THE PARMENIDES:

A DIALOGUE

ON THE GODS.

ERRATA.

Vol. III. p. 35, in the laſt line, for *infinite, multitude,* read *infinite multitude.*

——— p. 581, lines, 26, 27, 28, 29, for the word *mere,* in each of theſe lines, read *more.*

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PARMENIDES.

IT was the cuſtom of Pythagoras and his followers, amongſt whom Plato holds the moſt diſtinguiſhed rank, to conceal divine myſteries under the veil of ſymbols and figures; to diſſemble their wiſdom againſt the arrogant boaſtings of the Sophiſts; to jeſt ſeriouſly, and ſport in earneſt. Hence, in the following moſt important dialogue, under the appearance of a certain dialectic ſport, and, as it were, logical diſcuſſion, Plato has delivered a complete ſyſtem of the profound and beautiful theology of the Greeks. For it is not to be ſuppoſed that he, who in all his other dialogues introduces diſcuſſions adapted to the character of the principal ſpeaker, ſhould in this dialogue deviate from his general plan, and exhibit Parmenides, a venerable and aged philoſopher, engaged in the puerile exerciſe of a merely logical diſputation. Beſides, it was uſual with the Pythagoreans and Plato to form an harmonious conjunction of many materials in one ſubject, partly in imitation of nature, and partly for the ſake of elegance and grace. Thus, in the Phædrus, Plato mingles oratory with theology; in the Timæus, mathematics with phyſics; and in the preſent dialogue, dialectic with divine ſpeculations.

But the reader muſt not ſuppoſe that the dialectic of Plato is the ſame with vulgar dialectic, which is converſant with opinion, and is accurately inveſtigated in Ariſtotle's Topics: for the buſineſs of this firſt of ſciences, which at preſent is utterly unknown, is to employ definitions, diviſions, analyſations, and demonſtrations, as primary ſciences in the inveſtigation of cauſes; imitating the progreſſions of beings from the firſt principle of things, and their continual converſion to it, as the ultimate object of deſire. "But there are three energies," ſays Proclus [1], "of this moſt ſcientific method:

[1] In MSS. Comment. in Parmenidem, lib. i.

the firſt of which is adapted to youth, and is uſeful for the purpoſe of rouſing their intellect, which is, as it were, in a dormant ſtate; for it is a true exerciſe of the eye of the ſoul in the ſpeculation of things, leading forth through oppoſite poſitions the eſſential impreſſion of reaſons which it contains, and conſidering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain any thing worthy of belief; and, laſtly, ſtimulating the all-various conceptions of the ſoul. But the ſecond energy takes place when intellect reſts from its former inveſtigations, as becoming moſt familiar with the ſpeculation of beings, and beholds truth itſelf firmly eſtabliſhed upon a pure and holy foundation. And this energy, according to Socrates, by a progreſſion through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible nature, till it arrives at that which is firſt; and this by analyſing, defining, demonſtrating, and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, till, having entirely inveſtigated the nature of intelligibles, it raiſes itſelf to a nature ſuperior to beings. But the ſoul being perfectly eſtabliſhed in this nature, as in her paternal port, no longer tends to a more excellent object of deſire, as ſhe has now arrived at the end of her ſearch: and you may ſay that what is delivered in the Phædrus and Sophiſta is the employment of this energy, giving a twofold diviſion to ſome, and a fourfold to other operations of the dialectic art; and on this account it is aſſigned to ſuch as philoſophize purely, and no longer require preparatory exerciſe, but nouriſh the intellect of their ſoul in pure intellection. But the third energy, which is exhibitive according to truth, purifies from twofold ignorance when its reaſons are employed upon men full of opinion; and this is ſpoken of in the Sophiſta." So that the dialectic energy is triple, either ſubſiſting through oppoſite arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falſehood.

Parmenides by means of this dialectic perfects the conceptions of Socrates about ideas. For, as Proclus well obſerves, the mode of diſcourſe is every where obſtetric, but does not confute; and is explorative, but not defenſive. But it differs, conſidered as ſometimes proceeding from on high to ſuch things as are laſt, and ſometimes aſcending from ſenſible particulars to ſuch reaſons as are accommodated to divine cauſes; but, according to each of theſe, it elevates Socrates, calls forth his native conceptions concerning ideas, and cauſes them to poſſeſs an expanded diſtinction. And in this reſpect,

ſpect, ſays Proclus, Parmenides truly imitates the paternal cauſe of the univerſality of things, who from the ſupreme hypoſtaſis of all beings, preſerves and perfects all things, and draws them upwards by his unknown and ineffable powers.

With reſpect to the dramatic apparatus of this dialogue, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that the Athenians had two feſtivals in honour of Minerva; the former of which, on account of the greater preparation required in its celebration, was called *the greater Panathenaia*; and the latter, on account of its requiring a leſs apparatus, was denominated *the leſſer Panathenaia*. The celebration of them, likewiſe, was diſtinguiſhed by longer and ſhorter periods of time. In conſequence, therefore, of the greater feſtival taking place, ſacred to Minerva, Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens, Parmenides being the maſter, and Zeno his diſciple; but both of them Eleateans—and not only this, ſays Proclus, but partakers of the Pythagoric doctrine, according to the relation of Callimachus the hiſtorian. Parmenides and Zeno, therefore, in a place called the Ceramicus, beyond the walls of the city, and which was ſacred to the ſtatues of the Gods, met with one Pythodorus, together with Socrates and many other Athenians, who came thither for the purpoſe of hearing the writings of Zeno. The enſuing dialogue, which was the conſequence of Zeno's diſcourſe, was afterwards related by Pythodorus to one Antiphon, the brother on the mother's ſide of Adimantus and Glaucus, who were the brothers of Plato, both from the ſame father and mother; and the dialogue is ſuppoſed to be again related by Antiphon to Cephalus and his companions, in conſequence of their ſoliciting Adimantus and Glaucus to requeſt Antiphon for the narration.

Zeno, therefore, having read to the audience a book, in which he endeavoured to exhibit the difficulties attending the doctrine which aſſerts the exiſtence of *the many*, and this in order to defend the favourite dogma of Parmenides, who called *being*, *the one*; Socrates by no means oppoſes his arguments, but readily admits the errors which muſt enſue from ſuppoſing multitude to exiſt, without participating *the one*. However, Socrates does not reſt here, but urges Zeno to a ſpeculation of *the one* and the *unities* which ſubſiſt in intelligible natures, not enduring to dwell on the contemplation of *the one* which ſenſibles contain: and this leads him to the inveſtigation of ideas in which the unities of things reſide. After this Parmenides,

not in the leaſt contradicting Socrates, but completing the contemplation which he had begun, unfolds the entire doctrine of ideas, introducing for this purpoſe four queſtions concerning them: whether they have a ſubſiſtence; of what things there are ideas, and of what not; what kind of beings they are, and what power they poſſeſs: and how they are participated by ſubordinate natures. And this being diſcuſſed, Parmenides aſcends from hence to *the one* which ſubſiſts above intelligibles and ideas, and adduces nine hypotheſes concerning it; five, ſuppoſing *the one* to have a ſubſiſtence, and four, ſuppoſing it not to ſubſiſt; accurately inveſtigating, at the ſame time, the conſequences reſulting from theſe hypotheſes. But of this more hereafter.

With reſpect to ideas, though many invincible arguments may be adduced for their exiſtence, the following appear to me remarkable for their perſpicuity and ſtrength. Diverſity of powers always indicates diverſity of objects. But it is obvious to every one, that the power of intellect is different from the power of ſenſe; that which is ſenſible, therefore, is one thing, and that which is intelligible another. And as intellect is ſuperior to ſenſe, ſo is intelligible more excellent than that which is ſenſible. But that which is ſenſible has an exiſtence; and by a much greater reaſon, therefore, that which is intelligible muſt have a real ſubſiſtence. But intelligible is a certain univerſal ſpecies; for univerſal reaſon is always the object of intelligence. And hence there are ſuch things as intelligible and common ſpecies of things which we call ideas.

Again, all corporeal natures ſubſiſt in time; but whatever ſubſiſts in time is meaſured by time; and whatever is thus conditioned depends on time for the perfection of its being. But time is compoſed of the paſt, preſent, and future. And if we conceive that any one of theſe periods is taken away from the nature with which it is connected, that nature muſt immediately periſh. Time, therefore, is ſo eſſentially and intimately united with the natures which it meaſures, that their being, ſuch as it is, depends on the exiſtence of time. But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, and this in the moſt rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is evident, therefore, that the natures to which it is ſo eſſential muſt ſubſiſt in a manner equally tranſitory and flowing. As we cannot, therefore, affirm with propriety, of any part of time that it *is*, ſince even before we can form the aſſertion

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the preſent time is no more, ſo with reſpect to all corporeal natures (from their ſubſiſtence in time), before we can ſay that they exiſt, they loſe all identity of being. And hence no one of them is truly that which it is ſaid to be. On the contrary, truth is eternal and immutable: for, if any one ſhould aſſert that truth is not, he aſſerts this either truly or falſely; but if falſely, there is ſuch a thing as truth; and if truly, then it is true that there is no ſuch thing as truth. But if it is truly aſſerted, it can only be true through truth; and, conſequently, there is ſuch a thing as truth, which muſt alſo be eternal and immutable. Hence, truth cannot ſubſiſt in any thing mutable; for that which is ſituated in a mutable nature is alſo changed in conjunction with it. But all corporeal natures are continually changed, and hence they are neither true, nor have a true exiſtence. If, therefore, the forms of bodies are imperfect, they are not the firſt forms; for whatever ranks as firſt is perfect and entire, ſince the whole reaſon of every nature is eſtabliſhed in that which is firſt. There are, therefore, certain forms above theſe, perfect, primary, and entire, and which are not indigent of a ſubject.

But if the forms of bodies are not true, where do the true forms ſubſiſt? Shall we ſay nowhere? But in this caſe falſehood would be more powerful than truth, if the former poſſeſſed, and the latter had no, ſubſiſtence. But this is impoſſible. For that which is more powerful derives its power from truth; ſince, unleſs it was truly more powerful, it would not be that which it is ſaid to be. But, indeed, without the preſence of truth, the forms which are ſaid to be falſe could not ſubſiſt; for they would no longer be what they are, unleſs it was true that they are falſe. True ſpecies, therefore, have a ſubſiſtence ſomewhere. But does not our ſoul poſſeſs truer ſpecies than thoſe which are the objects of ſenſible inſpection, by which it judges, condemns, and corrects them, and underſtands how far they depart from, and in what reſpect they agree with, ſuch forms as are true? But he who does not behold true forms, can by no means make a compariſon between them and others, and rectify the inaccuracy of the one by the accurate truth of the other. For the ſoul, indeed, corrects the viſible circle, when it does not touch a plane in one point only; approves or condemns every artificial ſtructure and muſical modulation; and judges concerning the goodneſs or depravity, utility or detriment, beauty or deformity, of every object in nature.

ture. The ſoul, therefore, poſſeſſes truer forms, by which ſhe judges of corporeal natures. But neither are theſe forms in the ſoul firſt forms, for they are movable; and though not ſubſiſting in place, yet they have a diſcurſive proceſſion through the intervals of time. Nor do they always exiſt in energy; for the ſoul does not always energize through them. Nor do they ſubſiſt in a total but in a partial intellect. For as the ſoul is not total intellect, on account of its ſelf-motive nature, ſo the intellect which is in ſoul is not a total and firſt intellect, but ſuffers a remiſſion of intellectual union, from its connection with the diſcurſive energies of ſoul. There is, therefore, above ſoul, and that intellect which is a part of ſoul, a certain firſt intellect, in itſelf entire and perfectly complete, in which the firſt and moſt true ſpecies of all things are contained, and which have a ſubſiſtence independent of time, place, and motion. And this firſt intellect is no other than that vital nature αυτοζωον, or *animal itſelf*, in which Plato in the Timæus repreſents the artificer of the univerſe contemplating the ideas of things, and fabricating the machine of the world according to this all-beautiful exemplar.

Again, the artificer of the univerſe muſt be a God. Every God operates eſſentially, or produces from his eſſence that which he produces, becauſe this is the moſt perfect mode of production. Every thing which operates eſſentially produces an image of itſelf. He, therefore, who fabricated the univerſe, fabricated it an image of itſelf. But if this be the caſe, he contains in himſelf paradigmatically the cauſes of the univerſe: and theſe cauſes are ideas. To which we may add, that the perfect muſt neceſſarily antecede the imperfect; unity, multitude; the indiviſible, the diviſible; and that which abides perpetually the ſame, that which ſubſiſts in unceaſing mutation. From all which it follows, that things do not originate from baſer natures, but that they end in theſe; and that they commence from natures the moſt perfect, the moſt beautiful, and the beſt. For it is not poſſible that our intellect ſhould be able to apprehend things properly equal, ſimilar, and the like, and that the intellect of the artificer of the univerſe ſhould not contain in itſelf the eſſentially equal, juſt, beautiful, and good, and, in ſhort, every thing which has a univerſal and perfect ſubſiſtence, and which, from its reſidence in deity, forms a link of that luminous chain of ſubſtances to which we very properly give the appellation of ideas.

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The following additional arguments in defence of the Platonic doctrine of ideas are given for the ſake of the liberal and Platonic reader. The whole is nearly extracted from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides.

This viſible world is either ſelf-ſubſiſtent, or it derives its ſubſiſtence from a ſuperior cauſe. But if it is admitted to be ſelf-ſubſiſtent, many abſurd conſequences will enſue: for it is neceſſary that every thing ſelf-ſubſiſtent ſhould be impartible; becauſe every thing which makes and every thing which generates is entirely incorporeal. For bodies make through incorporeal powers; fire by heat, and ſnow by coldneſs. But if it is neceſſary that the maker ſhould be incorporeal, and in things ſelf-ſubſiſtent the ſame thing is the maker and the thing made, the generator and the thing generated, that which is ſelf-ſubſiſtent will be perfectly impartible. But the world is not a thing of this kind: for every body is every way diviſible, and conſequently is not ſelf-ſubſiſtent. Again: every thing ſelf-ſubſiſtent is alſo ſelf-energetic. For, as it generates itſelf, it is by a much greater priority naturally adapted to energize in itſelf, ſince to make and to generate are no other than to energize. But the world is not ſelf-motive, becauſe it is corporeal. No body, therefore, is naturally adapted to be moved, and at the ſame time to move according to the whole of itſelf. For neither can the whole at the ſame time heat itſelf, and be heated by itſelf: for, becauſe it is heated, it will not yet be hot, in conſequence of the heat being gradually propagated through all its parts; but, becauſe it heats, it will poſſeſs heat, and thus the ſame thing will be, and yet not be, hot. As, therefore, it is impoſſible that any body can move itſelf according to internal change, neither can this be effected by any other motion. And, in ſhort, every corporeal motion is more ſimilar to paſſion than to energy; but a ſelf-motive energy is immaterial and impartible: ſo that, if the world is corporeal, it will not be ſelf-motive. But, if not ſelf-motive, neither will it be ſelf-ſubſiſtent. And if it is not ſelf-ſubſiſtent, it is evident that it is produced by another cauſe.

For, again, that which is not ſelf-ſubſiſtent is twofold, viz. it is either better than, or inferior to, cauſe. And that which is more excellent than cauſe [1], as is the ineffable principle of things, has ſomething poſterior to

[1] This is demonſtrated by Proclus in his Elements of Theology.

itſelf, ſuch as is a ſelf-ſubſiſtent nature. But that which is ſubordinate to cauſe is entirely ſuſpended from a ſelf-ſubſiſtent cauſe. It is neceſſary, therefore, that the world ſhould ſubſiſt from another more excellent cauſe. But, with reſpect to this cauſe, whether does it make according to free will and the reaſoning energy, or produce the univerſe by its very eſſence? for, if according to free will, its energy in making will be unſtable and ambiguous, and will ſubſiſt differently at different times. The world, therefore, will be corruptible: for that which is generated from a cauſe moving differently at different times is mutable and corruptible. But, if the cauſe of the univerſe operated from reaſoning and inquiry in producing the world, his energy could not be ſpontaneous and truly his own; but his eſſence would be ſimilar to that of the artificer, who does not derive his productions from himſelf, but procures them as ſomething adventitious by learning and inquiry. Hence we infer that the world is eternal, and that its maker produced it by his very eſſence; for, in ſhort, every thing which makes according to free will has alſo the eſſential energy. Thus, our ſoul, which energizes in many things according to free will, imparts at the ſame time life to the body by its very eſſence, which life does not depend on our free will: for, otherwiſe, the animal from every adverſe circumſtance would be diſſolved, the ſoul on ſuch occaſions condemning its aſſociation with the body. But not every thing which operates from its very eſſence has alſo another energy according to free will. Thus, fire heats by its very eſſence alone, but produces nothing from the energy of will; nor is this effected by ſnow, nor, in ſhort, by any body, ſo far as body. If, therefore, the eſſential energy is more extended than that of free will, it is evident that it proceeds from a more venerable and elevated cauſe: and this very properly; for the creative energy of natures that operate from their very eſſence is unattended with anxiety. But it is eſpecially neceſſary to conceive an energy of this kind in divine natures; ſince we alſo then live more free from anxiety, and with greater eaſe, when our life is divine, or according to virtue. If, therefore, there is a cauſe of the univerſe operating from his very eſſence, he is that primarily which his production is ſecondarily; and that which he is primarily he imparts in a ſecondary degree to his production. Thus, fire both imparts heat to ſomething elſe, and is itſelf hot; and ſoul imparts life, and poſſeſſes life: and this reaſoning will be found to

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be true in every thing which operates eſſentially. The cauſe of the univerſe, therefore, fabricating from his very eſſence, is that primarily which the world is ſecondarily. But, if the world is full of all-various forms, theſe will ſubſiſt primarily in the cauſe of the world: for it is the ſame cauſe which gave ſubſiſtence to the ſun and moon, to man and horſe. Theſe, therefore, are primarily in the cauſe of the world; another ſun beſides the apparent, another man, and, in a ſimilar manner, every other form. There are, therefore, forms prior to ſenſibles, and demiurgic cauſes of the phænomena pre-ſubſiſting in the one cauſe of the univerſe.

But if any one ſhould ſay that the world has indeed a cauſe, yet not producing, but final, and that thus all things are orderly diſpoſed with relation to this cauſe, it is ſo far well indeed, that they admit the good to preſide over the univerſe. But, it may be aſked, whether does the world receive any thing from this cauſe, or nothing according to deſire? for, if nothing, the deſire by which it extends itſelf towards this cauſe is vain. But if it receives ſomething from this cauſe, and this cauſe not only imparts good to the world, but imparts it eſſentially, by a much greater priority, it will be the cauſe of exiſtence to the univerſe, that it may impart good to it eſſentially; and thus he will not only be the final, but the producing cauſe of the univerſe.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to the phænomena, to things equal and unequal, ſimilar and diſſimilar, and all ſuch ſenſible particulars as are by no means truly denominated: for where is there equality in ſenſibles which are mingled with inequality? where ſimilitude in things filled with diſſimilitude? where the beautiful among things of which the ſubject is baſe? where the good in things in which there is capacity and the imperfect? Each of theſe ſenſible particulars, therefore, is not that truly which it is ſaid to be: for, how can things, the nature of which conſiſts in the impartible and in privation of interval, ſubſiſt perfectly in things partible, and endued with interval? But our ſoul is able, both to conceive and generate things far more accurate and pure than the phænomena. Hence, it corrects the apparent circle, and points out how far it falls ſhort of the perfectly accurate. And it is evident that in ſo doing it beholds another form more beautiful and more perfect than this: for, unleſs it beheld ſomething more pure, it could not ſay that this is not truly beautiful, and that is not in every reſpect equal. If, therefore, a partial ſoul ſuch as ours is able to generate and contemplate

in itſelf things more perfect than the phænomena, ſuch as the accurate ſphere and circle, the accurately beautiful and equal, and, in a ſimilar manner, every other form, but the cauſe of the univerſe is neither able to generate, nor contemplate, things more beautiful than the phænomena, how is the one the fabricator of the univerſe, but the other of a part of the univerſe? For a greater power is effective of things more perfect, and a more immaterial intellect contemplates more excellent ſpectacles. The maker of the world, therefore, is able both to generate and underſtand forms much more accurate and perfect than the phænomena. Where, then, does he generate, and where does he behold them? Evidently, in himſelf: for he contemplates himſelf. So that, by beholding and generating himſelf, he at the ſame time generates in himſelf, and gives ſubſiſtence to forms more immaterial and more accurate than the phænomena.

In the third place, if there is no cauſe of the univerſe, but all things are from chance, how are all things coordinated to each other, and how do things perpetually ſubſiſt? And whence is it that all things are thus generated according to nature with a frequency of ſubſiſtence? for whatever originates from chance does not ſubſiſt frequently, but ſeldom. But if there is one cauſe, the ſource of coordination to all things, and this cauſe is ignorant of itſelf, muſt there not be ſome nature prior to this, which, by knowing itſelf, imparts being to this cauſe? for it is impoſſible that a nature which is ignorant ſhould be more excellent than that which has a knowledge of itſelf. If, therefore, this cauſe knows itſelf, it is evident that, knowing itſelf to be a cauſe, it muſt alſo know the things of which it is the cauſe; ſo that it will alſo comprehend the things which it knows. If, therefore, intellect is the cauſe of the univerſe, it alſo coordinated all things to each other: for there is one artificer of all things. But the univerſe is various, and all its parts do not participate either of the ſame dignity or order. Who is it then that meaſures the dignity of theſe, except the power that gave them ſubſiſtence? Who diſtributed every thing in a convenient order, and fixed it in its proper ſeat—the ſun here, and there the moon, the earth here, and there the mighty heaven—except the being by whom theſe were produced? Who gave coordination to all things, and produced one harmony from all, except the power who imparted to every thing its eſſence and nature? If, therefore, he orderly diſpoſed all things, he cannot be ignorant

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of the order and rank which every thing maintains in the univerſe; for to operate in this manner would be the province of irrational nature, and not of a divine cauſe, and would be the characteriſtic of neceſſity, and not of intellectual providence. Since, if, intellectually perceiving himſelf, he knows himſelf, but knowing himſelf and the eſſence which he is allotted, he knows that he is an immovable cauſe, and the object of deſire to all things, he will alſo know the natures to which he is deſirable: for he is not deſirable from accident, but eſſentially. He will therefore either be ignorant of what he is eſſentially, or, knowing this, he will alſo know that he is the object of deſire; and, together with this, he will know that all things deſire him, and what the natures are by which he is deſired: for, of two relatives, to know one definitely, and the other indefinitely, is not the characteriſtic of ſcience, and much leſs of intellectual perception. But, knowing definitely the things by which he is deſired, he knows the cauſes of them, in conſequence of beholding himſelf, and not things of a poſterior nature. If, therefore, he does not in vain poſſeſs the cauſes of all things, he muſt neceſſarily, according to them, bound the order of all things, and thus be of all things the immovable cauſe, as bounding their order by his very eſſence.

But whether ſhall we ſay that, becauſe he deſigned to make all things, he knew them, or, becauſe he underſtands all things, on this account he gave ſubſiſtence to all things? But if, in conſequence of deſigning to make all things, he knows all things, he will poſſeſs inward energy, and a converſion to himſelf ſubordinate to that which proceeds outwardly, and his knowledge of beings will ſubſiſt for the ſake of things different from himſelf. But if this is abſurd, by knowing himſelf he will be the maker of all things. And, if this be the caſe, he will make things external ſimilar to thoſe which he contains in himſelf; for ſuch is the natural order of things, that externally proceeding ſhould be ſuſpended from inward energy, the whole world from the all-perfect monad of ideas, and the parts of the viſible univerſe from monads which are ſeparated from each other.

In the fourth place, we ſay that man is generated from man, and from every thing its like. After what manner, therefore, are they generated? for you will not ſay that the generation of theſe is from chance: for neither nature nor divinity makes any thing in vain. But, if the generation of men is not from chance, whence is it? You will ſay, It is evidently from ſeed.

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Let it then be admitted, that man is from ſeed; but ſeed poſſeſſes productive powers in capacity, and not in energy. For, ſince it is a body, it is not naturally adapted to poſſeſs productive powers impartibly and in energy: for every where a ſubſiſtence in energy precedes a ſubſiſtence in capacity: ſince, being imperfect, it requires the aſſiſtance of ſomething elſe endued with a perfective power. This ſomething elſe you will ſay is the nature of the mother; for this perfects and faſhions the offspring by its productive powers. For the apparent form of the mother does not make the infant, but nature, which is an incorporeal power and the principle of motion. If, therefore, nature changes the productive powers of ſeed from capacity to a ſubſiſtence in energy, nature muſt herſelf poſſeſs theſe productive powers in energy. Hence, being irrational and without imagination, ſhe is at the ſame time the cauſe of phyſical reaſons. As the nature of man, therefore, contains human productive powers, does not alſo nature in a lion contain thoſe of the lion; as, for inſtance, the reaſons or productive powers of the head, the hair, the feet, and the other parts of the lion? Or, whence, on ſhedding a tooth, does another grow in its place, unleſs from an inherent power which is able to make the teeth? How, likewiſe, does it at the ſame time make bone and fleſh, and each of the other parts? for the ſame thing energizing according to the ſame would not be able to faſhion ſuch a variety of organization. But does not nature in plants alſo poſſeſs productive powers as well as in animals? or ſhall we not ſay that, in theſe likewiſe, the order of generation and the lives of the plants evince that they are perfected from orderly cauſes? It is evident, therefore, from the ſame reaſoning, that the natures of theſe alſo comprehend the apparent productive powers. Let us then aſcend from theſe to the one nature of the earth, which generates whatever breathes and creeps on its ſurface, and which by a much greater priority contains the productive powers of plants and animals. Or whence the generation of things from putrefaction? (for the hypotheſis of the experimentaliſts is weak and futile.) Whence is it that different kinds of plants grow in the ſame place, without human care and attention? Is it not evident that it is from the *whole nature* of the earth, containing the productive powers of all theſe in herſelf? And thus proceeding, we ſhall find that the nature in each of the elements and celeſtial ſpheres comprehends the productive powers of the animals which it contains. And if from the celeſtial ſpheres

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we aſcend to the nature of the univerſe itſelf, we may alſo inquire reſpecting this, whether it contains forms or not, and we ſhall be compelled to confeſs, that in this alſo the productive and motive powers of all things are contained: for whatever is perfected from inferior ſubſiſts in a more excellent and perfect manner from more univerſal natures. The nature of the univerſe, therefore, being the mother of all things, comprehends the productive powers of all things; for, otherwiſe, it would be abſurd that art, imitating natural reaſons, ſhould operate according to productive principles, but that nature herſelf ſhould energize without reaſons, and without inward meaſures. But, if nature contains productive principles, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be another cauſe prior to nature, which is comprehenſive of forms; for nature verging to bodies energizes in them, juſt as if we ſhould conceive an artiſt verging to pieces of timber, and inwardly, by various operations, reducing them to a certain form: for thus nature, merged together with and dwelling in corporeal maſſes, inſpires them with her productive powers and with motion; ſince things which are moved by others require a cauſe of this kind, a cauſe which is properly irrational indeed, that it may not depart from bodies, which cannot ſubſiſt without a cauſe continually reſiding with them, but containing the productive powers of bodies, that it may be able to preſerve all things in their proper boundaries, and move every thing in a convenient manner. Nature, therefore, belongs to other things, being merged in, or coordinated with, bodies. But it is requiſite that the moſt principal and proper cauſe ſhould be exempt from its productions: for, by how much more the maker is exempt from the thing made, by ſo much the more perfectly and purely will he make. And, in ſhort, if nature is irrational, it requires a leader. There is, therefore, ſomething prior to nature, which contains productive powers, and from which it is requiſite that every thing in the world ſhould be ſuſpended. Hence, a knowledge of generated natures will ſubſiſt in the cauſe of the world more excellent than the knowledge which we poſſeſs; ſo far as this cauſe not only knows, but gives ſubſiſtence to, all things; but we poſſeſs knowledge alone. But if the demiurgic cauſe of the univerſe knows all things, if he beholds them externally, he will again be ignorant of himſelf, and will be ſubordinate to a partial ſoul; but, if he beholds them in himſelf, he will contain in himſelf all forms, intellectual and gnoſtic.

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In the fifth place, things produced from an immovable cauſe are immovable and without mutation; but things produced from a movable cauſe are again movable and mutable, and ſubſiſt differently at different times. If this be the caſe, all ſuch things as are eſſentially eternal and immutable muſt be the progeny of an immovable cauſe; for, if from a movable cauſe, they will be mutable; which is impoſſible. Are not, therefore, the form of man and the form of horſe from a cauſe, if the whole world ſubſiſts from a cauſe? From what cauſe, therefore? Is it from an immovable or from a movable cauſe? But if from a movable cauſe, the human ſpecies will ſome time or other fail; ſince every thing which ſubſiſts from a movable cauſe ranks among things which are naturally adapted to periſh. We may alſo make the ſame inquiry reſpecting the ſun and moon, and each of the ſtars: for, if theſe are produced from a movable cauſe, in theſe alſo there will be a mutation of eſſence. But if theſe, and all ſuch forms as eternally ſubſiſt in the univerſe, are from an immovable cauſe, where does the immovable cauſe of theſe ſubſiſt? For it is evidently not in bodies, ſince every natural body is naturally adapted to be moved. It therefore ſubſiſts proximately in nature. But nature is irrational; and it is requiſite that cauſes properly ſo called ſhould be intellectual and divine. Hence, the immovable cauſes of theſe forms ſubſiſt primarily in intellect, ſecondarily in ſoul, in the third gradation in nature, and laſtly in bodies. For all things either ſubſiſt apparently or unapparently, either ſeparate or inſeparable from bodies; and if ſeparate, either immovably according to eſſence and energy, or immovably according to eſſence, but movably according to energy. Thoſe things, therefore, are properly immovable, which are immutable both according to eſſence and energy, ſuch as are intelligibles; but thoſe poſſeſs the ſecond rank which are immovable indeed according to eſſence, but movable according to energy, and ſuch are ſouls: in the third place, things unapparent indeed, but inſeparable from the phænomena, are ſuch as belong to the empire of nature; and thoſe rank in the laſt place which are apparent, ſubſiſt in ſenſibles, and are diviſible: for the gradual ſubjection of forms proceeding as far as to ſenſibles ends in theſe.

In the ſixth place, let us ſpeculate after another manner concerning the ſubſiſtence of forms or ideas, beginning from demonſtrations themſelves. For Ariſtotle has proved in his Laſt Analytics, and all ſcientific men muſt

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confeſs, that demonſtrations are entirely from things which have a priority of ſubſiſtence, and which are naturally more honourable. But if the things from which demonſtrations conſiſt are univerſals, (for every demonſtration is from theſe),—hence, theſe muſt be cauſes to the things which are unfolded from them. When, therefore, the aſtronomer ſays, that the circles in the heavens biſect each other, ſince every greateſt circle biſects its like, whether does he demonſtrate or not? For he makes his concluſion from that which is univerſal. But where ſhall we find the cauſes of this ſection of circles in the heavens which are more univerſal than the circles? For they will not be in bodies, ſince every thing which is in body is diviſible. They muſt, therefore, reſide in an incorporeal eſſence; and hence there muſt be forms which have a ſubſiſtence prior to apparent forms, and which are the cauſes of ſubſiſtence to theſe, in conſequence of being more univerſal and more powerful. Science, therefore, compels us to admit that there are univerſal forms, which have a ſubſiſtence prior to particulars, are more eſſential and more cauſal, and from which the very being of particulars is derived.

By aſcending from motion we may alſo after the ſame manner prove the exiſtence of ideas. Every body from its own proper nature is alter-motive, or moved by another, and is indigent of motion externally derived. But the firſt, moſt proper and principal motion is in the power which moves the mundane wholes: for he poſſeſſes the motion of a mover, and body the motion of that which is moved, and corporeal motion is the image of that which pre-ſubſiſts in this power. For that is perfect motion becauſe it is energy; but the motion in body is imperfect energy: and the imperfect derives its ſubſiſtence from the perfect.

From knowledge alſo we may perceive the neceſſity of the ſame concluſion. For laſt knowledge is that of bodies, whether it be denominated ſenſible or imaginable: for all ſuch knowledge is deſtitute of truth, and does not contemplate any thing univerſal and common, but beholds all things inveſted with figure, and all things partial. But more perfect knowledge is that which is without figure, which is immaterial, and which ſubſiſts by itſelf, and from itſelf; the image of which is ſenſe, ſince this is imperfect knowledge, ſubſiſting in another, and not originating from itſelf. If, therefore, as in motion, ſo alſo in knowledge and in life, that which participates, that which is participated, and that which is imparticipable, are different

from each other, there is alſo the ſame reaſoning with reſpect to other forms. For matter is one thing, the form which it contains another, and ſtill different from either is the ſeparate form. For God and Nature do not make things imperfect which ſubſiſt in ſomething different from themſelves, and which have an obſcure and debile exiſtence, but have not produced things perfect, and which ſubſiſt from themſelves; but by a much greater priority they have given ſubſiſtence to theſe, and from theſe have produced things which are participated by, and merged in, the darkneſs of matter.

But if it be requiſite ſummarily to relate the cauſe that induced the Pythagoreans and Plato to adopt the hypotheſis of ideas, we muſt ſay, that all theſe viſible natures, celeſtial and ſublunary, are either from chance, or ſubſiſt from a cauſe. But that they ſhould be from chance is impoſſible: for things more excellent will ſubſiſt in things ſubordinate, viz. intellect, reaſon, and cauſe, and that which proceeds from cauſe. To which we may add, as Ariſtotle obſerves, that prior to cauſes according to accident, it is requiſite that there ſhould be things which have an eſſential ſubſiſtence; for the accidental is that in which the progreſſions of theſe are terminated. So that a ſubſiſtence from cauſe will be more antient than a ſubſiſtence from chance, if the moſt divine of things apparent are the progeny of chance. But if there is a cauſe of all things, there will either be many unconjoined cauſes, or one cauſe; but if many, we ſhall not be able to aſſign to what it is owing that the world is one, ſince there will not be one cauſe according to which all things are coordinated. It will alſo be abſurd to ſuppoſe that this cauſe is irrational. For, again, there will be ſomething among things poſterior better than the cauſe of all things, viz. that which, being within the univerſe, and a part of the whole, operates according to reaſon and knowledge, and yet derives this prerogative from an irrational cauſe. But if this cauſe is rational and knows itſelf, it will certainly know itſelf to be the cauſe of all; or, being ignorant of this, it will be ignorant of its own nature. But if it knows that it is eſſentially the cauſe of the univerſe, it will alſo definitely know that of which it is the cauſe; for, that which definitely knows the one will alſo definitely know the other. Hence, he will know every thing which the univerſe contains, and of which he is the cauſe: and if this be the caſe, beholding himſelf, and knowing himſelf, he knows things poſterior to himſelf. By immaterial reaſons, therefore, and forms, he knows the

the mundane reaſons and forms from which the univerſe conſiſts, and the univerſe is contained in him as in a cauſe ſeparate from matter. This, Proclus adds, was the doctrine of the Eleatic Zeno, and the advocates for ideas: nor did theſe men alone, ſays he, form conceptions of this kind reſpecting ideas, but their doctrine was alſo conformable to that of the theologiſts. For Orpheus ſays, that after the abſorption of Phanes in Jupiter all things were generated: ſince prior to this the cauſes of all mundane natures ſubſiſted unitedly in Phanes, but ſecondarily and with ſeparation in the demiurgus of the univerſe. For there the ſun and the moon, heaven itſelf, and the elements, Love the ſource of union, and in ſhort all things, were produced: for there was a natural conflux, ſays Orpheus, of all things in the belly of Jupiter. Nor did Orpheus ſtop here; but he alſo delivered the order of demiurgic forms through which ſenſible natures were allotted their preſent diſtribution. Proclus further adds: The Gods alſo have thought fit to unfold to mankind the truth reſpecting ideas; and have declared what the one fountain is whence they proceed; where ideas firſt ſubſiſt in full perfection; and how in their progreſſion they aſſimilate all things, both wholes and parts, to the Father of the univerſe. What Proclus here alludes to is the following Chaldaic Oracle:

Νους πατρος ερρ̣οιζησε νοησας ακμαδι βουλη
Παμμορφους ιδεας· πηγης δε μιας αποπτασαι
Εξεθορον· πατροθεν γαρ ειην βουλητε τελος τε.
Αλλ' εμερισθησαν νοερω πυρι μοιρηθεισαι
Εις αλλας νοερας· κοσμῳ γαρ αναξ πολυμορφῳ
Προυθηκεν νοερον τυπον αφθιτον, ὃν κατα κοσμον
Ιχνος επειγομενος μορφης μετα κοσμος εφανθη,
Παντοιαις ιδεαις κεχαρισμενος, ὧν μια πηγη,
Εξ ης ῥοιζουνται μεμερισμεναι αλλαι απληται,
Ῥηγνυμεναι κοσμου περι σωμασιν, αἱ περι κολπους
Σμερδαλεους σμηνεσσιν εοικυιαι φορεονται,
Τραπουσι περι τ' αμφι παρα σχεδον αλλυδις αλλη
Εννοιαι νοεραι πηγης πατρικης απο, πολυ
Δραττομεναι πυρος ανθος ακοιμητου χρονου, ακμη
Αρχεγονους ιδεας πρωτη πατρος εβλυσε τας δε
Αυτοτελης πηγη.

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i. e. " The intellect of the Father made a craſhing noiſe, underſtanding with unwearied counſel omniform ideas. But with winged ſpeed they leaped forth from one fountain: for both the counſel and the end were from the Father. In conſequence, too, of being allotted an intellectual fire, they are divided into other intellectual forms: for the king previouſly placed in the multiform world an intellectual incorruptible impreſſion, the veſtige of which haſtening through the world, cauſes it to appear inveſted with form, and replete with all-various ideas of which there is one fountain. From this fountain other immenſe diſtributed ideas ruſh with a craſhing noiſe, burſting forth about the bodies of the world, and are borne along its terrible boſoms like ſwarms of bees. They turn themſelves, too, on all ſides, and nearly in all directions. They are intellectual conceptions from the paternal fountain, plucking abundantly the flower of the fire of ſleepleſs time. But a ſelf-perfect fountain pours forth primogenial ideas from the primary vigour of the Father."

Through theſe things, ſays Proclus, the Gods have clearly ſhown where ideas ſubſiſt, who the divinity is that comprehends the one fountain of theſe, and that from this fountain a multitude proceeds. Likewiſe, how the world is fabricated according to ideas; that they are motive of all mundane ſyſtems; that they are eſſentially intellectual; and that they are all-various according to their characteriſtics.

If, therefore, he adds, arguments perſuade us to admit the hypotheſis reſpecting ideas, and the wiſe unite in the ſame deſign, viz. Plato, Pythagoras, and Orpheus, and the Gods clearly bear witneſs to theſe, we ſhould but little regard ſophiſtical arguments, which are confuted by themſelves, and aſſert nothing ſcientific, nothing ſane. For the Gods have manifeſtly declared that they are conceptions of the Father: for they abide in his intelligence. They have likewiſe aſſerted that they proceed to the fabrication of the world; for the craſhing noiſe ſignifies their progreſſion;—that they are omniform, as comprehending the cauſes of all diviſible natures; that from fontal ideas others proceed, which are allotted the fabrication of the world, according to its parts, and which are ſaid to be ſimilar to ſwarms of bees; and laſtly, that they are generative of ſecondary natures.

Timæus, therefore, places in intelligibles the one primary cauſe of all ideas; for there animal itſelf ſubſiſts, as is evident from that dialogue. But the

the oracles ſay, that the fountain of ideas pre-ſubſiſts in the demiurgus; nor are theſe aſſertions diſcordant with each other, as they may appear to be to ſome. For it is not the ſame thing to inveſtigate the one and total cauſe of mundane forms, and ſimply to contemplate the firſt unfolding into light of every ſeries of ideas; but the comprehenſion of the former muſt be referred to the demiurgus, and of the latter to the intelligible order itſelf, of divine natures, from which the demiurgus is filled, and all the orders of an ideal eſſence. And, on this account, I think the oracles aſſert, that ideas proceed with a craſhing noiſe from their intellectual fountain, and, being diſtributed in different places, burſt about the bodies of the world, in conſequence of the cauſe of mundane natures being comprehended in this fountain, according to which, all generated compoſite natures in the world are inveſted with form, conformably to the demiurgic will. But the forms ſubſiſting in animal itſelf, according to an intelligible bound, are neither ſaid by Plato to be moved, nor to leap into bodies, but to impart eſſence to all things by their very eſſence alone. If, therefore, to ſubſiſt through energy and motion is ſecondary to a making prior to energizing and being moved, it is evident that the ideas intelligibly and immovably eſtabliſhed in animal itſelf are allotted an order more elevated than demiurgic ideas. And the demiurgus is fabricative of forms in a twofold reſpect; both according to the fountain in himſelf, and according to intelligible ideas: for there are the total cauſes of all things, and the four monads; but, thence originating, they proceed through the whole divine orders as far as to the laſt of things, ſo that the laſt and ſenſible images of theſe poſſeſs a certain ſimilitude, more clearly of ſome, and more obſcurely of others. He, likewiſe, who is capable of following the divine progreſſions will perceive that every ſenſible form expreſſes the idioms of all of them. For the immovable and the eternal in ſenſible forms are no otherwiſe preſent than from the firſt forms: for they are primarily eternal; and hence they communicate eternity to the conſequent progreſſions in a ſecondary and third gradation. Again, that every form is a multitude, ſubſiſts according to a peculiar number, and is filled with its proper numbers, and that on this account a different form is referred to a different divine order to us unknown and ineffable,—this it receives from the ſummit of the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual order, and from the forms which there ſubſiſt occultly, and ineffably: juſt as the power of

uniting a diſſipated eſſence, and bounding the infinity of generated natures in common limits, is derived from the connecting order, and from connective forms. But to be entirely perfective of an imperfect nature, and to produce into energy the aptitude of ſubjects, comprehending the unfigured in figures, and the imperfect in perfection, is ſolely derived from perfective deity, and the forms which there appear. Again, ſo far as every form haſtens to verge to itſelf, and comprehends parts uniformly in itſelf, ſo far it bears an image of the ſummit of intellectuals, and the impartible ſubſiſtence of forms eſtabliſhed according to that order. But ſo far as it proceeds with life, ſubſiſts through motion, and appears immovably in things moved, ſo far it participates of the viviſic ſeries, and expreſſes the powers of viviſic forms. Again, ſo far as it poſſeſſes the power of giving form to matter, is filled with artificial fabrication pervading through nature herſelf, and evinces a wonder ſubtilty, and a production of forms according to reaſon, ſo far it receives the repreſentations of demiurgic ideas. If, likewiſe, it aſſimilates ſenſibles to intelligibles, and ſeparates the eſſences of them by mutations according to reaſons, it is evident that it reſembles the aſſimilative orders of forms, from which the diviſible progreſſions of mundane natures appear, which inveſt ſenſibles with the repreſentations from intelligibles. Further ſtill, if every form pervades to many things, though it be material, and bounds the multitude of them according to its proper form, muſt it not, according to this power, be referred to that order of Gods which governs with a liberated characteriſtic the allotments in the world, and draws to itſelf many portions of divine allotments in the univerſe? We may behold, therefore, an uninterrupted continuity of the whole ſeries ſupernally proceeding from intelligible ideas as far as to the laſt of things, and likewiſe perceive what peculiarities ſenſibles derive from each order. For it is requiſite that all ſecondary things ſhould participate of the natures prior to them, and thus enjoy each, according to the order which they are ſeverally allotted.

With reſpect to *what things there are ideas of, and what not*, I ſhall ſummarily obſerve, that there are ideas only of univerſal and perfect ſubſtances, and of whatever contributes to the perfection of theſe, as for inſtance of man, and whatever is perfective of man, ſuch as wiſdom and virtue; and conſequently matter, particulars, parts, things artificial, evil and ſordid natures, are excluded from the region of ideas.

To the queſtion *what kind of beings ideas are*, we may anſwer with Zenocrates, according to the relation of Proclus, that they are *the exemplary cauſes of things, which perpetually ſubſiſt according to nature.* They are *exemplars*, indeed, becauſe the final cauſe, or *the good*, is ſuperior to theſe, and that which is properly the efficient cauſe, or the demiurgic intellect, is of an inferior ordination. But they are the exemplars of things *according to nature*, becauſe there are no ideas of things unnatural or artificial: and of ſuch natural things as are *perpetual*, becauſe there are no ideas of mutable particulars.

Laſtly, *ideas are participated by material natures*, ſimilar to the impreſſions in wax of a ſeal, to images appearing in water or a mirror, and to pictures. For material ſpecies, on account of their union with matter, are analogous to the impreſſions of a ſeal; but on account of their apparently real, but at the ſame time deluſive ſubſiſtence in its dark receptacle, they are ſimilar to images in water, or in a mirror, or a dream; and they reſemble pictures on account of their ſimilitude, though very remote and obſcure, to firſt ideas themſelves. We may add too, as Proclus beautifully obſerves, that they derive their ſubſiſtence as *impreſſions* from the *mundane* Gods; their *apparent* exiſtence from the *liberated* Gods; and their *ſimilitude* to ſupernal forms from the *ſupermundane* or *aſſimilative* Gods. And thus much for the firſt part of the dialogue, or the doctrine of ideas [1].

But in order to a ſummary view of the inimitably profound and ſublime diſcuſſion which the ſecond part contains concerning *the one*, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that by *the one itſelf* the Pythagoreans and Plato ſignified the firſt cauſe, which they very properly conſidered as perfectly ſupereſſential, ineffable and unknown. For it is neceſſary that multitude ſhould be poſterior to unity: but it is impoſſible to conceive *being* [2] without multitude, and conſequently the cauſe of all beings muſt be void of multitude and ſupereſſential. And that this was really the opinion of the moſt antient Pythagoreans, from

[1] See more concerning ideas in the firſt diſſertation prefixed to my tranſlation of Proclus on Euclid, in the notes to my tranſlation of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics, and in the notes to this dialogue.

[2] If *being* were the ſame with *the one*, multitude would be the ſame with non-being: for the oppoſite to *the one* is *multitude*, and the oppoſite to *being* is *non-being*. As *being*, therefore, is not the ſame with, it muſt be poſterior to, *the one*; for there is not any thing in things more excellent than *unity*.

whom

whom Plato derived his philoſophy, the following citations will abundantly evince.

And, in the firſt place, this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, a moſt antient Pythagorean, on the principles of things, preſerved by Stobæus, Eclog. Phyſ. p. 82, and in which the following extraordinary paſſage occurs: Ὥστ' αναγκα τρεις ειμεν τας αρχας, ταν τε εστω των πραγματων και ταν μορφω, και το εξ αυτου κινατικον και αορατον δυναμει· το δε τοιϋτον ὀν ου μονον[1] ειμεν δει, αλλα και νοῳ τι κρεσσον· νοῳ δε κρεσσον εστι ὁπερ ονομαζομεν Θεον φανερον.—i. e. "So that it is neceſſary to aſſert that there are three principles; *that which is the ſubject of things* (*or matter*), *form, and that which is of itſelf motive, and inviſible in power.* With reſpect to the laſt of which, it is not only neceſſary that it ſhould have a ſubſiſtence, *but that it ſhould be ſomething better than intellect.* But that which is better than intellect is evidently the ſame with that which we denominate God." It muſt here however be obſerved, that by the word *God* we are not only to underſtand the firſt cauſe, but every God: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every Deity, conſidered according to the characteriſtic of his nature, is ſuperior to intellectual eſſence. Agreeably to the above paſſage is that alſo of Brotinus, as cited by Syrianus in Ariſt. Meta. p. 102, b. who expreſsly aſſerts that the firſt cauſe νϐ παντος και ϐσιας δυναμει και πρεσϐειᾳ ὑπερεχει—"ſurpaſſes every intellect and eſſence both in power and antiquity." Again, according to the ſame Syrianus, p. 103, b. we are informed, "that the Pythagoreans called God *the one*, as the cauſe of union to the univerſe, and on account of his ſuperiority to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated him the meaſure of all things, on account of his conferring on all things, through illumination, eſſence and bound; and containing and bounding all things by the ineffable ſupereminence of his nature, which is extended beyond every bound." Των Θειων ανδρων ἐν μεν λεγοντων τον Θεον ὡς ἑνωσεως τοις ὁλοις αιτιον, και παντος τϐ ὀντος, και πασης ζωης, και νϐ τϐ παντελϐς επεκεινα. Μετρον δε των παντων ὡς πασα τὴν ουσιαν, και το τελος επιλαμποντα, και ὡς παντα περιεχοντα, και οριζοντα ταις αφραστοις αυτϐ, και παντος ὑπερηπλωμεναις περατος ὑπεροχαις. And again, this is confirmed by Clinius the Pythagorean, as cited by Syrianus, p. 104, in which place *præclari* is erroneouſly ſubſtituted for *Clinii*. "That which is *the one*, and *the meaſure of*

[1] Inſtead of ὀν ου μονον, which is evidently the true reading, ὀνομον μονον is erroneouſly printed in Stobæus.

all

all things (ſays he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and mundane concerns, but likewiſe from intelligibles themſelves; ſince he is the venerable principle of beings, the meaſure of intelligibles, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (μονον), poſſeſſing abſolute dominion (κυριωδες), and himſelf manifeſting himſelf (αυτο το εαυτο δηλων)." This fine paſſage I have tranſlated agreeably to the manuſcript corrections of the learned Gale, the original of which he has not inſerted. To this we may likewiſe add the teſtimony of Philolaus; who, as Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cauſe which is ſuperior to the two firſt elements of things, *bound* and *infinite*. For (ſays he) "Philolaus aſſerts that the Deity eſtabliſhed *bound* and *infinite:* by bound, indeed, exhibiting every coordination, which is more allied to *the one*; but by infinity a nature ſubjected (ὑφειμενην) to *bound*. And prior to theſe two principles he places one, and a ſingular cauſe, ſeparated from the univerſality of things, which Archainetus (Αρχαινετος) denominates a cauſe prior to cauſe; but which, according to Philolaus, is the principle of all things." To all theſe reſpectable authorities for the ſupereſſential nature of the firſt cauſe, we may add the teſtimony of Sextus Empiricus himſelf. For in his books againſt the Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us, "that the Pythagoreans placed *the one* as tranſcending the genus of things which are eſſentially underſtood." Και δη των μεν καθ' αυτα νοουμενων γενος υπεστησαντο Πυθαγορικων παιδες, ως επαναβεβηκος το εν. In which paſſage, by things which are eſſentially underſtood, nothing more is meant than intelligible eſſences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and Pythagoric philoſophy.

But in conſequence of this doctrine of the antients concerning *the one*, or the firſt principle of things, we may diſcover the meaning and propriety of thoſe appellations given by the Pythagoreans to unity, according to Photius and others: ſuch as αλαμπια, σκοτωδια, αμιξια, βαραθρον ὑτοχθονιον, Απολλων, &c. viz. *obſcurity*, or *without illumination*, *darkneſs*, *without mixture*, *a ſubterranean profundity*, *Apollo*, &c. For, conſidered as ineffable, incomprehenſible, and ſupereſſential, he may be very properly called *obſcurity*, *darkneſs*, and a *ſubterranean profundity:* but conſidered as perfectly ſimple and one, he may with no leſs propriety be denominated *without mixture*, and *Apollo*; ſince Apollo ſignifies a privation of multitude. "For (ſays Plotinus) the Pythagoreans denominated the firſt God *Apollo*, according to a more ſecret ſignification, implying a negation of many." Ennead. 5. lib. 5. To which we

may add, that the epithets *darkneſs* and *obſcurity* wonderfully agree with the appellation of *a thrice unknown darkneſs*, employed by the Egyptians, according to Damaſcius [1], in their moſt myſtical invocations of the firſt God; and at the ſame time afford a ſufficient reaſon for the remarkable ſilence of the moſt antient philoſophers and poets concerning this higheſt and ineffable cauſe.

This ſilence is, indeed, remarkably obvious in Heſiod, when in his Theogony he ſays:

Ητοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ',——

That is, "*Chaos was the firſt thing which was generated*"—and conſequently there muſt be ſome cauſe prior to Chaos, through which it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cauſe. Such, however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of Heſiod γενετο is tranſlated *fuit*, as if the poet had ſaid that *Chaos was the firſt of all things*; and he is even accuſed by Cudworth on this account as leaning to the atheiſtical ſyſtem. But the following teſtimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all antiquity, γενετο was conſidered as meaning *was generated*, and not *was* ſimply. And, in the firſt place, this is clearly aſſerted by Ariſtotle in lib. 3, de Cœlo. "There are certain perſons (ſays he) who aſſert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are *generated*. And this is eſpecially the caſe with Heſiod."—Ειστ γαρ τινες οι φασιν ουθεν αγεννητον ειναι, αλλα παντα γιγνεσθαι—Μαλιστα μεν οι περι τον Ησιοδον. And again, by Sextus Empiricus in his Treatiſe Adverſus Mathemat. p. 383, edit. Steph. who relates, that this very paſſage was the occaſion of Epicurus applying himſelf to philoſophy. "For (ſays he) when Epicurus was as yet but a young man, he aſked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of Heſiod,

Chaos of all things was the firſt produced,

from what Chaos was *generated*, if it was the firſt thing generated. And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his buſineſs to teach things of this kind, but was the province of thoſe who are called philoſophers—To thoſe then, ſays Epicurus, muſt I betake myſelf, ſince they know the truth

[1] Περι αρχων.

of

of things." Κομιδῃ γαρ μειρακισκος ὠν, ἠρετο τον επαναγινωσκοντα αυτῳ Γραμματιστην (ἡ τοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ') εκ τινος το χαος εγενετο, ειπερ πρωτον εγενετο. Τουτου δε ειποντος μη αυτου ἐργον ειναι τα τοιαυτα διδασκειν, αλλα των καλουμενων φιλοσοφων· τουτων εφῃτεν ὁ Επικουρος, επ' εκεινους μοι βαδιστεον εστιν, ειπερ αυτοι τὴν των ὀντων αληθειαν ισασιν.

Simplicius, too, in commenting on the paſſage above cited from Ariſtotle, beautifully obſerves as follows—"Ariſtotle (ſays he) ranks Heſiod among the firſt phyſiologiſts, becauſe he ſings Chaos was firſt *generated*. He ſays, therefore, that Heſiod in a particular manner makes all things to be generated, becauſe that which is firſt is by him ſaid to be generated. But it is probable that Ariſtotle calls Orpheus and Muſæus the firſt phyſiologiſts, who aſſert *that all things are generated, except the firſt*. It is, however, evident that thoſe theologiſts, ſinging in fabulous ſtrains, meant nothing more by *generation* than the proceſſion of things from their cauſes; on which account *all of them conſider the firſt cauſe as unbegotten*. For Heſiod alſo, when he ſays that *Chaos was firſt generated*, inſinuates that there was ſomething prior to Chaos, from which Chaos was produced. For it is always neceſſary that every thing which is generated ſhould be generated from ſomething. But this likewiſe is inſinuated by Heſiod, that the firſt cauſe is above all knowledge and every appellation." (De Cœlo, p. 147.)

But theſe divine men not only called the firſt cauſe *the one*, on account of his tranſcendent ſimplicity, but likewiſe *the good*, on account of the ſuperlative excellency of his nature; by the former of theſe appellations conſidering him as that principle from which all things flow, and by the latter as that ſupreme object of deſire to which all things ultimately tend. And hence Plato, in his Republic, aſſerts that *the good* is ſupereſſential; and Ariſtotle, in lib. 14, Metaphyſ. cap. 4, alluding to Plato and the Pythagoreans, ſays, "that according to ſome, *the one* is the ſame with the good." Οι μεν φασιν αυτο το ἑν, το αγαθον αυτο ειναι.

With great beauty, therefore, does Proclus [1], with his uſual magnificence of expreſſion, aſſert of this incomprehenſible cauſe, "that he is the God of all Gods, the unity of unities, and above the firſt adyta [2]; that he is more

[1] In Plat. Theol. p. 110.

[2] Αδυνατων is erroneouſly printed for αδυτων.

ineffable than all ſilence, and more unknown than all eſſence; that he is holy among the holies, and is concealed among the intelligible Gods."

Plato, too, in the Republic, that we may be enabled to gain a glimpſe from analogy of this tranſcendent nature, compares him to the ſun. For as the ſun by his light not only confers the power of being ſeen on viſible objects, but is likewiſe the cauſe of their generation, nutriment, and increaſe; ſo *the good*, through ſupereſſential light, imparts being and the power of being known to every thing which is the object of knowledge. Hence, ſays Damaſcius [1], "this higheſt God is ſeen afar off as it were obſcurely; and if you approach nearer, he is beheld ſtill more obſcurely; and laſtly, he takes away the ability of perceiving other objects. He is, therefore, truly an incomprehenſible and inacceſſible light, and is profoundly compared to the ſun: upon which the more attentively you look, the more you will be darkened and blinded; and will only bring back with you eyes ſtupefied with exceſs of light."

And ſuch is the doctrine of Plato and the Pythagoreans concerning the higheſt principle of things. But, according to the ſame divine men, the immediate progeny of this ineffable cauſe muſt be Gods; and as ſuch muſt have a ſupereſſential ſubſiſtence. For what elſe prior to unities is it lawful to conjoin with *the one*, or what is more conjoined with a God ſubſiſting according to unity, than the multitude of Gods? Beſides, progreſſions are every where perfected through ſimilitude to their principles. For both nature herſelf, intellect, and every generative cauſe, leads and conjoins to itſelf ſimilar natures, prior to ſuch as are diſſimilar. For as there can be no vacuum either in incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is neceſſary that every thing which has a natural progreſſion ſhould proceed through ſimilitude. Hence, every cauſe muſt deliver its own form and characteriſtic to its progeny, and, before it generates that which is hypoſtatic of progreſſions far diſtant and ſeparate from its nature, muſt conſtitute things proximate to itſelf according to eſſence, and conjoined with it through ſimilitude. As nature, therefore, generates a natural number, ſoul one that is animal, and intellect an intellectual number, it is neceſſary that the firſt unity ſhould produce from itſelf,

[1] Περι αρχων.

prior

prior to every thing elſe, a multitude of natures characteriſed by unity, and a number the moſt of all things allied to its cauſe. And hence the fountain of univerſal good muſt produce and eſtabliſh in beings *goodneſſes* naturally conjoined with himſelf; and theſe exalted natures can be no other than Gods.

But if theſe divine natures are alone ſupereſſential, they will in no reſpect differ from the higheſt God. They muſt, therefore, be participated by beings; that is, each muſt have ſome particular being conſubſiſtent with its nature, but yet ſo as not to loſe its ſupereſſential characteriſtic. And hence every unity may be conſidered as the lucid bloſſom or centre of the being by which it is participated; abſorbing, as it were, in ſupereſſential light, and thus deifying the eſſence with which it is connected.

Nor let the reader imagine that this ſublime theory is nothing more than the fanatic jargon of the latter Platoniſts, as is raſhly and ignorantly aſſerted by Cudworth; for it is a doctrine as old at leaſt as Timæus the Locrian. For, in his book *On the Soul of the World*, after aſſerting that there are two cauſes of all things, intellect of ſuch as are produced according to reaſon, but neceſſity of ſuch as are produced by force, according to the powers of bodies, he adds—"that the former of theſe, that is intellect, is a cauſe of the nature of *the good*, and is called God, and is the principle of ſuch things as are beſt." Τουτεων δε, τον μεν τας ταγαθω φυσιος ειμεν, θεον τε ονυμαινεσθαι, αρχαν τε των αριστων. But according to the Pythagoreans, as we have abundantly proved, *the good* or *the one* is above eſſence and intellect; and conſequently by intellect here we muſt not underſtand the firſt cauſe, but a deity ſubordinate to the firſt. Intellect, however, is (ſays he) of the nature of *the good*; but *the good* is ſupereſſential, and conſequently intellect participates of a ſupereſſential nature. And when he adds that intellect is called God, he plainly intimates that every God (the firſt being excepted) partakes of a ſupereſſential nature.

But to return to our inimitable dialogue: This ſecond part conſiſts of nine hypotheſes; five of which conſider the conſequences which reſult from admitting the ſubſiſtence of *the one*, and the other four what muſt be the conſequences if it were taken away from the nature of things. But as Plato in theſe hypotheſes delivers the Eleatic method of reaſoning, it is neceſſary to inform the reader that, according to Proclus [1], it was as follows:—Two

[1] In lib. 5. MS. Comment. in Parmenidem.

hypotheſes

hypotheſes being laid down, viz. *if a thing is*, and *if it is not*, each of theſe may be tripled by conſidering in each *what happens*, *what does not happen*, *what happens and at the ſame time does not happen*: ſo that ſix caſes will be the reſult. But ſince, *if a thing is*, we may conſider itſelf either with reſpect to itſelf, or itſelf with reſpect to others; or we may conſider others themſelves with reſpect to themſelves, or others with reſpect to that thing itſelf, and ſo likewiſe if a thing is not: hence, the whole of this proceſs will conſiſt of eight triads, which are as follows:—1. *If a thing is*, what happens to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, what does not happen, what happens and at the ſame time does not happen. 2. *If a thing is*, what happens to itſelf with reſpect to others, what does not happen, what happens and at the ſame time does not happen. 3. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with reſpect to themſelves, what does not happen, what happens and at the ſame time does not happen. 4. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with reſpect to that thing, what does not happen, what happens and at the ſame time does not happen. And the other four, which are founded on the hypotheſis *that a thing is not*, are to be diſtributed in exactly the ſame manner as thoſe we have juſt enumerated. Such (ſays Proclus) is the whole form of the dialectic method, which is both intellectual and ſcientific; and under which thoſe four powers, the *definitive* and *diviſive*, the *demonſtrative* and *analytic*, receive their conſummate perfection.

In the firſt hypotheſis, therefore, Plato conſiders *what does not follow* to *the one*, conſidered with reſpect to itſelf and to others. *In the ſecond, what does follow. In the third, what follows and at the ſame time does not follow.* And this forms the firſt hexad. But *in the fourth hypotheſis* he conſiders *what follows to others with reſpect to themſelves, and what does not follow, what follows and at the ſame time does not follow. In the fifth, what follows to others with reſpect to the ſubject of the hypotheſis, what does not follow, what follows and at the ſame time does not follow.* And ſo two hexads, or four triads, are by this means produced from the five hypotheſes, if *the one* is. And the reader will eaſily perceive how each of the other four, which ſuppoſe *the one* is not, may form a triad: ſo that theſe four triads, in conjunction with the preceding four, will give the whole Eleatic or dialectic method complete.

It

It is likewiſe neceſſary to obſerve, that theſe hypotheſes are derived from the triple diviſion of *the one*, and the twofold diviſion of *non-being*. For *the one* is either *above being*, or *in being*, or *poſterior to being*. But *non-being* is either *that which in no reſpect is*, or *that which is conſidered as partly having a ſubſiſtence, and partly not*. This being premiſed, let the reader attend to the following beautiful account of theſe hypotheſes from Proclus on Plato's Theology, and from his admirable commentary on this dialogue.

The firſt hypotheſis demonſtrates by negations the ineffable ſupereminence of the firſt principle of things; and evinces that he is exempt from all eſſence and knowledge. But the ſecond unfolds the whole order of the Gods. For Parmenides does not alone aſſume the intellectual and eſſential idiom of the Gods, but likewiſe the divine characteriſtic of their hyparxis, through the whole of this hypotheſis. For what other *one* can that be which is participated by *being*, than that which is in every being divine, and through which all things are conjoined with the *imparticipable one?* For, as bodies through their *life* are conjoined with *ſoul*, and as *ſouls* through their *intellective part* tend to *univerſal intellect* and *the firſt intelligence*, in like manner *true beings*, through *the one* which they contain, are reduced to *a ſeparate union*, and are conjoined with *the firſt cauſe of all*.

But becauſe this hypotheſis commences from that which is *one being*, and eſtabliſhes the ſummit of intelligibles as the firſt after *the one*, but ends in an eſſence which participates of time, and deduces divine ſouls to the extremities of the divine orders, it is neceſſary that the third hypotheſis ſhould demonſtrate by various concluſions the whole multitude of particular ſouls, and the diverſities which they contain. And thus far the ſeparate and incorporeal hypoſtaſis extends.

But after this follows *that nature which is diviſible about bodies and inſeparable from matter*, which the fourth hypotheſis delivers ſupernally depending from the Gods. And the laſt hypoſtaſis is the proceſſion of matter, whether conſidered as *one* or as *various*, which the fifth hypotheſis demonſtrates by negations, according to its diſſimilar ſimilitude to *the firſt*. But ſometimes, indeed, the negations are privations, and ſometimes the ſeparate cauſes of all productions. And that which is moſt wonderful of all, the higheſt

higheſt negations are only enunciative, but ſome in a ſupereminent manner, and others according to ſubjection. But each of the negations conſequent to theſe is affirmative; the one paradigmatically, but the other iconically, or according to ſimilitude. But the middle correſponds to the order of ſoul: for it is compoſed from affirmative and negative concluſions. But it poſſeſſes negations ſimilar to affirmations. And ſince it is alone multiplied, as conſiſting from wholes, it poſſeſſes an adventitious *one*. And this *one* which it contains, though truly one, ye ſubſiſts in motion and multiplication, and in its progreſſions is, as it were, abſorbed by eſſence. And ſuch are the hypotheſes which unfold all beings, both ſeparable and inſeparable, together with the cauſes of the univerſe, as well exempt as ſubſiſting in things themſelves, according to the hyparxis of *the one*.

But there are four hypotheſes beſides theſe, which by taking away *the one* entirely ſubvert all things, both ſuch as truly are, and ſuch as ſubſiſt in generation, and ſhow that no being can any longer exiſt. *The one*, therefore, being admitted, all things ſubſiſt even to the laſt hypoſtaſis; and this being taken away, eſſence itſelf is immediately deſtroyed.

The preceding mode of expoſition (except in the ſecond hypotheſis) agrees with that of the great Plutarch, preſerved by Proclus in his commentary on this dialogue, and which is as follows:

The firſt hypotheſis diſcourſes concerning the firſt God. The ſecond, concerning the firſt intellect, and an order entirely intellectual. The third, of the ſoul. The fourth, of material ſpecies. And the fifth, of formleſs matter. For theſe are the five principles of things. Parmenides in the mean time, after the manner of his own Pythagoreans, calls every ſeparate ſubſtance, on account of its ſimplicity, by the common appellation of *one*. But he denominates matter and corporeal form *different*, on account of their flowing nature and far diſtant diverſity from divine eſſences: eſpecially ſince theſe two do not ſo much ſubſiſt by themſelves as through others, and are not ſo much cauſes as concauſes, as it is aſſerted in the Timæus and Phædo. With great propriety, therefore, the three firſt hypotheſes, which inquire how *the one* is related to itſelf and to others, are conſidered as treating of principal cauſes. But the other two, which inveſtigate how other things are related to each other and to *the one*, are conſidered as repreſenting form

and matter. In theſe five hypotheſes, therefore, theſe principles, together with what they contain or ſubſiſts about them, are confirmed from the poſition of *one:* of *one*, I ſay, *above* being, *in* being, and *poſterior* to being. The remaining four hypotheſes demonſtrate how many abſurdities follow from taking away *that one* which beings contain, that we may underſtand how much greater abſurdities muſt enſue from denying the ſubſiſtence of that which is *ſimply one*. The ſixth hypotheſis, therefore, proves that, if there is not *that which is one* in beings, i. e. if intelligible has no real ſubſiſtence, but partly poſſeſſes and is partly deſtitute of being, that which is ſenſible would alone exiſt in the order of things. For, if intelligible is taken away, that which is ſenſible muſt alone remain; and there can be no knowledge beyond ſenſe. And this the ſixth hypotheſis demonſtrates to be abſurd. But the ſeventh hypotheſis proves that, if *the one which beings contain* has no kind of ſubſiſtence, there can be no knowledge, nor any thing which is the object of knowledge, which this ſeventh hypotheſis ſhows is fooliſh to aſſert. And again, *if this one partly ſubſiſts and is partly without ſubſiſtence*, as the ſixth hypotheſis feigns, other things will be ſimilar to ſhadows and dreams, which the eighth hypotheſis confutes as abſurd. But *if this one has no kind of ſubſiſtence*, other things will be leſs than ſhadows or a dream, that is, nothing; which the ninth hypotheſis repreſents as a monſtrous aſſertion. Hence the firſt hypotheſis has the ſame relation to thoſe which remain, as the principle of the univerſe to the univerſality of things. But the other four which immediately follow the firſt, treat concerning the principles poſterior to *the one*. And the four conſequent to theſe prove that, *one* being taken away, all that was exhibited in the four prior hypotheſes muſt entirely periſh. For ſince the ſecond demonſtrates that, *if that one ſubſiſts which is conjoined with being*, every order of ſoul muſt ſubſiſt; the ſeventh declares that, *if this one is not*, all knowledge, reaſon, imagination, and ſenſe, muſt be deſtroyed. Again, ſince the fourth hypotheſis declares that, *if this one being* ſubſiſts, material ſpecies alſo muſt ſubſiſt, which in a certain reſpect participate of *one being*,—the eighth hypotheſis ſhows that, *if this one being* has no ſubſiſtence, what we now call ſenſible natures would be only ſhadows and dreams, without any formal diſtinction or ſubſtance whatever. And laſtly, ſince the fifth hypotheſis admoniſhes us that, *if this one being* ſubſiſts, matter will

ſubſiſt, not indeed participating of *one being* ſo far as *being*, but conſidered as *one*; the ninth hypotheſis at length ſhows that, *if this one being* is taken away, not even the ſhadow of any thing could poſſibly ſubſiſt.

Thus far Plutarch; who likewiſe obſerves that this dialogue was conſidered as divine by the antients; and declares that the preceding expoſition is partly taken from the writings of the antients, and partly from his own private opinion.

Now from all this we may ſafely conclude, with Proclus, that all the axioms of theological ſcience are perfectly exhibited in this part of the dialogue; that all the diſtributions of the divine natures are unfolded in connected continuity; and that this is nothing elſe *than the celebrated generation of the Gods, and every kind of exiſtence, from the ineffable and unknown cauſe of the univerſe*. For the antients by *generation* meant nothing more than the *proceſſion* of things from their cauſe; and hence the firſt cauſe was ſymbolically called by Orpheus *time*,—becauſe, ſays Proclus, where there is generation, there time has a ſubſiſtence.

That firſt and imparticipable one, then, who is declared to be the cauſe of all things after an ineffable manner, but who is without circumſcription, and does not poſſeſs any power or characteriſtic of a kindred kind with the other Gods, is celebrated by the firſt hypotheſis. And from this ſupereminent cauſe, as from an exalted place of ſurvey, we may contemplate the divine unities, that is, the Gods, flowing in admirable and ineffable order, and at the ſame time abiding in profound union with each other, and with their cauſe. And here, ſays Proclus, an apt reſemblance of their progreſſion preſents itſelf to our view. Becauſe a line is the firſt continuous and diviſible nature amongſt magnitudes, hence it participates of an indiviſible, that is, of a point. And this point, though it is allotted a ſuperlinear condition and is indiviſible, yet it ſubſiſts in the line, is ſomething belonging to it, and is the ſummit of the line. To which we may add, that many lines in a circle touch by their ſeveral points the centre of the circle. In like manner an intelligible and intellectual eſſence, becauſe it is the firſt multiplied nature, on this account partakes of an excellent unity. And this unity, though it is neither eſſence nor obnoxious to eſſential multitude, yet abides in eſſence, or rather ſubſiſts as its vertex, through which every intellectual eſſence is a God, enjoying

divine unity as the very flower of its nature, and as that which conjoins it with the ineffable one. And as every thing is eſtabliſhed in its own ſpecies through form, and as we derive the characteriſtic of our nature from ſoul, ſo every God becomes that which he is, or a Deity, through the unity of his nature.

Laſtly, ſays he, the intention of the firſt hypotheſis is to abſolve that which is ſimply one from all the properties and conditions of the unities of the Gods; and by this abſolving to ſignify the proceſſion of all things from thence. But our intention in purſuing theſe myſteries is no other than by the logical energies of our reaſon to arrive at the ſimple intellection of beings, and by theſe to excite the divine one reſident in the depths of our eſſence, or rather which preſides over our eſſence, that we may perceive the ſimple and incomprehenſible one. For after, through diſcurſive energies and intellections, we have properly denied of the firſt principle all conditions peculiar to beings, there will be ſome danger, leſt, deceived by imagination after numerous negations, we ſhould think that we have arrived either at nothing, or at ſomething ſlender and vain, indeterminate, formleſs, and confuſed; unleſs we are careful in proportion as we advance in negations to excite by a certain amatorial affection the divine vigour of our unity; truſting that by this means we may enjoy divine unity, when we have diſmiſſed the motion of reaſon and the multiplicity of intelligence, and tend through unity alone to *the one itſelf*, and through love to *the ſupreme and ineffable good.*

It may likewiſe be clearly ſhown, and will be immediately obvious to thoſe who underſtand the following dialogue, that the moſt antient poets, prieſts, and philoſophers, have delivered one and the ſame theology, though in different modes. The firſt of theſe, through fabulous names and a more vehement diction; the ſecond, through names adapted to ſacred concerns, and a mode of interpretation grand and elevated; and the third, either through mathematical names, as the Pythagoreans, or through dialectic epithets, as Plato. Hence we ſhall find that the *Æther*, *Chaos*, *Phanes*, and *Jupiter*, of Orpheus; the *father*, *power*, *intellect*, and *twice beyond* of the Chaldæans; the *monad*, *duad*, *tetrad*, and *decad*, of Pythagoras; and *the one being*, *the whole*, *infinite multitude*, and *ſameneſs and difference* of Plato, re-

ſpectively, ſignify the ſame divine proceſſions from the ineffable principle of things.

I only add, that I have followed the opinion of Proclus in inſcribing this Dialogue ON THE GODS: for as ideas, conſidered according to their ſummits or unities, are Gods, and the whole dialogue is entirely converſant with ideas and theſe unities, the propriety of ſuch an inſcription muſt, I think, be apparent to the moſt ſuperficial obſerver.

THE

THE PARMENIDES:

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CEPHALUS,	PYTHODORUS,
ADIMANTUS,	SOCRATES,
ANTIPHON,	ZENO,
GLAUCO,	PARMENIDES.

SCENE, the CERAMICUS[1].

WHEN we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, the place of our abode, we fortunately met with Adimantus and Glaucus in the forum: and Adimantus, taking me by the hand, I am glad to ſee you (ſays he), Cephalus; and if you are in want of any thing here, in which we are able to aſſiſt you, I beg you would inform me. Upon which I replied, I came for this very purpoſe, as being indigent of your aſſiſtance. Tell me, then (ſays he), what you are in want of. And I replied, What was your brother's name? for I do not remember: as he was almoſt a child when I firſt came here from Clazomenia; and, ſince that circumſtance took place, a great length of time has intervened. But his father's name was, I think, Pyrilampes. Entirely ſo (ſays he), and my brother's name was Antiphon. But what is it you principally inquire after? I replied, Theſe my fellow-citizens are very philoſophic, and have heard that this Antiphon was frequently preſent with one Pythodorus, the familiar of Zeno, and that he treaſured in his memory the diſcourſes which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other, and which had frequently been heard by Pythodorus. You ſpeak the truth

[1] See the Introduction.

(ſays

(ſays he). Theſe diſcourſes, therefore (ſays I), we are deſirous to hear. But this (ſays he) is no difficult matter to accompliſh: for the young man has made them the ſubject of vehement meditation; and now with his grandfather, who bears the ſame name as himſelf, very much applies himſelf to equeſtrian affairs. But if it is neceſſary, we will go to him: for he juſt now went from hence home; and dwells very near, in Melita. After we had thus ſpoke, we proceeded to the houſe of Antiphon; and found him at home, giving a certain bridle to a copperſmith, to be furniſhed in a proper manner. But as ſoon as the ſmith was gone, and the brothers had told him the cauſe of our arrival, Antiphon knew me, in conſequence of my former journey to this place, and very kindly ſaluted me: and upon our begging him to relate the diſcourſes, at firſt he ſeemed unwilling to comply (for he ſaid it was a very operoſe undertaking); but afterwards, however, he gratified our requeſt. Antiphon, therefore, ſaid that Pythodorus related that Zeno and Parmenides once came to celebrate the great Panathenæa: that Parmenides was very much advanced in years, extremely hoary, but of a beautiful and venerable aſpect, and about ſixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, was very tall and graceful to the view, and was reported to be the boſom friend of Parmenides. He likewiſe ſaid that he met with them, together with Pythodorus, in the Ceramicus, beyond the walls; where alſo Socrates came, and many others with him, deſiring to hear the writings of Zeno, for then for the firſt time they became acquainted with his writings: but that Socrates at that time was very young. That, in conſequence of this, Zeno himſelf read to them. And Pythodorus further related that it happened Parmenides was gone out; and that but a ſmall part of the diſcourſe remained unfiniſhed, when he himſelf entered, together with Parmenides and Ariſtotle, who was one of the thirty Athenians. That, in conſequence of this, he heard but a little at that time; but that he had often before heard the whole diſcourſe from Zeno.

He further added, that Socrates, upon hearing the latter part of Zeno's diſcourſe, entreated him to repeat the firſt hypotheſis of his firſt diſcourſe; and that, when he had repeated it, Socrates ſaid—How is it you aſſert, O Zeno, that if beings are many, it is requiſite that the ſame things ſhould be both ſimilar and diſſimilar? But that this is impoſſible. For neither can things diſſimilar be ſimilar, nor things ſimilar be diſſimilar. Is not this what

what you aſſert? Zeno anſwered, It is. If, therefore, it is impoſſible that diſſimilars ſhould be ſimilar, and ſimilars diſſimilar, is it not impoſſible that many things ſhould have a ſubſiſtence? For, if there were many, they would ſuffer impoſſibilities. Is it not then the ſole intention of your diſcourſes to evince, by conteſting through all things, that *the many* has no ſubſiſtence? And do you not conſider each of your diſcourſes as an argument in ſupport of this opinion; and ſo think that you have produced as many arguments as you have compoſed diſcourſes, to ſhow that *the many* is not? Is not this what you ſay, or do I not rightly underſtand you? Upon which Zeno replied, You perceive excellently well the meaning of the whole book. That Socrates then ſaid, I perceive, O Parmenides, that this Zeno does not only wiſh to connect himſelf in the bands of friendſhip with you, but to agree with you likewiſe in ſentiments concerning the doctrines of the preſent diſcourſe. For Zeno, in a certain reſpect, has written the ſame as yourſelf; though, by changing certain particulars, he endeavours to deceive us into an opinion that his aſſertions are different from yours. For you in your poems aſſert that the univerſe is *one*; and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in ſupport of this opinion: but Zeno ſays that *the many* is not, and delivers many and mighty arguments in defence of this aſſertion. As, therefore, you aſſert that *the one* is, and he, that *the many* has no ſubſiſtence; and each ſpeaks in ſuch a manner as to diſagree totally according to appearance from one another, though you both nearly aſſert the ſame; on this account it is that your diſcourſes ſeem to be above our comprehenſion. That Zeno ſaid—Indeed, Socrates, ſo it is: but you do not perfectly apprehend the truth of my writings; though, like Laconic dogs, you excellently purſue and trace the meaning of the aſſertions. But this in the firſt place is concealed from you, that this diſcourſe is not in every reſpect ſo venerable, that it was compoſed, as you ſay, for the purpoſe of concealing its real doctrines from men, as if effecting a thing of great importance: yet you have ſpoken ſomething of that which happens to be the caſe. But indeed the truth of the matter is this: Theſe writings were compoſed for the purpoſe of affording a certain aſſiſtance to the doctrine of Parmenides, againſt thoſe who endeavour to defame it by attempting to ſhow that if *the one* is *many*, ridiculous conſequences muſt attend ſuch an opinion; and that things contrary to the aſſertion muſt enſue. This writing, therefore, contradicts

tradicts thoſe who ſay that *the many* is, and oppoſes this and many other opinions; as it is deſirous to evince that the hypotheſis which defends the ſubſiſtence of *the many* is attended with more ridiculous conſequences than that which vindicates the ſubſiſtence of *the one*, if both are ſufficiently examined. You are ignorant, therefore, Socrates, that this diſcourſe, which was compoſed by me when a youth, through the love of contention, and which was privately taken from me, ſo that I was not able to conſult whether or not it ſhould be iſſued into the light—you are ignorant, I ſay, that it was not written through that deſire of renown which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile deſire of contention: though, as I have ſaid, you do not conjecture amiſs. I admit it (ſays Socrates); and I think the caſe is juſt as you have ſtated it. But ſatisfy me in the following particulars. Do you think that there is a certain form of ſimilitude, itſelf ſubſiſting from itſelf? And another which is contrary to this, and is that which is diſſimilar? But that you and me, and other things which we call many, participate of theſe two? And that ſuch things as participate of ſimilitude become ſimilar, ſo far as they participate? But thoſe which participate of diſſimilitude become diſſimilar? And that thoſe which participate of both become both? But if all things participate of both, which are contrary to each other, and become ſimilar and diſſimilar to each other through participating of both, is there any thing wonderful in the caſe? For, if any one ſhould ſhow that ſimilars themſelves become diſſimilar, or diſſimilars ſimilar, I ſhould think it would be a prodigy: but if he evinces that ſuch things as participate both theſe ſuffer likewiſe both theſe, it does not appear to me, O Zeno, that there would be any thing abſurd in the caſe; nor again, if any one ſhould evince *that all things are one*, through their participating of *the one*, and at the ſame time *many*, through their participating multitude. But I ſhould very much wonder if any one ſhould ſhow that that which is *one* is *many*, and that *the many* is *one*; and in a ſimilar manner concerning all the reſt: for, doubtleſs, he would produce a proper ſubject of admiration, who ſhould evince that both genera and ſpecies ſuffer theſe contrary affections. But what occaſion of wonder would there be, ſhould any one ſhow that I myſelf am both *one* and *many*? and ſhould prove his aſſertion by ſaying, when he wiſhes to aſſert that I am *many*, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from thoſe on the left, the anterior

rior from the poſterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts (for I think that I participate of multitude): but when he deſires to ſhow that I am *one*, ſhould ſay, that as we are ſeven in number, I am *one* man, and participate of *the one*? ſo that he would by this means evince the truth of both theſe aſſertions. If any one, therefore, ſhould endeavour to ſhow that ſtones, wood, and all ſuch particulars, are both *many* and *one*, we ſhould ſay that he exhibits to our view ſuch things as are *many* and *one*, but that he does not aſſert that *the one* is *many*, nor *the many one*; nor ſpeak of any thing wonderful, but aſſerts that which is confeſſed by all men. But if any one ſhould, in the firſt place, diſtribute the forms of things, concerning which I have juſt been ſpeaking, ſeparating them eſſentially apart from each other, ſuch as *ſimilitude* and *diſſimilitude*, *multitude* and *the one*, and the reſt of this kind, and ſhould afterwards ſhow himſelf able to mingle and ſeparate them in themſelves, I ſhould be aſtoniſhed (ſays he), O Zeno, in a wonderful manner. But it appears to me that we ſhould ſtrenuouſly labour in the inveſtigation of theſe particulars: yet I ſhould be much aſtoniſhed if any one could ſolve this doubt, which is ſo profoundly involved in ſpecies; ſo as to be able no leſs clearly to explain this affair in the forms which are apprehended by the reaſoning power, than in thoſe belonging to viſible objects, and which you have already diſcuſſed.

Pythodorus ſaid, that when Socrates had thus ſpoken, he thought that Parmenides and Zeno ſeemed to be indignant at the ſeveral particulars of Socrates's diſcourſe; but that they beſtowed the greateſt attention on what he ſaid, and frequently looking at each other ſmiled, as wondering at Socrates: and that, in conſequence of his ceaſing to ſpeak, Parmenides ſaid—How worthy, O Socrates, of admiration is your ardour in the purſuit of liberal diſciplines! Tell me, therefore, have you ſeparated, as you ſay, certain ſpecies apart by themſelves, and likewiſe the participants of theſe ſpecies apart? And does there appear to you to be a certain *ſimilitude* ſeparate from that *ſimilitude* which we poſſeſs, and a certain *one* and *many*, and all ſuch other particulars, which you have juſt now heard mentioned by Zeno? That Socrates ſaid, So it appears to me. And (that Parmenides ſaid) does it alſo appear to you, that there is a certain ſpecies or form of *juſtice*, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf; likewiſe of *beauty* and *the good*, and every thing of this kind? That Socrates ſaid, It does. And likewiſe of all ſuch things as we

are compoſed from: ſo that there is a certain form of *man* [1], or of *fire*, or *water*? That Socrates anſwered--I have often been in doubt, O Parmenides, concerning theſe; whether it is neceſſary to ſpeak of them in the ſame manner as of the former particulars, or in a different manner. And do you doubt, O Socrates, whether it is neceſſary to ſay that there is a certain form of every ſuch particular as may appear to be ridiculous, I mean hair [2], clay, and mud, or any thing elſe which is vile and abject; and that theſe forms are different from the particulars with which we are converſant? That Socrates ſaid, I do not by any means think that the forms of theſe can be

[1] It is neceſſary, ſays Proclus, that immovable cauſes of all things which have a perpetual ſubſiſtence in the univerſe ſhould preſubſiſt in the intellect of the fabricator of the world: for the immutable is preſent with theſe, through the eternal power of cauſes. Hence, of man ſo far as man, and of every individual form in animals and in plants, there are intellectual cauſes; and the progreſſion of all things from thence is not immediately into theſe material genera. For it was not lawful for intellectual, eternal, and immaterial cauſes to generate material particulars, which have a various ſubſiſtence; ſince every progreſſion is effected through ſimilitude; and prior to things which are ſeparated from their cauſe as much as poſſible, ſuch things as are conjoined with, and are more clearly aſſimilated to, it, muſt have a ſubſiſtence. From *man itſelf*, therefore, or the ideal man in the demiurgic intellect, there will be, in the firſt place, a certain celeſtial man; afterwards an empyrean, an aërial, and an aquatic man; and, in the laſt place, this terreſtrial man. All this ſeries of form is perpetual, (the ſubjection proceeding into that which is more partial,) being ſuſpended from an intellectual unity, which is called *man itſelf*. There is alſo another ſeries from *horſe itſelf*, from *lion itſelf*, and in a ſimilar manner of all animals and plants. Thus, too, there is a fountain and unity of all fire, and a fountain of all mundane water. And that theſe monads are more partial than thoſe before mentioned, viz. than beauty, ſimilitude, juſtice, &c. is evident; and it is alſo clear that the fountain, or idea, of all the ſeries of man is the moſt partial of all the forms that are participated by mundane natures.

[2] We have already obſerved in the Introduction to this dialogue, and ſhall largely prove in the Additional Notes, that there are ideas alone of *univerſal* eſſences, and of ſuch things as contribute to the perfection of theſe: for *the good*, *the eſſential*, and *the perpetual*, eminently pertain to forms; the firſt of theſe being derived from the firſt cauſe, the ſecond from the higheſt being, and the third from eternity. From theſe three elements, therefore, we may define what things are generated according to a paradigmatic intellectual cauſe, and what things ſubſiſt indeed from other principles, but not according to an intellectual paradigm. Of hair, therefore, becauſe it is a part, there can be no idea; nor of clay, becauſe it is an indefinite mixture of two elements, earth and water, and is not generated according to a phyſical reaſon, or productive principle; ſince there are ten thouſand other things which we combine for the various purpoſes of life, and which are the works of art, and not of nature. Nor is there any idea of mud, becauſe there are no ideas of degenerations, detriments, and evils, which either ariſe from a confluence of diviſed cauſes, or from our actions and paſſions.

different from thoſe which are the objects of our inſpection: but is it not vehemently abſurd to think that there is a certain form of theſe? For this has formerly diſturbed me, whether or not ſomething of this kind does not take place about every thing: but, after having been fixed for ſome time in this opinion, I have haſtily withdrawn myſelf and fled away; fearing leſt, falling into a certain abyſs of trifles, I ſhould utterly periſh and be loſt; but, returning from thence, I have ſeriouſly applied myſelf to conſider thoſe particulars, to which, as we have juſt now aſſerted, forms belong. That Parmenides then ſaid, You are as yet but a young man [1], O Socrates, and Philoſophy has not yet received you into her embraces: for, in my opinion, when you are received by her, you will not deſpiſe any of theſe particulars: but now, on account of your juvenile age, you regard the opinions of men.

Tell me, then, does it appear to you, as you ſay, that there are certain forms, of which other things participating [2] retain the appellations; as, for inſtance,

[1] Parmenides, as Proclus juſtly obſerves, in correcting this conception of Socrates, reproves in what he now ſays thoſe who conſider theſe little and vile particulars as without a cauſe. For every thing which is generated, as Timæus ſays, is neceſſarily generated from ſome cauſe, ſince it is perfectly impoſſible that it ſhould be generated without a cauſe. There is nothing, therefore, ſo diſhonourable and vile which does not participate of *the good*, and thence derive its generation. Since, even though you ſhould ſpeak of matter, you will find that this is good; though of evil itſelf, you will find that this alſo participates of a certain good, and is no otherwiſe able to ſubſiſt than as coloured with, and receiving a portion of, a certain good. But the opinions of men are aſhamed to ſuſpend from a divine cauſe things ſmall and vile, looking to the nature of the latter, and not to the power of the former; and not conſidering that, being generative of greater things, it is much more ſo of ſuch as are leſs, as the Athenian gueſt ſays in the Laws. True philoſophers, however, ſuſpending every thing in the world both great and ſmall from providence, ſee nothing diſhonourable, nothing deſpicable in the dwelling of Jupiter; but they perceive all things good, ſo far as they ſubſiſt from providence, and beautiful, ſo far as generated according to a divine cauſe.

[2] The diſcourſe of Parmenides, ſays Proclus is perfective of, evolves and elevates, the conceptions of Socrates; praiſing, indeed, his unperverted conceptions, but perfecting ſuch as are imperfect, and diſtinctly unfolding ſuch as are confuſed. But as there are four problems concerning ideas, as we have obſerved in the Introduction, with reſpect to their ſubſiſtence Parmenides excites Socrates, in order to learn whether he ſuſpends all things from a formal principle, or whether he knew another cauſe more antient than this; and his reproof of Socrates was in conſequence of looking to this firſt cauſe. He proceeds, therefore, ſupernally from the moſt total

 forms,

inſtance, that ſuch things as participate of *ſimilitude* are *ſimilars*; of *magnitude* [1], *great*; and that the participants of *beauty* and *juſtice* are *beautiful* and

forms, through the more partial, and ſuch as are moſt individual, to ſuch things as do not ſubſiſt according to an intellectual form, but originate from the monad of all beings, or, in other words, being itſelf. Hence truly proceeding as far as to the laſt of things, and ſuſpending all things from a paternal cauſe, and perfecting the conceptions of Socrates concerning theſe, he proceeds to the third problem, or the manner in which ideas are participated, again extending obſtetric aid. For the mode of the diſcourſe is every where maieutic or obſtetric, and does not confute, and is piraſtic, or explorative, but not vindicative. It differs, however, ſo far as at one time it proceeds from on high as far as to the laſt of things, and at another recurs downwards to aſſertions adapted to divine cauſes; according to each of theſe forms perfecting and elevating Socrates, and diſtinctly unfolding his conceptions reſpecting theſe particulars. Such, then, is the mode of the diſcourſe, calling forth ſpontaneous conceptions, accurately expanding ſuch as are imperfect, and elevating thoſe that are able to follow them; truly imitating the paternal cauſe, which from the ſummit of all beings preſerves, perfects, and draws upwards all things by the unknown powers which he contains. Let us now proceed to conſider the mode in which forms or ideas are participated, following the divine Proclus as our leader in this arduous inveſtigation.

The participations of intellectual forms are aſſimilated to the repreſentations in a mirror; for as, in theſe, *habitude* and *poſition* cauſe the image of the perſon to be ſeen in the mirror; ſo, the *aptitude* of matter extending itſelf as it were to the Artificer of the univerſe, and to the inexhauſtible abundance which he contains, is filled from him with forms. The participations are alſo aſſimilated to the impreſſions in wax. For ideas impart a certain veſtige and impreſſion of themſelves; and neither is this impreſſion the ſame with the ſeal by which it was produced, as neither is the form merged in matter the ſame with the immaterial and divine form from which it originated. But this latter mode differs from the former ſo far as it indicates a certain paſſive property in the recipient; for the mirror does not exhibit paſſivity ſenſibly, as the wax does in the latter inſtance. Hence ſome of the Platonic philoſophers, conſidering matter as impaſſive in the participation of forms, aſſimilate it to a mirror, but call forms images and repreſentations. Others again, conſidering matter as paſſive, ſay, that it is impreſſed like the wax by the ſeal, and call forms the *paſſions* of matter.

Forms alſo are ſaid to be like the ſimilitudes of icons, whether effected by the painter's, or the plaſtic, or any other art. For theſe forms, being faſhioned by a divine artificer, are ſaid to be *ſimilar* to divine forms; and hence the whole ſenſible order is called the icon of the intelligible. But this aſſertion differs from the former, ſo far as this ſeparates the maker from the exemplar; but

[1] *Magnitude* here, as Proclus well obſerves, is not ſuch as that of which geometricians ſpeak; for they denominate whatever poſſeſſes interval magnitude, whether it be line, ſuperficies, or ſolid. But Plato does not denominate the form which is the cauſe of every interval, magnitude, but that which according to every genus imparts *tranſcendency* to things.

and *juſt?* That Socrates replied, Entirely ſo. Does not every thing which participates either participate the whole form, or only a part of it? Or can there

but thoſe produce the analogy from conſidering both as one. And ſuch are the modes according to which material forms have been ſaid to ſubſiſt with relation to ſuch as are divine.

It muſt, however, be obſerved, that each of theſe is imperfect conſidered by itſelf, and incapable of repreſenting to our intellectual conceptions the whole truth reſpecting this participation. For, in the firſt place, conſider, as to the mirror, that the countenance beheld in it turns itſelf towards the mirror, while, on the contrary, an intellectual cauſe beholds itſelf, and does not direct its viſion to outward objects. If, too, the mirror appears to poſſeſs a communication of ſomething, but in reality does not, (for the rays are reflected back to the countenance,) it is evident that this alſo is foreign from the participation of divine forms; for, as they are perfectly incorporeal, nothing can be ſeparated from them and diſtributed into matter.

In the ſecond place, if we conſider the impreſſions in wax, we ſhall find, that both that which impreſſes externally impreſſes, and that which is paſſive to the impreſſion is externally paſſive; but form pervades through the whole of the ſubject matter, and operates internally. For nature faſhions body inwardly, and not externally like art. And above all, in this inſtance, that which is participated approximates to that which participates. But it is requiſite that divine forms ſhould be exempt from all things, and not be mingled with any thing of a different nature.

In the third place, let us conſider the analogy from icons, and we ſhall find this alſo deficient. For, in the firſt place, forms faſhion the whole of the ſubject matter by which they are received, and this by an internal energy: and, in the next place, the exemplar and the maker are here ſeparated from each other. Thus, the figure which is painted does not produce its likeneſs on the canvaſs, even though the painter ſhould paint a reſemblance of himſelf; for it is the ſoul which operates, and not the external figure, which is the exemplar; nor does that which makes, *aſſimilate* that which is produced to itſelf; for it is ſoul which makes, and that which is produced is the reſemblance of external form. But divine forms are at the ſame time paradigmatic and demiurgic of their reſemblances: for they have no ſimilitude to the impreſſions in wax, but poſſeſs an efficacious eſſence, and a power aſſimilative of things ſecondary to themſelves.

No one of theſe modes, therefore, is of itſelf ſufficient to repreſent the true manner in which divine forms are participated. But, perhaps, if we can diſcover the moſt proper mode of participation, we ſhall ſee how each of theſe touches on the truth, at the ſame time that it falls ſhort of the whole characteriſtic.

It is requiſite, therefore, in order to this participation, to conſider as the cauſes by which it is effected, the efficacious power of primary and divine forms, and the deſire and aptitude of the natures which thence derive their formation. For neither is the fabricative and efficacious power of forms alone ſufficient to produce participation; for they are every where ſimilarly preſent, but are not ſimilarly participated by all things. Nor is the deſire and aptitude of the participants ſufficient without the productive energy of forms; for deſire and aptitude are of themſelves imperfect. The prolific eſſence, therefore, of the demiurgic intellect exerts an efficacious

there be any other mode of participation beſides theſe? That Socrates ſaid, How can there be? Does it then appear to you that the whole form [1] is one

efficacious energy, which the ſubject nature of ſenſibles receives. But, in effecting this participation, it neither makes uſe of impulſions, for it is incorporeal; nor of any indefinite impetus, as we do, for it is impaſſive; nor of any projectile force, for it is perfect; but it operates by its very eſſence. Hence, that which is generated is an image of its maker, intellection there concurring with eſſence: ſo that, according as he intellectually perceives, he fabricates; and, according as he fabricates, intellectually perceives. Hence, too, that which is generated is *always* generated by him; for, in eſſential productions, that which is generated is every where conſubſiſtent with its maker. In conſequence of this, in things ſubſiſting according to time, form, in *the ſudden*, ſupervenes its ſubject matter, whatever has been effected previous to its preſence alone removing the impediments to its reception. For, *the ſudden* imitates according to *the now*, the at-once-collected and eternal generation of all things through the aptitude of the recipient.

If, again, we deſire to ſee what it is which connects demiurgic power with the aptitude of recipients, we ſhall find it is goodneſs itſelf, this being the cauſe of all poſſible union. For, participations proceed to mundane cauſes through a deſire of good; and demiurgic forms, through goodneſs, make their progreſſions into ſecondary natures, imitating the inexhauſtible and exuberant fountain of all good, which, through its own tranſcendent goodneſs, gives ſubſiſtence to all the divine orders, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak. We have therefore theſe three cauſes of the participation of forms, the one goodneſs of the Father of all things; the demiurgic power of forms, and the aptitude of the natures which receive the illuminations of forms. But, participation ſubſiſting according to theſe cauſes, we may perceive how it is poſſible to aſſimilate it to repreſentations in a mirror, and to *reflection*. For aptitude and deſire, which are imparted to ſenſible natures from on high, become the cauſes of their being again *converted* to the ſources whence they were derived. This participation too may, after another manner, be aſſimilated to a *ſeal*. For the efficacious power of divine cauſes imparts a *veſtige* of ideas to ſenſibles, and apparent impreſſions from unapparent forms. For we have ſaid that the demiurgic cauſe unites both theſe together. But he who produces an icon effects ſomething of this kind. For in a certain reſpect he congregates the ſubject and the paradigm; ſince, when this is accompliſhed, he produces an impreſſion ſimilar to the exemplar. So that theſe modes, in a certain reſpect, touch upon the truth. But it is by no means wonderful if each is found to be deficient. For the recipients of ideas are partible and ſenſible; and the characteriſtic peculiarity of theſe unapparent and divine cauſes cannot be circumſcribed by the nothingneſs of corporeal natures.

[1] He who inveſtigates whole and part, not corporeally, but in ſuch a manner as is adapted to intelligible and immaterial forms, will perceive that every ſenſible nature participates both of the whole and the part of its paradigm. For, as that has the relation of a cauſe, but ſenſibles are from a cauſe, and effects can by no means receive the whole power of their cauſes, hence, ſenſibles do not participate of the whole form. For, where can that which is ſenſible receive the intellectual lives and powers of form? Where can the uniform and impartible nature of idea ſubſiſt in matter? Becauſe however, ſenſibles preſerve the idiom according to which *the juſt* in

one in each individual of *many things?* Or what other opinion have you on this ſubject? That then Socrates ſaid, What hinders, O Parmenides, but

in the intelligible world is called *the juſt*, or *the beautiful the beautiful*; through this again they may be ſaid to participate of wholes, and not of parts. Thus, for inſtance, the idiom of *the beautiful* is every where and in all things; but in one place it is intellectually, and in another materially preſent. And it is evident that the participations of more perfect natures are more abundant than of thoſe more remote from perfection; and that ſome things participate according to many, and others according to a few, powers. For, let *the beautiful itſelf* be *an intellectual vital form the cauſe of ſymmetry. Form*, therefore, and *that which is effective of ſymmetry*, are preſent to every thing beautiful: for this was the idiom of *the beautiful itſelf*; ſo that every thing participates of its whole idiom. But the *intellectual* nature of *the beautiful* is not preſent to all beauty, but to that which belongs to ſoul: for the beauty in this is uniform. Nor, again, is its *vital* nature preſent to all beauty, but to that which is celeſtial; but the *ſplendour* of beauty is ſeen in gold, and in certain ſtones. Some things, therefore, participate of the intellectual and vital nature of *the beautiful*; others of its vital ſeparate from its intellectual nature; and others participate of its idiom alone. More immaterial natures, likewiſe, receive more of its powers than material natures. Things ſecondary, therefore, participate both the wholes and parts of their proper paradigms. And in this manner it is proper to ſpeak to thoſe who are able to look to the incorporeal eſſence of forms. But to thoſe who are of opinion that the participation is corporeal, we muſt ſay, that ſenſibles are incapable of participating either the wholes or parts of ideas; which Parmenides evinces, leading Socrates to the diſcovery of the moſt proper mode of the participation of forms, and, in the firſt place, that they are not participated according to the whole; for this was the firſt thing to be ſhown. And Socrates ſays, that nothing hinders the participation of the whole form. But Parmenides reprobates the poſition inferring that one and the ſame thing will be in many things ſeparate from each other, and ſo the thing itſelf will be ſeparate from itſelf, which is of all things the moſt abſurd. For if a finger, or any thing elſe which ſubſiſts in other things, whether it be a corporeal part or power, ſhould be in many things ſeparate from each other, it would alſo be ſeparate from itſelf. For a corporeal power being in a ſubject will thus belong to ſubjects, and be ſeparate from itſelf, ſince it will be both in one and many. And, with reſpect to a body, it is impoſſible that the whole of it ſhould be in this place, and at the ſame time in another. For it cannot be denied, that many bodies may be in one place when the bodies conſiſt of pure immaterial light, ſuch as thoſe of the ſpheres in which the planets are carried, but it is impoſſible for the ſame body to be at the ſame time in many places. And hence it is impoſſible for a whole to be in many ſubjects corporeally.

But, ſays Proclus, if you wiſh to perceive the accuracy of Plato's diction in a manner adapted to theological ſpeculation, divide the words, and ſay as follows:—Since forms firſt ſubſiſt in the paradigm of intelligibles, as we learn in the Timæus, each of the firſt forms will be *one*, and *being*, and *a whole*. And being ſuch, it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be in many things ſeparate from each other, and at once, except in an exempt manner; ſo as to be both every where and no where, and, being preſent with all things without time, to be unmingled with them. For

every

but that it ſhould be one? As it is, therefore, one and the ſame in things many and ſeparate from each other, the whole will be at the ſame time one, and ſo itſelf will be ſeparate from itſelf. That Socrates ſaid, It would not be ſo: but juſt as if this form was *day* [1], this being *one* and *the ſame*, is collectively preſent in many places, and yet is not any thing the more ſeparate from itſelf; in the ſame manner, every form may be at once *one* and *the ſame* in all. That Parmenides then ſaid, You have made, O Socrates, one and the ſame thing to be collectively preſent in many places, in a very pleaſant manner; juſt as if, covering many men with a veil, you ſhould ſay that there is *one whole*, together with *the many*. Do you not think that you would make an aſſertion of this kind? That Socrates ſaid, Perhaps ſo. Will, therefore, the whole veil ſubſiſt together with each man, or a different part of it with each individual? A different part only. That Parmenides ſaid, Theſe forms then, O Socrates, are diviſible [2], and their participants participate only parts of them: and hence there will no longer be one whole form in each individual, but only one part of each form. So indeed it

every divine form, being in itſelf, is alſo preſent with others. And thoſe natures which are incapable of being at the ſame time in many things, derive this inability from not being in themſelves: for that which is ſomething belonging to one thing is not capable of belonging to another.

[1] That Socrates, ſays Proclus, derived his example of day from the diſcourſe of Zeno, is evident. For Zeno, wiſhing to evince how the many participate of a certain one, and are not deſtitute of the one, though they ſhould be moſt remotely ſeparated from each other, ſays in this very diſcourſe, that whiteneſs, being one, is preſent both to us and the antipodes, in the ſame manner as day and night. Ὁτι μεν εκ του ζηνωνος λογου το παραδειγμα ειληφε, δηλον· εκεινος γαρ δηλωσαι βουλομενος ὁπως τα πολλα μετεχει τινος ενος, και ουκ εστιν ερημα ενος, καν διεστηκει πορρωτατω απ' αλληλων, ειπεν εν τῳ αυτῳ λογῳ μιαν ουσαν την λευκοτητα παρειναι και ἡμιν και τοις αντιποσιν, ὁυτως ὡς ευφροιην και την ημεραν. Parmenides, however, corrects Socrates, as no longer preſerving, by the example of day, form one and the ſame; but as introducing the partible inſtead of the impartible, and that which is one, and at the ſame time not one, inſtead of one; ſuch as is whiteneſs with us and the antipodes. For the intention of Zeno's diſcourſe was not to aſcend to ſeparate form, but to lead his auditors to that form which ſubſiſts with, and is inſeparable from, the many.

[2] Every thing ſenſible is a multitude which has an adventitious one, but form is a certain one comprehending multitude uniformly. For in divine natures progreſſion begins from the one, and from hyparxis; ſince, if multitude ſubſiſts prior to the one, the one will be adventitious. From theſe things alſo, ſays Proclus, you may underſtand how fables aſſert that there are certain diviſions and lacerations of the Gods, when they are diviſibly participated by ſecondary natures, which diſtribute the impartible cauſes of things partible preſubſiſting in the Gods. For the diviſion is not in reality of the divinities, but of theſe ſecondary natures, about them.

ſeems.

ſeems. Are you then willing to aſſert that one form is in reality divided, and that nevertheleſs it is ſtill one? That Socrates ſaid, By no means. For ſee (ſaid Parmenides), whether upon dividing magnitude [1] itſelf, it would not be abſurd that each of the many things which are great, ſhould be great by a part of magnitude leſs than magnitude itſelf? Entirely ſo, ſaid Socrates.

[1] Parmenides, ſays Proclus, wiſhing to ſhow the abſurdity of admitting that a formal eſſence is partible, diſcourſes concerning magnitude, equality, and parvitude, becauſe each of theſe is beheld about quantity. But quantity has not by any means a part the ſame with the whole, in the ſame manner as a part of quality appears to preſerve the ſame power with the whole; whence alſo a part of fire is indeed diminiſhed according to quantity, but according to quality preſerves the nature of fire. In magnitude, therefore, equality, and parvitude, he very properly confutes thoſe who ſay that forms are partible. For, if thoſe forms which eſpecially appear to be partible, becauſe they introduce with themſelves the conception of quantity, cannot be diviſible, by a much greater reaſon other forms muſt be impartible, which do not introduce together with themſelves ſuch a conception; ſuch as are the juſt itſelf, the beautiful itſelf, the ſimilar itſelf, and the diſſimilar itſelf, which Parmenides co-ordinating with magnitude itſelf inquires how they are participated by ſenſibles. About theſe, therefore, which appear to be quantities, he very properly forms the demonſtration, and, in the firſt place, about magnitude. For, let magnitude be corporeally diviſible. The part, therefore, will be leſs than the whole; and, if this be the caſe, the whole will be greater than the part. So that, if ſenſible magnitude receiving a part of magnitude in the intelligible world, i. e. of magnitude itſelf, becomes great, this very thing is called great from receiving that which is ſmaller: for a part of magnitude itſelf is leſs and ſmaller. But it is ſuppoſed that things which participate of *the great* are great, and that things which participate of *the ſmall* are ſmall.

Let us however conſider magnitude itſelf by itſelf, apart from corporeal diviſion. Do we not, therefore, ſay that it has multitude, and is not one alone? But, if it has multitude, ſhall we ſay that each of its parts is magnitude itſelf, or that each is leſs than the whole, but is by no means ſmall? For, if a part is magnitude itſelf, in no reſpect leſs than the whole, there will be a progreſſion to infinity; ſince this will not only be the caſe with this part, but alſo with its parts, and the parts of its parts, the parts always being the ſame with the wholes. But if magnitude has not magnitudes as its parts, the whole will conſiſt from parts unadapted to it. It is neceſſary, therefore, that the parts as it were of magnitude itſelf ſhould be magnitudes, according with the whole, but yet not that which the whole is. For the part of fire is fire, but the power of the whole is greater than that of the part; and neither does the whole conſiſt from cold parts, nor is each part of equal ſtrength with the whole. Hence we muſt conceive that magnitude itſelf has twofold powers, one of which inſerts tranſcendency in incorporeals with reſpect to incorporeals; for in theſe there is a certain magnitude, and the other in bodies with reſpect to bodies. So that, though form poſſeſſes abundance of power, yet it does not depart from its proper idiom in the multitude of the powers which it contains. By ſpeculating intellectually in this manner parts and wholes in ideas, we ſhall avoid the abſurdities with which Parmenides ſhows the ſpeculation of them in a corporeal manner is attended.

But what then? Can that which participates a part of equal [1] itſelf, be equal to any thing by this its part of equality, which is leſs than equal itſelf?

[1] *Magnitude itſelf* is the ſource of tranſcendency and exempt perfection to all things, whether ſuch tranſcendency and perfection be intellectual, or vital, or ſubſiſting with interval. But *the equal* is the cauſe of harmony and analogy to all things: for from equality, as we ſhall ſhow in the Additional Notes to the Timæus, all the mediums are derived, as well thoſe belonging to the ſoul and ſuch as are phyſical, as thoſe that are mathematical; and the end of it is friendſhip and union. Since therefore the demiurgus, in adorning the univerſe, employed all the mediums, and the arithmetical, geometrical, and harmonic bonds proceeding from theſe, it may be ſafely inferred that the one intellectual cauſe of theſe, which generates and adorns them, is this demiurgic equality. For, as the monad which ſubſiſts in the demiurgus gives ſubſiſtence to every natural number, ſo the equality which is there, generates all the mediums or middles which are here; ſince alſo the equality which is contained in our dianoëtic part generates the mathematical mediums. But, if this be the caſe in images, much more in intellectual forms is equality the prolific ſource of all the variety of mediums which proceed about the world. Equality, therefore, is the cauſe of theſe to all mundane natures. It is likewiſe the ſupplier of co-ordination to beings; juſt as *magnitude* is the cauſe of exempt perfection, and *parvitude* of eſſential ſubjection. It appears, indeed, that all beings are adorned from this triad of forms, as they impart tranſcendency to ſuperior natures, ſubjection to ſuch as are inferior, and a communion of the ſame ſeries to ſuch as are co-ordinate. And it is evident that the perpetually indiſſoluble ſeries of wholes are generated according to this triad. For every ſeries requires theſe three, viz. *tranſcendency*, *co-ordination* and *ſubjection*. So that, if there are certain progreſſions of every form from on high, as far as to the laſt of things, and which, together with communion, preſerve the diſtinction between things ſecond and firſt, they are perfected through this triad.

Let us now ſee how Parmenides confutes thoſe who think that ſenſible equals participate parts of equality itſelf corporeally. For, if any ſenſible particular thus participates a part of equality, it is evident that it participates of ſomething leſs than the whole. But, if this be the caſe, that which participates of the leſſer is no longer leſſer, but equal. It ought not however to be ſo; ſince it is agreed that forms give the appellations of themſelves to ſenſibles. Hence that which participates of the leſſer muſt not be called equal, but leſſer; nor muſt that which participates of the equal be called leſſer, but equal; nor that which participates of the greater be denominated equal or leſſer, but greater. If, therefore, we direct our view to equality itſelf as an incorporeal eſſence, we muſt ſay that being one it contains in itſelf the cauſes of all equalities, viz. of the equality in weights, in corporeal maſſes, in multitudes, in dignities and in generations; ſo that each of ſuch-like particulars, which are all-various, is a certain *equal*, poſſeſſing a power and dignity ſubordinate to the whole. Since every form, therefore, generates all the idioms of the powers which it contains, it follows that there are many equalities comprehended under one equality. Nor ought we to wonder if all equalities, being ſubordinate to their comprehending unity, ſuffer this through the participation of parvitude itſelf. For all forms communicate with all; and magnitude itſelf, ſo far as it poſſeſſes a leſſer power than other forms, participates of parvitude. Parvitude itſelf alſo, ſo far as it ſurpaſſes other forms, participates of magnitude itſelf; while in the mean time every form is participated by ſenſibles ſo far as it is that which it is, and not ſo far as it communicates with others.

It is impoſſible. But ſome one of us muſt poſſeſs a part of this ſmall quantity; and that which is *ſmall itſelf* [1] will be greater than this, this ſmall quantity

[1] Parvitude itſelf may be conſidered as that which is the ſource of ſubjection in all forms, or it may be ſaid to be that which ſupplies impartibility, connected continuity, and a power which converges to the ſame in every form. For through this ſouls are able to proceed from a life extended with body and ſenſe to a more impartible form of life. Through this alſo bodies are compreſſed and connectedly contained in their indiviſible cauſes; the whole world is one, and poſſeſſes the whole of its life converging in one thing, the middle; and from this the poles and centres, and all impartible ſections, and contacts of circles, are derived. But the preſent diſcourſe evinces that it is impoſſible for ſenſibles to participate a part of parvitude corporeally. For, if parvitude itſelf had a certain part, it would be greater than its part; ſince a part of the ſmall, ſo far as it is a part, muſt be ſmaller than the whole: ſo that the ſmall will evidently be greater than its proper part, which is ſmaller than it. But it is impoſſible that the ſmall ſimply conſidered ſhould be greater. For we now conſider parvitude itſelf by itſelf, without any connection with magnitude. And ſuch is the abſurdity attending thoſe that divide parvitude when ſuch diviſion is conſidered in the form itſelf. But we may alſo inveſtigate another abſurdity which takes place in the participants of parvitude, and which is as follows: If we divide the ſmall itſelf, ſince the part of it is, as has been ſhown, ſmaller than the whole, it is evident that the thing, to which the part taken away from the whole of *the ſmall* is added, will become greater by this addition, and not ſmaller. Hence parvitude muſt not be divided.

We may alſo, ſays Proclus, interpret the preſent paſſage in the ſame manner as our aſſociate Pericles. For, to whatever the part taken away from the ſmall is added, this muſt neceſſarily become greater; but, by adding to that ſame thing the remaining part of the ſmall thus divided, the whole thing will become ſmall, and not greater than it was before: for the form was ſmall from the beginning. It is abſurd, therefore, to think that the ſmall can be divided. Proclus adds, that the preſent paſſage to ſome appeared ſo difficult, that they conſidered it as ſpurious. The words of Parmenides however, by introducing certain ablations and additions, evince that the participation which he reprobates is corporeal.

But we may aſſert in common, ſays Proclus, reſpecting theſe three forms, magnitude, parvitude, and equality, or rather concerning all forms at once, that they are impartible, and are allotted an incorporeal eſſence. For every thing corporeal, being bounded according to interval, cannot after the ſame manner be preſent to things greater and leſſer; but the equal, the greater, the leſſer, and, in a ſimilar manner, every other form are preſent to their participants, whatever interval they may poſſeſs. All forms, therefore, are without interval. For the ſame reaſon they are alſo eſtabliſhed above all place; ſince without impediment they are every where preſent to their participants. But things which ſubſiſt in place are naturally deſtitute of this unimpeded preſence: for it is impoſſible that they can be participated by all things which are arranged in different places. In like manner, forms are entirely expanded above all time: for they are preſent untemporally and collectively to all things; ſince generations themſelves are certain preparations which precede the participations of forms. And generations indeed ſubſiſt in time, but

quantity being a part of *ſmall itſelf*; and thus *ſmall itſelf* will be that which is *greater:* but that to which this part which was taken away is added, will become ſmaller, and not greater than it was before. That Socrates ſaid—This cannot take place. But after what manner [1] then, O Socrates, can individuals

forms give the participations of themſelves to generated natures, in an inſtant, impartibly, without being in any reſpect indigent of temporal extenſion. Let not, therefore, any one transfer from participants to the things participated, either time, or local comprehenſion, or corporeal diviſion; nor let him, in ſhort, underſtand in forms either corporeal compoſitions or ſeparations. For theſe things are very remote from the immaterial ſimplicity of forms, and from the purity of an impartible eſſence which is contained in eternity.

[1] The whole form of theſe words, ſays Proclus, is excitative and maieutic of the conceptions of Socrates. Hence Parmenides does not add, like one who contends for victory in diſputation, "ſenſibles, therefore, do not participate of forms," but he excites Socrates, and calls forth his intellect to the diſcovery of the moſt proper mode of participation. But we have already obſerved that whole and part are not to be conſidered corporeally, but in a manner accommodated to immaterial and intellectual eſſences. Senſibles, therefore, participate both the whole and the parts of form. For, ſo far as the idiom of every form proceeds in its participants as far as to the laſt of them, the participation is that of a whole; but, ſo far as things ſecondary do not receive all the power of their cauſes, the participation is of parts. Hence the more elevated of participants receive more powers of the paradigm; but the more ſubordinate, fewer. So that, if there are men in other parts of the univerſe better than us, theſe, being nearer the idea of man, will have a greater communion with it, and according to a greater number of powers. Hence the celeſtial lion is intellectual, but the ſublunary irrational: for the former is nearer to the idea of lion than the latter. The idiom indeed of idea pervades as far as to mortal natures; and hence things ſublunary ſympathize with things celeſtial. For one form, and communion according to this, produce the ſympathy. The moon alſo, ſays Proclus, as beheld in the heavens is a divinity; but the lunar form, which is beheld here in ſtones, preſerves alſo a power appropriate to the lunar order, ſince it increaſes and decreaſes in conformity to the changes of the moon. Thus, one idiom proceeds from on high as far as to the laſt of things; and it is evident that it proceeds through mediums. For, if there is this one form both in Gods and ſtones, much prior to its being preſent with the latter muſt it ſubſiſt in the middle genera, ſuch as dæmons, or other animals. For certain ſeries pervade from the intellectual Gods to the heavens, and again from the heavens into generation or the ſublunary realms, being changed according to each of the elements, and ſubſiding as far as to earth. But of theſe ſeries the higher parts participate in a greater, but the lower in a leſſer degree; one idiom being extended to all the parts, which makes the whole ſeries one.

Again, after another manner, we may ſay that ſenſibles participate both of the whole and of the parts of form. They participate of the whole, ſo far as the fabrication of form is impartible: whence alſo the ſame whole is every where preſent to all things, ſubſiſting from itſelf in the firſt place, and afterwards filling the eſſence of its participants with its proper power. But they par-

individuals participate of forms, if they are neither able to participate according to parts, nor according to wholes? That Socrates ſaid, It does not appear to me, by Jupiter, to be in any reſpect an eaſy matter to define a circumſtance of this kind. But what will you ſay to this? To what? I think that you conſider every form as one [1], on this account; becauſe, ſince a certain multitude of particulars ſeems to you to be great, there may perhaps appear to him who ſurveys them all to be one idea, from whence you think

ticipate of the parts of form, ſo far as they do not participate of form itſelf, but of its images; and images are parts of their proper paradigms. For image is to its paradigm, as a part to the whole. And if any one, admitting this expoſition, examines what has been already delivered concerning ideas, none of thoſe impoſſibilities will follow, which ſome of the antients have conſidered as the inevitable conſequences of the doctrine of ideas. For, will it any longer be impoſſible that the ſame thing ſhould be in all things, if we admit that an immaterial and intellectual form ſubſiſting in itſelf, and requiring no ſeat nor place, is equally preſent to all things which are able to participate it? Will it be impoſſible that eſſentially impartible form, and which pre-ſubſiſts as one, ſhould be divided in its participants and ſuſtain a Titanic divulſion? And how is it not moſt true that what participates of magnitude itſelf participates of the leſſer? For magnitude in the participant, being diviſible, is the image of magnitude itſelf; but the image is leſs than the paradigm by a certain part. In like manner, that which we call equal in ſenſibles is leſs than the power of the equal itſelf, and is nothing more than the image of perfection; but the equal itſelf is greater than this, ſo far as it is more perfect in power. In ſhort, with reſpect to each of theſe three forms, ſince they are exempt from their participants, meaſure their eſſence, and impart the cauſe of ſubjection to them; according to exempt tranſcendency, each employs magnitude itſelf; according to a meaſuring power, the equal itſelf; and according to the gift of ſubjection, parvitude itſelf. All, therefore, co-operate with each other in the gifts which they impart to ſecondary natures. For, if magnitude itſelf imparts a power which extends to all things, but parvitude impartibility, they are connaſcent with each other; ſince then pervading more impartibly to a great number of particulars, they are impartible in a greater degree: and both are in a greater degree equal, by being eſpecially the meaſures both of themſelves and others. There is nothing, therefore, abſurd, nothing impoſſible, if whole and part are conſidered in a manner adapted to the nature of forms; but all things follow appropriately to the hypotheſis. Whence alſo Parmenides appears continually to aſk Socrates, how ſenſibles participate of, and how whole and part are to be ſurveyed in, forms, elevating him to the moſt true conceptions concerning ideas.

[1] From what has been already delivered (ſays Proclus) it is ſufficiently evident that forms are not participated in a corporeal manner; whence we may infer that neither do they fabricate corporeally, nor operate by impulſion, like the motions of bodies. But if this be the caſe, it is evident that the order of forms is incorporeal. In the Sophiſta, therefore, it is ſhown that *the one* is incorporeal; for, if it were body, it would require ſomething elſe to unite its parts. But it is here ſhown that *true being* and *intellectual forms* have an impartible ſubſiſtence: and in the Laws,

that

think them to be one great thing. That then Socrates ſaid, You ſpeak the truth. But what if you conſider the *great* [1] *itſelf*, and other things which are

that *ſouls* are incorporeal through their ſelf-motive hypoſtaſis. Theſe, however, are the three orders prior to ſenſibles, viz. the order of *ſouls*, the order of *intellectual eſſences*, and the order of *unities*, the immediate progeny of *the one*.

But here Parmenides aſcends to a more perfect hypotheſis concerning ideas, viz. whether ſenſibles participate of ideas as of phyſical reaſons or productive principles, which are coordinate and connaſcent with their participants, but are at the ſame time incorporeal: for the doubt prior to this conſidered the participation of ideas as corporeal. Parmenides, therefore, aſcends to a certain incorporeal reaſon, which, looking to things, we muſt define to be phyſical, and muſt aſſert, that the mode of participation is indeed incorporeal, but poſſeſſes ſomething common with its participants. For if, together with incorporeal participation, we alſo conſider the things participated as perfectly exempt from their participants, there will no longer any doubt remain concerning the participation; ſince theſe two things produce the doubt, the corporeal mode of being preſent, and the poſſeſſion of ſomething common between ideas and their participants, to which Socrates looking in the Phædo ſays, that it is dubious whether participation is the *preſence* of forms, as in the preceding inquiry, whether ſenſibles participate of the whole of form, or only of a part; or whether it is not a being preſent. This ſecond inquiry, therefore, conſiders form as in its participants, and as coordinate with them. For phyſical reaſons and natures are arranged above bodies and the apparent order of forms; but at the ſame time they verge to bodies, and do not

[1] Ideas muſt be conſidered as exempt and ſeparate from, and as generative of, the many; and the tranſitions from things which are ſeparated muſt be made, not through privations, but through forms, and in forms, till we arrive at ſelf-ſubſiſtent and firſt natures. For how, through things indefinite and formleſs, can we arrive at form and bound? Aſcending, indeed, from things material to ſpermatic reaſons, we ſhall find ſomething common in them, but which is imperfect; and proceeding from theſe to cauſes ſubſiſting in ſoul, we ſhall perceive that the effective power of theſe is temporal. But if we run back to forms which are truly ſo called, we ſhall find that there is nothing common between theſe and ſenſibles. For theſe true forms are perfect, and their energy is incorporeal and eternal, and is above all generation. For the characteriſtics of all generation are the imperfect from itſelf, the partible, the temporal, from which forms being purified, they are liberated from all ſenſibles, and poſſeſs nothing in common with them; ſo that it is no longer poſſible to make a tranſition to any other ſomething common. As, therefore, ſays Proclus, we obſerved in commenting on the former doubt, that forms are preſent with their participants through that which they impart, and are not preſent through their ſeparate hypoſtaſis; ſo, with reſpect to this ſecond doubt, we ſay, that forms communicate with their participants, and do not communicate. They communicate by illuminating them from themſelves, but do not communicate, in conſequence of being unmingled with the illuminated natures. So that a certain ſimilitude to them is divulſed, not from forms themſelves, but from the illuminations proceeding from them. Hence, through theſe they are ſaid to communicate after a certain manner with ſenſibles; not as in things ſynonymous, but as in things ſecond and firſt.

are *great*, in the ſame manner, with the eye of the ſoul, will not again a certain ſomething which is *great* appear to you, through which all theſe neceſſarily

not connect them exemptly. Hence, alſo, phyſical reaſons are entirely coordinated with ſenſible forms. But Parmenides himſelf clearly teaches how we aſcend to phyſical reaſons; ſince we recur from things common in particulars to the proximate cauſe of them, which is entirely phyſical form. For, perceiving many things that are great, and one idea extending to all theſe, we conceive that there is a certain ſomething *great* which is common to the magnitude in particulars. But that the diſcourſe is about phyſical form, and a tranſition from ſenſibles to this form, is evident, as Proclus juſtly obſerves, from Parmenides employing ſuch expreſſions as το οιεσθαι, το δοξει, το δοκει, το ηγη, and the like, which could not be employed about things which are objects of ſcience, but are only adapted to phyſical concerns. In like manner we muſt ſay, with reſpect to men, that we ſee many men, and one idea extending to all of them, the man in particulars. Whence we think that one man pre-ſubſiſts in the reaſons or productive principles of nature, generative of the apparent man, and that thus the many participate of the one, as of phyſical reaſon proceeding into matter; ſuch reaſon or form not being ſeparate from matter, but reſembling a ſeal verging to the wax, impreſſing in it the form which it contains, and cauſing it to be adapted to the whole of the inſerted form. As the proximate tranſition, therefore, is from bodies to natures, Parmenides evinces that phyſical reaſons fall ſhort of the perfection of ideas, which is primary and unmingled with its participants.

From hence it may be inferred, that, as form is that primarily which the multitude under it is ſecondarily, it neither communicates with this multitude according to name alone, nor is ſynonymous with it; and that it is not neceſſary again to inveſtigate that which is common to form and its depending multitude. When, therefore, we conſider the one in every form, we ought not to inveſtigate it either doxaſtically or dianoëtically: for theſe knowledges are not connate with intellectual monads, which neither belong to the objects of opinion, nor to thoſe of the dianoëtic part, as we learn from the ſixth book of the Republic. But it is fit that we ſhould ſurvey the ſimple and uniform eſſence of forms through intellectual intuition. Nor muſt we conceive that the one in theſe ſubſiſts according to compoſition from the many, or by an abſtraction from particulars: for the intellectual number of forms proceeds from *the good* and *the one*, and does not depart from a union and alliance adapted to the cauſe which gave it ſubſiſtence. Hence, Socrates in the Philebus, at one time calls ideas *unities*, and at another time *monads*. For, conſidered with relation to *the one*, they are *monads*, becauſe each is a multitude, ſince it is a certain being, life, and intellectual form; but conſidered with relation to their productions, and the ſeries to which they give ſubſiſtence, they are *unities*; for things poſterior to them are multiplied, and from their impartible eſſence become partible. If, therefore, that which is characterized by unity in forms is exempt from the many, it is evident that the knowledge of intellect, which is profoundly one, is ſufficient to the apprehenſion of the one of forms. Whether, therefore, there is a multitude of participants, it does not multiply the unity of that which is participated; or, whether there are differences of parts in the participants, the impartible nature of forms is preſerved immutable; or, whether there is compoſition in that which participates, the ſimplicity of intellectual

neceſſarily ſeem to be great? It ſeems ſo. Hence, another form of *magnitude* will become apparent, beſides *magnitude itſelf* and its participants: and beſides

lectual forms remains eternally the ſame. For they are neither connumerated with their effects, nor do they give completion to their eſſence; ſince, if they ſubſiſted in their productions, they could not be beheld as the principle of them, and as their prolific cauſe. For, in ſhort, every thing which is ſomething belonging to another cannot be a cauſe, ſimply conſidered; ſince every true cauſe is exempt from its effects, and is eſtabliſhed in itſelf and from itſelf, ſeparate from its participants. He, therefore, who is willing to paſs from theſe ſenſibles, and every way divided natures, to forms themſelves, muſt permit intellect inſtead of opinion to be the leader of the way, and muſt contemplate every form uncoordinated and unmingled with objects of ſenſe; neither conceiving that they poſſeſs any habitude with ſenſibles, nor ſurveying any common definition of eſſence between them and the many, nor, in ſhort, any coordination of participants and the things which are participated. But he who uſes opinion in this tranſition, and apprehends forms mingled with ſenſibles, and connumerated with material reaſons, will ſcarcely aſcend as far as to nature, and the phyſical order of forms: whence, again, he muſt after theſe contemplate other more total monads, and this to infinity, till, arriving at intellectual boundaries themſelves, he beholds in theſe ſelf-ſubſiſting, moſt ſimple, and eternal natures, the definite derivation of forms. Parmenides, therefore, gradually evinces that primary are expanded above diviſible forms, and all that is mingled and connumerated with theſe, and this according to a wonderful tranſcendency of nature.

And here, what Socrates obſerves in the Phædo reſpecting the participation of forms, is worthy of admiration: for he there ſays, that he cannot yet ſtrenuouſly affirm whether it is requiſite to call this participation *preſence*, or *communion*, or any thing elſe beſides theſe. For, from the firſt doubt, it may be evinced that it is impoſſible for the participation to be *preſence*, ſince neither the whole, nor certain parts of them, are able to be preſent with their participants. But, from this ſecond doubt, we may confute thoſe who contend that the participation is *communion*. If, therefore, there is any thing common to ideas and their participants, there will be a tranſition ad infinitum from the participants of that which is common to that which is common; and hence this latter doubt is different from the former. For the former was, that form is preſent with its participants, and is ſomething belonging to them; but the latter, that form is different from its participant, but poſſeſſes an abundant communion with it. Hence, in the former, the argument proceeds from the inability of form being preſent, either according to the whole or a part of itſelf; but, in the latter, it no longer proceeds in a ſimilar manner, but, from that which is common in form and its participant, again aſcends to ſomething elſe which is more common than the one form, and the many by which it is participated. He alone, therefore, can aſſign a ſcientific reaſon concerning the participation of forms, who takes away that which is corporeal in their being preſent, and removes that which is common from an incorporeal eſſence. For thus ideas will be incorporeally preſent with their participants, but will not be ſubdued by one relation towards them; that they may be every where, through their incorporeal nature, and no where, in conſequence of being exempt from their participants. For a communion with participants takes away

beſides all theſe another *magnitude*, through which all theſe become great; ſo that each of your forms will no longer be one thing, but an infinite multitude.

away exempt tranſcendency. For it is requiſite, indeed, that there ſhould be communion, yet not as of things coordinate, but only ſo far as participants are ſuſpended from ideas; but ideas are perfectly exempt from their participants. Corporeal preſence, however, obſcures a preſence every way impartible. Bodies therefore, are things incapable of being wholly in many things; but eſſentially incorporeal natures are wholly preſent to things which are able to participate them; or, rather, they are not preſent to their participants, but their participants are preſent to them. And this is what Socrates obſcurely ſignifies in the Phædo, when he ſays, "whether preſence, or communion, or any thing elſe may be the cauſe of the participation of forms." Forms, therefore, muſt not be admitted to be the progeny and bloſſoms of matter, as they were ſaid to be by the Stoics; nor muſt it be granted that they conſiſt from a comixture of ſimple elements; nor that they have the ſame eſſence with ſpermatic reaſons. For all theſe things evince their ſubſiſtence to be corporeal, imperfect, and diviſible. Whence, then, on ſuch an hypotheſis, is perfection derived to things imperfect? Whence union to things every way diſſipated? Whence is a never-failing eſſence preſent with things perpetually generated, unleſs the incorporeal and all-perfect order of forms has a ſubſiſtence prior to theſe? Others again, of the antients, ſays Proclus, attended that which is common in particulars as the cauſe of the permanency in forms: for man generates man, and the ſimilar is produced from the ſimilar. They ought, however, at the ſame time to have directed their attention to that which gives ſubſiſtence to what is common in particulars; for, as we have before obſerved, true cauſes are exempt from their effects. That which is common, therefore, in particulars, may be aſſimilated to one and the ſame ſeal which is impreſſed in many pieces of wax, and which remains the ſame, without failing, while the pieces of wax are changed. What, then, is it which proximately impreſſes this ſeal in the wax? For matter is analogous to the wax, the ſenſible man to the type, and that which is common in particulars, and verges to things, to the ring itſelf. What elſe, then, can we aſſign as the cauſe of this, than nature proceeding through matter, and thus giving form to that which is ſenſible, by her own inherent reaſons? Soul, therefore, will thus be analogous to the hand which uſes the ring, ſince ſoul is the leader of nature; that which ranks as a whole of the whole of nature, and that which is partial of a partial nature. But intellect will be analogous to the ſoul which impreſſes the wax through the hand and the ring; which intellect fills that which is ſenſible through ſoul and the nature of forms, and is itſelf the true Porus *, generative of the reaſons which flow, as far as to matter. It is not neceſſary, therefore, to ſtop at the things common in particulars, but we ſhould inveſtigate the cauſes of them. For why do men participate of this peculiar ſomething which is common, but another animal of a different ſomething common, except through unapparent reaſons? For nature is the one mother of all things; but what are the cauſes of definite ſimilitudes? And why do we ſay the generation is according to nature when man is from man, unleſs there is a reaſon of men in nature, according to which all ſenſible men ſubſiſt? For it is not becauſe that which is produced is an animal, ſince if it were a lion that was pro-

* See the ſpeech of Diotima in the Banquet.

titude. But that upon this Socrates replied, Perhaps, O Parmenides, each of theſe forms is nothing more than an intellectual *conception* [1], which ought

duced from a man, it would be a natural animal indeed, but would no longer be *according to nature*, becauſe it would not be generated according to a proper reaſon. It is neceſſary, therefore, that there ſhould be another cauſe of ſimilars prior to ſimilars; and hence it is neceſſary to recur from the things common in particulars to the one cauſe which proximately gives ſubſiſtence to ſenſibles, and to which Parmenides himſelf leads us. That he does not, however, think it proper that we ſhould ſtop at this cauſe, he manifeſts from what follows. For if, looking to theſe things which are common, we wiſh, beginning from theſe, to faſhion ideas, in conſequence of recurring in a ſimilar manner to them from all things, we ſhall be in want not only of things of which there are ideas, but alſo of thoſe of which there are not, ſuch as of things contrary to nature, of things artificial, of things uneſſential, and of ſuch as have no ſubſiſtence, ſuch as an animal mingled from a goat and ſtag, (τραγελαφος), or an animal mingled from a horſe and centaur, (ιπποκενταυρος); for there are alſo things common in theſe, and thus we ſhall eſtabliſh ideas of non-entities. To which we may add, that we muſt likewiſe admit that there are ideas of infinities, as of irrational lines, and the ratios in numbers: for both theſe are infinite, and of both there are things common. If, therefore, we faſhion certain ideas from theſe, we ſhall often make infinities, though it is requiſite that ideas ſhould be leſs numerous than their participants, the participants of each, at the ſame time, being many. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides direct the mode of tranſition to ideas, as not being ſcientific, if it proceeds from the things common in ſenſibles; for it will always be poſſible to conceive different things common, and thus to proceed ad infinitum. But this is evident from the words that immediately follow.

[1] The fourth problem concerning ideas is here conſidered, viz. what kind of beings they are, or in other words, where they ſubſiſt, whether in ſouls, or prior to ſouls. Socrates, therefore, being ſeparated by Parmenides from phyſical forms, calls idea a conception belonging to the ſoul, (νοημα ψυχικον), and defines the place of it to be ſoul. For the form in ſoul is one and incorporeal; and this dogma is not attended with the former difficulties. For this form is exempt from the many, and is not co-ordinate with them like the forms in matter, in conſequence of being allotted a ſubſiſtence in ſoul. There is likewiſe nothing common between this form and the many; nor s it either according to the whole, or a part of itſelf, in its participants, ſo that it may be ſhown to be ſeparate from itſelf, or to have a partible ſubſiſtence. Socrates, therefore, by adopting this dogma, avoids the above-mentioned doubts. But, ſays Proclus, when Socrates calls idea *a conception* (νοημα), we muſt not think that he aſſerts it to be that which is the object of intellectual viſion, (το νοουμενον) in the ſame manner as we call that which is apprehended by ſenſe *ſenſible* (ὡς αισθημα φαμεν το τῃ αισθησει ληπτου); but that intelligence itſelf underſtanding form, is here called *a conception*; being ſo denominated as a certain theorem and dogma ingenerated in ſouls, about dogmatized and deiform concerns. (Ουτω νοημα λεγομενον ὡς θεωρημα τι και δογμα εν ταις ψυχαις εγγινομενον περι των δογματιζομενων και θεοειδων πραγματων). This conception, therefore, he ſays is *ingenerated* in ſouls, through the word *ingenerated*, (εγγινεσθαι), manifeſting that it does not ſubſiſt in them *eſſentially*. And this is that form of poſterior origin (το υστερογενες ειδος), which ſome of the followers

ought not to ſubſiſt any where but in the ſoul; and if this be the caſe, each will be one: and the conſequences juſt now mentioned will not enſue. That Parmenides

of Ariſtotle, and moſt of the moderns, ſo much celebrate, but which is entirely different from that reaſon or form which abides eſſentially in ſouls, and does not derive its ſubſiſtence from an abſtraction from ſenſibles. Looking to this eſſential reaſon we ſay, that the ſoul is all forms, and is the place of forms, not in capacity only, but in that kind of energy, through which we call one ſkilled in geometry a geometrician in energy, even when he does not geometrize, and which Ariſtotle accurately calls the prior form of being in energy. This, therefore, which is denominated a conception, as of poſterior origin, is very properly ſaid to be different from the eſſential reaſon of the ſoul: for it is more obſcure than the many in ſenſibles, as being poſterior and not prior to them. But the eſſential reaſon or form of the ſoul is more perfect, becauſe the conception of poſterior origin, or in modern language, abſtract idea, has a leſs eſſence than the many, but the eſſential form more.

That it is not, however, proper to ſtop at conceptions of poſterior origin, i. e. notions gained by an abſtraction from ſenſible particulars, but that we ſhould proceed to thoſe eſſential reaſons which are allotted a perpetual ſubſiſtence within the ſoul, is evident to thoſe who are able to ſurvey the nature of things. For, whence is man able to collect into one by reaſoning the perceptions of many ſenſes, and to conſider one and the ſame unapparent form prior to things apparent, and ſeparated from each other; but no other animal that we are acquainted with, ſurveys this ſomething common, for neither does it poſſeſs a rational eſſence, but alone employs ſenſe, and appetite, and imagination? Whence, then, do rational ſouls generate theſe univerſals, and recur from the ſenſes to that which is the object of opinion? It is becauſe they eſſentially poſſeſs the gnoſtically productive principles of things: for, as nature poſſeſſes a power productive of ſenſibles, by containing reaſons, or productive principles, and faſhions, and connects ſenſibles, ſo as by the inward eye to form the external, and in a ſimilar manner the finger, and every other particular; ſo he who has a common conception of theſe, by previouſly poſſeſſing the reaſons of things, beholds that which each poſſeſſes in common. For he does not receive this common ſomething from ſenſibles; ſince that which is received from ſenſibles is a phantaſm, and not the object of opinion. It likewiſe remains within ſuch as it was received from the beginning, that it may not be falſe, and a non-entity, but does not become more perfect and venerable, nor does it originate from any thing elſe than the ſoul. Indeed, it muſt not be admitted that nature in generating generates by natural reaſons and meaſures, but that ſoul in generating does not generate by animaſtic reaſons and cauſes. But if matter poſſeſſes that which is common in the many, and this ſomething common is eſſential, and more eſſence than individuals; for this is perpetual, but each of thoſe is corruptible, and they derive their very being from this, ſince it is through form that every thing partakes of eſſence,—if this be the caſe, and ſoul alone poſſeſſes things common which are of poſterior origin (ὑστερογενη κοινα), do we not make the ſoul more ignoble than matter? For the form which is merged in matter will be more perfect and more eſſence than that which reſides in the ſoul; ſince the latter is of poſterior origin, but the former is perpetual; and the one is after, but the other generative and connective of the many. To which we may add, that a common phantaſm in the ſoul derives its ſubſiſtence from a ſurvey of that which is

ſaid, What then? is each of theſe *conceptions* [1] one, but at the ſame time a *conception* of nothing? That Socrates ſaid, This is impoſſible. It is a *conception*, therefore, of ſomething? Certainly. Of *being* or of *non-being*? Of *being*. Will it not be of one particular thing, which that conception underſtands as one certain idea in all things? Undoubtedly. But now will not that which is underſtood to be one, be a form always the ſame in all

common in particulars. Hence it tends to this; for every thing adheres to its principle, and is ſaid to be nothing elſe than a predicate; ſo that its very eſſence is to be predicated of the many.

Further ſtill: the univerſal in the many is leſs than each of the many; for by certain additions and accidents it is ſurpaſſed by every individual. But that which is of poſterior origin (i. e. univerſal abſtracted from particulars) comprehends each of the many. Hence it is predicated of each of theſe; and that which is particular is contained in the whole of this univerſal. For this ſomething common, or abſtract idea, is not only predicated of that ſomething common in an individual, but likewiſe of the whole ſubject. How then can it thence derive its ſubſiſtence, and be completed from that which is common in the many? For, if from the many themſelves, where do we ſee infinite men, of all which we predicate the ſame thing? And if from that which is common in the many, whence is it that this abſtract idea is more comprehenſive than its cauſe? Hence it has a different origin, and receives from another form this power which is comprehenſive of every individual; and of this form the abſtract idea which ſubſiſts in opinion is an image, the inward cauſe being excited from things apparent. To which we may add, that all demonſtration, as Ariſtotle has ſhown in his Laſt Analytics, is from things prior, more honourable, and more univerſal. How, therefore, is univerſal more honourable, if it is of poſterior origin? For, in things of poſterior origin, that which is more univerſal is more uneſſential; whence ſpecies is more eſſence than genius. The rules, therefore, concerning the moſt true demonſtration muſt be ſubverted, if we alone place in the ſoul univerſals of poſterior origin: for theſe are not more excellent than, nor are the cauſes of, nor are naturally prior to, particulars. If, therefore, theſe things are abſurd, it is neceſſary that eſſential reaſons ſhould ſubſiſt in the ſoul prior to univerſals, which are produced by an abſtraction from ſenſibles. And theſe reaſons or productive powers are indeed always exerted, and are always efficacious in divine ſouls, and in the more excellent orders of beings; but in us they are ſometimes dormant, and ſometimes in energy.

[1] From the things common in particulars, it is neceſſary to recur to phyſical form, which is proximate to theſe; and after this to the reaſon or form in the ſoul which is of poſterior origin, or which derives it ſubſiſtence from an abſtraction from ſenſibles, and is a conception ingenerated in the ſoul. But when we have arrived thus far, it is requiſite to paſs on to the conception of the eſſential reaſon of the ſoul, and from this to make a tranſition to being itſelf, to which alſo Socrates is now led through the obſtetric arguments of Parmenides. As in intellect, therefore, that which underſtands, intelligence, and the intelligible, are united to each other, and intellectual conception every where pertains to the intelligible, it is evident that the intelligible is prior to intellectual conception, in which intelligible, the reaſon in the ſoul being firmly fixed, is a noëma, or intellectual conception. Hence, we muſt not ſtop in aſcending from one form to another,

all things? This ſeems to be neceſſary. That Parmenides then ſaid, But what, is it not neceſſary, ſince other things participate of forms, that each ſhould be compoſed from intellectual conceptions [1]; and thus all of them be

another, till we arrive at true beings, or, in other words, intelligibles. For though we ſhall find that intellect and intelligibles are connately united to each other, yet intellect is a plenitude of forms according to the intelligible which it contains. And as we unite intellect and the intelligible to each other, ſo we ſhould conſider intelligibles to be the ſame with beings. For intellect being in itſelf, and intellectually perceiving itſelf, is at the ſame time full of intelligibles. And, as among ſenſibles, whatever is apparently one, is in reality a multitude; ſo in intelligibles, intellectual conception and being, which are two things, are profoundly abſorbed in unity.

[1] If all things participate of forms, but all things do not participate of intellectual conceptions, forms or ideas will not primarily be intellectual conceptions. For one of theſe three things muſt happen, either that things which participate of intellectual conceptions do not participate of intellection, or that forms are not intellectual conceptions, or that things which are deſtitute of intelligence do not participate of forms, of which three the firſt and laſt are perfectly abſurd. For every thing which participates of intellectual conception, underſtands intellectually, ſince the word noëma manifeſts intelligence; and things deprived of intelligence participate of forms; for inanimate natures participate of the equal, the leſſer, and the greater, which are forms. Ideas, therefore, are not intellectual conceptions, nor are they eſſentiallized in intellections, but in intelligibles. We muſt aſcend, therefore, from things partible to the impartible reaſons of nature, which do not intellectually perceive the things prior to themſelves: for nature is not only deprived of intelligence, but is alſo irrational and deſtitute of phantaſy. In the next place, we muſt riſe from theſe to the intelligibles which are proximately placed above phyſical forms, and are the energies of the intellective ſoul, according to the poſition of Socrates concerning them: for he ſays, that they are ingenerated in the ſoul, and are noëmata, as being intellections of the ſoul. But from theſe we muſt aſcend to true intelligibles: for theſe are able to be the cauſes of all things which have a formal ſubſiſtence, but this cannot be aſſerted of ſuch things as are intellectual conceptions only.

Here, however, as Proclus well obſerves, it is worth while to enquire, why, ſince all things ſubſiſt intellectually in intellect, all ſenſible natures in conſequence of participating forms do not intellectually energize? and why, ſince all things there poſſeſs life, all things that are aſſimilated to them do not live? The anſwer is, that the progreſſion of beings gradually ſubſiding from the firſt to the laſt of things, obſcures the participations of wholes and all-perfect eſſences. Demiurgic energy alſo pervading through all things, gives ſubſiſtence to all things, according to different meaſures of eſſence; and beſides this, all things do not ſimilarly participate of the ſame form. For ſome things participate of it in a greater, and others in a leſſer degree; and ſome things are aſſimilated to form according to one power, others according to two, and others according to many powers. Whence alſo there are certain ſeries which beginning ſupernally extend as far as to things beneath. Thus, for inſtance, ſays Proclus, the form of the moon is beheld firſt of all in the Gods according to that which is characterized by *the one* and *the good* in form: for all things are

be endued with intellection? Or will you aſſert that though they are intellectual conceptions, yet they underſtand nothing? But that Socrates ſaid, This is by no means rational. But, O Parmenides, the affair appears to me to take place, in the moſt eminent degree, as follows: *that theſe forms are eſtabliſhed paradigms*[1], *as it were, in nature; but that other things are aſſimilated*

are deified from *the good*, as Socrates ſays in the ſixth book of the Republic, through the light of truth. This form is alſo beheld in angels, according to that which is intellectual in form; and in dæmons, according to the dianoëtic energy. It is likewiſe beheld in animals which are no longer able to imitate it intellectually, but vitally. Hence, the Egyptian Apis, and the lunar fiſh, and many other animals, differently imitate the celeſtial form of the moon. And this form is beheld in the laſt place in ſtones; ſo that there is a certain ſtone ſuſpended from this form, and which ſuſtains augmentations and diminutions, together with the moon in the heavens, though it is deprived of life. It muſt not, therefore, be ſuppoſed that all things receive all the powers of forms, but, together with proper ſubjection, ſome things receive a greater, and others a leſſer, number of theſe; while that alone which is the idiom of the participated form, and according to which it differs from other forms, is neceſſarily ſeen in all its participants. To which we may add, that the participation being different, the ſubordinate idioms of forms firſt deſert the participants, and afterwards thoſe that are more total than theſe; but thoſe idioms which are primary, and are particularly allied to *the one*, are ſimilarly apparent in all the productions of form. For every form is *one* and a *multitude*, the multitude not giving ſubſiſtence to *the one* according to compoſition, but *the one* producing the many idioms of the form. Form, therefore, uniformly *is*, and *lives*, and *intellectually energizes*; but with reſpect to its progeny, ſome participate of all theſe, others of more or leſs of them, and others of one idiom alone. Since alſo in forms themſelves, their intellectual nature is derived from the firſt intellect, their life from imparticipable, or the firſt life, their being from the firſt being, and *the one* which they contain from the unity which is beyond beings.

[1] Socrates, ſays Proclus, being led by the obſtetrication of Parmenides to the intelligible eſſence of forms, thinks that here eſpecially, the order and the mode of the participation of forms ſhould be inveſtigated; aſſerting, indeed, that forms themſelves are eſtabliſhed in nature, but that other things are generated as their reſemblances. Having, therefore, thus explored the order of forms, he at the ſame time introduces the mode of participation, and diſſolves the former doubts, that he may not be compelled to ſay that ſenſibles participate either of the whole or a part of form, or that forms are coordinate with ſenſibles. For a paradigm is not preſent with its image, nor coordinate with it. The participation, therefore, is through ſimilitude; which Socrates introduces, calling forms paradigms, but their participants reſemblances. And ſo confident is he in theſe aſſertions, that he who before ſwore that it was not eaſy to define what the participation of forms is, now ſays that the mode of participation is eminently apparent to him. But he is thus affected through his acuteneſs, and the power of Parmenides perfecting his ſpontaneous conceptions concerning divine natures; by which it is alſo evident that the manner of what is ſaid is maieutic, or obſtetric, and not contending for victory (καταγωνιστικος). For it would not otherwiſe

lated to theſe, and are their reſemblances: and that the participation of forms by other things, is nothing more than an aſſimilation to theſe forms. If any thing,

wiſe advance Socrates, and perpetually perfect his conceptions. For the end of obſtetrication is the evocation of inward knowledge, but of contention, victory. If, therefore, Socrates by every doubt advances, and is perfected, and diſtinctly evolves his conceptions concerning primary forms, we muſt ſay that he is rather obſtetricated than vanquiſhed by Parmenides.

This being premiſed, let us ſee how the hypotheſis of Socrates approximates to the truth, but does not yet poſſeſs the perfect. For he is right in apprehending that forms are intellectual and truly paradigms, and in defining their idiom, by aſſerting that they are *eſtabliſhed*; and further ſtill, in admitting that other things are aſſimilated to them. For the ſtable and a perpetual ſameneſs of ſubſiſtence are the idioms of eternally energizing forms. For, in the Politicus, it is ſaid that a ſubſiſtence according to the ſame, and after the ſame manner, belongs only to the moſt divine of all things; and the Eleatean gueſt, in the Sophiſta, defines *the being eſtabliſhed* (το ἑστανατ) to be nothing elſe than a ſubſiſtence according to the ſame, and after the ſame manner. If, therefore, Socrates alſo ſays, that forms are *eſtabliſhed*, but things eſtabliſhed ſubſiſt according to the ſame and after the ſame manner, and things which thus ſubſiſt are the moſt divine of all things, it is evident that forms will be moſt divine. Hence, they will no longer be the conceptions of ſouls, but will be exempt from every thing of this kind. Theſe things, therefore, are rightly aſſerted; and Socrates alſo very properly admits union in forms prior to multitude. For the words *in nature* (ἐν τῃ φυσει) manifeſt the one enad or unity of forms. It is uſual indeed with Plato to give the appellation of *nature* to intelligibles. For Socrates, in the Philebus, ſays, that a royal intellect, and a royal ſoul, ſubſiſt in the *nature* of Jupiter; and Timæus ſays, "the *nature* of animal itſelf being eternal," ſignifying by *nature* the monad of intelligible ideas. Such, therefore, is that which is now called nature, viz. the one unity and comprehenſion of intelligible forms. And thus far, as we have ſaid, Socrates is right.

However, as he only attributes a paradigmatic idiom to ideas, and does not aſſert that they alſo perfect, guard, and unite, in this reſpect he will appear to have yet imperfectly apprehended the theory concerning them. For every form is not only the paradigm of ſenſibles, but alſo gives ſubſiſtence to them; ſince if it were alone paradigmatic, another nature would be requiſite, in order to produce and aſſimilate ſenſibles to forms, which would thus remain ſluggiſh and unmoved, without any efficacious power, and reſembling impreſſions in wax. Forms, therefore, produce and generate their images: for it would be abſurd that the reaſons in nature ſhould poſſeſs a certain effective power, but that intelligible forms ſhould be deprived of it. Hence, every divine form is not only paradigmatic, but alſo *paternal*, and is by its very eſſence a cauſe generative of the many. It is alſo *perfective*: for it leads ſenſibles from the imperfect to the perfect, fills up their indigence, and brings matter, which is all things in capacity, to become that in energy which it was in capacity, prior to its becoming ſpecific. Forms, therefore, contain in themſelves this perfective power. But do they not alſo poſſeſs a *guardian* power? For whence is the order of the univerſe indiſſoluble, except from forms? Whence thoſe ſtable reaſons, and which preſerve the one ſympathy of wholes infrangible, through which the world abides for ever perfect,

thing, therefore, becomes ſimilar [1] to a form, can it be poſſible that the form ſhould not be ſimilar to the aſſimilated, ſo far as the aſſimilated nature is rendered

perfect, without the deſertion of any form, except from ſtable cauſes? Again, the diviſible and diſſipated nature of bodies is no otherwiſe compreſſed and *connected* than by impartible power. For body is of itſelf diviſible, and requires the connective power of forms. But, if *union* precedes this connection, for every thing connective muſt previouſly be one and undivided, form will not only be *generative*, and poſſeſs a *guarding* and *perfective* power, but it will alſo be *connective* and *unific* of all ſecondary natures. Socrates, therefore, ſhould not only have ſaid that form is a *paradigm*, but ſhould alſo have added, that it *connects*, *guards*, and *perfects* the things aſſimilated; which Timæus alſo teaching us, ſays, that the world was generated *perfect* and *indiſſoluble* through the *aſſimilation* to all-perfect animal itſelf.

[1] Socrates, as we have before obſerved, was not accurate in aſſerting that ideas are paradigms alone, ſince they alſo generate, perfect, and guard ſenſibles; and that ſenſibles are reſemblances alone of ideas, ſince they are generated and guarded by them, and thence derive all their perfection and duration. This being the caſe, Parmenides, in a truly divine manner, grants that forms are eſtabliſhed as paradigms in nature; but Socrates having introduced ſimilitude, and a participation according to ſimilitude, in order to ſolve the firſt doubts concerning the participation of forms, Parmenides being deſirous to indicate the primary and total cauſe of paradigm and its exemption from all habitude to its reſemblances, ſhows, that if ſenſible is ſimilar to intelligible form, it is not requiſite that the habitude ſhould reciprocate, and that the intelligible ſhould be ſimilar to the ſenſible form, leſt, prior to two things ſimilar to each other, we ſhould again inveſtigate ſome other form, the cauſe of ſimilitude to both: for things ſimilar to each other entirely participate a certain ſomething which is the ſame, and through this ſomething ſame which is in them they are ſaid to be ſimilar. Hence, if it be granted that the participant and that which is participated are ſimilar, or, in other words, the paradigm and its reſemblance, there will be prior to theſe ſomething elſe which aſſimilates them, and this will be the caſe ad infinitum. To avoid this inconvenience, Socrates ſhould have ſaid that the ſimilar is twofold, the one being ſimilar conjoined with the ſimilar, the other being as a ſubject ſimilar to its archetype; and the one being beheld in the ſameneſs of a certain one ratio, but the other not only poſſeſſing ſameneſs, but at the ſame time difference, when it is ſimilar in ſuch a manner as to poſſeſs the ſame form from, but not together with, it. And thus much may be ſaid logically and doubtingly.

But if we direct our attention to the many orders of forms, we ſhall find the profundity which they contain. For there are phyſical forms prior to ſenſibles, the forms in ſoul prior to theſe, and intellectual forms preceding thoſe in ſoul; but there are no longer others prior to theſe. Intellectual forms, therefore, are paradigms alone, and are by no means ſimilar to the things poſterior to theſe; but the forms in ſoul are both paradigms and images. And ſo far as they are images, both theſe forms themſelves, and the things poſterior to them, are ſimilar to each other, as deriving their ſubſiſtence from the ſame intellectual forms. This is alſo the caſe with phyſical forms, which are ſimilar to ſenſibles, ſo far as both are images of the forms which are above them. But thoſe forms which are alone paradigms, are no longer ſimilar to their images: for things

rendered ſimilar to the form? Or can any reaſon be aſſigned why ſimilar ſhould not be ſimilar to ſimilar? There cannot. Is there not, therefore, a mighty neceſſity that the ſimilar to ſimilar ſhould participate of one and the ſame form? It is neceſſary. But will not that through the participation of which ſimilars become ſimilars be *form itſelf?* Entirely ſo. Nothing, therefore, can be ſimilar to *a form*, nor *a form* to any other. For in this caſe another *form* will always appear beſides ſome particular *form:* and if this again ſhould become ſimilar to another, another would be required; and a new *form* would never ceaſe to take place, as long as any *form* becomes ſimilar to its participant. You ſpeak moſt truly. Hence, then, other things do not participate of *forms* through ſimilitude [1]; but it is neceſſary to ſeek after ſomething elſe through which they participate. So it ſeems.

That

things are ſimilar through a participation of a certain ſameneſs; but paradigmatic forms participate of nothing, ſince they rank as the firſt of things.

We may alſo ſay, ſpeaking theologically, that there is one order of forms in the mundane intellect, another in the demiurgic intellect, and another ſubſiſting between theſe, viz. in participated but ſupermundane intellect, or, in other words, in an intellect conſubſiſtent indeed with ſoul, but unconnected with body, and binding the forms in the mundane intellect with that intellect which is not conſubſiſtent with ſoul, and is therefore called imparticipable. To thoſe, therefore, who begin downwards, we may ſay that the intellectual forms in the world and in ſoul are ſimilar to each other, ſo far as all theſe are ſecondary to the aſſimilative or ſupermundane intellects, and are as it were ſiſters to each other. But to thoſe who recur to imparticipable intellect, this can no longer be ſaid. For the aſſimilative order has a middle ſubſiſtence; and hence it aſſimilates ſenſibles which are ſubordinate to it to intellectual forms, but not, vice verſa, intellectuals to ſenſibles. For it is not lawful that what is ſecondary ſhould impart any thing to that which is primary, nor that what is primary ſhould receive any thing from what is ſecondary. That Parmenides, therefore, might indicate to Socrates theſe paradigms, which are indeed intellectual, but eſtabliſhed in imparticipable intellect prior to aſſimilative intellects, he ſhows him that it is not proper that the habitude of forms to ſenſibles ſhould reciprocate: for this pertains to things ſecondary to an aſſimilative cauſe.

[1] Parmenides juſtly infers that ſenſibles do not participate of all forms through the ſimilar; for this is effected through another more principal cauſe, viz. the uniting cauſe of wholes. The efficacious power of forms alſo, in conjunction with the aptitude of ſenſibles, muſt be conſidered as together giving completion to the fabrication of the univerſe. The aſſimilative genus of forms, therefore, which are denominated by theologiſts ſupermundane, are able to connect and conjoin mundane cauſes with their participants. This genus alſo connects according to a medium firſt intellectual forms and their participants, imparting to ſecondary natures a habitude to theſe forms; but the uniting cauſe of wholes, or in other words *the one*, connects ſupernally, and with

That Parmenides then ſaid, Do you ſee, O Socrates, how great a doubt ariſes, if any one defines forms as having an eſſential ſubſiſtence by themſelves? I do very much ſo. Know, then, that you do not apprehend what dubious [1] conſequences are produced, by placing every individual form of beings ſeparate from its participants. But that Socrates ſaid, How do you mean? That Parmenides anſwered, There are many other doubts [2], indeed, but this is the

exempt tranſcendency, intelligible forms with ſenſibles. It may alſo be truly aſſerted that the third cauſe of ſimilitude is the aptitude of the recipient. For, in conſequence of this being in capacity what form is in energy, that which is generated becomes ſimilar to form. So that the three cauſes of aſſimilation are the ſubject matter, that which collects together the things perfecting and perfected, and that which ſubſiſts between theſe, and binds the extremes in union. What is aſſerted, therefore, is in a certain reſpect true. For if we inveſtigate the one moſt principal cauſe of participation, we muſt not ſay that it is ſimilitude, but a cauſe ſuperior to both intellectual and intelligible forms.

[1] Parmenides here indicates the eſſence of divine forms, which is uncircumſcribed, and incapable of being narrated by our conceptions. For the diſcourſe is, indeed, dubious to thoſe who undertake to define accurately their eſſence, order, and power, to behold where they firſt ſubſiſt, and how they proceed; what the divine idioms are which they receive; how they are participated by the laſt of things, and what the ſeries are to which they give ſubſiſtence; with ſuch other particulars of a more theological nature as the ſpeculation of them may afford. And theſe things, indeed, Parmenides indicates, but Socrates has not yet touched upon the doubts concerning them. For Parmenides was willing, not only beginning downwards to define the order of divine forms, but alſo beginning from on high to behold their idiom. For he has already ſpoken concerning phyſical forms, and ſuch as are ſimply intellectual, and concerning thoſe that are properly intellectual. Something alſo will be ſaid concerning thoſe that are called intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual; and, in the laſt place, concerning thoſe that are alone intelligible. But how he ſpeaks concerning theſe, ſays Proclus, and that his diſcourſe is under the pretext of doubting, is already evident to the more ſagacious, and follows from what has been ſaid.

[2] That the diſcourſe concerning ideas, ſays Proclus, is full of very numerous and moſt difficult doubts, is evident from the infinite aſſertions of thoſe poſterior to Plato, ſome of which regard the ſubverſion, and others the admiſſion, of ideas. And thoſe that admit their ſubſiſtence think differently reſpecting their eſſence; concerning the particulars of which there are ideas, the mode of participation, and other all-various problems with which the ſpeculation of them is attended. Parmenides, however, does not attend to the multitude of doubts, nor does he deſcend to their infinite length, but, in two of the greateſt, comprehends all the ſubſequent inveſtigation concerning them; through which doubts it appears that forms are neither apprehended and known by us, nor have any knowledge of, nor providentially energize about, ſenſibles; though, through this we eſpecially embrace a formal eſſence, that, as being ourſelves intellectual, we may energize about it, and may contemplate in it the providential cauſes of wholes. But, if ideas are not

the greateſt: if any one ſhould aſſert that it is not proper *forms* ſhould be known, if they are ſuch as we have ſaid they ought to be, it is impoſſible to demonſtrate

not known by us, it is alſo vain to ſay that they have any ſubſiſtence; for we do not even know that they are, if we are ignorant of their nature, and are, in ſhort, incapable of apprehending them, and do not poſſeſs from our own eſſence that which is preparatory to the ſpeculation of them. Such, then, are the doubts, both of which happen through the exempt eſſence of forms, which exemption we conſider ſo tranſcendent as to have no communication with ſecondary natures. For that which thus ſubſiſts is foreign from us, and is neither known by, nor is gnoſtic of, us. But, if the exempt nature of forms, together with tranſcendency, is alſo preſent to all things, our knowledge of them will be preſerved, and they will poſſeſs a formal knowledge of ſecondary natures. For if they are every where preſent to all things, we may then be able to meet with them, by only making ourſelves adapted to the reception of them. And if they adorn all things, they comprehend intellectually the cauſe of the things adorned. It is neceſſary, therefore, that thoſe who wiſh to guard theſe dogmas, ſhould conſider forms as unſhaken and exempt, and pervading through all things. And here alſo we may ſee how this accords with the unreſtrained nature of forms: for neither does that which is demiurgic in them poſſeſs any habitude to things ſecondary, nor is their unreſtrained and exempt nature ſuch as to be incommunicable with, and foreign from, ſenſibles.

But here the divine conception of Plato is truly admirable, which previouſly ſubverts through theſe doubts all the confuſed and atheiſtical ſuſpicion concerning divine forms; imitating in this reſpect intellect itſelf, which, prior to the ſhadowy ſubſiſtence of evils, gave ſubſiſtence to ſubvertive powers. That it is not proper, therefore, to make that which is generative in forms poſſeſſing any habitude to that which is generated, or that which is paradigmatic to conſiſt in verging to that which is governed, Parmenides has ſufficiently ſhown in what has been already delivered. For all habitude requires another collective and connecting cauſe, ſo that, prior to forms, there will be another form conjoining both through ſimilitude; ſince habitude is of the ſimilar, with relation to the ſimilar. But that the exempt nature of forms is not ſluggiſh and without providential energy, and is not foreign from things ſecondary, Parmenides indicates through theſe doubts. For, perhaps, ſome one, alone looking to the unreſtrained nature of forms, may ſay that they neither know their participants, nor are known by us. Hence, he leads Socrates to an animadverſion of the mode of the exempt power of divine forms. And how, indeed, he collects that ſenſibles are not known by them, will be afterwards manifeſt to us; but he wiſhes, firſt of all, to evince that we are not able to know them, aſſuming, for this purpoſe, in a manner perfectly divine, that the ſcience which we poſſeſs pertains to human objects of ſcientific knowledge, but that divine ſcience belongs to ſuch as are divine. And this, indeed, appears to deprive us of the knowledge of divine natures. It is, however, true in a certain reſpect, and not according to one mode, but after one manner when philoſophically, and after another when theologically, conſidered. For let the ſcience which is with us pertain to our objects of ſcientific knowledge; but what prevents ſuch objects from being images of divine natures? And why may we not know divine natures through them, in the ſame manner as the Pythagoreans, perceiving the images of

demonſtrate that he who aſſerts this is deceived, unleſs he who doubts is ſkilled in a multitude of particulars, and is naturally of a good diſpoſition. But

the divine orders in numbers and figures, and being converſant with theſe, endeavoured to obtain from them as from certain types, a knowledge of things divine. Why, alſo, is it wonderful that the ſcience which is with us ſhould be ſo called with relation to that which is with us the object of ſcientific knowledge, and ſhould be conjoined with this? For it is coordinate to that with reſpect to which it is denominated. It may alſo, not as coordinate knowledge, but as that which is of an inferior order, be admitted to intelligibles themſelves. For coordinate knowledges of all things are of one kind, and thoſe which are arranged according to a different order of things known, of another, and which either apprehend the nature of things ſubordinate in a more excellent manner, as opinion the nature of ſenſibles, or which apprehend things more excellent ſecondarily and ſubordinately, as opinion that which is the object of ſcience. He, therefore, who poſſeſſes ſcientific knowledge, and he who opines rightly, know the ſame thing, but the one in a more excellent, and the other in a ſubordinate manner. Hence there is no abſurdity that ſcience ſhould be denominated not with relation to the object of ſcience among intelligibles, but with relation to that with which it is conjoined, and that it ſhould apprehend the former not as coordinate, but in a ſecondary degree. Agreeably to this, Plato in his ſeventh Epiſtle ſays that the intelligible form is not known through ſcience but through intelligence, or the direct and immediate viſion of intellect. For ſcientific knowledge is of a more compoſite nature with reſpect to intellectual intuition; but intellect is properly the ſpectator of ideas: for theſe are naturally intellectual, and we every where know the ſimilar by the ſimilar; intelligibles indeed by intellect, the objects of opinion by opinion, and things ſcientific by ſcience. It is by no means wonderful, therefore, that there ſhould be no ſcience of forms, and yet that another knowledge of them ſhould remain, ſuch as that which we denominate intelligence.

But if you are willing, ſays Proclus, to ſpeak after another more theological mode, you may ſay that aſcending as far as to intellectual forms, Parmenides ſhows that the forms which are beyond theſe, and which poſſeſs an exempt tranſcendency, ſuch as are the intelligible, and the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual forms, are better than our knowledge. Hence by aſſerting that ſouls when perfectly purified, and conjoined with the attendants on the twelve ſuperceleſtial Gods, then merge themſelves in the contemplation of theſe forms, you will perhaps not wander from the divinely-inſpired conception of Plato. For as there are three orders of forms prior to the aſſimilative order as is evident from the ſecond hypotheſis of the Parmenides, viz. the intellectual, the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual, and the intelligible; intellectual forms indeed are proximate to ſecondary natures, and through the ſeparation which they contain are more known to us, but intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual forms are not to be apprehended by that partial knowledge by which we perceive things coordinate with our nature; and hence theſe forms are characterized by *the unknown*, through their exempt tranſcendency.

Let us now conſider, ſays Proclus, the words of Plato, becauſe through theſe he indicates who is a fit hearer of theſe things, and who is adapted to be a teacher of them. For it is requiſite that

But he ſhould be willing to purſue *him* cloſely who endeavours to ſupport his opinion by a multitude of far-fetched arguments: though, after all, he who

that the hearer ſhould poſſeſs a *naturally good diſpoſition*, and this in a remarkable degree, that he may be by nature a philoſopher, may be aſtoniſhed about an incorporeal eſſence, and prior to things viſible may always purſue ſomething elſe and reaſon concerning it, and may not be ſatisfied with things preſent; and in ſhort he muſt be ſuch a one as Socrates in the Republic deſcribes him to be, who *naturally* loves the ſpeculation of wholes. In the next place, he muſt be ſkilled in a multitude of particulars, not indeed in a multitude of human affairs, for theſe are trifling, and contribute nothing to a divine life, but in logical, phyſical, and mathematical theorems. For ſuch things as our dianoëtic power is unable to ſurvey in the Gods, we may behold in theſe as in images; and beholding we are induced to believe the aſſertions of theologiſts concerning divine natures. Thus if he wonders how multitude is contained in *the one*, and all things in the impartible, he will perceive that the even and the odd, the circle and the ſphere and other forms of numbers are contained in the monad. If he wonders how a divine nature makes by its very eſſence, he will perceive in natural objects that fire eſſentially imparts heat, and ſnow coldneſs. And if he wonders how cauſes are every where preſent with their effects, he will behold the images of this in logic. For genera are every where predicated of the things of which ſpecies are predicated, and the latter indeed with the former, but the former without the latter. And thus in every thing, he who is unable to look directly to a divine nature, may ſurvey it through theſe as images. It is requiſite, therefore, in the firſt place, that he ſhould poſſeſs a naturally good diſpoſition, which is allied to true beings, and is capable of becoming winged, and which as it were from other perſuaſions vindicates to itſelf the conceptions concerning permanent being. For as in every ſtudy we require a certain preparation, in like manner in order to obtain that knowledge which genuinely leads to being, we require a preceding purified aptitude. In the next place, ſkill, as we have ſaid, in many and all-various theorems is requiſite, through which he will be led back to the apprehenſion of theſe things; and, in the third place, *alacrity*, and an extenſion of the powers of the ſoul about the contemplation of true beings; ſo that from his leader alone indicating, he may be able to follow his indications.

Three things, therefore, are requiſite to the contemplation of an incorporeal nature, a naturally good diſpoſition, ſkill, and alacrity. And through a naturally good diſpoſition indeed, faith in a divine nature will be ſpontaneouſly produced; but through ſkill the truth of paradoxical theorems will be firmly poſſeſſed; and through alacrity the amatory tendency of the ſoul to the contemplation of true being will be excited.

But the leader, ſays Proclus, of theſe ſpeculations, will not be willing through a long diſcourſe to unfold divine truth, but to indicate it with brevity, framing his language ſimilar to his intellections; nor will he accompliſh this from things known and at hand, but ſupernally, from principles moſt profoundly one. Nor again, will he ſo diſcourſe as that he may appear to ſpeak clearly, but he will be ſatisfied with indications. For it is requiſite that myſtical concerns ſhould be myſtically delivered, and that occult conceptions reſpecting divine natures, ſhould not be rendered popular. Such then is the hearer and ſuch the leader of theſe diſcourſes. And in

Parmenides

who contends that *forms* cannot be known will remain unperſuaded. That Socrates ſaid, In what reſpect [1], O Parmenides? Becauſe, O Socrates, I think

Parmenides you have a perfect leader of this kind; and hence if we attend to the mode of his diſcourſe we ſhall find that he teaches many things through a few words, that he derives what he ſays ſupernally, and that he alone indicates concerning divine natures. But in Socrates you have a hearer of a naturally good diſpoſition indeed, and amatory, but not yet perfectly ſkilled; whence alſo Parmenides exhorts him to exerciſe himſelf in dialectic, that he may obtain ſkill in the theorems, receiving indeed his naturally good diſpoſition and his impulſe, but ſupplying what is deficient. He alſo informs us that the end of this triple power is the being freed from deception in reaſonings concerning divine natures: for he who is deficient in any one of theſe three, muſt be compelled to aſſent to many things that are falſe. I only add that inſtead of και μη αφυης, as in Thompſon's edition of this dialogue, it appears from the commentary of Proclus that we ſhould here read και μεν ευφυης, as in our tranſlation.

[1] The diſcourſe here proceeds to other doubts, one of which takes away from our ſoul the knowledge of true beings, but the other deprives divine natures of the knowledge of ſenſibles; through both which our progreſſions from and converſion to divine natures, are deſtroyed. Things ſecond and firſt alſo appear to be diviſed from each other, ſecond being deprived of firſt, and firſt being unprolific of ſecond natures. The truth however is, that every thing is in all things in an appropriate manner; the middle and laſt genera of wholes ſubſiſting cauſally in things firſt, whence alſo they are truly known by them, as they alſo ſubſiſt in them; but things firſt ſubſiſting according to participation in ſuch as are middle; and both theſe in ſuch things as are laſt. Hence ſouls alſo know all things in a manner accommodated to each; through images indeed things prior to them; but according to cauſe things poſterior to them; and in a connate and co-ordinate manner, the reaſons or productive principles which they themſelves contain. Theſe doubts, therefore, are extended after the two prior to theſe concerning the order of ideas, becauſe Socrates and every one who admits that there are ideas muſt be led to this hypotheſis, through a cauſal and ſcientific knowledge of every thing in the world. Hence thoſe who deny that there are ideas, deny alſo the providential animadverſion of intelligibles. Parmenides, therefore, propoſes at preſent to ſhow that by admitting ideas to be alone exempt from things it muſt alſo be neceſſarily admitted that they are unknown, as there will no longer be any communion between us and them, nor any knowledge, whether they ſubſiſt or not, whether they are participated, and how, and what order they are allotted, if they are alone exempt, and are not together with unreſtrained energy, the cauſes of ſecondary natures. But to the ſpeculation of this the diſcourſe pre-aſſumes certain axioms and common conceptions; and, in the firſt place, that ideas are not entirely exempt, and do not ſubſiſt by themſelves without any communion with things ſubordinate. For how can this be poſſible, ſince both we and all other things are ſuſpended from them? For the place in which they ſubſiſt is intellect, not that it is the place as if they required a ſeat, in the ſame manner as accidents require eſſence for their ſupport, or as material forms require matter. Intellect indeed, does not comprehend them, as if they were its parts heaped together by compoſition, but in the ſame manner as the centre comprehends in itſelf the many terminations

I think that both you and any other, who eſtabliſhes the eſſence of each *form* as ſubſiſting by itſelf, muſt allow, in the firſt place, that no one of theſe ſubſiſts

tions of the lines which proceed from it, and as ſcience, the many theorems of which it is the ſource; not being compoſed from the many, but ſubſiſting prior to the many, and all being contained in each. For thus intellect is many, containing multitude impartibly in the unity of its nature; becauſe it is not *the one* which ſubſiſts prior to all multitude, but is collectively one multitude, its multitude being profoundly united through the dominion of unity in its nature. In this manner, therefore, is intellect the place of ideas. Hence, if ſoul is not the ſame with intellect, thoſe ideas will not be in us of which intellect is the place. Hence, alſo, it is evident that the diſcourſe in this dialogue about ideas becomes perpetually more perfect, aſcending to certain more-united hypoſtaſes of theſe luminous beings. For the diſcourſe no longer ſuppoſes them to be corporeal or phyſical, or conceptions of the ſoul, but prior to all theſe. For they are not in us, ſays Parmenides; nor are they coordinate with our conceptions.

You may ſay, then, philoſophically with Proclus, that they are exempt from, and are not in us; and that they are preſent every where, and are participated by us, without being ingenerated in their participants. For they being in themſelves, are proximate to all things for participation that are capable of receiving them. Hence, we participate them through the things which we poſſeſs, and this is not only the caſe with us, but alſo with more excellent natures, who poſſeſs in themſelves eſſential images of ideas, and introducing theſe as veſtiges of paradigms to ideas, they know the latter through the former. For he who underſtands the eſſence of theſe, knows alſo that they are images of other things, but knowing this, it is alſo neceſſary that by intellections he ſhould come into contact with the paradigms. But you may ſay, theologically, that the forms which are exempt from thoſe that are intellectual, are perfectly eſtabliſhed above our order. Hence, of intellectual forms, we perceive both in ourſelves, and in ſenſibles, images; but the eſſence of intelligibles, through its profound union, is perfectly exempt both from us and all other things, being of itſelf unknown. For it fills Gods and intellects with itſelf; but we muſt be ſatisfied with participating intellectual forms in a manner adapted to the ſoul. Plato alſo manifeſts theſe things when he makes our life to be twofold, political and theoretical, and aſſigns us a twofold felicity; elevating the former life to the patronymic government of Jupiter, and the latter to the Saturnian order and a pure intellect. For from hence it is evident that he re-elevates the whole of our life, as far as to the intellectual kings: for Saturn ſubſiſts at the ſummit, and Jupiter at the extremity, of the intellectual order. But ſuch things as are beyond theſe, he ſays in the Phædrus, are the ſpectacles of ſouls divinely inſpired and initiated in them as in the moſt bleſſed of all myſteries. So that thus the propoſed axiom will be true, when conſidered as pertaining to a certain formal order. And thus much for the things.

With reſpect to the diction, ſays Proclus, the words πη δη ὦ Παρμενιδη; "*In what reſpect, O Parmenides?*" are the interrogation of Socrates, vehemently wondering if intellectual form is unknown, and not yet perceiving the tranſition, and that Parmenides proceeds through the whole extent of forms till he ends in the firſt ideas. But the words πως γαρ αν αυτη καθ' αυτην ετι ειη; "*For how could it any longer ſubſiſt itſelf by itſelf?*" are aſſerted according to common conceptions.

ſubſiſts in us. For (that Socrates ſaid) how if it did, could it any longer ſubſiſt itſelf by itſelf? That Parmenides replied, You ſpeak well. But will you not admit that ſuch ideas as are, with relation [1] to each other, ſuch as they

For every thing exempt is of itſelf, and is itſelf by itſelf, neither ſubſiſting in any other, nor in us. Hence, through theſe three terms, *itſelf*, *by itſelf*, and *eſſence*, Parmenides unfolds the whole truth concerning theſe forms. For the firſt of theſe indicates their *ſimplicity*, the ſecond, their *ſeparate tranſcendency*, and the third their *perfection eſtabliſhed in eſſence alone*. In the next place, the words καλως λεγεις, "*You ſpeak well*," are not delivered ironically, and as if Parmenides was from them beginning a confutation, but as receiving the ſpontaneous intuition of Socrates, and his conception about divine natures. For the aſſumed axiom is true, Timæus alſo aſſerting that true being neither receives any thing into itſelf, as matter does form, nor proceeds into any other place, as form does into matter. It remains, therefore, ſeparately in itſelf, and being participated, does not become any thing belonging to its participants, but, ſubſiſting prior to them, imparts to theſe as much as they are able to receive; neither being in us, for we participate, not receiving idea itſelf, but ſomething elſe proceeding from it; nor being generated in us, for it is entirely void of generation.

[1] This is the ſecond axiom, ſays Proclus, contributing to the ſpeculation of the propoſed object of inquiry. For the former axiom was, that forms are by no means in us, but in themſelves; but this ſecond axiom is, that ſenſibles when denominated as relatives, are ſo denominated with relation to each other; and that intelligibles are denominated with relation to each other, and not with relation to ſenſibles; and that ſenſibles are not denominated with relation to intelligibles. For, by thoſe who are accuſtomed to conſider theſe things more logically, it is well ſaid, that univerſals ought to be referred as relatives to univerſals, but particulars to particulars; ſcience ſimply conſidered to that which is ſimply the object of ſcience, but a particular ſcience to a particular object of ſcience; things indefinite to the indefinite; ſuch as are definite to the definite; ſuch as are in capacity to things in capacity; and ſuch as are in energy to things in energy. And of theſe things the logical and phyſical treatiſes of the antients are full. If, therefore, in things univerſal, and things particular, alternations cannot be admitted in comparing the one with the other, by a much greater reaſon it cannot take place in ideas and the images of ideas; but we muſt refer ſenſibles to ſenſibles, and intelligibles to intelligibles. Theſe things, then, are perfectly true, if we conſider each ſo far as it is that which it is, and not ſo far as it makes ſomething, or is generated ſomething. For in this caſe, ſenſibles have the relation of things generated to intelligibles, but intelligibles, that of producing cauſes to ſenſibles; and as images, ſenſibles are related to intelligibles, but ideas, as paradigms, are related to ſenſibles.

If, therefore, we aſſume dominion itſelf, it muſt be referred to ſervitude itſelf; but if we conſider it as a paradigm, it muſt be referred to that which is ſimilar to dominion itſelf; though we are accuſtomed, indeed, to call the Gods our lords, ſo that dominion there will be denominated with reference to ſervitude with us. This, however, is true, becauſe we participate of ſervitude itſelf, to which dominion itſelf has a precedaneous reference. And here you may ſee how dominion among ideas, or in the intelligible world, evinces that more excellent natures are our lords, becauſe

they are, poſſeſs alſo their eſſence with reſpect to themſelves, and not with reference to things ſubſiſting among us, whether they are reſemblances, or in whatever manner you may eſtabliſh ſuch things; each of which, while we participate, we diſtinguiſh by ſome peculiar appellation? But that the things ſubſiſting among us, and which are ſynonymous to theſe, ſubſiſt alſo with reference to each other, and not with relation to forms; and belong to themſelves, but not to thoſe which receive with them a common appellation. That then Socrates ſaid, How do you mean? As if, Parmenides anſwered,

becauſe we participate of ſervitude itſelf. But that which is called dominion with us, with reference to ſervitude among us, is no longer alſo denominated with reference to ſervitude among ideas, becauſe the being of ſervitude which is there does not ſubſiſt from that which is with us, but the very contrary takes place. For things which govern more excellent natures muſt alſo neceſſarily govern ſuch as are ſubordinate, but not vice verſa.

But from all theſe doubts we learn what idea truly ſo called is. From the firſt doubt we aſſume that it is incorporeal; for if it were a body, neither the whole, nor a part of it could be participated. But from the ſecond doubt we aſſume that it is not coordinate with its participants; for if it were coordinate, it would poſſeſs ſomething common, and on this account we muſt conceive another idea prior to it. From the third doubt we learn, that it is not a conception of eſſence, but eſſence and being; for otherwiſe all its participants would participate of knowledge. From the fourth, we collect that it is a paradigm alone, and not an image alſo, as the reaſon or productive principle in ſoul, leſt being ſimilar to that which proceeds from it, it ſhould introduce another idea prior to itſelf. From the fifth, we learn that intelligible idea is not directly known to us, but from the images of it. For ſcience in us is not coordinate with it. And from the ſixth we infer that it underſtands things which are ſecondary to it, and that it knows them by being itſelf their cauſe. Idea, therefore, truly ſo called, is an incorporeal cauſe, exempt from its participants, is an immovable eſſence, is a paradigm only and truly, and is intelligible to ſouls from images, but has a cauſal knowledge of things which ſubſiſt according to it. So that from all the doubts we derive one definition of idea truly ſo called. Hence, thoſe that oppoſe the doctrine of ideas, ſhould oppoſe this definition, and not aſſuming corporeal imaginations of them, or conſidering them as co-arranged with ſenſibles, or as uneſſential, or as coordinate with our knowledge, ſophiſtically diſcourſe concerning them. Let it alſo be obſerved that Parmenides ſays that ideas are Gods, and that they have their ſubſiſtence in deity; in the ſame manner as the Chaldæan oracle alſo calls them the conceptions of the father: for whatever ſubſiſts in deity is a God. Laſtly, we muſt be careful to remember that when we ſpeak of relation as ſubſiſting among ideas, we muſt remove from them mere, uneſſential habitudes: for nothing of this kind is adapted to the Gods. But we muſt aſſume ſameneſs for habitude; and even prior to this ſameneſs, the hyparxis of each in itſelf: for each is of itſelf firſt, and is both united to itſelf and to other things. Communion, therefore, according to participations characterizes the power of things which are ſaid to be relatives in the intelligible world.

ſome one of us ſhould be the maſter [1] or ſervant of any one; he who is maſter is not the *maſter* of ſervant, nor is he who is ſervant, *ſervant* of maſter;

[1] How relatives are to be underſtood, ſays Proclus, among forms, is I think evident from what has been already ſaid. You will, however, find dominion and ſervitude peculiarly ſubſiſting there. For what elſe pertains to deſpots, than to have abſolute dominion over ſlaves, and to arrange every thing pertaining to them with a view to their own good? And what elſe is the province of ſlaves, than to be governed by others, and to miniſter to the will of their maſters? Muſt not theſe, therefore, by a much greater priority, be found among forms which are arranged one under the other, and among which ſome are more powerful, and uſe thoſe of a ſubordinate nature, but others are ſubſervient, and cooperate with the powers of the higher orders of forms? *Dominion*, therefore, is an *employing* power (χρηστικη δυναμις), and *ſervitude* a *miniſtrant* power. And both theſe ſubſiſt eſſentially among forms, and not caſually, as in their images: for dominion and ſervitude among ſenſibles, are the the laſt echoes, as it were, of dominion and ſervitude in the intelligible world.

But if you are willing not only to ſurvey theſe two in forms philoſophically, but alſo theologically, in the divine orders themſelves, direct your intellectual eye to thoſe intellectual and at the ſame time intelligible Gods, and to the forms which are ſuſpended from them; and you will ſee how both theſe are adapted to that order of forms. For having primarily a middle ſubſiſtence, they rule over all ſecondary natures, but are ſuſpended from the forms which are prior to them, and which are alone intelligible, energize with reference to their good, and are from them that which they are. For being firſt unfolded into light from them, they are governed by, and abide in, them; but they ſupernally rule over the eſſences and powers poſterior to themſelves. Hence, alſo, in the ſecondary orders, the more total govern the more partial, the more monadic, the more multiplied, and the exempt, the coordinated. Thus, for inſtance, in the demiurgic genera, Jupiter in Homer at one time iſſues his mandates to Minerva, at another time to Apollo, at another to Hermes, and at another to Iris; all of whom act in ſubſervience to the will of their father, imparting their providential energies according to the demiurgic boundary. The angelic tribe, alſo, and all the better genera, are ſaid to act as ſervants to the Gods, and to miniſter to their powers.

But, that dominion and ſervitude have an eſſential, and not a caſual ſubſiſtence only, we may learn from the Phædo: for it is there ſaid, that nature commanded the body to act the part of a ſlave, but the ſoul that of a maſter. If, therefore, theſe have a natural ſubſiſtence in the ſoul and body, it is nothing wonderful that we ſhould refer dominion itſelf, and ſervitude itſelf, to divine forms, theologiſts employing theſe names as indications of the ruling and miniſtrant powers in the Gods; juſt as the paternal and maternal there ſubſiſt in one reſpect according to a divine idiom, and in another according to a formal cauſe, mere habitude having no ſubſiſtence in theſe, but prolific power, and an eſſence adapted to the Gods.

It muſt, however, here be carefully obſerved, that when the Gods are ſaid to rule over us alſo with abſolute dominion, as when in the Phædo Socrates calls the Gods our maſters, and us the poſſeſſions of the Gods, the mode of dominion is tranſcendently exempt. For in the divine orders

the

maſter; but he ſuſtains both theſe relations, as being a man; while, in the mean time, *dominion itſelf* is that which it is from its relation to *ſervitude*; and *ſervitude*, in a ſimilar manner, is ſervitude with reference to *dominion*. But the ideas with which we are converſant poſſeſs no power over the ideas which ſubſiſt by themſelves, nor have *they* any authority over us: but I aſſert that they ſubſiſt from themſelves, and with relation to themſelves; and ours, in a ſimilar manner, with relation to themſelves. Do you underſtand what I ſay? That Socrates replied, Entirely ſo. That Parmenides then ſaid, Is not ſcience [1] itſelf, ſo far as it is ſuch, the ſcience of truth [2] itſelf? Perfectly

the more total rule over the more partial coordinately, and we approach to the Gods, as our maſters, through the ſervitude which is there as a medium. Hence, as all the ſeries of ſervitude itſelf is under that of dominion itſelf, the Gods alſo govern according to their abſolute power. And not only do the more total rule over the more partial Gods, but alſo over men, participating according to comprehenſion of ſervitude itſelf, which makes ſubordinate ſubſervient o more excellent natures.

[1] Socrates, in the Phædrus, celebrates divine ſcience, elevating ſouls of a total characteriſtic, or which ſubſiſt as wholes to the intellectual and intelligible orders, and aſſerting that they there ſurvey juſtice itſelf, temperance itſelf, and ſcience itſelf, in conſequence of being conjoined with the middle order of theſe Gods. He alſo aſſerts that truth is there, proceeding from intelligibles, and illuminating all the middle genera of Gods with intelligible light; and he conjoins that ſcience with that truth. If, therefore, in diſcourſing concerning the formal orders, he ſays that ſcience itſelf is of truth itſelf, it is not wonderful. For there ſcience and truth, and all the forms in the middle genera of Gods, participate of ſcience itſelf, and truth itſelf, which cauſe every thing there to be intellectual: for ſcience itſelf is the eternal and uniform intelligence of eternal natures. For the light of truth being intelligible, imparts to theſe forms intelligible power. But ſince there are many orders of theſe middle forms; for ſome of them are, as theologiſts ſay, the higheſt, uniform, and intelligible; others connect and bind together wholes; and others are perfective and convertive; hence, after the one and the firſt ſcience, Parmenides mentions many ſciences. For they proceed ſupernally through all the genera in conjunction with the light of truth. For truth is *the one* in every order, and the intelligible, with which alſo intelligence is conjoined. As, therefore, total intelligence is of the total intelligible, ſo the many intelligences are united to the many intelligibles. Theſe middle forms, therefore, which poſſeſs intelligences united with their intelligibles, are perfectly exempt from our knowledge; or, in other words, they cannot be directly and without a medium apprehended even by the higheſt of our powers. Intellectual forms, indeed, are exempt from us; but ſince we proximately ſubſiſt from them, they are

[2] Inſtead of της ὁ ἐστιν αληθεια, αυτης αν εκεινης ειη επιστημη, as in Thompſon's edition of this dialogue, it appears from the MS. commentary of Proclus that we ſhould read της αληθειας αυτης αν εκεινης κ. τ. λ. Indeed the ſenſe of the text requires this emendation.

fectly ſo. But will each of the ſciences which is, be the ſcience of each of the things which are? Certainly it will. But will not our ſcience [1] be converſant

are in a certain reſpect in us, and we poſſeſs a knowledge of them, and through theſe, of the unknown tranſcendency of more divine forms.

We ought not however, ſays Proclus, to ſay, with ſome of the friends of Plato, that divine ſcience does not know itſelf, but from itſelf imparts ſelf-knowledge to other things. For every divine nature primarily directs its energy to itſelf, and begins its idiom from itſelf. Thus the cauſe of life fills itſelf with life, and the ſource of perfection produces itſelf perfect. Hence, that which imparts knowledge to other things, poſſeſſes itſelf prior to other things the knowledge of beings; ſince alſo the ſcience which is with us being an image of ſcience itſelf, knows other things, and prior to other things, itſelf. Or what is that which informs us what this very thing ſcience is? And muſt not relatives belong to the ſame power? Knowing, therefore, the objects of ſcience, it alſo knows itſelf, being the ſcience of thoſe objects. As the knowledge, however, of divine ſcience is ſimple and uniform, ſo the object of its knowledge is ſingle and comprehenſive of all other objects of ſcientific knowledge. Science itſelf, therefore, is the cauſe of ſcientific knowledge to other things, and by a much greater priority, to itſelf. For it is an eſſence eſſentialized in the knowledge of itſelf and of being. For ſcience there is not a habit, nor a quality, but a ſelf-perfect hyparxis ſubſiſting from, and eſtabliſhed in, itſelf; and by knowing itſelf, knowing that which is primarily the object of ſcientific knowledge, or that which is ſimply being. For it is conjoined with this, in the ſame manner as that which is intellect ſimply, to that which is ſimply intelligible, and as that which is ſimply ſenſe, to that which is ſimply ſenſible. But the many ſciences after ſcience itſelf are certain progreſſions of the one ſcience conjoined with the multitude of beings, which the being of that one ſcience comprehends. For being is many, and in like manner ſcience. And that which is moſt characterized by unity in ſcience itſelf, is united to the one of being, which alſo it knows; but the multitude in ſcience itſelf knows the multitude of beings which being itſelf comprehends.

[1] We alſo participate in a certain reſpect of truth, but not of that of which thoſe divine forms alluded to in the preceding text participate, but of that which was imparted to our order by the artificer of the univerſe; and the ſcience which is with us is the ſcience of this truth. There are, however, knowledges more partial than this, ſome evolving one, and others a different object of knowledge. Some of theſe, alſo, are converſant with generation, and the variety it contains; others inveſtigate the whole of nature; and others contemplate ſupernatural beings. Some, again, employ the ſenſes, and together with theſe, give completion to their work; others require the figured intellection of the phantaſy; others acquieſce in doxaſtic reaſons; others convert pure reaſon itſelf to itſelf; and others extend our reaſon to intellect. As there is then ſuch a difference in the ſciences, it is evident that ſome form a judgment of theſe, and others of different, objects of ſcience, and things which contribute to our reminiſcence of being. Thus, for inſtance, geometry ſpeculates the reaſon of figure in us, but arithmetic unfolds, by its demonſtrations, the one form of numbers; and each of the other ſciences which have a partial ſubſiſtence ſpeculates ſome other particular of the things with which we are converſant. We muſt not, therefore, pervert

verſant with the truth which ſubſiſts among us? And will not each of our ſciences be the ſcience of that being which happens to reſide with us? It is neceſſary that it ſhould be ſo. But you have granted that we do not poſſeſs forms [1], and that they are not things with which we are converſant? Certainly not. Is each genus [2] of beings known to be what it is, through

pervert the name of ſcience by introducing arts into the midſt, and the ideas of theſe, to which the uſes of a mortal life gave a being; for they are nothing more than adumbrations of true ſcience. As, therefore, we ſay that there are ideas of things which contribute to the perfection of eſſence, but not of things proceeding from theſe, and alone ſubſiſting accidentally in others, in like manner the arts being the images of the ſciences have here their generation. But the ſciences themſelves are derived from the ſciences which preſubſiſt among ideas; and through the former we are enabled to aſcend to the latter, and become aſſimilated to intellect. However, as there it is neceſſary that there ſhould be one ſcience prior to the many, being the ſcience of that which is truth itſelf, juſt as the many ſciences have many truths for their objects (for the peculiar ſcientific object of every ſcience is a certain truth) in like manner with reſpect to the ſciences with us which are many, it is neceſſary to underſtand the one and whole form of ſcience, which neither receives its completion from the many, nor is coordinated with them, but preſubſiſts itſelf by itſelf. But the many ſciences diſtribute the one power of ſcience, a different ſcience being arranged under a different object of knowledge, and all of them being referred to and receiving their principles from the one and entire form of ſcience. The ſcience, therefore, which is with us is very different from that which is divine; but through the former we aſcend to the latter.

[1] Here Parmenides, ſays Proclus, beginning from the preceding axioms collects the thing propoſed as follows: Exempt forms ſubſiſt by themſelves; things which ſubſiſt by themſelves and of themſelves are not in us; things which are not in us, are not coordinate with our ſcience, and are unknown by it. Exempt forms, therefore, are unknown by our ſcience. All forms indeed, are only to be ſeen by a divine intellect, but this is eſpecially the caſe with ſuch as are beyond the intellectual Gods. For neither ſenſe nor doxaſtic knowledge, nor pure reaſon, nor our intellectual knowlege, is able to conjoin the ſoul with thoſe forms; but this can alone be effected through an illumination from the intellectual Gods, as ſome one ſpeaking divinely ſays. The nature, therefore, of thoſe forms is unknown to us, as being better than our intellection, and the diviſible intuitive perceptions of our ſoul. Hence Socrates in the Phædrus, as we have before obſerved, aſſimilates the ſurvey of them to the myſteries, and calls the ſpectacles of them entire, tranquil, ſimple and happy viſions. Of intellectual forms, therefore, the demiurgus and father of ſouls has implanted in us the knowledge; but of the forms above intellect, ſuch as thoſe belonging to the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual orders, the knowledge is exempt from our immediate viſion, is ſpontaneous, and alone known to ſouls energizing from a divine afflatus. So that what Parmenides now infers, and alſo that we do not participate of ſcience itſelf, follow from the conceptions concerning this order of divine forms.

[2] The genera of being are not to be conſidered in this place, either as things appearing in the many, and which are the ſubject of logical predications, or as univerſals collected from the many, and which are called by the moderns abſtract ideas; for theſe are poſterior to beings. But the genera

through the *form itſelf* of ſcience? Undoubtedly. But this *form* we do not poſſeſs? By no means. No form, therefore, is known by us, as we do not participate of ſcience itſelf? It does not appear it can. The *beautiful* [1] *itſelf*, therefore, and the *good itſelf*, and all ſuch things which we have conſidered as being ideas, are unknown to us? So it ſeems. But ſurvey this, which is yet ſtill more dire [2]. What? You will ſay, perhaps, that if there is

of being here ſignify ſuch things as poſſeſs a generative power, more total than, and preceding according to cauſe, the progeny in more partial forms. For as the genera of forms in ſenſibles, either appear in the many, or are predicated of the many; in like manner genera in intelligibles are more principal, perfect and comprehenſive than other forms; ſurpaſſing the things comprehended in ſimplicity and prolific power. Theſe genera we muſt ſay are known by the form of ſcience itſelf, as beginning ſupernally, and comprehending according to one uniform knowledge, things multiplied, unitedly, and things partial, totally. This alſo the ſcience which is with us wiſhes to effect: for it always contemplates the progreſſions of things from their cauſes.

[1] *The beautiful*, and alſo *the good* conſidered as a form and not as ſupereſſential proceed ſupernally from the ſummit of intelligibles to all the ſecond genera of Gods. The middle orders of forms, therefore, receive the progreſſions of theſe in a becoming manner; according to *the good* becoming full of their own perfection, and of the ſufficient, and the unindigent; but according to *the beautiful* becoming lovely to ſecondary natures, leading back things which have proceeded, and binding together divided cauſes. For a converſion to *the beautiful* collects together and unites all things, and fixes them as in one center. Theſe two forms, therefore, *the good* and *the beautiful* ſubſiſt occultly and uniformly in firſt natures, but are changed in the different orders of things in a manner coordinate to each. So that it is not wonderful if there is certain beauty known only to ſenſe, another known to opinion, another beheld through the dianoëtic power, another by intelligence in conjunction with reaſon, another by pure intelligence, and laſtly another which is unknown, ſubſiſting by itſelf perfectly exempt, and capable of being ſeen by its own light alone.

[2] The preceding arguments have led us as far as to the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual order of forms: for being falſe and of a doubting idiom, they alone unfold the truth in intellectual forms. But what is now ſaid, ſays Proclus, leads us to thoſe forms which preſubſiſt in the intelligible, proceeding indeed in the form of doubt as about intellectual forms, but in reality ſignifying the idiom of the firſt forms. The diſcourſe, therefore, ſhows that forms neither know nor govern ſenſibles; falſely, indeed, in demiurgic ideas, for ſenſibles ſubſiſt from theſe, and theſe rule over their all-various diſtribution into individual forms; ſo that they previouſly comprehend the providence and government of ſenſibles: but the diſcourſe is moſt true in the firſt ideas, which are in the higheſt degree characterized by unity, and are truly intelligible. For theſe firſt ſhine forth from being in intelligible intellect, uniformly, unitedly, and totally. For they contain the paternal cauſes of the moſt common and comprehenſive genera, and are ſuperior to a diſtributed knowledge of and a proximate government of ſenſibles. Hence theſe intelligible Gods have dominion over the Gods which are unfolded from them, and their knowledge is beyond all other divine knowledge; to which alſo Plato looking collects, that the Gods neither rule over us, nor have any knowledge of human

is any certain *genus of ſcience*, it is much more accurate than the ſcience which reſides with us; and that this is likewiſe true of beauty, and every thing

concerns. For the divided cauſes of theſe, and the powers which rule over them, are in the intellectual Gods. But the ideas which are properly called intelligible, are eſtabliſhed above all ſuch diviſions; produce all things according to united and the moſt ſimple cauſes; and both their effective energy and knowledge are one, collected and uniform. Hence there the intelligible cauſe of the celeſtial genus produces every thing celeſtial, Gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, ſouls, not ſo far as they are dæmons or angels, for this is the peculiarity of diviſible cauſes, and of divided ideas, of which the intellectual forms make a diſtribution into multitude, but ſo far as all theſe genera are in a certain reſpect divine and celeſtial, and ſo far as they are allotted an hyparxis united to the Gods; and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to each of the reſt. Thus for inſtance, the intelligible idea of every thing pedeſtrian and terreſtrial cannot be ſaid to rule over things, each of which is ſeparated according to one form, for this is the province of things diſtributed from it into multitude, but it governs all things ſo far as they are of one genus. For things nearer to the one, give ſubſiſtence to all things in a more total and uniform manner.

As, however, we ſhall hereafter ſpeak of this, let us rather conſider the opinion of Plato concerning providence. The Athenian gueſt, therefore, in the Laws clearly evinces that there is a providence, where his diſcourſe ſhows that the Gods know and poſſeſs a power which governs all things. But Parmenides at the very beginning of the diſcuſſion concerning providence evinces the abſurdity of doubting divine knowledge and dominion. For to aſſert that the concluſion of this doubt is ſtill *more dire* than the former, ſufficiently ſhows that he rejects the arguments which ſubvert providence. For it is dire to ſay that divinity is not known by us who are rational and intellectual natures, and who eſſentially poſſeſs ſomething divine; but it is ſtill more dire to deprive divine natures of knowledge; ſince the former pertains to thoſe who do not convert themſelves to divinity, but the latter to thoſe who impede the all-pervading goodneſs of the Gods. And the former pertains to thoſe who err reſpecting our eſſence, but the latter to thoſe who convert themſelves erroneouſly about a divine cauſe. But the expreſſion ſtill *more dire*, (δεινοτερον) ſays Proclus, is not uſed as ſignifying a more ſtrenuous doubt, in the ſame manner as we are accuſtomed to call thoſe *dire* (δεινοι) who vanquiſh by the power of language, but as a thing worthy of greater dread and caution to the intelligent. For it diſcuſſes the union of things, and diſlocates divinity apart from the world. It alſo defines divine power as not pervading to all things, and circumſcribes intellectual knowledge as not all-perfect. It likewiſe ſubverts all the fabrication of the univerſe, the order imparted to the world from ſeparate cauſes, and the goodneſs which fills all things from one will, in a manner accommodated to the nature of unity. Nor leſs dire than any one of theſe is the confuſion of piety. For what communion is there between Gods and men, if the former are deprived of the knowledge of our concerns. All ſupplications, therefore, of divinity, all ſacred inſtitutions, all oaths adducing the Gods as a witneſs, and the untaught conceptions implanted in our ſouls concerning divinity, will periſh. What gift alſo will be left of the Gods to men, if they do not previouſly comprehend in themſelves the deſert of the recipients, if they do not poſſeſs a knowledge of all that we do, of all we ſuffer, and of all that we think though we do not carry it into effect? With great propriety, therefore,

thing elſe? Certainly. If, therefore, any one poſſeſſes *ſcience itſelf*, will you not aſſert that no one poſſeſſes the moſt accurate ſcience more than a God?

fore are ſuch aſſertions called dire. For if it is unholy to change any legitimately divine inſtitution, how can ſuch an innovation as this be unattended with dread? But that Plato rejects this hypotheſis which makes Divinity to be ignorant of our concerns, is evident from theſe things, ſince it is one of his dogmas, that Divinity knows and produces all things. Since, however, ſome of thoſe poſterior to him have vehemently endeavoured to ſubvert ſuch-like aſſertions, let us ſpeak concerning them as much as may be ſufficient for our preſent purpoſe.

Some of thoſe, then, poſterior to Plato, on ſeeing the unſtable condition of ſublunary things were fearful that they were not under the direction of providence and a divine nature; for ſuch events as are ſaid to take place through fortune, the apparent inequality reſpecting lives, and the diſordered motion of material natures, induced them greatly to ſuſpect that they were not under the government of providence. Beſides, the perſuaſion that Divinity is not buſily employed in the evolution of all-various reaſons, and that he does not depart from his own bleſſedneſs, induced them to frame an hypotheſis ſo lawleſs and dire. For they were of opinion that the paſſion of our ſoul, and the perturbation which it ſuſtains by deſcending to the government of bodies, muſt happen to Divinity, if he converted himſelf to the providential inſpection of things. Further ſtill, from conſidering that different objects of knowledge are known by different gnoſtic powers; as, for inſtance, ſenſibles by ſenſe, objects of opinion by opinion, things ſcientific by ſcience, and intelligibles by intellect, and, at the ſame time, neither placing ſenſe, nor opinion, nor ſcience in Divinity, but only an intellect immaterial and pure;—hence, they aſſerted that Divinity had no knowledge of any other things than the objects of intellect *. For, ſay they, if matter is external to him, it is neceſſary that he ſhould be pure from apprehenſions which are converted to matter; but being purified from theſe, it follows that he muſt have no knowledge of material natures: and hence, the patrons of this doctrine deprived him of a knowledge of, and providential exertions about, ſenſibles; not through any imbecility of nature, but through a tranſcendency of gnoſtic energy; juſt as thoſe whoſe eyes are filled with light, are ſaid to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects, at the ſame time that this incapacity is nothing more than tranſcendency of viſion. They likewiſe add, that there are many things which it is beautiful not to know. Thus, to the entheaſtic, (or thoſe who are divinely inſpired) it is beautiful to be ignorant of whatever would deſtroy the delfic energy; and to the ſcientific, not to know that which would defile the indubitable perception of ſcience.

But others aſcribe, indeed, to Divinity a knowledge of ſenſibles, in order that they may not take away his providence, but at the ſame time convert his apprehenſion to that which is external, repreſent him as pervading through the whole of a ſenſible nature, as paſſing into contact with the objects of his government, impelling every thing, and being locally preſent with all things; for, ſay they, he would not otherwiſe be able to exert a providential energy in a becoming manner, and impart good to every thing according to its deſert †.

* This opinion was embraced by the more early Peripatetics.

† This was the opinion of the Stoics.

Others

God[1]? It is neceſſary ſo to aſſert. But can a God, being ſuch as he is, know our affairs through poſſeſſing ſcience itſelf? Why ſhould he not? That

Others again affirm that Divinity has a knowledge of himſelf, but that he has no occaſion to underſtand ſenſibles in order to provide for them, ſince by his very eſſence he produced all things, and adorns whatever he has produced, without having any knowledge of his productions. They add, that this is by no means wonderful, ſince nature operates without knowledge, and unattended with phantaſy; but that Divinity differs from nature in this, that he has a knowledge of himſelf, though not of the things which are fabricated by him. And ſuch are the aſſertions of thoſe who were perſuaded that Divinity is not ſeparated from mundane natures, and of thoſe who deprived him of the knowledge of inferior concerns, and of a knowledge operating in union with providence.

With reſpect to theſe philoſophers, we ſay, that they ſpeak truly, and yet not truly, on this ſubject.

[1] Every divine intellect, ſays Proclus, and every order of the Gods, comprehends in itſelf the knowledge and the cauſe of all things. For neither is their knowledge inefficacious, poſſeſſing the indefinite in intellection; but they both know all things, and communicate good. For that which is primarily good, is alſo willing to illuminate ſecondary natures with a ſupply from himſelf. Nor are their productions irrational and void of knowledge: for this is the work of nature and of ultimate life, and not of a divine cauſe, which alſo produces rational eſſences. Hence, they at the ſame time both know and make all things; and prior to theſe, according to their will, they preaſſume both a knowledge and a power effective of all things. Hence, they preſide over all things *willingly*, *gnoſtically*, and *powerfully*; and every thing through this triad enjoys their providential care. And if you are willing to unite things which ſubſiſt diviſibly in ſecondary natures, and refer them to a divine cauſe, you will perhaps apprehend the truth concerning it more accurately. Nature, therefore, appears to poſſeſs reaſons or productive principles effective, but not gnoſtic; the dianoëtic power poſſeſſes as its end, knowledge in itſelf; and proæreſis, or a deliberative tendency to things capable of being accompliſhed, has for its end good, and the will of things good. Collect theſe, therefore, in one, *the willing*, *the gnoſtic*, *the efficacious*, and prior to theſe, conceiving a divine unity, refer all theſe to a divine nature, becauſe all theſe preſubſiſt there uniformly together. However, though all the Gods poſſeſs all theſe, yet in intelligibles, the firſt intelligence, the firſt power generative of wholes, and a beneficent will, are eſpecially apparent. For the intelligible order ſubſiſting immediately after the fountain of good, becomes that to natures poſterior to itſelf, which *the good* is to the univerſality of things; expreſſing his ſuper-cauſal nature through paternal power; *the good*, through beneficent will; and that which is above all knowledge, through occult and united intellection. Proclus adds, but it appears to me that through this Parmenides now firſt calls ideas Gods, as recurring to the firſt fountain of them, and as being uniform, and moſt near to *the good*, and as thus poſſeſſing a knowledge of, and dominion over, all things, ſo far as each participates of a divine power, and ſo far as all of them are ſuſpended from the Gods.

That Parmenides ſaid, Becauſe it has been confeſſed by us, O Socrates, that neither do thoſe forms poſſeſs the power which is peculiar to them, through relation

ſubject. For if providence has a ſubſiſtence, neither can there be any thing diſordered, nor can Divinity be buſily employed, nor can he know ſenſibles through paſſive ſenſe: but theſe philoſophers, in conſequence of not knowing the exempt power and uniform knowledge of Divinity, appear to deviate from the truth. For thus we interrogate them: does not every thing energize in a becoming manner when it energizes according to its own power and nature? as, for inſtance, does not nature, in conformity to the order of its eſſence, energize phyſically, intellect intellectually, and ſoul pſychically, or according to the nature of ſoul? And when the ſame thing is generated by many and different cauſes, does not each of theſe produce according to its own power, and not according to the nature of the thing produced? Or ſhall we ſay, that each produces after the ſame manner, and that, for example, the ſun and man generate man, according to the ſame mode of operation, and not according to the natural ability of each, viz. the one partially, imperfectly, and with a buſy energy, but the other without anxious attention, by its very eſſence, and totally? But to aſſert this would be abſurd; for a divine operates in a manner very different from a mortal nature.

If, therefore, every thing which energizes, energizes according to its own nature and order, ſome things divinely and ſupernaturally, others naturally, and others in a different manner, it is evident that every gnoſtic being knows according to its own nature, and that it does not follow that becauſe the thing known is one and the ſame, on this account, the natures which know, energize in conformity to the eſſence of the things known. Thus ſenſe, opinion, and our intellect, know that which is white, but not in the ſame manner: for ſenſe cannot know what the eſſence is of a thing white, nor can opinion obtain a knowledge of its proper objects in the ſame manner as intellect; ſince opinion knows only *that* a thing is, but intellect knows the cauſe of its exiſtence. Knowledge, therefore, ſubſiſts according to the nature of that which knows, and not according to the nature of that which is known. What wonder is it then that Divinity ſhould know all things in ſuch a manner as is accommodated to his nature, viz. diviſible things indiviſibly, things multiplied, uniformly, things generated, according to an eternal intelligence, totally, ſuch things as are partial; and that with a knowledge of this kind, he ſhould poſſeſs a power productive of all things, or, in other words, that by knowing all things with ſimple and united intellections, he ſhould impart to every thing being, and a progreſſion into being? For the auditory ſenſe knows audibles in a manner different from the common ſenſe; and prior to, and different from, theſe, reaſon knows audibles, together with other particulars which ſenſe is not able to apprehend. And again, of deſire, which tends to one thing, of anger, which aſpires after another thing, and of *proaireſis*, (προαιρεσις), or that faculty of the ſoul which is a deliberative tendency to things in our power, there is one particular life moving the ſoul towards all theſe, which are mutually motive of each other. It is through this life that we ſay, I deſire, I am angry, and I have a deliberative tendency to this thing or that; for this life verges to all theſe powers, and lives in conjunction with them, as being a power which is impelled to every object of deſire. But prior both to reaſon and this one life, is *the one* of the ſoul, which often ſays, I perceive, I reaſon,

relation to our concerns, nor ours from relation to theirs; but that the forms in each diviſion are referred to themſelves. It was admitted by us. If,

reaſon, I deſire, and I deliberate, which follows all theſe energies, and energizes together with them. For we ſhould not be able to know all theſe, and to apprehend in what they differ from each other, unleſs we contained a certain indiviſible nature, which has a ſubſiſtence above the common ſenſe, and which, prior to opinion, deſire, and will, knows all that theſe know and deſire, according to an indiviſible mode of apprehenſion.

If this be the caſe, it is by no means proper to diſbelieve in the indiviſible knowledge of Divinity, which knows ſenſibles without poſſeſſing ſenſe, and diviſible natures without poſſeſſing a diviſible energy, and which, without being preſent to things in place, knows them prior to all local preſence, and imparts to every thing that which every thing is capable of receiving. The unſtable eſſence, therefore, of apparent natures is not known by him in an unſtable, but in a definite manner; nor does he know that which is ſubject to all-various mutations dubiouſly, but in a manner perpetually the ſame; for by knowing himſelf, he knows every thing of which he is the cauſe, poſſeſſing a knowledge tranſcendently more accurate than that which is coordinate to the objects of knowledge; ſince a cauſal knowledge of every thing is ſuperior to every other kind of knowledge. Divinity, therefore, knows without buſily attending to the objects of his intellection, becauſe he abides in himſelf, and by alone knowing himſelf, knows all things. Nor is he indigent of ſenſe, or opinion, or ſcience, in order to know ſenſible natures; for it is himſelf that produces all theſe, and that, in the unfathomable depths of the intellection of himſelf, comprehends an united knowledge of them, according to cauſe, and in one ſimplicity of perception. Juſt as if ſome one having built a ſhip, ſhould place in it men of his own formation, and, in conſequence of poſſeſſing a various art, ſhould add a ſea to the ſhip, produce certain winds, and afterwards launch the ſhip into the new created main. Let us ſuppoſe, too, that he cauſes theſe to have an exiſtence by merely conceiving them to exiſt, ſo that by imagining all this to take place, he gives an external ſubſiſtence to his inward phantaſms, it is evident that in this caſe he will contain the cauſe of every thing which happens to the ſhip through the winds on the ſea, and that by contemplating his own conceptions, without being indigent of outward converſion, he will at the ſame time both fabricate and know theſe external particulars. Thus, and in a far greater degree, that divine intellect the artificer of the univerſe, poſſeſſing the cauſes of all things, both gives ſubſiſtence to, and contemplates, whatever the univerſe contains, without departing from the ſpeculation of himſelf. But if, with reſpect to intellect, one kind is more partial, and another more total, it is evident that there is not the ſame intellectual perfection of all things, but that where intelligibles have a more total and undiſtributed ſubſiſtence, there the knowledge is more total and indiviſible, and where the number of forms proceeds into multitude and extenſion, there the knowledge is both one and multiform. Hence, this being admitted, we cannot wonder on hearing the Orphic verſes, in which the theologiſt ſays:

Λυτη δε Ζηνος και εν ομμασι πατρος ανακτος
Ναιουσ' αθανατοι τε θεοι, θνητοι τ' ανθρωποι,
Ὁσσα τε ην γεγαωσα, και ὑστερον ὁσσα εμελλον.

i. e. There

If, therefore, there is the moſt accurate dominion with Divinity, and the moſt accurate ſcience, the dominion of the Gods will not rule over us, nor will

i. e. There in the ſight of Jove, the parent king,
Th' immortal Gods and mortal men reſide,
With all that ever was, and ſhall hereafter be.

For the artificer of the univerſe is full of intelligibles, and poſſeſſes the cauſes of all things ſeparated from each other; ſo that he generates men, and all other things, according to their characteriſtic peculiarities, and not ſo far as each is divine, in the ſame manner as the divinity prior to him, the intelligible father Phanes. Hence, Jupiter is called the father of things divided according to ſpecies, but Phanes of things divided according to genera. And Jupiter, indeed, is the father of wholes, though, by a much greater priority, Phanes is the father of all things, but of all things ſo far as each participates of a divine power. With reſpect to knowledge, alſo, Jupiter knows human affairs particularly, and in common with other things: for the cauſe of men is contained in him, divided from other things and united with all of them; but Phanes knows all things at once, as it were centrically, and without diſtribution. Thus, for inſtance, he knows man, ſo far as he is an animal and pedeſtrian, and not ſo far as he is man. For as the pedeſtrian which ſubſiſts in Phanes, is collectively, and at once, the cauſe of all terreſtrial Gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, ſouls, animals, plants, and of every thing contained in the earth, ſo alſo the knowledge which is there is one of all theſe things collectively, as of one genus, and is not a diſtributed knowledge of human affairs. And as in us the more univerſal ſciences give ſubſiſtence to thoſe which are ſubordinate to them, as Ariſtotle ſays, and are more ſciences, and more allied to intellect, for they uſe more comprehenſive concluſions,—ſo alſo in the Gods, the more excellent and more ſimple intellections comprehend according to cauſal priority the variety of ſuch as are ſecondary. In the Gods, therefore, the firſt knowledge of man is as of being, and is one intellection which knows every being as one, according to one union. But the ſecond knowledge is as of eternal being: for this knowledge uniformly comprehends according to one cauſe every eternal being. The knowledge which is conſequent to this is as of animal: for this alſo has an intellection of animal according to union. But the knowledge which ſucceeds this is of that which is perfected under this particular genus, as of pedeſtrian: for it is an intellection of all that genus, as of one thing; and diviſion firſt takes place in this, and variety together with ſimplicity. At the ſame time, however, neither in this is the intellection of man alone: for it is not the ſame thing to underſtand every thing terreſtrial as one thing, and to underſtand man. Hence, in demiurgic, and in ſhort in intellectual forms, there is a certain intellection of man as of man, becauſe this form is ſeparated from others in theſe orders. And thus we have ſhown how the higheſt forms do not poſſeſs a knowledge of human affairs, and how they have dominion over all things, ſo far as all things are divine, and ſo far as they participate of a certain divine idiom. But that in the firſt order of forms dominion itſelf, and ſcience itſelf, ſubſiſt, is evident. For there is a divine intellection there of all things characterized by unity, and a power which rules over wholes; the former being the fountain of all knowledge, and the latter the primary cauſe

will their ſcience take cognizance of us, or of any of our concerns; and in a ſimilar manner, we ſhall not rule over them by our dominion, nor know any thing divine through the aſſiſtance of our ſcience. And again, in conſequence of the ſame reaſoning, they will neither, though Gods [1], be our governors, nor have any knowledge of human concerns. But would not the diſcourſe be wonderful in the extreme, which ſhould deprive Divinity of knowledge? That Parmenides ſaid, Theſe, O Socrates, and many other conſequences beſides theſe, muſt neceſſarily [2] happen to forms, if they are the

of all dominion, whether they ſubſiſt in the Gods, or in the genera more excellent than our ſpecies, or in ſouls. And, perhaps, Parmenides here calls the genus of ſcience the intellection of thoſe forms, wiſhing to ſhow its comprehenſive and uniform nature; but prior to this, when he was ſpeaking of middle ideas, he alone denominated it ſpecies. For, from intelligible knowledge the middle orders are filled with the intelligence which they poſſeſs; and intelligence in the latter, has the ſame relation to that in the former, which ſpecies has to genus. If, alſo, the term *much more accurate*, is employed in ſpeaking of this ſcience, it is evident that ſuch an addition repreſents to us its more united nature. For this is the accurate, to comprehend all things, and leave nothing external to itſelf.

[1] It is well obſerved here by Proclus, that the words "*though Gods*" contain an abundant indication of the preſent doubt. For every thing divine is good, and is willing to fill all things with good. How, therefore, can it either be ignorant of things pertaining to us, or not have dominion over ſecondary natures? How is it poſſible that it ſhould not govern according to its own power, and provide according to its own knowledge for things of which it is the cauſe? And it appears that Parmenides by theſe words evinces, that for the Divinities to be ignorant of our concerns over which they have dominion, is the moſt abſurd of all things, profoundly indicating that it eſpecially pertains to the Gods, ſo far as Gods, to know and provide for all things, according to *the one* by which they are characterized. For intellect, ſo far as intellect, has not a knowledge of all things, but of *wholes*, nor are ideas the cauſes of all things, but of ſuch as perpetually ſubſiſt according to nature; ſo that the aſſertion is not entirely vane which deprives theſe of the knowledge and government of our concerns, ſo far as we rank among particulars, and not ſo far as we are men, and poſſeſs one form. But it is neceſſary that the Divinity and the Gods ſhould know all things, particulars, things eternal, and things temporal; and that they ſhould rule over all things, not only ſuch as are univerſal, but ſuch alſo as are partial: for there is one providence of them pervading to all things. Forms, therefore, ſo far as Gods, and intellect ſo far as a God, poſſeſs a knowledge of, and dominion over, all things. But intellect is a God according to *the one*, which is as it were the luminous flower of its eſſence; and forms are Gods, ſo far as they contain the light proceeding from *the good*.

[2] Parmenides here indicates that what has been ſaid under the pretext of doubts, is after another manner true. For he ſays that theſe and many other conſequences muſt *neceſſarily* happen to forms, viz. the being unknown, and having no knowledge of our affairs. And, in ſhort,

the ideas of things, and if any one ſeparates each form apart from other things; ſo that any one who hears theſe aſſertions, may doubt and heſitate whether ſuch forms have any ſubſiſtence; or if they do ſubſiſt in a moſt eminent degree, whether it is not abundantly neceſſary that they ſhould be unknown [1] by the human nature. Hence he who thus ſpeaks may ſeem to ſay ſomething to the purpoſe; and as we juſt now ſaid, it may be conſidered as a wonderful [2] thing, on account of the difficulty of being perſuaded, and as the province of a man [3] of a very naturally good diſpoſition, to be able to perceive *that there is a certain genus of every thing, and an eſſence itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf:* but he will deſerve ſtill greater admiration, who, after having made this diſcovery, ſhall be able to teach another how to diſcern and diſtinguiſh all theſe in a becoming manner. That then Socrates ſaid, I aſſent to you, O Parmenides, for you entirely ſpeak agreeably to my opinion.

That Parmenides further added, But indeed, O Socrates, if any one on the contrary takes away the forms of things, regarding all that has now been

ſhort, he indicates that all the above-mentioned idioms are adapted to different orders of forms. For it is by no means wonderful that what is true of one order ſhould be falſe when extended to another.

[1] Theſe things alſo, ſays Proclus, are divinely aſſerted, and with a view to the condition of our nature. For neither does he who has arrived at the ſummit of human attainments, and who is the wiſeſt among men, poſſeſs ſcience perfectly indubitable concerning divine natures; for it is intellect alone which knows intelligibles free from doubt; nor is the moſt imperfect and earth-born character entirely deprived of the knowledge of a formal cauſe. For to what does he look when he ſometimes blames that which is apparent to ſenſe, as very mutable, if he does not contain in himſelf an unperverted preconception of an eſſence permanent and real?

[2] The ſimilar is every where naturally adapted to proceed to the ſimilar. Hence that which is obſcure to the eyes, and is only to be obtained by philoſophy, will not be apprehended by imperfect ſouls, but by thoſe alone who through phyſical virtue, tranſcendent diligence, and ardent deſire apply themſelves in a becoming manner to ſo ſublime an object of contemplation. For the ſpeculation of intelligibles cannot ſubſiſt in foreign habits; nor can things which have their eſſence and ſeat in a pure intellect become apparent to thoſe who are not purified in intellect; ſince the ſimilar is every where known by the ſimilar.

[3] By theſe words, ſays Proclus, Plato again teaches us who is a moſt fit hearer of this diſcourſe about ideas. Such a one he denominates a *man* (i. e. ανηρ, not ανθρωπος), not indeed in vain, but in order to indicate that ſuch a one according to the form of his life poſſeſſes much of the *grand, robuſt* and *elevated:* (ανδρα μεν ονομασας ου ματην, αλλ' ινα και κατα το ειδος της ζωης τοιουτος η, πολυ το ἀβρον και ὑψηλον επιδεικνυμενος.)

been ſaid, and other things of the ſame kind, he will not find where to turn his dianoëtic [1] part, while he does not permit the idea of every thing which exiſts

επιδεικνυμενος.) For it is fit that he who is about to apprehend the Gods ſhould direct his attention to nothing ſmall and grovelling. But he calls him a man of a very naturally good diſpoſition, as being adorned with all the prerogatives of a philoſophic nature, and as receiving many viatica from nature, in order to the intellectual perception of divine natures. In addition to this, he alſo again reminds us who is the leader of the ſcience concerning theſe divine forms, and that he is prolific and inventive, and this with reſpect to teaching. For ſome have made ſuch a proficiency as is ſufficient for themſelves, but others are alſo able to awaken others to a recollection of the truth of things. Hence he ſays, that ſuch a one deſerves ſtill greater admiration. In the third place, he ſhows us what is the end of this teaching, viz. that the learner who poſſeſſes ſcience may be ſufficiently able to diſtinguiſh the genera of beings, and to ſurvey in perfection the definite cauſes of things; whence they originate; how many are their orders; how they ſubſiſt in every order of things; how they are participated; how they cauſally comprehend all things in themſelves; and, in ſhort, all ſuch particulars as have been diſcuſſed in the preceding notes.

Proclus adds, that by *a certain genus of every thing*, Plato ſignifies the primary cauſe preſubſiſting in divine natures of every ſeries. For idea compared with any other individual form in ſenſibles is a genus, as being more total than ſenſible forms, and as comprehending things which are not entirely of a ſimilar form with each other. For how can the terreſtrial man be ſaid to be entirely of a ſimilar form with the celeſtial, or with the man that is allotted a ſubſiſtence in any other element?

[1] Very ſcientifically, ſays Proclus, does Plato in theſe words remind us that there are ideas or forms of things. For if dianoëtic and intellectual are better than ſenſible knowledge, it is neceſſary that the things known by the dianoëtic power and by intellect ſhould be more divine than thoſe which are known by ſenſe: for as the gnoſtic powers which are coordinated to beings are to each other, ſuch alſo is the mutual relation of the things which are known. If, therefore, the dianoëtic power and intellect ſpeculate ſeparate and immaterial forms, and likewiſe things univerſal, and which ſubſiſt in themſelves, but ſenſe contemplates things partible, and which are inſeparable from ſubjects, it is neceſſary that the ſpectacles of the dianoëtic power and of intellect, ſhould be more divine and more eternal. Univerſals, therefore, are prior to particulars, and things immaterial to things material. Whence then does the dianoëtic power receive theſe? for they do not always ſubſiſt in us according to energy. It is however neceſſary, that things in energy ſhould precede thoſe in capacity, both in things intellectual and in eſſences. Forms, therefore, ſubſiſt elſewhere, and prior to us, in divine and ſeparate natures, through whom the forms which we contain derive their perfection. But theſe not ſubſiſting, neither would the forms in us ſubſiſt: for they could not be derived from things imperfect: ſince it is not lawful that more excellent natures ſhould be either generated or perfected from ſuch as are ſubordinate. Whence, too, is this multitude of forms in the multitude of ſouls derived? For it is every where neceſſary, prior to multitude, to conceive a monad from which the multitude proceeds. For as the multitude of ſenſibles was not generated, except from an unity, which is better than ſenſibles,

exiſts to be always the ſame, and by this means entirely deſtroys the dialectic power of the ſoul: but you alſo ſeem in this reſpect to perceive perfectly

and which gave ſubſiſtence to that which is common in particulars; ſo neither would the multitude of forms ſubſiſt in ſouls, ſuch as the juſt itſelf, the beautiful itſelf, &c. which ſubſiſt in all ſouls in a manner accommodated to the nature of ſoul, without a certain generating unity, which is more excellent than this animaſtic multitude: juſt as the monad from which the multitude of ſenſibles originates, is ſuperior to a ſenſible eſſence, comprehending unitedly all the variety of ſenſibles. Is it not alſo neceſſary, that prior to ſelf-motive natures, there ſhould be an immovable form? For as ſelf-motive reaſons tranſcend thoſe which are alter-motive, or moved by others, after the ſame manner immovable forms, and which energize in eternity, are placed above ſelf-motive forms, which are converſant with the circulations of time: for it is every where requiſite that a ſtable ſhould precede a movable cauſe. If, therefore, there are forms in ſouls which are many, and of a ſelf-motive nature, there are prior to theſe intellectual forms. In other words, there are immovable prior to ſelf-motive natures, ſuch as are monadic, prior to ſuch as are multiplied, and the perfect prior to the imperfect. It is alſo requiſite that they ſhould ſubſiſt in energy; ſo that if there are not intellectual, neither are there animaſtic forms: for nature by no means begins from the imperfect and the many; ſince it is neceſſary that multitude ſhould proceed about monads, things imperfect about the perfect, and things movable about the immovable. But if there are not forms eſſentially inherent in ſoul, there is no place left to which any one can turn his dianoëtic power as Parmenides juſtly obſerves: for phantaſy and ſenſe neceſſarily look to things connaſcent with themſelves. And of what ſhall we poſſeſs a dianoëtic or ſcientific knowledge, if the ſoul is deprived of forms of this kind? For we ſhall not make our ſpeculation about things of poſterior origin, ſince theſe are more ignoble than ſenſibles themſelves, and the univerſals which they contain. How then will the objects of knowledge, which are coordinate to the dianoëtic power, be ſubordinate to thoſe which are known by ſenſe? It remains, therefore, that we ſhall not know any thing elſe than ſenſibles. But if this be the caſe, whence do demonſtrations originate? Demonſtrations indeed, are from thoſe things which are the cauſes of the things demonſtrated, which are prior to them according to nature, and not with relation to us, and which are more honourable than the concluſions which are unfolded from them. But the things from which demonſtrations are formed are univerſals, and not particulars. Univerſals, therefore, are prior to, and are more cauſal and more honourable than, particulars. Whence likewiſe are definitions? For definition proceeds through the eſſential reaſon of the ſoul: for we firſt define that which is common in particulars, poſſeſſing within, that form, of which the ſomething common in theſe is the image. If, therefore, definition is the principle of demonſtration, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be another definition prior to this, of the many forms and eſſential reaſons which the ſoul contains. For ſince, as we have before ſaid, the juſt itſelf is in every ſoul, it is evident that there is ſomething common in this multitude of the juſt, whence every ſoul knowing the reaſon of the juſt contained in its eſſence, knows in a ſimilar manner that which is in all other ſouls. But if it poſſeſſes ſomething common, it is this ſomething common which we define, and this is the principle of demonſtration, and not that univerſal in the many, which is material, and in a certain

fectly the ſame with myſelf. That Socrates anſwered, You ſpeak the truth. What then will you do with reſpect to philoſophy? Where will you turn yourſelf,

certain reſpect mortal, being coordinated with the many: for in demonſtrations and definitions, it is requiſite that the whole of what is partial ſhould be comprehended in univerſal and definition. The definitions however of things common in particulars do not comprehend the whole of particulars: for, can it be ſaid that Socrates is the whole of rational mortal animal, which is the definition of man? ſince he contains many other particulars, which cauſe him to poſſeſs characteriſtic peculiarities. But the reaſon of man in the ſoul comprehends the whole of every individual: for it comprehends uniformly all the powers which are beheld about the particulars of the human ſpecies. And, in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to animal: for, indeed, the univerſal in particulars is leſs than the particulars themſelves, and is leſs than ſpecies; ſince it does not poſſeſs all differences in energy, but in capacity alone; whence alſo, it becomes as it were the matter of the ſucceeding formal differences. But the reaſon of man in our ſoul is better and more comprehenſive; for it comprehends all the differences of man unitedly, and not in capacity, like the univerſal in particulars, but in energy. If, therefore, definition is the principle of demonſtration, it is requiſite that it ſhould be the definition of a thing of that kind which is entirely comprehenſive of that which is more partial. But of this kind are the forms in our ſoul, and not the forms which ſubſiſt in particulars. Theſe, therefore, being ſubverted, neither will it be poſſible to define. Hence the definitive together with the demonſtrative art will periſh, abandoning the conceptions of the human mind. The diviſive art alſo, together with theſe, will be nothing but a name: for the whole employment of diviſion is, to ſeparate the many from the one, and to diſtribute things preſubſiſting unitedly in the whole, into their proper differences, not adding the differences externally, but contemplating them as inherent in the genera themſelves, and as dividing the ſpecies from each other. Where, therefore, will the work of this art be found, if we do not admit that there are eſſential forms in our ſoul? For he who ſuppoſes that this art is employed in things of poſterior origin, i. e. forms abſtracted from ſenſibles, perceives nothing of the power which it poſſeſſes: for to divide things of poſterior origin, is the buſineſs of the diviſive art, energizing according to opinion; but to contemplate the eſſential differences of the reaſons in the ſoul, is the employment of dianoëtic and ſcientific diviſion, which alſo unfolds united powers, and perceives things more partial branching forth from ſuch as are more total. By a much greater priority, therefore, to the definitive and demonſtrative arts will the diviſive be entirely vain, if the ſoul does not contain eſſential reaſons: for definition is more venerable, and ranks more as a principle than demonſtration, and again, diviſion than definition: for the diviſive gives to the definitive art its principles, but not vice verſa. The analytic art alſo, muſt periſh together with theſe, if we do not admit the eſſential reaſons of the ſoul. For the analytic is oppoſed to the demonſtrative method, as reſolving from things cauſed to cauſes, but to the definitive as proceeding from compoſites to things more ſimple, and to the diviſive, as aſcending from things more partial to ſuch as are more univerſal. So that thoſe methods being deſtroyed, this alſo will periſh. If, therefore, there are not forms or ideas, neither ſhall we contain the reaſons of things. And if we do not contain the reaſons of things, neither will there

yourſelf, being ignorant of theſe? Indeed I do not ſeem to myſelf to know at preſent. That Parmenides ſaid, Before you exerciſe [1] yourſelf in this affair,

be the dialectic methods according to which we obtain a knowledge of things, nor ſhall we know where to turn the dianoëtic power of the ſoul.

[1] Socrates was alone deficient in ſkill, whence Parmenides exhorts him to apply himſelf to dialectic, through which he would become much more ſkilful, being exerciſed in many things, and perceiving the conſequences of hypotheſes; and when he has accompliſhed this, Parmenides adviſes him to turn to the ſpeculation of forms. For ſuch particulars as are now dubious are very eaſy of ſolution to thoſe that are exerciſed in dialectic. And this is the whole end of the words. This exerciſe, however, muſt not be thought to be ſuch as that which is called by logicians the epichirematic or argumentative method. For that looks to opinion, but this deſpiſes the opinion of the multitude. Hence, to the many it appears to be nothing but words, and is on this account denominated by them garrulity. The epichirematic method, indeed, delivers many arguments about one problem; but this exerciſe delivers the ſame method to us about many and different problems; ſo that the one is very different from the other. The latter, however, is more beautiful than the former, as it uſes more excellent methods, beginning from on high, in order to accompliſh its proper work. For, as we have already obſerved in the Introduction to this dialogue, it employs as its inſtruments diviſion and definition, analyſis and demonſtration. If, therefore, we exerciſe ourſelves in this method, there is much hope that we ſhall genuinely apprehend the theory of ideas; diſtinctly evolving our confuſed conceptions; diſſolving apparent doubts; and demonſtrating things of which we are now ignorant. But till we can effect this, we ſhall not be able to give a ſcientific definition of every form.

Should it, however, be inquired whether it is poſſible to define forms or not, ſuch as the beautiful itſelf, or the juſt itſelf; for forms, as Plato ſays in his Epiſtles, are only to be apprehended by the ſimple viſion of intelligence; to this we reply, that the beautiful itſelf, the juſt itſelf, and the good itſelf, conſidered as ideas, are not only in intellect, but alſo in ſouls, and in ſenſible natures. And of theſe, ſome are definable, and others not. This being the caſe, intellectual forms, though they may be in many and partial natures, cannot be defined on account of their ſimplicity, and becauſe they are apprehended by intelligence, and not through compoſition; and likewiſe, becauſe whatever is defined ought to participate of ſomething common, which is, as it were, a ſubject, and is different from itſelf. But in divine forms there is nothing of this kind: for being, as Timæus ſays, does not proceed into any thing elſe, but though it makes a certain progreſſion from itſelf, yet after a manner it is the ſame with its immediate progeny, being only unfolded into a ſecond order. Forms, however, belonging to ſoul, and ſubſiſting in ſenſibles, can be defined; and, in ſhort, ſuch things as are produced according to a paradigmatic cauſe, and ſuch as are ſaid to participate of forms. Hence, dialectic ſpeculates the firſt forms by ſimple intuitions; but when it defines, or divides, it looks to the images of theſe. If, therefore, ſuch a ſcience is the pureſt part of intellect and prudence, it is evident that it employs pure intellections, through which it apprehends intelligibles, and multiform methods by which it binds the ſpectacles derived from

affair, O Socrates, you ſhould endeavour to define what *the beautiful*, *the juſt*, and *the good* are, and each of the other forms: for I before perceived the neceſſity of your accompliſhing this, when I heard you diſcourſing with Ariſtotle. Indeed that ardour of yours, by which you are impelled to diſputation, is both beautiful [1] and divine; but collect yourſelf together, and while

from intelligibles, and which ſubſiſt in ſecondary orders: and thus it appears that the aſſertions of Plato are true.

But it is by no means wonderful if we alſo define certain other particulars of which there are no ideas, ſuch as things artificial, parts, and things evil. For there are in us reaſons of wholes which are according to nature, and alſo of things good; and in conſequence of this, we know ſuch things as give completion to wholes, ſuch as imitate nature, and ſuch as have merely a ſhadowy ſubſiſtence. For ſuch as is each of theſe, ſuch alſo is it known and defined by us; and we diſcourſe about them from the definitely ſtable reaſons which we contain.

[1] Some, ſays Proclus, are neither impelled to, nor are aſtoniſhed about, the ſpeculation of beings: others again have obtained perfection according to knowledge: and others are impelled, indeed, but require perfection, logical ſkill, and exerciſe, in order to the attainment of the end. Among the laſt of theſe is Socrates; whence Parmenides, indeed, receives his impulſe, and calls it divine, as being philoſophic. For, to deſpiſe things apparent, and to contemplate an incorporeal eſſence, is philoſophic and divine; ſince every thing divine is of this kind, ſeparate from ſenſibles, and ſubſiſting in immaterial intellections. But Parmenides alſo calls the impulſe of Socrates beautiful, as leading to that which is truly beautiful, (which does not conſiſt in practical affairs, as the Stoics afterwards conceived it did, but in intellectual energies,) and as adapted to true love. For the amatory form of life eſpecially adheres to beauty. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides admit the impulſe of Socrates as *divine* and *beautiful*, as leading to *intellect* and *the one*. As *divine*, indeed, it vindicates to itſelf *the one*, but as *beautiful*, *intellect*, in which the beautiful firſt ſubſiſts; and as purifying the eye of the ſoul, and exciting its moſt divine part. But he extends the road through dialectic as irreprehenſible and moſt expedient; being connate, indeed, with things, but employing many powers for the apprehenſion of truth; imitating intellect, from which alſo it receives its principles, but beautifully extending through well-ordered gradations to true being, and giving reſpite to the wandering about ſenſibles; and laſtly, exploring every thing by methods which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at the occult reſidence of *the one* and *the good*.

But when Parmenides ſays, "if you do not truth will elude your purſuit," he manifeſts the danger which threatens us from raſh and diſordered impulſe to things inacceſſible to the unexerciſed, and this is no other than falling from the whole of truth. For an orderly progreſſion is that which makes our aſcent ſecure and irreprehenſible. Hence, Proclus adds, the Chaldæan oracle ſays, "that Divinity is never ſo much turned from man, and never ſo much ſends us novel paths, as when we make our aſcent to the moſt divine of ſpeculations or works in a confuſed and diſordered manner, and, as it adds, with unbathed feet, and with unhallowed lips. For, of thoſe

while you are young more and more exerciſe yourſelf in that ſcience, which appears uſeleſs to the many, and is called by them empty loquacity; for if you do not, the truth will elude your purſuit.

That Socrates then ſaid, What method of exerciſe [1] is this, O Parmenides? And that Parmenides replied, It is that which you have heard Zeno employing: but beſides this, while you was ſpeaking with Zeno, I admired your aſſerting that you not only ſuffered yourſelf to contemplate the *wandering* [2] which ſubſiſts about the objects of ſight, but likewiſe that which takes place

that are thus negligent, the progreſſions are imperfect, the impulſes are vain, and the paths are blind." Being perſuaded, therefore, both by Plato and the oracles, we ſhould always aſcend through things more proximate to us to ſuch as are more excellent, and from things more ſubordinate, through mediums, to ſuch as are more elevated.

[1] If again, ſays Proclus, Parmenides calls this dialectic an exerciſe (γυμνασια), not being argumentative, we ought not to wonder. For every logical diſcurſus, and the evolution itſelf of theorems, conſidered with reference to an intellectual life, is an exerciſe. For as we call endurance an exerciſe, with reference to fortitude, and continence, with reſpect to temperance, ſo every logical theory may be called an exerciſe with reference to intellectual knowledge. The ſcientific diſcurſus, therefore, of the dianoëtic power, which is the buſineſs of dialectic, is a dianoëtic exerciſe preparatory to the moſt ſimple intellection of the ſoul.

[2] Again, in theſe words Parmenides evinces his admiration of the aſtoniſhment of Socrates about intelligibles and immaterial forms: for he ſays that he admires his transferring the dialectic power from ſenſibles to intelligibles; and he alſo adds the cauſe of this. For things which are eſpecially apprehended by reaſon, or the ſummit of the dianoëtic part (for ſuch is the meaning of reaſon in this place), are intelligibles; ſince Timæus alſo ſays that the reaſon about ſenſibles is not firm and ſtable, but conjectural, but that the reaſon which is employed about intelligibles is immovable and cannot be confuted. For ſenſibles are not accurately that which they are ſaid to be; but intelligibles having a proper ſubſiſtence, are moreable to be known. But, after another manner, it may be ſaid that intelligible forms are eſpecially known by reaſon, and this by beginning from the gnoſtic powers. For ſenſe has no knowledge whatever of theſe forms; the phantaſy receives figured images of them; opinion logically apprehends them, and without figure, but at the ſame time poſſeſſes the various, and is, in ſhort, naturally adapted alone to know *that*, and not *why*, they are. Hence, the ſummit of our dianoëtic part is the only ſufficient ſpeculator of forms: and hence Timæus ſays that true being is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reaſon. So that forms, properly ſo called, are juſtly ſaid to be eſpecially apprehended by reaſon. For all ſenſible things are partial; ſince every body is partial: for no body is capable of being all things, nor of ſubſiſting impartibly, in a multitude of particulars. Phyſical forms verge to bodies, and are divided about them; and the forms belonging to the ſoul participate of variety, and fall ſhort of the ſimplicity of intellectual forms. Hence, ſuch forms as are called intellectual and intelligible, and are moſt remote from matter are eſpecially to be apprehended by reaſon.

place in ſuch things as are eſpecially apprehended by reaſon, and which ſome one may conſider as having a real ſubſiſtence. For it appears to me (ſaid Socrates), that after this manner it may without difficulty be proved, that there are both ſimilars and diſſimilars, or any thing elſe which it is the province of beings to ſuffer. That Parmenides replied, You ſpeak well: but it is neceſſary that, beſides this, you ſhould not only conſider *if each of the things ſuppoſed is* [1], what will be the conſequences from the hypotheſis, but likewiſe

reaſon. The dialectic wandering, therefore, is neceſſary to the ſurvey of theſe forms, exerciſing and fitting us, like the preparatory part of the myſteries, for the viſion of theſe ſplendid beings. Nor muſt we by this wandering underſtand, as we have before obſerved, a merely logical diſcurſus about matters of opinion, but the whole of dialectic, which Plato in the Republic calls the defenſive incloſure of diſciplines, and which, in the evolutions of arguments, exerciſes us to the more accurate intellection of immaterial and ſeparate natures.

Nor muſt we wonder, ſays Proclus, that Plato calls ſcientific theory wandering: for it is ſo denominated with reference to pure intelligence, and the ſimple apprehenſion of intelligibles. And what wonder is it, ſays he, if Plato calls a progreſſion of this kind wandering, ſince ſome of thoſe poſterior to him have not refuſed to denominate the variety of intellections in intellect a wandering; for though the intelligence in intellect is immutable, yet it is at the ſame time one and multiplied, through the multitude of intelligibles. And why is it requiſite to ſpeak concerning intellect, ſince thoſe who energize in the higheſt perfection from a divine afflatus, are accuſtomed to ſpeak of the wanderings of the Gods themſelves, not only of thoſe in the heavens, but alſo of thoſe that are denominated intellectual; obſcurely ſignifying by this their progreſſion, their being preſent to all ſecondary natures, and their prolific providence as far as to the laſt of things. For they ſay that every thing which proceeds into multitude wanders; but that the inerratic alone ſubſiſts in the ſtable and uniform. Wandering, indeed, appears to ſignify four things, either a multitude of energies, though they may all ſubſiſt together, or a tranſitive multitude, like the intellections of the ſoul, or a multitude proceeding from oppoſites to oppoſites, or a multitude of diſordered motions. The dialectic exerciſe is called a wandering according to the third of theſe, in conſequence of proceeding through oppoſite hypotheſes. So that if there is any thing which energizes according to one immutable energy, this is truly inerratic.

[1] It appears to me, ſays Proclus, to be well ſaid by the antients that Plato has given perfection in this dialogue to the writings both of Zeno and Parmenides, producing the dialectic exerciſe of the former to both oppoſites, and elevating the theory of the latter to true being. We ſhall find, therefore, the perfection of the writings of Parmenides in the following part of this dialogue, which contains nine hypotheſes concerning *the one*; but we may perceive the perfection of Zeno's writings in what is now ſaid. In addition, therefore, to what we have already delivered reſpecting the dialectic of Zeno in the preceding Introduction, we ſhall ſubjoin from Proclus the following obſervations. The diſcourſe of Zeno having ſuppoſed the multitude of forms ſeparate from *the one*, collects the abſurdities which follow from this hypotheſis, and this by conſidering what

likewiſe what will reſult from ſuppoſing that *it is not*, if you wiſh to be more exerciſed in this affair. How do you mean [1] (ſaid Socrates)? As if (ſaid Parmenides)

what follows, and what follows and does not follow: for he collects that they are ſimilar and not ſimilar; and proceeds in a ſimilar manner reſpecting *the one* and the many, motion and permanency. Parmenides, however, thinks it fit that in dialectic inveſtigations it ſhould not only be ſuppoſed if *the one* is, but alſo if it is not, and to ſpeculate what will happen from this hypotheſis; as, for inſtance, not only if ſimilitude is, but alſo if it is not, what will happen, either as conſequent, or as not conſequent, or as conſequent and at the ſame time not conſequent. But his reaſon for making ſuch an addition is this: if we only ſuppoſe that a thing is, and diſcover what will be the conſequence of the hypotheſis, we ſhall not entirely diſcover that of which the thing ſuppoſed is eſſentially the cauſe; but if we can demonſtrate in addition to this, that if it is not, this very ſame thing will no longer follow which was the conſequence of its being ſuppoſed to have a ſubſiſtence, then it becomes evident to us that if the one is, the other is alſo.

Some

[1] Socrates not being able to apprehend the whole method ſynoptically delivered, through what has been previouſly ſaid, requeſts Parmenides to unfold it more clearly. Parmenides accordingly again gives a ſpecimen of this method logically and ſynoptically: comprehending in eight the four and twenty modes which we have already mentioned in the Introduction to this dialogue. For, he aſſumes, if it happens, and if it follows and does not follow, and both theſe conjoined; ſo that again we may thus be able to triple the eight modes. But let us conciſely conſider, with Proclus, theſe eight modes in the hypotheſis of Zeno:—If, then, the many have a ſubſiſtence, there will ſimply happen to the many with reſpect to themſelves to be ſeparated, not to be principles, to ſubſiſt diſſimilarly. But to the many with reſpect to *the one* there will happen, to be comprehended by *the one*, to be generated by it, and to participate of ſimilitude and union from it. To *the one* there will happen, to have dominion over the many, to be participated by them, to ſubſiſt prior to them; and this with reſpect to the many. But to *the one* with reſpect to itſelf there will happen the impartible, the unmultiplied, that which is better than being, and life, and knowledge; and every thing of this kind.

Again, if the many is not, there will happen to the many with reſpect to themſelves the unſeparated and the undivided from each other: but to the many with reſpect to *the one*, a ſubſiſtence unproceeding from *the one*, a privation of difference with reſpect to *the one*. To *the one* with reſpect to itſelf there will happen the poſſeſſion of nothing efficacious and perfect in its own nature; for if it poſſeſſed any thing of this kind it would generate the many. To *the one* with reſpect to the many, not to be the leader of multitude, and not to operate any thing in the many.

Hence, we may conclude, that *the one* is every where that which makes multitude to be one thing, is the cauſe of, and has dominion over, multitude. And here you may ſee that the tranſition is from the object of inveſtigation to its cauſe; for ſuch is *the one*. It is requiſite, therefore, that always after many diſcuſſions and hypotheſes there ſhould be a certain ſummary deduction, (κεφαλαιουμενον.) For thus Plato, through all the intellectual conceptions, ſhows that *the one* gives ſubſiſtence to all things, and to the unities in beings, which we ſay is the end of the dialogue.

Parmenides) you ſhould wiſh to exerciſe yourſelf in this hypotheſis of Zeno, *if there are many things*, what ought to happen both to *the many* with reference to themſelves, and to *the one*; and to *the one* with reſpect to itſelf, and to *the many*: and again, *if many are not*, to conſider what will happen both to *the one* and to *the many*, as well to themſelves as to each other. And again, if he ſhould ſuppoſe *if ſimilitude* [1] *is*, or *if it is not*, what will happen from

Some one, however, may probably inquire how it is poſſible for any thing to happen to that which is not. And how can that be the recipient of any thing which has no ſubſiſtence whatever? To this we reply, that *non being*, as we learn in the Sophiſta, is either that which in no reſpect has a ſubſiſtence (το μηδαμη μηδαμως ον), or it is privation, for by itſelf it is not, but has an accidental being; or it is matter, for this is not, as being formleſs, and naturally indefinite; or it is every thing material, as that which has an apparent being, but properly is not; or, further ſtill, it is every thing ſenſible, for this is continually converſant with generation and corruption, but never truly is. Prior to theſe, alſo, there is non-being in ſouls, according to which they are likewiſe ſaid to be the firſt of generated natures, and not to belong to thoſe true beings which rank in intelligibles. And prior to ſouls, there is the non-being in intelligibles themſelves, and this is the firſt *difference* of beings, as we are taught by the Sophiſta, and which as we there learn is not leſs than being itſelf. Laſtly, beyond all theſe is the non-being of that which is prior to being, which is the cauſe of all beings, and is exempt from the multitude which they contain. If, therefore, non-being may be predicated in ſo many ways, it is evident that what has not in any reſpect being, can never become the ſubject of hypotheſis: for it is not poſſible to ſpeak of this, nor to have any knowledge of it, as the Eleatean gueſt in the Sophiſta ſhows, confirming the aſſertion of Parmenides concerning it. But when we ſay that the many is not, or that *the one* is not, or that ſoul is not, we ſo make the negation, as that each of theſe is ſomething elſe, but is not that particular thing, the being of which we deny. And thus the hypotheſis does not lead to that which in no reſpect has a ſubſiſtence, but to that which partly is, and partly is not: for, in ſhort, negations are the progeny of intellectual difference. Hence, a thing is not a horſe, becauſe it is another thing; and, through this, it is not man, becauſe it is ſomething elſe. And Plato in the Sophiſta on this account ſays, that when we ſay non-being, we only aſſert an ablation of being, but not the contrary to being, meaning by contrary, that which is moſt diſtant from being, and which perfectly falls from it. So that when we ſay a thing is not, we do not introduce that which in no reſpect has a being, nor when we make non-being the ſubject of hypotheſis do we ſuppoſe that which is in no reſpect is, but we ſignify as much of non-being as is capable of being known and expreſſed by words.—For an account of the Eleatic method of reaſoning which Plato here delivers, ſee the Introduction to this dialogue.

[1] If ſimilitude is, ſays Proclus, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the monadic, the perpetual, the prolific, and the primary. But, with reſpect to ſenſibles, the aſſimilation of them to intelligibles, the not ſuffering them to fall into the place of diſſimilitude, and the conjunction of parts with their wholeneſſes. To ſenſibles with reſpect to themſelves there will hap-

from each hypotheſis, both to the things ſuppoſed and to others, and to themſelves and to each other; and the ſame method of proceeding muſt take place concerning *the diſſimilar*, *motion* [1] and *permanency*, *generation*

pen, a communion with each other, a participation of, and a rejoicing in, each other. For ſimilars rejoice in, are copaſſive, and are mingled with ſimilars. But with reſpect to ſimilitude there will happen a participation of it, an aſſimilation with, and union according to, it.

But if ſimilitude is not, there will happen to itſelf according to itſelf the uneſſential, the neither poſſeſſing prolific power, nor a primary eſſence. But with reſpect to others not to have dominion over them, not to make them ſimilar to themſelves according to form, but rather in conjunction with itſelf to take away the ſimilar which is in them; for the principle of ſimilars not having a ſubſiſtence, neither will theſe be ſimilar. But to ſenſibles with reſpect to themſelves there will happen the immovable, the unmingled, the unſympathetic. But with reſpect to it, neither to be faſhioned by form according to it, nor to be connected by it.

In like manner we ſay with reſpect to the diſſimilar. For if diſſimilitude is, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf to be a form pure, immaterial and uniform, poſſeſſing multitude together with unity; but with reſpect to other things, I mean ſenſibles, a cauſe of the definite circumſcription and diviſion in each. To other things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, that each will preſerve its proper idiom and form without confuſion; but with reſpect to it, to be ſuſpended from it, and to be adorned both according to wholes and parts by it. But if diſſimilitude is not, it will neither be a pure and immaterial form, nor, in ſhort, one and not one, nor will it poſſeſs, with reſpect to other things, a cauſe of the ſeparate eſſence of each; and other things will poſſeſs an all-various confuſion in themſelves, and will not be the participants of one power which gives ſeparation to wholes.

From theſe things, therefore, we collect that ſimilitude is the cauſe of communion, ſympathy, and commixture to ſenſibles; but diſſimilitude of ſeparation, production according to form, and unconfuſed purity of powers in themſelves. For theſe things follow the poſitions of ſimilitude and diſſimilitude, but the contraries of theſe from their being taken away.

[1] If motion is, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf the eternal, and the poſſeſſion of infinite power; but to itſelf, with reſpect to things which are here, to be motive of them, the vivific, the cauſe of progreſſion, and of various energies. But to theſe things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, the energetic, the vivific, the mutable; for every thing material paſſes from a ſubſiſtence in capacity, to a ſubſiſtence in energy. To other things with reſpect to motion there will happen, to be perfected by it, to partake of its power, to be aſſimilated through it to things eternally ſtable. For things which are incapable of obtaining good ſtably, participate of it through motion.

But if motion is not, it will be ineffıcacious, ſluggiſh, and without power; it will not be a cauſe of things which are here; will be void of motive powers, and a producing eſſence. And things which are here will be uncoordinated, indefinite and imperfect, firſt motion not having a ſubſiſtence.

In like manner with reſpect to permanency, if it is, there will happen to itſelf with reference

tion [1] and *corruption*, *being* and *non-being*: and, in one word, concerning every

to itſelf, the ſtable, the eternal, and the uniform. But to other things with reſpect to themſelves, that each will abide in its proper boundaries, and will be firmly eſtabliſhed in the ſame places or meaſures. To other things with reſpect to it there will happen, to be every way bounded and ſubdued by it, and to partake of ſtability in being. But if it is not, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the inefficacious, and the unſtable. To itſelf with reference to other things, not to afford them the ſtable, the ſecure, and the firm; but to other things with reſpect to themſelves the much wandering, the uneſtabliſhed, the imperfect, and the being deprived of habitation; and to other things with reſpect to it, neither to be ſubſervient to its meaſures, nor to partake of being according to it, but to be borne along in a perfectly diſordered manner, that which connects and eſtabliſhes them, not having a ſubſiſtence. Motion itſelf, therefore, is the ſupplier of efficacious power, and multiform life and energy; but permanency, of firmneſs and ſtability, and an eſtabliſhment in proper boundaries.

[1] Let us now conſider, ſays Proclus, prior to theſe, whence generation and corruption originate, and if the cauſes of theſe are to be placed in ideas. Or is not this indeed neceſſary, not only becauſe theſe rank among things perpetual (for neither is it poſſible for generation not to be, nor for corruption to be entirely diſſolved, but it is neceſſary that theſe ſhould conſubſiſt with each other in the univerſe, ſo far as it is perpetual) but this is alſo requiſite, becauſe generation participates of eſſence and being, but corruption of non-being. For every thing ſo far as it is generated is referred to eſſence, and partakes of being, but ſo far as it is corrupted, it is referred to non-being, and a mutation of the *is* to another form. For through this it is corrupted from one thing into another, becauſe non-being preſubſiſts which gives diviſion to forms. And as in intelligibles, non-being is not leſs than being, as is aſſerted by the Eleatean gueſt, ſo here corruption is not leſs than generation, nor does it leſs contribute to the perfection of the univerſe. And as there, that which participates of being enjoys alſo non-being, and non-being partakes of being, ſo here that which is in generation, or in paſſing into being, is alſo the recipient of corruption, and that which is corrupting, of generation. Being, therefore, and non-being, are the cauſes of generation and corruption.

But it is requiſite to exerciſe ourſelves after the ſame manner with reſpect to theſe. In the firſt place, then, if generation is, it is in itſelf imperfect, and is the cauſe to others of an aſſimilation to eſſence. But there will happen to other things with reſpect to themſelves, a mutation from each other: and to other things with reſpect to generation, there will happen a perpetual participation of it, in conſequence of its ſubſiſting in them. But if generation is not, it will be itſelf, not the object of opinion; and with reſpect to other things it will not be the form of any thing, nor the cauſe of order and perfection to any thing; but other things will be unbegotten and impaſſive, and will have no communion with it, nor participate through it of being.

In like manner with reſpect to corruption: If corruption is, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the never failing, infinite power, and a fullneſs of non-being; but to itſelf with reſpect to other things, the giving meaſure to being, and the cauſe of perpetual generation. But to other things with reſpect to themſelves, there will happen a flowing into each other, and an inability of connecting themſelves. And to other things with reſpect to corruption there will

every thing which is ſuppoſed either to be [1] or nor to be, or influenced in any manner by any other paſſion, it is neceſſary to conſider the conſequences

happen, to be perpetually changed by it, to have non-being conjoined with being, and to participate of corruption totally. But if corruption is not, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, that it will not be ſubvertive of itſelf; for not having a ſubſiſtence, it will ſubvert itſelf with reſpect to other things. To itſelf, with reference to other things there will happen, that it will not diſſipate them, nor change them into each other, nor dilacerate being and eſſence. To other things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, the not being changed into each other, the not being paſſive to each other, and that each will preſerve the ſame order. But to other things with reſpect to it there will happen, the not being paſſive to it. The peculiarity, therefore, of generation is to move to being, but of corruption to lead from being. For this we infer from the preceding hypotheſes, ſince it has appeared to us that admitting their exiſtence, they are the cauſes of being and non-being to other things; and that being ſubverted they introduce a privation of motion and mutation.

[1] We engage, ſays Proclus, in the inveſtigation of things in a twofold reſpect, contemplating at one time if a thing is or is not, and at another time, if this particular thing is preſent with it, or is not preſent, as in the inquiry if the ſoul is immortal. For here we muſt not only conſider all that happens to the thing ſuppoſed, with reſpect to itſelf and other things, and to other things with reſpect to the thing ſuppoſed, but alſo what happens with reference to ſubſiſtence and non-ſubſiſtence. Thus, for inſtance, if the ſoul is immortal, its virtue will have a connate life, ſufficient to felicity; and this will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf. But to itſelf with reſpect to other things there will happen, to uſe them as inſtruments, to provide for them ſeparately, to impart life to them. In the ſecond place, to other things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, that things living and dead will be generated from each other, the poſſeſſion of an adventitious immortality, the circle of generation; but to other things with reſpect to it, to be adorned by it, to participate of a certain ſelf-motion, and to be ſuſpended from it, in living.

But if the ſoul is not immortal, it will not be ſelf-motive, it will not be intellectual eſſentially, it will not be ſelf-vital; nor will its diſciplines be reminiſcences. It will be corrupted by its own proper evil, and will not have a knowledge of true beings. And theſe things will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf. But to itſelf with reſpect to others there will happen, to be mingled with bodies and material natures, to have no dominion over itſelf, to be incapable of leading others as it pleaſes, to be ſubſervient to the temperament of bodies; and all its life will be corporeal, and converſant with generation. To other things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, ſuch a habit as that which conſiſts from entelecheia and body. For there will alone be animals compoſed from an indefinite life and bodies. But to other things with reſpect to it there will happen, to be the leaders of it, to change it together with their own motions, and to poſſeſs it in themſelves, and not externally governing them, and to live in conjunction with and not from it. You ſee, therefore, that after this manner we diſcover by the dialectic art the mode, not only how we may be able to ſuppoſe if a thing is and is not, but any other paſſion which it may ſuffer, ſuch as the being immortal or not immortal.

quences both to itſelf and to each individual of other things, which you may ſelect for this purpoſe, and towards many, and towards all things in a ſimilar manner; and again, how other things are related to themſelves, and to another which you eſtabliſh, whether you conſider that which is the ſubject

Since, however we may conſider the relation of one thing to another variouſly; for we may either conſider it with reference to one thing only, as for inſtance, how ſimilitude, if it is ſuppoſed to be, ſubſiſts with reſpect to diſſimilitude; or, we may conſider it with reſpect to more than one thing, as for inſtance, how eſſence, if ſuppoſed to be, is with reference to permanency and motion; or with reſpect to all things, as, if *the one* is, how it ſubſiſts with reference to all things,—this being the caſe, Plato does not omit this, but adds, That it is requiſite to conſider the conſequences with reſpect to one thing only, which you may ſelect for this purpoſe, and towards many, and towards all things in a ſimilar manner.

It is neceſſary indeed that this one, or thoſe many ſhould be allied to the thing propoſed, for inſtance, as the ſimilar to the diſſimilar: for theſe are coordinate to each other. And motion and reſt to eſſence: for theſe are contained in and ſubſiſt about it. But if the difference with reſpect to another thing, is with reſpect to one thing, to many things, and to all things, and we ſay there are twenty four modes, aſſuming in one way only a ſubſiſtence with reference to another, this is not wonderful. For difference with reſpect to another thing pertains to matter; but we propoſe to deliver the form of the dialectic method, and the formal but not the material differences which it contains.

Obſerve, too, that Plato adds, that the end of this exerciſe is the perception of truth. We muſt not, therefore, conſider him as ſimply ſpeaking of ſcientific truth, but of that which is intelligible, or which in other words, ſubſiſts according to a ſupereſſential characteriſtic: for the whole of our life is an exerciſe to the viſion of this, and the wandering through dialectic haſtens to that as its port. Hence Plato in a wonderful manner uſes the word διοψεσθαι *to look through*: for ſouls obtain the viſion of intelligibles through many mediums.

But again, that the method may become perſpicuous to us from another example, let us inveſtigate the four-and-twenty modes in providence. If then providence is, there will follow to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the beneficent, the infinitely powerful, the efficacious; but there will not follow, the ſubverſion of itſelf, the privation of counſel, the unwilling. That which follows and does not follow is, that it is one and not one. There will follow to itſelf with reſpect to other things, to govern them, to preſerve every thing, to poſſeſs the beginning and the end of all things, and to bound the whole of ſenſibles. That which does not follow is, to injure the objects of its providential care, to ſupply that which is contrary to expectation, to be the cauſe of diſorder. There will follow and not follow, the being preſent to all things, and an exemption from them; the knowing and not knowing them: for it knows them in a different manner, and not with powers coordinate to the things known. There will follow to other things with reſpect to themſelves, to ſuffer nothing caſually from each other, and that nothing will be injured by any thing. There will not follow, that any thing pertaining to them will be from

ſubject of your hypotheſis as having a ſubſiſtence or as not ſubſiſting; if, being perfectly exerciſed, you deſign through proper media to perceive the truth.

That Socrates then ſaid, You ſpeak, O Parmenides, of an employment which it is impoſſible to accompliſh, nor do I very much underſtand what you mean; but why do you not eſtabliſh a certain hypotheſis yourſelf, and enter on its diſcuſſion, that I may be the better inſtructed in this affair?

fortune, and the being uncoordinated with each other. There will follow and not follow, that all things are good; for this will partly pertain to them and partly not. To other things with reſpect to it there will follow, to be ſuſpended from it, on all ſides to be guarded and benefited by it. There will not follow, an oppoſition to it, and the poſſibility of eſcaping it. For there is nothing ſo ſmall that it can be concealed from it, nor ſo elevated that it cannot be vanquiſhed by it. There will follow and not follow, that every thing will participate of providence: for in one reſpect they partake of it, and in another not of it, but of the goods which are imparted to every thing from it.

But let providence not have a ſubſiſtence, again there will follow to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the imperfect, the unprolific, the inefficacious, a ſubſiſtence for itſelf alone. There will not follow, the unenvying, the tranſcendently full, the ſufficient, the aſſiduous. There will follow and not follow, the unſolicitous, and the undiſturbed: for in one reſpect theſe will be preſent with that which does not providentially energize, and in another reſpect will not, in conſequence of ſecondary natures not being governed by it. But it is evident that there will follow to itſelf with reſpect to other things, the unmingled, the privation of communion with all things, the not knowing any thing. There will not follow, the aſſimilating other things to itſelf, and the imparting to all things the good that is fit. There will follow and not follow, the being deſirable to other things: for this in a certain reſpect is poſſible and not poſſible. For, if it ſhould be ſaid, that through a tranſcendency exempt from all things, it does not providentially energize, nothing hinders but that it may be an object of deſire to all ſecondary natures; but yet, conſidered as deprived of this power, it will not be deſirable. To other things with reſpect to themſelves there will follow, the unadorned, the caſual, the indefinite in paſſivity, the reception of many things adventitious in their natures, the being carried in a confuſed and diſordered manner. There will not follow, an allotment with reſpect to one thing, a diſtribution according to merit, and a ſubſiſtence according to intellect. There will follow and not follow, the being good: for, ſo far as they are beings, they muſt neceſſarily be good: and yet, providence not having a ſubſiſtence, it cannot be ſaid whence they poſſeſs good. But to other things with reſpect to providence there will follow, the not being paſſive to it, and the being uncoordinated with reſpect to it. There will not follow, the being meaſured and bounded by it. There will follow and not follow, the being ignorant of it: for it is neceſſary they ſhould know that it is not, if it is not. And it is alſo neceſſary that they ſhould not know it; for there is nothing common to them with reſpect to providence.

That

That Parmenides replied, You aſſign, O Socrates, a mighty labour [1] to a man ſo old as myſelf! Will you, then, O Zeno (ſaid Socrates), diſcuſs ſomething

[1] By this Plato indicates that the enſuing diſcourſe contains much truth, as Proclus well obſerves: and if you conſider it with relation to the ſoul, you may ſay that it is not proper for one who is able to perceive intellectually divine natures, to energize through the garrulous phantaſy and body, but ſuch a one ſhould abide in his elevated place of ſurvey, and in his peculiar manners. It is laborious, therefore, for him who lives intellectually to energize logically and imaginatively, and for him who is converted to himſelf, to direct his attention to another; and to ſimplicity of knowledge the variety of reaſons is arduous. It is alſo laborious to an old man to ſwim through ſuch a ſea of arguments. The aſſertion alſo has much truth, if the ſubjects themſelves are conſidered. For frequently univerſal canons are eaſily apprehended, but no ſmall difficulty preſents itſelf to thoſe that endeavour to uſe them; as is evident in the lemmas of geometry, which are founded on univerſal aſſertions. Proclus adds, that the difficulty of this dialectic method in the uſe of it is evident, from no one after Plato having profeſſedly written upon it; and on this account, ſays he, we have endeavoured to illuſtrate it by ſo many examples.

For the ſake of the truly philoſophic reader, therefore, I ſhall ſubjoin the following ſpecimen of the dialectic method in addition to what has been already delivered on the ſubject. The importance of ſuch illuſtrations, and the difficulty with which the compoſition of them is attended, will, I doubt not, be a ſufficient apology for its appearing in this place. It is extracted, as well as the preceding, from the admirable MS. commentary of Proclus on this dialogue.

Let it then be propoſed to conſider the conſequences of admitting or denying the perpetual exiſtence of ſoul.

If then ſoul always is, the conſequences *to itſelf, with reſpect to itſelf*, are, the ſelf-motive, the ſelf-vital, and the ſelf-ſubſiſtent: but *the things which do not follow to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf*, are, the deſtruction of itſelf, the being perfectly ignorant, and knowing nothing of itſelf. The conſequences which *follow* and *do not follow* are the indiviſible and the diviſible*, (for in a certain reſpect it is diviſible, and in a certain reſpect *indiviſible*), perpetuity and non-perpetuity of being; for ſo far as it communicates with intellect, it is eternal, but ſo far as it verges to a corporeal nature, it is mutable.

Again, *if ſoul is*, the conſequences *to itſelf with reſpect to other things*, i. e. bodies, are communication of motion, the connecting of bodies, as long as it is preſent with them, together with dominion over bodies, according to nature. *That which does not follow*, is to move externally; for it is the property of animated natures to be moved inwardly; and to be the cauſe of reſt and immutability to bodies. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow*, are, to be preſent to bodies, and yet to be preſent ſeparate from them; for ſoul is preſent to them, by its *providential energies*, but is exempt from them by its *eſſence*, becauſe this is *incorporeal*. And this is the firſt hexad.

The ſecond hexad is as follows: *if ſoul is*, the conſequence *to other things*, i. e. *bodies with reſpect to themſelves*, is ſympathy; for, according to a vivific cauſe, bodies ſympathize with each other.

* For ſoul, according to Plato, ſubſiſts between *intellect* and a corporeal nature; the former of which is perfectly *indiviſible*, and the latter perfectly *diviſible*.

But

ſomething for us? And then Pythodorus related that Zeno, laughing, ſaid—We muſt requeſt Parmenides, O Socrates, to engage in this undertaking; for,

But that which does not follow, is the non-ſenſitive; for, in conſequence of there being ſuch a thing as ſoul, all things muſt neceſſarily be ſenſitive: ſome things peculiarly ſo, and others as parts of the whole. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow to bodies with reſpect to themſelves* are, that in a certain reſpect they move themſelves, through being animated, and in a certain reſpect do not move themſelves: for there are many modes of ſelf-motion.

Again, *if ſoul is, the conſequences to bodies with reſpect to ſoul* are, to be moved internally and vivified by ſoul, to be preſerved and connected through it, and to be entirely ſuſpended from it. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, to be diſſipated by ſoul, and to be filled from it with a privation of life; for bodies receive from ſoul life and connection. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow* are, that bodies participate, and do not participate of ſoul; for ſo far as ſoul is preſent with bodies, ſo far they may be ſaid to participate of ſoul; but ſo far as it is ſeparate from them, ſo far they do not participate of ſoul. And this forms the ſecond hexad.

The third hexad is as follows: *if ſoul is not*, the conſequences *to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf* are, the non-vital, the uneſſential, and the non-intellectual; for, not having any ſubſiſtence, it has neither eſſence, nor life, nor intellect. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, the ability to preſerve itſelf, to give ſubſiſtence to, and be motive of, itſelf, with every thing elſe of this kind. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow* are, the unknown and the irrational. For not having a ſubſiſtence, it is in a certain reſpect unknown and irrational with reſpect to itſelf, as neither reaſoning nor having any knowledge of itſelf; but in another reſpect, it is neither irrational nor unknown, if it is conſidered as a certain nature, which is not rational, nor endued with knowledge.

Again, *if ſoul is not, the conſequences which follow to itſelf with reſpect to bodies* are, to be unprolific of them, to be unmingled with, and to employ no providential energies about, them. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, to move, vivify, and connect bodies. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow* are, that it is different from bodies, and that it does not communicate with them. For this in a certain reſpect is true, and not true; if that which is not ſoul is conſidered as having indeed a being, but unconnected with ſoul: for thus it is different from bodies, ſince theſe are perpetually connected with ſoul. And again, it is not different from bodies, ſo far as it has no ſubſiſtence, and is not. And this forms the third hexad.

In the fourth place, then, *if ſoul is not, the conſequences to bodies with reſpect to themſelves* are, the immovable, privation of difference according to life, and the privation of ſympathy to each other. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, a ſenſible knowledge of each other, and to be moved from themſelves. *That which follows and does not follow* is, to be paſſive to each other; for in one reſpect they would be paſſive, and in another not; ſince they would be alone corporeally and not vitally paſſive.

Again, *if ſoul is not, the conſequences to other things with reſpect to it* are, not to be taken care of, nor to be moved by ſoul. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, to be vivified and connected by ſoul. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow* are, to be aſſimilated and not aſſimilated

to

for, as he ſays, it is no trifling matter; or do you not ſee the prodigious labour of ſuch a diſcuſſion? If, therefore, many [1] were preſent, it would not

to ſoul: for, ſo far as ſoul having no ſubſiſtence, neither will bodies ſubſiſt, ſo far they will be aſſimilated to ſoul; for they will ſuffer the ſame with it; but ſo far as it is impoſſible for that which is not to be ſimilar to any thing, ſo far bodies will have no ſimilitude to ſoul. And this forms the fourth and laſt hexad.

Hence we conclude, that *ſoul* is the cauſe of life, ſympathy, and motion to bodies; and, in ſhort, of their being and preſervation: for ſoul ſubſiſting, theſe are at the ſame time introduced; but not ſubſiſting, they are at the ſame time taken away.

[1] It it unneceſſary to obſerve, that the moſt divine of dogmas are unadapted to the ears of the many, ſince Plato himſelf ſays that all theſe things are ridiculous to the multitude, but thought worthy of admiration by the wiſe. Thus alſo, ſays Proclus, the Pythagoreans aſſert, that of diſcourſes, ſome are myſtical, and others to be expoſed in open day; and the Peripatetics, that ſome are eſoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himſelf wrote ſome things according to truth, and others according to opinion; and Zeno calls ſome diſcourſes true, and others uſeful. Ουτω δε και οι Πυθαγορειοι των λογων, τους μεν εφασκον ειναι μυστικους, τους δε υπαιθριους, και οι εκ του περιπατου, τους μεν εσωτερικους, τους δε εξωτερικους, και αυτος Παρμενιδης, τα μεν προς αληθειαν εγραψε, τα δε προς δοξαν, και ο Ζηνων δε τους μεν αληθεις εκαλει των λογων, τους δε χρειωδεις.

The multitude therefore, ſays Proclus, are ignorant how great the power is of dialectic, and that the end of this wandering is truth and intellect. For it is not poſſible for us to recur from things laſt to ſuch as are firſt, except by a progreſſion through the middle forms of life. For, as our deſcent into the realms of mortality was effected through many media, the ſoul always proceeding into that which is more compoſite, in like manner our aſcent muſt be accompliſhed through various media, the ſoul reſolving her compoſite order of life. In the firſt place, therefore, it is requiſite to deſpiſe the ſenſes, as able to know nothing accurate, nothing ſane, but poſſeſſing much of the confuſed, the material, and the paſſive, in conſequence of employing certain inſtruments of this kind. After this it follows, that we ſhould diſmiſs imaginations, thoſe winged ſtymphalidæ of the ſoul, as alone poſſeſſing a *figured* intellection of things, but by no means able to apprehend unfigured and impartible form, and as impeding the pure and immaterial intellection of the ſoul, by intervening and diſturbing it in its inveſtigations. In the third place, we muſt entirely extirpate multiform opinions, and the wandering of the ſoul about theſe; for they are not converſant with the cauſes of things, nor do they procure for us ſcience, nor the participation of a ſeparate intellect. In the fourth place, therefore, we muſt haſtily return to the great ſea of the ſciences, and there, by the aſſiſtance of dialectic, ſurvey the diviſions and compoſitions of theſe, and, in ſhort, the variety of forms in the ſoul, and through this ſurvey, unweaving our vital order, behold our dianoëtic part. After this, in the fifth place, it is requiſite to ſeparate ourſelves from compoſition, and contemplate by intellectual energy true beings: for intellect is more excellent than ſcience; and a life according to intellect is preferable to that which is according to ſcience. Many, therefore, are the wanderings of the ſoul: for one of theſe is in imaginations, another in opinions, and a third in the dianoëtic power. But a life according to intellect

is

not be proper to make ſuch a requeſt; for it is unbecoming, eſpecially for an old man, to diſcourſe about things of this kind before many witneſſes. For the many are ignorant that, without this diſcurſive progreſſion and wandering through all things, it is impoſſible, by acquiring the truth, to obtain the poſſeſſion of intellect. I, therefore, O Parmenides, in conjunction with Socrates, beg that you would undertake a diſcuſſion, which I have not heard for a long time. But Zeno having made this requeſt, Antiphon ſaid that Pythodorus related that he alſo, and Ariſtotle, and the reſt who were preſent, entreated Parmenides to exhibit that which he ſpoke of, and not to deny their requeſt. That then Parmenides ſaid, It is neceſſary to comply with your entreaties, though I ſhould ſeem to myſelf to meet with the fate of the Ibycean [1] horſe, to whom as a courſer, and advanced in years, when about to contend in the chariot races, and fearing through experience for the event, Ibycus comparing himſelf, ſaid—*Thus alſo I that am ſo*

is alone inerratic. And this is the myſtic port of the ſoul, into which Homer conducts Ulyſſes, after an abundant wandering of life.

[1] Parmenides, as Proclus beautifully obſerves, well knew what the wandering of the ſoul is, not only in the ſenſes, imaginations, and opinions, but alſo in the dianoëtic evolutions of arguments. Knowing this, therefore, and remembering the labours he had endured, he is afraid of again deſcending to ſuch an abundant wandering; like another Ulyſſes, after paſſing through various regions, and being now in poſſeſſion of his proper good, when called to certain ſimilar barbaric battles, he is averſe, through long experience, to depart from his own country, as remembering the difficulties which he ſuſtained in war, and his long extended wandering. Having, therefore, aſcended to reaſoning from phantaſies and the ſenſes, and to intellect from reaſoning, he is very properly afraid of a deſcent to reaſoning, and of the wandering in the dianoëtic part, leſt he ſhould in a certain reſpect become oblivious, and ſhould be drawn down to phantaſy and ſenſe. For the deſcent from intellect is not ſafe, nor is it proper to depart from things firſt, leſt we ſhould unconſciouſly abide in thoſe of a ſubordinate nature. Parmenides, therefore, being now eſtabliſhed in the port of intellect, is averſe again to deſcend to a multitude of reaſonings from an intellectual and ſimple form of energy. At the ſame time, however, he does deſcend for the ſake of benefitting ſecondary natures; for the very grace (χαρις) itſelf is an imitation of the providence of the Gods. Such, therefore, ought the deſcents of divine ſouls from the intelligible to be, coming from divine natures, knowing the evils ariſing from wandering, and deſcending for the benefit alone of fallen ſouls, and not to fill up a life enamoured with generation, nor falling profoundly, nor agglutinating themſelves to the indefinite forms of life. I only add, that Ibycus, from whom Parmenides borrows his ſimile of a horſe, was a Rheginenſian poet, and is mentioned by Cicero in Tuſcul. Quæſtion. lib. 4. Pauſan. Corinth. lib. 2. Suidas and Eraſmus in Adagiis. There are alſo two epigrams upon him in the Anthologia.

old,

old, am compelled to return to the ſubjects of my love; in like manner, I appear to myſelf to dread vehemently the preſent undertaking, when I call to mind the manner in which it is requiſite to ſwim over ſuch, and ſo great a ſea of diſcourſe: but yet it is neceſſary to comply, eſpecially as it is the requeſt of Zeno, for we are one and the ſame. Whence then ſhall we begin [1]; and what ſhall we firſt of all ſuppoſe? Are you willing, ſince it ſeems we muſt play a very ſerious game, that I ſhould begin from myſelf, and my own [2] hypotheſis, ſuppoſing concerning *the one itſelf, whether the one*

[1] Parmenides, ſays Proclus, deſcending to the evolution of arguments, and to ſcientifically-diſcurſive energies from his intellectual place of ſurvey, and from a form of life without, to one with habitude, aſks his participants whence he ſhall begin, and from what hypotheſis he ſhall frame, his diſcourſe; not ſuſpending his intellect from their judgment; for it is not lawful that the energy of more excellent natures ſhould be meaſured from that of ſuch as are ſubordinate; but converting them to himſelf, and exciting them to a perception of his meaning, that he may not inſert arguments in the ſtupid, as nature implants productive principles in bodies, but that he may lead them to themſelves, and that they may be impelled to *being* in conjunction with him. For thus intellect leads ſouls, not only elevating them together with itſelf, but preparing them to aſſiſt themſelves. He exhorts, therefore, his participants to attend to themſelves, and to behold whence he begins, and through what media he proceeds, but does not ſeek to learn from them what is proper on the occaſion. That this is the caſe is evident from hence, that he does not wait for their anſwer, but diſcourſes from that which appears to him to be beſt.

[2] The one method of Parmenides aſſumes one hypotheſis, and according to it frames the whole diſcourſe, this hypotheſis not being one of many, as it may appear to ſome, but that which is comprehenſive of all hypotheſes, and is one prior to the many. For it unfolds all beings, and the whole order of things, both intelligible and ſenſible, together with the unities of them, and the one ineffable unity, the fountain of all theſe. For *the one* is the cauſe of all things, and from this all things are generated in a conſequent order from the hypotheſis of Parmenides. But perhaps, ſays Proclus, ſome one may aſk us how Parmenides, who in his poems ſings concerning true or the one being, (το ἐν ον), calls *the one* his hypotheſis, and ſays that he ſhall begin from this his proper principle. Some then have ſaid that, Parmenides making *being* the whole ſubject of his diſcuſſion, Plato, finding that *the one* is beyond being and all eſſence, corrects Parmenides, and repreſents him beginning from *the one*. For, ſay they, as Gorgias and Protagoras, and each of the other perſons in his dialogues, ſpeak better in thoſe dialogues than in their own writings, ſo, likewiſe, Parmenides is more philoſophic in Plato, and more profound, than in his own compoſitions; ſince in the former he ſays, if *the one* is, it is not *one being*, as alone diſcourſing concerning *the one*, and not concerning *one being*, or *being* characterized by *the one*; and in the following hypotheſes he ſays, if *the one* is not; and laſtly, infers that if *the one* is, or is not, all things are, and are not. Parmenides, therefore, being Platonic, calls that his hypotheſis which ſuppoſes

one is, or *whether it is not*, what ought to be the conſequence? That Zeno ſaid, By all means. Who then (ſaid Parmenides) will anſwer to me? Will the

the one. In anſwer to this it may be ſaid that it is by no means wonderful if Parmenides in his poems appears to aſſert nothing concerning *the one*: for it is ineffable, and he in his poems generates all beings from the firſt being; but he might indicate ſomething concerning it, ſo far as this can be effected by diſcourſe, in his unwritten converſations with Zeno. Very properly, therefore, does he call this buſineſs concerning *the one* his own hypotheſis. Proclus adds—if, however, it be requiſite to ſpeak more truly, we may ſay, with our preceptor Syrianus, that Parmenides begins indeed from *one being*; (for the hypotheſis, if *the one is*, having the *is* together with *the one*, belongs to this order of things); but that he recurs from one being to *the one*, clearly ſhowing that *the one*, properly ſo called, wills this alone, to be *the one*, and haſtily withdraws itſelf from being. He alſo ſhows that *one being* is the ſecond from this, proceeding to being through ſubjection, but that *the one* itſelf is better than the *is*, and that if it *is*, together with the *is*, it no longer remains that which is properly *the one*. Hence, it is true that Parmenides makes *true being*, or *the one being*, the ſubject of his hypotheſis, and alſo, that through this hypotheſis he aſcends to *the one* itſelf, which Plato in the Republic denominates unhypothetic: for it is neceſſary, ſays he, always to proceed through hypotheſes, that aſcending, we may at length end in the unhypothetic one; ſince every hypotheſis is from a certain other principle. But if any one ſhould make the hypotheſis the principle, we may ſay to ſuch a one, with Plato, that where the principle is unknown, and the end and middle alſo conſiſt from things that are unknown, it is not poſſible that a thing of this kind can be ſcience. *The one* alone, therefore, is the principle, and is unhypothetic; ſo that what is made the ſubject of hypotheſis is ſomething elſe, and not *the one*. But Plato aſcends from this to *the one*, as from hypotheſis to that which is unhypothetic. Whence alſo it appears that the manner in which Parmenides manages the diſcourſe is admirable. For, if he had aſſumed the unhypothetic as an hypotheſis, and that which is without a principle as from a principle, he would not have followed the method which ſays it is entirely neceſſary to conſider what is conſequent to the hypotheſis. Or, if he had not aſſumed *the one* as an hypotheſis, but ſome one of the things more remote from *the one*, he could not eaſily have made a tranſition to it, nor would he have unfolded to us ſpontaneouſly and without violence the cauſe prior to being. That *the one*, therefore, might remain unhypothetic, and that at the ſame time he might recur from a certain proper hypotheſis to *the one*, he makes *the one being* the ſubject of his hypotheſis, which proximately ſubſiſts after *the one*, and in which, perhaps, that which is properly *the one* primarily ſubſiſts, as we ſhall ſhow at the end of the firſt hypotheſis of this dialogue. And thus he ſays that he begins from his own hypotheſis, which is *the one being*, and this is, "if *the one is*," and transferring himſelf to the unhypothetic, which is near to this, he unfolds the ſubſiſtence of all beings from the unity which is exempt from all things. Whence, ſaying that he ſhall make his own one the ſubject of hypotheſis, in evincing what things follow, and what do not follow, at one time as uſing *the one* alone, he demonſtrates the *is*, employing affirmations; but at another time he aſſumes, together with *the one*, the conception of the *is*. But he every where

the youngeſt among you do this? For the labour will be very little for him to anſwer what he thinks; and his anſwer will at the ſame time afford me a time for breathing in this arduous inveſtigation. That then Ariſtotle ſaid, I am prepared to attend you, O Parmenides; for you may call upon me as being the youngeſt. Aſk me, therefore, as one who will anſwer you.

That Parmenides ſaid, Let us then begin. If *one* [1] is, is it not true that *the*

where reaſons as looking to *the one*, either unparticipated, or participated, that he may ſhow that all things are through *the one*, and that ſeparate from *the one*, they and their very being are obliterated.

[1] In the Introduction to this Dialogue we have ſpoken concerning the number, and unfolded the meaning of the hypotheſis about *the one*; let us, therefore, with Proclus, diſcuſs a few particulars reſpecting principle, that we may more accurately underſtand the nature of *the one*. The principle, therefore, of all beings and non-beings is called *the one*, ſince to be united is good to all things, and is the greateſt of goods; but that which is entirely ſeparated from *the one* is evil, and the greateſt of evils. For diviſion becomes the cauſe of diſſimilitude, and a privation of ſympathy, and of a departure from a ſubſiſtence according to nature. Hence the principle of wholes, as ſupplying all things with the greateſt of goods, is the ſource of union to all things, and is on this account called *the one*. Hence, too, we ſay that every principle, ſo far as it is allotted this dignity in beings, is a certain *enad* or unity, and that what is moſt united in every order ranks as firſt, placing this principle not in parts, but in wholes, and not in ſome one of the many, but in the monads connective of multitude; and, in the next place, eſpecially ſurveying it in the ſummits, and that which is moſt united in monads, and according to which they are conjoined with *the one*, are deified, and ſubſiſt without proceeding, in the one principle of all things.

Thus, for inſtance, (that we may illuſtrate this doctrine by an example,) we perceive many cauſes of light, ſome of which are celeſtial, and others ſublunary; for light proceeds to our terreſtrial abode from material fire, from the moon, and from the other ſtars, and this, ſo as to be different according to the difference of its cauſe. But if we explore the one monad of all mundane light, from which other lucid natures and ſources of light derive their ſubſiſtence, we ſhall find that it is no other than the apparent orb of the ſun; for this orbicular body proceeds, as it is ſaid, from an occult and ſupermundane order, and diſſeminates in all mundane natures a light commenſurate with each.

Shall we ſay then that this apparent body is the principle of light? But this is endued with interval, and is diviſible, and light proceeds from the different parts which it contains; but we are at preſent inveſtigating the one principle of light. Shall we ſay, therefore, that the ruling ſoul of this body generates mundane light? This indeed, produces light, but not primarily, for it is itſelf multitude: and light contains a repreſentation of a ſimple and uniform ſubſiſtence. May not intellect, therefore, which is the cauſe of ſoul, be the fountain of this light? Intellect, indeed, is more united than ſoul, but is not that which is properly and primarily the principle of light. It remains, therefore, that *the one* of this intellect, its ſummit, and as it were flower, muſt be the principle of mundane light: for this is properly the ſun which reigns over the viſible place,

the one will not be many? For how can it be? It is neceſſary, therefore, that

and, according to Plato in the Republic, is the offspring of *the good*; ſince every unity proceeds from thence, and every deity is the progeny of the unity of unities, and the fountain of the Gods. And as *the good* is the principle of light to intelligibles, in like manner the unity of the ſolar order is the principle of light to all viſible natures, and is analogous to *the good*, in which it is occultly eſtabliſhed, and from which it never departs.

But this unity having an order prior to the ſolar intellect, there is alſo in intellect, ſo far as intellect, an unity participated from this unity, which is emitted into it like a ſeed, and through which intellect is united with the unity or deity of the ſun. This, too, is the caſe with the ſoul of the ſun; for this through *the one* which ſhe contains, is elevated through *the one* of intellect as a medium, to the deity of the ſun. In like manner, with reſpect to the body of the ſun, we muſt underſtand that there is in this a certain echo as it were, of the primary ſolar *one*. For it is neceſſary that the ſolar body ſhould participate of things ſuperior to itſelf; of ſoul according to the life which is diffeminated in it; of intellect according to its form; and of unity according to its one, ſince ſoul participates both of intellect and this one, and participations are different from the things which are participated. You may ſay, therefore, that the proximate cauſe of the ſolar light is this *unity* of the ſolar orb.

Again, if we ſhould inveſtigate the root as it were of all bodies, from which celeſtial and ſublunary bodies, wholes and parts, bloſſom into exiſtence, we may not improperly ſay that this is *Nature*, which is the principle of motion and reſt to all bodies, and which is eſtabliſhed in them, whether they are in motion or at reſt. But I mean by *Nature*, the one life of the world, which being ſubordinate to intellect and ſoul, participates through theſe of generation. And this indeed is more a principle than many and partial natures, but is not that which is properly the principle of bodies; for this contains a multitude of powers, and through ſuch as are different, governs different parts of the univerſe: but we are now inveſtigating the one and common principle of all bodies, and not many and diſtributed principles. If, therefore, we wiſh to diſcover this one principle, we muſt raiſe ourſelves to that which is moſt united in Nature, to its flower, and that through which it is a deity, by which it is ſuſpended from its proper fountain, connects, unites, and cauſes the univerſe to have a ſympathetic conſent with itſelf. This *one*, therefore, is the principle of all generation, and is that which reigns over the many powers of Nature, over partial natures, and univerſally over every thing ſubject to the dominion of Nature.

In the third place, if we inveſtigate the principle of knowledge, we ſhall find that it is neither phantaſy nor ſenſe; for nothing impartible, immaterial, and unfigured is known by theſe. But neither muſt we ſay that doxaſtic or dianoëtic knowledge is the principle of knowledge; for opinion does not know the cauſes of things, and the dianoëtic power, though it knows cauſes, yet apprehends the objects of its perception partially, and does not view the whole at once, nor poſſeſs an energy collective and ſimple, and which eternally ſubſiſts according to the ſame. Nor yet is intellect the principle of knowledge: for all the knowledge which it contains ſubſiſts indeed, at once, and is intranſitive and impartible. But if the knowledge of intellect was entirely without multiplication, and profoundly one, perhaps we might admit that it is the principle of knowledge.

that there ſhould neither be any part belonging to it, nor that it ſhould be a whole.

knowledge. Since however, it is not only one but various, and contains a multitude of intellections; for as the objects of intellect are ſeparated from each other, ſo alſo intellectual conceptions,—this being the caſe, intellect is not the principle of knowledge, but this muſt be aſcribed to *the one* of intellect, which is generative of all the knowledge it contains, and of all that is beheld in the ſecondary orders of beings. For this being exempt from the many, is the principle of knowledge to them, not being of ſuch a nature as the famineſs of intellect; ſince this is coordinate to *difference*, and is ſubordinate to eſſence. But *the one* tranſcends and is connective of an intellectual eſſence. Through this *one* intellect is a God, but not through ſameneſs, nor through eſſence: for in ſhort intellect ſo far as intellect is not a God; ſince otherwiſe a partial intellect would be a God. And the peculiarity of intellect is to underſtand and contemplate beings, and to judge; but of a God to confer unity, to generate, to energize providentially, and every thing of this kind. Intellect, therefore, by that part of itſelf which is not intellect is a God, and by that part of itſelf which is not a God, it is a divine intellect. And this unity of intellect knows itſelf indeed, ſo far as it is intellectual, but becomes intoxicated as it is ſaid with nectar, and generates the whole of knowledge, ſo far as it is the flower of intellect, and a ſupereſſential one. Again, therefore, inveſtigating the principle of knowledge, we have aſcended to *the one*; and not in theſe only, but in every thing elſe in a ſimilar manner, we ſhall find monads the leaders of their proper numbers, but the unities of monads ſubſiſting as the moſt proper principles of things. For every where *the one* is a principle, and you may ſay concerning this principle, what Socrates ſays in the Phædrus, viz. "a principle is unbegotten." For if no one of total forms can ever fail, by a much greater neceſſity the one principle of each muſt be preſerved, and perpetually remain, that about this every multitude may ſubſiſt, which originates in an appropriate manner from each. It is the ſame thing, therefore, to ſay unity and principle, if principle is every where that which is moſt characterized by unity. Hence he who diſcourſes about every *one*, will diſcourſe about principles. The Pythagoreans, therefore, thought proper to call every incorporeal eſſence *one*; but a corporeal and in ſhort partible eſſence, they denominated *other*. So that by conſidering *the one*, you will not deviate from the theory of incorporeal eſſences, and unities which rank as principles. For all the unities ſubſiſt in, and are profoundly united with each other; and their union is far greater than the communion and famineſs which ſubſiſt in beings. For in theſe there is indeed a mutual mixture of forms, ſimilitude and friendſhip, and a participation of each other; but the union of the Gods, as being a union of unities, is much more uniform, ineffable and tranſcendent: for here *all are in all*, which does not take place in forms or ideas*; and their unmingled purity and the characteriſtic of each, in a manner far ſurpaſſing the diverſity in ideas, preſerve their natures unconfuſed, and diſtinguiſh their peculiar powers. Hence ſome of them are more univerſal, and others more partial; ſome of them are characterized according to permanency, others according to progreſſion, and others according to converſion. Some again, are generative, others anagogic, or endued with a power of leading things back to their cauſes, and others demiurgic; and, in ſhort, there are different

* For in theſe all are in each, but not all in all.

whole [a]. Why? Is not a part a part of a whole? Certainly. But what is

characteriſtics of different Gods, viz. the connective, perfective, demiurgic, aſſimilative, and ſuch others as are celebrated poſterior to theſe, ſo that all are in all, and yet each is at the ſame time ſeparate and diſtinct.

Indeed, Proclus adds, we obtain a knowledge of their union and characteriſtics from the natures by which they are participated: for, with reſpect to the apparent Gods, we ſay that there is one ſoul of the ſun, and another of the earth, directing our attention to the apparent bodies of theſe divinities, which poſſeſs much variety in their eſſence, powers, and dignity among wholes. As, therefore, we apprehend the difference of incorporeal eſſences from ſenſible inſpection, in like manner, from the variety of incorporeal eſſences, we are enabled to know ſomething of the unmingled ſeparation of the firſt and ſupereſſential unities, and of the characteriſtics of each; for each unity has a multitude ſuſpended from its nature, which is either intelligible alone, or at the ſame time intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual alone; and this laſt is either participated or not participated, and this again is either ſupermundane or mundane: and thus far does the progreſſion of the unities extend. Surveying, therefore, the extent of every incorporeal hypoſtaſis which is diſtributed under them, and the mutation proceeding according to meaſure from the occult to that which is ſeparated, we believe that there is alſo in the unities themſelves idiom and order, together with union: for, from the difference of the participants, we know the ſeparation which ſubſiſts in the things participated; ſince they would not poſſeſs ſuch a difference with reſpect to each other if they participated the ſame thing without any variation. And thus much concerning the ſubſiſtence of the firſt unities, and their communion with, and ſeparation from, each other, the latter of which was called by the antient philoſophers, idiom, and the former, union, contradiſtinguiſhing them by names derived from the ſameneſs and difference which ſubſiſt in eſſences. For theſe unities are ſupereſſential, and, as ſome one ſays, are flowers and ſummits. However, as they contain, as we have obſerved, both union and ſeparation, Parmenides, diſcuſſing this, that he may ſupernally unfold all their progreſſion from the exempt unity, the cauſe of all things, aſſumes as an hypotheſis his own one. But this is *the one* which is beheld in beings, and this is beheld in one reſpect as *the one*, and in another as participated by being. He alſo preſerves that which has a leading dignity, ſurveying it multifariouſly, but varies that which is conſequent, that through the ſameneſs of that which leads, he may indicate the union of the divine unities: for whichever of theſe you receive, you will receive the ſame with the reſt; becauſe all are in each other, and are rooted in *the one*. For as trees by their ſummits are rooted in the earth, and are earthly according to theſe, after the ſame manner, divine natures are by their ſummits rooted in *the one*, and each of them is an enad and one, through unconfuſed union with *the one*. But through the mutation of that which is conſequent, Parmenides at one time aſſumes *whole*, at another time *figure*, and at another ſomething elſe, and theſe either affirmatively or negatively, according to the ſeparation and idiom of each of the divine orders. And, through that which is conjoined from *enad* and what is conſequent, he indicates the communion, and at the ſame time unmingled purity of each of the divine natures. Hence, one thing is the leader, but many the things conſequent, and many are the things conjoined, and many the hypotheſes.

Parmenides,

is a whole? Is not that to which no part is wanting a whole? Entirely ſo. From

Parmenides, alſo, through the hypotheſis of the one being, at one time recurs to *the one* which is prior to the participated unities, at another time diſcuſſes the extent of the unities which are in beings, and at another time diſcovers that ſubſiſtence of them which is ſubordinate to being.

Nor muſt we wonder that there ſhould be this union, and at the ſame time ſeparation, in the divine unities. For thus alſo we are accuſtomed to call the whole of an intellectual eſſence impartible and one, and all intellects one, and one all, through ſameneſs which is collective and connective of every intellectual hypoſtaſis. But if we thus ſpeak concerning theſe, what ought we to think of the unities in beings? Muſt it not be that they are tranſcendently united? that their commixture cannot be ſurpaſſed? that they do not proceed from the ineffable adytum of *the one?* and that they all poſſeſs the form of *the one?* Every where, therefore, things firſt poſſeſs the form of their cauſe. Thus, the firſt of bodies is moſt vital, and is ſimilar to ſoul; the firſt of ſouls has the form of intellect; and the firſt intellect is a God. So that the firſt of numbers is uniform and enadic, or characterized by unity, and is ſupereſſential as *the one*. Hence, if they are unities and number, there is there both multitude and union.

Again, the ſcope of this firſt hypotheſis, as we have obſerved in the Introduction, is concerning the firſt God alone, ſo far as he is generative of the multitude of Gods, being himſelf exempt from this multitude, and uncoordinated with his offſpring. Hence, all things are denied of this one, as being eſtabliſhed above, and exempt from, all things, and as ſcattering all the idioms of the Gods, at the ſame time that he is uncircumſcribed by all things. For he is not a certain one, but ſimply one, and is neither intelligible nor intellectual, but the ſource of the ſubſiſtence of both the intelligible and intellectual unities. For it is requiſite in every order which ranks as a principle that imparticipable and primary form ſhould be the leader of participated multitude. Thus, immaterial are prior to material forms. Thus, too, a ſeparate life, unmingled, and ſubſiſting from itſelf, is prior to the life which ſubſiſts in another; for every where things ſubſiſting in themſelves precede thoſe which give themſelves up to ſomething elſe. Hence, imparticipable ſoul, which revolves in the ſupercelеſtial place, is the leader, according to eſſence, of the multitude of ſouls, and of thoſe which are diſtributed in bodies. And one, imparticipable intellect, ſeparate, eternally eſtabliſhed in itſelf, and ſupernally connecting every intellectual eſſence, precedes the multitude of intellects. The firſt intelligible alſo, unmingled, and uniformly eſtabliſhed in itſelf, is expanded above the multitude of intelligibles. For the intelligible which is in every intellect is different from that which is eſtabliſhed in itſelf; and the latter is intelligible alone, but the former is intelligible as in intellectuals. The imparticipable one, therefore, is beyond the many and participated unities, and is exempt, as we have before ſaid, from all the divine orders. Such, then, is the ſcope of the firſt hypotheſis, viz. to recur from the one being, or in other words, the firſt and higheſt being, to that which is truly the one, and to ſurvey how he is exempt from wholes, and how he is connumerated with none of the divine orders.

In the next place, let us conſider what mode of diſcourſe is adapted to ſuch a theory, and how the interpretation of what is before us may be properly undertaken. It appears, then, that this

can

From both theſe conſequences, therefore, *the one* would be compoſed of parts,

can only be effected by energizing logically, intellectually, and at the ſame time divinely, that we may be able to apprehend the demonſtrative power of Parmenides, may follow his intuitive perceptions which adhere to true beings, and may in a divinely inſpired manner recur to the ineffable and uncircumſcribed coſenſation of *the one*. For we contain the images of firſt cauſes, and participate of total ſoul, the intellectual extent, and of divine unity. It is requiſite, therefore, that we ſhould excite the powers of theſe which we contain, to the apprehenſion of the things propoſed. Or how can we become near to *the one*, unleſs by exciting *the one* of our ſoul, which is as it were an image of the ineffable one? And how can we cauſe this one and flower of the ſoul to diffuſe its light, unleſs we firſt energize according to intellect? For intellectual energy leads the ſoul to the tranquil energy according to *the one* which we contain. And how can we perfectly obtain intellectual energy, unleſs we proceed through logical conceptions, and prior to more ſimple intellections, employ ſuch as are more compoſite? Demonſtrative power, therefore, is requiſite in the aſſumptions; but intellectual energy in the inveſtigations of beings; (for the orders of being are denied of *the one*) and a divinely-inſpired impulſe in the coſenſation of that which is exempt from all beings, that we may not unconſciouſly, through an indefinite phantaſy, be led from negations to non-being, and its dark immenſity. Let us, therefore, by exciting *the one* which we contain, and through this, cauſing the ſoul to revive, conjoin ourſelves with *the one itſelf*, and eſtabliſh ourſelves in it as in a port, ſtanding above every thing intelligible in our nature, and diſmiſſing every other energy, that we may aſſociate with it alone, and may, as it were, dance round it, abandoning thoſe intellections of the ſoul which are employed about ſecondary concerns. The mode of diſcourſe, then, muſt be of this kind, viz. logical, intellectual, and entheaſtic: for thus only can the propoſed hypotheſis be apprehended in a becoming manner.

In the third place, let us conſider what the negations are, and whether they are better or worſe than affirmations: for affirmation appears to all men to be more venerable than negation; negation, ſay they, being a privation, but affirmation the preſence and a certain habit of form. To forms, indeed, and to things inveſted with form, affirmation is better than negation; for it is neceſſary that their own habit ſhould be preſent with forms, and that privation ſhould be abſent, and, in ſhort, to be is more accommodated to beings than not to be, and affirmation than negation: for being is the paradigm of affirmation, but non-being of negation. But it is not immaniſeſt how Plato in the Sophiſta ſays that *non-being*, by which he means *difference*, is related to being, and that it is not leſs than being. Since, however, *non-being* is multifarious, one kind ſubſiſting as more excellent than, another as coordinated with, and a third as a privation of, *being*, it is evident that we may alſo ſpeculate three ſpecies of negations; one above affirmation, another inferior to affirmation, and a third in a certain reſpect equal to it. Affirmation, therefore, is not always uniformly more excellent than negation, ſince, when negation ſpeaks of that non-being which is above being, affirmation is allotted the ſecond order. But ſince this non-being is alſo twofold, one kind being participated by being, viz. the divine unities, the immediate progeny of *the one*, and the other, viz. the ineffable principle of things, not being connumerated with

parts, being a whole and poſſeſſing parts? It is neceſſary it ſhould be ſo. And

with any being, it is evident that to this latter affirmation is not by any means adapted, and that to the former negation more properly belongs than affirmation; though in a certain reſpect affirmation is adapted to this ſo far as it communicates with being. However, though nothing can be truly ſaid of that non-being which is uncoordinated with being, yet negation may be more properly aſſerted of it than affirmation; for, as affirmations belong to beings, ſo negations to non-being. In ſhort, affirmation wiſhes to be converſant with a certain form; and when the ſoul ſays that one thing is preſent to another, and makes an affirmation, it adduces ſome of the kindred natures which it contains. But the firſt cauſe of all is above form, and it is not proper to introduce to it any thing belonging to ſecondary natures, nor transfer to it things adapted to us: for we ſhall thus deceive ourſelves, and not aſſert what the firſt is. We cannot, therefore, in a becoming manner employ affirmations in ſpeaking of this cauſe, but rather negations of ſecondary natures; for affirmations haſten to know ſomething of one thing as preſent with another. But that which is firſt is unknown by the knowledge which is connate with beings, and nothing can be admitted as belonging to, or preſent with, it, but rather as not preſent: for it is exempt from all compoſition and participation. To which we may add, that affirmations manifeſt ſomething definite; for non-man is more infinite than man. The incomprehenſible and uncircumſcribed nature of *the one* is therefore more adapted to be manifeſted through negations: for affirmations may be ſaid to vanquiſh beings, but negations poſſeſs a power of expanding from things circumſcribed to the uncircumſcribed, and from things diſtributed in proper boundaries to the indefinite. Can it, therefore, be ſaid that negations are not more adapted to the contemplation of *the one?* For its ineffable, incomprehenſible, and unknown nature can alone through theſe be declared, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, to partial intellectual conceptions ſuch as ours. Negations, therefore, are better than affirmations, and are adapted to ſuch as are aſcending from the partial to the total, from the coordinated to the uncoordinated, and from the circumſcribed and vanquiſhed form of knowledge to the uncircumſcribed, ſingle, and ſimple form of energy.

In the fourth place, let us conſider how, and after what manner, negations are adapted to the firſt cauſe. They muſt not then be adapted as in things capable of receiving negation, but yet which do not receive it, as if we ſhould ſay that Socrates is not white: for, in ſhort, *the one* does not receive any thing, but is exempt from every being, and all participation. Nor, again, muſt negation be adapted to *the one*, as in that which in no reſpect receives negation, which poſſeſſes a privation of it, and is unmingled with form; as if any one ſhould ſay that a line is not white, becauſe it is without any participation of whiteneſs. For that which is firſt is not ſimply divulſed from its negations; nor are theſe entirely void of communion with *the one*, but they are thence produced: nor can it be ſaid that, as whiteneſs neither generates a line, nor is generated by it, ſo things poſterior to *the one* neither generate *the one*, nor are generated by it; for they thence derive their ſubſiſtence. Nor yet muſt negation be applied according to that middle mode, in which we ſay, that things do not receive indeed, but are the cauſes to others in which they are inherent, of receiving affirmation; as, for inſtance, motion is not moved, but that which is in motion. Negation, therefore, is predicated of it, viz. the not being moved, though other things

And ſo both ways *the one* will be many, and not one. True. But it is neceſſary

are moved through it. And, in ſhort, every paſſion is itſelf impaſſive; ſince, being ſimple, it either is or is not. But that which ſuffers, or the paſſive ſubject, is through paſſion a compoſite. Negations, therefore, are not after this manner denied of *the one*; for neither is *the one* ingenerated in any thing, but is the cauſe of all the affirmations, the negations of which we introduce to it; but it is by no means ingenerated in thoſe things of which it is the cauſe. It may be concluded, therefore, that as *the one* is the cauſe of wholes, ſo negations are the cauſes of affirmations; whence ſuch things as the ſecond hypotheſis affirms, the firſt denies. For all thoſe affirmations proceed from theſe negations; and *the one* is the cauſe of all things, as being prior to all things: for, as ſoul, being incorporeal, produces body, and as intellect, by not being ſoul, gives ſubſiſtence to ſoul, ſo *the one*, being void of multitude, gives ſubſiſtence to all multitude, and, being without number and figure, produces number and figure; and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other things: for it is no one of the natures which it produces; ſince neither is any other cauſe the ſame with its progeny. But if it is no one of the natures to which it gives ſubſiſtence, and at the ſame time gives ſubſiſtence to all things, it is no one of all things. If, therefore, we know all things affirmatively, we manifeſt *the one* negatively, by denying every thing of it; and ſo this form of negation is generative of the multitude of affirmations. Thus, the unfigured, when applied to *the one*, is not like that of matter, which is beheld according to a privation of figure, but it is that which generates and produces the order which ſubſiſts according to figure.

With reſpect to matter, therefore, negations are worſe than affirmations, becauſe they are privations, but affirmations are participations of which matter is eſſentially deprived. But, with reſpect to beings, negations are conjoined with affirmations: and when applied to *the one*, they ſignify tranſcendency of cauſe, and are better than affirmations. Hence, negations of things ſubordinate are verified in cauſes poſterior to *the one*. Thus, when we ſay that the ſoul neither ſpeaks nor is ſilent, we do not aſſert theſe things reſpecting it as of ſtones and pieces of wood, or any other inſenſible thing, but as of that which is generative in an animal of both voice and ſilence. And again, we ſay that nature is neither white nor black, but uncoloured, and without interval. But is ſhe without theſe in the ſame manner as matter? By no means: for ſhe is better than the things denied. But ſhe is uncoloured, and without interval, as generative of all various colours and intervals. In the ſame manner, therefore, we ſay that the monad is without number, not as being ſubordinate to numbers and indefinite, but as generating and bounding numbers. I mean the firſt monad, and that which we ſay contains all the forms of numbers. All, therefore, that is denied of *the one*, proceeds from it: for it is neceſſary that it ſhould be none of all things, that all things may be its offspring. Hence, it appears that Plato often denies of *the one* things which are oppoſite to each other, ſuch as that it is neither *whole* nor *part*, neither *ſame* nor *different*, neither *permanent* nor in *motion*: for it is expanded above all habitude, and is pure from every duad, being the cauſe of all the multitude of theſe, of twofold coordinations, of the firſt duad, and of all habitude and oppoſition. For nature is the cauſe of all corporeal oppoſitions, the ſoul of all vital cauſes, and intellect of the genera pertaining to ſoul. But *the one* is ſimply the cauſe of all diviſions: for it cannot be ſaid that it is the cauſe of ſome, and not the

cauſe

ceſſary that it ſhould not be many, but one. It is neceſſary [3]. Hence, it will

cauſe of others. The cauſe, however, of all oppoſition is not itſelf oppoſed to any thing: for, if it were, it would be requiſite that there ſhould be ſome other cauſe of this oppoſition, and *the one* would no longer be the cauſe of all things. Hence, negations are generative of affirmations: thoſe which are aſſumed in the firſt hypotheſis of thoſe which are inveſtigated in the ſecond: for whatever the firſt cauſe generates in the firſt hypotheſis is generated and proceeds in its proper order in the ſecond. And thus the order of the Gods ſubſiſting from exempt unity is demonſtrated.

But here, perhaps, ſome one may aſk us whether we uſe negations through the imbecility of human nature, which is not able firmly to apprehend the ſimplicity of *the one*, through a certain projection of intellect, and adheſive viſion and knowledge? or whether natures better than our ſoul know *the one* negatively in an analogous manner? We reply, therefore, that intellect by its perceptions which are conjoined with forms, knows forms, and comprehends intelligibles, and this is a certain affirmative knowledge: for *that which is*, approaches to *that which is*, and intellect is that which it underſtands through the intellectual perception of itſelf. But, by an unity above intellect, it is conjoined with *the one*, and through this union knows *the one*, by not being that which is *being*. Hence, it knows *the one* negatively: for it poſſeſſes a twofold knowledge, one kind as intellect, the other as not intellect; one as knowing itſelf, the other becoming inebriated, as ſome one ſays, and agitated with divine fury from nectar; and one ſo far as it is, but the other ſo far as it is not, Much-celebrated intellect itſelf, therefore, poſſeſſes both a negative and affirmative knowledge of *the one*. But if intellect, divine ſouls alſo, according to their ſummits and unities, energize enthuſiaſtically about *the one*, and are eſpecially *divine* ſouls on account of this energy; but, according to their *intellectual* powers, they are ſuſpended from intellect, round which they harmonically dance. According to their *rational* powers they know themſelves, preſerve their own eſſence with purity, and evolve the productive principles which they contain; but, according to thoſe powers which are characterized by *opinion*, they comprehend and govern in a becoming manner all ſenſible natures. And all the other kinds of knowledge which they poſſeſs are indeed affirmative: for they know beings as they are; and this is the peculiarity of affirmation. But the enthuſiaſtic energy about *the one* is in theſe a negative knowledge: for they do not know that *the one* IS, but that he IS NOT, according to that which is better than the IS. The intellection, however, of that which is not, is negation. If, therefore, both divine ſouls and much celebrated intellect itſelf knew *the one* through negation, what occaſion is there to deſpiſe the imbecility of our ſoul, earneſtly endeavouring to manifeſt negatively its uncircumſcribed nature? For nothing pertaining to *the firſt* is ſuch as we are accuſtomed to know, i. e. a certain quality of a thing, as Plato ſays in his ſecond Epiſtle. This, however, is the cauſe of every thing beautiful in the ſoul, viz. to inveſtigate the characteriſtic of the firſt, to commit in a becoming manner the knowledge of him to the reaſoning power, and to excite *the one* which we contain, that, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, we may know the ſimilar by the ſimilar, ſo far as it is poſſible to be known by our order: for, as by opinion we know the objects of opinion, and by the dianoëtic

will neither be a whole, nor poſſeſs parts, if *the one* is one. It will not. If,

power dianoëtic objects, and as by our intellectual part we know that which is intelligible, ſo by our *one* we know *the one*.

Again, in the fifth place, let us conſider whether Plato denies all things of *the one*, or, if not all, what thoſe are which he denies, and why he proceeds as far as to theſe. But in the firſt place, it will, perhaps, be proper to enumerate all the particulars which in the firſt hypotheſis are denied of *the one*. Theſe then are in order as follow: that it is not many; that it is neither whole nor part; that it has neither a beginning, nor middle, nor end; that it has no boundary; that it is without figure; is neither in another nor in itſelf; is neither in motion nor at reſt; is neither ſame nor different; is neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar; is neither equal, nor greater nor leſſer; is neither older nor younger; that it participates in no reſpect of generation or time; that neither does it participate of being; that it cannot be named, and is not effable; and that it is neither the object of opinion nor ſcience. Theſe, then, are briefly what the firſt hypotheſis denies of *the one*; but why theſe alone, we now propoſe to inveſtigate: for Proclus informs us, that to ſome philoſophers prior to him this was a ſubject of much doubt. Some, ſays he, were of opinion, that whatever the ten categories of Ariſtotle contain is enumerated in theſe negations. However, as he juſtly obſerves, not theſe alone, but many other things are contained under the ten categories, which are not mentioned by Parmenides. Others aſſerted, that theſe negations were comprehended in the five genera of being, viz. eſſence, ſameneſs, and difference, motion and permanency. However, not theſe only are denied of *the one*, but likewiſe *figure*, *the whole*, *time*, *number*, and the ſimilar, and the diſſimilar, which are not genera of being. But thoſe, ſays he, ſpeak the moſt probably who wiſh to ſhow that all theſe negations ſubſiſt in the monad. For the monad contains occultly many things, ſuch as whole, and parts, and figures, and is both in itſelf and in another, ſo far as it is preſent to whatever proceeds from itſelf. It alſo is permanent and is moved, abiding and at the ſame time proceeding, and, in being multiplied, never departing from itſelf: and in a ſimilar manner other things may be ſhown to belong to the monad. That theſe things indeed ſubſiſt in the monad may be readily granted, and alſo, that the monad is an imitation of intellect, ſo that by a much greater priority all theſe are cauſally comprehended in intellect. Hence, theſe things are denied of *the one*, becauſe it is above intellect and every intellectual eſſence. For theſe things, ſays Proclus, Parmenides alſo ſurveying in his verſes concerning true being, ſays, that it contains the ſphere, and the whole, the ſame, and the different. For he celebrates true being as ſimilar to a perfect ſphere, every where equal from the middle, and rejoicing in revolving manſion. He alſo denominates it perfectly entire and unmoved. So that all theſe ſubſiſt primarily in intellect, but ſecondarily, and after the manner of an image, in the monad, and every thing ſenſible, phyſically in this, and mathematically in that. For intellect is an intelligible ſphere, the monad a dianoëtic ſphere, and this world a ſenſible ſphere, bearing in itſelf the images of the perpetual Gods.

However, the patrons of this opinion cannot aſſign the cauſe why the particulars which Parmenides denies are alone aſſumed, but by no means neither more nor leſs. For neither are theſe things

If, therefore, it has no part, it neither poſſeſſes beginning, middle, nor end;

things alone in the monad, but many others alſo may be found, ſuch as the even and the odd, and each of the forms ſubſiſting under theſe. Why, therefore, theſe alone from among all are aſſumed, they aſſign no clear reaſon. Our preceptor, therefore, Syrianus, ſays Proclus, is the only one we are acquainted with who perfectly accords with Plato in the knowledge of divine concerns. He therefore perceived, that all ſuch things * as are affirmed in the ſecond are denied of *the one* in the firſt hypotheſis; and that each of theſe is a ſymbol of a certain divine order; ſuch as the many, the whole, figure, the being in itſelf and in another, and each of the conſequent negations. For all things are not ſimilarly apparent in every order of being; but in one multitude, and in another a different idiom of divine natures is conſpicuous. For, as we learn in the Sophiſta, *the one being*, or, in other words, the higheſt being, has the firſt rank, *whole* the ſecond, and *all* the third. And in the Phædrus, after the intelligible Gods, an eſſence without *colour*, without *figure*, and without *touch*, is the firſt in order, *colour* is the ſecond, and *figure* the third; and in other things, in a ſimilar manner, an unfolding of different things takes place in a different order of being. If, therefore, all theſe things manifeſt the extent of the firſt being, but, according to Plato, *the one* is beyond all beings, with great propriety are theſe things alone denied of *the one*. How each of theſe is diſtributed in the divine orders, we ſhall know more accurately in the ſecond hypotheſis. It is apparent, therefore, what are the particulars which are denied of *the one*, and that ſo many alone are neceſſarily denied: for ſo many are the enumerated orders of true beings. Thus much, however, is now evident, that all the negations are aſſumed from the idiom of being, and not from the idiom of knowledge. For to will, and to deſire, and every thing of this kind, are the peculiarities of vital beings; but to perceive intellectually, or dianoëtically, or ſenſibly, is the idiom of gnoſtic beings. But theſe negations are common to all beings whatever. For the hypotheſis was, If *the one* is, ſo many things will follow as negations of *the one*, that at laſt it may be inferred if *the one* is, this *one is* not, as being better than the *is*: for it is the recipient of nothing, which is conſequent to the *is*. And it appears that thoſe alone are the things which belong to beings, ſo far as they are beings; which the ſecond hypotheſis affirms, and the firſt denies; and we ſhall not find things common to all beings, except theſe. But, of theſe, the higher are more total, but the others more partial. Hence, by taking away the higher, Plato alſo takes away thoſe in a following order, according to the hypotheſis. He has, therefore, in a wonderful manner diſcovered what are the things conſequent to being, ſo far as being, as he was willing to ſhow that *the one* is beyond all beings.

But if any one ſhould think that this hypotheſis collects things impoſſible, he ſhould call to mind what is written in the Sophiſta, in which the Eleatean gueſt examines the aſſertion of Parmenides concerning being, and clearly ſays that *the one* truly ſo called muſt *neceſſarily* be impartible, or without parts (αμερες γαρ δει το ὡς αληθως εν). So that, this being granted, all the concluſions of the firſt hypotheſis muſt unavoidably follow, as in every reſpect true, and as alone according with that which is truly *the one*. For it is abſurd to admit that true being has a ſubſiſtence, and

* Viz. Such things as are reſpectively characteriſtic of the divine orders.

not

end[4]; for ſuch as theſe would be its parts? Right. But end and beginning

not only true being, but alſo the truly equal, the truly beautiful, and every other form, but that the true one ſhould no where ſubſiſt, but ſhould be a name alone, though by this all beings are preſerved and have a ſubſiſtence. But if it is, it is evident that it is not many: for it would not be the true one, if it were replete with any thing; ſince the many are not one. If, therefore, it is not many, again the whole of the firſt hypotheſis will follow, this being aſſumed; and it is by no means proper to accuſe it as aſſerting impoſſibilities.

Again, in the ſixth place, let us conſider concerning the order of the negations: for, if they originate ſupernally and from things firſt, how does he firſt of all take away the many, and, in the laſt place, being, and even *the one* itſelf? *The one*, therefore, appears to us to be more venerable than multitude, and *being* itſelf as among beings is moſt venerable. But if they originate from things laſt, how, after the genera of being, does he aſſume the ſimilar and diſſimilar, the equal and unequal, the greater and the leſſer? For theſe are ſubordinate to the genera of being. It is better, therefore, to ſay, that he begins ſupernally, and proceeds through negations as far as to the laſt of things. For thus alſo in the Phædrus, denying of the ſummit of the intellectual orders, things conſequent to, and proceeding from it, he makes the ablation, beginning ſupernally; in the firſt place, aſſerting that it is without colour, in the next place, without figure, and, in the third place, without contact. For here *colour* ſymbolically ſignifies that middle order of the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual Gods, which is called by theologiſts *ſynochike* (συνοχικη) or *connective*; but *figure* indicates the extremity of that order, which is denominated *teleſiurgic*, (τελεσιουργικη) or *the ſource of perfection*; and *contact* ſignifies the intellectual order. In like manner here alſo the negations begin ſupernally, and proceed together with the ſeries of the divine orders, of all which *the one* is the generative ſource. But that at the end he ſhould take away *the one* itſelf, and being, is by no means wonderful. For, if we follow the whole order of the diſcourſe, this will become moſt apparent. For it is immediately evident, that in affirmative concluſions it is requiſite to begin from things moſt allied, and through theſe to evince things leſs allied, which are conſequent; but in negative concluſions it is neceſſary to begin from things moſt foreign, and through theſe to ſhow things leſs foreign, which are not conſequent to the hypotheſis. For it is requiſite, ſays Plato, that thoſe who uſe this method ſhould begin from things moſt known. Hence he firſt denies *many* of the one, and laſt of all *the one* that *is*, which is by poſition moſt allied to *the one*, but is participated by eſſence, and on this account is a certain one, and not ſimply one. Hence it is neceſſary, ſince the concluſions are negative, that the beginning of all the hypotheſis ſhould be *not many*, and the end *not one*.

In the ſeventh place, let us conſider what we are to underſtand by the *many*, which Plato firſt denies of *the one*. Some of the antients then, ſays Proclus, aſſert that multitude of every kind is here taken away from *the one*, becauſe *the one* tranſcends all multitude, both intelligible and ſenſible. But theſe ſhould recollect, that in the ſecond hypotheſis *the many* is affirmed. What ſenſible multitude then can we behold there? For all things are aſſerted of true beings, becauſe *the one* is there equal to *being*. Others more venerable than theſe aſſert that *intellectual multitude* is denied of *the one*. For the firſt cauſe, ſay they, is one without multitude; intellect, *one many*; ſoul,

ning are the bounds of every thing? How ſhould they not? *The one*, therefore,

ſoul, *one* and *many*, through its diviſible nature, being indigent of copula; body, *many* and *one*, as being a diviſible nature characterized by multitude; and matter, *many* alone. This *many*, therefore, viz. intellectual multitude, Parmenides takes away from the firſt cauſe, that he may be one alone, and above intellect. It is proper, therefore, to aſk theſe, what intellect they mean? For, if that which is properly intellect, and which is ſecondary to the intelligible, not only *the one* is beyond intellectual multitude, but the intelligible alſo, as being better than intellect. But if they call the whole of an intelligible eſſence intellect, as was the caſe with the followers of Plotinus, they are ignorant of the difference which ſubſiſts in the Gods, and of the generation of things proceeding according to meaſure. Other philoſophers, therefore, more entheaſtic than theſe, diſmiſſing ſenſible, and not even admitting intellectual multitude, ſay that prior to the intellectual numbers are the intelligible monads, from which every intellectual multitude and the many divided orders are unfolded into light. Plato, therefore, takes away from *the one*, the multitude which is intelligible, as ſubſiſting proximately after *the one*, but he does not take away intellectual multitude. For it is by no means wonderful that *the one* ſhould be exempt from intellectual multitude, above which the intelligible monads alſo are expanded. And hence the diſcourſe, being divine, recurs to certain more ſimple cauſes. It is neceſſary however to underſtand that there are many orders in intelligibles, and that three triads are celebrated in them by theologiſts, as we ſhall ſhow when we come to the ſecond hypotheſis. But, if this be admitted, it is evident that theſe *many* muſt be the firſt and intelligible multitude: for theſe ſo far as many alone ſubſiſt from *the one*; and from theſe the triadic ſupernally proceeds as far as to the laſt of things in the intellectual, ſupermundane, and ſenſible orders; and whatever is allotted a being participates of this triad. Hence, ſome of the antients, aſcending as far as to this order, conſidered its ſummit as the ſame with *the one*. We muſt either, therefore, admit that *the many* which are now denied of *the one* ſubſiſt according to the intelligible multitude, or that they are the firſt multitude in the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual orders. Indeed, the many unities are not in the intelligible Gods, but in thoſe immediately poſterior to them. For there is one unity in each intelligible triad; but the multitude of unities is firſt apparent in the firſt order of the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual Gods. Thus much, therefore, muſt now be admitted, that Plato exempts *the one* from all the multitude of theſe unities, as being generative of and giving ſubſiſtence to it; and this he does, by aſſuming from our common conceptions that *the one* is not many. But at the end of the hypotheſis, he takes away intelligible multitude itſelf from *the one*, conjoining the end with the beginning: for he there ſhows that *the one* is not *being*, according to which the intelligible order is characterized.

It is likewiſe neceſſary to obſerve, that Plato does not think that the aſſertion, '*the one* is not many,' requires demonſtration, or any confirmation of its truth; but he aſſumes it according to common and unperverted conception. For, in ſpeculations concerning the firſt cauſe of all things, it is eſpecially neceſſary to excite common conceptions; ſince all things are ſpontaneouſly arranged after it, and without labour, both ſuch as energize according to intellect, and thoſe that energize according to nature only. And, in ſhort, it is neceſſary that the indemonſtrable ſhould

therefore, is infinite[5], if it has neither beginning nor end? Infinite. And without

ſhould be the principle of all demonſtration, and that common conceptions ſhould be the leaders of demonſtrations, as alſo geometricians aſſert. But there is nothing more known and clear to us than that *the one* is not *many*.

[a] It is neceſſary, ſays Proclus, that the firſt negation of *the one* ſhould be that it is not *many*; for *the one* is firſt generative of *the many*; ſince, as we have before obſerved, the firſt and the higheſt multitude proceeds from *the one*. But the ſecond negation after this is, that *the one* is neither a whole, nor has any part: for it gives ſubſiſtence to this order, in the ſecond place, after the firſt multitude. This will be evident from conſidering in the firſt place logically, that in negative concluſions, when through the ablation of that which precedes we collect a negative concluſion, that which precedes is more powerful; but that when through the ablation of that which is conſequent we ſubvert that which precedes, that which is conſequent; and, in ſhort, that which by the ſubverſion of itſelf takes away that which remains, whether it precedes or follows, is more powerful. Thus, if we ſay, If there is not *being*, there is not *man*; but alſo, If there is not animal, there is not man: animal, therefore, is more univerſal than man. Let this then be one of the things to be granted; but another which muſt be admitted is as follows:—Every thing which is more comprehenſive than another according to power, is nearer to *the one*. For, ſince *the one itſelf* is, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, the moſt comprehenſive of all things, and there is nothing which it does not ineffably contain, not even though you ſhould adduce privation itſelf, and the moſt evaneſcent of things, ſince, if it has any ſubſiſtence, it muſt neceſſarily be in a certain reſpect one;—this being the caſe, things alſo which are nearer to *the one* are more comprehenſive than thoſe which are more remote from it; imitating the uncircumſcribed cauſe, and the infinite tranſcendency of *the one*. Thus *being*, as it is more comprehenſive than life and intellect, is nearer to *the one*; and life is nearer to it than intellect. Theſe two axioms being admitted, let us ſee how Parmenides ſyllogizes. If *the one*, ſays he, is a whole, or has parts, it is many; but it is not many, as was before ſaid: neither, therefore, will it be a whole, nor will it have parts. And again, If *the one* is not many, it is neither a whole, nor has parts. In both theſe inſtances, by the ſubverſion of the many, *parts* alſo and *whole* are ſubverted. But our poſition is, that whatever together with itſelf ſubverted that which remains in things conjoined, is more powerful and more comprehenſive; but that which is more comprehenſive is nearer to *the one*. Hence, *many* is nearer to *the one* than *parts* and *whole*. For *parts* are *many*, but *many* are not entirely *parts*. So that *the many* are more comprehenſive than *parts*, and are therefore beyond them. *The many*, therefore, firſt ſubſiſt in beings; and in the ſecond place, whole and parts. Hence, *the one* produces the firſt by itſelf alone, but the ſecond through the many. For firſt natures, in proceeding from their cauſes, always produce, together with their cauſes, things conſequent. Since, therefore, the negations generate the affirmations, it is evident that the firſt generates ſuch of theſe as are firſt, but the ſecond ſuch as are ſecond. We may alſo ſee the geometrical order which Plato here obſerves: for that *the one* is not many, is aſſumed as an axiom, and as a common conception; but that it is neither a whole, nor has parts, is collected through this common conception. And again, that *the one* has neither beginning nor end, is demonſtrated through the prior con-

6 cluſion;

without figure [6], therefore, for it neither participates of the round [7] figure nor

cluſion; and thus always in ſucceſſion according to the truly golden chain of beings, in which all things are indeed from *the one*, but ſome immediately, others through one medium, others through two, and others through many. After this manner, therefore, it may be logically demonſtrated that theſe *many* are prior to *whole* and parts.

If we wiſh, however, to ſee this in a manner more adapted to things themſelves, we may ſay that the many, ſo far as many, have one cauſe, *the one*: for all multitude is not derived from any thing elſe than *the one*; ſince alſo, with reſpect to the multitude of beings, ſo far as they are intelligible, they are from being, but, ſo far as they are multitude, they ſubſiſt from *the one*. For, if multitude was derived from any other cauſe than *the one*, that cauſe again muſt neceſſarily either be one, or nothing, or not one. But if nothing, it could not be a cauſe. And if it was not one, not being one, it would in no reſpect differ from the many, and therefore would not be the cauſe of the many, ſince cauſe every where differs from its progeny. It remains, therefore, either that the many are without cauſe, and are uncoordinated with each other, and are infinitely infinite, having no *one* in them, or that *the one* is the cauſe of being to the many. For either each of *the many* is not one, nor that which ſubſiſts from all of them, and thus all things will be infinitely infinite; or each is indeed one, but that which conſiſts from all is not one: and thus they will be uncoordinated with each other; for, being coordinated, they muſt neceſſarily participate of *the one*: or, on the contrary, that which conſiſts from all is one, but each is not one, and thus each will be infinitely infinite, in conſequence of participating no *one*: or, laſtly, both that which conſiſts from all and each muſt participate of *the one*, and in this caſe, prior to them, there muſt neceſſarily be that which is the ſource of union both to the whole and parts, and which is itſelf neither a whole, nor has parts; for, if it had, this again would be indigent of *the one*; and if we proceed to infinity, we ſhall always have *the one* prior to whole and parts. To this we may alſo add, that if there was another cauſe of the many beſides *the one*, there would be no multitude of unities. If, therefore, there are many unities, the cauſe of this multitude ſo far as multitude is *the one*: for the primary cauſe of unities is *the one*, and on this account they are called unities. But the multitude of beings is from the multitude of unities; ſo that all multitude is from *the one*. But whole and parts belong to beings: for, though *whole* ſhould be *the one being*, it is evident that, together with being, it is a *whole*, though it ſhould be *the participated one*. This alſo entirely conſubſiſts with being; and though it ſhould be *being* alone, this is immediately eſſence. If, therefore, whole and part are beings, either eſſentially or according to participation, theſe alſo will indeed be produced from *the one*, but from eſſence alſo, if whole and part belong to beings. Hence, *whole* is a certain being. For all ſuch things as participate of eſſential wholeneſs, theſe alſo participate of eſſence, but not all ſuch things as participate of eſſence participate alſo of wholeneſs. Thus, for inſtance, parts, ſo far as they are parts, partake of eſſence, but ſo far as they are parts they do not participate of wholeneſs. But if this be the caſe, eſſence is beyond eſſential wholeneſs. And hence, the eſſential whole participates of eſſence, and is not the ſame with it. Thus, alſo, if there is any wholeneſs which is characterized by unity, it participates of *the one*: a part however characterized by unity muſt indeed

nor the ſtraight. Why not? For the round figure is that, the extremities of

neceſſarily participate of *the one*, but is not neceſſarily a whole; ſince indeed it is impoſſible it ſhould be, ſo far as it is a part. Whole and part, therefore, are either eſſential or characterized by unity: for whole and part ſubſiſt both in eſſences and in unities. *The one*, therefore, is beyond whole and parts, both the eſſential, and thoſe characterized by *the one*: and not this only, but the many alſo ſubſiſt prior to whole and parts. For each, as we have ſhown, is in a certain reſpect many; but the firſt *many* alone participate of *the one*. *The many*, therefore, are beyond *whole* and *parts*.

And here it is neceſſary to obſerve, that in the firſt part of this firſt hypotheſis Plato aſſumes ſuch things as do not follow to *the one* conſidered with reſpect to itſelf. For we aſſert, that *the one* itſelf by itſelf is without multitude, and is not a whole, though there ſhould be nothing elſe. But in the middle of the hypotheſis ſuch things are aſſumed as do not follow, neither to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, nor to other things; ſuch, for inſtance, as that it is neither the ſame with itſelf, nor different from itſelf, nor is the ſame with others, nor different from others: and after the ſame manner that it is neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar, &c. And at the end ſuch things are aſſumed as do not follow to *the one* with reſpect to others alone; where it is alſo ſhown that it is neither effable, nor the object of opinion or ſcience, nor is, in ſhort, known by any other gnoſtic power, but is itſelf exempt from all other things, both knowledges and objects of knowledge. When, therefore, he ſays *the one* is not *many*, he does not ſay that things different from *the one* are not *the one*, as denying them of *the one*, but that it has not multitude in itſelf; and that *the one* is not alſo multitude together with *the one*, but that it is alone *one*, and one itſelf exempt from all multitude.

[a] The caution of Plato here, ſays Proclus, deſerves to be remarked: for he does not ſay that *the one* is *impartible*, (αμερες), but *that it has no parts* (μερη μη εχον). For the *impartible* is not the ſame with the *non-poſſeſſion of parts*; ſince the latter may be aſſerted of *the one*, but the *impartible* not entirely. Thus the *impartible* ſometimes ſignifies a certain nature, and, as it were, a certain form. Or rather, it is nothing elſe than a form characterized by unity; and in this ſenſe it is uſed by Timæus when he is deſcribing the generation of the ſoul. But in the Sophiſta he calls that which is truly one impartible: "for it is neceſſary (ſays he) that *the truly one* ſhould be impartible." So that he there calls the ſame thing *impartible* which he ſays here *has no parts*. Hence, if any thing has no parts, it is impartible, according to Plato; but it no longer follows, that what is impartible has no parts, if each of the genera of being is either impartible, or partible, or a medium between both. Thus, a point is impartible, not having parts, ſuch as that which is endued with interval poſſeſſes: but it is not ſimply impartible, as having no part; for the definition of a point receives its completion from certain things. But all ſuch things as complete, have the order of parts, with reſpect to that which is completed by them. Thus, alſo, the monad is impartible, becauſe it is not compoſed from certain divided parts, as is every number which proceeds from it. Becauſe, however, it conſiſts of certain things which make it to be the monad, and to be different from a point, theſe may be ſaid to be the parts of the definition of the monad. For ſuch things as contribute to the definition of every form are entirely parts of it, and ſuch form

is

of which are equally diſtant from the middle. Certainly. And the ſtraight figure

is a certain whole paſſive to *the one*, but is not *the one itſelf*. But *the ſimply one* alone neither ſubſiſts from parts as connecting, nor as dividing, nor as giving completion to it; being alone *the one*, and ſimply one, but not that which is united.

Plato alſo indicates concerning theſe negations, that they are not privative, but that they are exempt from affirmations according to tranſcendency: "for it is *neceſſary* (ſays he) that it ſhould not be many, but one." By this word *neceſſary*, therefore, he indicates tranſcendency according to the good. As a proof of this, we do not add the word *neceſſary* to things deprived of any thing. For who would ſay it is neceſſary that the ſoul ſhould be ignorant of itſelf? for ignorance is a privation to gnoſtic natures. Thus alſo, in the Theætetus, Plato ſpeaking of evils ſays, "it is *neceſſary* that they ſhould have a ſubſiſtence." At the ſame time, alſo, by this word Plato indicates that he is diſcourſing about ſomething which has a ſubſiſtence, and not about a non-ſubſiſting thing. For who would ſay, about that which has no ſubſiſtence, that it is *neceſſary* it ſhould be?

4 Here again we may obſerve how Plato collects that *the one* neither poſſeſſes beginning, nor middle, nor end, from the concluſion prior to this, following demonſtrative canons. For, if *the one* has no parts, it has no beginning, nor middle, nor end; but that which precedes is true, and conſequently that alſo which follows. By taking away, therefore, that which precedes, he takes away that which is conſequent. Hence, beginning, middle, and end, are ſymbols of a more partial order: for that which is more univerſal is more cauſal; but that which is more partial is more remote from the principle. Thus, with reſpect to that which has parts, it is not yet evident whether it has a beginning, middle, and end. For, what if it ſhould be a whole conſiſting only of two parts? For the duad is a whole after a certain manner, and ſo as the principle of all partible natures; but that which has a beginning, middle, and end, is firſt in the triad. But if it ſhould be ſaid that every whole is triadic, in this caſe nothing hinders but that a thing which poſſeſſes parts may not yet be perfect, in conſequence of ſubſiſting prior to the perfect and the whole. Hence, Plato does not form his demonſtration from *whole*, but from *having parts*.

And here it is neceſſary to obſerve, with Proclus, that *part* is multifariouſly predicated. For we call that a part which is in a certain reſpect the ſame with the whole, and which poſſeſſes all ſuch things partially as the whole poſſeſſes totally. Thus, each of the multitude of intellects is a part of total intellect, though all things are in every intellect. And the inerratic ſphere is a part of the univerſe, though this alſo comprehends all things, but in a manner different from the world, viz. more partially. In the ſecond place, that is ſaid to be a part which is completive of any thing. Thus the total ſpheres of the planets and elements are ſaid to be parts of the univerſe; and the dianoëtic and doxaſtic powers are ſaid to be parts of the ſoul: for the former give completion to the univerſe, and the latter to the ſoul. In the third place, according to a common ſignification, we call a part every thing which is in any way coordinated with certain things to the conſummation of one thing: for thus each of us may be ſaid to be a part of the world: not that the univerſe receives its completion, as the univerſe, through us; for it would not become imperfect from the corruption of any one of us; but becauſe we alſo are coarranged with the total parts of the univerſe, are governed in conjunction with all other things, are in the world as in

figure is that, the middle part of which is ſituated before, or in the view of both

one animal, and give completion to it, not ſo far as it is, but ſo far as it is prolific. Part, therefore, being triply predicated, Plato, having before ſaid that *the one* has no part, evidently takes away from it all the conceptions of part. For whatever has parts has multitude; but *the one* has no multitude, and conſequently has no parts whatever. But, if this be the caſe, it has no beginning, nor middle, nor end: for theſe may be ſaid to be the parts of the things that poſſeſs them, according to the third ſignification of part, in which every thing coordinated with certain things is ſaid to be a part of that which receives its completion through the coordination of thoſe things.

[s] Plato might here have ſhown, as Proclus well obſerves, that *the one* is without beginning and end, from its not poſſeſſing extremes, and its not poſſeſſing extremes from its not poſſeſſing parts; but his reaſoning proceeds through things more known. For, from its non-poſſeſſion of parts, he immediately demonſtrates that it is without beginning and end, transferring beginning and end to bound, which is the ſame with extreme. Infinite, therefore, in this place does not ſimply ſignify that which is negative of bound, but that which is ſubverſive of extremes. As in the ſecond hypotheſis, therefore, he affirms the poſſeſſion of extremes, he very properly in this hypotheſis, where he denies it, demonſtrates *the one* to be infinite, as not having extremes, which are accuſtomed to be called terms or limits.

But in order to underſtand how *the one* is infinite, it will be neceſſary to conſider, with Proclus, how many orders there are in beings of *the infinite*, and afterwards, how many progreſſions there are oppoſite to theſe of *bound*. *Infinite*, therefore, that we may begin downwards, is beheld in matter, becauſe it is of itſelf indefinite and formleſs; but forms are the bounds of matter. It is alſo beheld in body devoid of quality, according to diviſion ad infinitum: for this body is infinitely diviſible, as being the firſt thing endued with interval. It is alſo beheld in the qualities which firſt ſubſiſt about this body, which is itſelf devoid of quality, in which qualities the more and the leſs are firſt inherent: for by theſe Socrates in the Philebus characterizes the infinite. It is alſo beheld in the whole of a generated nature, i. e. in every thing which is an object of ſenſe: for this poſſeſſes the infinite according to perpetual generation, and its unceaſing circle, and according to the indefinite mutations of generated natures, which are always riſing into being and periſhing, in which alſo infinity according to multitude exiſts, alone poſſeſſing its ſubſiſtence in becoming to be. But prior to theſe, the infinite is beheld in the circulation of the heavens: for this alſo has the infinite, through the infinite power of the mover; ſince body ſo far as body does not poſſeſs infinite power; but through the participation of intellect body is perpetual, and motion infinite. Prior alſo to theſe, the infinite muſt be aſſumed in ſoul: for in its tranſitive intellections it poſſeſſes the power of unceaſing motion, and is always moved, conjoining the periods of its motions with each other, and cauſing its energy to be one and never-failing. Again, prior to ſoul, the infinite is ſeen in time, which meaſures every period of the ſoul. For time is wholly infinite, becauſe its energy, through which it evolves the motions of ſouls, and through which it meaſures their periods, proceeding according to number, is infinite in power: for it never ceaſes abiding and proceeding, adhering to *the one*, and unfolding the number which meaſures

both the extremes? It is ſo. Will not, therefore, *the one* conſiſt of parts [s], and

meaſures the motions of wholes. Prior to time, alſo, we may ſurvey the infinite in intellect, and intellectual life: for this is intranſitive, and the whole of it is preſent eternally and collectively. That which is immovable, too, and never failing in intellect, is derived from an eſſence and power which never deſert it, but which eternally poſſeſs a ſleepleſs life; through which alſo every thing that is always moved, is able to be always moved, participating in motion of ſtable infinity. Nor does the infinite alone extend as far as to theſe: but prior to every intellect is much-celebrated eternity, which comprehends every intellectual infinity. For, whence does intellect derive its eternal life, except from eternity? This, therefore, is infinite according to power prior to intellect; or rather, other things are indeed infinite according to power, but eternity is primarily power itſelf. From this firſt fountain then of the infinite, it remains that we aſcend to the occult cauſe of all infinites whatever, and, having aſcended, that we behold all infinites ſubſiſting according to the power which is there. For ſuch is the infinite itſelf; and ſuch is the chaos of Orpheus, which he ſays has no bound. For eternity, though it is infinite through the ever, yet, ſo far as it is the meaſure of things eternal, it is alſo a bound. But chaos is the firſt infinite, is alone infinite, and is the fountain of all infinity, intelligible, intellectual, that which belongs to ſoul, that which is corporeal, and that which is material. And ſuch are the orders of the infinite, in which ſuch as are ſecond are always ſuſpended from thoſe prior to them. For material infinity is connected through the perpetuity of generation. The perpetuity of generation is never-failing, through the perpetual motion of æther; and the perpetual motion of æther is effected through the unceaſing period of a divine ſoul; for of this it is an imitation. The period alſo of a divine ſoul is unfolded through the continued and never-failing power of time, which makes the ſame beginning and end, through the temporal *inſtant* or *now*. And time energizes infinitely, through intellectual infinity, which is perpetually permanent. For that which proceeds according to time, when it is infinite, is ſo through a cauſe perpetually abiding, about which it evolves itſelf, and round which it harmonically moves in a manner eternally the ſame. Intellect alſo lives to infinity through eternity. For the eternal is imparted to all things from eternity and being; whence all things derive life and being, ſome more clearly, and others more obſcurely. And eternity is infinite, through the fountain of infinity, which ſupernally ſupplies the never-failing to all eſſences, powers, energies, periods, and generations. As far as to this, therefore, the order of infinites aſcends, and from this deſcends. For the order of things beautiful is from the beautiful itſelf, that of equals from the firſt equality, and that of infinites from the infinite itſelf. And thus much concerning the orders of *the infinite*.

Let us now conſider ſupernally the ſeries of bound which proceeds together with the infinite: for divinity produced theſe two cauſes, bound and infinity, together, or in other words, ſpeaking Orphically, æther and chaos. For *the infinite* is *chaos*, as diſtributing all power, and all infinity, as comprehending other things, and as being as it were the moſt infinite of infinites. But bound is æther, becauſe æther itſelf bounds and meaſures all things. The firſt bound, therefore, is bound itſelf, and is the fountain and baſis of all bounds, intelligible, intellectual, ſupermundane, and mundane, preſubſiſting as the meaſure and limit of all things. The ſecond is

that

and be many, whether it participates of a ſtraight or round figure? Entirely

that which ſubſiſts according to eternity. For eternity, as we have before obſerved, is characterized both by infinity and bound; ſince, ſo far as it is the cauſe of never-failing life, and ſo far as it is the ſupplier of *the ever*, it is *infinite*; but ſo far as it is the meaſure of all intellectual energy, and the boundary of the life of intellect, terminating it ſupernally, it is *bound*. And, in ſhort, it is itſelf, the firſt of the things mingled from bound and infinity. The third proceſſion of bound is beheld in intellect. For, ſo far as it abides in ſameneſs according to intellection, and poſſeſſes one life, eternal and the ſame, it is bounded and limited. For the immutable and the ſtable belong to a bounded nature; and, in ſhort, as it is number, it is evident that in this reſpect it participates of bound. In the fourth place, therefore, time is bound, both as proceeding according to number, and as meaſuring the periods of ſouls. For every where that which meaſures, ſo far as it meaſures and limits other things, effects this through participating of the cauſe of bound. In the fifth place, the period of the ſoul, and its circulation, which is accompliſhed with invariable ſameneſs, is the unapparent meaſure or evolution of all alter-motive natures. In the ſixth place, the motion of æther, ſubſiſting according to the ſame, and in the ſame, and about the ſame, *bounds* on all ſides that which is diſordered in material natures, and convolves them into one circle; and is itſelf bounded in itſelf. For the infinity of it conſiſts in *the again*, (εν τω παλιν), but not in not reverting, (ου τω μη αναιαμπτειν): nor is the infinity of it ſuch as that which ſubſiſts according to a right line, nor as deprived of bound. For the one period of æther is infinite by frequency (τω πολλακις εστιν απειρος). In the ſeventh place, the never-failing ſubſiſtence of material forms, the indeſtructibility of wholes, and all things being bounded, particulars by things common, and parts by wholes, evince the oppoſition in theſe of bound to the infinite. For, generated natures being infinitely changed, forms at the ſame time are bounded, and abide the ſame, neither becoming more nor leſs. In the eighth place, all quantity in things material may be called bound, in the ſame manner as, we before obſerved, quality is infinite. In the ninth place, the body without quality, which is the laſt of all things except matter, as a whole is *bound*: for it is not infinite in magnitude, but is as much extended in quantity as the univerſe. For it is neceſſary to call this body the whole ſubject of the univerſe. In the tenth place, the material form which detains matter, and circumſcribes its infinity, and formleſs nature, is the progeny of *bound*, to which ſome alone looking, refer bound and the infinite to *matter* alone and *form*. And ſuch and ſo many are the orders of bound.

The *infinite*, therefore, which is here denied of *the one*, is the ſame as *the not having a bound*, in the ſame manner as *the not having parts* is the ſame with the *impartible*, when the impartible is aſſerted of *the one*. But if *the one* is neither from any other cauſe, and there is no *final* cauſe of it, it is very properly ſaid to be *infinite*. For every thing is bounded by its cauſe, and from it obtains its proper end. Whether, therefore, there is any intelligible or intellectual bound, *the one* is beyond all the ſeries of bound. But if the firſt God, in the Laws, is ſaid to be the meaſure of all things, it is not wonderful: for there he is ſo denominated, as the object of deſire to all things, and as limiting the being, power, and perfection of all things; but here he is ſhown to be infinite, as being indigent of no bound or part. For all things are denied of him in this place, as

tirely ſo. It is, therefore, neither ſtraight nor circular, ſince it is without parts.

of himſelf with reſpect to himſelf. *The one*, therefore, is *infinite*, as *above all bound*. Hence this *infinite* muſt be conſidered as the ſame with the *non-poſſeſſion of extremes*; and the poſſeſſion of extremes is, therefore, denied of *the one*, through the infinite. For neither power muſt be aſcribed to it, nor indefinite multitude, nor any thing elſe which is ſignified by the infinite.

[6] Parmenides firſt takes away *many* from *the one*; and this as from common conception: in the ſecond place, he takes away *whole*, and *the having parts*; and this through *the one* not being *many*: in the third place, *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*; and this through not having parts. He alſo aſſumes as a conſequent corollary, that *the one* is beyond bound, which is coordinated with parts, and which makes the poſſeſſion of *extremes*. But bound is twofold: for it is either beginning or end. In the fourth place, therefore, he now takes away the *ſtraight* and the *round*, which in the ſecond hypotheſis he arranges after the poſſeſſion of extremes, and after the poſſeſſion of beginning, middle, and end. But before he ſyllogiſtically demonſtrates the fourth, he enunciates the concluſion; for he ſays, "without figure therefore." For it is requiſite that intellectual projections, or, in other words, the immediate and direct viſion of intellect, ſhould be the leader of ſcientific ſyllogiſms; ſince intellect alſo comprehends the principles of ſcience. The preaſſumption, therefore, of the concluſion imitates the collected viſion of intellect; but the proceſſion through ſyllogiſms imitates the evolution of ſcience from intellect. And here we may perceive alſo, that the concluſion is more common than the ſyllogiſms: for the latter receive the ſtraight and the round ſeparately, and thus make the negation; but the former ſimply aſſerts that *the one* is without figure. But theſe are the forms common to all intervals. For lines are divided into the ſtraight, the round, and the mixed; and, in a ſimilar manner, ſuperficies and ſolids; except that in lines the ſtraight and the round are without figure; but in ſuperficies or ſolids they are receptive of figure. Hence ſome of theſe are called right-lined, others curve-lined, and others mixed from theſe. As it has been ſhown, therefore, that *the one* is without bounds or extremities, it was neceſſary that Parmenides ſhould deny of it the ſtraight, and the poſſeſſion of extremes. But that which is figured is a thing of this kind: for he aſſumes boundaries comprehenſive of the things bounded, which alone belong to things figured. There is alſo another accuracy in the words, ſays Proclus, which is worthy of admiration. For he does not ſay that *the one* is neither ſtraight nor round; ſince he has not yet collected that it is without figure. For what would hinder it from having ſome one of the middle figures, ſuch as that of the cylinder or cone, or ſome other of thoſe that are mixed? For, if we ſhould give to *the one* ſome figure from thoſe that are mixed, it would participate both of the ſtraight and the round. Thus, for inſtance, if we ſhould inquire whether nature is white or black, and ſhould find that it is neither white nor black, it would not follow from this, that it is entirely void of colour: for, by the participation of both theſe, it would poſſeſs ſome one of the middle colours; ſince the media are from the extremes. Plato therefore ſays, that *the one* neither participates of the *round* nor the *ſtraight*, that it may not have either of theſe, nor any one of the media. This alſo is evident, that this concluſion is more partial than that which is prior to it. For, if any thing participates of figure, it has alſo extremes and a middle; but not every thing which has extremes and

parts. Right. And indeed, being ſuch, it will be no where [9]; for it will neither

and a middle participates of figure. For a line, number, time and motion, may poſſeſs extremes, all which are without figure. A tranſition likewiſe is very properly made from figure to the ſtraight and the round. For it is poſſible univerſally to deny figure of *the one*, by ſhowing that figure has bound and limitation. But *the one* does not receive any bound. Plato however was willing to deduce his diſcourſe ſupernally, according to two coordinations; and hence from the beginning he aſſumes after *many*, *whole* and *parts*, and again *extremes* and *middle*, *ſtraight* and *round*, *in itſelf* and *in another*, *abiding* and *being moved*, &c. through this aſſumption indicating that *the one* is none of theſe. For it is not poſſible that it can be both oppoſites, ſince it would no longer remain one according to the hypotheſis; nor can it be either of theſe, for thus it would have ſomething hoſtile and oppoſed to itſelf. It is however neceſſary that *the one* ſhould be prior to all oppoſition, or it will not be the cauſe of all things; ſince it will not be the cauſe of thoſe things which its oppoſite produces. Proceeding, therefore, according to the two ſeries of things, he very properly now paſſes from figure to *the ſtraight* and *the round*.

But ſince in the Phædrus Plato denominates the intelligible ſummit of intellectuals, which he there calls the ſuperceleſtial place, uncoloured, unfigured, and untouched, muſt we ſay that that order and *the one* are ſimilarly unfigured? By no means: for neither is there the ſame mode of negation in both. For of that order Plato denies ſome things, and affirms others. For he ſays that it is eſſence and true eſſence, and that it can alone be ſeen by intellect, the governor of the ſoul; and likewiſe that the genus of true ſcience ſubſiſts about it; becauſe there is another, viz. the intelligible order prior to it, and it is exempt from ſome things, but participates of others. But he denies all things, and affirms nothing of *the one*: for there is nothing prior to *the one*, but it is ſimilarly exempt from all beings. The mode, therefore, of ablation is different; and this, as Proclus well obſerves, Plato indicates by the very words themſelves. For he calls the intelligible ſummit of intellectuals *unfigured*; but he ſays that *the one* participates of *no figure*. But the former of theſe is not the ſame with the latter, as neither is the *impartible* the ſame with that which has no part. After the ſame manner, therefore, he calls that eſſence *unfigured*, but aſſerts that the one participates of no figure. Hence it appears that the former, as producing, and as being more excellent than intellectual figure, is called *unfigured*. This, therefore, was ſubordinate to another figure, viz. the intelligible: for intelligible intellect comprehends the intelligible cauſes of figure and multitude, and all things; and there are figures perfectly unknown and ineffable, which are firſt unfolded into light from intelligibles, and which are only known to intelligible intellect. But the ſuperceleſtial place, being the ſummit in intelligibles, is the principle of all intellectual figures; and hence it is *unfigured*, but is not ſimply exempt from all figure. *The one*, however, is exempt from every order of theſe figures, both the occult and intellectual, and is eſtabliſhed above all unknown and known figures.

[9] The *ſtraight* and the *round* here are to be conſidered as ſignifying progreſſion and converſion: for progreſſion is beheld according to the ſtraight, which alſo it makes the end of itſelf. Every intellectual nature, therefore, *proceeds* to all things according to the ſtraight, and is *converted* to its own good, which is the middle in each; and this is no other than the intelligible which it contains. But things are ſeparated from each other according to progreſſion, the *proceeding* from the

neither be in another, nor in itſelf. How ſo? For, being in another, it would

the *abiding*, and the *multiplied* from the *united*. For *progreſſion* is that which makes ſome things firſt, others middle, and others laſt; but *converſion* again conjoins all things, and leads them to one thing, the common object of deſire to all beings. In theſe two, therefore, each of theſe definitions is to be found, of which the intellectual Gods firſt participate: for theſe are eſpecially characterized by converſion. In the ſecond place from theſe, ſouls participate of the ſtraight and the round; proceeding, indeed, after the manner of a line, but being again inflected into circles, and converting themſelves to their principles. But ſenſibles participate of theſe in the laſt place: for right-lined figures ſubſiſt in theſe with interval, and partibly, and the ſpheric form, which is comprehenſive of all mundane figures. Hence, Timæus makes the whole world to be a ſphere; but through the five figures, which are the only figures that have equal ſides and angles, he adorns the five parts of the world, inſcribing all theſe in the ſphere, and in each other, by which he manifeſts that theſe figures are ſupernally derived from a certain elevated order.

Theſe two alſo may be perceived in generation: the *round* according to the circulation in things viſible; for generation circularly returns to itſelf, as it is ſaid in the Phædrus. But the *ſtraight* is ſeen according to the progreſſion of every thing, from its birth to its acme; and acme is here the middle darkening the extremes; for through this there is a tranſition to the other of the extremes, juſt as, in a right line, the paſſage from one extreme to the other is through the middle. Theſe two, therefore, ſupernally pervade from intellectual as far as to generated natures; the *ſtraight* being the cauſe of progreſſion, but the *round* of converſion. If, therefore, *the one* neither proceeds from itſelf, nor is converted to itſelf—for that which proceeds is ſecond to that which produces, and that which is converted is indigent of the deſirable—it is evident that it neither participates of the *ſtraight*, nor of the *round* figure. For how can it proceed, having no producing cauſe of itſelf, neither in nor prior to itſelf, leſt it ſhould be deprived of *the one*, being ſecond, or having the form of the duad? How, alſo, can it be converted, having no end, and no object of deſire? Here, likewiſe, it is again evident that Plato collects theſe concluſions from what precedes, viz. from *the one* neither poſſeſſing beginning, nor middle, nor end; always geometrically demonſtrating things ſecond through ſuch as are prior to them, imitating the orderly progreſſion of things, which ever makes its deſcent from primary to ſecondary natures.

[8] As the whole middle order of the Gods called intelligible, and at the ſame time intellectual, is ſymbolically ſignified in theſe words, Plato very properly in the concluſion converts the whole of it. For, if *the one* has *figure*, it will be *many*. He therefore conjoins figure to *many* through *parts*; but demonſtrates that all theſe genera are ſecondary to *the one*. So great, however, ſays Proclus, is the ſeparation of the divine orders, that Plato does not attempt to connect the negations that follow in a regular ſucceſſion till he has firſt converted this order to itſelf; conjoining *figure* to *many*, and indicating the alliance of all the aforeſaid genera. In what order of things, however, the *ſtraight* and the *round* ſubſiſt, will be more clearly known in the ſecond hypotheſis.

[9] The diſcourſe paſſes on to another order, viz. to the ſummit of thoſe Gods that are properly called intellectual: and this he denies of *the one*, demonſtrating that *the one* is no where; neither as comprehended in another cauſe, nor as itſelf comprehended in itſelf. Before he ſyllogizes, however,

would after a manner be circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and

however, he again previouſly announces the concluſion, employing intellectual projections prior to ſcientific methods; and this he conſtantly does in all that follows.

It is here, however, neceſſary to obſerve, that *no where* is predicated moſt properly and ſimply of the firſt cauſe. For the ſoul is frequently ſaid to be no where, and particularly, the ſoul which has no habitude or alliance with body: for it is not detained by any ſecondary nature, nor is its energy circumſcribed through a certain habitude, as if it were bound by ſuch habitude to things poſterior to itſelf. Intellect alſo is ſaid to be no where: for it is in a ſimilar manner every where, and is equally preſent to all things. Or rather, through a preſence of this kind it is detained by no one of its participants. Divinity alſo is ſaid to be no where, becauſe he is exempt from all things, becauſe he is imparticipable, or, in other words, is not conſubſiſtent with any thing elſe; and becauſe he is better than all communion, all habitude, and all coordination with other things. There is not, however, the ſame mode of the *no where* in all things. For ſoul indeed is *no where* with reſpect to the things poſterior to itſelf, but is not ſimply no where; ſince it is in itſelf, as being ſelf-motive, and likewiſe in the cauſe whence it originates. For every where the cauſe preaſſumes and uniformly comprehends the power of its effect. Intellect is alſo *no where* with reſpect to the things poſterior to itſelf, but it is in itſelf, as being ſelf-ſubſiſtent, and, further ſtill, is comprehended in its proper cauſe. Hence, it is falſe to ſay that intellect is abſolutely *no where*; for *the one* alone is ſimply no where. For it is neither in things poſterior to itſelf, as being exempt from all things; (ſince neither intellect nor ſoul, principles poſterior to *the one*, are in things poſterior to themſelves,) nor is it in itſelf, as being ſimple and void of all multitude; nor is it in any thing prior to itſelf, becauſe there is nothing better than *the one*. This, therefore, is ſimply *no where*; but all other things have the *no where* ſecondarily, and are in one reſpect *no where*, and in another not. For, if we ſurvey all the order of beings, we ſhall find material forms ſubſiſting in others only, and eſtabliſhed in certain ſubjects: for they verge to bodies, and are in a certain reſpect in a ſubject, bearing an echo, as it were, and image of a thing ſubſiſting in itſelf, ſo far as they are certain lives and eſſences, and in conſequence of one part ſuffering they are copaſſive with themſelves. With reſpect to ſouls that ſubſiſt in habitude or alliance to body, theſe, ſo far as they have habitude, are in another: for habitude to ſecondary natures entirely introduces, together with itſelf, ſubſiſtence in another; but ſo far as they are able to be converted to themſelves, they are purified from this, ſubſiſting in themſelves. For natures indeed extend all their energies about bodies, and whatever they make they make in ſomething elſe. Souls employ, indeed, ſome energies about bodies; but others are directed to themſelves, and through theſe they are converted to themſelves. But ſouls that are without habitude to body are not in other things that are ſecondary or ſubordinate to them, but are in others that are prior to them. For a ſubſiſtence in another is twofold, one kind being ſubordinate to the ſubſiſtence of a thing in itſelf, and ariſing from a habitude to things ſecondary, but the other being better than ſuch a ſubſiſtence; and the former extends as far as to ſouls that ſubſiſt in habitude to body; but the latter only originates from divine natures, and, in ſhort, from ſuch as ſubſiſt without habitude. Divine ſouls, therefore, are alone in the natures prior to them, as, for inſtance, in the intellects

from

and would be touched [10] by it in many places: but it is impoſſible that *the one*

from which they are ſuſpended; but intellect is both in itſelf, and in that which is prior to itſelf, viz. in the unity which it derives from *the one*, and which is the vertex and flower of its eſſence. This *no where*, therefore, is by no means ſubordinate to the ſubſiſtence of a thing in itſelf. For how can *the no where* which oppoſes a ſubſiſtence in ſome particular thing be adapted to things which have their being in another? But to thoſe that have a ſubſiſtence in themſelves better than a ſubſiſtence in another, *the no where* is preſent indeed, but not ſimply: for each of theſe is in its proper cauſe. But to *the one* alone *the no where* primarily and ſimply belongs. For *the one* is not in things poſterior to itſelf, becauſe it is without habitude or alliance; nor in itſelf, becauſe it is *the one*; nor in any thing prior to itſelf, becauſe it is the firſt.

In the next place, let us conſider *the every where*, and whether it is better and more perfect than *the no where*, or ſubordinate to it. For, if better, why do we not aſcribe that which is better to the firſt, inſtead of ſaying that *the one* is alone *no where*? But, if it is ſubordinate, how is it not better not to energize providentially, than ſo to energize? May we not ſay, therefore, that the *every where* is twofold? one kind taking place, when it is conſidered with reference to things poſterior to it, as when we ſay that providence is every where, that it is not abſent from any ſecondary natures, but that it preſerves, connects and adorns all things, pervading through them by its communications. But the other kind of *every where* ſubſiſts as with relation to all things prior and poſterior to it. Hence that is properly *every where* which is in things ſubordinate, in itſelf, and in things prior to itſelf. And of this *every where* the *no where* which is now aſſumed is the negation, as being neither in itſelf, nor in any thing prior to itſelf. This *no where* alſo is better than *the every where*, and is alone the prerogative of *the one*. But there is another *no where* coordinate with *the every where*, and which is alone predicated with reference to things ſecondary, ſo that each is true in conſequence of that which remains. For *being* is *no where* becauſe it is *every where*. For that which is detained in ſome particular place, is in a certain thing; but that which is ſimilarly preſent to all things is definitely *no where*: and again, becauſe *no where*, on this account it is *every where*. For, in conſequence of being ſimilarly exempt from all things, it is ſimilarly preſent to all things, being as it were equally diſtant from all things. Hence, this *no where* and this *every where* are coordinate with each other. But the other *no where* is better than every *every where*, and can alone be adapted to *the one*, as being a negation of every ſubſiſtence in any thing. For, whether the ſubſiſtence is as in *place*, or as in *whole*, or as the *whole* in its *parts*, or as in the *end*, or as *things governed* in *the governing principle*, or as *genus* in *ſpecies*, or as *ſpecies* in *genera*, or as in *time*, *the one* is ſimilarly exempt from all theſe. For neither is it comprehended in place, leſt it ſhould appear to be multitude. Nor is it any comprehending whole, leſt it ſhould conſiſt of parts. Nor is it a part of any thing, leſt, being in the whole of which it is a part, it ſhould be a paſſive one. For every whole which is paſſive to *the one*, is indigent of that which is truly one. Nor is it in parts: for it has no parts. Nor is there any end of it: for it has been ſhown that it has no end. Nor does it ſubſiſt as in the governing *principle*: for it has been ſhown that it has not any *beginning*. Nor is it as genus in ſpecies, leſt again multitude ſhould happen about it, through the comprehenſion of ſpecies;

one which is without parts, and which does not participate of a circle, ſhould

nor as ſpecies in genera; for, of what will it be the ſpecies, ſince nothing is more excellent than itſelf? Nor is it as in time: for thus it would be multitude; ſince every thing which is in time flows; and every thing that flows conſiſts of parts. *The one*, therefore, is better than all the modes of a ſubſiſtence in any thing. Hence the negation of *no where* is true: for a ſubſiſtence *in ſome particular thing* is oppoſed to *no where*; juſt as *ſome one* is oppoſed to *no one*: ſo that *the one* will be *no where*.

Again, too, Plato gives a twofold diviſion to a ſubſiſtence in ſomething; viz. into a ſubſiſtence in another, and into a ſubſiſtence in itſelf; comprehending in theſe two all the abovementioned celebrated modes which are enumerated by Ariſtotle in his Phyſics; that if he can ſhow that *the one* is neither in itſelf, nor in another, he may be able to demonſtrate that it is *no where*. But this being ſhown, it will appear that *the one* is exempt from that order to which the ſymbol of being *in itſelf* and *in another* pertains. It will alſo appear from hence that intellect is not the firſt cauſe: for the peculiarity of intellect is a ſubſiſtence in itſelf, in conſequence of being converted to itſelf, at the ſame time that its energy is directed to ſuch things as are firſt, viz. to intelligibles and *the one*.

[10] Let us here conſider how according to Plato every thing which is in another, is after a manner circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and is touched by it in many places. Of thoſe prior to us then, ſays Proclus, ſome have conſidered the ſubſiſtence of *the one* in ſomething elſe, more partially, alone aſſuming a ſubſiſtence in place, and in a veſſel, and to theſe adapting the words. For that which is in place in a certain reſpect touches place, and alſo that which is in a veſſel touches the veſſel, and is on all ſides comprehended by it. This, therefore, ſay they, is what Plato demonſtrates to us, that *the one* is not in place, ſince that which is in place muſt neceſſarily be many, and muſt be touched by it in many places; but it is impoſſible that *the one* ſhould be *many*. There is however nothing venerable in the aſſertion that *the one* is not in place, ſince this is even true of partial ſouls like ours; but it is neceſſary that what is here ſhown ſhould be the prerogative of *the one*, and of that cauſe which is eſtabliſhed above all beings. But others looking to things ſay, that every thing which being in a certain thing is comprehended by it, is denied of *the one*: and their aſſertion is right. For *the one* is in no reſpect in any thing, as has been before ſhown. But how does this adapt the words to the various modes of a ſubſiſtence in ſomething? For a point is evidently ſaid to be in a line as in *another*; ſince a point is different from a line; and it does not follow, becauſe it is in another, that on this account it is on all ſides comprehended by the line, and is touched by many of its parts. It may indeed be ſaid, in anſwer to this, that though the line does not circularly contain the point according to interval, yet it comprehends it after another manner: for it embraces its idioms. For a point is a boundary only; but a line is both a boundary and ſomething elſe, being a length without a breadth. A point alſo is without interval; but a line poſſeſſes interval according to length, though not according to breadth and depth. For, in ſhort, ſince a point is not the ſame with *the one*, it is neceſſary that the point ſhould be *many*, not as containing parts after the manner of interval, for in this reſpect it is impartible, but as containing many idioms which

ſhould be touched by a circle in many places. Impoſſible. But if it were in itſelf it would alſo contain itſelf, ſince it is no other than itſelf which ſubſiſts in itſelf: for it is impoſſible that any thing ſhould not be comprehended [11] by

which have the relation of parts, and which the line comprehending, may be ſaid to touch the point in many places. But that the point is not the ſame with *the one* is evident; for the latter is the principle of all things, but the former of magnitudes alone. Nor is the point prior to *the one:* for the monad is one, and the impartible in time, or the now. It remains, therefore, that the point is poſterior to *the one*, and participates of it. But, if this be the caſe, it may poſſeſs many incorporeal idioms, which are in the line, and are comprehended by it.

Thoſe however who thus interpret the preſent paſſage do not perceive how Plato aſſumes a ſubſiſtence in a certain thing, and what he looks to among beings, when he denies this of *the one.* It is better, therefore, ſays Proclus, to ſay with our preceptor Syrianus, conformably to that moſt prudent and ſafe mode of interpretation, that Plato denies theſe things of *the one,* which in the ſecond hypotheſis he affirms of *the one being*, and that he ſo denies as he there affirms. In the ſecond hypotheſis, therefore, Plato indicating the ſummit of the intellectual order, ſays that *the one* is in itſelf and in another; which evidently applies to that order, becauſe it is converted to itſelf intellectually, and abides eternally with a monadic ſubſiſtence in its cauſes. For it is the monad of the intellectual Gods; abiding indeed, according to its tranſcendency, in the intellectual Gods, prior to, but unfolding into light the intellectual idiom, according to an energy in and about, itſelf. The ſubſiſtence, therefore, in another is of ſuch a kind as an abiding in cauſe, and being comprehended in its proper cauſe. This, therefore, is the circular comprehenſion, and the being touched in many places, of which Plato now ſpeaks. For, as this order is contained in its cauſe, it is more partial than it. But every thing more partial is more multiplied than its more comprehenſive cauſe; and, being more multiplied, it is conjoined with it by the various powers of itſelf, and differently with different powers. For this is what is implied by the words "*in many places*;" ſince according to different powers it is differently united to the intelligible prior to itſelf. To this order of beings, alſo, a ſubſiſtence in itſelf accords together with a ſubſiſtence in another. The multitude likewiſe of this order is numerous: for it participates of intelligible multitude, and has parts; ſince it participates of the middle genera in the cauſes prior to itſelf. It is alſo in a certain reſpect circular; for it participates of the extremity of the middle orders, viz. of the figure which is there. Hence, it is neither one ſimply, but many, nor impartible, but having parts, viz. incorporeal idioms; nor is it beyond all figure, but is circular. And ſo far as it is many, it is able to be touched in many things by the natures prior to itſelf; but ſo far as it has parts, it is able to communicate with them in many places, and in a remarkable degree; and ſo far as it is figured, it is circularly comprehended by them. For every thing figured is comprehended by figure. But *the one* neither has parts, nor participates of the circle; ſo that there cannot be a cauſe prior to it, which circularly touches it and in many places; but it is beyond all things, as having no cauſe better than itſelf.

[11] Let us here conſider with Proclus how that which is in itſelf poſſeſſes both that which comprehends,

by that in which it is. It is impoſſible. Would not, therefore, that which contains be one thing, and that which is contained another? For the ſame whole [12] cannot at the ſame time ſuffer and do both theſe: and thus *the*

comprehends, and that which is comprehended; and what both theſe are. Every thing, therefore, which is the cauſe of itſelf, and is ſelf-ſubſiſtent, is ſaid to be in itſelf. For, as ſelf-motive rank prior to alter-motive natures, ſo things ſelf-ſubſiſtent are arranged prior to ſuch as are produced by another. For, if there is that which perfects itſelf, there is alſo that which generates itſelf. But if there is that which is ſelf-ſubſiſtent, it is evident that it is of ſuch a kind as both to produce and be produced by itſelf. As, therefore, producing power always comprehends according to cauſe that which it produces, it is neceſſary that whatever produces itſelf ſhould comprehend itſelf ſo far as it is a cauſe, and ſhould be comprehended by itſelf ſo far as it is cauſed; but that it ſhould be at once both cauſe and the thing cauſed, that which comprehends and that which is comprehended. If, therefore, a ſubſiſtence in another ſignifies the being produced by another more excellent cauſe, a ſubſiſtence in ſelf muſt ſignify that which is ſelf-begotten, and produced by itſelf.

[12] Let us conſider how it is impoſſible for the ſame whole, at the ſame time, both to do and ſuffer: for this Plato aſſumes as a thing common and univerſally acknowledged. Will it not follow, therefore, if this be granted, that the ſelf-motive nature of the ſoul will no longer remain? For, in things ſelf-moved, that which moves is not one thing, and that which is moved another; but the whole is at the ſame time moving and moved. To this it may be replied as follows: Of the powers of the ſoul ſome are generative, and others converſive of the ſoul to herſelf. The generative powers, therefore, beginning from the ſoul produce its life; but the converſive convolve the ſoul to itſelf, according to a certain vital circle, and to the intellect which is eſtabliſhed prior to ſoul. For, as the generative powers produce a twofold life, one kind abiding, but the other proceeding into body and ſubſiſting in a ſubject, ſo the converſive powers make a twofold converſion, one of the ſoul to herſelf, the other to the intellect which is beyond her. Of theſe powers, therefore, the whole ſoul participates, becauſe they proceed through each other, and energize together with each other; whence every rational ſoul is ſaid to generate herſelf. For the whole participates through the whole of generative powers, and ſhe converts as it were herſelf to herſelf; and neither is that which generates without converſion, nor is that which converts unprolific, but a participation through each other is effected. Hence both aſſertions are true, viz. that the ſoul generates herſelf, and that it is not poſſible for the whole of a thing at the ſame time both to do and ſuffer. For though that which produces and that which is produced are one thing, yet together with union there is alſo difference, through which a thing of this kind does not remain unmultiplied. For the whole ſoul is indeed produced, but not ſo far as it produces is it alſo according to this produced; ſince that which primarily produces is the generative power of the ſoul. Since however it is poſſible in ſome things for a certain part to generate, and a part to be generated, as in the world that which is celeſtial is ſaid to generate and fabricate, and that which is ſublunary to be generated; and again, not for a part, but the whole to be generated and generate in different times; and laſtly, for the whole

the one would no longer be one, but two. It certainly would not. *The one*, therefore, is not any where [13], ſince it is neither in itſelf nor in another. It

both to do and ſuffer in the ſame time, but to do one thing, and ſuffer another, and not the ſame: for what if a thing ſhould impart heat, and at the ſame time receive cold, or ſhould whiten and be at the ſame time blackened?—on this account, Plato taking away all ſuch objections accurately adds the words, *the whole, at the ſame time, the ſame thing*, that it may not act in one part and ſuffer in another, nor at different times, nor do one thing and ſuffer another.

Hence, ſince that which is ſelf-ſubſiſtent is neceſſarily diviſible into that which is more excellent, and that which is ſubordinate, for ſo far as it produces it is more excellent, but ſo far as it is produced ſubordinate, it follows that *the one* is beyond a ſelf-ſubſiſtent nature: for *the one* does not admit of diviſion, with which a ſelf-ſubſiſtent nature is neceſſarily connected. Indeed *the one* is better than every paternal and generative cauſe, as being exempt from all power. For though according to Plato it is the cauſe of all beautiful things, yet it is not the cauſe in ſuch a manner as if it employed power, through which it is productive of all things: for power ſubſiſts together with hyparxis or the ſummit of eſſence, to which it is at the ſame time ſubordinate. But of the natures poſterior to *the one*, ſome being moſt near to, and ineffably and occultly unfolded into light from it, have a paternal and generative dignity with relation to all beings, and produce other things from themſelves by their own powers. In this, therefore, they abound more than, and conſequently fall ſhort of the ſimplicity of, *the one*, that they generate ſelf-ſubſiſtent natures: for additions in things divine are attended with diminution of power. Other natures, therefore, poſterior to *the one*, being now ſeparated and multiplied in themſelves, are allotted the power of things ſelf-ſubſiſtent; ſubſiſting indeed from primary cauſes, but produced alſo from themſelves. Theſe, therefore, are ſuſpended from the paternal and generative cauſes of forms, but paternal cauſes from *the one*, which is more excellent than every cauſe of this kind, and which in a manner unknown to all things unfolds beings from itſelf, according to the principles of things. Hence, if this be the caſe, it is evident that every thing which gives ſubſiſtence to itſelf is alſo productive of other things. For ſelf-ſubſiſtent natures are neither the firſt nor the laſt of things. But that which produces other things without producing itſelf is twofold; one of theſe being better, and the other worſe, than things ſelf-ſubſiſtent. Such, therefore, are producing natures. But of things produced from a generating cauſe, ſelf-ſubſiſtent natures firſt proceed, being produced indeed, but ſubſiſting ſelf-begotten from their proper cauſes. For they proceed from their cauſe in a way ſuperior to a ſelf-begetting energy. The next in order to theſe are the natures which are ſuſpended from another producing cauſe, but which are incapable of generating and being generated from themſelves. And this order of things has its progreſſion ſupernally as far as to the laſt of things. For if, among generating natures, that which generates itſelf alſo generates other things, but that which generates other things does not neceſſarily generate itſelf, it follows that things generative of others are prior to ſuch as generate themſelves: for things more comprehenſive rank more as principles.

[13] Plato very geometrically, in each of the theorems, firſt enunciates the propoſition, afterwards gives the demonſtration, and, in the laſt place, the concluſion; through the propoſition imitating

It is not. But conſider whether thus circumſtanced it can either ſtand or be moved [14]. Why can it not? Becauſe whatever is moved is either locally moved, or ſuffers alteration [15]; for theſe alone are the genera of motion.

imitating the collected and ſtable energy of intellect; through the demonſtration, the progreſſion of intellections evolving itſelf into multitude; and through the concluſion, the circular motion of intellect to its principle, and the one perfection of all intellectual energy. This, therefore, which he does in the preceding theorems, he particularly does in this. For it pertains to this order, both to ſubſiſt from itſelf, and to abide in the natures prior to itſelf. The logical diſcurſus, therefore, imitates the ſubſiſtence of this order in itſelf, but the concluſion, and a returning to the principle, a ſubſiſtence in another.

[14] Parmenides here proceeds to another order, viz. the vivific, from the intellectual monad, and evinces that *the one* is exempt from this. The idioms, therefore, of this vivific order are *motion* and *permanency*; the former unfolding into light the fountains of life, and the latter firmly eſtabliſhing this life exempt from its proper rivers. That it is not requiſite, however, alone to take away phyſical motions from *the one*, Plato himſelf manifeſts, by ſaying, "*the one* therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion." But all energy, according to him, is motion. *The one* therefore is prior to energy. Hence alſo it is prior to power, leſt it ſhould poſſeſs power imperfect and unenergetic. Should it be aſked why Plato places *motion* before *ſameneſs* and *difference*? we reply, that motion and permanency are beheld in the eſſences and energies of things: for proceſſion is eſſential motion, and permanency an eſſential eſtabliſhment in cauſes; ſince every thing at the ſame time that it abides in, alſo proceeds from, its cauſe. Eſſential *motion* and *permanency*, therefore, are prior to *ſameneſs* and *difference*: for things in proceeding from their cauſes become *ſame* and *different*; *different* by proceeding, but *ſame* by converting themſelves to that which abides. Hence *motion* and *permanency* rank prior to *ſameneſs* and *difference*, as originating prior to them. On this account, in the Sophiſta, Plato arranges *motion* and *permanency* after *being*, and next to theſe *ſame* and *different*.

[15] Plato, in the tenth book of his Laws, makes a perfect diviſion of all motions into ten, eight of which are paſſive. The ninth of theſe is indeed energetic, but is both motive and moved, moving other things, and being moved by a cauſe prior to itſelf; and the tenth is energetic from itſelf, in that which is moved poſſeſſing alſo that which moves, being no other than a ſelf-motive nature. It is however now requiſite to make a more ſynoptical diviſion, that we may not phyſiologize in diſcourſes about divine natures. Hence Plato concifely diſtributes all motions into two. For that it is requiſite not only to conſider the propoſed motions as corporeal, but likewiſe as comprehenſive of all incorporeal motions, is evident from his ſaying, "for theſe are the only motions." Both the motions of ſoul, therefore, and ſuch as are intellectual, are comprehended in theſe two, viz. lation and alteration, or internal motion. It is alſo evident that every vivific genus of the Gods belongs to theſe motions, ſince all life is motion according to Plato, and every motion is comprehended in the two which are here mentioned. Let us therefore conſider every thing which is moved; and firſt of all let us direct our attention to bodies, either as ſuffering ſome internal or ſome external change: for that which changes one place for another ſuſtains

motion. Certainly. But if *the one* ſhould be altered from itſelf, it is impoſſible that it ſhould remain in any reſpect the one. Impoſſible. It will not therefore be moved according to alteration? It appears that it will not.

tains a mutation of ſomething belonging to things external; but that which is generating or corrupting, or increaſing, or diminiſhing, or mingling, ſuffers a mutation of ſomething inward. Hence that which is changed according to the external is ſaid to be moved according to lation: for a motion of this kind is local, place being external to bodies. But that which is moved according to ſome one of the things within it is ſaid to ſuffer internal change, whether it ſuſtains generation, or corruption, or increaſe, or diminution, or mixture. Local motion, therefore, is preſent with divine bodies, ſuch as thoſe of the ſtars, but they have no mutation according to eſſence. For it is neceſſary, indeed, that theſe ſhould be locally moved, becauſe, as Plato ſays in the Politicus, always to ſubſiſt according to the ſame, and after the ſame manner, belongs to the moſt divine of things alone; but the nature of body is not of this order. The celeſtial bodies, however, being the firſt of things viſible, poſſeſs a perpetual ſubſiſtence: for ſuch things as are firſt in every order poſſeſs the form of natures prior to themſelves. Hence theſe bodies are moved according to this motion alone, which preſerves the eſſence of the things moved unchanged. But, aſcending from bodies to ſouls, we may ſee that which is analogous in theſe to local motion, and that which correſponds to internal change. For, ſo far as at different times they apply themſelves to different forms, and through contact with theſe become aſſimilated to their proper intelligibles, or the objects of their intellectual viſion, they alſo appear in a certain reſpect to be multiform, participating by their energies of theſe intelligibles, which are always different, and being diſpoſed together with them. So far, therefore, as this is effected, they may be ſaid to be internally changed. But again, ſo far as they energize about the intelligible place, and pervade the whole extent of forms, being as it were external to them, and comprehending them on all ſides, ſo far they may be ſaid to be locally moved; Plato alſo in the Phædrus calling the energy of the ſoul about the intelligible place, a period and circulation. Souls, therefore, are both internally changed and locally moved; being internally changed according to that which is vital, for it is this which is diſpoſed together with, and is aſſimilated to, the viſions of the ſoul; but, according to that which is gnoſtic, paſſing on locally from one intelligible to another, revolving round theſe by its intellections, and being reflected from the ſame to the ſame. Or we ſhould rather ſay, that ſouls comprehend in themſelves the cauſes of internal change, and of mutation according to place. In much celebrated intellect, alſo, we ſhall find the paradigms ſubſiſting intellectually of theſe two ſpecies of motion. For by participating the nature of the intelligible in intellection, and becoming through intelligence a certain intelligible itſelf, it is internally changed about the intellectual idiom. For participations are ſaid to impart ſomething of their own nature to their participant. But by intellectually perceiving in the ſame, according to the ſame things, and after the ſame manner, and by energizing about its own intelligible as about a centre, it previouſly comprehends the paradigm of local circulation. Every where, therefore, we ſhall find that motions are internal changes and lations, ſubſiſting intellectually in intellect, pſychically in ſoul, and corporeally and diviſibly in ſenſibles; ſo that we ought not to wonder if theſe are the only motions; for all others are comprehended in theſe.

But will it be moved locally [16]? Perhaps ſo. But indeed if *the one* is moved locally,

[16] Parmenides paſſes on to the other form of motion, viz. lation, and ſhows that neither is *the one* moved according to this. He alſo divides lation into motion about the ſame place, and into a mutation from one place to another. For every thing which is moved according to place, either preſerves the ſame place, ſo that the whole remains intranſitive, and the thing itſelf is only moved in its parts; or it is moved both in the whole and the parts, and paſſes from one place to another. For there are theſe four caſes: a thing is neither moved in the whole, nor in the parts; or it is moved in the whole, and not in the parts; or it is moved in the parts, and not in the whole; or it is moved both in the whole and in the parts. But, of theſe four, it is impoſſible for the whole to be moved, the parts remaining immovable; ſince the parts from which the whole conſiſts are moved together with the whole. To be moved neither in the whole nor in the parts belongs to things which ſtand ſtill. It remains, therefore, either that the whole is not moved, the parts being moved, or that both the whole and the parts are moved. The former of theſe motions is produced by a ſphere or cylinder, when theſe are moved about their axes; but the latter is effected by a tranſition from one place to another, when the whole changes its place. It is evident, therefore, from this diviſion, that ſuch are the neceſſary differences of motion.

Theſe two motions are not only apparent in ſenſibles, viz. the circular in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and a motion both according to whole and parts in the ſublunary region, but they alſo ſubſiſt in the natures beyond thoſe. For a partial ſoul, through its aſcents and deſcents, and its tranſitive energy according to length, contains the paradigm of motions both according to the whole and parts; and intellect, through its intranſitive revolution about the intelligible, cauſally contains the circular motion. And not only intellect, but alſo every divine ſoul, through its meaſured motion about intellect, receives an incorporeal circulation. Parmenides alſo, ſays Proclus, when he calls being a ſphere, in his poems, and ſays that it perceives intellectually, evidently calls its intellection ſpheric motion. But Timæus, bending the progreſſion of the ſoul according to length, into circles, and making one of theſe circles external and the other internal, confers both theſe eternally on the ſoul according to a demiurgic cauſe, and an intellectual period prior to that of bodies. Theologiſts alſo, Proclus adds, were well acquainted with incorporeal circulation. For the theologiſt of the Greeks (Orpheus) ſpeaking concerning that firſt and occult God * who ſubſiſts prior to Phanes, ſays, "that he moves in an infinite circle with unwearied energy."

Ὁ δ'ἀπειρεσιον κατα κυκλον ατρυτως φοροιτο.

And the Chaldæan Oracles aſſert that all fountains and principles abide in an *unſluggiſh* revolution. For, ſince every thing which is moved in a circle has permanency mingled with motion, they are very properly ſaid always to abide in circulation, the *unſluggiſh* here ſignifying *immateriality*. The motions, therefore, of incorporeal natures are comprehended in this diviſion; and ſo *the one*

* Viz. the το ὀν or the firſt being of Plato, the ſummit of the intelligible order.

is

locally, it will either be carried round in the ſame circle, or it will change one place for another. Neceſſarily ſo. But ought not that which is carried round in a circle to ſtand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itſelf rolled about the middle? And can any method be deviſed by which it is poſſible that a nature which has neither middle nor parts can be circularly carried about the middle? There cannot be any. But if it changes its place[17], would it not become ſituated elſewhere, and thus be moved? In this caſe it would. Has it not appeared to be impoſſible that *the one* ſhould be in any thing? It has. Is it not much more impoſſible that it ſhould *become ſituated* in

is ſhown to be immovable, as being eſtabliſhed above all motion, and not as being partly immovable and partly movable.

[17] That it is impoſſible for *the one* to paſs from one place to another is evident. For either the whole muſt be within both places; or the whole muſt be without both; or this part of it muſt be here, and that in the other place. But if the whole being without is in neither, it cannot be moved from one place to another. If again the whole is within both, neither again will it be moved from the former to the following place. And if one part of it is in this, and another in the remaining place, it will be partible, or conſiſt of parts. But *the one* is not partible; and conſequently it cannot be in any thing. And here obſerve, that though there may be ſomething which is neither without nor within a certain thing, but is both without and within (for thus ſoul and intellect are ſaid to be in the world and out of it), yet it is impoſſible for the whole of a thing to be in ſomething, and yet be neither without nor within it. Regarding, therefore, the partible nature of ſoul, not only ours, but alſo that which is divine, we may ſay that it poſſeſſes the cauſe of a motion of this kind, ſince it is neither wholly within nor yet perfectly without that which is the object of its energy. For the whole of it does not at once apply itſelf to the conceptions of intellect, ſince it is not naturally adapted to ſee theſe collectively; nor is it wholly ſeparated from intellect, but according to its own different intellections it becomes in a certain reſpect ſituated in the different forms of intellect, and introduces itſelf as it were into its intellections, as into its proper place. Hence Timæus does not refuſe to call the ſoul generated, as he had previouſly denominated it partible. For ſoul does not poſſeſs a collective intelligence, but all its energies are generated; and in conſequence of this its intellections are eſſentialized in tranſitions. Hence alſo time is ſo intimately connected with ſoul, that it meaſures its firſt energies. Intellect, therefore, appears genuinely to contain the paradigm of a circular motion, poſſeſſing as a centre that part of itſelf which abides, and which is the intelligible of intellect, but the many progreſſions of forms from this Veſta as it were of itſelf, as right lines from the centre. But all its energies, which are intellective of intelligibles, have the relation of the one ſuperficies running round the lines from the centre, and the centre itſelf. A divine ſoul, however, contains the paradigm both of a right-lined and circular progreſſion; of the former, as proceeding about the intelligible place, abiding indeed as a whole, but evolving the intelligible by its tranſitions; but of the latter, as always fixing the whole of itſelf in the object of intellection: for, as

in any thing? I do not underſtand how you mean. If any thing is *becoming to be* in any thing, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould not yet *be* in it, ſince it is *becoming to be*; nor yet entirely out of it, ſince it has already *become?* It is neceſſary. If therefore this can take place in any other thing, it muſt certainly happen to that which poſſeſſes parts; for one part of it will be in this thing, but another out of it: but that which has no parts cannot by any means be wholly within or without any thing. It is true. But is it not much more impoſſible that that which neither has parts nor is a whole can be *becoming to be* in any thing; ſince it can neither ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* according to parts, nor according to a whole? So it appears. Hence it will neither change its place by going any where [18], nor that it may *become ſituated* in any thing; nor, through being carried round in that which is the ſame, will it ſuffer any alteration. It does not appear that it can. *The one* therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion. Immovable. But we have likewiſe aſſerted [19] that it is impoſſible for

a whole, it both abides and is moved. And in the laſt place, a partial ſoul, by its motions according to length, clearly produces the incorporeal cauſe of a right-lined motion.

[18] Plato here collects all the aforeſaid concluſions about motion; and having before enumerated them in a divided manner, he makes one univerſal concluſion, teaching us through this aſcent how it is always requiſite in the viſion of *the one* to contract multitude into that which is common, and to comprehend parts through the whole. For the things which he had before divided into parts receiving three motions, viz. internal mutation, the right-lined and circular progreſſion, theſe he now ſeparately enumerates, by ſaying, that *the one* neither proceeds, nor is circularly borne along, nor is altered; and making an orderly enumeration, he recurs from things proximately demonſtrated to ſuch as are prior to them, that he may conjoin the beginning to the end, and may imitate the intellectual circle. And here we may again ſee that the propoſition and the concluſion are univerſal, but that the demonſtrations proceed together with diviſions. For ſtable intellections and converſions contract multitude; but thoſe which ſubſiſt according to progreſſion divide the whole into parts, and *the one* into its proper number.

[19] The thing propoſed to be ſhown from the firſt was to demonſtrate that *the one* is unindigent of permanency and motion, and that it is beyond and the cauſe of both. For the negation of permanency and motion cannot be applied to *the one* in the ſame manner as to matter. For matter participates of theſe merely in appearance. It is therefore applied to *the one*, as being better than both theſe. For, as ſome one prior to us, ſays Proclus, obſerves, becauſe *the one* does not abide, *being* is moved, and becauſe it is not moved, *being* is permanent. For *being* by its ſtability imitates the immobility of *the one*, and, by its efficacious energy, that which in *the one* is above tenſion and an eſtabliſhment in itſelf. And through both theſe it is aſſimilated to *the one*, which is neither.

It

for *the one* to be in any thing. We have ſaid ſo. It can never therefore be in *ſame*. Why? Becauſe it would now be in that in which *ſame* is. Entirely ſo. But the one can neither be in itſelf nor in another. It cannot. The one therefore is never in *ſame*. It does not appear that it is. But as it is never in *ſame*, it can neither be at reſt nor ſtand ſtill. In this caſe it cannot. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, neither ſtands ſtill nor is moved. It does not appear that it can. Nor will it be the ſame either with another[20], or with itſelf; nor again different either from itſelf or from another.

It is alſo beautifully obſerved here by Proclus, that a thing appears to ſtand ſtill, which is eſtabliſhed in *another*, but *to be at reſt*, which is able to abide in *itſelf*. But Parmenides denies both theſe of *the one*, as not being in another nor in itſelf. Whether, therefore, there is a certain intellectual tranquillity which is celebrated by the wiſe, or myſtic port, or paternal ſilence, it is evident that *the one* is exempt from all ſuch things, being beyond energy, ſilence and quiet, and all the ſtable ſignatures which belong to beings.

But here, perhaps, ſome one may ſay, it has been ſufficiently ſhown that *the one* is neither moved nor ſtands ſtill, yet nothing hinders but that he may be called *ſtability* or motion. To this we reply, that *the one*, as we have before obſerved, is neither both of two oppoſites, leſt he ſhould become not one, and there ſhould be prior to it that which mingles the oppoſites; nor is it the better of the two, leſt it ſhould have ſomething which is oppoſed, and thus, in conſequence of containing a property oppoſite to ſomething elſe, ſhould again be not one, and not being one ſhould conſiſt of infinite infinites; nor is it the worſe of the two, leſt it ſhould have ſomething better than itſelf, and this ſomething better ſhould again in like manner conſiſt of infinite infinites. Hence Plato at length even denies *the one* of it, becauſe that which is firſt is beyond all oppoſition, and *the one* is oppoſed to *the many*.

Let it alſo be obſerved that the firſt permanency and the firſt motion originate from themſelves, the one deriving from itſelf ſtable power, and the other efficacious energy; in the ſame manner as every thing elſe which is firſt begins its own energy from itſelf. So that, when it is ſaid *the one* does not ſtand, and is not moved, this alſo implies that it is not permanency, and that it is not motion. Hence, neither muſt it be ſaid that *the one* is the moſt firm of all ſtable things, and the moſt energetic of every thing that is in motion: for tranſcendencies of participations do not take away, but ſtrengthen the participations. If, therefore, *the one* does not in ſhort *ſtand*, it is not *moſt firm*. For either *moſt firm* is only a name, and aſſerts nothing concerning *the one*, or it manifeſts that it is moſt ſtable. And if it is not in any reſpect moved, it is not *moſt energetic*. For, if theſe words ſignify nothing, they aſſert nothing concerning *the one*; but, if they ſignify that which in the moſt eminent degree participates of motion, *the one* will not be moſt energetic. For energy is a certain motion.

[20] Plato here appears to characteriſe for us the whole demiurgic order, in the ſame manner as the words prior to theſe characteriſe the vivific order, and thoſe again prior to theſe, that which ranks as the ſummit in intellectuals. Theſe things, indeed, as Proclus well obſerves, appear in a moſt eminent degree to pertain to the demiurgic ſeries, according to the Platonic narrations concerning

another. How ſo? For, if different from itſelf[21], it would be different from

cerning it, and thoſe of other theologiſts; though, ſays he, this is dubious to ſome, who alone conſider *permanency* and *motion*, *fameneſs* and *difference*, philoſophically, and do not perceive that theſe things are firſt beheld about *the one*, and not about *being*; and that, as there is a twofold number, viz. ſupereſſential and eſſential, in like manner each of theſe genera of being firſt ſubſiſt in the divine unities, and afterwards in beings. They likewiſe do not ſee that theſe are ſigns of the divine and ſelf-perfect orders, and not of the genera or ſpecies only of being.

Let it alſo be obſerved that the genera of being ſubſiſt both in the intelligible and intellectual orders, intelligibly in the former, and intellectually in the latter; and this is juſt the ſame as to aſſert that in intelligibles they ſubſiſt abſorbed in unity, and without ſeparation, but in intellectuals with ſeparation according to their proper number. So that it is by no means wonderful if the intelligible monad comprehends the whole intellectual pentad, viz. eſſence, motion, permanency, fameneſs and difference, without diviſion, and in the moſt profound union, ſince through this union all theſe are after a manner one: for all things, ſays Proclus, are there without ſeparation according to a *dark miſt*, as the theologiſt* aſſerts. Αδιακριτων παντων οντων κατα σκοτοεσσαν ὁμιχλην φησιν ὁ Θεολογος. For if in arithmetic the monad, which is the cauſe of monadic numbers, contains all thoſe forms or productive principles which the decad comprehends decadically, and the tetrad tetradically, is it at all wonderful that among beings the intelligible monad ſhould comprehend all the genera of being monadically, and without ſeparation; but that another order ſhould contain theſe dyadically, another tetradically, and another decadically? For ideas alſo ſubſiſt in intelligibles, but not after the ſame manner as in intellectuals; ſince in the former they ſubſiſt *totally*, *unitedly*, and *paternally*; but in the latter *with ſeparation*, *partially*, and *demiurgically*. But it is every where neceſſary that the number of ideas ſhould be ſuſpended from the genera of being. If, therefore, intellectual ideas participate of the intellectual genera, intelligible ideas alſo muſt participate of the intelligible genera. But if ideas firſt ſubſiſt tetradically at the extremity of intelligibles, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a monadic ſubſiſtence of theſe genera prior to the formal tetrad.

Let us now conſider why Plato firſt takes away from *the one*, *motion* and *permanency*, and afterwards *ſame* and *different*. We have already indeed ſaid what was the cauſe of this, viz. that *motion* and *permanency* are twofold, one kind being prior to ſame and different, according to which every thing proceeds and is converted to its cauſe, but the other being poſterior to ſame and different, and appearing in the energies of beings. But we ſhall now, with Proclus, aſſign the reaſon of this, after another manner, from the problems themſelves. In this firſt hypotheſis then, concerning *the one*, ſome things are denied of it with reſpect to itſelf alone: for *multitude* and *the whole*, *figure*, and *the being in a certain thing*, *motion* and *permanency*, are taken away from *the one* conſidered with reſpect to itſelf. But *ſame* and *different*, *ſimilar* and *diſſimilar*, *equal* and *unequal*, *older* and *younger*, are denied of *the one* both with reſpect to itſelf and other things: for *the one* is neither the *ſame* with itſelf, nor with others, and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to

* Viz. Orpheus. Agreeably to this, in the Orphic hymn to Protogonus, who ſubſiſts at the extremity of the intelligible order, that deity is ſaid "*to wipe away from the eyes a dark miſt.*"

Οσσων ἐς σκοτοεσσαν απημαυρωσας ὁμιχλην.

different,

from *the one*, and ſo would not be *the one*. True. And if it ſhould be the ſame

different, and each of the reſt. But *that which is the object of opinion* or *ſcience*, or *which can be named*, or *is effable*, are denied of *the one* with reſpect to other things: for it is unknown to all ſecondary natures, by theſe gnoſtic energies. Negations, therefore, being aſſumed in a triple reſpect, viz. of a thing with reſpect to itſelf, of itſelf with reſpect to others, and of itſelf both with reſpect to itſelf and others, and ſome of theſe ranking as firſt, others as middle, and others as laſt, hence *motion* and *permanency* are denied of *the one*, as of itſelf with reference to itſelf, but *the ſame* and *different* are denied in a twofold reſpect, viz. of *the one* with reference to itſelf, and of itſelf with reference to other things. Hence the former are co-arranged with firſt negations, but the latter with ſuch as are middle. Nor is it without reaſon that he firſt diſcourſes about the former, and afterwards about the latter. Thus alſo he denies *the ſimilar* and *the diſſimilar*, *the equal* and *the unequal*, *the older* and *the younger*, of *the one* with reference to itſelf and other things. He likewiſe through theſe takes away from *the one*, *eſſence*, *quantity*, *quality*, and *the when*: for *the ſame* and *different* pertain to *eſſences*, *the ſimilar* and *the diſſimilar*, to *qualities*, *the equal* and *the unequal*, to *quantities*, and *the older* and *the younger*, to things which exiſt at a certain time. Plato alſo, ſays Proclus, denies *the ſame* and *the different* of *the one*, knowing that Parmenides in his poems places theſe in *the one being*: for thus Parmenides ſpeaks—

Ταυτον τ' εν ταυτῳ μιμνει, καθ' εαυτο τε κειται.

i. e. *Same* in *the ſame* abides, yet by itſelf ſubſiſts.

It is neceſſary, therefore, to ſhow that *the one* which is eſtabliſhed above *the one being*, is by no means *ſame*, and much more that it it is not *different*: for *ſameneſs* is more allied to *the one* than *difference*. Hence, he takes away both *ſame* and *different* from *the one*, that he may ſhow that it tranſcends *the one being*, in which both theſe ſubſiſt according to the verſes of Parmenides, not confuting theſe verſes, but taking occaſion from them to make this additional aſſertion. For, if that which participates of ſameneſs and difference is not yet *the true one*, it neceſſarily follows that *the true one* muſt ſubſiſt prior to theſe: for whatever is added to *the one* obſcures by the addition the unity of the recipient.

[21] There being four problems concerning *ſame* and *different*, as denied of *the one*, Plato beginning from the former of theſe, and which are more eaſily apprehended by us, proceeds through thoſe that remain. But the four problems are as follow: *The one* is not different from itſelf: *the one* is not different from other things: *the one* is not the ſame with itſelf: and *the one* is not the ſame with other things. Of theſe four the extremes are the cleareſt: for that *the one* is not the ſame with other things is evident, and alſo that it is not different from itſelf. But the other two are attended with ſome difficulty. For how can any one admit that that which is one is not the ſame with itſelf? Or how is it poſſible not to be perſuaded, that it is not different from other things, ſince it is exempt from them?

Let us then conſider how the firſt of theſe problems is demonſtrated, viz. that *the one* is not different from itſelf. It is, therefore, demonſtrated as follows: If *the one* is different from itſelf, it will be entirely different from *the one*. But that which is different from *the one*, is not *one*:

ſame with another [22], it would be that thing and would not be itſelf; ſo that neither could it thus be *the one*, but it would be ſomething different from *the*

for that which is different from man is not man, and that which is different from horſe is not horſe; and, in ſhort, that which is different from any thing is not that thing. If, therefore, *the one* is different from itſelf, *the one* is not *one*. And this abſurdity leads us to contradiction, that *the one* is not *one*. *The one*, therefore, is not different from itſelf. Some one, however, may doubt againſt this demonſtration, whether it may not thus be ſhown that *difference* is not *different* from itſelf; though indeed it is neceſſary that it ſhould. For every true being begins its energy from itſelf, as we have before obſerved: and the Eleatean gueſt, in the Sophiſta, ſays that the nature of *difference* is different from the other genera. But if *difference* is different from itſelf, it will not be *difference*; and hence *difference* is not different from itſelf. May we not ſay, therefore, that difference begins indeed its energy from itſelf, and makes itſelf different, yet not different from itſelf, but from other things? For it is able to ſeparate them from each other, and, by a much greater priority, itſelf from them: and thus its energy is directed to itſelf, in preſerving itſelf unconfuſed with other things. It may alſo be ſaid, and that more truly, that *difference* ſo far as it is different from itſelf is not *difference*: for it is different from itſelf through the participation of the other genera of being. So far, therefore, as it participates of other things, ſo far it is not difference. Nor is it abſurd that this ſhould be the caſe with *difference*: for it is *multitude*. But it is abſurd that this ſhould be the caſe with *the one*: for it is *one* alone, and nothing elſe.

[22] This is the ſecond of the four problems, which is indeed more eaſily to be apprehended than thoſe that follow, but is more difficult than the one that precedes it. Plato, therefore, confides in the aſſertion that *the one* receives nothing from other things. For this is an axiom of all others the moſt true, both when applied to *the one*, and to all other cauſes; ſince no cauſe receives any thing from that which is ſubordinate to itſelf. For neither do the heavens receive into themſelves any thing of mortal moleſtation; nor does the demiurgus receive any thing from the generation which is about the whole world; nor do intelligibles participate of multitude from the intellectual order, and the ſeparation which it contains. So that neither can *the one* be filled from the idiom of beings, and conſequently it is by no means the ſame with other things. For it would either participate of the things themſelves, or of things proceeding from them, or both they and *the one* would participate of ſome other one. But both cannot participate of another one: for nothing is better than *the one*, nor is there any thing which is more one; ſince in this caſe there would be ſomething prior to *the one*. For the aſcent is to *the one*, and not to multitude; ſince things more elevated always poſſeſs more of the nature of unity, as for inſtance, ſoul than body. Nor does *the one* participate of things themſelves, ſince theſe are worſe than it, nor of things proceeding from them: for it is at once exempt from all things, and is the object of deſire to all beings, ſubſiſting as an imparticipable prior to wholes, that it may be *one* without multitude; ſince the participated one is not in every reſpect one. In no reſpect, therefore, is *the one* the ſame with others. And thus it appears from common conceptions that the aſſertion is true.

Let

the one. It could not indeed. But, if it is the ſame with another, muſt it not be different from itſelf? It muſt. But it will not be different [23] from another

Let us now conſider the demonſtration of Parmenides, which is as follows: If *the one* is the ſame with any thing elſe, it will be the ſame with that which is not one: for it is itſelf *the one.* Hence alſo it is at the ſame time evident, that it is impoſſible for the true one to be two: for the two will differ from each other. Each, therefore, being one and differing from the other, each in conſequence of poſſeſſing difference together with unity, will no longer be one. Hence *the one* is alone one. That, therefore, which is different from it is not one. Hence, if *the one* is the ſame with another, it is clearly the ſame with non-one: for that which is the ſame with *the one* is one, and that which is the ſame with non-man is non-man. If, therefore, *the one* is the ſame with any other thing beſides itſelf, *the one* is not one. But if not one it is different from *the one*; which was before ſhown to be abſurd. Parmenides alſo adds, and it would be different from *the one,* that through the abſurdity proximately ſhown the abſurdity of this hypotheſis alſo may become apparent. Thus likewiſe it may be demonſtrated that ſameneſs itſelf is not ſameneſs, if there is any inſtance in which it is in a certain reſpect the ſame with difference, or any thing elſe beſides itſelf. Thus, it may be ſaid that ſameneſs is the ſame with difference, ſo far as it participates of difference. If, therefore, it is the ſame with difference, it is different, and not the ſame. Nor is there any abſurdity in this: for in its own eſſence it is ſameneſs, but by participation of difference it becomes different. It becomes however the *ſame* with *difference,* through the participation of difference; which is moſt paradoxical, that *ſameneſs* ſhould become *ſame* through *difference.*

[23] Of the two remaining problems Plato again demonſtrates the more eaſy prior to the other. But it is eaſier to deny that which is more remote from *the one*; and ſuch is *difference.* But ſameneſs is more allied to *the one*; and hence it has a nature more difficult to be ſeparated from it, and requires more abundant diſcuſſion. *The one* then, ſo far as *one,* does not participate of difference: for, if it did, it would be non-one. But every thing which is different from another is ſaid to be ſo through difference. *The one,* therefore, ſo far as one is not different, becauſe it does not participate of difference. For to be different alone pertains to that which is different from another, and not to *the one*; and ſuch is that which participates of difference. But if *the one* is different through difference, it participates of difference. For *the one* is one thing, and different another; the former being denominated by itſelf, and the other with relation to ſomething elſe: ſo that different is not different by *the one,* but by that which makes different.

But here a doubt may ariſe, how *the one* is ſaid to be exempt from all things if it is not different from them? For that which is exempt is ſeparated from thoſe things from which it is exempt. But every thing which is ſeparated is ſeparated through difference: for *difference* is the ſource of diviſion, but *ſameneſs* of connexion. In anſwer to this it may be ſaid, that *the one* is exempt and ſeparate from all things, but that it does not poſſeſs this ſeparation through difference, but from another ineffable tranſcendency, and not ſuch as that which difference imparts to beings. For, as both the world and intellect ſubſiſt for ever, but the *ever* is not the ſame in both, being *temporal* in the former, and *eternal* in the latter, and exempt from all time; ſo intellect is exempt from the

another while it is *the one*. For it does not belong to *the one* to be different from another, but to that alone which is different from another, and to no other. Right. In conſequence, therefore, of its being *the one*, it will not be another; or do you think that it can? Certainly not. But if it is not different from another, neither will it be different from itſelf. But if not different from itſelf, it will not be that which is *different*; and being in no reſpect that which is different, it will be different from nothing. Right. Nor yet will it be the ſame [1] with itſelf. Why not? Is the nature of *the one* the ſame with that of *ſame*? Why? Becauſe, when any thing becomes the ſame with any thing, it does not on this account become one. But what then? That which becomes the ſame with many things muſt neceſſarily become many, and not one. True. But if *the one* and *ſame* differ in no reſpect, whenever any thing becomes *ſame* it will always become *the one*, and whenever it becomes *the one* it will be *ſame*. Entirely ſo. If, therefore, *the one* ſhould be the *ſame* with itſelf, it would be to itſelf that which is *not one*; and ſo that which is one will not be one. But this indeed is impoſſible. It is impoſſible, therefore, for *the one* to be either different from another, or the ſame with itſelf. Impoſſible. And thus *the one* will neither be *different* [2] nor *the ſame*, either with reſpect to itſelf or another. It

world, and *the one* from beings; but the exempt ſubſiſtence of intellect is derived from *difference* which ſeparates beings, but that of *the one* is prior to *difference*. For *difference* imitates that which is exempt and unmingled in *the one*, juſt as *ſameneſs* imitates its ineffable *oneneſs*.

[1] This is the fourth of the problems, that *the one* is not the *ſame* with itſelf, neither as ſameneſs, nor as participating of ſameneſs: and, in the firſt place, he ſhows that it is not as *ſameneſs*. For, if *the one* is ſameneſs, it is neceſſary that every thing which participates of ſameneſs ſhould according to that participation become one. It is however poſſible that a thing ſo far as it participates of ſameneſs may become many, as is evident in that which becomes the ſame with many qualities. Sameneſs, therefore, is not *the one*. For, as that which becomes the ſame with man is man, and that which becomes the ſame with the white is white, and with the black, black, and, in ſhort, in every thing, that which is the ſame with any form entirely receives that with which it is ſaid to become the ſame,—ſo that which becomes the ſame with many things, ſo far as it is many, is the ſame with them. But, ſo far as it is many, it is impoſſible that it can be one. And hence ſameneſs is not *the one*.

[2] This is the common concluſion of the four problems, and which reverts to the firſt propoſition. We may alſo ſee that Plato begins from *the different* and ends in *the different*, imitating, both by the conciſeneſs of the concluſion and in making the end the ſame with the beginning, the

It will not. But neither will it be ſimilar [1] to any thing, or diſſimilar either to itſelf or to another. Why not? Becauſe the ſimilar is that which in a certain

the circle of intellectual energy. It is alſo beautifully obſerved here by Proclus, that as *difference* in beings is twofold, or rather triple, viz. that of things more excellent, that of things ſubordinate, and that of things coordinate,—hence in ſupereſſential natures *tranſcendency* muſt be aſſumed inſtead of the *difference* which ſubſiſts in forms between the more excellent and the inferior; *ſubjection* inſtead of the *difference* of the *inferior* with reſpect to the ſuperior; and *idiom* inſtead of the *ſeparation* of things coordinate from each other. *The one*, therefore, tranſcends all things; and neither is *the one* different from other things, nor are other things different from *the one*. But if we employ ſuch like appellations, and aſſert that other things are different from *the one*, we ſhould look to the imbecility of human nature, and pardon ſuch aſſertions. For that we cannot properly predicate any thing of *the one*, Plato himſelf indicates at the end of this hypotheſis: at the ſame time, however, we aſſert ſomething *concerning* it, through the ſpontaneous parturition of the ſoul about *the one*.

[1] Parmenides, ſays Proclus, paſſes from the *demiurgic* to the *aſſimilative* order, the idiom of which is to be alone ſupermundane, and through which all the *mundane* and *liberated* genera are aſſimilated to the intellectual Gods, and are conjoined with the demiurgic monad, which rules over wholes with exempt tranſcendency. From this demiurgic monad, too, all the aſſimilative order proceeds. But it imitates the *ſameneſs* which is there through ſimilitude, exhibiting in a more partial manner that power of *ſameneſs* which is collective and connective of wholes. It likewiſe imitates *demiurgic difference*, through diſſimilitude, expreſſing its ſeparating and diviſive power through unconfuſed purity with reſpect to the extremes. Nor muſt we here admit, as Proclus well obſerves, that which was aſſerted by ſome of the antients, viz. that *ſimilitude* is *remitted ſameneſs*, and *diſſimilitude remitted difference*. For neither are there any intentions and remiſſions in the Gods, nor things indefinite, and the more and the leſs, but all things are there eſtabliſhed in their proper boundaries and proper meaſures. Hence, it more accords with divine natures to aſſert ſuch things of them as can be manifeſted by analogy. For Plato alſo admits analogy in theſe, in the Republic eſtabliſhing *the good* to be that in intelligibles which *the ſun* is in ſenſibles. Similitude, therefore, and diſſimilitude are that in ſecondary which ſameneſs and difference are in the natures prior to them: and the ſimilar and the diſſimilar are the firſt progeny of ſameneſs and difference. The equal, alſo, and the unequal proceed from thence, but prior to theſe are ſimilitude and diſſimilitude: for the ſimilar is more in forms than the equal, and the diſſimilar more than the unequal. Hence, they are proximately ſuſpended from the demiurgic monad; and on this account Timæus not only repreſents the demiurgus making the world, but alſo *aſſimilating* it to animal itſelf more than it was before; indicating by this that the *aſſimilative* cauſe preſubſiſts in the fabricator of the univerſe. With great propriety, therefore, Plato proceeds to the aſſimilative order after the demiurgic monad, taking away this alſo from *the one*.

But the method of the problems is the ſame as before: for here alſo there are four problems, viz. if *the one* is ſimilar to itſelf; if *the one* is diſſimilar to itſelf; if *the one* is ſimilar to other things;

certain reſpect ſuffers [1] *ſame*. Certainly. But it has appeared that *ſame* is naturally ſeparate from *the one*. It has appeared ſo. But if *the one* ſhould ſuffer any thing except being *the one* which *is*, it would become more than *the one*: but this is impoſſible. Certainly. In no reſpect, therefore, can *the one*

if *the one* is diſſimilar to other things. But all the demonſtrations, that none of theſe is adapted to *the one*, originate from ſameneſs and difference, the media, according to demonſtrative rules, being the proper cauſes of the thing. Hence, he often frames the demonſtration from things remote, and not from things which have been proximately demonſtrated. For things in a higher order, and which have a prior ſubſiſtence, are not always generative of ſecondary natures, but they perfect, or defend, or employ a providential care about, but are not entirely generative of them. Thus, for inſtance, Plato demonſtrates that *the one* is not a *whole*, and has not *parts*, from *the many*: for thence the intellectual wholeneſs proceeds. He demonſtrates that it has not *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, from *whole* and *parts*: for the order characterized by *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, is proximately produced from theſe. Again, he demonſtrates that *the one* is neither *ſtraight* nor *round*, from *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*: for the *ſtraight* and *round* thence receive their generation. But he ſhows that *the one* is neither in *itſelf*, nor in *another*, from that order, and not from figure, though according to progreſſion this is arranged before it. And he demonſtrates that *the one* neither ſtands nor is moved, from *not being in any thing*, and from *not having a middle*, and from *not having parts*. Thus, alſo, in the demonſtrations concerning *ſimilitude* and *diſſimilitude*, he derives the negations which are negative of *the one* from *ſameneſs* and *difference*: for the latter are the ſources of progreſſion to the former.

[1] The ſyllogiſm which furniſhes us with a proof that *the one* is not ſimilar, neither to itſelf nor to another, proceeds geometrically as follows, Plato having firſt defined what the ſimilar is. That, then, which ſuffers a certain ſomething which is the ſame, is ſaid to be ſimilar to that with which it ſuffers ſomething the ſame. For, we ſay that two white things are ſimilar, and alſo two black, in conſequence of the former being the paſſive recipients of the white, and the latter of the black. And again, if you ſay that a white thing and a black thing are ſimilar to each other, you will ſay that they are ſimilar from the participation of colour, which is their common genus. The ſyllogiſm, therefore, is as follows: *The one* ſuffers nothing the ſame, neither with itſelf nor with another: *the ſimilar* ſuffers ſomething the ſame, either with itſelf or with another: *the one*, therefore, is not ſimilar, neither to itſelf nor to another. Such being the ſyllogiſm, Plato thinks that one of the propoſitions alone requires aſſiſtance, viz. that which aſſerts that *the one* does not ſuffer any thing the ſame, neither with itſelf nor with another.

And here, as Proclus well obſerves, we may ſee what caution Plato uſes: for he does not ſay if *the one* ſhould ſuffer *the one*, but if *the one* ſhould ſuffer any thing, except being *the one which is*, χωρις του εν ειναι, for it is *the one*, and does not ſuffer it; ſince every thing which ſuffers, or is paſſive, is many. For he calls the participation of any thing a paſſion. Does he not, therefore, in ſaying that *the one* ſuffers nothing elſe, but *the one* which *is*, indicate in a very wonderful manner that even *the one* is ſubordinate to the principle of all things? which indeed he ſays it is at the

one ſuffer to be the ſame, either with another or with itſelf. It does not appear that it can. It cannot, therefore, be ſimilar either to another or to itſelf. So it ſeems. Nor yet can *the one* ſuffer to be another; for thus it would ſuffer to be more than *the one*. More, indeed. But that which ſuffers to be different, either from itſelf or from another, will be diſſimilar either to itſelf or to another, if that which ſuffers *ſame* is ſimilar. Right. But *the one*, as it appears, ſince it in no reſpect ſuffers *different*, can in no reſpect be diſſimilar either to itſelf or to another. It certainly cannot. *The one*, therefore, will neither be ſimilar nor diſſimilar, either to another or to itſelf. It does not appear that it can.

end of this hypotheſis. He alſo indicates that the addition of this aſſertion to the principle of things is foreign to it, though more allied to it than other things, becauſe it is not poſſible to conceive any thing more venerable than *the one*.

Should it be aſked whence it is that what ſuffers the ſame is ſimilar, we reply that ſimilitude is the progeny of ſameneſs, in the ſame manner as ſameneſs of *the one*. Sameneſs, therefore, participates of *the one*, and ſimilitude of ſameneſs. For, this it is to ſuffer, to participate of another, and to proceed according to another more antient cauſe.

Let it alſo be obſerved, that when it is ſaid that all things are ſimilar to *the one*, in conſequence of ineffably proceeding from thence, they muſt not be underſtood to be ſimilar according to this ſimilitude, but alone according to that union which pervades to all beings from *the one*, and the ſpontaneous deſire of all things about *the one*. For all things are what they are from a deſire of *the one*, through *the one*; and in conſequence of this parturition every thing being filled with a union adapted to its nature, is aſſimilated to the one cauſe of all things. Hence, it is not aſſimilated to ſimilars; leſt the ineffable principle itſelf ſhould alſo appear to be ſimilar to other things; but, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, it is aſſimilated to the paradigm of things ſimilar to this higheſt cauſe. Beings, therefore, are aſſimilated to *the one*; but they are aſſimilated through an ineffable deſire of *the one*, and not through this aſſimilative order, or the form of ſimilitude. For the aſſimilative which immediately ſubſiſts after the intellectual order, is not able to conjoin and draw upwards all beings to *the one*; but its province is to elevate things poſterior to itſelf to the intellectual demiurgic monad. When, therefore, it is ſaid that every progreſſion is effected through ſimilitude, it is requiſite to pardon the names which we are accuſtomed to uſe in ſpeaking of beings, when they are applied to the unfolding into light of all things from the ineffable principle of all. For, as we call him *the one*, in conſequence of perceiving nothing more venerable, nothing more holy, in beings than unity, ſo we characterize the progreſſion of all things from him by *ſimilitude*, not being able to give any name to ſuch progreſſion more perfect than this. Thus alſo Socrates, in the Republic, calls this ineffable principle, according to analogy, the *idea* of the good; becauſe *the good*, or *the one*, is that to all beings which every intelligible idea is to the proper ſeries ſubſiſting from and with relation to it.

But

But ſince it is ſuch, it will neither be equal [1] nor unequal, either to itſelf or to another. How ſo? If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the ſame

[1] After the aſſimilative order of Gods, which is ſupermundane alone, antient theologiſts arrange that which is denominated liberated, the peculiarity of which, according to them, is to be exempt from mundane affairs, and at the ſame time to communicate with them. They are alſo proximately carried in the mundane Gods; and hence they ſay that they are allotted the medium of the ſupermundane and mundane Gods. This liberated order, therefore, Plato delivers to us in the ſecond hypotheſis, and alſo there ſays what the idiom of it is, and that it is *touching*: for it is in a certain reſpect mundane and ſupermundane, being collective of thoſe that are properly called mundane Gods, and producing into multitude the union of all the aſſimilative and ſupermundane ſeries. Here, however, Plato omits this order, and paſſes on to thoſe Gods that are alone mundane; the reaſon of which we ſhall endeavour to aſſign in commenting on the ſecond hypotheſis.

The peculiarity, therefore, of the mundane Gods is *the equal* and *the unequal*, the former of theſe indicating their fulneſs, and their receiving neither any addition nor ablation; (for ſuch is that which is equal to itſelf, always preſerving the ſame boundary;) but the latter, the multitude of their powers, and the exceſs and defect which they contain. For, in theſe, diviſions, variety of powers, differences of progreſſions, analogies, and bonds through theſe, are, according to antient theologiſts, eſpecially allotted a place. Hence, Timæus alſo conſtitutes ſouls through analogy, the cauſes of which muſt neceſſarily preſubſiſt in the Gods that proximately preſide over ſouls: and as all analogies ſubſiſt from equality, Plato very properly indicates the idiom of theſe divinities by the equal and the unequal. But he now very properly frames the demonſtrations of the negations of the equal and the unequal from *ſameneſs* and *the many*, and not from *the ſimilar* and *the diſſimilar*, though he proximately ſpoke of theſe. For every mundane deity proceeds from the demiurgic monad, and the firſt multitude which he firſt denies of the one.

Of this then we muſt be entirely perſuaded, that the things from which demonſtrations conſiſt are the preceding cauſes of the particulars about which Parmenides diſcourſes; ſo that *the equal* and *the unequal*, ſo far as they proceed from *the one*, and ſubſiſt through *ſameneſs* and *the many*, ſo far through theſe they are denied of *the one*. Hence, Plato thus begins his diſcourſe concerning them:—"*But ſince it is ſuch*," viz. not as we have juſt now demonſtrated, but as was formerly ſhown, that it neither receives *ſame* nor *different*, and is *without multitude*,—being ſuch, it is neither equal nor unequal, neither to itſelf nor to others: for, again, there are here twofold concluſions, in the ſame manner as concerning the ſimilar and the diſſimilar, and the ſame and the different. But that *the equal* and *the unequal* are ſuſpended from the twofold coordinations of divine natures is not immaniſeſt. For *the equal* is arranged under *the ſimilar*, and *the ſame*, *ſubſiſtence in another*, *the round*, and *the whole*; but *the unequal*, under *the diſſimilar*, *the different*, *ſubſiſtence in itſelf*, *the ſtraight*, and *the poſſeſſion of parts*. And again, of theſe the former are ſuſpended from *bound*, and the latter from *infinity*. Plato alſo appears to produce the diſcourſe through certain oppoſitions, as it were, that he may ſhow that *the one* is above all oppoſition. For *the one* cannot be the worſe of the two oppoſites, ſince this would be abſurd; nor can it be the better of the two, ſince in

ſame [1] meaſures with that to which it is equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or leſſer than the things with which it is commenſurate, will poſſeſs more meaſures than the leſſer quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to thoſe to which it is incommenſurable, with reſpect to the one part, it will conſiſt of leſſer; and with reſpect to the other, of greater meaſures. How ſhould it not? Is it not, therefore, impoſſible that that which does not participate of *ſame* ſhould either be of the ſame meaſures, or admit any thing in any reſpect the ſame? It is im-

in this caſe it would not be the cauſe of all things. For the better oppoſite is not the cauſe of the worſe, but in a certain reſpect communicates with it, without being properly its cauſe. For neither does fameneſs give ſubſiſtence to difference, nor permanency to motion; but comprehenſion and union pervade from the better to the worſe.

[1] It is by no means wonderful that the demonſtrations of *the equal* and *the unequal*, which are here aſſumed as ſymbols of mundane deity, ſhould be adapted to phyſical and mathematical equals, to the equals in the reaſons of ſoul, and to thoſe in intellectual forms. For it is neceſſary that demonſtrations in all theſe negations ſhould begin ſupernally, and ſhould extend through all ſecondary natures, that they may ſhow that *the one* of the Gods is exempt from intellectual, pſychical, mathematical, and phyſical forms. All ſuch axioms, therefore, as are now aſſumed concerning things equal and unequal, muſt be adapted to this order of Gods. Hence, ſays Proclus, as it contains many powers, ſome of which are coordinate with each other, and extend themſelves to the ſelf-perfect and the good, but others differ according to tranſcendency and ſubject in—the former muſt be ſaid to be characteriſed by *equality*, but the latter by *inequality*. For *the good* is the meaſure of every thing: and hence ſuch things as are united by the ſame good are meaſured by the ſame meaſure, and are equal to each other. But things which are uncoordinated with each other make their progreſſion according to the unequal.

Since, however, of things unequal, ſome are commenſurate and others incommenſurate, it is evident that theſe alſo muſt be adapted to divine natures. Hence commenſuration muſt be referred to thoſe Gods, through whom ſecondary natures are mingled with thoſe prior to them, and participate of the whole of more excellent beings: for thus, in things commenſurate, the leſſer is willing to have a common meaſure with the greater, the ſame thing meaſuring the whole of each. But incommenſuration muſt be aſcribed to thoſe divinities from whom things ſubordinate, through the exempt tranſcendency of more excellent natures, participate of them in a certain reſpect, but are incapable through their ſubjection of being conjoined with the whole of them. For the communion from firſt to partial and multifarious natures is incommenſurate to the latter. If, indeed, *the equal* and *the unequal* are ſymbols of the mundane Gods, *the commenſurate* and *the incommenſurate* are here very properly introduced. For in things incorporeal and immaterial this oppoſition has no place, all things being there effable; but where there is a material ſubject, and a mixture of form and ſomething formleſs, there an oppoſition of commenſuration very properly ſubſiſts. Hence, as the mundane Gods are proximately connective of ſouls and bodies, form and matter, a diviſion appears in them, according to *the equal* and *the unequal*.

poſſible.

poſſible. It will, therefore, neither be equal to itſelf nor to another, if it does not conſiſt of the ſame meaſures. It does not appear that it will. But if it conſiſts of more or fewer meaſures, it will be of as many parts as there are meaſures; and ſo again it will no longer be *the one*, but as many as there are meaſures. Right. But if it ſhould be of one meaſure, it would become equal to that meaſure: but it has appeared that *the one* cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared ſo. *The one*, therefore, neither participates of one meaſure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor (ſince it in no reſpect participates of *ſame)* can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itſelf or to another, nor again greater or leſſer either than itſelf or another. It is in every reſpect ſo.

But what? Does it appear that *the one* can be either older [1] or younger, or

[1] Plato having proceeded in negations as far as to the mundane Gods, always taking away things in a conſequent order from *the one*, through the middle genera, or, to ſpeak more clearly, the negations always producing things ſecondary, through ſuch as are proximate to *the one*, from the exempt cauſe of wholes, he is now about to ſeparate from *the one* the divine eſſence itſelf, which firſt participates of the Gods, and receives their progreſſion into the world; or, to ſpeak more accurately, he is now about to produce this eſſence from the ineffable fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its ſubſiſtence from the monad of beings, both *true being*, and that which is aſſimilated to it, which of itſelf indeed is not, but through its communion with true being receives an obſcure repreſentation of being; in like manner, from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of which, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, is to deify all things according to a certain exempt and ineffable tranſcendency, every divine number ſubſiſts, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The deſign, therefore, as we have before obſerved, of what is now ſaid, is to ſhow that *the one* is exempt from this eſſence. And here we may ſee how Parmenides ſubverts their hypotheſis who contend that the firſt cauſe is ſoul, or any thing elſe of this kind, and this by ſhowing that *the one* does not participate of time: for it is impoſſible that a nature which is exempt from time ſhould be ſoul; ſince every ſoul participates of time, and uſes periods which are meaſured by time. *The one* alſo is better than and is beyond intellect, becauſe every intellect is both moved and permanent; but it is demonſtrated that *the one* neither ſtands nor is moved: ſo that, as Proclus well obſerves, through theſe things the three hypoſtaſes which rank as principles, viz. *the one*, *intellect*, and *ſoul*, become known to us (ὡς τε διὰ τουτων τας τρεις αρχικας ὑποστασεις εχοιμεν αν γνωριμους γεγενημενας.) But that *the one* is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides demonſtrates by ſhowing in the firſt place that it is neither older, nor younger, nor of the ſame age with itſelf, nor with any other. For every thing which participates of time neceſſarily participates of theſe; ſo that by ſhowing that *the one* is exempt from theſe which happen to every thing that participates of time, he alſo ſhows that *the one* has no connexion with time. This, however, ſays Proclus, is incredible to the many, and appeared ſo to the phyſiologiſts

or be of the ſame age? What ſhould hinder? If it had in any reſpect the ſame

giſts prior to Plato, who thought that all things were comprehended in time, and that, if there is any thing perpetual, it is infinite time, but that there is not any thing which time does not meaſure. For, as they were of opinion that all things are in place, in conſequence of thinking that all things are bodies, and that nothing is incorporeal, ſo they thought that all things ſubſiſt in time, and are in motion, and that nothing is immovable; for the conception of bodies introduces with itſelf place, but motion time. As therefore it was demonſtrated that *the one* is not in place, becauſe it is not in another, and on this account is incorporeal,—in like manner through theſe arguments it is alſo ſhown that neither is it in time, and on this account that it is not ſoul, nor any thing elſe which requires and participates of time, either according to eſſence or according to energy.

And here it is well worthy our obſervation, that Parmenides no longer ſtops at the dyad as in the former concluſions, but triadically enumerates the peculiarities of this order, viz. *the older*, *the younger*, and *the poſſeſſion of the ſame age*, though, as Proclus juſtly obſerves, he might have ſaid dyadically, *of an equal age*, and *of an unequal age*, as there *the equal* and *the unequal*. But there indeed, having previouſly introduced the dyad, he paſſes from the diviſion of the unequal to the triadic diſtribution; but here he begins from the triad. For there union precedes multitude, and the whole the parts; but in this order of things multitude is moſt apparent, and a diviſion into parts, as Timæus ſays, whom Parmenides, in what is now ſaid, imitating begins indeed from the triad, but proceeds as far as to the hexad. For *the older* and *the younger*, and *the poſſeſſion of the ſame age*, are doubled, being divided into *itſelf* and *relation to another*. That the triad, indeed, and the hexad are adapted to this order, is not immanifeſt: for the triple nature of ſoul, conſiſting of *eſſence*, *ſame*, and *different*, and its triple power, which receives its completion from the charioteer and the two horſes, as we learn from the Phædrus, evince its alliance with the triad; and its eſſence being combined from both theſe ſhows its natural alliance with the hexad.

And here it is neceſſary to obſerve, that as the diſcourſe is about divine ſouls who are deified by always participating of the Gods, *time* according to its firſt ſubſiſtence pertains to theſe ſouls,—not that which proceeds into the apparent, but that which is liberated, and without habitude; and this is the time which is now denied of *the one*. All the periods of ſouls, their harmonious motions about the intelligible, and their circulations, are meaſured by this time. For it has a ſupernal origin, imitates eternity, and connects, evolves, and perfects every motion, whether vital, or pertaining to ſoul, or in whatever other manner it may be ſaid to ſubſiſt. This time alſo is indeed eſſentially an intellect; but it is the cauſe to divine ſouls of their harmonic and infinite motion about the intelligible, through which theſe likewiſe are led to *the older* and to *the ſame age*: and this in a twofold reſpect. For *the older* in theſe *with reſpect to themſelves* takes place, ſo far as with their more excellent powers they more enjoy the infinity of time, and participate it more abundantly: for they are not filled with ſimilar perfection from more divine natures, according to all their powers, but with ſome more, and with others leſs. But that is ſaid to be older which participates more of time. That which is older in theſe divine ſouls *with reſpect to other things* is effected ſo far as ſome of theſe receive the whole meaſure of time,

ſame [1] age, either with itſelf or with another, it would participate equally of time and ſimilitude, which we have nevertheleſs aſſerted *the one* does not participate.

and the whole of its extenſion proceeding to ſouls, but others are meaſured by more partial periods. Thoſe, therefore, are older, whoſe period is more total, and is extended to a longer time. They may alſo be ſaid to be *older and at the ſame time younger with reſpect to themſelves*, by becoming *hoary* as it were above, through extending themſelves to the whole power of time, but *juvenile* beneath, by enjoying time more partially. But, *as with reſpect to others*, they may be ſaid to be *older and at the ſame time younger*, according to a ſubjection of energy: for that which has its circulation meaſured by a leſſer period is *younger* than that whoſe circulation is meaſured by a more extended period. Again, among things coordinate, that which has the ſame participation and the ſame meaſure of perfection with others may be ſaid to be of *the ſame age with itſelf and others*. But every divine ſoul, though its own period is meaſured according to one time, and that of the body which is ſuſpended from it according to another, yet it has an equal reſtitution to the ſame condition; itſelf always according to its own time, and its body alſo according to its time. Hence, again, it is of the ſame age with itſelf and its body, according to the analogous.

By thus interpreting what is now ſaid of *the one*, we ſhall accord with Plato, in the Timæus, who there evinces that *time* is the meaſure of every tranſitive life, and who ſays that ſoul is the origin of a divine and wiſe life through the whole of time. And we ſhall alſo accord with his aſſertion in the Phædrus, that ſouls ſee true being through time, becauſe they perceive *temporally*, and not *eternally*.

[1] Plato here demonſtrates that *the one* is neither older nor younger than itſelf, or another. For, it was neceſſary to ſhow that *the one* is beyond every divine ſoul, prior to other ſouls, in the ſame manner as it is demonſtrated to be prior to true beings, and to be the cauſe of all things. Nor muſt it be on this account admitted that *the one* comprehends in itſelf the cauſes of all things, and through this is multitude. For every cauſe is the cauſe of one particular property; as, for inſtance, *animal itſelf* is the cauſe alone to animals of a ſubſiſtence as animals; and, in the ſame manner, every intelligible produces other things, according to its idiom alone. *The one*, therefore, is the cauſe of *unities*, and of *union* to all things; and all things are thence derived, either as being unities, or as compoſed from certain unities: for being itſelf, and, in ſhort, every thing, is either as *one*, or as conſiſting from certain unities. For, if it is *united*, it is evident that it conſiſts from certain things; and if theſe are unities the conſequence is manifeſt: but if they are things united, we muſt again paſs on to the things from which they are compoſed, and thus proceeding ad infinitum, we muſt end in certain unities, from which, as elements, that which is united conſiſts. Hence it follows that all things are either unities or numbers. For that which is not a *unity*, but *united*, if it conſiſts from certain definite unities, is number, and this will be the firſt number, ſubſiſting from things indiviſible: for every unity is indiviſible. But the number of beings is from beings, and not from things indiviſible. So that, if there is a certain cauſe of beings, it is the cauſe of all beings; but if there is a certain cauſe of the unities from which all things conſiſt, it is indeed the cauſe of all things: for there is no longer any thing which is not either a unity, or compoſed from unities. Hence, it is not proper to ſay that the cauſes of all things are

participate. We have aſſerted ſo. And this alſo we have ſaid, that it neither participates of diſſimilitude nor inequality. Entirely ſo. How, therefore, being ſuch, can it either be older or younger than any thing, or poſſeſs the ſame age with any thing? It can in no reſpect. The one, therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the ſame age, either with itſelf or with another. It does not appear that it will. Will it not, therefore, be impoſſible that *the one* ſhould be at all in time, if it be ſuch? Or, is it not neceſſary that, if any thing is in time, it ſhould always become older than itſelf? It is neceſſary. But is not that which is older [1], always older than the younger? What then? That, therefore, which is becoming to be older than itſelf, is at the ſame time becoming to be younger than itſelf, if it is about to have that through which it may become older. How do you ſay? Thus: It is requiſite that nothing ſhould ſubſiſt in *becoming* to be different from another, when it *is* already different, but that it ſhould

in *the one*, nor, without ſaying this, to think that *the one* is the cauſe of certain things, as of unities, and is not at the ſame time the cauſe of all things. Since, therefore, it is the cauſe of every divine ſoul, ſo far as theſe derive their ſubſiſtence as well as all beings from the divine unities, with great propriety is it neceſſary to ſhow that the one is beyond the order of deified ſouls: for theſe ſouls ſo far as they are intellectual have intellect for their cauſe; ſo far as they are eſſences, they originate from intellect; and ſo far as they have the form of unity, they are derived from the one; receiving their hypoſtaſis from this, ſo far as each is a multitude conſiſting of certain unities, and of theſe as elements.

[1] That which participates of time is twofold, the one proceeding, as it were, in a right line, and beginning from one thing, and ending in another; but the other proceeding circularly, and having its motion from the ſame to the ſame, to which both the beginning and the end are the ſame, and the motion is unceaſing, every thing in it being both beginning and end. That, therefore, which energizes circularly, participates of time periodically: and ſo far as it departs from the beginning it becomes older, but ſo far as it approaches to the end it becomes younger. For, becoming nearer the end, it becomes nearer to its proper beginning; but that which becomes nearer to its beginning becomes younger. Hence, that which circularly approaches to the end becomes younger, the ſame alſo according to the ſame becoming older; for that which approximates to its end proceeds to that which is older. That to which the beginning, therefore, is one thing, and the end another, to this the younger is different from the older; but that to which the beginning and the end are the ſame, is in no reſpect older than younger, but, as Plato ſays, at the ſame time becomes younger and older than itſelf. Every thing, therefore, which participates of time, if it becomes both older and younger than itſelf, is circularly moved. But divine ſouls are of this kind: for they participate of time, and the time of their proper motion is periodical.

be now different from that which *is* different, *have been* from that which *was*, and *will be* from that which is *to be hereafter:* but from that which is *becoming to be* different, it ought neither to *have been*, nor *to be hereafter*, nor *to be*, but to ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* different, and no otherwiſe. It is neceſſary. But the older differs from the younger, and no other. Certainly. Hence, that which is *becoming to be* older than itſelf, muſt neceſſarily at the ſame time ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* younger than itſelf. It ſeems ſo. But likewiſe it ought not to ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* in a longer time than itſelf, nor yet in a ſhorter; but in a time equal to itſelf it ſhould ſubſiſt in *becoming to be*, ſhould *be*, *have been*, and *be hereafter*. For theſe are neceſſary. It is neceſſary, therefore, as it appears, that ſuch things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, ſhould each one poſſeſs the ſame age with itſelf, and ſhould ſubſiſt in becoming to be both older and younger than itſelf. It ſeems ſo. But no one of theſe paſſions belongs to *the one*. None. Neither, therefore, is time preſent with it, nor does it ſubſiſt[1] in any time. It does not, indeed, according to the deciſions of reaſon. What then? Do not the terms *it was*[2], *it has been*, *it did become*, ſeem to

[1] As *the one* is not in *time*, becauſe it is not in motion, ſo neither is it in *eternity*, becauſe it is not in *permanency:* for *eternity abides*, as Timæus ſays.

[2] This diviſion of time, ſays Proclus, accords with the multitude of the divine genera which are ſuſpended from divine ſouls, viz. with angels, dæmons and heroes. And, in the firſt place, this diviſion proceeds to them ſupernally, according to a *triadic* diſtribution into the *preſent*, *paſt*, and *future*; and, in the next place, according to a diſtribution into nine, each of theſe three being again ſubdivided into three. For the monad of ſouls is united to the one whole of time, but this is participated ſecondarily by the multitude of ſouls. And of this multitude thoſe participate of this whole *totally*, that ſubſiſt according to *the paſt*, or *the preſent*, or *the future*; but thoſe participate it *partially*, that are eſſentialized according to the differences of theſe: for to each of the wholes a multitude is coordinated, divided into things firſt, middle, and laſt. For a certain multitude ſubſiſts in conjunction with that which is eſtabliſhed according to the paſt, the *ſummit* of which is according to *the was*, but the *middle* according to it *has been*, and the *end* according to it *did become*. With that alſo which is eſtabliſhed according to the *preſent*, there is another multitude, the *principal* part of which is characterized by *the is*, the *middle* by it *is generated*, and the *end* by it *is becoming to be*. And there is another triad with that which ſubſiſts according to the future, the *moſt elevated part* of which is characterized by the *will be*, that which ranks in the *middle*, by it *may become*, and the *end*, by it *will be generated*. And thus there will be three triads proximately ſuſpended from theſe three wholeneſſes, but all theſe are ſuſpended from their monad.

All

to ſignify the participation of the time paſt? Certainly. And do not the terms *it will be*, *it may become*, and *it will be generated*, ſignify that which

All theſe orders which are diſtributed according to the parts of time, energize according to the whole of time, this whole containing in itſelf triple powers, one of which is *perfective* of all motion, the ſecond *connects* and *guards* things which are governed by it, and the third *unfolds* divine natures into light. For as all ſuch things as are not eternal are led round in a circle, the *wholeness* or the *monad* of time perfects and connects their eſſence, and diſcloſes to them the united infinity of eternity, evolving the contracted multitude which ſubſiſts in eternal natures; whence alſo this apparent time, as Timæus ſays, unfolds to us the meaſures of divine periods, perfects ſenſibles, and guards things which are generated in their proper numbers. Time, therefore, poſſeſſes triple powers prior to ſouls, viz. *the perfective*, *the connective*, and *the unfolding*, according to a ſimilitude to eternity. For eternity, poſſeſſing a middle order in intelligibles, *perfects* the order poſterior to itſelf, ſupplying it with union, but *unfolds into light* that which is prior to itſelf, producing into multitude its ineffable union, and *connects* the middle bond of intelligibles, and guards all things intranſitively through its power. Time, therefore, receiving ſupernally the triple powers of eternity, imparts them to ſouls. Eternity, however, poſſeſſes this triad unitedly; but time unitedly, and at the ſame time diſtributively; and ſouls diſtributively alone. Hence, of ſouls, ſome are characterized according to one, and others according to another power of time; ſome imitating its *unfolding*, others its *perfective*, and others its *connective* power. Thus alſo with reſpect to the Fates, ſome of theſe being adapted to give completion and perfection to things, are ſaid to ſing the paſt, always indeed energizing, and always ſinging, their ſongs being intellections and fabricative energies about the world: for the *paſt* is the ſource of *completion*. Others again of theſe are adapted to *connect* things preſent: for they guard the eſſence and the generation of theſe. And others are adapted to *unfold* the future: for they lead into eſſence and to an end that which as yet is not.

We may alſo ſay, ſince there is an order of ſouls more excellent than ours divided into ſuch as are firſt, ſuch as are middle, and ſuch as are laſt, the moſt total of theſe are adapted to *the paſt*. For, as this comprehends in itſelf the preſent and the future, ſo theſe ſouls comprehend in themſelves the reſt. But ſouls of a middle rank are adapted to *the preſent*: for this was once *future*, but is not yet *the paſt*. As, therefore, *the preſent* contains in itſelf *the future*, ſo theſe middle ſouls comprehend thoſe poſterior, but are comprehended in thoſe prior to themſelves. And ſouls of the third order correſpond to *the future*: for this does not proceed through *the preſent*, nor has become *the paſt*, but is *the future* alone; juſt as theſe third ſouls are of themſelves alone, but, through falling into a moſt partial ſubſiſtence, are by no means comprehenſive of others; for they convolve the boundary according to a triadic diviſion of the genera poſterior to the Gods.

The whole of the firſt triad, therefore, has in common the *once*, for this is the peculiarity of the paſt, and of completion; but it is divided into *the was*, *it was generated*, and *it did become*. Again, therefore, of theſe three, *the was* ſignifies the ſummit of the triad, bounded according to hyparxis itſelf; but *it was generated*, ſignifies an at-once-collected perfection; and *it did become*, an extenſion in being perfected; theſe things being imitations of intelligibles. For *the was* is an imitation of *being*, *it was generated*, of *eternity*, and *it did become*, of that which is *primarily eternal*: for *being* is derived to all things from the firſt of theſe; a ſubſiſtence at once as *all* and a *whole* from the ſecond, and an *extenſion into multitude* from the third.

is

is about to be hereafter? Certainly. But are not the terms *it is*, and *it is becoming to be*, marks of the preſent time? Entirely ſo. If then *the one* participates [1] in no reſpect of any time, it neither ever *was*, nor *has been*, nor *did become*: nor is it *now generated*, nor is *becoming to be*, nor *is*, nor *may become* hereafter, nor *will be generated*, nor *will be*. It is moſt true. Is it poſſible, therefore, that any thing can participate of eſſence [2], except

[1] It is not immaniſeſt how the ſyllogiſm proceeds in what is now ſaid: *The one* participates of no time; but every thing which once ſubſiſted *was*, or *has been*, or *did become*; every thing which ſubſiſts according to the preſent *is*, or *is generated*, or *is becoming to be*; and every thing which ſubſiſts according to the future *will be*, or *may become*, or *will be generated*. But all theſe diſtribute the *wholeneſs* of time. *The one*, therefore, is exempt from, and is expanded above, this temporal triad and the unity from which it is ſuſpended. From all, therefore, that has been ſaid, it is requiſite, as Proclus juſtly obſerves, to collect this one thing, that *the one* is eſtabliſhed above every divine eſſence characterized by the nature of ſoul, and which always energizes after the ſame manner, ſuch as are the ſouls of the more excellent genera, whether the diviſion of them is made into three, or into nine, or into any other number.

Should it be ſaid, however, that *the one*, though it does not participate of time, may be time itſelf, for the firſt cauſe is denominated time by Orpheus; to this it may be replied, that *the one* cannot be time; ſince in this caſe the perfection proceeding from it would extend no further than ſouls, and things which are moved. For eternal natures are more excellent than ſuch as energize according to time. *The one*, therefore, would be the cauſe of ſubordinate only, and not of ſuperior natures; and thus would not be the cauſe of all things. But the firſt cauſe, ſays Proclus, was denominated time by Orpheus, according to a certain wonderful analogy: for the theologiſt ſymbolically calls the myſtical proceſſions of unbegotten natures, generations; and the cauſe of the unfolding into light of divine natures, Time; for, where there is generation, there alſo there is time. Thus, the generation of ſenſibles is according to mundane time, that of ſouls according to ſuperceleſtial time, and that of things eternal according to *the one*. Proclus beautifully adds: As therefore we endure to hear the ſleepleſs energy of divine natures ſeparate from the objects of their providential care, denominated ſleep, their union, a bond, and their progreſſion, a ſolution from bonds, ſo alſo we muſt endure thoſe that introduce time and generation to things without time, and which are unbegotten.

[2] Having proceeded as far as to a deified eſſence, and which always energizes after the ſame manner, and having denied all the orders of *the one*, viz. the divine, the intellectual, and ſuch as are pſychical, we muſt again recur through a nature common to all the aforeſaid orders, or, in other words, through *being* to the intelligible monad of all beings, and from this alſo we muſt exempt *the one*. For, as we before obſerved, Plato does not make the beginning of his negations from the ſummit of intelligibles, but from the ſummit of the intellectual order: for there *the many* are generated, as we ſhall ſhow in commenting on the ſecond hypotheſis. But eſſence which ſubſiſts according to *the one being*, is prior to theſe *many*, and to all the above-mentioned orders. Hence, from all theſe, as participating of *eſſence* in common, we recur to *eſſence itſelf*, and

according to ſome one of theſe? It is not. In no reſpect, therefore, does *the one* participate of eſſence. It does not appear that it can. *The one*, therefore,

and make a negation even of this. For every thing which participates of eſſence participates of it according to ſome one of theſe, not indeed of thoſe that are proximately enumerated, but of all together that the firſt hypotheſis contains, ſuch as *whole*, or having *parts*, or having *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, or *being in itſelf*, or *in another*, and every thing elſe which is there denied of *the one*; ſo that it follows, as was before obſerved, that ſuch things only are aſſumed as are conſequent to beings ſo far as they are beings, and not ſo far as they are certain vital or intellectual natures. For every thing, ſays he, which in any reſpect participates of eſſence, participates of it according to ſome one of theſe negations. *The one*, therefore, does not participate of eſſence. Thus alſo Socrates, in the Republic, ſays, that *the good* is beyond eſſence, and is not eſſence, but is the cauſe of it, and is beyond every thing intellectual and intelligible, in the ſame manner as the ſun is the cauſe of all viſible natures, by *eſſence* meaning the ſame as *being* (το ον). For Plato here clearly ſays, that it is not poſſible for any thing *to be*, unleſs it participates of *eſſence*: and in the Timæus he makes a ſimilar aſſertion. If, therefore, the firſt cauſe is ſupereſſential and above all being, it is falſe to aſſert that he *is*: for, ſince he is beyond *eſſence*, he is alſo exempt from *being*. And in this, as Proclus well obſerves, Parmenides in Plato differs from Parmenides in his verſes, becauſe the latter looks to *the one being*, and ſays that this is the cauſe of all things; but the former aſcending from *the one being* to that which is *one alone* and prior to being, he denies of *the one* the participation of eſſence.

And here obſerve, that Plato does not adopt the concluſion that *the one is not* through demonſtration, becauſe it was not poſſible to demonſtrate this directly through the alliance of *being* with *the one*. For, as we have before obſerved, in negations, things more allied are more difficult to be demonſtrated. But if this be true, it is evident that *the one* IS NOT. For every thing about *the one* which is added to it diminiſhes its exempt tranſcendency.

Should it be aſked why Parmenides does not begin his negations from *the is*, but from *the many*, and neither ſeparates the order which immediately ſubſiſts after *the one*, and thus proceeds as far as to the laſt of things, nor, ſeparating *the one* from theſe, aſcends as far as to the ſummit of beings, we reply, that the negation of eſſence would be contrary to the hypotheſis: for the hypotheſis ſays that *the one* IS, but the negation that it IS NOT. It would, therefore, be of all things the moſt ridiculous to ſay immediately from the beginning, if *the one is*, *the one is not*: for the aſſertion would appear to ſubvert itſelf. Hence, employing the *is*, and ſaying, as if it made no difference, *if the one is*, Parmenides finds that *the many* appear to be eſpecially oppoſed to *the one*.

That *the one*, indeed, according to Plato, is above all eſſence, is evident from the teſtimony of Speuſippus, according to Proclus, who alſo adds, that Speuſippus confirms this from the opinion of the antients, when he ſays they thought that *the one* is better than *being*, and is the principle of *being*, free from all habitude to ſubſequent natures, juſt as *the good itſelf* is ſeparated from the condition of every other good. But Speuſippus there calls the firſt being the proper principle of beings, and boundleſs divinity depending on *the one*.

Parmenides,

fore, *is* in no reſpect. So it ſeems. Hence, it is not in ſuch a manner as *to be* one, for thus it would be being, and participate of eſſence: but, as it appears, the one neither *is one* nor *is*, if it be proper to believe in reaſoning of this kind. It appears ſo. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of, that which is not? How can it? Neither, therefore, does any name belong to it, nor diſcourſe, nor any ſcience, nor ſenſe, nor opinion. It does not appear that there can. Hence, it can neither be named, nor

Parmenides, therefore, beginning ſupernally from the intelligible ſummit of the firſt intellectual Gods, and producing in an orderly ſeries the genera of the Gods, and of the natures united and ſubſequent to them, and always evincing that *the one* is ineffably exempt from all things, again returns from hence to the beginning, and, imitating the converſion of wholes, ſeparates *the one* from the intelligible or higheſt Gods. For thus eſpecially may we behold its immenſe tranſcendency, if we not only ſhow that it is eſtabliſhed above the ſecond or third orders in the golden chain of deity, but that it alſo ranks before the intelligible unities themſelves, and evince this in a manner coordinate to the ſimplicity of thoſe occult natures, and not by various words, but by intellectual projection alone: for intelligibles are naturally adapted to be known by intellect. This, therefore, Parmenides in reality evinces, leaving logical methods, but energizing according to intellect, and aſſerting that *the one* is beyond eſſence, and *the one being*. For this is not collected, as we have before obſerved, from the preceding concluſions; ſince in this caſe the belief concerning the higheſt Gods, who are implied by *eſſence*, being derived from things inferior to them, would be void of demonſtration: for all demonſtration, as Ariſtotle juſtly obſerves, is from things naturally prior to, and more honourable than, the concluſions. Hence, Parmenides at the ſame time infers, that every kind of knowledge, and all the inſtruments of knowledge, fall ſhort of the tranſcendency of *the one*, and beautifully end in the ineffable of the God who is beyond all things. For, after ſcientific energies and intellectual projections, union with the unknown ſucceeds; to which alſo Parmenides referring the whole diſcourſe, concludes the firſt hypotheſis, ſuſpending all the divine genera from *the one*, which, as he alſo ſhows, is ſingularly exempt from all things. Hence it is ſaid to be beyond *the one which is conjoined with eſſence*, and at the ſame time all the participated multitude of unities.

It is alſo beautifully obſerved by Proclus, that by the appellation of *the one* in this dialogue we are not to underſtand that which is in itſelf *the one*; but that the inward one reſident in our eſſence, and derived from the firſt one, as an occult ſymbol of his nature, is expreſſed by this appellation. For in every being there is an innate deſire of the firſt cauſe; and hence, prior to appetite there is a certain occult perception of that which is firſt.

Laſtly, when Parmenides ſays that *the one* can neither be named nor ſpoken of, it follows that we are not only incapable of affirming any thing of it, but that even negations of it, though more ſafe than affirmations, are not to be admitted. For he who openly denies, in the mean time ſecretly affirms; ſince to deny any thing of the firſt, is to ſeparate ſomething from it; and this cannot be effected without forming in ourſelves both the firſt, and that which we ſeparate from it.

ſpoken

ſpoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it ſeems. Is it poſſible, therefore, that theſe things can thus take place about *the one?* It does not appear to me that they can.

Are you therefore willing that we ſhould return again to the hypotheſis from the beginning, and ſee whether or not by this means any thing ſhall appear to us different from what it did before? I am entirely willing. Have we not therefore declared if *the one is*, what circumſtances ought to happen to it? Is it not ſo? Certainly. But conſider from the beginning, if *the one is*[1], can it be poſſible that it ſhould *be*, and yet not participate of *eſſence?*

[1] This is the beginning of the ſecond hypotheſis, which, as we have obſerved in the Introduction to this dialogue, unfolds the whole order of the Gods, and eſtabliſhes the ſummit of intelligibles as the firſt after *the one*, but ends in an eſſence which participates of time, and in deified ſouls. In the firſt place, therefore, let us endeavour to unfold what Plato here occultly delivers concerning the firſt proceſſion or order of Gods, called the intelligible triad.

As the firſt cauſe then is *the one*, and this is the ſame with *the good*, the univerſality of things muſt form a whole, the beſt and the moſt profoundly united in all its parts which can poſſibly be conceived: for *the firſt good* muſt be the cauſe of the greateſt good, that is, the whole of things; and as goodneſs is union, the beſt production muſt be that which is moſt united. But as there is a difference in things, and ſome are more excellent than others, and this in proportion to their proximity to the firſt cauſe, a profound union can no otherwiſe take place than by the extremity of a ſuperior order coaleſcing through intimate alliance with the ſummit of one proximately inferior. Hence the firſt of bodies, though they are eſſentially corporeal, yet κατα σχεσιν, through *habitude* or *alliance*, are moſt vital, or lives. The higheſt of ſouls are after this manner intellects, and the firſt of beings are Gods. For, as *being* is the higheſt of things after *the firſt cauſe*, its firſt ſubſiſtence muſt be according to a ſupereſſential characteriſtic.

Now that which is ſupereſſential, conſidered as participated by the higheſt or *true being*, conſtitutes that which is called *intelligible*. So that every true being depending on the Gods is a *divine intelligible*. It is *divine*, indeed, as that which is deified; but it is *intelligible*, as the object of deſire to intellect, as perfective and connective of its nature, and as the plenitude of *being* itſelf. But in the firſt being life and intellect ſubſiſt according to cauſe: for every thing ſubſiſts either according to *cauſe*, or according to *hyparxis*, or according to *participation*. That is, every thing may be conſidered either as ſubſiſting occultly in its cauſe, or openly in its own order (or according to what it is), or as participated by ſomething elſe. The firſt of theſe is analogous to light when viewed ſubſiſting in its fountain the ſun; the ſecond to the light immediately proceeding from the ſun; and the third to the ſplendour communicated to other natures by this light.

The firſt proceſſion therefore from the firſt cauſe will be the intelligible triad, conſiſting of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, which are the three higheſt things after the firſt God, and of which *being*

eſſence? It cannot. Will not eſſence therefore be the *eſſence* of *the one*, but not the ſame with *the one?* for, if it were the ſame, it would not be the eſſence

is prior to *life*, and *life* to *intellect*. For whatever partakes of life partakes alſo of being: but the contrary is not true, and therefore being is above life; ſince it is the characteriſtic of higher natures to extend their communications beyond ſuch as are ſubordinate. But *life* is prior to *intellect*, becauſe all intellectual natures are vital, but all vital natures are not intellectual. But in this intelligible triad, on account of its ſupereſſential characteriſtic, all things may be conſidered as ſubſiſting according to cauſe: and conſequently number here has not a proper ſubſiſtence, but is involved in unproceeding union, and abſorbed in ſuper-eſſential light. Hence, when it is called a triad, we muſt not ſuppoſe that any *eſſential diſtinction* takes place, but muſt conſider this appellation as expreſſive of its ineffable perfection. For, as it is the neareſt of all things to *the one*, its union muſt be tranſcendently profound and ineffably occult.

All the Gods indeed conſidered according to their unities are all in all, and are at the ſame time united with the firſt God like rays to light, or lines to a centre. And hence they are all eſtabliſhed in the firſt cauſe (as Proclus beautifully obſerves) like the roots of trees in the earth; ſo that they are all as much as poſſible ſupereſſential, juſt as trees are eminently of an earthly nature, without at the ſame time being earth itſelf: for the nature of the earth as being a whole, or ſubſiſting according to the eternal, is different from the partial natures which it produces. The intelligible triad, therefore, from its being wholly of a ſupereſſential idiom, muſt poſſeſs an inconceivable profundity of union, both with itſelf and its cauſe, ſo as to ſubſiſt wholly according to *the united*, το ηνωμενον; and hence it appears to the eye of pure intellect, as one ſimple indiviſible ſplendour beaming from an unknown and inacceſſible fire.

He then who is able, by opening the greateſt eye of the ſoul, to ſee that perfectly which ſubſiſts without ſeparation, will behold the ſimplicity of the intelligible triad ſubſiſting in a manner ſo tranſcendent as to be apprehended only by a ſuperintellectual energy, and a deific union of the perceiver with this moſt arcane object of perception. But ſince in our preſent ſtate it is impoſſible to behold an object ſo aſtoniſhingly lucid with a perfect and ſteady viſion, we muſt be content, as Damaſcius well obſerves*, with a far diſtant, ſcarcely attainable, and moſt obſcure glimpſe; or with difficulty apprehending a trace of this light like a ſudden corruſcation burſting on our ſight. Such then is the preeminence of the intelligible order, to which, on account of the infirmity of our mental eye, we aſſign a triple diviſion, beholding as in a mirror a luminous triad, beaming from a uniform light; juſt, ſays Damaſcius, as the uniform colour of the ſun appears in a cloud which poſſeſſes three catoptric intervals, through the various-coloured nature of the rainbow.

But when we view this order in a diſtributed way, or as poſſeſſing ſeparation in order to accommodate its all-perfect mode of ſubſiſtence to our imperfect conceptions, it is neceſſary to give the triad itſelf a triple diviſion. For we have ſaid that it conſiſts of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*. But in *being* we may view life and intellect, according to cauſe; in *life* being according to participation,

* Vid. Excerpta ex Damaſcio, a Wolfio, p. 232.

and

eſſence of *the one*, nor would *the one* participate of eſſence; but it would be all one to ſay *the one is*, and *one one*. But now our hypotheſis is not *if one*, what

and intellect according to cauſe; and in *intellect* both being and life according to participation; while at the ſame time in reality the whole is profoundly one, and contains all things occultly, or according to cauſe. But when viewed in this divided manner, each triad is ſaid in the Chaldaic theology to conſiſt of *father*, *power*, and *intellect*; *father* being the ſame with *hyparxis*, *unity*, *ſummit*, or *that which is ſuper-eſſential*; *power* being a certain pouring forth, or infinity of *the one* * (or the ſummit); and on this account, ſays Damaſcius, it is preſent with *father*, as a diffuſed with an abiding one, and as pouring itſelf forth into a true chaos: but *intellect*, that is *paternal intellect*, ſubſiſting according to a converſion to the paternal *one*; a converſion tranſcending all other converſions, as being neither gnoſtic, nor vital, nor eſſential, but an unſeparated ſurpaſſing energy, which is union rather than converſion.

Let not the reader, however, imagine that theſe names are the inventions of the latter Platoniſts; for they were well known to Plato himſelf, as is evident from his Timæus. For in that dialogue he calls the artificer of the univerſe *intellect*, and *father*; and repreſents him commanding the junior Gods to imitate the *power* which he employed in their generation.

This intelligible triad is occultly ſignified by Plato, in the Philebus, under the dialectic epithets of *bound*, *infinite*, and *that which is mixed*. For all beings (ſays he) conſiſt or are mingled from *bound* and *infinity*; and conſequently *being itſelf*, which we have already ſhown has the higheſt ſubſiſtence after the firſt cauſe, muſt be before all things mixed from theſe two; the former of theſe, viz. *bound*, being evidently analogous to *the one*, or *father*, and *infinity* to power. We may likewiſe conſider him as unfolding the intelligible order in the ſame dialogue, by the epithets of *ſymmetry*, *truth*, and *beauty*; which, ſays he, are requiſite to every thing that is mixed. And he adds that this triad ſubſiſts in the veſtibule of *the good*; evidently alluding by this expreſſion to the profound union of this triad with the incomprehenſible cauſe of all things.

But, in the preſent dialogue, the intelligible order is delivered by Plato according to an all-perfect diſtribution into three triads; for the ſake of affording us ſome demonſtration, though very obſcure and imperfect, of truth ſo tranſcendent and immenſe. In this ſecond hypotheſis, therefore, which, as we have already obſerved, unfolds the various orders of the Gods, each concluſion ſignifying ſome particular order, he calls the firſt of theſe triads ἓν ον, *one being*; power, or the middle habitude of both, being here concealed through exceſs of union; ſo that here *the one* partakes of *being*, and *being* of *the one*; which, as Proclus well obſerves, is indeed a circumſtance of a moſt wonderful nature. Parmenides therefore calls this triad *one being*, without mentioning *power*, becauſe the whole triad abides in unproceeding union, ſubſiſting uniformly and without ſeparation. But after this the ſecond triad is allotted a progreſſion, which Parmenides characteriſes by intelligible *wholeneſs*, but its parts are *being* and *the one*, and power, which is ſituated in the middle, is here diſtributive and not unific, as in the former triad. But his diſcourſe concerning this triad commences from hence—" Again, therefore, let us conſider if *the*

* Let the reader be careful to remember that *the one* of the Gods is their ſupereſſential characteriſtic.

what ought to happen, but *if the one is*—Is it not ſo? Entirely ſo. Does it not ſignify that the term *is* is ſomething different from *the one?* Neceſſarily.

one is, what will happen. Conſider then whether it is not neceſſary that this hypotheſis ſhould ſignify ſuch a *one* as poſſeſſes parts." But he concludes his ſpeculation thus—" That which is *one* therefore is a whole, and poſſeſſes a part."

But after theſe the third triad ſubſiſts, in which all intelligible multitude appears; and which Parmenides indeed (ſays Proclus) calls a wholeneſs, but ſuch a one as is compoſed from a multitude of parts. For after that occult union (ſays he) of the firſt triad, and the dyadic diſtinction of the ſecond, the progreſſion of the third triad is produced, poſſeſſing its hypoſtaſis indeed from parts, but then theſe parts compoſe a multitude which the triad prior to this generates. For *unity*, *power* and *being* are contained in this third triad; but then each of theſe is multiplied, and ſo the whole triad is a wholeneſs. But ſince each of its extremities, viz. *the one*, and *being*, is a multitude which is conjoined through a collective power, each of theſe is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining united multitude with the multitude of beings, ſome of theſe *one being* perfects through progreſſion; but others, *being which is one*, through communion. Here therefore there are two parts of the wholeneſs, *one* and *being*. But *the one* participates of *being:* for *the one* of *being* is conjoined with *being*. *The one* of *being* therefore is again divided, ſo that both *the one* and *being* generate a ſecond unity, connected with a part of *being*. But *being which participates of the one*, ον εν, is again divided into *being* and *the one:* for it generates a more particular *being*, depending on a more particular *unity*. And *being* here belongs to more particular deified beings, and is a more ſpecial monad. But *power* is the cauſe of this progreſſion: for power poſſeſſes dual effection, and is fabricative of multitude.

Parmenides begins his diſcourſe concerning this triad as follows:—" What then? Can each of theſe parts of *one being*, that is to ſay *the one* and *being*, deſert each other, ſo that *the one* ſhall not be a part of *being*, or *being* ſhall not be a part of *the one?* By no means." But he finiſhes thus: " Will not, therefore, *one being* thus become an infinite multitude? So it appears." Proclus adds: " Hence this triad proceeds according to each of the preexiſtent triads, *flowing (according to the Oracle) and proceeding into all intelligible multitude*. For infinite multitude demonſtrates this flux, and evinces the incomprehenſible nature of power."

But he likewiſe evinces that this triad is *firſt begotten:* for this firſt imparts the power of generating. And hence he calls the multitude which it contains *generating* (γονιμον). Proclus, therefore, very properly aſks, whether the frequent uſe of the term generation in this part, does not plainly imply that the natures prior to this triad are more united with each other? But the infinity of multitude in this triad muſt not be conſidered as reſpecting the infinite of quantity; but nothing more is implied than that a multitude of this kind is the progeny of the firſt infinity, which it alſo unfolds: and this infinite is the ſame with that which is *all perfect*. For that (ſays Proclus) which has proceeded according to *the all*, and as far as it is requiſite an intelligible nature ſhould proceed, on account of a power generative of all things, is *infinite*; for it can be comprehended by no other. And thus much concerning the third intelligible triad, according to Parmenides.

Let

ſarily. If, therefore, any one ſhould ſummarily aſſert that *the one is*, this would be no other one than that which participates of eſſence. Certainly. Again,

Let us now diſcourſe in general (ſays Proclus *) concerning all the intelligible triads, and the three concluſions in the Parmenides, by which theſe three orders are characteriſed. The firſt triad, therefore, which is allotted an occult and intelligible ſummit among intelligibles, Plato, at one time proceeding from that union which it contains, and from its ſeparate ſupremacy with reſpect to others, denominates *one*; as in the Timæus—For *eternity* (ſays he) *abides in one*. But reaſon demonſtrates that the firſt triad of intelligibles is contained in this *one*. But at another time proceeding from the extremities which it contains, that is from that which is participated, and from that which participates, he calls it *one being*; not mentioning power here, becauſe it is uniformly and occultly comprehended in this triad. And again, ſometimes he calls the whole triad *bound*, *infinite*, and *mixed*, according to the monads which it contains. And here *bound* demonſtrates divine *hyparxis*; but *infinite*, *generative power*; and *mixed*, *an eſſence proceeding from this power*. And thus (as I have ſaid) by theſe appellations Plato inſtructs us concerning the firſt triad; evincing its nature, ſometimes by one name, ſometimes by two, and ſometimes by three appellations. For a *triad* is contained in this, according to which the whole is characteriſed; likewiſe a *duad*, through which its extremities communicate with each other; and laſtly a *monad*, which evinces through its monads the ineffable, occult, and unical nature of the firſt God.

But he calls the ſecond triad poſterior to this; in the Timæus, indeed, *eternity*; but in the Parmenides *the firſt wholeneſs*. And if we attentively conſider that every eternal is a whole, we ſhall perceive that theſe two are allotted the ſame peculiarity of nature. For, whatever is entirely eternal poſſeſſes both its whole eſſence and energy at once preſent with itſelf. For ſuch is every intellect which perfectly eſtabliſhes in itſelf both being and intellection, as a whole at once preſent, and a comprehenſive all. Hence it does not poſſeſs one part of being while it is deſtitute of another; nor does it participate partially of energy, but it *wholly* comprehends *total* being and *total* intelligence. But if intellect proceeded in its energies according to time, but poſſeſſed an eternal eſſence, it would poſſeſs the one as a *whole* ever abiding the ſame, but the other ſubſiſting in generation, differently at different periods of time. *Eternity*, therefore, wherever it is preſent, is the cauſe of *wholeneſs*. To which we may add, that *the whole* every where contains eternity: for no *whole* ever deſerts either its own eſſence or perfection; but that which is firſt corrupted and vitiated is partial. Hence this viſible univerſe is eternal, becauſe it is a whole; and this is likewiſe true of every thing contained in the heavens, and of each of the elements: for *wholeneſs* is every where comprehenſive of its ſubject natures. Hence *wholeneſs* and *eternity* ſubſiſt together, are the ſame with each other, and are each of them a meaſure; the one indeed of all eternal and perpetual natures, but the other of parts and every multitude. But ſince there are three *wholeneſſes*, one *prior to parts*, another *compoſed from parts*, and a third *contained in a part*—hence, through that *wholeneſs* which is prior to parts, eternity meaſures the divine unities exempt from beings; but through that which is compoſed from parts, the unities diſtributed together with beings; and through that which ſubſiſts in a part, all beings

* In Plat. Theol. lib. 3. p. 168.

and

Again, therefore, let us ſay, if *the one is*, what will happen. Conſider then whether it is not neceſſary that this hypotheſis ſhould ſignify ſuch a

one

and total eſſences. For theſe partially contain the parts of the divine unities, which preexiſt unically in the unities themſelves. Beſides, *eternity is nothing elſe than an illumination proceeding from the unity connected with being*. But *whole itſelf* conſiſts of two parts, viz. from *one* and *being*, power being the conciliator of theſe parts. Hence the duad, according with the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uniform and occult hypoſtaſis of the firſt triad. Beſides, Plato in the Timæus calls the third intelligible triad *animal-itſelf*, *perfect*, and *only-begotten*. But in the Parmenides he denominates it *infinite multitude*, and *a wholeneſs comprehending many parts*. And in the Sophiſta he calls it *that which is always intelligible, and diſtributed into many beings*. All theſe, therefore, are the progeny of one ſcience, and tend to one intelligible truth. For when Timæus calls this triad *intelligible animal*, he likewiſe aſſerts that it is *perfect*, and that it comprehends intelligible animals as its parts, both according to *the one* and according *to parts*. And Parmenides himſelf, declaring that *one being* is perfect multitude, demonſtrates that it ſubſiſts in this order. For the infinite is omnipotent and perfect, as we have previouſly obſerved, containing in itſelf an intelligible multitude of parts, which it likewiſe produces. And of theſe parts, ſome are more univerſal, but others more partial; and (as Timæus obſerves) are parts both according to the one and according to genera. Beſides, as Timæus calls that which is *animal-itſelf eternal*, and *only-begotten*, ſo Parmenides firſt attributes to infinite multitude *the ever*, and *to be generated*, in the following words: "And on the ſame account, whatever part is *generated* will *always* poſſeſs theſe two parts: for *the one* will *always* contain *being*, and *being the one*; ſo that two things will *always be generated*, and no part will ever *be* one."

Who then ſo perſpicuouſly admoniſhes us of *eternal animal* and of the *firſt-begotten* triad as Parmenides, who firſt aſſumes in this order *generation* and *the ever*, and ſo frequently employs each of theſe appellations? *Perfect animal*, therefore, is the ſame with omnipotent intelligible multitude. For ſince the firſt infinity is power, and the whole of that which is intelligible ſubſiſts according to this, receiving from hence its diviſion into parts, I rather chooſe to call this triad *omnipotent*; deviating in this reſpect from that appellation of *the infinite*, by which vulgar minds are generally diſturbed.

Such then is the intelligible triad, conſidered according to an all-perfect diſtribution, in accommodation to the imbecility of our mental eye. But if we are deſirous, after having bid adieu to corporeal viſion, and the faſcinating but deluſive forms of the phantaſy, which, Calypſo-like, detain us in exile from our fathers' land; after having through a long and laborious dialectic wandering gained our paternal port, and purified ourſelves from the baneful rout of the paſſions, thoſe domeſtic foes of the ſoul; if after all this we are deſirous of gaining a glimpſe of the ſurpaſſing ſimplicity and ineffable union of this occult and aſtoniſhing light, we muſt crowd all our conceptions together into the moſt profound indiviſibility, and, opening the greateſt eye of the ſoul, entreat this all-comprehending deity to approach: for then, preceded by unadorned Beauty, ſilently walking on the extremities of her ſhining feet, he will ſuddenly from his awful ſanctuary riſe to our view.

one as poſſeſſes parts? How? Thus. If the term *it is* is ſpoken of *one being*, and *the one*, of *being which is one*, and *eſſence* is not the ſame with *the one*, but each belongs to that ſame *one being* which we have ſuppoſed, is it

But after ſuch a viſion, what can language announce concerning this tranſcendent object? That it is perfectly indiſtinct and void of number. "And," as Damaſcius * beautifully obſerves, "ſince this is the caſe, we ſhould conſider whether it is proper to call *this* which belongs to it *ſimplicity*, απλοτης; *ſomething elſe*, *multiplicity* πολλοτης; and *ſomething beſides this*, *univerſality* παντοτης. For that which is intelligible is *one*, *many*, *all*, that we may triply explain a nature which is one. But how can one nature be *one* and *many?* Becauſe *many* is the infinite power of *the one*. But how can it be *one* and *all?* Becauſe *all* is the every-way extended energy of *the one*. Nor yet is it to be called an energy, as if it was an extenſion of power to that which is external; nor power, as an extenſion of hyparxis abiding within; but again, it is neceſſary to call them three inſtead of one: for one appellation, as we have often teſtified, is by no means ſufficient for an explanation of this order. And are all things then here indiſtinct? But how can this be eaſy to underſtand? For we have ſaid that there are three principles conſequent to each other; viz. *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*. *But theſe in reality are neither one, nor three, nor one and at the ſame time three* †. But it is neceſſary that we ſhould explain theſe by names and conceptions of this kind, through our penury in what is adapted to their nature, or rather through our deſire of expreſſing ſomething proper on the occaſion. For as we denominate this triad *one*, and *many*, and *all*, and *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*, and again *bound*, *infinite*, and *mixed*—ſo likewiſe we call it *a monad*, and *the indefinite duad*, and *a triad*, and a paternal nature compoſed from both theſe. And as in conſequence of purifying our conceptions we reject the former appellations as unable to harmonize with the things themſelves, we ſhould likewiſe reject the latter on the ſame account."

Now from this remarkable paſſage in particular, and from all that has been ſaid reſpecting the intelligible triad, it follows that the Platonic is totally different from the Chriſtian trinity, ſince the former is a triad poſterior to the firſt cauſe, who according to Plato is a principle tranſcendently exempt from all multitude, and is not coordinated or conſubſiſtent with any being or beings whatever.

A ſuperficial reader indeed, who knows no more of Platoniſm than what he has gleaned from Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem, will be induced to think that the genuine Platonic trinity conſiſts of *the firſt cauſe*, or *the good*, *intellect*, and *ſoul*, and that theſe three were conſidered by Plato as in a certain reſpect one. To ſuch men as theſe it is neceſſary to obſerve, that a triad of principles diſtinct from each other, is a very different thing from a triad which may be conſidered as a whole, and of which each of the three is a part. But *the good* or *the one* is according to Plato ſupereſſential, as is evident from the firſt hypotheſis of this Dialogue, and from the ſixth Book of his Republic. It is impoſſible, therefore, that *the good* can be conſubſiſtent with *intellect*, which is even poſterior to *being*, and much leſs with *ſoul*, which is ſubordinate to *intellect*. And hence *the good*, *intellect*, and *ſoul*, do not form a conſubſiſtent triad.

* Vid. Excerpta, p. 228.

† Αλλ' αυται μεν ουκ εισι κατα αληθειαν, ουτε μιαν, ουτε τρεις, ουτε μια αμα και τρεις.

not

not neceſſary that the whole of it ſhould be *one being*, but that its parts ſhould be *the one* and *to be?* It is neceſſary. Whether, therefore, ſhould we call each of theſe parts a part alone, or a part of the whole? Each ſhould be called a part of the whole. That which *is one*, therefore, is a whole, and poſſeſſes a part. Entirely ſo. What then? Can each of theſe parts of one being, viz. *the one* and *being*, deſert each other, ſo that *the one* ſhall not be a part of *being*, or *being* ſhall not be a part of *the one?* It cannot be. Again, therefore, each of the parts will contain both *one* and *being*, and each part will at leaſt be compoſed from two parts; and, on the ſame account, whatever part takes place will always poſſeſs theſe two parts: for *the one* will always contain *being*, and *being the one*; ſo that two things will always be produced, and no part will ever be *one*. Entirely ſo. Will not, therefore, *one being* thus become an infinite multitude? So it ſeems.

But proceed, and ſtill further conſider this. What? We have ſaid that the one participates of eſſence, ſo far as it is being. We have ſaid ſo. And on this account *one being* appears to be *many*. It does ſo. But what then? If we receive dianoëtically that one which we ſaid participates of eſſence, and apprehend it alone by itſelf without that which we have ſaid it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this alſo be many? I think it will be one. But let us conſider another certain circumſtance. It is neceſſary that its eſſence ſhould be one thing, and itſelf another thing, if *the one* does not participate of eſſence; but as eſſence it participates of *the one*. It is neceſſary. If, therefore, *eſſence* is one thing, and *the one* another thing, neither is *the one*, ſo far as *the one*, different from *eſſence*, nor *eſſence*, ſo far as *eſſence*, different from *the one*; but they are different from each other through that which is *different* and *another*. Entirely ſo. So that *different* is neither the ſame with *the one* nor with *eſſence*. How can it? What, then, if we ſhould ſelect from them, whether if you will *eſſence* and *different*, or *eſſence* and *the one*, or *the one* and *different*, ſhould we not, in each aſſumption, ſelect certain things which might very properly be denominated both theſe? How do you mean? After this manner: Is there not that which we call *eſſence?* There is. And again, that which we denominate *the one?* And this alſo. Is not, therefore, each of them denominated? Each. But what, when I ſay *eſſence* and *the one*, do I not pronounce both theſe? Entirely ſo. And if I ſhould ſay *eſſence* and *different*, or *different* and

and *the one*, ſhould I not perfectly, in each of theſe, pronounce both? Certainly. But can thoſe things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two? They cannot. And can any reaſon be aſſigned, why of two things each of them ſhould not be one? There cannot. As, therefore, theſe two ſubſiſt together, each of them will be one. It appears ſo. But if each of them is one, and *the one* is placed together with them, by any kind of conjunction, will not all of them become three? Certainly. But are not three *odd*, and two *even?* How ſhould they not? But what then? Being two, is it not neceſſary that twice ſhould be preſent? And being three, thrice; ſince twice one ſubſiſts in two, and thrice one in three? It is neceſſary. But if there are two and twice, is it not neceſſary that there ſhould be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, that there ſhould be thrice three? How ſhould it not? But what, if there are three and twice, and two and thrice, is it not neceſſary that there ſhould be thrice two and twice three? Entirely ſo. Hence, there will be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd. It will be ſo. If, therefore, this be the caſe, do you think that any number will be left which is not neceſſarily there? By no means. If, therefore, *the one* is, it is alſo neceſſary that there ſhould be number [1]. It is neceſſary. But

[1] Parmenides after the intelligible triads generates the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual orders, and demonſtrates, by ſubſequent concluſions, a continuous progreſſion of the Gods. For the ſeries and connection of the words with each other imitate the indiſſoluble order of things, which always conjoins the media with the extremes, and through middle genera advances to the ultimate progreſſions of beings. As there are then three intelligible triads, conſiſting of *one being*, *whole itſelf*, and *infinite multitude*, ſo three intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual triads preſent themſelves to our view, viz. *number itſelf*, *whole itſelf*, and *the perfect itſelf*. Hence, *number* here proceeds from *one being*; but *that which is a whole* from *whole itſelf* in intelligibles; and *the perfect itſelf* from *infinite multitude*. For in the intelligible triad the *infinite* was omnipotent and perfect, comprehending all things, and ſubſiſting as incomprehenſible in itſelf. *The perfect*, therefore, is analogous to that which is omnipotent and all-perfect, poſſeſſing an intellectual perfection, and ſuch as is poſterior to primary and intelligible perfection. But *the whole*, which is both intelligible and intellectual, is allied to that which is intelligible, yet it differs from it ſo far as the latter poſſeſſes wholeneſs according to *the one union* of *the one being*; but *the one* of the former appears to be eſſentially a whole of parts characterized by unity, and its being a compoſite of many beings.

But again, *number* muſt be conſidered as analogous to *one being*. For *one being* ſubſiſts among intelligibles occultly, intelligibly, and paternally; but here, in conjunction with difference, it ge-

But if number is, it is neceſſary that the many ſhould ſubſiſt, and an infinite multitude of beings: or do you think that number, infinite in multitude, will alſo participate of eſſence? By all means I think ſo. If, therefore, every number participates of eſſence, will not each part alſo of number participate of eſſence? Certainly. Eſſence, therefore, will be diſtributed through all things which are many, and will not deſert any being, whether the leaſt or the greateſt: for how can eſſence be abſent from any being? In no reſpect. Eſſence, therefore, is diſtributed as much as poſſible into the leaſt and the greateſt, and into all things every way, and is divided the moſt of all things, and poſſeſſes infinite parts. It is ſo. Very many, therefore, are its parts. Very many, indeed. But what, is there any one of theſe which is a part of eſſence, and yet is not *one* part? But how can this be? But if it is, I think it muſt always be neceſſary, as long as it is, that it ſhould be a certain one; but that it cannot poſſibly be nothing. It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, is preſent with every part of eſſence, deſerting no part, whether ſmall or great, or in whatever manner it may be affected. It is ſo. Can *one being*, therefore, be a whole, ſubſiſting in many places at once? Conſider this diligently. I do conſider it, and I ſee that it is impoſſible. It is divided, therefore, ſince it is not a whole; for it can no otherwiſe be preſent with all the parts of eſſence, than in a divided ſtate. Certainly. But that which is diviſible ought neceſſarily to be ſo many as its

nerates number, which eſtabliſhes the ſeparation of forms and reaſons. For *difference* firſt exhibits itſelf in this order; but ſubſiſts among intelligibles as *power* and the *duad*. And in this order it is a maternal and prolific fountain. With great propriety, therefore, does Plato from the ſummit of this order begin his negations of *the one*: for *the many* ſubſiſt here, through that difference which divides *being* and *the one*; becauſe *the whole*, which is denied of *the one*, is intellectual and not intelligible. The negation, therefore, aſſerts that *the one* is not a whole, on which account the affirmation muſt be, *the one* is a whole. For *intelligible whole* is *one being*, but not *the one*. And he thus denies *the many*, "*The one* is not many," the oppoſite to which is, *the one* is many. But the multitude of intelligibles, and not *the one*, is the proximate cauſe of *the many*. And, in ſhort, the whole of that which is intelligible is characterized by *one being*. For both *being* and *the one* are contained in this, and are naturally conjoined with each other; and *being* is here the moſt of all things characterized by *the one*. But when each of theſe, viz. *being*, and *the one*, proceeds into multitude, the one becomes diſtant from the other, and evinces a greater diverſity of nature; but each is diſtributed into multitude through the prolific nature of difference itſelf. And thus it is from hence evident, that the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual orders proceed with ſubjection analogous to the intelligible triads. In the notes to the Phædrus it will be ſhown how Socrates leads us to this order of Gods.

parts.

parts. It ought. We did not, therefore, juſt now ſpeak truly, when we ſaid that eſſence was diſtributed into very many parts; ſince it is not divided into more parts than *the one*, but into parts equal to thoſe of *the one:* for neither does *being* deſert *the one*, nor *the one*, *being:* but theſe two always ſubſiſt, equalized through all things. It appears to be entirely ſo. *The one*, therefore, which is diſtributed by eſſence, is many and an infinite multitude. So it appears. *One being*, therefore, is not only many, but it is likewiſe neceſſary that *the one* which is diſtributed by eſſence ſhould be many. Entirely ſo.

And, indeed, in conſequence of the parts being parts of a whole, *the one* will be defined according to a whole: or are not the parts comprehended by the whole? Neceſſarily ſo. But that which contains will be a bound. How ſhould it not? *One being*, therefore, is in a certain reſpect both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude. It appears ſo. As it is bounded, therefore, muſt it not alſo have extremes? It is neceſſary. But what, if it be a whole, muſt it not alſo have a beginning, middle, and end? Or can there be any whole without theſe three? And if any one of theſe be wanting, can it be willing to be any longer a whole? It cannot. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, will poſſeſs a beginning, end, and middle. It will. But the middle is equally diſtant from the extremes; for it could not otherwiſe be the middle. It could not. And, as it appears, *the one* being ſuch, will participate of a certain figure, whether ſtraight or round, or a certain mixture from both. It will ſo.

Will it, therefore, being ſuch, ſubſiſt in itſelf[1] and in another? How? For each of the parts is in the whole, nor is any one external to the whole. It

[1] By theſe words Plato indicates the ſummit of the intellectual order, or in other words, according to the Grecian theology, Saturn. For, ſo far as he is a total intellect, his energy is directed *to himſelf*, but ſo far as he is in the intelligibles prior to himſelf, he eſtabliſhes the all-perfect intelligence of himſelf in *another*. For ſubſiſtence in *another* here ſignifies that which is better than the ſubſiſtence of a thing in *itſelf*. Saturn, therefore, being intelligible as among intellectuals, eſtabliſhes himſelf in the intelligible triads of the orders prior to him, from which he is alſo filled with united and occult good; and on this account he is ſaid to be *in another*. But becauſe he is a pure and immaterial deity, he is converted to himſelf, and ſhuts up all his powers in himſelf. For the parts of this deity, when he is conſidered as an intellectual wholeneſs, are more partial

It is ſo. But all the parts are comprehended by the whole. Certainly. But *the one* is all the parts of itſelf; and is neither more nor leſs than all. Certainly. Is not *the one*, therefore, a whole? How ſhould it not? If, therefore, all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are one, and *the one* is a whole, but all the parts are comprehended by the whole; hence, *the one* will be comprehended by *the one*, and ſo *the one* will be in itſelf. It appears ſo. But again, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in a certain one. For, if it were in all, it would neceſſarily be in one: for, if it were not in ſome one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a one belonging to all the parts, and the whole is not in this one, how can it any longer be a whole in all the parts? In no reſpect. Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole ſhould be in ſome of the parts, the greater would be in the leſſer; which is impoſſible. Impoſſible. But ſince the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould either be in ſome other, or that it ſhould be nowhere? It is neceſſary. But if it is nowhere, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, ſince it is not in itſelf, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould be in another? Entirely ſo. So far, therefore, as *the one* is a whole, it is in another: but ſo far as all things are its parts, and itſelf all the parts, it is in itſelf: and ſo *the one* will neceſſarily be in itſelf and in another. Neceſſarily.

But as *the one* is naturally ſuch, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould both be moved[1] and ſtand ſtill? How? It muſt ſtand ſtill, indeed, if it be in itſelf. For,

powers, which haſten indeed to a progreſſion from him as their father, but are eſtabliſhed in, and on all ſides comprehended by, him. And this wholeneſs is a deity which connectedly contains the intelligible parts in itſelf, being parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, and ſtably generating all things. It alſo receives into its boſom, and again gathers into itſelf its progeny, and, as the more tragical of fables ſay, devours and depoſits its offspring in itſelf. For its progeny are twofold; ſome being, as it were, reſolved into itſelf, and others ſeparated from it.

[1] The middle of the intellectual order, viz. Rhea, is here indicated by Plato: for all life, according to Plato, is motion; ſince ſoul is ſelf-motive becauſe it is ſelf-vital; and intellect is through this moved, becauſe it poſſeſſes the moſt excellent life. The firſt viviſic cauſe, therefore, of the intellectual Gods is primarily allotted *motion*. If this cauſe, however, was the firſt and higheſt life, it would be requiſite to call it *motion*, and not *that which is moved*; but ſince it is life as in intellectuals, and is filled from exempt life, it is at the ſame time *motion* and *that which is moved*. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides evince that *the one* in this order is moved, becauſe

For, being in one, and not departing from this, it will be in *ſame*, through being in itſelf. It will. But that which is always in the ſame muſt neceſſarily without doubt always ſtand ſtill. Entirely ſo. But what, muſt not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, neceſſarily never be in *ſame*? But if it be never in *ſame*, can it ſtand ſtill? And if it does not ſtand ſtill, muſt it not be moved? Certainly. It is neceſſary, therefore, that *the one*, ſince it is always in itſelf and in another, muſt always be moved and ſtand ſtill. It appears ſo.

But, likewiſe, it ought to be the ſame [1] with itſelf, and different from itſelf; and, in like manner, the ſame with, and different from, others, if it ſuffers

cauſe it proceeds from the cauſes of all life which rank above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual order; which triad Socrates in the Phædrus calls *heaven*, becauſe the whole of it is *life* and *motion*.

When Parmenides, therefore, ſays that *the one* is both *moved and ſtands ſtill*, by *motion* he indicates the vivific hyparxis of the Gods, and the generative fountain of wholes; but by *permanency* coordinated with motion, that pure monad which contains the middle centres of the triad of *guardian* deities, or, in other words, one of the *Curetes* conſubſiſtent with Rhea. So that the *motion* in this order is the fountain of the life which proceeds to all things; and the *permanency* eſtabliſhes the whole vivific fountain in itſelf, but is thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Hence Parmenides, delivering to us the progreſſion of theſe two, ſhows that *that which is moved* is generated from *that which is in another*, but *that which is permanent* from *that which is in itſelf*. For *motion* in this order is better than *permanency*. For as *that which is in another* is cauſally more antient than *that which is in itſelf*, ſo here that which is *moved* than that which is *permanent*. Hence, according to the Grecian theology, the Curetes are powers ſubordinate to Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, the parents of the intellectual order, and are contained in them.

[1] Parmenides here delivers the ſymbols of that deity who ſubſiſts at the extremity of the intellectual order, viz. Jupiter, the artificer of the univerſe. We ſhall find, therefore, that the number of the concluſions is here doubled. For *the one* is no longer ſhown to be alone *ſame* or *different*, as it was ſhown to be *in itſelf* and *in another*, and to be *moved* and be *permanent*; but it is now demonſtrated to be *the ſame with itſelf*, and *different from itſelf*, and *different from others*, and *the ſame with others*. But this *twice* perfectly accords with the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologiſts, and to Socrates in the Cratylus, who ſays that the demiurgic name is compoſed from two words.

In the next place the multitude of cauſes is here ſeparated, and all the monads of the Gods appear according to the demiurgic progreſſion. For the paternal order of the demiurgus, the prolific power which is coordinate with him, the undefiled monad which is the cauſe of exempt providence, the fountain diſtributive of wholes, and all the orders in conjunction with theſe

which

ſuffers what we have related above. How? Every thing, in a certain reſpect, thus takes place with relation to every thing: for it is either the ſame with it or different: or if it is neither ſame nor different, it will be a part of this to which it is ſo related, or with reſpect to a part it will be a whole. It appears ſo. Is therefore *the one* a part of itſelf? By no means. It will not therefore be a whole, with reſpect to itſelf, as if itſelf were a part. For it cannot. But is *the one*, therefore, different from *the one?* By no means. It will not therefore be different from itſelf. Certainly not. If, therefore, it is neither different nor a whole, nor yet a part with reſpect to itſelf, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould be the ſame with itſelf? It is neceſſary. But what, that which is elſewhere than itſelf, ſubſiſting in *ſame* in

which ſubſiſt about the demiurgus, according to which he produces and preſerves all things, and, being exempt from his productions, is firmly eſtabliſhed in himſelf, and ſeparates his own kingdom from the united government of his father—all theſe are here unfolded into light.

Hence that which Parmenides firſt demonſtrates concerning the nature of *the one*, viz. that it is *the ſame* with itſelf, repreſents to us the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which Jupiter is the demiurgus. For the term *ſame* is a manifeſt ſign of his proper or paternal hyparxis: for being one, and the exempt demiurgus and father of wholes, he eſtabliſhes his proper union in himſelf. This term alſo remarkably ſhows the uniform nature, and the alliance of this deity with *bound*. But his being *the ſame with others*, is the illuſtrious good of prolific power, and of a cauſe proceeding to all things, and pervading through all things without impediment. For he is preſent to all things which he produces, and is in all things which he adorns, pre-eſtabliſhing in himſelf an eſſence generative of wholes. Hence *bound* and *the infinite* ſubſiſt in him fabricatively; the former conſiſting in a *ſameneſs* ſeparate from *others*, and the latter in a power which generates *others*. The aſſertion alſo that *he is different from others*, manifeſts his undefiled purity, and his tranſcendency exempt from all ſecondary natures. Hence by his never ceaſing to impart good, by his providence, and by his generating things ſubordinate, *he is the ſame with them*: for he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his own providential care. But by his purity, his undefiled power, and his undeviating energies, he is ſeparate from wholes, and is not conſubſiſtent with others. And as Saturn, the firſt king of the intellectual Gods, is allotted a nature which does not verge to matter, through that pure monad or guard which is united to him, viz. the firſt of the Curetes; and as the vivific goddeſs Rhea poſſeſſes her ſtable and undeviating power from the ſecond of the guardian deities; ſo alſo the demiurgic intellect guards a tranſcendency ſeparate from others, and a union withdrawing itſelf from multitude, through the third monad of the Curetes, who are the leaders of purity.

That deity therefore remains who is the ſeventh of theſe intellectual monads, who is conjoined with all of them, and energizes in conjunction with all, but particularly unfolds himſelf into light in the demiurgic order. This deity, which is celebrated by antient theologiſts as Ocean, Par-

in itſelf, muſt it not neceſſarily be different from itſelf, ſince it has a ſubſiſtence elſewhere? It appears ſo to me. And in this manner *the one* appears to ſubſiſt, being at the ſame time both in itſelf and in another. So it ſeems. Through this, therefore, it appears that *the one* is different from itſelf. It does ſo.

But what if any thing is different from any thing, is it not different from that which is different? Neceſſarily ſo. But are not all ſuch things as are not one different from *the one?* And is not *the one* different from ſuch things as are not one? How ſhould it not? *The one* therefore will be different from other things. Different. But ſee whether *different* and *ſame* are not contrary to each other. How ſhould they not? Do you think, therefore, that *ſame* can ever be in *different*, or *different* in *ſame?* I do not.

menides indicates when he aſſerts that *the one* is *different from itſelf.* As, therefore, the demiurgus is the ſame with himſelf through paternal union, ſo he is ſeparated from himſelf and his father, according to this difference. Whence, therefore, does Parmenides ſay that the demiurgus derives this power? We reply, From being *in himſelf*, and *in another.* For theſe things were unitedly in the firſt father, but ſeparately in the third. Hence ſeparation there ſubſiſts according to cauſe, but in the demiurgus it ſhines forth, and unfolds his power into light. For that the cauſe of diviſion ſubſiſts in a certain reſpect in the firſt father, Parmenides himſelf evinces in the firſt hypotheſis, when he ſays, that every thing which is in itſelf is in a certain reſpect *two*, and is *ſeparated* from itſelf. But the duad is there indeed occultly, but here it ſubſiſts more clearly, where all intellectual multitude is apparent. For difference is the progeny of the duad, which is there firmly eſtabliſhed. This *difference*, therefore, ſeparates the demiurgic intellect from the Gods prior to it, and alſo ſeparates from each other the monads which it contains. Hence Parmenides, when he divides the ſigns of fabrication, ſhows that the idioms of the undefiled and diviſive monads are in the middle of them, ſo far as they alſo in a certain reſpect are comprehended in the one fabrication of things. For the firſt of the concluſions demonſtrates that *the one* is *the ſame with itſelf*; the ſecond, that it is *different from itſelf*; the third, that it is *different from others*; and the fourth, that it is *the ſame with others*; conjoining the diviſive power with the paternal union, and connecting the providential cauſe of ſecondary natures—with a tranſcendency ſeparate from them. For in the Gods it is neceſſary that union ſhould ſubſiſt prior to ſeparation, and a purity unmingled with things ſecondary prior to a providential care of them, through which the divinities being every where are alſo no where, being preſent to all things are exempt from all things, and being all things are no one of their progeny.

I only add, that the reader will find the theology concerning Saturn, delivered by Plato in perfect conformity to what has been above aſſerted of this deity, in the Cratylus, Politicus, and Gorgias; that concerning Rhea, in the Cratylus; concerning Jupiter in the Timæus, Critias, Philebus, Protagoras, and Politicus; and concerning the Curetes in the Laws.

If

If therefore *different* is never in *ſame*, there is no being in which for any time *different* ſubſiſts; for, if it ſubſiſted in it during any time whatever, in that time *different* would be in *ſame*. Would it not be ſo? It would. But ſince it is never in *ſame*, *different* will never ſubſiſt in any being. True. Neither therefore will *different* be in things which are not one, nor in *the one*. It will not. *The one*, therefore, will not through *different* be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one from *the one*. Not, indeed. Nor likewiſe will they be different from each other, ſince they do not participate of *different*. For how can they? But if they are neither different from themſelves, nor from *different*, muſt they not entirely eſcape from being different from each other? They muſt eſcape. But neither will things which are not one participate of *the one*: for if they did they would no longer be *not one*, but in a certain reſpect one. True. Hence things which are *not one* will not be number; for they would not be entirely *not one* in conſequence of poſſeſſing number. Certainly not. But what, can things which are *not one* be parts of one? Or would not things which are *not one* by this means participate of *the one*? They would participate. If, therefore, this is entirely *the one*, but thoſe *not one*, neither will *the one* be a part of things which are *not one*, nor a whole with reſpect to them, as if they were parts; nor, on the contrary, will things which are *not one* be parts of *the one*, nor yet wholes, as if *the one* were a part. They will not. But we have ſaid that things which are neither parts nor wholes, nor different from each other, muſt be the ſame with each other. We have ſaid ſo. Muſt we not therefore aſſert that *the one*, ſince it ſubſiſts in this manner with reſpect to things which are *not one*, is the ſame with them? We muſt. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, is both different from others and itſelf, and the ſame with them and with itſelf. It appears from this reaſoning to be ſo.

But is it alſo ſimilar[1] and diſſimilar to itſelf and others? Perhaps ſo. Since,

[1] After the intellectual the ſupermundane order of Gods follows, who are alſo called by the Grecian theologiſts *aſſimilative leaders*. *Sameneſs* and *difference*, therefore, as we have before obſerved, define the idiom of the demiurgic order, and of the Gods coordinated with it. But ſince the whole order of the aſſimilative Gods is ſuſpended from the demiurgic monad, ſubſiſts about, and is converted to it, and is perfected from it, it is neceſſary to refer the ſigns of this

Since, therefore, it appears to be different from others, others alſo will be different from it. But what then? Will it not be different from others, in the ſame manner as others from it? And this neither more nor leſs? How ſhould it not? If, therefore, neither more nor leſs, it muſt be different in a ſimilar manner. Certainly. Will not that through which *the one* becomes different from others, and others in a ſimilar manner from it, be alſo that through which both *the one* becomes the ſame with others, and others with *the one*? How do you ſay? Thus: Do not you call every name the name of ſomething? I do: but what then? Do you pronounce the ſame name often or once? I pronounce it once. When, therefore, you enunciate that name once, do you denominate that thing to which the name belongs: but if often, not the ſame? Or, whether you pronounce the ſame name once or often, do you not neceſſarily always ſignify the ſame thing? But what then? Does not a different name belong to ſome certain thing? Entirely ſo. When, therefore, you pronounce this, whether once or often, you do not aſſign this name to any other, nor do you denominate any other thing than that to which this name belongs. It is neceſſary it ſhould be ſo. But when we ſay that other things are different from *the one*, and that *the one* is different from others, twice pronouncing the name *different*, we yet ſignify nothing more than the nature of that thing of which this is the name. Entirely ſo.

this order to the demiurgic ſeries, and thence to impart to them a generation proceeding according to order and meaſure.

As this order of Gods, therefore, according to the Grecian theologiſts, aſſimilates ſenſibles to intellectuals, and produces all things poſterior to itſelf according to an imitation of cauſes, it is the primary cauſe of ſimilitude to things ſubordinate to itſelf. Hence it is alſo the cauſe of diſſimilitude coordinate with ſimilitude: for all things which participate of the ſimilar neceſſarily alſo participate of the diſſimilar.

Similitude alſo in this order has a ſubſiſtence analogous to paternal cauſes, and to thoſe which convert things to their principles; but diſſimilitude is analogous to prolific cauſes, and which preſide over multitude and diviſion. Hence *ſimilitude* is *collective*, but *diſſimilitude ſeparative* of things which proceed.

But that the idioms of theſe Gods proceed from the demiurgic monad, and the ſigns which there preſubſiſt, Parmenides ſufficiently demonſtrates: for demiurgic ſameneſs and difference are the cauſes, as he ſays, of the ſimilitude and diſſimilitude of this order.

The reader will find the theology relative to this order delivered by Plato, conformably to what is here ſaid, in the Politicus and the Laws, the Gorgias and the Cratylus.

If therefore *the one* be different from others, and others from *the one*, in conſequence of ſuffering the ſame *different*, *the one* will not ſuffer that which is different from others, but the ſame with others: but is not that which in a certain reſpect ſuffers the ſame ſimilar? Certainly. But, in the ſame manner, as *the one* becomes different from others, every thing becomes ſimilar to every thing: for every thing is different from all things. It appears ſo. But is the ſimilar contrary to the diſſimilar? It is. And is not *different* contrary to *ſame*? And this alſo. But this likewiſe is apparent, that *the one* is both the ſame with and different from others. It is apparent. But to be the ſame with others is a contrary paſſion to the being different from others. Entirely ſo. But *the one* appears to be ſimilar, ſo far as different. Certainly. So far therefore as it is *ſame*, it will be diſſimilar on account of its ſuffering a paſſion contrary to that which produces the ſimilar: or was it not the ſimilar which produced the different? Certainly. It will therefore render that which is diſſimilar the ſame; or it would not be contrary to different. So it appears. *The one* therefore will be both ſimilar and diſſimilar to others: and ſo far as *different* it will be ſimilar; but ſo far as *the ſame* diſſimilar. The caſe appears to be ſo. And it is likewiſe thus affected. How? So far as it ſuffers *ſame* it does not ſuffer that which is various; but not ſuffering that which is various, it cannot be diſſimilar; and not being diſſimilar, it will be ſimilar: but ſo far as it ſuffers *different* it will be various; and being various it will be diſſimilar. You ſpeak the truth. Since, therefore, *the one* is both the ſame with and different from others, according to both and according to each of theſe, it will be ſimilar and diſſimilar to others. Entirely ſo. And will not this in a ſimilar manner be the caſe with relation to itſelf, ſince it has appeared to be both different from and the ſame with itſelf; ſo that, according to both theſe, and according to each, it will appear to be ſimilar and diſſimilar? Neceſſarily ſo.

But conſider now how *the one* ſubſiſts with reſpect to touching[1] itſelf and others,

[1] That order of Gods called by the Greek theologiſts απολυτοι or *liberated*, ſucceeds the *ſupermundane* order, and is here indicated by Plato by *the one touching itſelf and others*. For all the divine genera after the demiurgic monad double their energies, ſince their energy is naturally directed both to themſelves and to other things poſterior to themſelves, rejoicing in progreſſions, being ſubſervient to the providence of ſecondary natures, and calling forth the ſupernatural, impartible,

others, and not touching. I conſider. For *the one* appears in a certain reſpect to be in the whole of itſelf. Right. But is *the one* alſo in others? Certainly. So far therefore as *the one* is in others it will touch others; but ſo far as it is in itſelf it will be hindered from touching others, but it will touch itſelf becauſe it ſubſiſts in itſelf. So it appears. And thus, indeed, *the one* will both touch itſelf and others. It will ſo. But what will you ſay to this? Muſt not every thing which is about to touch any thing be ſituated in a place proximate to and after that which it is about to touch, and in which when ſituated it touches? It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, if it is about to touch itſelf, ought to be ſituated immediately after itſelf, occupying the place proximate to that in which it is. It ought ſo. Would not this be the caſe with *the one* if it was two; and would it not be in two places at once? But can this be the caſe while it is *the one?* It cannot. The ſame neceſſity therefore belongs to *the one*, neither to be two nor to touch itſelf. The ſame. But neither will it touch others. Why? Becauſe we have ſaid, that when any thing is about to touch any thing which is ſeparate from it, it ought to be placed proximate to that which it is about to touch; but that there muſt be no third in the middle of them. True. Two things, therefore, at the leaſt are requiſite, if contact is about to take

partible, and all-perfect producing power of their father, and deducing it to ſubordinate beings. This *contact*, therefore, with and ſeparation from inferior natures clearly repreſents to us a liberated idiom. For *touching* indicates a providence allied to and coordinate with us; and *not to touch*, a tranſcendency exempt and ſeparate from others. Hence theſe epithets admirably accord with the *liberated* genus of Gods, who are ſaid to be at the ſame time conjoined with the celeſtial divinities, and expanded above them, and to proceed to all things with unreſtrained energy. Hence the Fates, as we have ſhown in a note on the 10th book of the Republic, belong to this order; for they are ſaid by Socrates to *touch* the celeſtial circulations. In the Cratylus alſo, the mundane *Core* or Proſerpine, who governs the whole of generation, is ſaid to *touch* flowing eſſence, and through this contact to have been called *Pherſephatta*. To which we may add, that in the Phædo, where we are taught what the mode is of the cathartic life of ſouls, Socrates ſays, that the ſoul, when it is not converſant with the body, *paſſes into contact with being*; through all which Plato indicates that *contact* is the buſineſs of an inſeparable providence, and coordinate inſpection; and that the negation of this is the employment of a dominion ſeparate, unreſtrained, and exempt from the natures that are governed.

Theſe *liberated* Gods are the ſame with thoſe which the Chaldæans call *azonic*, and which according to them are *Serapis*, *Bacchus*, the ſeries of *Oſiris*, and of Apollo, as we are informed by Pſellus in his expoſition of Chaldaic dogmas. He adds, "they are called *azonic*, becauſe they rule without reſtraint over the zones, and are eſtabliſhed above the apparent Gods."

place. Certainly. But if a third thing ſucceeds to the two terms, theſe will now be three, but the contacts two. Certainly. And thus one always being added, one contact will be added, and it will come to paſs that the contacts will be leſs by one than the multitude of the numbers: for by how much the two firſt numbers ſurpaſſed the contacts, ſo as to be more in number than the contacts, by ſo much will all the following number ſurpaſs the multitude of the contacts. For in that which remains one will be added to the number, and one contact to the contacts. Right. The contacts, therefore, leſs by one will always be as many in number as the things themſelves. True. If therefore it is one alone, and not two, there can be no contact. How can there? Have we not ſaid that ſuch things as are different from *the one* are neither one nor participate of it, ſince they are different? We have. *The one* therefore is not number in others, as *the one* is not contained in them. How can it? *The one*, therefore, is neither others, nor two, nor any thing poſſeſſing the name of another number. It is not. *The one*, therefore, is one alone, and will not be two. It will not, as it appears. There is no contact, therefore, two not ſubſiſting. There is not. *The one* therefore will neither touch other things, nor will other things touch *the one*, as there is no contact. Certainly not. On all theſe accounts, therefore, *the one* will both touch and not touch others and itſelf. So it appears.

Is it therefore equal [1] and unequal to itſelf and others? How? If *the one* were greater or leſſer than others, or others greater or leſſer than *the one*, would it not follow that neither *the one*, becauſe one, nor others, becauſe different from *the one*, would be greater or leſſer than each other from their own eſſences? But if each, beſides being ſuch as they are, ſhould poſſeſs equality, would they not be equal to each other? But if the one ſhould poſſeſs magnitude, and the other parvitude, or *the one* magnitude but *others* parvitude, would it not follow, that, with whatever ſpecies magnitude was preſent, that ſpecies would be greater; but that the ſpecies would be leſſer with which parvitude was preſent? Neceſſarily ſo. Are there not, therefore, two certain ſpecies of this kind, magnitude and parvitude? For if they had no ſubſiſtence they could never be contrary to each other, and be preſent with beings.

[1] The *equal* and *unequal* are characteriſtic of the mundane Gods, as we have ſhown in the notes on the firſt hypotheſis, to which we refer the reader.

How

How ſhould they? If therefore parvitude becomes inherent in *the one*, it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it. It is neceſſary. But if it ſhould be inherent in the whole, will it not either be extended equally through the whole of *the one* or comprehend *the one?* Plainly ſo. If parvitude, therefore, is equally inherent in *the one*, will it not be equal to *the one*; but if it comprehends *the one* will it not be greater? How ſhould it not? Can therefore parvitude be equal to or greater than any thing, and exhibit the properties of magnitude and equality, and not its own? It is impoſſible. Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in the whole of *the one*, but if at all, in a part. Certainly. Nor yet again in the whole part; as the ſame conſequences would enſue in the *whole* part of *the one*, as in the whole of *the one:* for it would either be equal to or greater than the part in which it is inherent. It is neceſſary. Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in any being, ſince it can neither be in a part nor in a whole; nor will there be any thing ſmall, except ſmallneſs itſelf. It does not appear that there will. Neither will magnitude therefore be in *the one:* for there will be ſome other thing great beſides magnitude itſelf. I mean that in which magnitude is inherent; and this, though parvitude is not, which ought to be ſurpaſſed by that which is great; but which in this caſe is impoſſible, ſince parvitude is not inherent in any being. True. But, indeed, magnitude itſelf will not ſurpaſs any thing elſe but parvitude itſelf, nor will parvitude be leſs than any other than magnitude itſelf. It will not. Neither therefore will other things be greater than *the one;* nor leſſer, ſince they neither poſſeſs magnitude nor parvitude: nor will theſe two poſſeſs any power with reſpect to *the one*, either of ſurpaſſing or of being ſurpaſſed, but this will be the caſe only with reſpect to each other: nor, on the contrary, will *the one* be either greater or leſſer than theſe two, or others, as it neither poſſeſſes magnitude nor parvitude. So indeed it appears. If *the one* therefore is neither greater nor leſſer than others, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould neither ſurpaſs nor be ſurpaſſed by them? It is neceſſary. Is it not alſo abundantly neceſſary, that that which neither ſurpaſſes nor is ſurpaſſed ſhould be equally affected? And muſt it not, if equally affected, be equal? How ſhould it not? *The one* therefore will be thus circumſtanced with reſpect to itſelf: *viz.* from neither poſſeſſing magnitude nor parvitude in itſelf, it will neither ſurpaſs nor be ſurpaſſed by itſelf; but being equally affected it will

be equal to itſelf. Entirely ſo. *The one* therefore will be equal both to itſelf and others. So it appears.

But if *the one* ſhould be in itſelf, it would alſo be externally about itſelf; and ſo, through comprehending itſelf, it would be greater than itſelf; but from being comprehended leſs than itſelf: and thus *the one* would be both greater and leſſer than itſelf. It would ſo. Is not this alſo neceſſary, that nothing has any ſubſiſtence beſides *the one* and others? How ſhould it be otherwiſe? But ought not whatever has a being to be always ſomewhere? Certainly. And does not that which ſubſiſts in another, ſubſiſt as the leſſer in the greater? For one thing cannot in any other way ſubſiſt in another. It cannot. But ſince there is nothing elſe except *the one* and others, and it is neceſſary that theſe ſhould be in ſomething, is it not neceſſary that they ſhould be in one another, viz. others in *the one*, and *the one* in others; or that they ſhould be no where? It appears ſo. Becauſe, therefore, *the one* is in others, others will be greater than *the one*, through comprehending it; but *the one* will be leſs than others, becauſe comprehended: but if others are inherent in *the one*, *the one* on the ſame account will be greater than others; but others will be leſs than *the one*. It appears ſo. *The one*, therefore, is equal to, greater and leſſer, both than itſelf and others. It ſeems ſo. But if it is greater, equal, and leſſer, it will be of equal, more, and fewer meaſures, both than itſelf and others; and if of meaſures, alſo of parts. How ſhould it not? Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer meaſures, it will alſo be more and leſs in number, both with reſpect to itſelf and others; and alſo, for the ſame reaſon, equal to itſelf and others. How? That which is greater poſſeſſes more meaſures than that which is ſmaller, and contains as many parts as meaſures; and that which is leſſer in the ſame manner, as alſo that which is equal. It is ſo. Since *the one*, therefore, is both greater, leſſer, and equal to itſelf, will it not alſo contain meaſures equal to, more and fewer than itſelf? And if of meaſures, will not this alſo be true of parts? How ſhould it not? If, therefore, it contains equal parts with itſelf, it will be equal in multitude to itſelf: but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, leſs in multitude, than itſelf. It appears ſo. But will *the one* be ſimilarly affected towards others? For, ſince it appears to be greater than others, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould be more in number than others? but, becauſe it is leſſer, muſt it not alſo be fewer in number?

number? and becauſe equal in magnitude, muſt it not alſo be equal in multitude to others? It is neceſſary. And thus again, as it appears, *the one* will be equal, more, and leſs in number, both than itſelf and others. It will ſo.

Will *the one*, therefore, participate of time? And is it, and does it ſubſiſt in becoming to be younger [1] and older, both than itſelf and others? And again, neither younger nor older than itſelf and others, though participating of time? How? *To be* in a certain reſpect is preſent with it, ſince it *is the one*. Certainly. But what elſe is *to be* than a participation of eſſence with the preſent time? In the ſame manner as *it was* is a communication of eſſence with the paſt, and *it will be* with the future? It is no other. It muſt participate, therefore, of time, if it participates of being. Entirely ſo. Muſt it not, therefore, participate of time in progreſſion? Certainly. It will always, therefore, ſubſiſt *in becoming to be* older than itſelf, if it proceeds according to time. It is neceſſary. Do we, therefore, call to mind that the older is always becoming older, becauſe it is always becoming younger? We do call it to mind. Does not *the one*, therefore, while it is becoming older than itſelf, ſubſiſt in becoming older than itſelf, while it is becoming younger than itſelf? Neceſſarily ſo. It will, therefore, become both younger and older than itſelf. Certainly. But is it not then older when it ſubſiſts in *becoming to be* according to the preſent time, which is between *it was* and *it will be*: for, through proceeding from the paſt to the future, it will not paſs beyond the preſent *now*? It will not. Will it not, therefore, ceaſe becoming to be older, when it arrives at *the now*, and is no longer *becoming to be*, but *is* now older? For while it proceeds it will never be comprehended by *the now*. For that which proceeds ſubſiſts in ſuch a manner as to touch upon both *the now* and the future time; departing, indeed, from *the now*, but apprehending the future, becauſe it ſubſiſts in the middle of the future and *the now*. True. But if it be neceſſary that whatever is becoming to be ſhould not paſs by *the now* or the preſent time, hence, as ſoon as it arrives at *the now*, it will always ceaſe becoming to be, and *is* then that which it was in purſuit of becoming. It appears ſo. *The one*, therefore, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*, will ceaſe *becoming*

[1] *Younger* and *older* are characteriſtic of divine ſouls. See the notes on that part of the firſt hypotheſis which correſponds to this part of the ſecond.

to

to be, and then *is* older. Entirely ſo. Is it not, therefore, older than that in reſpect of which it becomes older? And does it not become older than itſelf? Certainly. And is not the older older than the younger? It is. *The one*, therefore, is younger than itſelf, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*. It is neceſſary. But *the now* is always preſent with *the one*, through the whole of its being: for it is always *now* as long as it is. How ſhould it not? *The one*, therefore, always is, and is becoming to be younger and older than itſelf. So it appears. But *is the one*, or does it ſubſiſt in *becoming to be*, in a time more extended than or equal to itſelf? In an equal time. But that which either *is*, or ſubſiſts in *becoming to be*, in an equal time poſſeſſes the ſame age. How ſhould it not? But that which has the ſame age is neither older nor younger. By no means. *The one*, therefore, ſince it both ſubſiſts in *becoming to be* and *is*, in a time equal to itſelf, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* younger nor older than itſelf. It does not appear to me that it can.

But how is it affected with reſpect to others? I know not what to ſay. But this you may ſay, that things different from *the one* becauſe they are *others*, and not *another*, are more than *the one*. For that which is another is one; but being *others* they are more than one, and poſſeſs multitude. They do. But multitude participates of a greater number than *the one*? How ſhould it not? What then? Do we ſay that things more in number are generated, or have been generated, before the few? We aſſert this of the few before the many. That which is the feweſt, therefore, is firſt: but is not this *the one*? Certainly. *The one*, therefore, becomes the firſt of all things poſſeſſing number: but all other things have number, if they are *others* and not *another*. They have indeed. But that which is firſt generated has I think a priority of ſubſiſtence: but others are poſterior to this. But ſuch as have an after generation are younger than that which had a prior generation; and thus others will be younger than *the one*, but *the one* will be older than others. It will indeed. But what ſhall we ſay to this? Can *the one* be generated contrary to its nature, or is this impoſſible? Impoſſible. But *the one* appears to conſiſt of parts; and if of parts, it poſſeſſes a beginning, end, and middle. Certainly. Is not, therefore, the beginning generated firſt of all, both of *the one* and of every other thing; and after the beginning all the other parts, as far as to the end? What then? And, indeed,

indeed, we ſhould ſay that all theſe are parts of a whole and of one; but that *the one*, together with the end, is generated *one* and a *whole*. We ſhould ſay ſo. But the end I think muſt be generated laſt of all, and *the one* muſt be naturally generated together with this; ſo that *the one*, ſince it is neceſſary that it ſhould not be generated contrary to nature, being produced together with the end, will be naturally generated the laſt of others. *The one*, therefore, is younger than others, but others are older than *the one*. So again it appears to me. But what, muſt not the beginning, or any other part whatever, of *the one*, or of any thing elſe, if it is a part, and not parts—muſt it not neceſſarily be one, ſince it is a part? Neceſſarily. *The one*, therefore, while becoming to be, together with the firſt part, will be generated, and together with the ſecond; and it will never deſert any one of the other generated parts, till arriving at the extremity it becomes one whole; neither excluded from the middle, nor from the laſt, nor the firſt, nor from any other whatever in its generation. True. *The one*, therefore, will poſſeſs the ſame age with others, as (if it be not *the one* contrary to its own nature) it will be generated neither prior nor poſterior to others, but together with them; and on this account *the one* will neither be older nor younger than others, nor others than *the one:* but, according to the former reaſoning, *the one* was both older and younger than others, and others in a ſimilar manner than it. Entirely ſo.

After this manner, therefore, *the one* ſubſiſts and is generated. But what ſhall we ſay reſpecting its becoming older and younger than others, and others than *the one*; and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? Shall we ſay that it ſubſiſts in the ſame manner with reſpect to the term *becoming to be* as with reſpect to the term *to be?* or otherwiſe? I am not able to ſay. But I am able to affirm this, that however one thing may be older than another, yet it cannot otherwiſe ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* older, than by that difference of age which it poſſeſſed as ſoon as it was born: nor, on the contrary, can that which is younger ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* younger, otherwiſe than by the ſame difference. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing elſe, always cauſe them to differ by the ſame interval by which they were diſtant at firſt. How ſhould it be otherwiſe? *That which is*, therefore, cannot ſubſiſt in *becoming to be*

older or younger than *one being*, ſince it *is* always equally different from it in age: but this *is* and *was* older, but that younger; but by no means ſubſiſts in *becoming* ſo. True. That which *is* one, therefore, will never ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* either older or younger than other beings. Never. But ſee whether by this means other things will *become* younger and older. After what manner? The ſame as that through which *the one* appeared to be older than others, and others than *the one*. What then? Since *the one* is older than others, it was for a longer period of time than others. Certainly.

But again conſider, if we add an equal time to a longer and ſhorter time, does the longer differ from the ſhorter by an equal or by a ſmaller part? By a ſmaller. *The one*, therefore, will not differ from others by ſo great an age afterwards as before; but, receiving an equal time with others, it will always differ by a leſs age than before. Will it not be ſo? Certainly. But does not that which differs leſs in age, with reſpect to any thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with reſpect to thoſe than which it was before older? Younger. But if it is younger, will not, on the contrary, others with reſpect to *the one* be older than before? Entirely ſo. That, therefore, which was generated younger, will ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* older, with reſpect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never *is* older, but always is *becoming* older than it; the one indeed advancing to a more juvenile ſtate, but the other to one more aged: but that which is older is *becoming to be* younger than the younger, after the ſame manner. For both tending to that which is contrary they ſubſiſt in becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger: but they are not able to *become* ſo. For if they ſhould *become* they would no longer ſubſiſt in *becoming*, but would now *be*. But now they are becoming younger and older than each other; and *the one* indeed becomes younger than others, becauſe it appears to be older, and to have a prior generation: but others are older than *the one*, becauſe they have a poſterior generation; and, from the ſame reaſon, other things will be ſimilarly related with reſpect to *the one*, ſince they appear to be more antient and to have a prior generation. So indeed it appears. Does it not follow, that ſo far as the one does not become younger or older than the

the other, becauſe they differ by an equal number from each other, that, ſo far as this, *the one* will not become older or younger than others, nor others than *the one?* But that, ſo far as it is neceſſary that the prior ſhould always differ from ſuch as are becoming to be poſterior, and the poſterior from the prior; ſo far it is neceſſary that they ſhould become older and younger than each other, both others than *the one* and *the one* than others? Entirely ſo. On all theſe accounts, therefore, *the one is*, and is *becoming to be*, older and younger both than itſelf and others; and again, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* older nor younger than itſelf and others. It is perfectly ſo. But ſince *the one* participates of time, and of becoming to be older and younger, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould participate of the paſt, preſent, and future, ſince it participates of time? It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, was, and is, and will be; and was generated, and is generated, and will be generated. What then? And there will alſo be ſomething belonging to it, and which may be aſſerted of it, and which was, and is, and will be. Entirely ſo. There will, therefore, be ſcience, opinion, and ſenſe of *the one*, ſince we have now treated of all theſe things about it. You ſpeak rightly. A name, therefore, and diſcourſe may ſubſiſt about *the one*, and it may be denominated and ſpoken of: and whatever particulars of the ſame kind take place in other things, will alſo take place about *the one*. The caſe is perfectly ſo.

In the third place, let us conſider, if *the one* ſubſiſts in the manner we have already aſſerted, is it not neceſſary, ſince it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating of time, that becauſe *it is* one it ſhould participate of eſſence; but that becauſe *it is not*, it ſhould not at any time participate of eſſence? It is neceſſary. Is it, therefore, poſſible, that when it participates and becomes ſuch as it is, that then it ſhould not participate; or that it ſhould participate when it does not participate? It cannot be poſſible. It participates, therefore, at one time, and does not participate at another: for thus alone can it participate and not participate of the ſame. Right. Is not that alſo time, when it receives *being* and again loſes it? Or how can it be poſſible that, being ſuch as it is, it ſhould at one time poſſeſs the ſame thing, and at another time not, unleſs it both receives and loſes it? No otherwiſe. Do you not denominate the receiving of eſſence *to become?* I do. And is

not to loſe eſſence the ſame as to periſh? Entirely ſo. *The one*, therefore, as it ſeems, by receiving and loſing eſſence, is generated and periſhes. Neceſſarily ſo. But ſince it is both one and many, and ſubſiſts in becoming to be and periſhing, when it becomes one does it ceaſe to be many, and when it becomes many does it ceaſe to be one? Entirely ſo. But, in conſequence of becoming one and many, muſt it not be ſeparated and collected? It muſt. And when it becomes diſſimilar and ſimilar, muſt it not be aſſimilated and diſſimilated? Certainly. And when it becomes greater, leſſer, and equal, muſt it not be increaſed, corrupted, and equalized? It muſt ſo. But when from being moved it ſtands ſtill, and when from ſtanding ſtill it is changed into being moved, it is requiſite that it ſhould not ſubſiſt in one time. How ſhould it? But that which before ſtood ſtill and is afterwards moved, and was before moved and afterwards ſtands ſtill, cannot ſuffer theſe affections without mutation. For how can it? But there is no time in which any thing can neither be moved nor ſtand ſtill. There is not. But it cannot be changed without mutation. It is not probable that it can. When, therefore, will it be changed? For neither while it ſtands ſtill, nor while it is moved, will it be changed: nor while it is in time. It will not. Is that any wonderful thing in which it will be when it changes? What thing? *The ſudden*, or that which unapparently ſtarts forth to the view. For *the ſudden* ſeems to ſignify ſome ſuch thing, as that from which it paſſes into each of theſe conditions. For while it ſtands ſtill it will not be changed from ſtanding, nor while in motion will it be changed from motion: but that wonderful nature *the ſudden* is ſituated between motion and abiding, is in no time, and into this and from this that which is moved paſſes into ſtanding ſtill, and that which ſtands ſtill into motion. It appears ſo. *The one*, therefore, if it ſtands ſtill and is moved, muſt be changed into each: for thus alone will it produce both theſe affections. But, becoming changed, it will be changed ſuddenly; and when it changes will be in no time: for it will then neither ſtand ſtill nor be moved. It will not. Will *the one* alſo be thus affected with reſpect to other mutations? And when it is changed from *being* into the *loſs of being*, or from *non-being* into *becoming to be*, does it not then become a medium between certain motions and abidings? and then neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor periſhes? It appears ſo. And in the ſame manner,

when

when it paſſes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it ſeparated nor collected. And in paſſing from ſimilar to diſſimilar, and from diſſimilar to ſimilar, it is neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar, nor is aſſimilated nor diſſimilated. And while it paſſes from ſmall into great, and into equal or its contrary, it will neither be ſmall nor great, nor unequal, nor increaſing, nor periſhing, nor equalized. It does not appear that it can. But all theſe paſſions *the one* will ſuffer, if it is. How ſhould it not?

But ſhould we not conſider what other things ought to ſuffer if *the one* is? We ſhould. Let us relate, therefore, *if the one is*, what other things ought to ſuffer from *the one*. By all means. Does it not follow that becauſe other things are different from *the one* they are not *the one:* for otherwiſe they would not be different from *the one?* Right. Nor yet are others entirely deprived of *the one*, but participate it in a certain reſpect. In what reſpect? Becauſe things different from *the one* are different, from their having parts: for if they had not parts they would be entirely one. Right. But parts we have aſſerted belong to that which is a whole. We have ſo. But it is neceſſary that a whole ſhould be one compoſed from many, of which one the many are parts: for each of the parts ought not to be a part of many, but of a whole. How ſo? If any thing ſhould be a part of many, among which it ſubſiſts itſelf, it would doubtleſs be a part of itſelf (which is impoſſible), and of each one of the others; ſince it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of theſe it will be a part of the others, this being excepted; and ſo it will not be a part of each one: and not being a part of each, it will be a part of no one of the many: and being a part of no one of the many, it is impoſſible that it ſhould be any thing belonging to all thoſe, of no one of which it is either a part or any thing elſe. So it appears. A part, therefore, is neither a part of many nor of all; but of one certain idea and of one certain thing which we call a whole, and which becomes one perfect thing from all: for a part indeed is a part of this. Entirely ſo. If, therefore, other things have parts, they will alſo participate of a whole and one. Certainly. One perfect whole, therefore, poſſeſſing parts, muſt neceſſarily be different from *the one*. It is neceſſary. But the ſame reaſoning is true concerning each of the parts: for it is neceſſary

neceſſary that each of theſe ſhould participate of *the one.* For, if each of theſe is a part, the very being each, in a certain reſpect, ſignifies one; ſince it is diſtinguiſhed from others, and has a ſubſiſtence by itſelf, if it is that which is called each. Right. But it participates of *the one* as it is evidently ſomething different from *the one*; for otherwiſe it would not participate, but would be *the one itſelf.* But now it is impoſſible that any thing can be *the one* except *the one itſelf.* Impoſſible. But it is neceſſary both to a whole and to a part to participate of *the one:* for a whole is one certain thing and has parts. But each part whatever, which is a part of the whole, is one part. It is ſo. Muſt not, therefore, thoſe which participate of *the one* participate it, as being different from *the one?* How ſhould they not? But things different from *the one* will in a certain reſpect be many; for if things different from *the one* were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing. They would. But ſince the things which participate of one part and one whole are more than one, is it not neceſſary that theſe very things which participate of *the one* ſhould be infinite in multitude? How? Thus: they are different from *the one,* nor are they participants of *the one,* then when they have already participated of it. Certainly. Are not thoſe multitudes in which *the one* is not? Multitudes, certainly. What then? If we ſhould be willing by cogitation to take away the leaſt quantity from theſe, would it not be neceſſary that this quantity which is taken away ſhould be multitude, and not one, ſince it does not participate of *the one?* It is neceſſary. By always ſurveying, therefore, another nature of form, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf, will not any quantity of it which we may behold be infinite in multitude? Entirely ſo. And ſince every part becomes one, the parts will have bounds with reſpect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with reſpect to the parts. Perfectly ſo. It will happen, therefore, to things different from *the one,* as it appears both from *the one* and from their communicating with each other, that a certain ſomething different will take place in them; which indeed affords to them a bound towards each other, while in the mean time the nature of theſe cauſes them to become eſſentially connected with infinity. It appears ſo. And thus things different from *the one,* both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate of bound.

Entirely

Entirely ſo. Are they not, therefore, ſimilar and diſſimilar, both to each other and to themſelves? Why? Becauſe, ſo far as all of them are in a certain reſpect infinite, according to their own nature, they all of them, in conſequence of this, ſuffer that which is *the ſame*. How ſhould they not? But ſo far as they ſuffer to be bounded and infinite, which are paſſions contrary to each other, they ſuffer theſe paſſions. Certainly. But things contrary, as ſuch, are moſt diſſimilar. What then? According to each of theſe paſſions, therefore, they are ſimilar to themſelves and to each other; but, according to both, they are on both ſides moſt contrary and diſſimilar. It appears ſo. And thus others will be the ſame with themſelves and with each other, and ſimilar and diſſimilar. They will ſo. And again, they will be the ſame and different from each other, will both be moved and ſtand ſtill; and it will not be difficult to find all kinds of contrary paſſions ſuffered by things different from *the one*, while they appear to be paſſive, in the manner we have related. You ſpeak rightly.

Shall we not, therefore, paſs by theſe things as evident, and again conſider if *the one* is, whether things different from *the one* will ſubſiſt not in this manner, or whether in this manner alone? Entirely ſo. Let us, therefore, aſſert again from the beginning, *if the one is*, what things different from *the one* ought to ſuffer. Let us. Is, therefore, *the one* ſeparate from others, and are others ſeparate from *the one?* Why? Becauſe there is no other *different* beſides theſe, viz. that which is *different* from *the one*, and that which is *different* from others; for all that can be ſpoken is aſſerted, when we ſay *the one* and *others*. All, indeed. There is nothing elſe, therefore, beſides theſe in which *the one* and *others* can ſubſiſt after the ſame manner. Nothing. *The one* and *others*, therefore, are never in the ſame. It does not appear that they are. Are they ſeparate, therefore? They are. We have likewiſe aſſerted that *the truly one* has not any parts. For how can it? Neither, therefore, will the whole of *the one* be in *others*, nor the parts of it, if it is ſeparate from *others*, and has no parts. How ſhould it not be ſo? In no way, therefore, will *others* participate of *the one*, ſince they neither participate according to a certain part of it, nor according to the whole. It does not appear that they can. By no means, therefore, are *others the one*, nor have they any *one* in themſelves. They have not.

Neither,

Neither, then, are other things many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one: but now things different from *the one* are neither one nor many, nor a whole, nor parts, ſince they in no reſpect participate of *the one*. Right. *Others*, therefore, are neither two nor three, nor is *one* contained in them, becauſe they are entirely deprived of *the one*. So it is. *Others*, therefore, are neither ſimilars nor diſſimilars, nor the ſame with *the one*, nor are ſimilitude and diſſimilitude inherent in them. For, if they were ſimilar and diſſimilar, ſo far as they contained in themſelves ſimilitude and diſſimilitude, ſo far things different from *the one* would comprehend in themſelves two contrary ſpecies. So it appears. But it is impoſſible for thoſe to participate of two certain things which do not participate of one. Impoſſible. *Others*, therefore, are neither ſimilars nor diſſimilars, nor both. For, if they were things ſimilar or diſſimilar, they would participate of one other form; and if they were both, they would participate of two contrary forms: but theſe things appear to be impoſſible. True. *Others*, therefore, are neither *ſame* nor *different*, nor are moved nor ſtand ſtill, nor are generated nor deſtroyed, nor are greater, or leſſer, or equal, nor do they ſuffer any thing elſe of this kind. For, if *others* could ſuſtain to ſuffer any ſuch affection, they would participate of one and two, and of even and odd; all which it appears impoſſible for them to participate, ſince they are entirely deprived of *the one*. All this is moſt true. Hence, then, if *the one is*, *the one* is all things and nothing; and is ſimilarly affected towards itſelf and towards others. Entirely ſo.

Let this then be admitted. But ſhould we not after this conſider what ought to happen if *the one* is not? We ſhould. What then will be the hypotheſis *if the one is not?* Will it differ from the hypotheſis *if that which is not one is not?* It will indeed differ. Will it only differ, or is the hypotheſis *if that which is not one is not*, entirely contrary to the hypotheſis *if the one is not?* Entirely contrary. But what, if any one ſhould ſay, if magnitude is not, or parvitude is not, or any thing elſe of this kind, would he not evince in each of theſe that he ſpeaks of *that which is not* as ſomething *different?* Entirely ſo. Would he not, therefore, now evince that he calls *that which is not* different from others, when he ſays *if the one is not*; and ſhould we underſtand that which he ſays? We ſhould underſtand. In the

the firſt place, therefore, he ſpeaks of ſomething which may be known; and afterwards of ſomething different from others when he ſays *the one*, whether he adds to it *to be* or *not to be:* for that which is ſaid not to be will be not the leſs known, nor that it is ſomething different from others: is it not ſo? It is neceſſary it ſhould. Let us, therefore, relate from the beginning, *if the one is not*, what ought to be the conſequence. In the firſt place, therefore, this as it appears ought to happen it, that either there ſhould be a ſcience of it, or that nothing of what is pronounced can be known, when any one ſays *if the one is not*. True. Muſt not this alſo happen, that either other things muſt be different from it, or that it muſt be ſaid to be different from others? Entirely ſo. Diverſity, therefore, beſides ſcience, is preſent with it; for, when any one ſays that *the one* is different from others, he will not ſpeak of the diverſity of others, but of the diverſity of *the one*. It appears ſo. And beſides, that which is not, or non-being, will participate of *that*, and of *ſome certain thing*, and of *this*, and of *theſe*, and every thing of this kind. For neither could *the one* be ſpoken of, nor things different from *the one*, nor would any thing be preſent with it, nor could it be denominated any thing, if it neither participated of ſome certain thing or things of this kind. Right. But *to be* cannot be preſent with *the one* if it is not; though nothing hinders but it may participate of *the many:* but, indeed, it is neceſſary that it ſhould, if *the one* is *that*, and is not ſomething different from *that*. If, therefore, it is neither *the one* nor *that*, neither will it be; but diſcourſe muſt take place about ſomething elſe, and it will be neceſſary to pronounce nothing concerning it. But if *the one* is eſtabliſhed as *that* and not as *another*, it is neceſſary that it ſhould participate of *that* and of many other things. Entirely ſo. Diſſimilitude, therefore, is preſent with it as to other things: for other things being different from *the one* will alſo be foreign from it. Certainly. But are not things foreign various? How ſhould they not? And are not things various diſſimilars? Diſſimilars. If, therefore, they are diſſimilars to *the one*, it is evident they will be diſſimilars to that which is diſſimilar. It is evident. Diſſimilitude, therefore, will be preſent with *the one*, according to which others will be diſſimilars to it. It appears ſo. But if a diſſimilitude with reſpect to other things belongs to it, muſt not ſimilitude to itſelf be preſent with it? How? If there be a diſſimilitude of *the one* with reſpect to *the one*, diſcourſe would not take place about a

thing of this kind as of *the one*; nor would the hypotheſis be about *the one*, but about ſomething different from *the one*. Entirely ſo. But it ought not. Certainly not. There ought, therefore, to be a ſimilitude of *the one* with reſpect to itſelf. There ought. But neither is *the one* equal to others. For, if it were equal, it would according to equality be ſimilar to them; but both theſe are impoſſible, ſince *the one* is not. Impoſſible. But ſince it is not equal to others, is it not neceſſary that others alſo ſhould not be equal to it? It is neceſſary. But are not things which are not equal unequal? Certainly. And are not unequals unequal to that which is unequal? How ſhould they not? *The one*, therefore, will participate of inequality, according to which others will be unequal to it. It will participate. But magnitude and parvitude belong to inequality. They do. Do magnitude and parvitude, therefore, belong to a one of this kind? It appears they do. But magnitude and parvitude are always ſeparated from each other. Entirely ſo. Something, therefore, always ſubſiſts between them. Certainly. Can you aſſign any thing elſe between theſe, except equality? Nothing elſe. With whatever, therefore, there is magnitude and parvitude, with this equality alſo is preſent, ſubſiſting as a medium between theſe. It appears ſo. But to *the one which is not*, equality, magnitude, and parvitude, as it appears, belong. So it ſeems. But it ought likewiſe, in a certain reſpect, to participate of eſſence. How ſo? Ought it to poſſeſs the properties which we have already deſcribed? for, unleſs this is the caſe, we ſhall not ſpeak the truth when we ſay *the one is not*; but if this is true, it is evident that we have aſſerted things which have a ſubſiſtence: is it not ſo? It is. But ſince we aſſert that we ſpeak truly, it is likewiſe neceſſary to aſſert that we ſpeak of things which exiſt. It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, as it appears, *is*; for *if it is not*, while *not being* [1], but remits ſomething of *being* in order to *not being*, it will immediately become *being*. Entirely ſo. It ought, therefore, to have, as the bond of *not to be*, *to be that which is not* [2], if it is about *not to be*: juſt as *being* ought to have as a bond *not to be that which is*

[1] The original is μη εστι μη ον, and this is literally *is not non-being*. But the meaning of this difficult paſſage is as follows: Any remiſſion of *being* is attended with *non-being*, which is the ſame with *is not*; and if any thing of *is* be taken away, *is not* is immediately introduced, and ſo it will immediately become *is not non-being*, that is, *it is being*.

[2] For between μη ειναι and ειναι μη ον muſt ſubſiſt as a medium.

not,

not [1], that it may be perfectly *that which is*. For thus, in a moſt eminent degree, *being* will *be* and *non-being* will *not be*: *being* participating of eſſence, in order that it may *be being*; but of *non-eſſence* in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is about perfectly *to be*: but *non-being* participating of *non-eſſence*, in order that *it may not be that which is not being*; but participating of eſſence, in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is to be perfectly *that which is not*. Moſt truly ſo. Since, therefore, *non-being* is preſent with *being*, and *being* with *non-being*, is it not neceſſary that *the one* alſo, ſince it is not, ſhould participate of *being*, in order that it may *not be*? It is neceſſary. Eſſence, therefore, will appear with *the one*, if it is not. So it ſeems. And *non-eſſence*, ſince it is not. How ſhould it not? Can any thing, therefore, which is affected in a certain manner, be not ſo affected when not changed from this habit? It cannot. Every thing, therefore, ſignifies a certain mutation, which is affected and again not affected in ſome particular manner. How ſhould it not? Is mutation a motion, or what elſe do we call it? It is a motion. But has not *the one* appeared to be both *being* and *non-being*? Certainly. It has appeared, therefore, to be *thus* and *not thus* affected. It has. *The one*, therefore, which is *non-being* appears to be moved, ſince it poſſeſſes a mutation from *being* into *non-being*. It appears ſo. But if it be no where among beings, as *it is not* in conſequenee of *not being*, it cannot paſs elſewhere. For how can it? It will not, therefore, be moved by tranſition. It will not. Neither will it revolve in *ſame*: for it will never touch *ſame*, ſince *ſame* is *being*. But it is impoſſible that *non-being* can reſide in *any being*. Impoſſible. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, cannot revolve in that in which it is not. It cannot. Neither will *the one* be altered from itſelf, either into *being* or *non-being*: for our diſcourſe would no longer be concerning *the one*, if it was altered from itſelf, but concerning ſomething different from this one. Right. But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in *ſame*, nor ſuffers tranſition, is there any way in which it can be moved? How ſhould there? But that which is immovable muſt neceſſarily

[1] So το μη ον μη ειναι is the medium between το ειναι ον and το μη ειναι ον: for το μη ειναι μη is the ſame as το ειναι, and connects with το ειναι ον; and το μη ον with το μη ειναι ον. Thompſon had not the leaſt glimpſe of this meaning, as may be ſeen from his verſion.

be at reſt; and that which is at reſt muſt abide or ſtand ſtill. It is neceſſary. *The one which is not*, therefore, as it appears, both abides and is moved. It appears ſo. But if it be moved, there is a great neceſſity that it ſhould be altered; for, ſo far as any thing is moved, it is no longer affected in the ſame manner as before, but differently. There is ſo. *The one*, therefore, ſince it is moved, is alſo altered. Certainly. But as again it is in no reſpect moved, it will be in no reſpect altered. It will not. So far, therefore, as *the one which is not* is moved, it is altered; but ſo far as it is not moved it is not altered. Certainly not. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, is both altered and not altered. It appears ſo. But is it not neceſſary that when any thing is altered it ſhould become different from what it was before, and ſhould ſuffer a diſſolution of its former habit; but that a nature which is not altered ſhould neither be generated nor diſſolved? It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, through being altered, will be generated and diſſolved; but at the ſame time, from its not ſuffering alteration, will not be ſubject to either generation or corruption. And thus *the one which is not* will be generated and diſſolved, and will neither be generated nor diſſolved. It will not.

But let us again return to the beginning, and ſee whether theſe things will appear to us in our ſubſequent diſcuſſion as they do now, or otherwiſe. It is neceſſary, indeed, ſo to do. Have we not already related, *if the one is not*, what ought to happen concerning it? Certainly. But when we ſay *it is not*, do we ſignify any thing elſe than the abſence of eſſence from that which we ſay is not? Nothing elſe. Whether, therefore, when we ſay that any thing *is not*, do we ſay that in a certain reſpect it is not, and that in a certain reſpect it is? Or does the term *is not* ſimply ſignify that it is in no reſpect any where, and that it does not any how participate of eſſence, ſince it *is not*? It ſignifies, indeed, moſt ſimply. Neither therefore can that which is not *be*, nor in any other reſpect participate of eſſence. It cannot. But is to be generated and corrupted any thing elſe than for this to receive eſſence and for that to loſe eſſence? It is nothing elſe. That therefore with which nothing of eſſence is preſent, can neither receive nor loſe it. How can it? *The one*, therefore, ſince it in no reſpect *is*, can neither poſſeſs, nor loſe, nor receive eſſence, in any manner whatever. It is proper

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it ſhould be ſo. *The one which is not*, will neither therefore be corrupted nor generated, ſince it in no reſpect participates of eſſence. It does not appear that it will. Neither, therefore, will it be in any reſpect altered; for if it ſuffered this paſſion it would be generated and corrupted. True. But if it is not altered, is it not alſo neceſſary that it ſhould not be moved? It is neceſſary. But that which in no reſpect *is*, we have likewiſe aſſerted, cannot ſtand ſtill; for that which ſtands ought always to be in a certain *ſame?* How ſhould it not? And thus we muſt aſſert that *non-being* neither at any time ſtands nor is moved. For indeed it does not. But likewiſe nothing of beings is preſent with it; for this, through participating of being, would participate of eſſence. It is evident. Neither magnitude, therefore, nor parvitude, nor equality, belongs to it. Certainly not. Neither will ſimilitude or diverſity, either with reſpect to itſelf or others, be preſent with it. It does not appear that they will. But what, can other things be in any reſpect preſent with it, if nothing ought to be preſent with it? They cannot. Neither, therefore, are ſimilars nor diſſimilars, nor *ſame* nor *different*, different from it. They are not. But what, can any thing be aſſerted of it, or be with it, or can it be any certain thing, or this, or belong to this, or that, or be with ſome other thing, or be formerly, or hereafter, or now—or can ſcience, or opinion, or ſenſe, or diſcourſe, or a name, or any thing elſe belonging to beings, ſubſiſt about that which is not? There cannot. *The one* therefore *which is not*, will not in any reſpect ſubſiſt any where. So indeed it appears.

But let us again declare *if the one is not*, what other things ought to ſuffer. Let us. But in a certain reſpect *others* ought to ſubſiſt; for, unleſs *others* have a being, we cannot diſcourſe concerning them. True. But if diſcourſe is about *others*, *others* will be different: or do you not call *others* and *different* the ſame? I do. But do we not ſay that *different* is different from different, and *other* is other than *another?* Certainly. With reſpect to *others*, therefore, if they are about to be *others*, there is ſomething than which they will be others. It is neceſſary. But what will this be? For they will not be different from *the one*, ſince it is not. They will not. They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be different from nothing. Right. According to multitudes, therefore,

each is different from each; for they cannot be different according to *the one*, ſince *the one is not*. But each maſs of theſe, as it appears, is infinite in multitude. And though any one ſhould aſſume that which appears to be the leaſt, like a dream in ſleep, on a ſudden, inſtead of that which ſeemed to be *one*, *many* would riſe to the view; and inſtead of that which is ſmalleſt, a quantity perfectly great with reſpect to the multitude diſtributed from it. Moſt right. But among theſe maſſes or heaps, *others* will be mutually different from one another, if they are *others* and *the one* is not. Eminently ſo. Will there not then be many heaps, each of which will appear to be one, but is not ſo ſince *the one* is not? There will ſo. There will likewiſe appear to be a number of theſe, if each of theſe which are many is one. Entirely ſo. But the even and odd which are among them will not have a true appearance, ſince *the one* will not have a being. They will not. But likewiſe that which is ſmalleſt, as we have ſaid, will appear to be with them; but this minimum will ſeem to be many things and great, with reſpect to each of the things which are many and ſmall. How ſhould it not? And every ſmall heap will ſeem in the eye of opinion to be equal to many ſmall heaps: for it will not appear to paſs from a greater into a leſſer quantity, before it ſeems to arrive at ſomething between; and this will be a phantaſm of equality. It is likely to be ſo. Will it not alſo appear to be bounded with reſpect to another heap, itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, at the ſame time neither having a beginning, nor middle, nor end? How ſo? Becauſe, when any one apprehends by the dianoëtic power ſome one of theſe prior to the beginning, another beginning will always appear, and after the end another end will always be left behind: but in the middle there will always be other things more inward than the middle; and ſmaller, becauſe each of them cannot receive *one one*, ſince *the one is not*. This is moſt true. But every thing which any one may apprehend by the dianoëtic power, muſt I think be broken to pieces and diſtributed; for the bulk will in a certain reſpect be apprehended without *the one*. Entirely ſo. But will not ſuch a heap, to him who beholds it afar off and with a dull eye, neceſſarily appear to be one: but to him who with an intellectual eye ſurveys it near and acutely, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, ſince it is deprived of *the one*, becauſe it has no ſubſiſtence? It is neceſſary it ſhould be ſo in the higheſt degree.

Each, therefore, of other things ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, *if the one is not*, and other things beſides *the one* have a ſubſiſtence. It ought to be ſo. Will they, therefore, appear to be ſimilars and diſſimilars? But how? Since to him who beholds *others* at a diſtance, involved as it were in ſhadow, they all appear to be one, they will ſeem to ſuffer *ſame* and to be ſimilar. Entirely ſo. But to him who approaches nearer they will appear to be many and different, and different from and diſſimilar to themſelves, through the phantaſm of *diverſity*. It is ſo. The heaps, therefore, will neceſſarily appear to be ſimilar and diſſimilar to themſelves, and to each other. Entirely ſo. Will they not alſo be the ſame and different from each other, and in contact with, and ſeparate from, themſelves, and moved with all poſſible motions, and every way abiding: likewiſe generated and corrupted, and neither of theſe, and all of this kind, which may be eaſily enumerated, if, though *the one is not*, *the many* have a ſubſiſtence? All this is moſt true.

Once more, therefore, returning again to the beginning, let us relate what ought to happen to things different from *the one*, *if the one is not*. Let us relate. Does it not, therefore, follow that *others* are not *the one?* How ſhould it not be ſo? Nor yet are they many; for, in *the many*, *the one* alſo would be inherent. For, if none of theſe is one, all are nothing; ſo that neither can there be many. True. *The one*, therefore, not being inherent in *others*, *others* are neither many nor one. They are not. Nor will they appear either to be one or many. Why not? Becauſe *others* cannot in any reſpect have any communication with things which are not, nor can any thing of non-beings be preſent with *others*; for no part ſubſiſts with non-beings. True. Neither, therefore, is there any opinion of that which is not, inherent in others, nor any phantaſm; nor can that which is not become in any reſpect the ſubject of opinion to others. It cannot. *The one*, therefore, *if it is not*, cannot by opinion be conceived to be any certain one of others, nor yet many; for it is impoſſible to form an opinion of many without *the one*. It is impoſſible. If *the one*, therefore, *is not*, neither have *others* any ſubſiſtence; nor can *the one* or *the many* be conceived by opinion. It does not appear that they can. Neither, therefore, do ſimilars nor diſſimilars ſubſiſt. They do not. Nor *ſame nor different*, nor things in contact, nor

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ſuch as are ſeparate from each other, nor other things, ſuch as we have already diſcuſſed, as appearing to ſubſiſt; for no particular of theſe will have any exiſtence, nor will others appear to be, *if the one is not.* True. If we ſhould, therefore, ſummarily ſay, that *if the one is not, nothing is*, will not our aſſertion be right? Entirely ſo. Let this then be aſſerted by us, and this alſo: that whether *the one is* or *is not*, both itſelf, as it appears, and others, both with reſpect to themſelves and to each other, are entirely all things, and at the ſame time are not all, and appear to be, and at the ſame time do not appear. It is moſt true.

THE END OF THE PARMENIDES.

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