ' αυτο), conceiving that theſe words are properly adapted to this eſſence. For they indicate the unmingled, ſimple, and pure nature of forms. Thus, through the word *itſelf*, he ſignifies the ſimplicity of thoſe things; but, through the words *by itſelf*, their purity unmingled with ſecondary natures. And indeed, through the words *by itſelf*, he ſeparates forms from the things predicated of the many. For which among theſe is *by itſelf*? ſince it poſſeſſes its ſubſiſtence in a habitude to ſubjects, is collected from ſenſible perception, is the object of opinion, and is accommodated to the conceptions * of the phantaſy. But by the word *itſelf* he ſeparates forms from that which is common in particulars, and which is definable: for this is contained in

* A thing of this kind is in modern language *an abſtract idea*. Such ideas as they are of an origin poſterior, muſt alſo be ſubordinate to ſenſibles; and the ſoul, if ſhe has no higher conceptions, muſt even be viler than matter itſelf; matter being the recipient of eſſential forms, and the ſoul of ſuch as are generated from theſe.

ſomething

ſomething different from itſelf, and ſubſiſts together with matter; whence alſo it is filled with internal change, and is in a certain reſpect mortal, through communion with that which is material. By no means, therefore, muſt it be ſaid, that forms which ſubſiſt by themſelves, which are eſtabliſhed on a ſacred foundation, and are immaterial and eternal, are the ſame with material forms of poſterior origin, and which are full of variety and habitude. For the former are unmingled, undefiled and ſimple, and are eternally eſtabliſhed in the demiurgus of the univerſe; poſſeſſing the undefiled and the pure from inflexible deity, which proceeds together with the demiurgus, but the ſimple from the demiurgic intellectual eſſence, which is ſingle and impartible, and, as the Chaldæan theologiſts would ſay, has a fontal ſubſiſtence. You may alſo ſay that the term *itſelf* ſeparates form from thoſe conceptions which are derived from ſenſibles (*εννοηματα*). For no one of theſe is *itſelf*; ſince they accord with the things of which they are the conceptions, belong to and ſubſiſt in others. But the words *by itſelf* ſeparate form from that which ſubſiſts in particulars, and which is in ſomething different from itſelf.

Neither, therefore, muſt we admit their opinion who ſay that idea is the ſame with that which is common in the many: for ideas ſubſiſt prior to the things which are common in ſenſibles, and the latter derive their ſubſiſtence from the former. Nor muſt we aſſent to thoſe who conſider ideas as the ſame with thoſe conceptions which we derive from ſenſibles, and who, in conſequence of this, inquire how there are not alſo ideas of individuals, and of things which are contrary to nature. For the conceptions of theſe things are entirely ſecondary to the particulars from which they are excited, and are in us, and not in the power that adorned the univerſe, and in whom we ſay ideas ſubſiſt. Nor yet muſt we admit the opinion of thoſe who connect ideas with ſpermatic reaſons. For the reaſons or productive principles in ſeeds are imperfect; and thoſe in nature, which generates ſeeds, are deſtitute of knowledge. But ideas ſubſiſt in energy always the ſame, and are eſſentially intellectual. If, therefore, we wiſh to define their idiom through things which are more known, we muſt receive from phyſical reaſons, the producing that which they produce, by their very being; but from the reaſons of art, the being gnoſtic of the things which they make, though they do not make by their very being. Hence we ſay that ideas are demiurgic, and at the ſame time intellectual cauſes of all things which are perfected according to nature,

nature, being immovable, prior to things moved, ſimple prior to compoſites, and ſeparate prior to the things which are inſeparable from matter. On this account, Parmenides does not ceaſe diſcourſing concerning them, till at the end of his arguments he ſays that they are Gods; through this ſignifying all that we have previouſly obſerved.

With reſpect to the ſimilar and the diſſimilar, theſe ſubſiſt primarily in the demiurgus, or, to ſpeak more clearly, they have in him a ſontal ſubſiſtence; ſince they ſubſiſt more conſpicuouſly in the aſſimilative Gods, and eſpecially in the paternal Deities of that order, as is evident from the ſecond hypotheſis of this dialogue. But ſince the demiurgus poſſeſſes the one fountain of theſe, the form of ſimilitude is alſo contained in him, preſubſiſting in the one monad of ideas. The demiurgus, therefore, is a monad comprehenſive of many divine monads, which impart to each other their proper idioms: one, the idiom of purity; another, of an aſſimilative eſſence; and another of ſomething elſe, according to which they are allotted their proper hyparxis. For it muſt not be thought that forms indeed preſubſiſt, as the cauſes of things which are generated according to them, but that there is not a different idea by which generated natures become ſimilar and diſſimilar to forms. Both ſimilitude, however, and diſſimilitude, are immaterial, pure, ſimple, uniform, and eternal eſſences; the former being collective, unific, the cauſe of bound, and uniform; and the latter, the ſource of diviſion, internal change, and infinity. But the order of theſe ideas is neither in the moſt generic nor in the moſt ſpecific of forms. For the moſt generic are ſuch forms as are participated by all beings, ſo that there is not any thing whatever which does not ſubſiſt from the participation of theſe, ſuch as *eſſence*, *ſameneſs*, *difference*; ſince theſe pervade to all beings. For what is there void of eſſence? what of difference? what of ſameneſs? Do not all things poſſeſs a certain hyparxis? And are they not eſſentially ſeparated from other things; and do they not alſo communicate with them? If this be the caſe, this triad is the common cauſe of all beings. But the moſt ſpecific ideas are ſuch as are naturally adapted to be participated by individual forms, ſuch as man, horſe, dog; and each of this kind. For theſe proximately generate the monads in individuals, ſuch as man in particulars, and dog and horſe in the many, and in a ſimilar manner each of the reſt. But the forms which ſubſiſt between theſe, have indeed a very extended ſubſiſtence, but do not energize in all beings.

Thus,

Thus, for inſtance, juſtice ſubſiſts in ſouls, but not in wood and ſtones. Among theſe middle forms, therefore, ſimilitude and diſſimilitude muſt be ranked: for though they are participated by moſt, yet not by all things; ſince, as Proclus well obſerves, where is there either ſimilitude or diſſimilitude among infinites?

P. 40. *For if any one ſhould ſhow that ſimilars themſelves become diſſimilar, &c.*

Forms are not to be conſidered as entirely unmingled, and without communication with each other, but each is that which it is, preſerving its idiom pure; and at the ſame time it participates of others without confuſion, not as becoming ſomething belonging to them, but as receiving the idiom of that which it participates, and to this imparting its own idiom. Thus, for inſtance, ſameneſs participates of difference, not being difference, and difference participates of ſameneſs, ſo far as they communicate with each other. Thus alſo ſimilitude and diſſimilitude participate of each other; but neither is ſimilitude diſſimilitude, nor diſſimilitude ſimilitude. Nor, ſo far as the one is ſimilitude, is it diſſimilar, nor, ſo far as the other is diſſimilitude, ſimilar. For the expreſſion *ſo far as*, is twofold. In the firſt place, it is uſed when one thing is always accompanied with another; as if ſome one ſhould ſay, So far as there is air, according to this there is alſo light; and ſo far as there is light, according to this there is alſo air. But admitting that there is illuminated air, yet neither is air light, nor light air, but air is in light, and light in air; becauſe the parts of air and light are ſituated near each other, and there is no one of theſe according to which the other is not alſo beheld. But this expreſſion is alſo uſed after another manner, when it is applied to any thing which always eſſentially introduces another thing; as when we ſay, Man is a recipient of ſcience. For it is not true that light is in the air, or air in light, according to this ſignification, ſince air does not entirely cointroduce light, as we ſay man cointroduces a recipient of ſcience; ſince the eſſence of air is different from that of light. Similitude, therefore, participates of diſſimilitude according to the former of theſe modes; for there is nothing belonging to it which does not participate of diſſimilitude; and yet the being of the former is different from that of the latter. For it does not participate in one part and not in another, ſince nothing impedes its pervading through diſſimilitude; nor is its impartible nature of ſuch a kind that it participates of it in one

reſpect, and in another remains unmingled with it. For the whole proceeds through the whole, ſimilitude through diſſimilitude, and in like manner diſſimilitude through ſimilitude. Not, indeed, that each, in conſequence of being that which it is, participates of the other; but while it participates it preſerves its own eſſence pure. This, therefore, is the peculiarity of incorporeal forms: to pervade through each other without confuſion; to be diſtinct from each other without ſeparation; and to be more united than things which are corrupted together, through their impartible nature; and to be more diſtinct from each other than things which are here ſeparated, through their unmingled purity.

Socrates, therefore, ſays Proclus, doubting whether forms ſubſiſt in conjunction with each other, calling on Zeno to aſſiſt him in the ſolution of this doubt, and apprehending that forms are not ſo mingled that the ſimilar itſelf is the diſſimilar, calls a dogma of this kind a *prodigy*, and rejects any ſuch mixture. But again, ſuſpecting that forms, through the union of intelligibles, participate in a certain reſpect of each other, he ſays he ſhould *wonder* if any one were able to ſhow that this is the caſe, employing for this purpoſe the language of one ſuſpecting. And at length inferring that they may be both united and ſeparated, he calls him who is able to demonſtrate this *admirable*. And here you ſee the order of aſcent: for Socrates in the firſt place denies; in the ſecond place, he has a ſuſpicion of the truth; and in the third place, he is firmly convinced of the truth through demonſtration. And neither is his negation of the mixture of forms blamable; for, according to the mode which he alludes to, they are unmingled: nor is his ſuſpicion falſe; for in one reſpect they are able to participate of each other, and in another they do not mutually communicate. And his laſt deciſion is moſt true; for they are both united with and ſeparated from each other.

P. 41. *Does it alſo appear to you that there is a certain ſpecies or form of juſtice, &c.*

A divine and demiurgic intellect comprehends things multiplied unitedly, things partible impartibly, and things divided indiviſibly. But it is ſoul which firſt divides things which preſubſiſt in intellect according to ſupreme union; and this is not only true of our ſoul, but likewiſe of that which is divine. For, becauſe it is not allotted intellections which are alone eſtabliſhed in eternity, but deſires to comprehend the

collected energy of intellect, aſpiring after the perfection which it contains, and its ſimple form of intelligence,—hence, it runs round intellect, and by the tranſitions of its projective energies divides the impartible nature of forms, perceiving the beautiful itſelf, the juſt itſelf, and every other form ſeparately, and underſtanding all things by ſurveying one at a time, and not all things at once. For, in ſhort, as it ranks in the third order from *the one*, it very properly poſſeſſes an energy of this kind. For that is one alone, and is prior to intellection. But intellect underſtands all things as one; and ſoul underſtands all things by ſurveying one at a time. Diviſion, therefore, firſt ſubſiſts in ſoul; and hence theologiſts ſay, that in the lacerations of Bacchus the intellect of the God was preſerved undivided by the providence of Minerva. But ſoul is that which is firſt diſtributed into parts; and to this a ſection into ſeven parts firſt pertains. It is, therefore, no longer wonderful, that, divine forms preſubſiſting unitedly in the demiurgic intellect, our ſoul ſhould apply herſelf to them diviſibly, and ſhould at one time ſurvey the firſt and moſt common forms; at another, thoſe which poſſeſs a middle form; and at another time, the moſt partial and as it were individual forms. For, ſince even a divine ſoul divides that which is impartible by its tranſitive adheſions and contacts, what ought we to ſay concerning a partial ſoul ſuch as ours? Muſt it not, much prior to this, apprehend partibly and diviſibly things which ſubſiſt together and in each other? It is, therefore, by no means wonderful that inquiries and anſwers ſhould at different times apprehend different forms; juſt as external diſcourſe divides the one and ſimple conception of the ſoul, and temporally paſſes through the united conceptions of intellect.

The forms, however, which were before mentioned by Socrates are moſt generic and common, viz. unity, multitude, ſimilitude, diſſimilitude, permanency, motion; but thoſe which are now preſented to our view are partly ſecondary to theſe, and partly not; juſt as, with reſpect to human virtue, we ſay that it is partly ſubordinate to, and partly better than, the ſoul: for, ſo far as it is perfective of it is better than the ſoul, but, ſo far as it is ſomething belonging to, and ſubſiſting in, the ſoul, it is ſubordinate to it. In like manner the good*, the beautiful, and the juſt, are partly more excellent than forms which produce eſſences, and are partly inferior to them. For, ſo

* Viz. the good, conſidered as ſubſiſting among ideas, and not as that good which is ſupereſſential, and the principle of all things.

far

far as they are moſt generic, theſe alſo communicate with them; but the latter are the primary cauſes of being to ſenſibles, and the former are the ſources of their perfection; the juſt proceeding as far as to ſouls, and adorning and perfecting theſe, but the beautiful extending its illuminations even as far as to bodies. Hence Socrates in the Phædrus ſays, that beauty has the prerogative of being the moſt apparent and the moſt lovely of all things; but that the ſplendour of juſtice is not viſible in the imitations of it which are here. Again, the good perfects all things according to the peculiar eſſence of each. For the beautiful perfects according to the ſymmetry of form with reſpect to matter; and ſymmetry then ſubſiſts when that which is naturally more excellent rules over that which is naturally inferior. According to this ſymmetry, therefore, the beautiful ſhines in bodies. But the good illuminates according to the perfect; and is preſent to every thing inveſted with form, when it poſſeſſes perfection from nature. In this triad, therefore, the firſt is the good, the ſecond the beautiful, and the third the juſt.

But that there are forms or ideas of theſe, and of all ſuch as theſe, as, for inſtance, of temperance, fortitude, prudence, we ſhall find, by conſidering that every virtue, and every perfection according to virtue, aſſimilates us to a divine nature, and that, by how much the more it is inherent in us, by ſo much the nearer do we approach to an intellectual life. If, therefore, the beautiful and the good, and every virtue, aſſimilate us to intellect, intellect will entirely poſſeſs the intellectual paradigms of theſe. For, with reſpect to the ſimilar, when it is ſaid to be ſimilar to that which is more excellent, then, that which is more excellent poſſeſſes that primarily which the ſubordinate nature receiving becomes ſimilar to it. The forms of the virtues, therefore, muſt neceſſarily ſubſiſt in intellect prior to ſoul. Each of theſe, however, muſt be conſidered in a twofold reſpect, viz. as a divine unity, and as an intellectual form. Thus, for inſtance, the juſt which ſubſiſts in forms is not the ſame with that which ſubſiſts in the Gods. For the former is one particular idea, is a part of another, and poſſeſſes intelligence proceeding as far as to ſouls; but the latter is a certain whole, and proceeds in its providential energies as far as to the laſt of things. It alſo originates from the firſt intellectual Gods; for there it is firſt apparent. But the former is an idea contained in the demiurgic intellect. Thus alſo, with reſpect to the beautiful, that which ſubſiſts as a form is different from that which is the unity of divine beauty. And

the energy of the latter, indeed, is directed to the Gods ſo far as they are Gods, and firſt originates from the firſt intelligible; but the former is in ideas, and is beheld about ideas. And laſtly, with reſpect to the good, one is eſſential, and the other, as we have before obſerved, is ſupereſſential.

P. 42. *I mean hair, clay, and mud, or any thing elſe which is vile and abject, &c.*

It is neceſſary, ſays Proclus, either that there ſhould only be ideas of things which ſubſiſt according to nature, or alſo of things which are contrary to theſe; and if only of things according to nature, that there ſhould alone be ideas of things perpetual, or alſo of each of the things which are not perpetual. And if there are alone ideas of things perpetual, they muſt either be of ſuch as are eſſential, or alſo of ſuch as are uneſſential. And if of the eſſential, they muſt either be alone confined to wholes, or alſo extend to parts; and if to wholes alone, either to ſuch as are alone ſimple, or alſo to ſuch as are compoſed from theſe. Such then being the diviſion of ideas, we ſay, that of intellects proceeding from one intellectual eſſence it is not proper to eſtabliſh paradigms: for that of which there is a paradigm muſt neceſſarily be an image. But to call an intellectual eſſence an image, is of all things the moſt abſurd: for every image is the idol (εἰδωλον) or reſemblance of that of which it is the image; and the Elean gueſt in the Sophiſta expreſsly denominates an idol *not true being*. If, therefore, every intellectual eſſence belongs to true being, it will not be proper to denominate it either an image or an idol. For, indeed, every intellectual nature is impartible, and the progreſſion of it is effected through ſameneſs; whence alſo ſecondary intellects ſubſiſt in unproceeding union in ſuch as are firſt, and are partially what the intellect which ranks as a whole is totally. But it is neceſſary in the image that diſſimilitude ſhould be mingled with ſimilitude; through the latter of which the image is converted to its paradigm. In intellectual eſſences, therefore, there are not image and paradigm, but cauſe alone, and things proceeding from cauſe. Whence alſo theologiſts, placing many fountains in the demiurgic intellect, aſſert that there is one of the multitude of ideas. Hence, not every thing which proceeds from the demiurgus proceeds according to a formal cauſe; but ſuch things as make a more extended progreſſion, and ſuch as poſſeſs a partible eſſence, theſe ſubſiſt from an ideal cauſe. But the other

fountains are generative of intellectual and divine hypoſtaſes. We muſt not, therefore, eſtabliſh in intellect a paradigmatic cauſe of every intellectual eſſence, but a cauſe alone which is characterized by unity, and is divine.

In the next place, it is requiſite to conſider if there is a primary cauſe of ſouls in forms, and whether there is one or many. But that there is, indeed, a certain monad of them in the demiurgus, in which monad every number of ſouls is comprehended monadically, is evident from the nature of things, and from the doctrine of Plato. For, if ſoul is the firſt generated nature, and that which is primarily partible, it is neceſſary that the impartible form ſhould precede things partible, and the eternal, things which are in any way generated. And if, as time is to eternity, ſo is ſoul to intellect, but time is the image of eternity, it is alſo neceſſary that ſoul ſhould be the image of intellect. And if in being there is not only life, as Socrates ſays in the Philebus, but alſo ſoul, it is neceſſary to conſider the ſoul which is there as the paradigm of the multitude of ſouls proceeding from intellect, and as comprehending, after the manner of unity, both their order and their number. But if there is not one form of rational ſouls alone, but there are alſo many forms after the one, ſince all of them are immortal, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a paradigm of each. Again, however, it is impoſſible that the proceeding multitude ſhould be juſt as numerous as that which abides: for progreſſion increaſes quantity, but diminiſhes power. We muſt therefore ſay, that there is a monad in the divine intellect, which is paradigmatic of all ſouls, from which the multitude of them flows, and which unitedly comprehends the meaſure that bounds their number. But with this monad a ſecond number is connate, divided, and paradigmatic of divine ſouls, containing the proper paradigm of each, and one form, from which divine ſouls proceed firſt, and afterwards the multitude coordinate with each. Thus, from the paradigm of the ſoul of the ſun, the divine ſoul of the ſun firſt proceeds; in the next place, all ſuch angelic ſouls as are of a ſolar characteriſtic; in the third place, ſuch as are of a dæmoniacal rank about the ſun; and, in the laſt place, ſuch as are partial: on which account alſo there are coordinations of parts to wholes, and of attendants to their leaders; the one intellectual cauſe of them imparting union and connection to their progreſſion. In like manner, alſo, the paradigm of the lunar ſoul firſt generates the divine ſoul about the moon, afterwards the angelic, then the dæmoniacal, and then that which is partial; and the intellectual

intellectual monad comprehends all the number of theſe. The like alſo takes place in other divine ſouls; for each has a ſeparate idea: but the orders of angelic, dæmoniacal, or partial ſouls, which follow them, participate of the one idea. And as the one monad of the paradigms of ſouls which are there, gives ſubſiſtence to the one ſoul of the world, ſo the many monads produce the multitude of ſouls; and the former comprehends the whole multitude uniformly, but the latter, the meaſures of their proper ſeries. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, primarily comprehends the forms of divine ſouls, which it firſt generates; but each of theſe forms is one and at the ſame time many; for it *cauſally* contains all the multitude of the ſouls ſubſiſting under it. And thus every ſoul ſubſiſts according to a certain proper paradigm; but all do not after the ſame manner participate of the ſame form. Antient theologiſts alſo having the ſame conceptions on this ſubject ſay, that the total cauſes of ſouls, which generate the whole ſeries of them, are different from the partial cauſes, through which they derive a ſeparation according to ſpecies, and a diviſion as it were into individual ſouls.

In the next place, with reſpect to irrational ſouls, it is evident that there is alſo an intelligible paradigm of theſe; if we conſider irrational ſouls to be all ſecondary lives, and which are diviſible about bodies. Whence then do theſe derive their perpetuity? It muſt neceſſarily indeed be from a certain immovable and intellectual cauſe: and it appears that this is accompliſhed as follows:

Again then, one monad and one idea muſt be arranged prior to theſe, whether it be ſontal or ſenſitive nature, or in whatever other way you may be willing to call it. For it may be ſaid that irrational ſouls derive their ſubſiſtence from the one demiurgic ſenſe, through a gnoſtic idiom; but through orexis or appetite, from the higheſt or ſontal nature, which ſubſiſts prior to the multitude of natures. From theſe cauſes, therefore, the multitude of perpetual but naturally irrational ſouls proceeds; this multitude ſubſiſting partibly in eternal vehicles, in which alſo it is eſtabliſhed according to a certain number, and the formal meaſure which is there. For every perpetual multitude is bounded; and prior to every bounded multitude *that* ſubſiſts which bounds and numbers this multitude. Theſe irrational alſo proceed from rational ſouls, or rather from the paradigms which they contain: for, through theſe, here alſo they are ſuſpended from rational ſouls, becauſe there the one meaſure of them, together with

the multitude of forms, at the ſame time generates this number of theſe. Divine ſouls indeed, and ſuch as are pure, preſerve alſo their irrational nature undefiled; but partial employ irrational ſouls, as they have a compoſite life, the more excellent part having dominion in ſome, and being frequently in a ſtate of ſubjection in others. From theſe perpetual irrational ſouls, ſuch as are mortal are allotted their generation; theſe alſo being preſerved according to ſpecies, through their intellectual paradigm, but the individuals periſhing, becauſe they derive their ſubſiſtence from the junior * Gods, as the irrational prior to theſe are generated from thoſe ſupernal ſouls whoſe fabricating energy is complicated with the monad of the whole of their ſeries. Souls that periſh, therefore, have a certain analogy to the divine cauſes from which they derive their ſubſiſtence, and immortal ſouls to their formal cauſes.

In the third place, let us conſider how we are to admit a paradigm of Nature. For we muſt not, as Plato ſays, eſtabliſh forms of fire, water, and motion, but deprive nature, which is the ſource of theſe, of an intellectual cauſe. Theologiſts indeed place the fountain of it in the vivific Goddeſs Rhea; for they ſay that immenſe Nature is ſuſpended from the ſhoulders of the goddeſs. But, according to Plato, we muſt ſay that the form of it ſubſiſts in the demiurgic intellect, which form is the origin of every natural vehicle. Timæus alſo ſays, that the demiurgus pointed out to ſouls the *nature* of the univerſe, and the laws of fate: for in him the one nature of all things, and the comprehenſion of thoſe fatal decrees according to which he arranges and divides the univerſe, ſubſiſt. For, if it is the demiurgus who ſpeaks, he converts ſouls to himſelf: but, if this be the caſe, he alſo ſhows to them the nature of the univerſe, and the laws of fate, ſubſiſting in himſelf. Hence the one form of nature is there; but the ſouls alſo that uſe, produce the natures which are inſpired from them; and theſe perpetual natures again generate partial and temporal natures. It may be concluded, therefore, that the paradigm of natures unitedly comprehends in the demiurgic intellect the number of ſuch as have a perpetual ſubſiſtence; but that the ſeparated cauſes of perpetual natures are contained in Vulcan, who according to theologiſts is the fabricator of the form of body alone. For from this divinity every phyſical order, and the number of natures, proximately ſubſiſt and are revivified.

* See the Timæus.

In

In the fourth place, with reſpect to bodies, muſt we not admit that the one and total cauſe of theſe is in the firſt demiurgus, which cauſe comprehends all the number of the bodies that rank as wholes? but, after this monad, that the ſeparated cauſes of bodies which rank as parts ſubſiſt in the fabricating cauſe of a corporeal nature? This, indeed, muſt neceſſarily be the caſe: for he who comprehends the one mundane form is the firſt father of the univerſe; and thoſe things which are generated through neceſſity muſt conſequently be parts; and theſe require the providence of that power which fabricates bodies. Beſides, this alſo is evident, that, as we ſaid of ſouls, it is here likewiſe requiſite to aſſert that there are intellectual and formal cauſes of divine bodies; for the vehicles of dæmons and partial ſouls participate of theſe cauſes in a ſecond and third gradation. Thus, for inſtance, the form of the ſolar body generates alſo the ſolar vehicles of dæmons and partial ſouls; and hence, as ſoul is to ſoul, ſo is vehicle to its proper ſphere. And, in ſhort, ſince there is a multitude of divine cauſes, the cauſes of bodies muſt be conſidered as ſubſiſting differently in different divinities. Thus, in Vulcan, the fabricator of body, the ſeparated cauſes of bodies, ſo far as bodies, ſubſiſt; but in the generative principles of ſouls they ſubſiſt pſychically; and in Jupiter, the demiurgus of wholes, they ſubſiſt as animals, thence deriving their hypoſtaſis both according to ſouls and bodies.

It now remains that we conſider, with reſpect to matter, whether there is alſo a form of this. And here perhaps it is neceſſary, that as in ſouls, natures, and bodies, fabrication does not begin from the imperfect; ſo likewiſe in matter, prior to that which is formleſs, and which has an evaneſcent being, that which is in a certain reſpect form, and which is beheld in one boundary and permanency, will be the paradigm of matter. This likewiſe will poſſeſs a twofold generation. viz. from its paradigm, and from a divine cauſe alone: for every thing intellectual produces in conjunction with divinity; but divinity proceeds by itſelf, and as far as to things which do not poſſeſs their generation from intellectual form.

After having, therefore, conſidered the ſimple hypoſtaſes of beings, let us direct our attention to the things compoſed from theſe,—I mean animals and plants. For there will be intellectual paradigms of all theſe; becauſe not the genus alone but likewiſe the ſpecies of each gives completion to the univerſe, and makes it more ſimilar to its paradigm. For the intelligible world comprehends all ſuch animals intelligibly

as

as the apparent world contains ſenſibly. Each therefore of theſe is aſſimilated to a certain intellectual form: but animal itſelf, or the extremity of the intelligible triad, comprehends unitedly and intelligibly the cauſes of ſouls, bodies, and animals. For, as it contracts in the tetrad of ideas all the number of them, ſo it preaſſumes according to union the diſtributed cauſes of things which are as it were ſimple, and alſo of ſuch which are as it were compoſite in intellectuals. For, in ſhort, the univerſal and the eſſential are thence derived. Or whence do things poſſeſs the never-failing, if there is no eternal cauſe? Whence that which is common, and which extends to a multitude of things? For whatever is derived from the circular motion of the heavens is partial, ſince the motion itſelf of the heavens is in a certain reſpect partial. But that univerſal ſhould be generated from that which is partial, is among the number of things impoſſible. Every form, therefore, both of plants and animals, thence ſubſiſts according to a certain intellectual paradigm. For every thing generated, and every thing which has in any reſpect a ſubſiſtence, has its being from a cauſe. Whence then are theſe viſible forms, and from what cauſe? Shall we ſay, from one that is mutable? But this is impoſſible. They muſt, therefore, derive their ſubſiſtence from an immovable cauſe, ſince they are perpetual. And we ſay that an intellectual is a cauſe of this kind: for it abides perfectly in eternity. Shall we admit, therefore, that there are not only forms of ſpecies, but alſo of particulars? as, for inſtance, of Socrates, and of every individual, not ſo far as he is a man, but ſo far as he is a particular individual. But if this be the caſe, muſt not the mortal be neceſſarily immortal? For, if every thing which is generated according to idea is generated according to an immovable cauſe, and every thing which ſubſiſts according to an immovable cauſe is immutable in eſſence, Socrates, and each individual of the human ſpecies, will be eſtabliſhed according to a perpetual ſameneſs of eſſence; which is impoſſible. It is likewiſe abſurd that idea ſhould at one time be the paradigm of ſomething, and at another not. For eternal being poſſeſſes whatever it does poſſeſs eternally; and hence, that which is paradigmatic will either not poſſeſs form, or will always poſſeſs it; ſince it would be abſurd to aſſert that there is any thing accidental among ideas. If therefore it is a paradigm, it is neceſſary that the image of it alſo ſhould be erpetual: for every paradigm is the paradigm of an image. But if it is at one time eſſential, and at another not, it will alſo at one time be a paradigm, and at

another not. Beſides, is it not neceſſary to be perſuaded by Socrates, who ſays that we are led to admit the ſubſiſtence of ideas, that we may have the one prior to the many? For, if there are ideas of particulars, there will be one prior to one, or rather infinites prior to finites; ſince, ſenſible natures being finite, ideas will be infinite. Nothing, however, can be more abſurd than this: for things nearer to *the one* are more bounded, according to number, than ſuch as are more remote from it. And hence it appears that there can be no ideas of individuals. Since, however, every thing which is generated is generated from a certain cauſe, we muſt alſo admit that there are cauſes of individuals; the one general cauſe being the order of the univerſe, but the many cauſes, the motion of the heavens, partial natures, the characteriſtic peculiarities of the ſeaſons, climates, and the inſpective guardians of theſe. For, the cauſe being moved moves together with itſelf, in a certain reſpect, that which is generated from it. Hence, from the idioms of the preſiding cauſes, different appropriate figures, colours, voices, and motions are imparted to different animals. For the generations are various in different places, and partial natures not only proceed from the whole of nature, but receive ſomething from the idiom of ſeeds, and are faſhioned by verging to bodies, and becoming as it were eminently corporeal, through departing from themſelves. We ſee, therefore, that they do not ſubſiſt from a paradigmatic cauſe: for it is not the ſame thing to ſubſiſt from a cauſe, and to be generated according to a paradigm. For cauſe is multifariouſly predicated, one of which is the paradigmatic.

Again, with reſpect to parts, ſhall we ſay that there are alſo ideas of theſe, ſo that there is not only a paradigm of man, but alſo of finger and eye, and every thing of this kind! Indeed, becauſe each of theſe is univerſal and eſſence, it ſubſiſts from a certain ſtable cauſe; but becauſe they are parts, and not wholes, they are ſubordinate to an impartible and intellectual eſſence. For there is no abſurdity in admitting that ſuch things as are not only parts, but wholes, ſubſiſt according to that eſſence; but it is abſurd to admit this of ſuch things as are parts only. For the generation of wholes is from thence, ſince the uniform, prior to the multiplied, and the whole, prior to part, is thence derived. Will it not, therefore, be right to aſſert of all ſuch things, that the cauſes of them are not intellectual, (for every intellect is impartible, and conſequently wholes ſubſiſt in it prior to parts, and impartible prior to partible natures,) but that they are pſychical and phyſical. For that which is primarily partible is in ſouls, and

after theſe in natures. Here, therefore, there is a reaſon and form of finger and tooth, and of each of theſe. And the wholeneſs of theſe, indeed, preſubſiſts in intellect, but that which in the one alſo comprehends multitude is in ſouls. That which vitally diſtributes the one from the multitude is in natures; and that which makes a diviſion accompanied with interval is in bodies. In ſhort, it muſt not be denied that there are definite dæmoniacal cauſes of theſe, as invocations upon the finger, eye, and heart evince: but of the wholes which comprehend theſe parts there are divine cauſes.

In the next place let us conſider accidents. Have theſe then alſo ideas, or is there alſo a twofold conſideration about theſe? For ſome of them are perfective of, and give completion to, eſſences, ſuch as ſimilitude, beauty, health, and virtue; but others ſubſiſt indeed in eſſences, yet do not give completion to, nor perfect them, ſuch as whiteneſs, blackneſs, and every thing of this kind. Things, therefore, which give completion to, and are perfective of, eſſences have paradigmatic cauſes precedaneouſly; but things which are ingenerated in bodies are indeed produced according to reaſon, and the temperament of bodies is not ſufficient to their generation, but form is derived inwardly from nature, yet they are not produced according to a certain definite intellectual cauſe. For the eſſential, the perfective, and the common, pertain to forms; but that which is deprived of all theſe ſubſiſts from ſome other cauſe, and not from the firſt forms. For nature, receiving the order of forms proceeding into corporeal maſſes, divides wholes from parts, and eſſences from accidents, which prior to this were united and impartible; expanding theſe by her diviſive powers. It is not indeed poſſible, that things perfectly divided ſhould immediately ſubſiſt from things united, and things moſt partial from ſuch as are moſt common; but a diviſion muſt neceſſarily be produced from the condition of ſubjection in the natures which ſubſiſt between. We muſt therefore admit, that there is a cauſe of figure which is the prolific ſource of all figures, and one monad of numbers which is generative of all numbers; ſince even the monad which is with us evinces that it contains unitedly the even and the odd, and all the forms of numbers. What then ought we to think concerning the monad which is there? Muſt it not be, that it is uniformly the cauſe of all things, and that its infinite power generates alſo in us infinite number? Indeed, this muſt neceſſarily be the caſe, ſince the monad which is here proceeds as the image of that.

In the next place, with reſpect to things artificial, ſhall we ſay that there are ideas

alſo of theſe? Socrates, indeed, in the Republic, does not refuſe to ſpeak of the idea of a bed, and of a table; but there he calls the productive principle in the dianoëtic part of the artiſt, idea, and ſays that this productive principle is the progeny of divinity, becauſe he was of opinion that the artificial itſelf is imparted to ſouls from divinity. For, if it ſhould be ſaid that the forms of theſe are in intellect, whether do theſe pervade to the ſenſible world immediately, or through nature as a medium? For, if immediately, it will be abſurd, ſince a progreſſion of this kind no where ſubſiſts in other forms, but ſuch things as are nearer to intellect are the firſt participants of ideas. But if through nature as a medium, becauſe the arts are ſaid to imitate nature, much prior to art nature will poſſeſs the forms of things artificial. But all things which are generated from nature live, and undergo generation and increaſe, if they belong to things which are generated in matter: for nature is a certain life, and the cauſe of things vital. It is however impoſſible that a bed, or any thing elſe which is the production of art, ſhould live and be increaſed. And hence things artificial will not have preſubſiſting ideas, nor intellectual paradigms of their ſubſiſtence. If, however, ſome one ſhould be willing to call the ſciences arts, we muſt make the following diviſion:—Of arts, ſuch as lead back the ſoul, and aſſimilate it to intellect, of theſe we muſt admit that there are ideas, to which they aſſimilate us: for figure, and the intelligence of figure, are ſimilar, and alſo number, and the intelligence of number. We muſt admit, therefore, that there are ideas of arithmetic, muſic, geometry, and aſtronomy, not indeed ſo far as they are applied to practical purpoſes, but ſo far as they are intellectual, and inſpective of divine forms. For theſe indeed conjoin us with intellect, when, like the Coryphæan philoſopher in the Theætetus, we aſtronomize above the heavens, ſurvey the intellectual harmony according to which the demiurgus generated ſouls and this univerſe, and contemplate that number which ſubſiſts in all forms occultly and ſeparately, and the intellectual figure, which is generative of all figures, and according to which the father of the univerſe convolves the world, and gives to each of the elements its proper figure. Of theſe, therefore, we muſt eſtabliſh ideas, and of ſuch other ſciences as elevate ſouls to intellect, and the aſſiſtance of which we require in running back to the intelligible. But, with reſpect to ſuch ſciences as pertain to the ſoul while ſporting and employing herſelf about mortal concerns, and adminiſtering to human indigence, of theſe there are no intellectual forms, but the ſoul poſſeſſes a power in opinion,

nion, which is the fruitful ſource of theorems, and is naturally adapted to generate and judge of ſuch-like particulars. There are, however, by no means ſeparate forms of the arts, or of things artificial. But it is not wonderful that the cauſes of theſe ſhould ſubſiſt in dæmons, who are ſaid to be the inſpective guardians of arts, and to impart them to men; or that they ſhould alſo be ſymbolically in the Gods. Thus, for inſtance, a certain dæmon of the order of Vulcan is ſaid to preſide over the brazier's art, and to contain the form of this art; but the mighty Vulcan himſelf is ſaid ſymbolically to fabricate the heavens from braſs. In a ſimilar manner, there is a certain Minerval dæmon who preſides over the weaver's art, Minerva herſelf being celebrated as weaving in a different and demiurgic manner the order of intellectual forms.

In the next place, with reſpect to evil, muſt we ſay that there is ſuch thing as evil itſelf, the idea of evils? or ſhall we ſay, that as the form of things endued with interval is impartible, and of things multiplied, monadic, ſo the paradigm of things evil is good? For the aſſertion is by no means ſane, which admits that evil itſelf ſubſiſts among ideas, leſt we ſhould be compelled to ſay that divinity himſelf is the cauſe of thoſe evils of which he contains the paradigms; though we, when we look to thoſe paradigms, become better than we were before. But if ſome one ſhould ſay that the form of evils is good, we aſk, whether it is alone good in its eſſence, or alſo in its energy? For, if in its eſſence alone, it will be productive of evil by its energy, which it is not lawful to aſſert; but if in its energy alſo, it is evident that what is generated by it will be good. For the effect of beneficent power and energy is good, no leſs than the effect of fire is hot. Evil, therefore, ſo far as evil, is not generated according to a certain paradigm. But if, as Parmenides alſo ſays, every idea is a God, and no God, as we learn from the Republic, is the cauſe of evil, neither muſt we ſay, that ideas being Gods are the cauſes of evil. But paradigms are the cauſes of the things of which they are paradigms; and hence, no idea is the cauſe of evil.

From all that has been ſaid, we may ſummarily collect that ideas are of univerſal eſſences, and of the perfections in theſe. For the good, the eſſential, and the perpetual, are moſt adapted to forms; the firſt of theſe pervading from the firſt cauſe, the ſecond from the higheſt being, and the third from eternity, to the firſt order of forms. From theſe three elements, therefore, we may define what things are generated according to a certain paradigmatic intellectual cauſe, and what ſubſiſt from other principles,

and not from an intellectual paradigm. For hair, though it ſhould be a leading part, will not be there; for it has been ſhown that other things are there, and not parts. But clay is an indefinite mixture of two elements not ſubſiſting according to a phyſical reaſon; ſince we are alſo accuſtomed to connect together ten thouſand other particulars for our uſe. We do not however refer any thing of this kind to form: for theſe works are either the offſpring of art, or of a deliberative tendency to things in our power. And as to mud, ſince it is a certain evil of that with which it ſubſiſts, it cannot ſubſiſt from ideas, becauſe, as we have ſhown, nothing evil is generated from thence. On this account theſe things, becauſe they are exits and privations of ideas, do not from them derive their origin. For darkneſs is a privation of light; but the ſun, being the cauſe of light, is not alſo the cauſe of its privation. In like manner, intellect, being the cauſe of knowledge, does not alſo give ſubſiſtence to ignorance, which is the privation of knowledge; and ſoul, being the ſupplier of life, does not alſo impart a privation of life. But if ſome one ſhould ſay that intellect knowing good knows alſo evil, and on this account ſhould place evil in intellect, to this we muſt reply, that there is no paradigm of evil in intellect, but that it poſſeſſes a knowledge of evil; and that this is the paradigm of all the knowledge of evil, which he who receives is benefited. For ignorance is evil, but not the knowledge of ignorance, this being one knowledge both of itſelf and of ignorance. For, if we thus ſpeak, we ſhall neither introduce ideas of things evil, as ſome of the Platoniſts have, nor ſhall we ſay that intellect alone knows things of a more excellent nature, as others have aſſerted; but, ranking between both, we ſhall admit that it has a knowledge of evils, but we ſhall not introduce a paradigmatic cauſe of theſe, ſince it would be evil.

The following tranſlation of extracts from the beginning of the MS. of Damaſcius περὶ ἀρχῶν, or CONCERNING PRINCIPLES, may be conſidered as an admirable comment on the concluding part of the firſt hypotheſis of this dialogue, where it is inferred (p. 160.) that *the one* neither *is* one, nor *is*; and that it can neither be named, nor ſpoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. The extracts are taken and tranſlated from the MS. in the Bodleian library. The difficulty of tranſlating theſe extracts, like the ſublimity which they contain, can be known only to a few.

Whether

Whether ſhall we ſay that the one principle of all things is beyond all things? or that it is ſomething belonging to all things, being as it were the ſummit of the things proceeding from it? And ſhall we ſay that all things ſubſiſt together with it, or that they are poſterior to and originate from it? For if ſome one ſhould aſſert this, how will the principle be ſomething external to all things? For, thoſe things are in ſhort all, of which no one whatever is abſent. But the principle is abſent, as not ranking among all things. All things, therefore, are not ſimply poſterior to the principle, but beſides the principle. Further ſtill, all things muſt be conſidered as many finite things: for things infinite will plainly not be all. Nothing, therefore, will be external to all things. For *allneſs* (παντοτης) is a certain boundary and comprehenſion, in which the principle is the boundary upwards, and that which is the ultimate proceſſion from the principle, the boundary downwards. All things, therefore, ſubſiſt together with the boundaries. Again, the principle is coordinated with the things which proceed from the principle; for it is ſaid to be and is the principle of them. The cauſe alſo is coordinated with the things cauſed, and that which is firſt with the things poſterior to the firſt. But things of which there is one coordination, being many, are ſaid to be all; ſo that the principle alſo is among all things. And, in ſhort, we call ſuch things as we conceive to ſubſiſt in any way whatever, all things; and we alſo conceive the principle to ſubſiſt. Hence we are accuſtomed to call all the city, the governor and the governed, and all the race, the begetter and the begotten. But if all things ſubſiſt together with the principle, will not the principle be ſomething belonging to all things, the principle alſo being aſſumed in conjunction with all things? The one coordination, therefore, of all things, which we ſay is all, is without a principle, and without a cauſe, leſt we ſhould aſcend to infinity. It is however neceſſary that every thing ſhould either be the principle, or from the principle. All things, therefore, are either the principle, or from the principle. But if the latter be the caſe, the principle will not ſubſiſt together with all things, but will be external to all things, as the principle of the things proceeding from it. If the former be admitted, what will that be which will proceed from all things, as from the principle? All things, therefore, are neither the principle, nor from the principle *. Further ſtill, all things are in a certain reſpect beheld ſubſiſting in multitude, and a certain ſepara-

* For the principle ſo far as it is the principle ranks among all things.

tion.

ion. For we cannot conceive the all without theſe. How, therefore, do a certain ſeparation and multitude directly appear? Or are not all things every where in ſeparation and multitude? But is *the one* the ſummit of the many, and *the monad* the united ſubſiſtence of things which are ſeparated from each other? And, ſtill further, is *the one* more ſimple than *the monad?* In the firſt place, however, if this be ſaid, every monad is number, though ſubſiſting contractedly and in profound union; and thus the monad alſo is all things. And, in the next place, *the one* is not ſomething belonging to *the many*; for thus it would give completion to *the many*, in the ſame manner as each of other things. But as numerous as are the many according to a certain diviſion, ſo numerous alſo will *the one* be prior to diviſion, according to the every way impartible. For it is not *the one* as that which is ſmalleſt, as Speuſippus appears to ſay, but it is *the one* as all things. For by its own ſimplicity it accedes to all things, and makes all things to be one. Hence all things proceed from it, becauſe it is itſelf all things prior to all. And as that which has an united ſubſiſtence is prior to things which are ſeparated from each other, ſo *the one* is *many* prior to *the many*. But when we expand every conception belonging to our nature to all things, then we do not predicate all things after the ſame manner, but in a triple reſpect at leaſt; viz. *unically*, *unitedly*, and in a *multiplied* manner. All things, therefore, are from *the one*, and with reference to *the one*, as we are accuſtomed to ſay. If then, according to a more uſual manner of ſpeaking, we call things which conſiſt in multitude and ſeparation all things, we muſt admit that *the united*, and in a ſtill greater degree *the one*, are the principles of theſe. But if we conſider theſe two as all things, and aſſume them in conjunction with all other things, according to habitude and coordination with them, as we have before ſaid, we muſt then inveſtigate another principle prior to all things, which it is no longer proper to conſider as in any way all things, nor to co-arrange with its progeny. For if ſome one ſhould ſay that *the one*, though it is all things which have in any reſpect a ſubſiſtence, yet is *one* prior to *all things*, and is more *one* than *all things*; ſince it is *one* by itſelf, but *all things* as the cauſe of all, and according to a coordination with all things;—if this ſhould be ſaid, *the one* will thus be doubled, and we ourſelves ſhall become doubled, and multiplied about its ſimplicity. For by being *the one* it is all things after the moſt ſimple manner. At the ſame time alſo, though this ſhould be ſaid, it is neceſſary that the principle of all things

ſhould

ſhould be exempt from all things, and conſequently that it ſhould be exempt from the moſt ſimple *allneſs*, and from a ſimplicity abſorbing all things, ſuch as is that of *the one*. Our ſoul, therefore, propheſies that the principle which is beyond all things that can in any reſpect be conceived, is uncoordinated with all things. Neither, therefore, muſt it be called principle, nor cauſe, nor that which is firſt, nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no means, therefore, muſt we celebrate it as all things, nor, in ſhort, is it to be celebrated, nor recalled into memory. For, whatever we conceive or conſider is either ſomething belonging to all things, or is all things, although analyſing we ſhould aſcend to that which is moſt ſimple, which is the moſt comprehenſive of all things, being as it were the ultimate circumference, not of beings, but of non-beings: for, of beings, that which has an united ſubſiſtence, and is perfectly without ſeparation, is the extremity, ſince every being is mingled from elements which are either *bound* and *infinity*, or the progeny of theſe. But *the one* is ſimply the laſt boundary of *the many*. For we cannot conceive any thing more ſimple than that which is perfectly one; which if we denominate the principle, and cauſe, the firſt and the moſt ſimple, theſe and all other things are there only according to *the one*. But we not being able to contract our conceptions into profound union, are divided about it, and predicate of *the one* the diſtributed multitude which is in ourſelves; unleſs we deſpiſe theſe appellations alſo, becauſe *the many* cannot be adapted to *the one*. Hence it can neither be known nor named; for, if it could, it would in this reſpect be *many*. Or theſe things alſo will be contained in it, according to *the one*. For the nature of *the one* is all-receptive, or rather all-producing, and there is not any thing whatever which *the one* is not. Hence all things are as it were evolved from it. It is, therefore, properly cauſe, and the firſt, the end, and the laſt, the defenſive encloſure of all things, and the one nature of all things; not that nature which is in things, and which proceeds from *the one*, but that which is prior to them, which is the moſt impartible ſummit of all things whatever, and the greateſt comprehenſion of all things which in any reſpect are ſaid to have a being.

But if *the one* is the cauſe of all things, and is comprehenſive of all things, what aſcent will there be for us beyond this alſo? For we do not ſtrive in vain, extending ourſelves to that which is nothing. For that which is not even *one, is* not according to the moſt juſt mode of ſpeaking. Whence then do we conceive that there is

ſomething beyond *the one?* for *the many* require nothing elſe than *the one.* And hence *the one* alone is the cauſe of *the many.* Hence alſo *the one* is entirely cauſe, becauſe it is neceſſary that the cauſe of the many ſhould alone be *the one.* For it cannot be nothing; ſince nothing is the cauſe of nothing. Nor can it be *the many*: for ſo far as *many* they are uncoordinated; and *the many* will not be one cauſe. But if there are many cauſes, they will not be cauſes of each other, through being uncoordinated, and through a progreſſion in a circle, the ſame things being cauſes and the things cauſed. Each, therefore, will be the cauſe of itſelf, and thus there will be no cauſe of the many. Hence it is neceſſary that *the one* ſhould be the cauſe of the many, and which is alſo the cauſe of their coordination: for there is a certain conſpiring coordination, and a union with each other.

If, therefore, ſome one thus doubting ſhould ſay that *the one* is a ſufficient principle, and ſhould add as the ſummit that we have not any conception or ſuſpicion more ſimple than that of *the one,* and ſhould therefore aſk how we can ſuſpect any thing beyond the laſt ſuſpicion and conception we are able to frame;—if ſome one ſhould thus ſpeak, we muſt pardon the doubt. For a ſpeculation of this kind is, as it ſeems inacceſſible and immenſe: at the ſame time, however, from things more known to us we muſt extend the ineffable parturitions of our ſoul, to the ineffable coſenſation of this ſublime truth. For, as that which ſubſiſts without is in every reſpect more honourable than that which ſubſiſts with habitude, and the uncoordinated than the coordinated, as the theoretic than the political life, and Saturn for inſtance than Jupiter; being than forms, and *the one* than *the many,* of which *the one* is the principle; ſo, in ſhort, that which tranſcends every thing of this kind is more honourable than all cauſes and principles, and is not to be conſidered as ſubſiſting in any coarrangement and habitude; ſince *the one* is naturally prior to *the many,* that which is moſt ſimple to things more compoſite, and that which is moſt comprehenſive to the things which it comprehends. So that, if you are willing thus to ſpeak, *the firſt* is beyond all ſuch oppoſition, not only that which is in things coordinate, but even that which takes place from its ſubſiſtence as the firſt. *The one,* therefore, and the united are poſterior to the firſt: for theſe cauſally contain multitude as numerous as that which is unfolded from them. *The one,* however, is no leſs one, if indeed it is not more ſo, becauſe ſeparate multitude is poſterior to and not in it; and the united is no leſs united becauſe it contracted in

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one things ſeparated prior to ſeparation. Each of theſe, therefore, is all things, whether according to coordination, or according to their own nature. But all things cannot be things firſt, nor the principle. Nor yet one of them alone, becauſe this one will be at the ſame time all things, according to *the one*; but we ſhall not yet have diſcovered that which is beyond all things. To which we may alſo add, that *the one* is the ſummit of *the many*, as the cauſe of the things proceeding from it. We may likewiſe ſay that we form a conception of *the one* according to a purified ſuſpicion extended to that which is moſt ſimple and moſt comprehenſive. But that which is moſt venerable muſt neceſſarily be incomprehenſible by all conceptions and ſuſpicions; ſince alſo, in other things, that which always ſoars beyond our conceptions is more honourable than that which is more obvious: ſo that what flies from all our ſuſpicions will be moſt honourable. But, if this be the caſe, it is *nothing*. Let however nothing be twofold, one better than *the one*, the other poſterior to ſenſibles. If alſo we ſtrive in vain in aſſerting theſe things, ſtriving in vain is likewiſe twofold; the one falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no reſpect whatever has any ſubſiſtence. For *this* alſo is ineffable, as Plato ſays, but according to the worſe, but *that* according to the better. If, too, we ſearch for a certain advantage ariſing from it, this is the moſt neceſſary advantage of all others, that all things thence proceed as from an adytum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable manner. For neither do they proceed as *the one* produces *the many*, nor as *the united* things *ſeparated*, but as the ineffable ſimilarly produces all things, ineffably. But if in aſſerting theſe things concerning it, that it is ineffable, that it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehenſible, we ſubvert what we ſay, it is proper to know that theſe are the names and words of our parturitions, daring anxiouſly to explore it, and which, ſtanding in the veſtibules of the adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but ſignify the manner in which we are affected about it, our doubts and diſappointment; nor yet this clearly, but through indications to ſuch as are able to underſtand theſe inveſtigations. We alſo ſee that our parturitions ſuffer theſe things about *the one*, and that in a ſimilar manner they are ſolicitous and ſubverted. For *the one*, ſays Plato, if it is, is not *the one*. But if it is not, no aſſertion can be adapted to it: ſo that neither can there be a negation of it, nor can any name be given to it; for neither is a name

ſimple. Nor is there any opinion nor ſcience of it; for neither are theſe ſimple: nor is intellect itſelf ſimple. So that *the one* is in every reſpect unknown and ineffable.

What then? Shall we inveſtigate ſomething elſe beyond the ineffable? Or, perhaps, indeed, Plato leads us ineffably through *the one* as a medium, to the ineffable beyond *the one*, which is now the ſubject of diſcuſſion; and this by an ablation of *the one*, in the ſame manner as he leads us to *the one* by an ablation of other things. For, that he gives to *the one* a certain poſition is evident from his Sophiſta, where he demonſtrates that it ſubſiſts prior to being, itſelf by itſelf. But if, having aſcended as far as to *the one*, he is ſilent, this alſo is becoming in Plato to be perfectly ſilent, after the manner of the antients, concerning things in every reſpect unſpeakable: for the diſcourſe was, indeed, moſt dangerous, in conſequence of falling on idiotical ears. Indeed, when diſcourſing concerning that which in no reſpect has any ſubſiſtence, he ſubverts his aſſertions, and is fearful of falling into the ſea of diſſimilitude, or, rather, of unſubſiſting void. But if demonſtrations do not accord with *the one*, it is by no means wonderful: for they are human and diviſible, and more compoſite than is fit. Indeed, they are not even adapted to being, ſince they are formal, or rather they are neither adapted to forms nor eſſences. Or, is it not Plato himſelf, who in his Epiſtles* evinces that we have nothing which is ſignificant of form, no type, nor name, nor diſcourſe, nor opinion, nor ſcience? For it is intellect alone which can apprehend ideas by its projecting energies, which we cannot poſſeſs while buſily engaged in diſcourſe. If, therefore, we even energize intellectually, ſince in this caſe our intellection is characterized by form, we ſhall not accord with *the united* and with being. And if at any time we are able to project a contracted intelligence, even this is unadapted and diſcordant with *the one*. If, alſo, we energize according to the moſt profoundly united intelligence, and through this occultly perceive *the one itſelf*, yet even this is expanded only as far as to *the one*, if there is a knowledge of *the one*; for this we have not yet determined. At the ſame time, however, let us now apply ourſelves to the diſcuſſion of things of ſuch great importance, through indications and ſuſpicions, being purified, with reſpect to unuſual conceptions, and led through analogies and negations, deſpiſing what we poſſeſs with reſpect to theſe, and advancing from things more diſhonour-

* See the ſeventh Epiſtle of Plato.

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able with us to things more honourable. Shall we therefore ſay, that the nature which we now inveſtigate as the firſt, is ſo perfectly ineffable, that it muſt not even be admitted concerning it that it is thus ineffable; but that *the one* is ineffable, as flying from all compoſition of words and names, and all diſtinction of that which is known from that which knows, and is to be apprehended in a manner the moſt ſimple and comprehenſive, and that it is not one alone as the idiom of one, but as *one all things*, and one prior to all things, and not one which is ſomething belonging to all things? Theſe, indeed, are the parturitions of the ſoul, and are thus purified with reſpect to *the ſimply one*, and that which is truly the one cauſe of all things. But, in ſhort, we thus form a conception of *the one* which we contain as the ſummit or flower of our eſſence, as being more proximate and allied to us, and more prompt to ſuch a ſuſpicion of that which nearly leaves all things behind it. But, from ſome particular thing which is made the ſubject of hypotheſis, the tranſition is eaſy to that which is ſimply ſuppoſed, though we ſhould in no reſpect accede to it, but, being carried in that which is moſt ſimple in us, ſhould form a ſuſpicion concerning that which is prior to all things. *The one*, therefore, is thus effable, and thus ineffable; but that which is beyond it is to be honoured in the moſt perfect ſilence, and, prior to this, by the moſt perfect ignorance*, which deſpiſes all knowledge.

Let us, therefore, now conſider, in the ſecond place, how it is ſaid to be perfectly unknown. For, if this be true, how do we aſſert all theſe things concerning it? For we do not elucidate by much diſcuſſion about things of which we are ignorant. But if it is in reality uncoordinated with all things, and without habitude to all things, and is nothing of all things, nor even *the one itſelf*, theſe very things are the nature of it. Beſides, with reſpect to its being unknown, we either know that it is unknown, or we are ignorant of this. But if the latter, how do we ſay that it is perfectly unknown? And if we know this, in this reſpect therefore it is known. Or ſhall we ſay that it is known, that the unknown is unknown? We cannot therefore deny one thing of another, not knowing that which is the ſubject of the negation; nor can we ſay that

* As that which is below all knowledge is an ignorance worſe than knowledge, ſo the ſilence in which our aſcent to the ineffable terminates is ſucceeded by an ignorance ſuperior to all knowledge. Let it, however, be carefully remembered, that ſuch an ignorance is only to be obtained after the moſt ſcientific and intellectual energies.

it is not this or that, when we can in no reſpect reach it. How, therefore, can we deny of that of which we are perfectly ignorant the things which we know? For this is juſt as if ſome one who was blind from his birth ſhould aſſert that heat is not in colour. Or perhaps, indeed, he alſo will juſtly ſay, that colour is not hot. For he knows this by the touch; but he knows nothing of colour, except that it is not tangible: for he knows that he does not know it. Such a knowledge, indeed, is not a knowledge of colour, but of his own ignorance. And we alſo, when we ſay that the firſt is unknown, do not announce any thing of it, but we confeſs the manner in which we are affected about it. For the non-perception of the blind man is not in the colour, nor yet his blindneſs, but in him. The ignorance, therefore, of that of which we are ignorant is in us. For the knowledge of that which is known, is in him that knows, and not in the thing known. But if knowledge is in that which is known, being as it were the ſplendour of it, ſo ſome one ſhould ſay ignorance is in that which is unknown, being as it were the darkneſs of it, or obſcurity, according to which it is unknown by, and is unapparent to, all things,—he who ſays this is ignorant, that as blindneſs is a privation, ſo likewiſe all ignorance, and that as is the inviſible, ſo that of which we are ignorant, and which is unknown. In other things, therefore, the privation of this or that leaves ſomething elſe. For that which is incorporeal, though inviſible, yet is intelligible: and that which is not intelligible by a certain intelligence, leaves at the ſame time ſomething elſe. But if we take away every conception and ſuſpicion, this alſo we muſt ſay is perfectly unknown by us, about which we cloſe every eye*. Nor muſt we aſſert any thing of it, as we do of the intelligible, that it is not adapted to be ſeen by the eyes, or as we do of *the one*, that it is not naturally adapted to be underſtood by an eſſential and abundant intellection: for it imparts nothing by which it can be apprehended, nothing which can lead to a ſuſpicion of its nature. For neither do we only ſay that it is unknown, that being ſomething elſe it may naturally poſſeſs the unknown, but we do not think it fit to predicate of it either *being*, or *the one*, or *all things*, or *the principle of all things*, or, in ſhort, *any thing*. Neither, therefore, are theſe things the nature of it, viz. *the nothing*, *the being beyond all things*, *ſupercauſal ſubſiſtence*, and *the uncoordinated with all things*; but theſe are only ablations of things poſterior to it. How, therefore, do we ſpeak concerning it? Shall we ſay,

* Παν ομμα μυομεν.

that,

that, knowing theſe poſterior things, we deſpiſe them with reſpect to the poſition, if I may ſo ſpeak, of that which is in every reſpect ineffable? For, as that which is beyond ſome particular knowledge is better than that which is apprehended by ſuch knowledge, ſo that which is beyond all ſuſpicion muſt neceſſarily be moſt venerable; not that it is known to be ſo, but poſſeſſing the moſt venerable as in us, and as the conſequence of the manner in which we are affected about it. We alſo call this a prodigy, from its being entirely incomprehenſible by our conceptions: for it is through analogy, if that which in a certain reſpect is unknown, according to a more excellent ſubſiſtence, is ſuperior to that which is in every reſpect known. Hence, that which is in every reſpect unknown according to a more excellent ſubſiſtence, muſt neceſſarily be acknowledged to be ſupreme, though it indeed has neither the ſupreme, nor the moſt excellent, nor the moſt venerable: for theſe things are our confeſſions about that, which entirely flies from all our conceptions and ſuſpicions. For by this very aſſertion, that we can form no ſuſpicion of it, we acknowledge that it is moſt wonderful; ſince, if we ſhould ſuſpect any thing concerning it, we muſt alſo inveſtigate ſomething elſe prior to this ſuſpicion, and either proceed to infinity in our ſearch, or ſtop at that which is perfectly ineffable. Can we, therefore, demonſtrate any thing concerning it? and is that demonſtrable which we do not think fit to conſider as a thing whoſe ſubſiſtence we can even ſuſpect? Or, when we aſſert theſe things, do we not indeed demonſtrate *concerning* it, but not *it*? For neither does it contain the demonſtrable, nor any thing elſe. What then? Do we not opine concerning it theſe things which we now aſſert? But if there is an opinion of it, it is alſo the object of opinion. Or ſhall we ſay we opine that it is not theſe things? for Ariſtotle alſo ſays that there is true opinion. If, therefore, the opinion is true, the thing likewiſe is to which opinion being adapted becomes true. For, in conſequence of the thing ſubſiſting, the opinion alſo is true. Though, indeed, how will it be, or how will that be true which is perfectly unknown? Or ſhall we ſay this is true, that it is not theſe things, and that it is not known? Is it therefore truly falſe, that it is theſe things, and that it is known? Or ſhall we ſay that theſe things are to be referred to privations, and to that which in a certain reſpect is not, in which there may be a falling from the hypoſtaſis of form? Juſt as we call the abſence of light darkneſs. For, light not exiſting, neither is there any darkneſs. But to that which is never and in no reſpect being, nothing among beings

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can, as Plato ſays, accede. Neither, therefore, is it non-being, nor, in ſhort, privation; and even the expreſſion *never in no reſpect* (το μηδαμη μηδαμως) is incapable of ſignifying its nature. For this expreſſion is being, and *ſignification* is ſomething belonging to beings. Likewiſe, though we ſhould opine that it is not in any reſpect, yet at the ſame time ſince it thus becomes the object of opinion, it belongs to beings. Hence, Plato very properly calls that which never and in no reſpect is, ineffable and incapable of being opined, and this according to the worſe than the effable and opinion, in the ſame manner as we ſay the ſupreme is according to that which is better than theſe. What then, do we not think and are we not perſuaded that the ſupreme thus ſubſiſts? Or, as we have often ſaid, do not theſe things expreſs the manner in which we are affected about it? But we poſſeſs in ourſelves this opinion, which is therefore empty, as is the opinion of a vacuum and the infinite. As therefore we form a phantaſtic and fictitious opinion of theſe, though they are not, as if they were, juſt as we opine the ſun to be no larger than a ſphere whoſe diameter is but a foot, though this is far from being the caſe;—ſo, if we opine any thing concerning that which never and in no reſpect is, or concerning that of which we write theſe things, the opinion is our own, and the vain attempt is in us, in apprehending which we think that we apprehend the ſupreme. It is, however, nothing pertaining to us, ſo much does it tranſcend our conceptions. How, therefore, do we demonſtrate that there is ſuch an ignorance in us concerning it? And how do we ſay that it is unknown? We reply, in one word, Becauſe we always find that what is above knowledge is more honourable; ſo that what is above all knowledge, if it were to be found, would be found to be moſt honourable. But it is ſufficient to the demonſtration that it cannot be found. We alſo ſay that it is above all things; becauſe, if it were any thing known, it would rank among all things; and there would be ſomething common to it with all things, viz. the being known. But there is one coordination of things in which there is ſomething common; ſo that in conſequence of this it will ſubſiſt together with all things. Hence it is neceſſary that it ſhould be unknown.

In the third place, the unknown is inherent in beings as well as the known, though they are relatively inherent at the ſame time. As, therefore, we ſay that the ſame thing is relatively large and ſmall, ſo alſo we ſay, that a thing is known and unknown with reference to different things. And as the ſame thing, by participating of the

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two forms, the great and the ſmall, is at the ſame time both great and ſmall, ſo that which at the ſame time participates of the known and the unknown is both theſe. Thus, the intelligible is unknown to ſenſe, but is known to intellect, For the more excellent will not be privation, the inferior at the ſame time being form; ſince every abſence, and a privation of this kind, is either in matter or in ſoul; but all things are preſent in intellect, and ſtill more in a certain reſpect in the intelligible. Unleſs, indeed, we denominate privation according to a more excellent ſubſiſtence, as we ſay that is not form which is above form; and that is not being which is ſupereſſential; and that is nothing which is truly unknown, according to a tranſcendency which ſurpaſſes all things. If, therefore, *the one* is the laſt known of things which are in any reſpect whatever known or ſuſpected, that which is beyond *the one* is primarily and perfectly unknown; which alſo is ſo unknown, that neither has it an unknown nature, nor can we accede to it as to the unknown, but it is even unknown to us whether it is unknown. For there is an all-perfect ignorance about it, nor can we know it, neither as known, nor as unknown. Hence, we are on all ſides ſubverted, in conſequence of not being able to reach it in any reſpect, becauſe it is not even one thing; or rather, it is not that which is not even one thing. Hence, it is that which in no reſpect whatever has any ſubſiſtence; or it is even beyond this, ſince this is a negation of being, and that which is not even one thing is a negation of *the one*. But that which is not one thing, or, in other words, that which is nothing, is a void, and a falling from all things. We do not, however, thus conceive concerning the ineffable. Or ſhall we ſay that *nothing* is twofold, the one being beyond, and the other below, all things? For *the one* alſo is twofold, *this* being the extreme, as *the one* of matter, and *that* the firſt, as that which is more antient than being. So that with reſpect to *nothing* alſo, *this* will be as that which is not even the laſt one, but *that*, as neither being the firſt one. In this way, therefore, that which is unknown and ineffable is twofold, *this*, as not even poſſeſſing the laſt ſuſpicion of ſubſiſtence, and *that*, as not even being the firſt of things. Muſt we, therefore, conſider it as that which is unknown to *us*? Or this indeed is nothing paradoxical: for it will be unknown even to much-honoured intellect, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak. For every intellect looks to the intelligible; and the intelligible is either *form* or *being*. But may not divine knowledge know it; and may it not be known to this ſupereſſentially? This knowledge, however, applies itſelf

to *the one*, but that which we are now inveſtigating is beyond *the one*. In ſhort, if it alſo is known, in conjunction with others, it will alſo be ſomething belonging to all things; for it will be common to it with others to be known, and thus far it will be coordinated with others. Further ſtill, if it is known, divine knowledge will comprehend it. It will, therefore, define it. Every boundary, however, aſcends ultimately as far as to *the one*; but *that* is beyond *the one*. It is, therefore, perfectly incomprehenſible and inviſible, and conſequently is not to be apprehended by any kind of knowledge. To which we may add, that knowledge is of things which may be known, as beings, or as having a ſubſiſtence, or as participating of *the one*. But this is beyond all theſe. Further ſtill, *the one* alſo appears to be unknown, if it is neceſſary that what is known ſhould be one thing, and that which knows another, though both ſhould be in the ſame thing. So that *the truly one* will not know itſelf: for it does not poſſeſs a certain duplicity. There will not, therefore, be in it that which knows, and that which is known. Hence, neither will a God, conſidered according to *the one itſelf* alone, and as being conjoined with *the one*, be united with that which is ſimple, according to duplicity. For how can the double be conjoined with the ſimple? But if he knows *the one* by *the one*, that which knows, and alſo that which is known, will be *one*, and in each the nature of *the one* will be ſhown, ſubſiſting alone and being *one*. So that he will not be conjoined as different with that which is different, or as that which is gnoſtic with that which is known, ſince this very thing is one alone; ſo that neither will he be conjoined according to knowledge. Much more, therefore, is that which is not even *the one* unknown. But if *the one* is the laſt thing known, we know nothing of that which is beyond *the one*; ſo that the preſent rhapſody is vain. Or ſhall we ſay we know that theſe things are unworthy to be aſſerted, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, of the firſt hypotheſis, ſince, not yet knowing even intelligible forms, we deſpiſe the images which ſubſiſt in us of their eternal and impartible nature; ſince theſe images are partible, and multifariouſly mutable. Further ſtill, being ignorant of the contracted ſubſiſtence of intelligible ſpecies and genera, but poſſeſſing an image of this, which is a contraction of the genera and ſpecies in us, we ſuſpect that being itſelf reſembles this contraction, but is at the ſame time ſomething more excellent; and this muſt be eſpecially the caſe with that which has an united ſubſiſtence. But now we are ignorant of *the one*, not contracting, but expanding all things to it;

and in us ſimplicity itſelf conſiſts, with relation to the all which we contain, but is very far from coming into contact with the all-perfect nature of *the one*. For *the one* and *the ſimple* in our nature, are in the ſmalleſt degree that which they are ſaid to be, except that they are a ſign or indication of the nature which is there. Thus alſo aſſuming in intellect every thing which can be in any reſpect known or ſuſpected, we think fit to aſcribe it as far as to *the one*; if it be requiſite to ſpeak of things unſpeakable, and to conceive things which are inconceivable. At the ſame time, alſo, we think fit to make that the ſubject of hypotheſis, which cannot be compared, and is uncoordinated with all things, and which is ſo exempt, that neither in reality does it poſſeſs the exempt. For that which is exempt is always exempt from ſomething, and is not in every reſpect exempt, as poſſeſſing habitude to that from which it is exempt, and, in ſhort, preceding in a certain coordination. If, therefore, we intend to make that which is truly exempt the ſubject of hypotheſis, we muſt not even ſuppoſe it to be exempt. For, accurately ſpeaking, its proper name will not be verified when aſcribed to *the exempt*; for in this caſe it would at the ſame time be coordinated; ſo that it is neceſſary even to deny this of it. Likewiſe, negation is a certain ſentence, and that which is denied is a certain thing; but that of which we are now endeavouring to ſpeak is not any thing. Neither, therefore, can it be denied, nor ſpoken of, nor be in any way known: ſo that neither is it poſſible to deny the negation; but that which appears to us to be a demonſtration of what we ſay, is a perfect ſubverſion of language and conceptions. What end, therefore, will there be of the diſcourſe, except the moſt profound ſilence, and an acknowledgment that we know nothing of that which it is not lawful, ſince impoſſible, to lead into knowledge?

May it not, therefore, be ſaid by ſome one who ventures to make ſuch-like inquiries, if we aſſert ſomething concerning it from things of a poſterior nature, ſince in theſe the monad is every where the leader of a certain proper number; for there is one firſt ſoul and many ſouls, one firſt intellect and many intellects, one firſt being and many beings, and one firſt unity and many unities;—if this be the caſe, may it not be ſaid that in a ſimilar manner it is requiſite there ſhould be one ineffable and many ineffables? If this then be admitted, it will be neceſſary to ſay that the ineffable is ineffably prolific. It will, therefore, generate a proper multitude. Or may we not ſay, that theſe and ſuch-like conceptions ariſe from forgetting what has been before aſſerted?

For there is nothing common between it and other things; nor will there be any thing pertaining to it among things which are ſpoken of, or conceived, or ſuſpected. Neither, therefore, can *the one* nor *the many*, neither *the prolific* nor *the productive*, nor that which is in any reſpect a cauſe, neither any analogy nor ſimilitude can be aſcribed to it. For it is eſpecially neceſſary to induce quiet, in that which is arcane, firmly abiding in the adytum of the ſoul. But if it be neceſſary to indicate ſomething concerning it by negations, we muſt ſay that it is neither one nor many, neither prolific nor unprolific, neither cauſe nor cauſeleſs; thus in reality ſubverting ourſelves, I know not how, by negations to infinity. Shall we, therefore, thus trifling adduce that which in no reſpect has any ſubſiſtence whatever? For to this all theſe aſſertions are adapted, and after all theſe the very ſubverſion itſelf, as the Elean philoſopher teaches us. This queſtion indeed is not difficult to ſolve; for we have before ſaid that all theſe things apply to that which is not in any reſpect, in conſequence of its being worſe than all theſe, but they apply to the firſt, in conſequence of admitting it to be better than all theſe. For the things denied are not denied of each after the ſame manner; but upwards things leſs, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, are denied of that which is more excellent; and downwards, things better of that which is worſe, if it be poſſible ſo to ſpeak. For we deny things both of matter and *the one*, but in a twofold reſpect, after the above-mentioned manner. This queſtion then, as I have ſaid, is eaſily ſolved.

Again, therefore, it may be ſaid, Does not ſomething proceed from it to the things which are here? Or how indeed ſhould this not be the caſe, if all things are from it? For every thing participates of that from which it proceeds. For, if nothing elſe, it thence poſſeſſes that which it is, reſpiring its proper principle, and converting itſelf to it as much as poſſible. What indeed ſhould hinder it from imparting ſomething of itſelf to its progeny? What other medium is there? And how is it not neceſſary that the ſecond ſhould always be nearer to the one principle than the third? and the third than the fourth? And if this be the caſe, muſt it not alſo leſs depart from it? If this too be the caſe, muſt it not alſo more abide in the boundary of its nature? Hence, too, muſt it not alſo be more aſſimilated to it, ſo that it likewiſe will be adapted to participate of it, and ſo that it will participate of it? How alſo could we ſuſpect theſe things concerning it, unleſs we contained a certain veſtige of it,—a veſtige

hafiening as it were to be conjoined with it? Shall we, therefore, fay that being arcane it beſtows an arcane participation on all things, through which there is in every thing ſomething arcane? For we acknowledge that ſome things are more arcane than others, *the one* than *being*, *being* than *life*, *life* than *intellect*, and thus always in ſucceſſion after the ſame manner; or rather inverſely; from matter as far as to a rational eſſence, theſe things ſubſiſt according to the worſe, but thoſe according to the better, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak. May we not however ſay that he who admits this will alſo make a progreſſion from the firſt, and a certain arcane order of things proceeding, and that thus we ſhall introduce all ſuch effables to the arcane, as we have conditributed with the effable? We ſhall therefore make three monads and three numbers, and no longer two; viz. the eſſential, the unical, or that which is characterized by unity, and the arcane. And thus we ſhall admit what we formerly rejected, i. e. multitude in the arcane, and an order of things firſt, middle, and laſt. There will alſo be permanency, progreſſion and regreſſion; and, in ſhort, we ſhall mingle much of the effable with the ineffable. But if, as we have ſaid, the term *it* or *thoſe* can not be introducedto that arcane nature which we conſider as above *the one* and *the many* neither muſt any thing elſe beſides *the one* be admitted as prior to the many, nor any thing elſe be condiſtributed with the many in participation. Neither, therefore, is it participated, nor does it impart any thing of itſelf to its progeny; nor is every God arcane prior to its being one, as it is one prior to its being eſſence. May we not ſay, therefore, that language here being ſubverted evinces that this nature is arcane by conceiving contraries according to every mode from things poſterior to it? And why is this wonderful, ſince we are alſo involved in ſimilar doubts concerning *the one?* Indeed, is not this alſo the caſe concerning being and that which is perfectly united?

In another part, near the beginning of the ſame admirable work, he remarks that *the one* in every thing is the mere true thing itſelf. Thus, for inſtance, *the one* of man is the mere true man, that of ſoul is the mere true ſoul, and that of body the mere true body. Thus alſo *the one* of the ſun, and *the one* of the moon, are the mere true ſun and moon. After which he obſerves as follows: Neither *the one* nor all things accords with the nature of *the one*. For theſe are oppoſed to each other, and diſtribute our conceptions. For, if we look to the ſimple and *the one*, we deſtroy its immenſely great perfection: and if we conceive all things ſubſiſting together, we aboliſh

abolish *the one* and the simple. But this is because we are divided, and look to divided idioms. At the same time, however, aspiring after the knowledge of it, we connect all things together, that we may thus be able to apprehend this mighty nature. But fearing the introduction of all multitudes, or contracting the peculiar nature of *the one*, and rejoicing in that which is simple and the first in speaking of the most antient principle, we thus introduce *the one itself* as a symbol of simplicity; since we likewise introduce *all things* as a symbol of the comprehension of all things. But that which is above or prior to both we can neither conceive nor denominate. And why is it wonderful that we should suffer these things about it, since the distinct knowledge of it is unical, which we cannot perceive? Other things too of this kind we suffer about *being*. For, endeavouring to perceive *being*, we dismiss it, but run round the elements of it, bound and infinity. But if we form a more true conception of it, that it is an united plenitude of all things, in this case the conception of *all things* draws us down to multitude, and the conception of *the united* abolishes that of all things. Neither however is this yet wonderful. For, with respect to forms also, when we wish to survey any one of these, we run round the elements of it, and, striving to perceive its unity, we obliterate its elements. At the same time, however, every form is one and many; not indeed partly one, and partly many, but the whole of it is through the whole a thing of this kind. Not being able, therefore, to apprehend this collectively, we rejoice in acceding to it with a distribution of our conceptions. But always adhering in our ascent, like those who climb clinging with their hands and feet to things which extend us to a more impartible nature, we obtain in a certain respect a cosensation in the distribution, of that which is uniform. We despise, therefore, this with respect to the collected apprehension of it, which we cannot obtain, unless a certain vestige of collected intelligence in our nature is agitated. And this is the light of truth, which is suddenly enkindled, as if from the collision of fire stones. For our greatest conceptions, when exercised with each other, verge to a uniform and simple summit as their end, like the extremities of lines in a circle hastening to the centre. And though even thus they subsist indeed with distribution, yet a certain vestige of the knowledge of form which we contain is pre-excited; just as the equal tendency of all the lines in a circle to terminate in the middle affords a certain obscure representation of the centre. After the same manner

manner alſo we aſcend to being, in the firſt place, by underſtanding every form which falls upon us as diſtributed, not only as impartible, but alſo as united, and this by confounding, if it be proper ſo to ſpeak, the multitude in each. In the next place, we muſt collect every thing ſeparated together, and take away the circumſcriptions, juſt as if making many ſtreams of water to be one collection of water, except that we muſt not underſtand that which is united from all things, as one collection of water, but we muſt conceive that which is prior to all things, as the form of water prior to divided ſtreams of water. Thus, therefore, we muſt expand ourſelves to *the one*, firſt collecting and afterwards diſmiſſing what we have collected, for the ſuper-expanded tranſcendency of *the one*. Aſcending, therefore, ſhall we meet with it as that which is known? Or, wiſhing to meet with it as ſuch, ſhall we arrive at the unknown? Or may we not ſay that each of theſe is true? For we meet with it afar off as that which is known; and when we are united to it from afar, paſſing beyond that in our nature which is gnoſtic of *the one*, then are we brought to be one, that is, to be unknown inſtead of being gnoſtic. This contact, therefore, as of one with one, is above knowledge, but the other is as of that which is gnoſtic with that which is known. As however the crooked is known by the ſtraight, ſo we form a conjecture of the unknown by the known. And this indeed is a mode of knowledge. *The one*, therefore, is ſo far known, that it does not admit of an approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and imparts a gnoſtic indication of itſelf. Unlike other things, however, the nearer we approach to it, it is not the more, but, on the contrary, leſs known; knowledge being diſſolved by *the one* into ignorance, ſince, as we have before obſerved, where there is knowledge there alſo is ſeparation. But ſeparation belonging to *the one* is incloſed in union; ſo that knowledge alſo is refunded into ignorance. Thus, too, the analogy of Plato requires. For firſt we endeavour to ſee the ſun, and we do indeed ſee it afar off; but by how much the nearer we approach to it, by ſo much the leſs do we ſee it; and at length we neither ſee other things, nor it, the eye becoming ſpontaneouſly dazzled by its light. Is, therefore, *the one* in its proper nature unknown, though there is ſomething elſe unknown beſides *the one*? *The one* indeed wills to be by itſelf, but with no other; but the unknown beyond *the one* is perfectly ineffable, which we acknowledge neither knows nor is ignorant, but has with reſpect to itſelf ſuper-ignorance. Hence by proximity to this *the one* itſelf

itſelf is darkened: for, being very near to the immenſe principle, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, it remains as it were in the adytum of that truly myſtic ſilence. On this account, Plato in ſpeaking of it finds all his aſſertions ſubverted: for it is near to the ſubverſion of every thing, which takes place about the firſt. It differs from it however in this, that it is *one* ſimply, and that according to *the one* it is alſo at the ſame time all things. But the firſt is above *the one* and all things, being more ſimple than both theſe.

P. 166. *Note. Such then is the intelligible triad.*

In order to convince the reader that the doctrine here delivered of the intelligible triad is not a fiction deviſed by the latter Platoniſts, I ſhall preſent him with the following tranſlation from the ſame excellent work of Damaſcius (Περι αρχων,) *Concerning principles**, in which the agreement of all the antient theologiſts concerning this triad is moſt admirably evinced.

The theology contained in the Orphic rhapſodies concerning the intelligible Gods is as follows:—*Time* is ſymbolically placed for the one principle of the univerſe; but *æther* and *chaos*, for the two poſterior to this one: and *being*, ſimply conſidered, is repreſented under the ſymbol of an egg. And this is the firſt triad of the intelligible Gods. But for the perfection of the ſecond triad they eſtabliſh either a conceiving and a conceived egg as a God, or a white garment, or a cloud: becauſe from theſe Phanes leaps forth into light. For, indeed, they philoſophize variouſly concerning the middle triad. But Phanes here repreſents intellect. But conceiving him over and above this, as father and power, contributes nothing to Orpheus. But they call the third triad Metis as *intellect*†, Ericapæus as *power*, and Phanes as *father*. But whether or not are we to conſider the middle triad according to the three-ſhaped God, while conceived in the egg‡? for the middle always repreſents each of the extremes; as in this inſtance, where the egg and the three-ſhaped God ſubſiſt together. And here you may perceive that the egg is that which is united; but that the three-ſhaped and really multiform God is the ſeparating and diſcriminating cauſe of that which is

* Vide Wolfii Anecdot. Græc. tom. iii. p. 252.

† Ὡς νουν is omitted in the original.

‡ This is not an interrogative ſentence in the original, but certainly ought to be ſo.

intelligible

intelligible. Likewiſe, the middle triad ſubſiſts according to the egg, as yet united; but the third* according to the God who ſeparates and diſtributes the whole intelligible order. And this is the common and familiar Orphic theology. But that delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanicus is as follows. According to them *water* and *matter* were the firſt productions from which earth was ſecretly drawn forth: ſo that water and earth are eſtabliſhed as the two firſt principles: the latter of theſe having a *diſperſed* ſubſiſtence, but the former conglutinating and connecting the latter. But they are ſilent concerning the principle prior to theſe two, as being ineffable: for, as there are no illuminations about him, his arcane and ineffable nature is from hence ſufficiently evinced. But the third principle poſterior to theſe two, *water* and *earth*, and which is generated from them, is a *dragon*, naturally endued with the heads of a bull and a lion, but in the middle having the countenance of the God himſelf. They add, likewiſe, that he has wings on his ſhoulders, and that he is called *undecaying Time*, and *Hercules*; that *Neceſſity* reſides with him, which is the ſame as *Nature*, and incorporeal *Adraſtia*, which is extended throughout the univerſe, whoſe limits ſhe binds in amicable conjunction. But, as it appears to me, they denominate this third principle as eſtabliſhed according to eſſence, and aſſert, beſides this, that it ſubſiſts as male and female, for the purpoſe of exhibiting the generative cauſes of all things.

I likewiſe find in the Orphic rhapſodies, that, neglecting the two firſt principles, together with the one principle who is delivered in ſilence, the third principle, poſterior to the two, is eſtabliſhed by the theology as the original; becauſe this firſt of all poſſeſſes ſomething effable and commenſurate to human diſcourſe. For, in the former hypotheſis, the highly reverenced and undecaying *Time*, the father of æther and chaos, was the principle: but in this *Time* is neglected, and the principle becomes *a dragon*. It likewiſe ſays that there was a triple offſpring; moiſt æther, an infinite chaos, and cloudy and dark Erebus; delivering this ſecond triad analogous to the firſt: this being potential, as that was paternal. Hence, the third proceſſion of this triad is dark Erebus: its paternal and ſummit æther, not according to a ſimple but intellectual ſubſiſtence: but its middle, infinite chaos, conſidered as a progeny or proceſſion, and among theſe parturient, becauſe from theſe the third intelligible triad proceeds. What then is the third intelligible triad? I anſwer, The egg; the duad of the natures of male and female

* Το τριτον is, I conceive, erroneouſly ommitted in the original.

which it contains, and the multitude of all-various ſeeds, reſiding in the middle of this triad: and the third among theſe is an incorporeal God, bearing golden wings on his ſhoulders; but in his inward parts naturally poſſeſſing the heads of bulls, upon which heads a mighty dragon appears, inveſted with the all-various forms of wild beaſts. This laſt then muſt be conſidered as the *intellect* of the triad; but the middle progeny, which are *many* as well as *two*, correſpond to *power*, and the egg itſelf is the *paternal principle* of the third triad: but the third God of this third triad, this theology celebrates as *Protogonus*, and calls him *Jupiter*, the diſpoſer of all things and of the whole world; and on this account denominates him *Pan*. And ſuch is the information which this theology affords us, concerning the genealogy of the intelligible principles of things.

But in the writings of the Peripatetic Eudemus, containing the theology of Orpheus, the whole intelligible order is paſſed over in ſilence, as being every way ineffable and unknown, and incapable of verbal enunciation. Eudemus, therefore, commences his genealogy from *Night*, from which alſo Homer begins: though Eudemus is far from making the Homeric genealogy conſiſtent and connected, for he aſſerts that Homer begins from Ocean and Tethys. It is however apparent that *Night* is according to Homer the greateſt divinity, ſince ſhe is reverenced even by Jupiter himſelf. For the poet ſays of Jupiter—"that he feared leſt he ſhould act in a manner diſpleaſing to ſwift *Night* *.' So that Homer begins his genealogy of the Gods from *Night*. But it appears to me that Heſiod, when he aſſerts that Chaos was firſt generated, ſignifies by Chaos the incomprehenſible and perfectly united nature of that which is intelligible: but that he produces Earth † the firſt from thence, as a certain principle of the whole proceſſion of the Gods. Unleſs perhaps Chaos is the ſecond of the two principles: but Earth ‡, Tartarus, and Love form the triple intelligible. So that

* Αζετο γαρ μη νυκτι θοη αποθυμια ρεζοι. Iliad. lib. ξ. ver. 261.

† Τηγν is printed inſtead of Γην.

‡ As the whole of the Grecian theology is the progeny of the myſtic traditions of Orpheus, it is evident that the Gods which Heſiod celebrates by the epithets of *Earth*, *Heaven*, &c. cannot be the viſible *Heaven* and *Earth*: for Plato in the Cratylus, following the Orphic doctrine concerning the Gods, as will appear in our notes on that dialogue, plainly ſhows, in explaining the name of Jupiter, that this divinity, who is ſubordinate to *Saturn*, *Heaven*, *Earth*, &c. is the artificer of the ſenſible univerſe; and conſequently *Saturn*, *Heaven*,

that *Love* is to be placed for the third monad of the intelligible order, conſidered according to its convertive nature; for it is thus denominated by Orpheus in his rhapſodies. But *Earth* for the firſt, as being firſt eſtabliſhed in a certain firm and eſſential permanency. And *Tartarus* for the middle, as in a certain reſpect exciting and moving forms into diſtribution. But Acuſilaus appears to me to eſtabliſh *Chaos* for the firſt principle, as entirely unknown; and after this, two principles, *Erebus* as male, and *Night* as female; placing the latter for *infinity*, but the former for *bound*. But from the mixture of theſe, he ſays * that *Æther*, *Love*, and *Counſel* are generated forming three intelligible hypoſtaſes. And he places *Æther* as the ſummit; but *Love* in the middle, according to its naturally middle ſubſiſtence; but *Metis* or *Counſel* as the third, and the ſame as highly-reverenced intellect. And, according to the hiſtory of Eudemus, from theſe he produces a great number of other Gods. But Epimenides eſtabliſhes *Air* and *Night* as the two firſt principles; manifeſtly reverencing in ſilence the one principle prior to theſe two. But from Air and Night *Tartarus* is generated, forming, as it appears to me, the third principle, as a certain mixed temperature from the two. And this mixture is called by ſome an intelligible medium, becauſe it extends itſelf to both the ſummit and the end. But from the mixture of the extremes with each other an egg is generated, which is truly an intelligible animal: and from this again another progeny proceeds. But according to Pherecydes Syrius, the three firſt principles are, *a Perpetually-abiding Vital Nature*, *Time* †, and *an Earthly Nature:* one of theſe ſubſiſting, as I conceive, prior to the other two. But

Heaven, *Earth*, &c. are much ſuperior to the mundane deities. Indeed, if this be not admitted, the Theogony of Heſiod muſt be perfectly abſurd and inexplicable. For why does he call Jupiter, agreeably to Homer, (πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε), "*father of Gods and men?*" Shall we ſay that he means literally that Jupiter is the father of *all* the Gods? But this is impoſſible; for he delivers the generation of Gods who are the parents of Jupiter. He can, therefore, only mean that Jupiter is the parent of all the mundane Gods: and his Theogony, when conſidered according to this expoſition, will be found to be beautifully conſiſtent and ſublime; whereas, according to modern interpretations, the whole is a mere chaos, more wild than the delirious viſions of Swedenborg, and more unconnected than the *filthy* rant of the ſtool-preaching methodiſt. I only add, that τγν is erroneouſly printed in the Excerpta of Wolfius for γην.

* Φημι in the original ſhould doubtleſs be ζητει.

† Χθονον is printed for χρονον.

he aſſerts that *Time* generates from the progeny of itſelf, *Fire*, *Spirit*, and *Water:* which ſignify, as it appears to me, the triple nature of that which is intelligible. But from theſe, diſtributed into five profound receſſes, a numerous progeny of Gods is conſtituted, which he calls *five-times animated* (πεντεμψυχος); and which is, perhaps, the ſame as if he had ſaid πεντεκοσμος, or a *five-fold world*. But we may probaby diſcourſe on this ſubject at ſome other opportunity. And thus much may ſuffice at preſent concerning the hypotheſis derived from the Grecian fables, which are both many and various.

But with reſpect to the theology of the barbarians, the Babylonians ſeem to paſs over in ſilence the one principle of the univerſe. But they eſtabliſh two principles, Tauthe and Apaſoon. And they conſider Apaſoon as the huſband of Tauthe, whom they denominate the mother of the Gods; from whom an only-begotten ſon *Mooumis* was produced: which, as it appears to me, is no other than the intelligible world deduced from two principles*. But from theſe another proceſſion is derived, *Dache* and *Dachus*. And likewiſe a third from theſe, *Kiſſare* and *Aſſoorus*. And from theſe again three deities are produced, *Anus*, *Illinus*, and *Aus*. But from *Aus* and *Dache* a ſon called Belus is produced, who they ſay is the demiurgus of the world. But with reſpect to the Magi, and all the Arion race, as we are informed by Eudemus, ſome of them call all the intelligible and united world *Place*, and ſome of them *Time:* from which *a good divinity* and *an evil dæmon* are diſtributed; *Light* and *Darkneſs* ſubſiſting prior to theſe, according to the aſſertions of others. However, both the one and the other, after an undiſtributed nature, conſider that nature as having a ſubſiſtence which diſtributes the twofold coordination of better natures: one of which coordinations *Oroſmades* preſides over, and the other *Arimanius*. But the Sidonians, according to the ſame hiſtorian, place before all things *Time*, *Deſire*, and *Cloudy Darkneſs*. And they aſſert, that from the mingling of *Deſire* and *Darkneſs* as two principles, *Air* and *a gentle Wind* were produced: *Air* evincing the ſummit of the intelligible triad; but *the gentle Wind* raiſed and proceeding from this, the vital prototype of the intelligible. And again, that from both theſe the bird *Otus*, ſimilar to a night raven, was produced; repreſenting, as it appears to me, intelligible intellect. But as we find (with-

* That is, from *bound* and *infinite*.

out the aſſiſtance of Eudemus) the Phœnician mythology, according to Moſchus, places *Æther* and *Air* as the two firſt principles, from which the intelligible God *Oulomus* was produced; who, as it appears to me, is the ſummit of the intelligible order. But from this God (yet proceeding together with him) they aſſert that *Chouſorus* was produced, being the firſt unfolding proceſſion. And after this *an egg* ſucceeds; which I think muſt be called intelligible intellect. But the unfolding *Chouſorus* is intelligible power, becauſe this is the firſt nature which diſtributes an undiſtributed ſubſiſtence: unleſs, perhaps, after the two principles *Æther* and *Air*, the ſummit is *one Wind*; but the middle *two Winds*, the *ſouth-weſt* and the *ſouth*; for in a certain reſpect they place theſe prior to *Oulomus*. But *Oulomus* himſelf is intelligible intellect: and unfolding *Chouſorus** the firſt order after the intelligible ſeries. And the *egg itſelf* is heaven: from the burſting of which into two parts, the ſections are ſaid to have become heaven and earth. But with reſpect to the Egyptians, nothing accurately is related of them by Eudemus. According to certain Egyptian philoſophers, however, among us, *an unknown Darkneſs* is celebrated in ſome Egyptian writings as the one principle of the univerſe, and this *thrice pronounced as ſuch:* but for the two principles after the firſt, they place *water* and *ſand*, according to Heraiſcus; but according to the more antient writer Aſclepiades, *ſand* and *water*; from which, and after which, the firſt *Kamephis* is generated. But after this *a ſecond*, and from this again *a third*; by all which the whole intelligible diſtribution is accompliſhed. For thus Aſclepiades determines. But the more modern Heraiſcus ſays, that the Egyptians, denominating the third Kamephis from his father and grandfather, aſſert that he is *the Sun*; which, doubtleſs, ſignifies in this caſe intelligible intellect. But a more accurate knowledge of theſe affairs muſt be received from the above-mentioned authors themſelves. It muſt, however, be obſerved, that with the Egyptians there are many diſtributions of things according to union; becauſe they unfold an intelligible nature into characteriſtics, or peculiarities of many Gods, as may be learned from ſuch as are deſirous of conſulting their writings on this ſubject.

Thus far Damaſcius; from which curious and intereſting relation the reader may not only perceive at one view the agreement of the antient theologiſts with each other

* χουσωρος ſhould be read inſtead of χουσωρου.

in

in celebrating the intelligible triad, and venerating in ſilence the ineffable principle of things, but may likewiſe behold the origin of the chriſtian trinity, its deviation from truth, and the abſurdity, and even impiety, with which a belief in it is unavoidably attended. Conſonant too with the above relation is the doctrine of the Chaldæans concerning the intelligible order, as delivered by Johannes Picus, in his *Concluſions according to the opinion of the Chaldæan theologiſts* *. "The intelligible coordination (ſays he) is not in the intellectual coordination, as Amaſis the Egyptian aſſerts, but is above every intellectual hierarchy, imparticipably concealed in the abyſs of the firſt unity, and under the obſcurity of the firſt darkneſs." Coordinatio intelligibilis non eſt in intellectuali coordinatione, ut dixit Amaſis Ægyptius, ſed eſt ſuper omnem intellectualem hierarchium, in abyſſo primæ unitatis, et ſub caligine primarum tenebrarum imparticipaliter abſcondita.

But from this triad it may be demonſtrated, that all the proceſſions of the Gods may be comprehended in ſix orders, viz. the *intelligible order*, the *intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual*, the *intellectual*, the *ſupermundane*, the *liberated*, and the *mundane* †. For the *intelligible*, as we have already obſerved, muſt hold the firſt rank, and muſt conſiſt of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, i. e. muſt *abide*, *proceed*, and *return*, and this ſupereſſentially; at the ſame time that it is characterized, or ſubſiſts principally according to *being*. But, in the next place, that which is both *intelligible* and *intellectual* ſucceeds, which muſt likewiſe be triple, but muſt principally ſubſiſt according to *life*, or *intelligence*. And, in the third place, the *intellectual* order muſt ſucceed, which is *triply convertive*. But as, in conſequence of the exiſtence of the ſenſible world, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be ſome demiurgic cauſe of its exiſtence, this cauſe can only be found in *intellect*, and in the laſt hypoſtaſis of the *intellectual triad*. For all forms in this hypoſtaſis ſubſiſt according to all-various and perfect diviſions; and forms can only fabricate when they have a perfect intellectual ſeparation from each other. But ſince *fabrication* is nothing more than *proceſſion*, the demiurgus will be to the poſterior order of the Gods what *the one* is to the orders prior to the *demiurgus*; and conſequently he will be that ſecondarily which the firſt cauſe of all is primarily. Hence, his

* Vid. Pici Opera, tom. i. p. 54.

† i. e. Θεοι νοητοι, νοητοι και νοεροι, νοεροι, ὑπερκοσμιοι, ἀπολυτοι ſive ὑπερουρανιοι, et ἐγκοσμιοι.

firſt production will be an order of Gods analogous to the *intelligible* order, and which is denominated *ſupermundane*. After this he muſt produce an order of Gods ſimilar to the *intelligible* and *intellectual* order, and which are denominated *liberated* Gods. And in the laſt place, a proceſſion correſpondent to the *intellectual* order, and which can be no other than the *mundane* Gods. For the demiurgus is chiefly characterized according to diverſity, and is allotted the boundary of all univerſal hypoſtaſes.

ADDITIONAL