THE EUTHYDEMUS:

A DIALOGUE

EXPOSING

THE VAIN TRIFLING OF THE SOPHISTS.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EUTHYDEMUS.

PLATO, in the following Dialogue, has given an illuſtrious ſpecimen of that philanthropy, which he often diſplays in his other dialogues. For he here ſtudies to avert the reader from the vain trifles of the ſophiſts, by ſhowing that theſe men, even when they diſcuſs the moſt weighty ſubjects, jeſt and delude the expectation of the hearers. Both in this Dialogue, however, and elſewhere, he deſcribes theſe men to be curious and vain diſputants in verbal altercation, and prompt to refute whatever may be ſaid, whether it be true or falſe. And, in the firſt place, indeed, he ſhows how avaricious the genius of the ſophiſts is, ſince the brother ſophiſts, Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, are prepared to teach for money the military art, in which they boaſt, and which no one ever ſold. In the next place, how ambitious, ſince they at the ſame time profeſs judicial together with military ſkill, and together with both the ſophiſtic art, though all theſe widely differ from each other. In the third place, how vain; ſince, though now old men, they betake themſelves from things to words, and from the ſtudy of truth to falſehood. And, in the fourth place, how deſpicable; ſince, in a ſhort time, any one may become a proficient in this cavilling art.

In the courſe of this Dialogue, Socrates, with a moſt facetious irony, beſeeches the ſophiſts, that after jeſting they would come to ſerious concerns; and he propoſes a certain formula, conformable to which, as a pattern, he hopes to receive from them an exhortation to philoſophy. In this formula he firſt defines felicity, by a common conception, to be *living well*. Afterwards

wards he proves that this living well conſiſts either in obtaining things agreeable to the will, or in the right uſe of the things themſelves. And he concludes that wiſdom alone renders its poſſeſſors bleſſed, ſince it alone obtains what is agreeable to the will, and rightly uſes what it obtains. In the courſe of the argument an illuſtrious dogma preſents itſelf to the view, and which afterwards became the foundation of the Stoic philoſophy, viz. that things external and corporeal ought rather to be called indifferent and common, than good or evil; and that wiſdom is properly good, and folly properly evil: ſince through the former we partake of every good, and through the latter of every evil. But that all the power of felicity conſiſts in wiſdom, the three appellations of felicity, inſtituted by the antient authors of the Greek language, ſufficiently evince, viz. ευδαιμονια, ευτυχια, ευπραγια, *eudaimonia, eutuchia, eupragia.* For the firſt of theſe appellations ſignifies the knowledge of good; the ſecond, the attainment of it; and the third, the uſe of it; all which are accompliſhed for us by wiſdom.

Near the concluſion of this Dialogue, the artificial, polite, facetious, and elegant irony of Socrates collects the reprehenſion of ſophiſtic cavilling into three heads. Firſt, that the moſt worthy men deſpiſe trifles of this kind. Secondly, that the ſophiſms confute themſelves. And thirdly, that even boys might acquire this moſt trifling artifice in the ſpace of two days. Soon after this, he deſcends from the ſophiſt to the rhetorician, for each of theſe falſely profeſſes political virtue, as we learn from the Gorgias. And he ſhows that rhetoricians, while they profeſs themſelves to be both politicians and philoſophers, are perfectly uſeleſs for the purpoſes of either.

I only add, that this Dialogue appears to have been juſtly ranked by the antients among thoſe of the *anatreptic*, or *ſubverſive* character, and that it belongs to that energy of Plato's dialectic, which, as we have already obſerved in the Introduction to the Parmenides, conſiſts in confuting falſe opinions.

THE

THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CRITO,	DIONYSODORUS,
SOCRATES,	CLINIAS,
[EUTHYDEMUS,	CTESIPPUS [1].]

CRITO.

WITH whom, Socrates, did you yeſterday converſe in the Lyceum? For you were ſurrounded with ſo great a crowd, that though I approached, deſirous to hear, yet I could not hear any thing clearly. I raiſed myſelf indeed on my feet that I might ſee more diſtinctly, and it appeared to me that it was a certain ſtranger with whom you were converſing. Who was this ſtranger?

Soc. You muſt aſk, Crito, which of them it was; for not one only, but two were preſent.

CRITO. He, of whom I ſpeak, ſat the third from your right hand; but in the middle of you was a lad [2], the ſon of Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great proficiency in learning, and who does not

[1] I have followed Dr. Routh, in his excellent edition of this Dialogue, in including the names of Euthydemus, Dionyſodorus, Clinias, and Cteſippus, in brackets, becauſe, as he juſtly obſerves, theſe perſons do not ſpeak, but the diſputation is delivered, as if the thing were narrated, and not acted.

[2] The name of this youth was Clinias, at whoſe requeſt Socrates, together with Axiochus, in a dialogue of that name, which is generally aſcribed to Æſchines, diſputes againſt the fear of death.

much

much differ in age from our Critobulus [1]; though he indeed is very ſlender, but this lad looks older than he is, and is of a fair and engaging aſpect.

Soc. It is Euthydemus, Socrates, of whom you inquire; but he who ſat with me, on my left hand, was his brother Dionyſodorus, who alſo partook of the diſcourſe.

Crito. I know neither of them, Socrates.

Soc. They are recent ſophiſts, as it appears.

Crito. Whence do they come; and what is the wiſdom which they profeſs?

Soc. They are, I think, natives of Chius, but they migrated to the Thurians [2], and flying [3] from thence, dwelt for many years about theſe places. But in anſwer to your inquiry reſpecting their wiſdom, they are indeed very wiſe, Crito; but I have been hitherto ignorant that they were pancratiaſts: for they are ſkilled in every kind of conteſt, not after the manner of thoſe brother panacratiaſts of Acarnania; ſince they are only able to contend with the body; but theſe, in the firſt place, are moſt powerful in body, and excel in that conteſt which conſiſts in vanquiſhing all men [4]. For they are very ſkilful in contending with arms, and they know how to impart this ſkill to another who gives them a reward for it. In the next place, they are moſt powerful in judicial conteſts, and are able both to contend themſelves, and inſtruct others, to deliver and compoſe forenſic orations. At firſt, therefore, they were only ſkilled in theſe things, but now they have carried the pancratiaſtic art to its utmoſt perfection: for they are now ſo ſkilled in that kind of conteſt, which it remained for them to acquire, that no one is able to reſiſt them; ſo ſkilful are they become in verbal contention, and in always confuting whatever is ſaid, whether it be true or falſe. I therefore, Crito,

[1] Xenophon often makes mention of this perſon, and ſometimes Plato. He was the friend of Clinias, and was a youth of admirable beauty. Vid. Xen. Sympoſ. p. 882. ed. Leunclav. See alſo more concerning this ſon of Crito near the end of the Dialogue.

[2] Thurii, or Thurium, was a town of Magna Græcia, ſituated between the rivers Sybaris and Crathis.

[3] Others of the antient ſophiſts alſo were baniſhed from Grecian cities, as we learn from Philoſtratus and others who have written their lives.

[4] Theſe ſophiſts were not in reality ſkilled in the *pancratium*; but Socrates ſays this ironically of them, becauſe they pretended to poſſeſs *univerſal ſkill in confutation*.

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intend to deliver myſelf to theſe men: for they ſay that, in a ſhort time, they can render another perſon ſkilled in the ſame things.

CRITO. But are you not afraid, Socrates, that you are too old for this purpoſe?

SOC. By no means, Crito, as I have a ſufficient argument and remedy againſt fear: for theſe very men, as I may ſay, who are now old, have entered on the ſtudy of this wiſdom, which I deſire, viz. the art of contending. For laſt year, or the year before laſt, they were not in the leaſt ſkilled in this art. But I am only afraid of one thing, leſt I ſhould be a diſgrace to theſe ſtrangers, in the ſame manner as I am to Connus the harper, the ſon of Metrobius, who even now teaches me to play on the harp. The boys, therefore, who are my fellow diſciples, on ſeeing me, laugh, and call Connus the preceptor of old men. Leſt therefore ſome one ſhould reproach theſe ſtrangers with the ſame thing, and they dreading this ſhould be unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, perſuaded other elderly men to attend me thither as my fellow diſciples, and here alſo I am perſuading others to accompany me. Do you alſo join us. Perhaps too, as an allurement, we may bring your ſons to them: for, in conſequence of deſiring to have them as their pupils, I know that they will alſo inſtruct us.

CRITO. Nothing hinders, Socrates, if you are ſo diſpoſed. But, in the firſt place, tell me what this wiſdom of theſe men is, that I may alſo know what it is which we ſhall learn.

SOC. You will be diſappointed, if you think that I am not able to tell you as if I did not attend to them. For I paid great attention, and very well remember what they ſaid: and I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For, by a certain divine allotment, I had ſeated myſelf where you ſaw me, alone, in the Apodyterium[1]: and I then intended to have riſen; but as I was about to riſe, the dæmon gave me the accuſtomed ſignal. I again therefore ſat down, and ſoon after Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus entered, and, together with theſe, many others, who appeared to me to be their diſciples; and having entered, they walked in the covered porch[2] of the Gymnaſium. But they had not yet walked twice or thrice round this place, when Clinias entered, who you ſay has made a great proficiency, and

[1] That part of the Gymnaſium, in which thoſe who waſhed or exerciſed put off their clothes.

[2] In this place the athletæ were exerciſed in the winter.

in ſo ſaying you ſpeak the truth. Behind him there were many lovers and others, and beſides theſe Cteſippus[1], a Pæanean youth, very beautiful and naturally very worthy, but wanton in conſequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, as ſoon as he entered, ſeeing me ſitting alone, came towards me, and ſat down on my right hand, as you ſay. Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus perceiving him, at firſt ſtopped and converſed with each other, occaſionally looking at us: for I beheld them very attentively. Afterwards approaching nearer, they ſat down, Euthydemus indeed by the lad, but Dionyſodorus by me, on my left hand. The reſt ſeated themſelves juſt as it happened. Theſe therefore I ſaluted, becauſe I had not ſeen them for ſome time. After this, I ſaid to Clinias, Theſe men, Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, O Clinias, are not wiſe in ſmall, but in great things. For they are ſkilled in every thing pertaining to war, in all that a good general ought to know, and in the arrangement and management of an army. They likewiſe know how to render a man able to defend himſelf in courts of juſtice, when he is injured by any one. For thus ſpeaking however they deſpiſed me, and both of them laughed, looking at each other. And Euthydemus indeed ſaid, We no longer engage in theſe matters ſeriouſly, Socrates, but incidentally. And I being ſurpriſed ſaid, Your purſuit muſt indeed be beautiful, if ſuch great affairs are with you incidental. And, by the gods, inform me, what this beautiful ſtudy is.—We are of opinion, ſaid he, Socrates, that we are able to teach virtue in the beſt manner, and with the greateſt celerity of all men. —O Jupiter! I replied, what a mighty thing do you announce. Whence was this gain derived? I indeed had hitherto conceived reſpecting you, as I juſt now ſaid, that you were very ſkilful in military conteſts; and this I had aſſerted to others. For when you firſt came hither, I remember that you announced this. But now, if in reality you poſſeſs this ſcience, be propitious. For indeed I invoke you, as if you were gods, entreating you to pardon what I have before ſaid. But ſee, Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, if you have ſpoken the truth: for it is by no means wonderful if the magnitude of the promiſe ſhould occaſion diſbelief.—Be aſſured, Socrates, that it is ſo, was the anſwer.—I therefore conſider you as much more bleſſed through this poſſeſſion, than the great king through his dominion. Thus

[1] He was one of thoſe that were preſent at the death of Socrates. See the Phædo.

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much however inform me, whether you intend to exhibit this wiſdom, or how have you determined to act.—We came hither, Socrates, for this very purpoſe, to demonſtrate and to teach, if any one is willing to learn.—But that all men who do not poſſeſs wiſdom are willing to learn, I readily admit: for, in the firſt place, I myſelf am willing, and, in the next place, Clinias here; and beſides theſe Cteſippus, and all the reſt that you ſee, pointing out to him the lovers of Clinias, by whom we were then ſurrounded: for Cteſippus at that time happened to be ſitting at a conſiderable diſtance from Clinias. And as it appeared to me, Euthydemus, while he was diſcourſing with me, prevented, by the inclination of his body, Cteſippus from ſeeing Clinias, who was ſeated in the middle of us. Cteſippus therefore wiſhing to ſee his familiars, and at the ſame time being anxious to hear what was ſaid, was the firſt that roſe, and ſtood oppoſite to me. Afterwards the reſt ſeeing him, ſtood round us, viz. the lovers of Clinias, and the companions of Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus. I therefore introducing theſe to Euthydemus, informed him that they were all ready to learn. And Cteſippus indeed, and the reſt, very readily aſſented; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit the power of his wiſdom. I therefore ſaid, O Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, theſe perſons muſt by all means be gratified, and you muſt exhibit your wiſdom to them for my ſake. And it is evident indeed, that to demonſtrate moſt things pertaining to this ſubject will be no ſmall labour; but inform me whether you are able to make him alone a good man, who is already perſuaded that he ought to be inſtructed by you, or him alſo, who is not yet perſuaded in conſequence of not believing that virtue is a thing to be taught, or that you are the teachers of it: for, it is the buſineſs of the ſame art, to perſuade a man thus affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are capable of teaching it in the beſt manner. Or is it not?—It is the buſineſs, Socrates, ſaid Dionyſodorus, of the ſame art.—You therefore, I replied, O Dionyſodorus, can in the beſt manner, of all the men that now exiſt, exhort to philoſophy and the ſtudy of virtue. Is it not ſo?—We think we can, Socrates.—Of other things, therefore, I ſaid, you will afterwards give us the demonſtration, but of this now: and you will perſuade this youth that he ought to philoſophize, and ſtudy virtue; and in ſo doing you will oblige me, and all that are preſent: for it ſo happens that both I, and all theſe, are deſirous that this lad may become the beſt of men. He is the ſon

of Axiochus, who deſcended from the antient Alcibiades, and the couſin of the now-exiſting Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is young, and we are fearful, as it is likely we ſhould be concerning one of his age, leſt ſome one previous to our endeavours ſhould turn his dianoëtic part to another ſtudy, and thus corrupt it. You therefore are very opportunely come: and if it is the ſame thing to you, make trial of the lad, and diſcourſe with him before us.—When I had thus nearly ſaid theſe things, Euthydemus boldly, and at the ſame time confidently, replied, It makes no difference, Socrates, if the lad is but willing to anſwer.—But indeed, I replied, he is accuſtomed to do this. For theſe frequently meeting together aſk many queſtions, and diſcourſe much with each other; ſo that it is likely that he will anſwer with confidence.

But how, O Crito, ſhall I diſcloſe to you, in a proper manner, what follows? For it is no trifling labour to narrate ſuch immenſe wiſdom. So that I, after the manner of the poets, in beginning this narration, find it neceſſary to invoke the Muſes and Mnemoſyne. Euthydemus, therefore, as I think, began after this manner.—Whether, O Clinias, are thoſe men that learn, wiſe or unwiſe?—And the lad through the magnitude of the queſtion bluſhed, and being dubious, looked at me. But I, perceiving his perturbation, ſaid, Be confident, Clinias, and boldly anſwer what appears to you to be the truth: for perhaps the greateſt advantage will thence enſue. Upon this Dionyſodorus wiſpering in my ear, and ſmiling, Indeed, Socrates, ſaid he, I predict that in whatever manner the lad may anſwer he will be confuted. However, while he was thus ſpeaking, Clinias happened to anſwer, ſo that it was not poſſible for me to admoniſh the lad any further. But he anwſered, that thoſe that learnt were wiſe men. Euthydemus, therefore, ſaid, Do you admit that there are certain teachers, or not?—He admitted that there are.—Are not therefore preceptors the preceptors of thoſe that learn? As, for inſtance, a harper and a grammarian, were the preceptors of you and other boys, but you were their diſciples.—He aſſented to this.—When you learned, therefore, were you not ignorant of theſe things which you learned?—Yes.—Were you, therefore, wiſe, when you were ignorant of theſe things?—By no means.—If, therefore, you were not wiſe, were you not ignorant?—Entirely ſo.—You therefore, when learning things of which you had no knowledge, learned them being ignorant?—The lad aſſented

aſſented to this.—The ignorant therefore learn, O Clinias, and not the wiſe, as you thought.—On his ſpeaking in this manner, juſt like a choir, on a ſignal given by the maſter, the followers of Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus loudly applauded what was ſaid and laughed. And before the lad could well take breath, Dionyſodorus ſaid to him, But what, Clinias, when the grammarian recites, whether are the boys who learn what he recites, wiſe, or unwiſe?—They are wiſe, ſaid Clinias.—The wiſe therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and conſequently you did not rightly juſt now anſwer Euthydemus.—But on this, the lovers of theſe men more loudly laughed and applauded, admiring the wiſdom of Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus; but the reſt of us being aſtoniſhed were ſilent. Euthydemus, therefore, perceiving our aſtoniſhment, that we might yet ſtill more admire him, did not diſmiſs the lad, but further interrogated him; and, after the manner of ſkilful dancers, turned twofold inquiries about the ſame thing. For, ſaid he, whether do thoſe who learn, learn the things which they know, or things which they do not know? And again Dionyſodorus ſaid to me whiſpering, This alſo, Socrates, is juſt ſuch another queſtion as the former.—By Jupiter, ſaid I, the former queſtion appeared to me to be beautiful.—We always aſk, ſaid he, Socrates, ſuch like inevitable queſtions.—You appear therefore to me, ſaid I, to poſſeſs a great reputation among your diſciples. In the mean time Clinias anſwered Euthydemus, that thoſe who learn, learn that of which they are ignorant. And Euthydemus interrogated him as before—Do you not, ſaid he, know your letters?—I do.—Do you not, therefore, know all of them?—He acknowledged that he did.—When therefore any one recites, does he not recite letters?—He confeſſed it.—Hence, ſaid he, he recites things which you know, ſince you know all the letters.—This alſo he acknowledged.—What then? he replied, Do you not learn that which ſome one recites?—Yes.—But do you learn, not knowing your letters?—I do not, he replied, but I learn in conſequence of knowing them.—Do you not therefore learn the things which you know, ſince you know all the letters?—He acknowledged that he did.—Hence, ſaid he, you have not anſwered rightly.—Euthydemus had ſcarcely thus ſpoken, when Dionyſodorus, taking up the diſcourſe as if it had been a ball, again aimed at the lad as a mark, and ſaid, Euthydemus deceives you, O Clinias. For tell me, is not to learn, to receive the ſcience of that which any one learns?—Clinias aſſented.—But, he replied, is to know

know ſcientifically any thing elſe than to poſſeſs ſcience when thus knowing?—He granted it was nothing elſe.—Not to know ſcientifically, therefore, is not yet to poſſeſs ſcience.—He aſſented to this.—Whether, therefore, are thoſe that receive any thing, thoſe who now poſſeſs it, or thoſe who do not poſſeſs it?—Thoſe who do not poſſeſs it.—Have you not then confeſſed that thoſe who have not ſcientific knowledge, are among the number of thoſe who do not poſſeſs?—He acknowledged that he had.—Thoſe that learn, therefore, belong to thoſe that receive, and not to thoſe that poſſeſs.—He granted it.—Thoſe therefore, ſaid he, Clinias, learn who have not a ſcientific knowledge, and not thoſe who have. After this, again wreſtling as it were the third time, Euthydemus attacked the youth. But I, ſeeing the merged condition of the lad, and wiſhing to give him ſome reſpite, leſt he ſhould be afraid of us, ſaid, in order to conſole him, Do not wonder, Clinias, if theſe diſcourſes appear to you to be unuſual; for perhaps you do not perceive the intention of theſe ſtrangers. They act however in the ſame manner as thoſe in the myſteries of the Corybantes, when they place him whom they are about to initiate on a throne[1]: for there alſo there are dancing and ſports, as you know, if you have been initiated in theſe myſteries. And now they do nothing elſe than dance, and as it were ſportively leap round, as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think that you have heard the firſt part of ſophiſtical ſacred rites. For, in the firſt place, as Prodicus ſays, it is neceſſary to learn the proper ſignification of names; which theſe ſtrangers alſo have indicated to you, becauſe you have not perceived that men employ the verb *to learn* in a thing of this kind, when any one, at firſt poſſeſſing no ſcience concerning a certain thing, afterwards receives the ſcience of that thing. They alſo employ this verb, when any one now poſſeſſing ſcience, conſiders this very thing by this ſame ſcience, either while the thing is effected or while it is enunciated. Or they rather call this *to apprehend* than *to learn*,

[1] The *Curetes* are gods of an unpolluted guardian characteriſtic, and firſt ſubſiſt in that order of gods which is called by the Chaldæan theologiſts νοερος, intellectual. The *Corybantes*, who form the guardian triad of *ſupermundane* gods, are analogous to theſe. Thoſe that were initiated in the myſteries of the Corybantes were *inſanely* and *enthuſiaſtically moved*, as we learn from the Lexicon of Timæus. When he who was about to be initiated in the myſteries of theſe, or any other gods, was inveſted with a ſacred and myſtic dreſs, he was placed in a ſolemn manner on a throne, while in the mean time the other myſtics danced round him. This ceremony was called θρονισμος.

though

though ſometimes they call it *to learn*. But of this, as they indicate, you are ignorant, viz. that the ſame name pertains to men affected in a contrary manner, viz. with reſpect to him who knows, and him who is ignorant. Similar to this is that which took place in the ſecond queſtion, in which they aſked you, whether men learn things which they know, or things of which they are ignorant. Theſe indeed are the ſports of diſciplines: on which account I ſay that theſe men play with you. But I uſe the word *play* on this account, becauſe, though ſome one ſhould learn many, or all ſuch particulars as theſe, yet he would not be in any reſpect wiſer with reſpect to the manner in which things ſubſiſt. However, he may ſport with men, by ſupplanting and ſubverting what they aſſert, through the difference of names; juſt as they who draw away the ſeats from thoſe that are going to ſit down rejoice and laugh when they ſee him whom they have overturned ſupine. Conſider therefore what has happened to you from theſe men as ſport; but what follows will be exhibited to you by them as ſerious concerns: and I will ſhow them the way that they may fulfil their promiſe to me. For they promiſe to exhibit their exhortatory wiſdom: but now, as it appears to me, they have thought it was requiſite firſt to ſport with you.

Thus far therefore, O Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, you have ſported, and perhaps ſufficiently: but in the next place ſhow, exhorting the lad, in what manner it is requiſite to pay attention to wiſdom and virtue. Firſt of all, however, I will indicate to you my conceptions on this affair, and what I deſire to hear concerning it. If, therefore, I ſhall appear to you to do this, in a fooliſh and ridiculous manner, do not deride me: for, through a deſire of hearing your wiſdom, I will venture for a time to ſpeak before you. Endure therefore to hear me, both you and your diſciples, without laughing: but do you, O ſon of Axiochus, anſwer me.—Do we not all then wiſh to do well? Or is this queſtion, of which we were juſt now afraid, one among thoſe that are ridiculous? For indeed, it is ſtupid to aſk queſtions of this kind. For who is there that does not wiſh to do well?—No one, ſaid Clinias.—Be it ſo, ſaid I.—But in the next place, ſince we wiſh to do well, in what manner ſhall we be able to accompliſh this? Shall we ſay, by having many good things? Or is this anſwer ſtill more ſtupid than the former? For it is evident that this alſo muſt be the caſe.—He aſſented.—But come, what are the things which are good to us? Or does it appear to

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be a thing neither difficult, nor the province of a venerable man, to diſcover this? For every one will tell us that it is good to be rich. Will they not?—Certainly, ſaid he.—And is it not alſo good to be in health, to be beautiful, and to be ſufficiently furniſhed with other things pertaining to the body?—So it appeared to him.—But nobility alſo, power, and honours, in one's own city, are alſo good.—He granted that they were.—What then, ſaid I, yet remains for us among things good? What is it to be temperate, juſt, and brave? Whether, by Jupiter, Clinias, do you think that, if we conſider theſe things as good, we ſhall conſider them properly? Or that this will be the caſe if we conſider them not as good? For perhaps this may be diſputed by ſome one. But how does it appear to you?—That theſe things are good, ſaid Clinias.—Be it ſo, ſaid I; but in what choir ſhall we place wiſdom? Among things good? Or how do you ſay?—Among things good.—But conſider, leſt among things good, we ſhould omit any one which is worthy to be related.—But, ſaid Clinias, it appears to me that we have not omitted any one.—However, I then recollecting, ſaid, But, by Jupiter, we appear to have omitted the greateſt of goods.—What is that? ſaid he.—Felicity, O Clinias, which all men, and even thoſe that are perfectly depraved, aſſert to be the greateſt of goods.—What you ſay is true, ſaid he.—And I again, correcting myſelf, ſaid, We have nearly, O ſon of Axiochus, rendered ourſelves ridiculous to theſe ſtrangers.—Why ſo? ſaid he.—Becauſe, having placed felicity in the things which we before enumerated, we now again ſpeak concerning it.—But why is this improper?—Becauſe it is certainly ridiculous again to adduce that which was formerly propoſed, and to ſay the ſame things twice.—How do you mean? ſaid he.—Wiſdom, I replied, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.—He indeed wondered, ſo young and ſimple was he. And I perceiving his admiration, ſaid, Do you not know, Clinias, that in performing well on the pipe, pipers[1] are moſt happy?—He granted that they were.—Are not therefore, ſaid I, grammarians alſo moſt happy in the writing and reading of letters?—Entirely ſo.—But what? In dangers of the ſea, do you think that any in ſhort are more happy than wiſe pilots?—Certainly not.—Again: In battle,

[1] Felicity is the *proper perfection* of a vital being. An artiſt therefore is happy, ſo far as pertains to his being an artiſt, when he arrives at *perfection* in his art.

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with which will you more pleaſantly partake of danger and fortune? with a wife, or with an ignorant general?—With a wife general.—And when you are dangerouſly ill, with which will you be more pleaſantly circumſtanced? with a wife, or with an ignorant phyſician?—With a wife phyſician.—Is it not therefore, ſaid I, becauſe you think that you will act more proſperouſly, by acting with one wife, than with one unwiſe?—He granted it.—Wiſdom, therefore, every where, renders men happy. For certainly no one can ever err through wiſdom; but it is neceſſary that through this he ſhould act rightly, and obtain his end: for otherwiſe it would not be wiſdom.—At length, but I do not know how, we ſummarily agreed that this was the caſe; viz. that when wiſdom is preſent, nothing of felicity is wanting.

After we had agreed in this particular, I again aſked him how we ſhould be affected with relation to the things which we had formerly granted. For, ſaid I, we granted that if many good things were preſent with us we ſhould be happy, and act well.—He aſſented to this.—Whether, therefore, ſhould we be happy through preſent good, if it were of no advantage to us, or if it beneſited us?—If it beneſited us, ſaid he.—Would then any thing beneſit us, if we alone poſſeſſed it, but did not uſe it? As, for inſtance, if we poſſeſſed much food, but did not eat it, or drink, but did not drink it, ſhould we in any reſpect be benefited by this?—Certainly not, ſaid he.—But what? If all artificers had every thing requiſite prepared for them, each for his own work, but did not uſe them when thus procured, would they act well through the poſſeſſion of theſe, viz. merely becauſe they poſſeſſed every thing which an artificer ought to poſſeſs? Thus, for inſtance, if a carpenter had all kinds of inſtruments and wood prepared for him ſufficient for his purpoſe, but yet ſhould faſhion nothing, would he derive any advantage from this poſſeſſion?—By no means, ſaid he.—But what? If any one ſhould poſſeſs riches, and all ſuch things as we now denominate good, but ſhould not uſe them, would he be happy through the poſſeſſion of theſe goods?—He certainly would not, Socrates.—It is neceſſary therefore, ſaid I, as it ſeems, that he who intends to be happy ſhould not only poſſeſs good things of this kind, but ſhould likewiſe uſe them.—What you ſay is true.—Is not therefore, O Clinias, the poſſeſſion and the uſe of good, ſufficient to make any one happy?—It appears ſo to me.—Whether, I replied, if any one uſes good things properly, or if he does not?—If he uſes them properly.—You ſpeak

well, ſaid I. For I think that the improper uſe of a thing is worſe than the neglect of it. For the former is vicious, but the latter is neither good nor bad. Or do we not ſay ſo?—He aſſented.—What then? In the operation and uſe pertaining to wood, is there any thing elſe which produces a right uſe than the tectonic ſcience?—Certainly not, ſaid he.—Perhaps alſo, in producing proper apparatus, it is ſcience which produces with rectitude.—He granted that it was.—Whether therefore, ſaid I, with reſpect to the uſe of thoſe goods which we firſt mentioned, viz. riches, health, and beauty, is it ſcience, leading and properly directing the practice, which enables us to uſe every thing of this kind properly, or is it any thing elſe?—It is ſcience, ſaid he.—Science, therefore, imparts to men in every poſſeſſion and action, not only felicity, as it ſeems, but likewiſe ſucceſs.—He confeſſed that it was ſo.

Is there then, ſaid I, by Jupiter, any advantage to be derived from other poſſeſſions, without prudence and wiſdom? Or will a man be benefited who poſſeſſes many things, and performs many actions, but without intellect? Or rather will not this be the caſe, if he poſſeſſes and performs but a few things, but is endued with intellect? However, conſider thus. Will he not by doing leſs, err leſs? And erring leſs, will he not act leſs improperly? And acting leſs improperly, will he not be leſs miſerable?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Whether, therefore, will he rather perform fewer things being poor, than being rich?—Being poor, ſaid he.—But whether if he is weak or ſtrong?—If he is weak.—Whether alſo, if he is honoured, or diſhonoured?—If diſhonoured.—But whether, if he is brave and temperate, will he do leſs, or if he is timid?—If he is timid.—Will not this then alſo be the caſe, if he is indolent rather than if he is active?—He granted that it would.—And if he is ſlow rather than if he is quick? And if his ſight and hearing are blunt rather than if they are ſharp?—In every thing of this kind we agreed with each other.—But in ſhort, ſaid I, O Clinias, it appears that, with reſpect to all thoſe things which we firſt aſſerted to be good, the diſcourſe about them is not that they are naturally eſſentially good, but, as it ſeems, that they ſubſiſt in the following manner; viz. that if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are of becoming ſubſervient to that evil leader; but that if they are led by prudence and wiſdom, they are greater goods; but that neither of them, when they are conſidered by themſelves, is of any worth.—It appears, ſaid he,

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to be as you ſay.—What then happens to us, from what has been ſaid? Is it any thing elſe than this, that no one of other things is either good or evil? But theſe being two, that wiſdom is good, and ignorance evil?—He aſſented.

Further ſtill then, ſaid I, let us conſider what remains. Since we all of us ſtrive to be happy, and we appear to become ſuch from uſing things, and from uſing them rightly, but ſcience affords rectitude and ſucceſs, it is requiſite, as it ſeems, that every man ſhould by all poſſible means endeavour to become moſt wiſe. Is it not ſo?—It is, ſaid he.—And he ſhould think that he ought to receive this from his father, his tutors, his friends, and from others who profeſs themſelves to be his lovers, much more than wealth, and ſhould requeſt and ſuppliantly implore ſtrangers and his fellow citizens to impart wiſdom. Nor is it in any reſpect baſe or reprehenſible, O Clinias, for the ſake of this, to be obſequious and ſubſervient both to a lover and to every man, willingly obeying him in worthy ſervices, through an ardent deſire of becoming wiſe. Or does it not appear ſo to you? ſaid I.—You entirely, ſaid he, appear to me to ſpeak well.—If, ſaid I, Clinias, wiſdom can but be taught, and does not caſually ſubſiſt among men. For this is yet to be conſidered by us, and has not yet been aſſented to by me and you.—But to me, ſaid he, Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.—And I, being delighted, ſaid, You ſpeak beautifully, O beſt of men, and you have done well in liberating me from a long ſpeculation about this very thing, whether wiſdom can, or cannot be taught. Now, therefore, ſince it appears to you that it can be taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man happy and proſperous, do you ſay any thing elſe than that it is neceſſary to philoſophize? And is it your intention to do this?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he, Socrates, as much as poſſible.—And I, rejoicing to hear theſe things, ſaid, My example, O Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory diſcourſes, ſuch as I deſired it to be, is of this kind; vulgar perhaps and ſcarcely unfolded by a multitude of words: but let whichever of you is willing, conſidering this very thing according to art, render it apparent to us. But if you are unwilling to do this, point out to the lad what follows, from that part in which my diſcourſe ended, viz. whether he ought to procure for himſelf every ſcience, or whether there is one particular ſcience which, when he receives, he will neceſſarily be happy and a good man; and what that ſcience is. For, as I ſaid

in the beginning, it is of great conſequence to us that this youth ſhould become wiſe and good.

I therefore, Crito, ſaid theſe things; but I paid very great attention to what followed, and conſidered after what manner they would diſcourſe, and whence they would begin, while they were exhorting the youth to the ſtudy of wiſdom and virtue. Dionyſodorus then, who was the elder of them, firſt began the conference. And all of us beheld him, as thoſe who were immediately to hear certain very wonderful diſcourſes; which indeed was the caſe. For the man, O Crito, began a certain admirable diſcourſe, which it is proper you ſhould hear, becauſe it exhorted to virtue.—Tell me, Socrates, ſaid he, and the reſt of you who expreſs a deſire that this youth ſhould become wiſe, whether you are jeſting when you make this aſſertion, or truly and ſeriouſly deſire this?—Then I perceived that they were of opinion that we had, prior to this, been jeſting, when we exhorted them to converſe with the youth, and that on this account they alſo jeſted and had not diſcourſed ſeriouſly with him. Perceiving this therefore to be the caſe, I further ſaid, that we were ſerious in a wonderful degree. And Dionyſodorus ſaid, See, Socrates, that you do not hereafter deny what you now aſſert.—I have conſidered this, ſaid I: for I ſhall never deny what I have aſſerted.—What is it then, ſaid he, that you aſſert? Do you wiſh that he ſhould become wiſe?—Entirely ſo.—But now, ſaid he, whether is Clinias wiſe or not?—Not yet, according to his own confeſſion: and he does not, ſaid I, ſpeak idly.—But do you, ſaid he, wiſh that he ſhould become wiſe, and not be unlearned?—We acknowledged that we did.—Do you not therefore wiſh him to become that which he is not; and no longer to be that which he now is?—And I, on hearing this, was diſturbed. But he, taking advantage of my perturbation, Since, ſaid he, you wiſh him to be no longer that which he now is, you wiſh, as it ſeems, that he may periſh; though thoſe friends and lovers would certainly be but of little worth, who ſhould be deſirous above all things that the objects of their love may be deſtroyed. Cteſippus on hearing this was indignant, on account of his attachment to the youth, and ſaid, O Thurian ſtranger, if it were not more ruſtic than is becoming, I ſhould call you to an account for this aſſertion, and ſhould aſk you why you falſely aſcribe to me and the reſt a thing of this kind, which I think it is not holy to aſſert, viz. that I ſhould wiſh that this youth might periſh.

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But what? O Cteſippus, ſaid Euthydemus, does it appear to you, that it is poſſible to ſpeak falſely?—By Jupiter, ſaid he, it does, unleſs I were inſane.—But whether will this be the caſe, when aſſerting a thing which is the ſubject of diſcourſe, or when not aſſerting it.—When aſſerting it.—When, therefore, he aſſerts that thing, is it not true, that he does not ſpeak of any thing elſe than that which he aſſerts?—For how ſhould he do otherwiſe, ſaid Cteſippus?—But that is one of the things which exiſt, of which he ſpeaks, ſeparate from others.—Entirely ſo.—Does he not therefore, when he ſpeaks of that thing, ſpeak of that which has a being?—Yes.—But he who ſpeaks of that which is, and of beings, ſpeaks of things which are true. So that if Dionyſodorus ſpeaks of beings, he ſpeaks of things which are true, and according to you utters nothing falſe.—He does ſo, ſaid he.—But he who ſays theſe things, ſaid Cteſippus, does not ſpeak, O Euthydemus, of beings.—To this Euthydemus replied, Are non-beings any thing elſe than things which are not?—They are not.—By no means, therefore, are non-beings, beings.—By no means.—Can therefore any one perform any action about theſe non-beings, ſo as to make things which in no reſpect are?—It does not appear to me, ſaid Cteſippus, that he can.—What then? Do rhetoricians, when they ſpeak to the people, perform nothing?—They do ſomething, he replied.—If, therefore, they do ſomething, do they not alſo make ſomething? To ſpeak then is to do and to make.—He aſſented.—No one therefore, ſaid he, ſpeaks of non-entities: for if he did, he would make ſomething. But you acknowledge that no one can make non-entities. So that, according to you, no one can aſſert things which are falſe; but if Dionyſodorus ſpeaks, he ſpeaks things which are true, and he ſpeaks of beings.—By Jupiter, ſaid Cteſippus, it is ſo, Euthydemus: yet he ſpeaks of beings after a certain manner, though not as they ſubſiſt.—How do you ſay, Cteſippus, ſaid Dionyſodorus? Are there ſome who ſpeak of things as they are?—There are indeed, ſaid he; and theſe are men worthy and good, and who aſſert things which are true.—What then? ſaid he. Are not things good, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned?—He granted that they were.—And do you not acknowledge that the worthy and the good ſpeak of things as they are?—I. do.—The good therefore, ſaid he, O Cteſippus, ſpeak of evil things evily, if they ſpeak of them as they are.—Truly, ſaid he, by Jupiter, they do very much ſo of bad men, among which, if you are perſuaded

perſuaded by me, you will be careful that you may not be numbered, leſt the good ſhould ſpeak evily of you; becauſe you well know that the good ſpeak evily of the bad.—Do they not alſo, ſaid Euthydemus, ſpeak magnificently of great men, and warmly of thoſe that are fervent?—Very much ſo indeed, ſaid Cteſippus.—Of cold men, therefore, they ſpeak coldly, and aſſert that they ſpeak frigidly.—You revile, O Cteſippus, ſaid Dionyſodorus, you revile.—Not I, by Jupiter, ſaid he, Dionyſodorus, for I love you; but I admoniſh you as my companion, and I endeavour to perſuade you, that you ſhould never in my preſence make ſuch a ruſtic aſſertion, as that I wiſh the deſtruction of thoſe whom I very much eſteem.

I therefore, as they appeared to me to conduct themſelves in a ruſtic manner towards each other, jeſted with Cteſippus, and ſaid, it appears to me, Cteſippus, that we ought to receive what is aſſerted by the ſtrangers, if we wiſh to impart it to others, and not contend about words. For if they know how to deſtroy men in ſuch a manner as to make them, from being depraved and unwiſe, worthy and wiſe, whether they have diſcovered this themſelves, or have learnt from ſome other, a corruption and deſtruction of this kind, ſo that having deſtroyed him who is depraved, they afterwards render him worthy; if they know how to effect this (but it is evident that they do poſſeſs this knowledge; for they affirm that the art of making men worthy that were depraved, is an art which they have recently invented;) we muſt therefore permit them to deſtroy the lad, and to make him and all the reſt of us wiſe. But if you young men are afraid of me, make trial of me, as if, according to the proverb, in Car[1], ſince, though an elderly man, I am prepared for danger: and I deliver myſelf to this Dionyſodorus, as to Medea the Colchian. Let him deſtroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever elſe he pleaſes with me, if he does but render me worthy. And Cteſippus ſaid, I alſo, Socrates, am prepared to deliver myſelf to theſe ſtrangers, though they ſhould be willing to excoriate more than they do at preſent, provided my ſkin does not end in a bladder like that of Marſyas, but in virtue. Indeed Dionyſodorus, here, thinks that I am angry with him: I am not however angry, but I contradict thoſe things which, in my opinion, he has not well advanced

[1] That is to ſay, make trial of me as if I were ſome vile man or thing, in which, if the event is not fortunate, not much loſs will be ſuſtained. See Eraſmus in Chiliad. p. 227.

againſt

againſt me. But do not, ſaid he, O Dionyſodorus, call contradiction reviling; for reviling is a different thing.

To this Dionyſodorus replied, Do not you, Cteſippus, diſcourſe as if you contradicted?—Entirely, and very much ſo, ſaid he.—Or do not you think that I ſpeak as if I contradicted? You cannot therefore at any time demonſtrate that, if you have heard no one contradicting another.—True, ſaid he: but let us now hear whether I can demonſtrate to you that Cteſippus contradicts Dionyſodorus. Or can you bear a diſcourſe of this kind?—By all means, ſaid he.—What then? he replied; are there definitions of every thing which exiſts?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Whether, therefore, is there a definition of every thing, as it is, or as it is not?—As it is. For if you remember, ſaid Cteſippus, we have juſt now ſhown that no one ſpeaks of a thing as it is not. For no one appears to ſpeak of that which is not. But why this? ſaid Cteſippus. Shall you and I, on this account, contradict the leſs?—Whether therefore, he replied, ſhall we contradict, if we both of us know the definition of the ſame thing, or ſhall we indeed thus ſay the ſame things?—He granted that we ſhould.—But, ſaid he, when neither of us gives the definition of that thing, ſhall we not then contradict? Or, indeed, will it not follow, that thus no mention whatever of that thing will be made by either of us?—He granted this alſo.—When therefore, ſaid he, I give the definition of that thing, but you of ſomething elſe, do we then contradict each other? Or do I then ſpeak of that thing, but you do not ſpeak of it in any reſpect whatever? But how can he who does not ſpeak of a thing contradict him who does?

Cteſippus indeed was then ſilent; but I, wondering at the diſcourſe, ſaid, How do you ſay, Dionyſodorus? For, though I have heard this aſſertion often, and from many, yet I always wondered at it. For it was much uſed by Protagoras and his followers, and by others more antient than theſe; but to me he always appears to be a wonderful perſon, who both ſubverts others and himſelf. I think, however, that I ſhall eſpecially learn the truth of this aſſertion from you. Is the aſſertion then any other than this, that it is not poſſible to aſſert things which are falſe? For this is the force of the argument. Is it not? And that he who ſpeaks, aſſerts things which are true, or otherwiſe does not ſpeak?—He granted that it was ſo.—Whether, therefore, is it not poſſible to aſſert things which are falſe, but to form an opinion

of

of them is poſſible?—It is not even poſſible, ſaid he, to form an opinion of them.—Neither therefore, ſaid I, is there any ſuch thing as falſe opinion.—There is not, ſaid he.—Neither therefore is there ignorance, nor are there unlearned men. Or would not this be ignorance, if there were any ſuch thing, viz. to ſpeak falſely of things?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—But, I replied, this is not poſſible.—It is not, ſaid he.—Do you make this aſſertion, O Dionyſodorus, for the ſake of diſcourſe, that you may ſpeak that which is wonderful; or does it truly appear to you that no man is unlearned?—Confute, ſaid he, the aſſertion. Or, according to your aſſertion, can confutation take place, while no one ſpeaks falſely?—It cannot, ſaid Euthydemus.—Neither therefore do I, ſaid Dionyſodorus, order you to confute. For how can any one order that to be done which is not?—O Euthydemus, ſaid I, I do not well underſtand theſe wiſe and excellent aſſertions, but I haſtily as it were conceive them. Perhaps, therefore, I ſhall aſk ſomething which will be troubleſome; but you will pardon me. See then. For if it is neither poſſible to ſpeak falſely, nor to entertain falſe opinions, nor to be unlearned, neither is it poſſible for any one to err when he does any thing. For he who acts cannot err in that which he does. Do you not ſay ſo?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—This, ſaid I, is the troubleſome queſtion which I juſt now mentioned. For if we do not err, neither acting nor ſpeaking, nor thinking, if this be the caſe, of what, by Jupiter, do you come as the teachers? Or did you not juſt now ſay, that you could teach him virtue who was willing to learn it, the beſt of all men?—Are you ſo dull, Socrates, ſaid Dionyſodorus, taking up the diſcourſe, as that you now remember what we firſt ſaid, and would even now remember any thing which I may have ſaid laſt year, yet do not know how to uſe what has been ſaid at preſent?—I replied, The things which have been now aſſerted are difficult: and this very properly; for they have been aſſerted by wiſe men. And likewiſe this laſt thing which you ſaid cannot be uſed without extreme difficulty: for what will you ſay, Dionyſodorus, is the meaning of this aſſertion, There is ſomething which I do not know how to uſe? Does it not mean this, that I do not know how to confute it? Or tell me, what other conception you form of theſe words, I do not know how to uſe theſe aſſertions?—Do you affirm, ſaid he, that they mean any thing elſe than this, that it is very difficult to uſe them? Anſwer me.—Before you have anſwered, ſaid I, Dionyſo-

dorus?

dorus?—Will you not anſwer, ſaid he.—Is it juſt that I ſhould?—It is certainly juſt, ſaid he.—After what manner? I replied. Is it becauſe you, being a perſon very wiſe, have now entered into a diſcuſſion with us reſpecting diſcourſe, and becauſe you know when it is proper to anſwer, and when not; and now will not give any anſwer, becauſe you know that it is not requiſite? —You babble, ſaid he, neglecting when it is proper to anſwer, and when not. But, good man, be obedient and anſwer; ſince you acknowledge that I am a wiſe man.

We muſt obey, ſaid I, and as it ſeems it is neceſſary: for you are the ruler. Aſk, then.—Whether therefore do thoſe that underſtand, underſtand having a ſoul? or do inanimate natures alſo underſtand?—They underſtand having a ſoul.—Do you know, therefore, ſaid he, any aſſertion which has a ſoul?—Not I, by Jupiter.—Why, then, did you juſt now aſk me what was the meaning of my aſſertion[1]?—For what other reaſon, I replied, than that I have erred through indolence: or ſhall I ſay, that I have not erred, but that I have alſo ſaid this rightly, when I aſſerted that my words underſtood? Whether will you ſay that I erred, or not? For if I have not erred, neither do you confute though you are a wiſe man, nor have you any thing to reply to my aſſertion: but if I have erred, neither thus do you ſpeak rightly, in ſaying that it is not poſſible to err. And I ſay theſe things, not in oppoſition to what you have aſſerted laſt year. But this diſcourſe, ſaid I, O Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus, ſeems to remain in the ſame condition, and even now as formerly, having thrown down others, to fall itſelf; nor has your art diſcovered a method of preventing this, though it is ſo wonderful with reſpect to accuracy of arguments.—Cteſippus then ſaid, You certainly ſpeak wonderful things, O Thurian or Chian men, or by whatever other name it may delight you to be called, as you are not in the leaſt concerned whether you are delirious or not.—And I, fearing leſt defamation ſhould take place, again appeaſed Cteſippus, and ſaid, O Cteſippus; and now indeed, O Cteſippus, what I have ſaid to Clinias, I alſo ſay to you, that you do not know that the wiſdom of theſe ſtrangers is admirable. They

[1] In the original ὁ, τι μοι νοει το ρημα, which is literally "what my aſſertion *underſtands* for me." The words of Socrates, therefore, are perverted by the ſophiſt from their natural meaning, in order that he might play on the word *underſtand*.

are however, unwilling to exhibit it to us ſeriouſly, but imitate Proteus the Egyptian ſophiſt, and deceive us by enchantments. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus, and not ſuffer the men to leave us, till they have unfolded to us what it is in which they are ſerious: for I think that ſomething pertaining to them very beautiful will appear, when they begin to act ſeriouſly; but we requeſt, we exhort, and we beſeech them to unfold themſelves.

I therefore again appear to myſelf to be about to relate in what manner I beſeech them to unfold themſelves to me: for I will endeavour to the beſt of my ability to diſcuſs what I formerly left unfiniſhed, if I can in a certain reſpect allure them, and induce them to pity and commiſerate me thus ſtrenuouſly and ſeriouſly acting, and to act ſeriouſly themſelves. But do you, Clinias, ſaid I, enable me to recollect whence we at that time diſcontinued our diſcourſe: for I think we ended there, whence we acknowledged we ſhould philoſophize: did we not?—We did, he replied.—But philoſophy is the poſſeſſion of ſcience: is it not ſo? ſaid I.—It is, ſaid he.—By the poſſeſſion therefore, of what ſcience ſhall we rightly poſſeſs? is not this indeed obvious, that it muſt be by the poſſeſſion of that ſcience which will benefit us?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Should we therefore be in any reſpect benefited, if we ſcientifically knew, while travelling, in what part of the earth much gold is buried?—Perhaps ſo, ſaid he.—But formerly, I replied, this was our deciſion, that we ſhould gain nothing, even though without labour, and without digging the earth, all the gold that exiſts ſhould be ours. So that neither if we knew how to make golden ſtones would this ſcience be of any worth: for if we knew not how to uſe gold, no advantage would be apparent from the poſſeſſion of it. Or do you not remember? ſaid I.—I do very well remember it, he replied.—Nor, as it ſeems, will any advantage be derived from any other ſcience, neither from that which is employed in the negotiation of money, nor from the medicinal ſcience, nor from any other, which knows how to make any thing, but does not know how to uſe that which it makes. Is it not ſo?—He granted that it was.—Nor even, if there were a ſcience by which men could be made immortal, but without knowing how to uſe immortality, neither from this does it appear that there would be any advantage, if it is proper to argue from what has been previouſly granted.—To all theſe particulars we mutually aſſented.

A certain ſcience, therefore, is requiſite for us, O beautiful boy, of ſuch a kind,

kind, in which both to make, and to know how to uſe that which is made, may concur.—It appears ſo, ſaid he.—It is of much conſequence therefore, as it ſeems, whether we are ſkilful makers of the lyre, or in poſſeſſion of a certain ſcience of that kind: for here the art which makes is ſeparated from the art which uſes, about the ſame thing. For the lyre-making and the harp-making arts differ very much from each other. Is it not ſo?—He granted that it was.—Nor ſhall we indeed require the pipe-making art: for this is another ſuch-like art.—He granted that it was.—But, by the gods, ſaid I, if we ſhould learn the art of compoſing orations, is this the art from the poſſeſſion of which we ſhould be happy?—I do not think it is, ſaid Clinias.—What argument, ſaid I, do you employ in thinking thus?—I ſee, he replied, certain framers of orations, who do not know how to uſe the very orations which they themſelves have compoſed: juſt as the makers of lyres are unſkilled in the uſe of the lyre; but here others are able to uſe the orations which theſe have framed, though they are incapable of framing orations themſelves. It is evident, therefore, with reſpect to orations, that the art of making is ſeparate from the art of uſing them.—You appear to me, ſaid I, to adduce a ſufficient argument that the art of compoſing orations is not that art by the acquiſition of which any one will be happy; though I thought that here that ſcience would be apparent which we ſome time ſince inveſtigated: for to me thoſe very men who compoſe orations appear, O Clinias, to be tranſcendently wiſe, when I am converſant with them; and this very art of theirs alſo appears to be ſomething divine and elevated. This indeed is by no means wonderful: for it is a portion of the art of enchantments, to which it is but a little inferior; for the art of enchantments is that art by which vipers, ſpiders called phalangii, and ſcorpions, are allured; but this allures and ſoothes judges, thoſe that frequent aſſemblies, and other tumultuous aſſociations. Or are you of a different opinion?—I am not, ſaid he; but it appears to me as you ſay.—Where then ſhall we yet further turn ourſelves? and to what art?—I do not well know, ſaid he.—But I think, ſaid I, that I have diſcovered this art.—What is it? ſaid Clinias.—The art of commanding an army, ſaid I, appears to me, more than any other art, to be that which will confer felicity on its poſſeſſor.—It does not appear ſo to me.—Why not? ſaid I.—This is certainly an art of hunting men.—What

then? ſaid I.—No part, ſaid he, of the hunting art extends beyond hunting and ſubjugating; but when they have ſubjugated that which they have hunted, they are not able to uſe it. But hunters and fiſhermen aſſign this to cocks; while, on the contrary, geometricians, aſtronomers, and thoſe ſkilled in the logiſtic art (for theſe alſo are hunters) do not make diagrams, but inveſtigate things themſelves. As therefore they do not know how to uſe theſe, but are alone ſkilled in hunting, they deliver their inventions to be uſed by thoſe who are expert in dialectic; I mean that this is done by ſuch among theſe as are not entirely ſtupid.—Be it ſo, I replied, O moſt beautiful and wiſe Clinias.—After the ſame manner, ſaid he, the commanders of armies alſo, when they have hunted any city or camp, deliver it to the care of politicians; for they know not how to uſe thoſe things which they have hunted: juſt, I think, as the hunters of quails deliver them to thoſe by whom quails are nurtured. If, therefore, he replied, we are in want of that art which its poſſeſſor, whether he makes or hunts it, will know how to uſe, and an art of this kind will render us bleſſed, ſome other art, ſaid he, muſt be inveſtigated inſtead of that of commanding an army.

CRITO. What do you ſay, Socrates? Did that lad aſſert things of this kind?

SOC. Do you not think he did, Crito?

CRITO. By Jupiter, I do not indeed. For I think if he had ſaid theſe things, that he would not have required the aſſiſtance either of Euthydemus, or any other man, with reſpect to erudition.

SOC. But, by Jupiter, was it Cteſippus then that ſaid theſe things? for I do not remember.

CRITO. What, Cteſippus?

SOC. This, indeed, I well know, that neither Euthydemus nor Dionyſodorus ſaid theſe things. But, O divine Crito, was it not ſome one of the beings more excellent than man, who being preſent ſaid theſe things? For I well know that I heard them.

CRITO. It is ſo, by Jupiter, Socrates; and it appears to me, and indeed very much ſo, to have been ſome one of the more excellent order of beings. But after this, what art have you ſtill inveſtigated? And have you diſcovered that art for the ſake of which you engaged in this inveſtigation?

SOC. Whence, bleſſed man, ſhould we have diſcovered it? But we were perfectly

perfectly ridiculous, juſt like boys that purſue larks; for we continually thought that we ſhould immediately apprehend each of the ſciences, but they always fled from our view. Why therefore ſhould I ſpeak to you concerning many ſciences? But when we came to the royal art, and conſidered whether it is that art which imparts and produces felicity, here falling as it were into a labyrinth, when we thought that we had now arrived at the end, we again proceeded in a winding courſe, as if we appeared to be in the beginning of our inquiry, and were as much diſtant from the object of our ſearch as when we began the inveſtigation.

CRITO. But how has this happened to you, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you. For the political and the royal art appear to us to be the ſame.

CRITO. But what then?

SOC. The art of commanding an army, and the other arts, appear to impart dominion over thoſe works of which they are the artificers, as alone knowing how to uſe them. Hence it clearly appeared to us to be the art which we were inveſtigating, and the cauſe of good conduct in a city, and, in ſhort, according to the Iambic of Æſchylus, that it alone is ſeated in the ſtern of the city, governing and ruling over all things, and rendering all things uſeful.

CRITO. Does not this therefore appear to you to be well ſaid reſpecting this art?

SOC. You ſhall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what after theſe things will happen to us. For again, let us nearly conſider as follows. What work will that royal art which rules over all things produce for us? Shall we ſay none? But we have ſaid to each other that it certainly will produce ſome work. For did not you aſſert this, Crito?

CRITO. I did.

SOC. What then will you ſay is the work of it? Juſt as if I ſhould aſk you what work the medicinal art produces in all thoſe things over which it rules? Would you not ſay it is health?

CRITO. I ſhould.

SOC. But what? With reſpect to your art, agriculture, what does it effect in all thoſe things over which it rules? Would you not ſay that it affords us food from the earth?

CRITO.

CRITO. I ſhould.

SOC. But what does the royal art effect while it governs every thing over which it has dominion? Perhaps you do not clearly perceive this.

CRITO. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates.

SOC. Nor do we, Crito. But thus much indeed you know, that if it is that art which we inveſtigate, it ought to be uſeful.

CRITO. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain good?

CRITO. Neceſſarily ſo, Socrates.

SOC. But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Clinias, that good is nothing elſe than a certain ſcience.

CRITO. You did indeed ſay ſo.

SOC. Do not therefore other works, which may be ſaid to belong to the political art, (but theſe will be many, ſuch as to render the citizens rich, free, and without ſedition,) do not all theſe appear to be neither evil nor good? But it is neceſſary that this art ſhould make men wiſe, and impart wiſdom, if it is to be that art which will benefit and render men happy.

CRITO. It is ſo: and thus you accord with each other conformably to your narration.

SOC. Does therefore the royal art make men wiſe and good?

CRITO. What ſhould hinder, Socrates?

SOC. Does it therefore make all men to be ſo, and to be entirely good? And is it that art which imparts every ſcience, that of the ſhoemaker, of the ſmith, and of all other artificers?

CRITO. I do not think it is, Socrates.

SOC. But what ſcience is it? Or to what purpoſe do we employ it? For it is requiſite that it ſhould not be the artificer of any work which is neither good nor evil, and that it ſhould impart no other ſcience than itſelf. Let us therefore ſay what it is, or to what purpoſe we ſhould uſe it. Are you willing, Crito, we ſhould ſay it is that by which we make others good?

CRITO. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But in what will theſe be good, and to what purpoſe will they be uſeful? Or ſhall we alſo ſay that they will make others good, and that thoſe others will make others to be ſo? However, it will no where appear to us in what they are good, becauſe we have rejected the works which are ſaid

to

to belong to the political ſcience. But in reality, according to the proverb[1], Corinthian Jupiter is preſent; and as I have ſaid, we are ſtill equally, or more than equally, remote from knowing what that ſcience is which will make us happy.

CRITO. By Jupiter, Socrates, you have arrived as it ſeems at abundant doubting.

SOC. I myſelf, therefore, Crito, ſince I was fallen into this doubt, with every poſſible exertion of voice entreated the ſtrangers, and called upon them as if they had been the Dioſcuri[2] to ſave us, viz. me and the lad from the overwhelming billows of this diſcourſe, to be by all means ſerious, and ſeriouſly to ſhow us what that ſcience is, by the poſſeſſion of which we may paſs through life in a becoming manner.

CRITO. What then? was Euthydemus willing to unfold any thing to you?

SOC. How could he do otherwiſe? And he began, my friend, the diſcourſe very magnificently thus: Whether, ſaid he, Socrates, ſhall I teach you this ſcience about which you formerly doubted, or evince that you poſſeſs it?—O bleſſed man, I replied, are you able to effect this?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Show me, therefore, by Jupiter, ſaid I, that I poſſeſs it · for this will be much eaſier than to inſtruct a man ſo far advanced in years.—Come then, ſaid he, anſwer me. Is there any thing which you know?—Certainly, ſaid I, there are many things which I know, and theſe of ſmall importance.—It is ſufficient, ſaid he. Does it therefore appear to you to be poſſible, that any thing which exiſts ſhould not be that thing which it is?—It does not, by Jupiter.—Do you not therefore, ſaid he, know ſomething?—I do.—Are you not therefore knowing, if you know?—Entirely ſo, in this very thing which I know.—It is of no conſequence. Is it not then neceſſary that you ſhould know all things, in conſequence of poſſeſſing knowledge?—It is not, by Jupiter, ſaid I, ſince there are many things which I do not know.—Will it not therefore follow, if there is any thing which you do not know, that you are not knowing?—

[1] A wearineſs from words repeated in vain, is ſignified by this adage. Concerning the origin of this proverb, which is obſcure, ſee the Greek Scholia on Plato, p. 96. and Eraſmus in Chiliad. p. 678.

[2] The Dioſcuri are Caſtor and Pollux, the ſons of Jupiter from Leda. Theſe brother deities were invoked by ſailors when in danger of ſhipwreck.

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It will follow that I am not knowing in that thing, my friend, I replied.—Will you then, ſaid he, be leſs deſtitute of knowledge? For you juſt now ſaid, that you were knowing: and thus you will be the ſame perſon, and again not the ſame perſon, according to the ſame, and at the ſame time.—Be it ſo, I replied, Euthydemus; for, according to the proverb, you ſay all things well. How then do I know that ſcience which we inveſtigate? Since it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not be: if knowing one thing, I know all things. For I cannot poſſeſs, and at the ſame time be deſtitute of knowledge. But if I know all things, I alſo poſſeſs that knowledge. Is this then what you ſay? And is this that wiſe thing?—You yourſelf, ſaid he, Socrates, confute yourſelf.

But what? ſaid I, O Euthydemus, does not the very ſame thing happen to you? For I, whatever I may ſuffer with you and this Dionyſodorus, the beloved head, ſhall not be very indignant. Tell me, do you not know ſome things, and are you not ignorant of others?—By no means, Socrates, ſaid Dionyſodorus.—How do you ſay? I replied. Do you therefore know nothing?—Very far from it, ſaid he.—Do you then know all things, ſaid I, ſince you alſo know any thing?—All things, he replied. And you likewiſe, if you know one thing, know all things.—O Jupiter! I replied, what a wonderful thing you ſpeak of: and a mighty good becomes apparent. But do all other men likewiſe know all things, or nothing?—They certainly, ſaid he, do not know ſome things, but are ignorant of others; and are not at the ſame time ſcientifically knowing, and deprived of ſcience.—But how is this? ſaid I.—All men, he replied, know all things, if they know one thing.—O, by the gods! ſaid I, Dionyſodorus, (for it is now manifeſt to me that you are ſerious, though I with difficulty incited you to be ſo,) do you in reality know all things, ſuch as the carpenter's and the ſhoemaker's art?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—And are you alſo able to ſew ſhoes, in the ſame manner as ſhoemakers?—I am, by Jupiter, ſaid he, and alſo to mend them.—Do you alſo know ſuch things as theſe, viz. the number of the ſtars and the ſands?—Perfectly ſo, he replied. Do you not think, we ſhould confeſs that we do?—And Cteſippus then taking up the diſcourſe, By Jupiter, ſaid he, O Dionyſodorus, exhibit to me ſuch a proof of theſe things, that I may know that you ſpeak the truth.—What ſhall I exhibit, ſaid he.—Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have?

have?—Is it not ſufficient for you, ſaid he, to have heard that we know all things?—By no means, ſaid he; but only tell us this one thing more, and ſhow that you ſpeak the truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have, and you ſhall appear to know this on our counting them, we ſhall then alſo believe you in other things. Conceiving, therefore, that they were derided, they were unwilling to comply, but they acknowledged that they knew all things, while they were ſeverally interrogated by Cteſippus. For there was not any thing at length, which Cteſippus did not aſk them without any heſitation, and even aſked them, if they knew the moſt indecent things. They however moſt bravely advanced to the interrogations, confeſſing that they knew, like wild boars ruſhing on the blow; ſo that I alſo myſelf, Crito, was at length compelled, through my incredulity, to aſk Euthydemus, whether Dionyſodorus knew alſo how to dance? But he replied, Perfectly ſo.—However, ſaid I, he certainly does not know how to precipitate himſelf upon ſwords, and to be whirled on a wheel, being ſo much advanced in years as he is. Or is he maſter of this piece of wiſdom alſo?—There is nothing, ſaid he, which he does not know.—But whether, ſaid I, do you now only know all things, or has this always been the caſe?—Always, ſaid he.—And when you were boys, and as ſoon as you were born, did you know all things?—All things, ſaid both of them together.—And to us, indeed, the thing appeared to be incredible. But Euthydemus ſaid, You do not believe, Socrates.—Except this one thing, I replied, that it is likely you are wiſe men.—But, ſaid he, if you are willing to anſwer me, I will alſo ſhow you, giving your aſſent to theſe wonderful things.—I replied, I ſhall moſt gladly be confuted in theſe things. For if it is concealed from me that I am wiſe, and you demonſtrate that I know all things, and that I have always poſſeſſed this knowledge, what greater gain than this ſhall I be able to diſcover through the whole of life?—Anſwer then, ſaid he.—Aſk me as one that will anſwer.

Whether, therefore, Socrates, ſaid he, do you know any thing or not?—I do.—Do you then know by that thing through which you are knowing, or by any thing elſe?—By that by which I am knowing: for I think that you ſpeak of the ſoul. Or do you not ſpeak of this?—Are you not aſhamed, ſaid he, Socrates, to interrogate when you are interrogated?—Be it ſo, ſaid I; but what ſhall I do? Shall I do as you bid me, when I know not what it

is you aſk me, though at the ſame time you order me to anſwer and not to interrogate?—You, doubtleſs, ſaid he, apprehend what I ſay.—I do, I replied.—Now therefore anſwer to that which you apprehend.—What then? ſaid I, if you indeed aſk conceiving one thing, but I apprehend another, and afterwards I ſhould anſwer to this, would it be ſufficient for you if I anſwered nothing to the purpoſe?—To me it would, he replied, but not to you, as I think.—I will not therefore, by Jupiter, ſaid I, anſwer, till I underſtand.—You will not anſwer, ſaid he, to the things which you always apprehend, becauſe you trifle, and are more ſimple than is becoming.—And I perceived that he was indignant with me for diſputing what was ſaid, he being deſirous to catch me by encloſing me with words. I recollected, therefore, that Connus was always indignant with me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid leſs attention to me, as one that was ignorant. As, therefore, I had formed the deſign of becoming inſtructed by theſe men, I thought it was neceſſary to ſubmit to them, leſt, conſidering me as an illiterate perſon, they ſhould reject me. Hence I ſaid, If you are diſpoſed to act in this manner, Euthydemus, let it be done: for you, in every reſpect, better know how to diſcourſe than I do, you who poſſeſs art, than I who am a rude unlettered man. Again, therefore, interrogate from the beginning.—Anſwer then again, ſaid he, whether you know thoſe things which you know, by ſomething or not.—I do, ſaid I; for I know them, by my ſoul.—Again, ſaid he, in his anſwer, he adds to what he is aſked. For I did not aſk by what you know, but if you know by any thing.—Again, ſaid I, I have anſwered more than is ſufficient, through my want of erudition; but pardon me. For I will now anſwer ſimply that I always know by a certain thing what I know.—But whether, ſaid he, do you always know by this very ſame thing? Or do you at one time know by this, and at another by ſomething elſe?—Always by this, ſaid I, when I know.—Again, ſaid he, you will not ceaſe to ſpeak ſuperfluouſly.—But I am afraid leſt this certain ſomething always ſhould deceive us.—It will not deceive *us*, ſaid he; but if at all, it will deceive you. Anſwer me, however, whether you always know by this.—Always, I replied; ſince it is neceſſary to take away the when.—Do you therefore always know by this? And always knowing, whether do you know ſome things by this by which you know, but other things by ſomething elſe? Or do you know all things by this?—All things by this, ſaid I, which I do know.—This latter part of your anſwer,

anſwer, ſaid he, is again ſuperfluous.—But I take away, ſaid I, the words which I do know.—You ſhould not, however, ſaid he, take away even one word; for I want none of your aſſiſtance. But anſwer me; would you be able to know all things unleſs you could know all things?—This would be a prodigy, I replied.—And he ſaid, Add now whatever you pleaſe: for you confeſs that you know all things.—I appear to have done ſo, ſaid I, ſince the words, the things which I know, poſſeſs no power whatever; but I know all things.—Have you not therefore alſo confeſſed that you always know by this thing by which you know? whether it be when you know, or in whatever way you pleaſe: for you have acknowledged that you always know, and at the ſame time, that you know all things. It is evident therefore that you knew when you was a boy, and when you was begot, and when you was born. Hence, before you was born, and before heaven and earth were produced, you knew all things, if you always poſſeſſed knowledge. And by Jupiter, ſaid he, you always will know, and will always know all things, if I am willing that you ſhould.—But be willing, I replied, O much-honoured Euthydemus, if you ſpeak the truth in reality. But I cannot entirely believe that you are ſufficient to accompliſh this, unleſs this your brother Dionyſodorus aſſiſts you with his counſel: and thus perhaps what you ſay may be accompliſhed.

But tell me, I ſaid; for in other things I cannot contend with you, who are endued with ſuch portentous wiſdom, nor deny that I know all things, ſince you ſay that I do;—how ſhall I ſay that I know ſuch things as the following, O Euthydemus, viz. that good men are unjuſt? Come, inform me, do I know this, or do I not know it?—You certainly know it, ſaid he.—What, I replied, do I know?—That good men are not unjuſt.—This, ſaid I, I perfectly knew a long time ago. But I do not aſk this; but where did I learn that good men are unjuſt?—No where, ſaid Dionyſdorus.—I do not therefore, ſaid I, know this.—Euthydemus then ſaid to Dionyſodorus, You deſtroy the converſation; and he will appear to be not knowing, and to poſſeſs, and at the ſame time to be deprived of knowledge. And Dionyſodorus bluſhed. But you, Euthydemus, ſaid I, how do you ſay? Does not your brother appear to you to ſpeak rightly, who knows all things?—But am I the brother of Euthydemus? ſaid Dionyſodorus, haſtily replying.—And I ſaid, Excuſe me from anſwering you, O good man, till Euthydemus has taught me

that I know that good men are unjuſt, and do not envy me the diſcipline.—You fly, Socrates, ſaid Dionyſodorus, and are not willing to anſwer.—It is reaſonable that I ſhould, ſaid I: for I am inferior to either of you, ſo that there is an abundant neceſſity that I ſhould fly from two. For I am much more imbecile than Hercules, who was not able to contend with the hydra (a ſophiſt who, by her wiſdom, if one head of the diſcourſe was cut off, preſented many inſtead of one), and at the ſame time with the crab, a certain other ſophiſt, who, as it appears to me, recently drove on ſhore from the ſea); and when Hercules had in a ſimilar manner tormented the crab) by ſpeaking to and biting him on the left-hand ſide, he called upon Iolaus, the ſon of his brother, to aſſiſt him: and he gave him ſufficient aid. But my Iolaus Patrocles, if he ſhould come, would rather effect the very contrary.

Anſwer then, ſaid Dionyſodorus, ſince theſe things are celebrated by you, whether Iolaus was more the nephew of Hercules than of you.—It is therefore beſt for me, O Dionyſodorus, ſaid I, to anſwer you. For you will not deſiſt from interrogating, nearly envying (for this I well know), and hindering Euthydemus from teaching me that wiſe thing.—Anſwer, however, ſaid he.—But I will anſwer, I ſaid, that Iolaus was the ſon of the brother of Hercules, but, as it appears to me, is by no means my nephew. For Patrocles, who is my brother, was not his father; but Iphicles, who reſembles him in name, was the brother of Hercules.—But is Patrocles, ſaid he, your brother?—Certainly, ſaid I; for he had the ſame mother, though not the ſame father with me.—He is your brother therefore, and not your brother.—I ſaid, He was not from the ſame father, O beſt of men: for his father was Chæredemus, but mine Sophroniſcus.—But the father, ſaid he, was Sophroniſcus and Chæredemus. Was he not?—Certainly, ſaid I; the former was my, and the latter his father.—Was not therefore, ſaid he, Chæredemus different from the father?—From my father, ſaid I.—Was he therefore a father, being different from a father? Or are you the ſame thing as a ſtone?—I am afraid, ſaid I, leſt through you I ſhould appear to be the ſame; but I do not appear to myſelf to be the ſame.—Are you not therefore, ſaid he, different from a ſtone?—Different certainly.—Being different from a ſtone, therefore, you are ſomething elſe, and not a ſtone: and being different from gold, you are not gold.—Granted.—Will not Chæredemus therefore, ſince he is different from father, not be a father?—It ſeems, ſaid I, he is not a father.—For certainly,

ſaid Euthydemus, taking up the diſcourſe, if Chæredemus is a father, again Sophroniſcus, on the contrary, being different from father, is not a father; ſo that you, O Socrates, are without a father.—And then Cteſippus, taking up the diſcourſe, ſaid, Does not your father ſuffer theſe very ſame things? for he is different from my father.—Very far from it, ſaid Euthydemus.—Is he then the ſame? he replied.—The ſame, indeed.—I ſhould not conſent to this. But whether, O Euthydemus, is he alone my father, or is he the father alſo of other men?—Of other men alſo, ſaid he.—Or do you think that the ſame perſon being father, is not father?—I ſhould indeed think ſo, ſaid Cteſippus.—But what? ſaid he. A thing being gold, is it not gold? Or being man, is it not man?—You do not, ſaid Cteſippus, according to the proverb, connect, O Euthydemus, thread with thread [1]. For you ſpeak of a dire thing, if your father is the father of all men.—But he is, ſaid he.—Whether is he the father of men, ſaid Cteſippus, or alſo of horſes? Or likewiſe of all other animals?—Of all others animals, ſaid he.—Is a mother alſo the mother of all animals?—And a mother likewiſe.—Your mother therefore, ſaid he, is alſo the mother of marine hedge-hogs.—And yours too, ſaid he.—Hence then you are the brother of gudgeons, whelps, and pigs.—For you alſo are, ſaid he.—And beſides this, your father alſo is a dog.—For your father is likewiſe, ſaid he.—But, ſaid Dionyſodorus, if you anſwer me, you will in a ſhort time acknowledge theſe things. For tell me, have you a dog?—And a very bad one, ſaid Cteſippus.—Has he therefore whelps?—He has indeed, ſaid he, others very much like himſelf.—Is not the dog then the father of them?—I, ſaid he, ſaw him having connection with a bitch.—What then? Is he not your dog?—Certainly, ſaid he.—Being a father therefore, is he not yours? So that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of whelps.—And again, Dionyſodorus haſtily took up the diſcourſe, that Cteſippus might not ſay any thing in reply prior to him; and ſtill further, ſaid he, anſwer me a trifling particular. Do you ſtrike this dog?—And Cteſippus laughing, By the gods, ſaid he, I do; for I cannot ſtrike you.—Do you not therefore, ſaid he, ſtrike your father?—I ſhould much more

[1] This proverb, according to the Greek Scholiaſt on Plato, is applied to thoſe who ſay or do the ſame things through the ſame, or who connect ſimilars into friendſhip. This proverb is alſo mentioned by Ariſtotle in the third book of his Phyſics.

juſtly,

juſtly, ſaid he, ſtrike your father, and aſk him what he meant, by begetting ſuch wife ſons. But certainly, O Euthydemus, ſaid Cteſippus, your father and the father of the whelps has obtained the poſſeſſion of many good things from this your wiſdom.

But he is not in want of many good things, O Cteſippus, neither he, nor you.—Nor are you, O Euthydemus, ſaid he, in want of them.—Neither I nor any other man am in want of them. For tell me, O Cteſippus, whether you think it good for a ſick man to drink a medicine, or does it appear to you to be not good, when it is requiſite he ſhould drink it; or when any one is going to a battle, ought he rather to go armed, or without arms?—To me, ſaid he, it appears to be better to do the former of theſe; though I think that you are about to ſay ſomething beautiful.—You underſtand moſt excellently, ſaid he; but anſwer me. For ſince you acknowledge that it is good for a man to drink a medicine when it is requiſite, it is alſo neceſſary to drink abundantly of this good, and it will in this caſe be well, if ſome one bruiſing it, ſhould mingle with it a cart load of hellebore.—And Ctesippus ſaid, This would be very proper indeed, O Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the ſtatue in Delphi.—As therefore, ſaid he, it is alſo good to have arms in battle, is it not neceſſary to have a great number of ſhields and ſpears, ſince it is a good thing?—Very much ſo, ſaid Cteſippus. But you are not of this opinion, O Euthydemus; for you think that one ſhield and one ſpear are ſufficient. Or do you not?—I do.—Would you alſo, ſaid he, arm Gorgon and Briareus after this manner? But I think that you are more ſkilful than to act in this manner, as being one who fights with military weapons, as is alſo the caſe with this your aſſociate.—And Euthydemus indeed was ſilent; but Dionyſodorus ſaid, in reply to thoſe things which had been before anſwered by Cteſippus, Does it not therefore alſo appear to you to be good to poſſeſs gold?—Certainly, ſaid Cteſippus, and alſo to have a great quantity of it.—What then? Does it not appear to you to be a good thing always to poſſeſs riches, and every where?—Very much ſo, ſaid he.—Do you not therefore alſo acknowledge gold to be a good thing?—We have acknowledged it, ſaid he.—Is it not then neceſſary always to poſſeſs it, and every where, and eſpecially in one's ſelf? And would not a man be moſt happy, if he had three talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his ſkull, and a ſtater of gold in each of his eyes?—They ſay indeed, O Euthydemus, ſaid

Cteſippus, that thoſe among the Scythians are the moſt happy and the beſt men, who have much gold in their ſkulls, juſt as you lately ſaid, that a dog was your father: and, what is ſtill more wonderful, they ſay, that they drink out of their own golden ſkulls, and view the gold within them, having their own head in their hands.

But whether, ſaid Euthydemus, do the Scythians and other men ſee things which may be ſeen, or things which cannot be ſeen?—Things which can be ſeen, certainly.—Is this, therefore, alſo the caſe with you? ſaid he.—It is.—Do you therefore ſee our garments?—Yes.—Are theſe then things which may be ſeen?—Tranſcendently ſo, ſaid Cteſippus.—But what? ſaid he.—Nothing. But you perhaps do not think that they are ſeen; ſo pleaſant are you. To me however, Euthydemus, you appear, not ſleeping to be aſleep, and if it were poſſible for a man when ſpeaking to ſay nothing, that you alſo do this.—Is it not therefore poſſible, ſaid Dionyſodorus, for him who is ſilent to ſpeak?—By no means, ſaid Cteſippus.—Is it alſo impoſſible for him who ſpeaks to be ſilent?—This is ſtill leſs poſſible, ſaid he.—When therefore you ſpeak of ſtones, and pieces of wood and iron, do you not ſpeak of things ſilent?—I do not, ſaid he, if I walk in braziers' ſhops; but the pieces of iron are called things which ſound, and make the greateſt noiſe, if any one meddles with them. So that in this particular, it is concealed from you through your wiſdom, that you have ſaid nothing. But further ſtill, explain to me the other aſſertion, how it is poſſible for one who ſpeaks to be ſilent.—And Cteſippus appeared to me to contend in a tranſcendent manner, on account of the youth, the object of his love.—When you are ſilent, ſaid Euthydemus, are you not ſilent as to all things?—I am, ſaid he.—Are you not therefore ſilent, as to things which are ſaid, if things which are ſaid are among the number of all things?—But what? ſaid Cteſippus, are not all things ſilent?—Certainly not, ſaid Euthydemus.—Do therefore, O beſt of men, all things ſpeak?—Thoſe things certainly do, which do ſpeak.—But, ſaid he, I do not aſk this; but I aſk whether all things are ſilent, or ſpeak?—They do neither, and they do both, ſaid Dionyſodorus, haſtily taking up the diſcourſe. For I well know that you have not any thing to ſay to this anſwer.—And Cteſippus, as was uſual with him, laughing very loudly, O Euthydemus, ſaid he, your brother has loſt his poſition in both caſes, and his aſſertion periſhes and is vanquiſhed. And Clinias was very much delighted and laughed;

laughed; ſo that Cteſippus became ten times greater than he was. But Cteſippus, as being very crafty, appeared to me to have ſtolen theſe things from theſe very men. For a wiſdom of this kind is not now poſſeſſed by any other perſons.

And I ſaid, Why do you laugh, O Clinias, at things ſo ſerious and beautiful?—Why have you now, Socrates, ever ſeen a beautiful thing? ſaid Dionyſodorus.—I have, ſaid I, and many ſuch, O Dionyſodorus.—Were they therefore, ſaid he, things different from the beautiful, or the ſame with the beautiful?—And I then became perfectly involved in doubt, and thought I had ſuffered juſtly for having granted. At the ſame time, however, I replied, They are different from the beautiful; but a certain beauty is preſent to each of them.—If, therefore, ſaid he, an ox is preſent with you, you are an ox; and becauſe I now am preſent with you, you are Dionyſodorus.—Predict better things, ſaid I.—But after what manner, ſaid he; when one thing is preſent with another, will that which is different be different?—Are you then, ſaid I, dubious reſpecting this? But I will now endeavour to imitate the wiſdom of men, as being one who is deſirous of it.—How ſhould I not doubt, ſaid he, both I and all other men, reſpecting that which is not?—What do you ſay? ſaid I, O Dionyſodorus. Is not the beautiful, beautiful, and the baſe, baſe?—If, ſaid he, it appears to be ſo to me.—Does it not therefore appear to be ſo to you?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Is not therefore alſo the ſame, ſame? and is not the different, different? For certainly the different is not the ſame. But I ſhould not think that even a boy would doubt this, that the different is not different. But, O Dionyſodorus, this indeed you willingly paſs by; ſince in other things you appear to me to reſemble artiſts on whom it is incumbent to accompliſh certain particulars; for it is proper that you ſhould accompliſh the buſineſs of diſcourſe in an all-beautiful manner.—Do you know therefore, ſaid he, what is proper to each of the artiſts? And, in the firſt place, do you know to whom it belongs to work in braſs?—I know that this belongs to copper-ſmiths.—But to whom does it belong to faſhion things from clay?—To a potter.—And whoſe buſineſs is it to cut throats, to excoriate, and cutting off ſmall pieces of fleſh to boil and roaſt them?—It is the buſineſs of a cook, ſaid I.—If then, ſaid he, a man does things which are proper, does he not act rightly?—Eſpecially ſo.—But it is proper, as you ſay, that a cook ſhould cut and excoriate. Have you

you aſſented to theſe things or not?—I have aſſented, I ſaid; but pardon me.—It is evident, therefore, ſaid he, that if any one, cutting the throat of a cook and chopping him into ſmall pieces, ſhould boil and roaſt him, he would do[1] what is proper; and that if any one ſhould work on a copper-ſmith himſelf after the manner of braziers, and on a potter after the manner of potters, he alſo would do what is proper.—O Neptune, ſaid I, now you place a ſummit[1] on your wiſdom. Will it therefore ever be preſent with me, ſo as to become familiar to me?—You will know it, Socrates, ſaid he, when it becomes familiar to you.—That is to ſay, ſaid I, if you are willing that it ſhould.

But what? ſaid he, Do you think you know the things pertaining to yourſelf?—Unleſs you ſay any thing to the contrary. For it is neceſſary to begin from you, but to end in Euthydemus here.—Whether therefore, ſaid he, do you think theſe things to be yours, over which you have dominion, and which you can uſe as you pleaſe? As, for inſtance, with reſpect to oxen and ſheep, do you think that ſuch among theſe are yours as it is lawful for you to ſell and give, and ſacrifice to whatever god you pleaſe? And that thoſe of them over which you have not this power, are not yours?—And I (for I knew that from thoſe queſtions ſomething beautiful would emerge, and at the ſame time being deſirous to hear very quickly) ſaid, it is perfectly ſo: things of this kind are alone mine.—But what? ſaid he. Do you not call theſe things animals, which poſſeſs a ſoul?—Yes, I ſaid.—Do you acknowledge then, that theſe alone among animals are yours reſpecting which you have the liberty of doing all theſe things which I have juſt now mentioned?—I acknowledge it.—And he pauſing, very ironically, as if conſidering ſomething of great conſequence, Tell me, ſaid he, Socrates, is Jupiter with you *Patrius?*—And I, ſuſpecting that the diſcourſe would come to that place, in which it would end, fled with a certain ambiguous craftineſs, and now turned myſelf as if I had been caught in a net. And I ſaid, He is not, O Dionyſodorus.—You therefore are a miſerable man; nor are you an Athenian, ſince you have neither gods called *Patrii*, nor ſacred rights, nor any thing elſe beautiful and good.—Spare me, ſaid I, O Dionyſodorus, predict better things, and do not inſtruct me with ſeverity. For

[1] This was uſually ſaid when the laſt hand was put to any thing, or when that was added without which a buſineſs could not be finiſhed. See Eraſmus in Chiliad. p. 570.

I have altars, and domeſtic ſacred concerns, and ſuch as belong to my country, and whatever other things of this kind are poſſeſſed by the reſt of the Athenians.—In the next place, ſaid he, is not Jupiter Patrius to the reſt of the Athenians?—That appellation, ſaid I, does not belong to any one of the Ionians, nor to ſuch as are colonized from this city, nor to us. But Apollo is Patrius [1], through the nativity of Ion. Jupiter, however, is not called by us Patrius, but Herceus [2] and Phratrius; and Minerva alſo is called Phratria. —This is ſufficient, ſaid Dionyſodorus; for you have, as it ſeems, Apollo, Jupiter, and Minerva.—Entirely ſo, ſaid I.—Will not theſe therefore, ſaid he, be your gods?—My progenitors, ſaid I, and maſters.—They will be ſo then to you, ſaid he. Or have you not confeſſed that they are yours?—I have confeſſed it, ſaid I. For what can I do?—Are not therefore, ſaid he, thoſe gods alſo animals? For you have acknowledged that ſuch things as have a ſoul are animals. Or have not thoſe gods a ſoul?—They have [3], ſaid I.—Are they not therefore alſo animals?—Animals, ſaid I.—But of animals, ſaid he, you have acknowledged theſe to be yours, which you can give and ſell, and ſacrifice to any god you pleaſe.—I have acknowledged it, ſaid I. For I do not recant, O Euthydemus.—Come then, ſaid he, tell me immediately, ſince you acknowledge that Jupiter is yours and the other gods, are you therefore permitted to ſell them, or give them, or to uſe them in any other way you pleaſe, in the ſame manner as other animals?—I therefore, O Crito, as if ſtruck by what he ſaid, lay ſpeechleſs; but Cteſippus coming as it were to my aſſiſtance, Pypax [4], O Herules, ſaid he, a beautiful diſcourſe!—And then Dionyſodorus, Whether, ſaid he, is Hercules Pypax, or Pypax Hercules?—And Cteſippus, O Neptune, ſaid he, what weighty queſtions! I yield; the men are unconquerable.

[1] Some, ſays the Greek ſcholiaſt on Plato, p. 98. ſay that the Greeks were indigenous, and that their parents were the earth and the ſun who is the ſame with Apollo. But others aſſert that Apollo having connexion with Creuſa, the daughter of Erectheus, begot Ion, from whom the Athenians were at one time called Ionians, and that on this account they have Apollo Patrius.

[2] The Athenians called houſes ἕρκη *erkē*; and hence Jupiter is with them Herceus, whom they eſtabliſh in theſe for the ſake of a guard. But Phratria is the third part of every tribe; and Minerva Phratria is the inſpective guardian of theſe. Schol. in Plat. p. 98.

[3] This paſſage, among numberleſs others that might be adduced, muſt convince the moſt careleſs reader that the gods of the antients were not conſidered by thoſe that worſhipped them to be nothing but ſtocks and ſtones, as ſome have ſtupidly pretended they were.

[4] The Greek Scholiaſt on Plato informs us, that this word expreſſes both indignation and praiſe.

Here

Here indeed, my dear Crito, there was not any one preſent, who did not in the higheſt degree praiſe what was ſaid; and the men were almoſt ready to die with laughing, applauding, and exulting. For before this, the lovers alone of Euthydemus applauded every thing that was ſaid in a very beautiful manner; but here, not far from the pillars in the Lyceum, they applauded the men, and were delighted with what they ſaid. As to myſelf, my feelings were ſuch, that I was forced to acknowledge that I had never at any time ſeen men ſo wiſe; and being perfectly enſlaved by their wiſdom, I applied myſelf to the praiſing and paſſing encomiums on them; and I ſaid, O bleſſed ye for your admirable genius, who have ſo rapidly, and in a ſhort time, accompliſhed a thing of ſuch magnitude! Your arguments indeed, O Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this is the moſt magnificent thing in them, that you pay no attention to the multitude of mankind, nor to things venerable, and which appear to be of ſome conſequence, but only to thoſe who are like yourſelves. For I well know, that very few men, and thoſe ſuch as are ſimilar to you, delight in theſe arguments; but others are ſo ignorant of them, that I well know, they would be more aſhamed to confute others with ſuch like arguments, than to be themſelves confuted. This too again is another popular and mild thing in your arguments, that when you ſay there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or any thing elſe of this kind, and, in ſhort, that one thing is not different from another, you in reality ſew up the mouths of men, as you alſo acknowledge that you do; but that you not only ſew up the mouths of others, but appear alſo to ſew up your own, this is very polite, and removes that which is oppreſſive in your arguments. The greateſt thing however is, that theſe arguments ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner, and are ſo artificially invented by you, that any one may learn them in a very ſhort time. This I have perceived, and I have noticed how rapidly, and indeed immediately, Cteſippus has been able to imitate you. This wiſdom therefore of yours, with reſpect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is beautiful, but is not adapted to be diſcuſſed before men. But if you will be perſuaded by me, be careful that you do not ſpeak before many, leſt rapidly learning, they ſhould not thank you for your inſtruction. But eſpecially diſcourſe together by yourſelves alone: if not, if you diſcourſe before another, let it be before him alone, who gives you ſilver for what you ſay. Theſe ſame things too if you are wiſe you will alſo admo-

niſh your diſciples, viz. That they never diſcourſe with any man, unleſs with you and themſelves. For that which is rare, O Euthydemus, is honourable; but water may he bought for a vile price, being the beſt of things, as Pindar ſays. But come, ſaid I, make Clinias and me partakers of your diſcipline.

Having ſaid theſe things, O Crito, and a few others, we departed. Conſider therefore now, how you will accompany me to theſe men. For they ſay that they are able to teach any one who is willing to give them money; and that they do not exclude any genius or age. They likewiſe aſſert that which it is eſpecially proper for you to hear, that an attention to gain does not hinder any one from eaſily receiving their wiſdom.

CRITO. And indeed, Socrates, I am deſirous of hearing them, and would willingly learn ſomething from them; though indeed I alſo appear to be among the number of thoſe who do not reſemble Euthydemus, but thoſe whom, as you ſaid, would more willingly be confuted by ſuch like arguments, than confute them. It ſeems however to me to be ridiculous to admoniſh you, at the ſame time I wiſh to relate to you what I have heard. Do you not know, that among thoſe that left you, a certain perſon came to me as I was walking, a man who thought himſelf to be very wiſe, and one of thoſe who are ſkilful in forenſic harangues, and that he ſaid to me, O Crito, have you heard nothing of theſe wiſe men?—By Jupiter, I have, not ſaid I. For I could not ſtand before others, ſo as to hear, on account of the crowd.—But, ſaid he, it was worth while to have heard them.—Why? ſaid I.—Becauſe you would have heard men diſcourſing, who are the wiſeſt of all thoſe who at preſent engage in ſuch like arguments.—And I ſaid, What then do you think of their arguments?—What elſe, ſaid he, than that they are ſuch as you will always hear from ſuch like triflers, who beſtow vile attention on things of no worth. For theſe were his very words.—And I ſaid, But certainly philoſophy is an elegant thing.—How, elegant, ſaid he, O bleſſed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you had been preſent juſt now, I think that you would have been very much aſhamed on account of your aſſociate, who was ſo abſurd as willingly to put himſelf in the power of men, who pay no attention to what they ſay, but adhere to every word. And theſe men, as I juſt now ſaid, are among the beſt of thoſe that exiſt at preſent. But indeed, Crito, ſaid he, both the thing itſelf, and the men who are converſant with it, are very vile and ridiculous.—But to me, Socrates,

ſes, neither he appears rightly to blame the thing, nor any other who blames it. To be willing, however, to diſcourſe with theſe men before many appears to me to be rightly blamed.

Soc. O Crito, men of this kind are wonderful. But I do not yet know what I am about to ſay. To what claſs of men did he belong who came to you, and blamed philoſophy? Was he among the number of thoſe who are ſkilful in contending in courts of juſtice, a certain orator; or was he one of thoſe who introduce men of this deſcription, a compoſer of the orations with which orators contend?

Crito. The leaſt of all, by Jupiter, was he an orator; nor do I think that he ever went into a court of juſtice; but they ſay that he is knowing in the thing itſelf, by Jupiter, and likewiſe that he is ſkilful, and that he compoſes ſkilful orations.

Soc. I now underſtand: for I myſelf was juſt now about to ſpeak concerning theſe men. For theſe are they, O Crito, whom Prodicus ſays exiſt in the confines of a philoſopher and politician. But they think themſelves to be the wiſeſt of men; and beſides being ſuch *in their own opinion*, they alſo entirely appear to be ſo among the many. Hence, as they are celebrated by all men, no others are an impediment to them, than thoſe who are converſant with philoſophy. They think therefore, if they can eſtabliſh an opinion, that philoſophers are of no worth, they ſhall obtain the palm of wiſdom without contention in the opinion of all men. For they conſider themſelves to be in reality moſt wiſe; but think that their authority is leſſened by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted in their private diſcourſes. But they are very reaſonably thought to be wiſe men: for moderately to poſſeſs philoſophy, and moderately to engage in political concerns, is very convenient; ſince this is to partake of both, as much as is requiſite, and to enjoy the fruits of wiſdom, ſecure from dangers and conteſts.

Crito. What then? Do they appear to you, O Socrates, to ſay any thing of conſequence?

Soc. They do not, indeed.

Crito. But the diſcourſe of the men poſſeſſes a certain gracefulneſs.

Soc. For it has in reality, O Crito, gracefulneſs rather than truth. For it is not eaſy to perſuade them, that men and all other things which ſubſiſt between

between two certain things, and participate of both, viz. ſuch particulars as conſiſt from good and evil, become better than the one, and worſe than the other; but that ſuch things as conſiſt from two goods, not tending to the ſame, are worſe than both with reſpect to that for which each of the things is uſeful from which they are compoſed; and that ſuch things as are compoſed from two evils, not tending to the ſame, and which are in the middle, are alone better than each of thoſe things, a part of both of which they participate. If, therefore, philoſophy and political action are good, but each tends to that which is different, and theſe men, while they participate of both, are ſituated in the middle, they ſay nothing to the purpoſe; for they are viler than both. But if philoſophy and political action are both good and bad, theſe men are better than ſome and worſe than others. And if both are bad, thus they will aſſert ſomething which is true, but by no means otherwiſe. I do not therefore think they will acknowledge, either that both theſe are bad, or that the one is bad, and the other good; but they in reality partaking of both, are inferior to both with reſpect to the performing of either, with a view to which both the political ſcience and philoſophy are worthy of regard; and though in reality they rank as the third, they endeavour to appear to be the firſt. It is requiſite, therefore, to pardon their deſire, and not to be indignant with them. We ſhould however conſider them to be ſuch as they are: for it is requiſite to embrace every man who ſays any thing which adheres to intellect, and who valiantly labours in endeavouring to do ſo.

Crito. And indeed, Socrates, I alſo (as I always ſay to you) am dubious with reſpect to the management of my own children. For the youngeſt is yet but a little one; but Critobulus is now an adult, and requires the aſſiſtance of ſome one. I therefore, when I converſe with you, am led to think that it is madneſs to be ſo much concerned about other things for the ſake of children, ſuch as about marriage, that they may be born from the moſt generous mother, and about riches, that they may become moſt wealthy, and yet neglect their education. But when I look at any one of thoſe who profeſs to inſtruct men, I am ſtruck with aſtoniſhment; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me to be unfit for the purpoſe; ſo that I cannot exhort the lad to philoſophy.

Soc. O, my dear Crito, do you not know that in every purſuit, the many are vile, and of no worth, and that the few are worthy of all regard? For do

do not the gymnaſtic art, the art of acquiring money, rhetoric, and the art of commanding an army, appear to you to be beautiful?

CRITO. To me they certainly do, in every reſpect.

SOC. What then? In each of theſe do you not ſee that the multitude are ridiculous with reſpect to the ſeveral employments of theſe arts?

CRITO. Yes, by Jupiter; and you ſpeak moſt truly.

SOC. Would you, therefore, on this account avoid all purſuits, and not ſuffer your ſon to engage in them?

CRITO. This indeed, Socrates, would not be juſt.

SOC. You muſt not, therefore, O Crito, do that which ought not to be done; but bidding farewell to thoſe who ſtudy philoſophy, whether they are good or bad, explore the thing itſelf, well and properly; and if it ſhould then appear to you to be a vile thing, diſſuade every man from it, and not your ſons only; but if it ſhould appear to you ſuch as I think it is, confidently purſue and cultivate it, as it is ſaid, both you and your children.

THE END OF THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE