THE CHARMIDES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

TEMPERANCE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE CHARMIDES.

TWO things are to be noted in the exordium of this Dialogue, which transfer love from corporeal to incorporeal form. Firſt, the aſſertion of Socrates, that nearly all young men appear to him to be beautiful; which is as if he had ſaid that he did not ſtop at the form of one body, but aſcended to the common beauty of the whole ſpecies. As therefore we aſcend from the beauty of an individual, to that which is common to the ſpecies, and from this to that beauty which is uncoordinated with the many, and is an incorporeal form ſubſiſting by itſelf; ſo by what is here ſaid we are admoniſhed to paſs from the love of an individual form, to the love of that which is common, and from this to the love of ideal form, ſubſiſting in intellect as its native ſeat. The ſecond thing which deſerves to be noted is, that Socrates orders the ſoul of Charmides to be expoſed naked to the view, and that neglecting the form of the body we ſhould behold the natural beauty of the ſoul, and diligently endeavour to obtain it when it is found to be wanting. Nor is it without reaſon that the exhortation to temperance begins from the beauty of body: for this is nothing more than a ſymphony and conſent of the organical parts, which correſponds to temperance in the ſoul.

Plato in the Cratylus explains the name of temperance, as ſignifying a certain ſafety and preſervation of prudence. For he conſidered all truth as naturally inherent in the ſoul; and that, in conſequence of this, the ſoul by profoundly looking into herſelf will diſcover every truth. She is however impeded from this converſion to herſelf, by an immoderate love of body and corporeal natures. Hence temperance is in the firſt place neceſſary, by which the darkneſs of perturbations being expelled, the intellect becomes more ſerene, and is abundantly irradiated with the ſplendors of divinity.

But

But as Socrates intends to diſcourſe about temperance, he admoniſhes Charmides to look into himſelf. For a converſion of the ſoul into herſelf is the buſineſs of this virtue. And it is ſaid in the Timæus that all our affairs become proſperous, from the ſoul being in harmony with herſelf, and in concord with reſpect to the body. The Pythagoreans alſo aſſert, that if the ſoul prudently governs not only her own motions, but thoſe of the body, length of life will be the portion of the latter, and perpetual health of both. To this Socrates adds, as ſtill more wonderful, that the Magi promiſe by their verſes immortality to bodies: and we learn from Plato, in the firſt Alcibiades, that the magic of Zoroaſter was nothing elſe than the worſhip of divinity. Socrates however obſerves, that the ſoul and body are not only preſerved from death by magical verſes, but likewiſe by philoſophic reaſonings and temperance. Again, as that diſcourſe, which is calculated to perſuade its auditors to temperance, requires power imparted by divinity, and reaſonings produced by philoſophy, Plato calls ſuch a diſcourſe a magical incantation.

In the next place, Socrates often inquires what temperance is, which, neither Charmides nor Critias accurately defines. For the one adduces, that which is not properly temperance, but its attendant, and the other, that which rather belongs to prudence. Hence the latter defines temperance to be a certain ſcience, which both knows itſelf and all other ſciences, but is ignorant of the things themſelves which are the objects of ſcience. This however is falſe, becauſe the truth of ſcience conſiſts in a certain congruity and contact of that, which knows with that which is known. Beſides, ſcience cannot be perfectly known, unleſs it is perceived what ſcience is, and this cannot be obtained without a knowledge of its object. But as Critias brings the diſcourſe on temperance to prudence, Socrates aſſerts that prudence, or the ſcience of good and evil, obtains the higheſt authority with reſpect to beatitude, as well becauſe it demonſtrates the moſt excellent end, and the media which lead to it, as becauſe all arts and purſuits, ſo far as they are governed by it, contribute to our advantage, but end in our detriment when it is neglected. In the laſt place, Socrates teaches us that nothing can with more difficulty be defined, or procured, than temperance. It is moſt difficult to define, becauſe it is ſo intimately combined with the other virtues, of which it is a certain conſonance; and it cannot be obtained without

without great difficulty, becauſe from our union with body we are prone to intemperance, and from our infancy drink deep of the envenomed cup of pleaſure.

For the benefit of the Platonic reader, as this Dialogue is piraſtic, I ſhall conclude this Introduction with the following admirable obſervations from Jamblichus[1], in which the nature of temperance is beautifully unfolded. "Every virtue deſpiſes that which is mortal, and embraces that which is immortal; but this in a very remarkable degree is the endeavour of temperance, as deſpiſing thoſe pleaſures which faſten the ſoul to the body as by a nail, and eſtabliſhing itſelf, as Plato ſays, on holy foundations. For how is it poſſible that temperance ſhould not make us perfect, ſince it exterminates from us the imperfect and the paſſive? But you may know that this is the caſe by attending to the fable of Bellerophon, who, contending in conjunction with *moderation*, deſtroyed Chimæra, and every beaſtly, wild, and ſavage tribe. For, in ſhort, the immoderate dominion of the paſſions does not ſuffer men to be men, but draws them down to that which is irrational, beaſtly, and diſordered. But that excellent order, which confines the pleaſures within definite meaſures, preſerves families, and preſerves cities according to the aſſertion of Crates: and further ſtill, it alſo in a certain reſpect approximates to the form of the gods. Perſeus therefore, riding to the higheſt good of temperance, with Minerva for his leader, cut off the head of Gorgon, which appears to me to be deſire drawing men down to matter, and turning them into ſtone, through a repletion of ſtupid paſſions. Continence of pleaſure therefore, as Socrates ſays, is the foundation of virtue; and temperance appears to be the ornament of all the virtues, as Plato alſo aſſerts. And, as I ſay, this virtue is the fortification of the moſt beautiful habits. Hence, I ſhall with confidence ſtrenuouſly aſſert, as a thing truly acknowledged, that the beauty of temperance extends through all the virtues, that it coharmonizes them according to one harmony, and that it inſerts in them ſymmetry and mixture with each other. Such then being the nature of temperance, it affords an opportunity to the implanting of the other virtues, and when they are implanted, imparts to them ſtable ſecurity."

[1] Stobæi Eclog. p. 68.

THE CHARMIDES.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, CHÆREPHO, ‖ CRITIAS, and CHARMIDES.

YESTERDAY, when I came in the evening from the army, I gladly returned to my accuſtomed exerciſe, in conſequence of having been for ſome time abſent from it; and entered into the Palæſtra of Taurean Neptune, which is oppoſite to the royal temple. Here I met with very many perſons, ſome of whom were unknown to me, but the greater part of them I knew. And as ſoon as I was ſeen entering thus unexpectedly, ſome from all quarters immediately congratulated me at a diſtance. But Chærepho, as if he had been inſane, leaping from the midſt of them, ran towards me, and taking me by the hand, O Socrates, ſays he, how were you ſaved in the engagement? For a ſhort time before we came away there was a battle at Potidæa, of which thoſe that are here juſt now heard.—And I anſwering them, ſaid, It is as you ſee.—Indeed, ſaid he, a report was ſpread here, that a very ſharp engagement had taken place, and that many of thoſe that we know had periſhed in it.—I replied, You were told the truth.—But, ſaid he, was you in the engagement?—I was.—Sit down here, ſaid he, and relate the affair to us; for we have not yet clearly heard the whole. And at the ſame time leading me along, he ſeated me near Critias the ſon of Callæſchrus. Being therefore ſeated, I ſaluted Critias, and the reſt, and according as any one aſked me, related the affairs of the army. But ſome aſked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of things of this kind, I again aſked them reſpecting philoſophy, how it was circumſtanced

at

at preſent; and whether there were any young men who were remarkable for wiſdom, or beauty, or both. Critias then, looking towards the gate, and perceiving certain young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, ſaid, It appears to me, Socrates, that you will immediately have an anſwer to your queſtion reſpecting beautiful youths. For thoſe that are now entering, are forerunners and lovers of one who ſeems to be the moſt beautiful of all of the preſent time. And it appears to me that he is now nearly entering.—But who is he? I replied; and of whom is he the ſon?—Perhaps you know, ſaid he, (but he was very young when you left this place;) I ſay, perhaps you know Charmides, the ſon of our uncle Glauco, but my couſin.—I know him indeed, by Jupiter, I replied, for he was not then to be deſpiſed, though he was but a boy, but now I think he muſt be almoſt a young man.—You will immediately know, ſaid he, both his age, and the qualities which he has acquired. And at the ſame time that he was thus ſpeaking, Charmides entered.—No conſideration therefore, my friend, is to be paid to me. For I am indeed a white rule [1] with reſpect to thoſe that are beautiful; ſince nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. But he then appeared to me to be wonderful, both on account of the magnitude and the beauty of his body: and all the reſt ſeemed to me to be in love with him; ſo aſtoniſhed and ſo diſturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers alſo followed among thoſe that were behind him. And as to the men indeed, this was leſs wonderful: but I alſo paid attention to the boys, and ſaw that none of theſe beheld any one elſe than him, not even the ſmalleſt among them, but the eyes of all were fixed on him, as on a ſtatue. And Chærepho calling me, ſaid, What do you think of the youth, Socrates? Is he not a beautiful perſon?—I replied, tranſcendently ſo.—But, ſaid he, if he were willing to ſhow himſelf naked, he would appear to you to have a deformed face, his form is ſo very beautiful. And this aſſertion of Chærepho was confirmed by all the reſt.—I then ſaid, By Hercules, you ſpeak of an unconquerable man, if only one ſmall thing further belongs to

[1] The expreſſion *a white rule*, ſays the Greek Scholiaſt on Plato, is applied to thoſe who ſignify things immaniſeſt, by ſuch as are immaniſeſt, and in ſo doing indicate nothing. For a white rule can indicate nothing in white ſtones *(with reſpect to whiteneſs)*, as a rule can which is of a red colour.

him.—What is that? ſaid Critias.—I replied, If his ſoul is naturally in a good condition. It is however proper, Critias, that it ſhould be ſo, as being one of your family.—But, he replied, he is alſo very beautiful and good in this reſpect.—Why then, I ſaid, do we not expoſe *this* naked to the view, and contemplate it prior to his form? For ſince he is thus inwardly beautiful, he will in every reſpect be willing to diſcourſe.—Very much ſo, ſaid Critias; ſince he is a philoſopher, and (as it appears both to others and himſelf) very poetic.—I replied, This beauty, friend Critias, deſcends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon. But why do you not call the youth hither, and preſent him to me? For it would not diſgrace us to diſcourſe with him, even if he were younger than he is, while you are preſent, who are his couſin and tutor.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he; and we will call him. And at the ſame time turning to the perſon that followed him; Call, ſays he, Charmides, and tell him that I wiſh to commit him to the care of a phyſician, on account of the infirmity of which he has lately complained.—Critias therefore ſaid to me, Charmides lately has complained of a heavineſs in his head when he roſe in the morning. What then ſhould hinder you from pretending to him, that you know a remedy for this diſorder of the head?—Nothing, I replied; let him only come.—But he does come, ſaid he. Which was indeed the caſe: for he came, and cauſed much laughter. For each of us that were ſeated together, through eagerneſs to ſit near Charmides, puſhed his neighbour; till of thoſe that were ſeated laſt of all, ſome we forced to riſe up, and others to fall on the ground. But he came and ſat between me and Critias. And I then ſaid, My friend, I am now perplexed, and the confidence which I before had, that I ſhould eaſily diſcourſe with Charmides, fails me. But when Critias had told him, that I was the perſon who knew a remedy for his diſeaſe, he fixed his eyes upon me as ſomething prodigious, and drew near as if he meant to aſk me a queſtion. Then all that were in the Palæſtra immediately gathered round us; and when, O generous man, I ſaw the beauty of his form within his garments, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myſelf. I likewiſe thought that Critias was moſt wiſe in amatory affairs, who ſaid, when ſpeaking of a beautiful boy, but employing the ſimilitude of ſomething elſe, that I ſhould be cautious leſt a fawn coming oppoſite to the lion, a portion of the fleſh ſhould be taken

taken away: for he appeared to me to have been captured by an animal of this kind. But at the ſame time, when Charmides aſked me, if I knew a remedy for the head, I ſcarcely knew what to anſwer. What is it? ſaid he.—I replied that it was a certain leaf, but that a certain incantation muſt be added to the medicine, which if any one employed together with the leaf, the medicine could perfectly reſtore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no uſe without the incantation.—He then ſaid, I will write down this incantation from you.—I replied, Will you do this, whether you are perſuaded by me or not?—Upon this, he ſaid laughing, I will, if I am perſuaded by you, Socrates.—Be it ſo, I replied. And do you alſo accurately know my name?—I do, unleſs I am unjuſt, ſaid he. For there is no ſmall talk about you, among thoſe of my age: and I can remember that you aſſociated with Critias when I was a boy.—You ſay well, I replied. For I ſhall now tell you, with greater freedom of ſpeech, what the incantation is. But, juſt now, I was doubtful, after what manner I ſhould ſhow you its power. For this incantation is ſuch, O Charmides, that it is not able to make the head alone well; juſt perhaps as you have often heard good phyſicians aſſert, when any one comes to them with diſeaſed eyes: for then they ſay, that they muſt not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is neceſſary for them at the ſame time to cure the head [1], if they deſign to render the eyes in a good condition. And again, that it would be very ſtupid to think to cure the head itſelf without the whole body. In conſequence of this reaſoning, they turn their attention to the regimen of the whole body, and endeavour to cure the part in conjunction with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus ſpeak, and that this is the caſe?—Entirely ſo, he replied.—Does it therefore appear to you that they ſpeak well; and do you admit this doctrine?—The moſt of all things, ſaid he.—And I, on hearing him praiſe this method of cure, took courage, and my confidence again was a little excited and revived: and I ſaid, Such, therefore, O Charmides, is the power of this incantation. But I learnt it there, in the army, from one of the Thracian phyſicians of Zamolxis [2], who are ſaid to render men immortal. This Thracian

[1] Viz. Not only the head, but the whole body muſt be cured, when the eyes are diſeaſed from an *internal* cauſe.

[2] A ſlave and diſciple of Pythagoras.

too

too ſaid, "The Grecian phyſicians beautifully aſſert the ſame things as I now aſſert. But Zamolxis, ſaid he, our king, being a god, ſays, that as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, ſo neither is it proper to cure the body without the ſoul: and that the reaſon why many diſeaſes are unknown to the Grecian phyſicians is, becauſe they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid. For when this is not well diſpoſed, it is impoſſible that a part ſhould be well affected. For all things, ſaid he, originate from the ſoul, both ſuch as are good and ſuch as are evil, and emanate from thence into the body, and the whole man, juſt as things flow from the head to the eyes. It is requiſite therefore that the maladies of this ſhould in the firſt place and eſpecially be healed, in order that the head and the whole body my be well affected." But he ſaid, O bleſſed youth, "that the ſoul was cured of its maladies by certain incantations; and that theſe incantations were beautiful reaſons, from which temperance was generated in ſouls." He further added, "that when this was inſerted and preſent, it was eaſy to impart health, both to the head and the reſt of the body." Having therefore taught me the medicine, and the incantations, "Let none, ſaid he, perſuade you to cure the head of any one with this medicine, who has not firſt preſented his ſoul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, ſaid he, of the preſent time, reſpecting men, is this, that certain perſons endeavour to become phyſicians without a knowledge of temperance and health." And he very earneſtly ordered me to take care, that neither any rich, or noble, or beautiful perſon, ever perſuaded me to do otherwiſe. I therefore declared to him, with an oath, that I would not; and hence it is neceſſary I ſhould obey him, which I am determined to do. And indeed, if you are willing, according to the mandate of the ſtranger, to preſent your ſoul firſt of all to be enchanted by the incantations of the Thracian, I will adminiſter the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot in any reſpect benefit you, O friend Charmides.—Critias therefore hearing me thus ſpeak, ſaid, This heavineſs of the head, O Socrates, will be gain to the youth, if he ſhould be compelled to become better in his dianoëtic part through his head. I can indeed aſſure you, that Charmides not only ſurpaſſes all his equals in the form of his body

body, but in this very thing for which you ſay you have an incantation. But you ſay this is temperance. Or do you not?—Entirely ſo, I replied.—Know then, ſaid he, that Charmides appears to be by far the moſt temperate of thoſe that exiſt at preſent; and that, as far as his age permits, he is not inferior to any one in every thing elſe.—And I replied, It is but juſt, O Charmides, that you ſhould excel all others in all ſuch things as theſe. For I do not think that any one now preſent can eaſily ſhow two families among the Athenians, from a conjunction between which by marriage, a beautiful and excellent offspring is ſo likely to be produced, as from thoſe that were your progenitors. For the paternal family of Critias, here, the ſon of Diopis, is celebrated by Anacreon, and Solon, and many other poets, as excelling in beauty, virtue, and the reſt of what is called felicity. And again, there is the ſame renown on his mother's ſide: for no one of thoſe that dwell on the continent is ſaid to ſurpaſs in beauty and grandeur your uncle Pyrilampes, as often as he goes in the character of ambaſſador to the great king, or to ſome other inhabitant of the continent. But the whole of his family is in nothing inferior to any other. It is likely, therefore, that, being the offspring of ſuch characters, you ſhould be the firſt in all things. Hence, O beloved ſon of Glauco, with reſpect to your viſible form, you appear to me to diſgrace no one of your progenitors: and, if you are naturally endued with all that is ſufficient to the poſſeſſion of temperance, and the other virtues, according to the aſſertion of Critias here, your mother, O dear Charmides, brought you forth bleſſed. The caſe, then, is this: If temperance is preſent with you, as Critias ſays it is, and if you are ſufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris[1], but the medicine for the head ſhould be immediately adminiſtered you. But if you are in any reſpect indigent of this, the incantation muſt precede the medicine. Inform me therefore, whether you aſſent to Critias, and affirm that you ſufficiently participate of temperance, or whether you are deficient in this reſpect.—Charmides therefore bluſhing, in the firſt place appeared to be ſtill more beautiful (for baſhfulneſs becomes his age); and in the next place he

[1] A Scythian in the time of the Trojan war, who is fabled to have received a flying arrow from Apollo, with which he gave oracles, and tranſported himſelf wherever he pleaſed.

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anſwered me not ignobly. For he ſaid, It is not eaſy either to admit or reject the ſubjects of the preſent inveſtigation: for, ſaid he, if I ſhould affirm that I am not temperate, it would be abſurd that I ſhould aſſert ſuch a thing of myſelf, and at the ſame time I ſhould evince that Critias has ſpoken falſely, and many others to whom I appear to be temperate. But again, if I ſhould affirm that I am temperate, by thus praiſing myſelf, I ſhall perhaps give offence: ſo that I do not know how to anſwer you.—To this I replied, You appear to me, O Charmides, to ſpeak well: and I think we ſhould conſider in common whether you poſſeſs that which I inquire after, or not; that you may neither be compelled to ſpeak contrary to your will, nor I may again inconſiderately turn myſelf to the medicinal art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I wiſh to conſider this affair together with you; but if it is not, to diſmiſs it.—But it is, ſaid he, the moſt agreeable to me of all things. Purſue therefore the inquiry, in whatever manner appears to you to be beſt.—This, I replied, ſeems to me to be the beſt mode of conſidering the ſubject: for it is evident, if temperance is preſent with you, that you have ſome opinion about it; for it is neceſſary, if it is really inherent in you, that it muſt produce ſome ſenſation of itſelf, from which you will poſſeſs an opinion reſpecting it, what it is, and what are the qualities with which it is endued. Or do you not think ſo?—He replied, I do think ſo.—And do you not alſo, I ſaid, think this, ſince you know how to ſpeak the Greek tongue, that you can likewiſe inform me what temperance appears to you to be?—Perhaps ſo, ſaid he.—That we may therefore conjecture whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, I ſaid, what temperance is, according to your opinion? And at firſt, indeed, he was tardy, and was not altogether willing to anſwer; but afterwards he ſaid, that temperance appeared to conſiſt in doing all things in an orderly manner, in walking and diſcourſing quietly in the public ways, and acting ſimilarly in every thing elſe. And, in ſhort, ſaid he, that which is the object of your inquiry appears to me to be a certain quietneſs[1].—I replied, You ſpeak well; for they ſay, O Charmides, that quiet are temperate perſons. But let us ſee if they ſay any thing to the purpoſe: for, tell me, is not temperance ſomething beautiful?—He replied, Entirely ſo.—Whether, therefore, in

[1] Ἡσυχία, *quietneſs*, ſignifies, in this place, a leiſurely mode of acting in every thing.

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the grammatic art, is it moſt beautiful to write ſimilar letters ſwiftly or ſlowly?—Swiftly.—But what with reſpect to reading? Is it moſt beautiful to read ſwiftly or ſlowly?—Swiftly.—And is it alſo by far more beautiful to play on the harp rapidly, and to wreſtle with celerity, than quietly and ſlowly? —Yes.—And does not the like take place in pugiliſtic and pancratiatic conteſts? —Entirely ſo.—And with reſpect to running and leaping, and all other works of the body, are they not beautiful when performed with vigour and rapidity; but when performed ſlowly, with difficulty, and quietly, are they not baſe?—It appears ſo.—It appears to us, therefore, I replied, that with reſpect to the body, not the quiet, but the moſt rapid, and the moſt vigorous, are the moſt beautiful. Is it not ſo?—Entirely ſo.—But did we not ſay that temperance is ſomething beautiful?—Yes.—Not quietneſs, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with reſpect to the body; ſince temperance is beautiful.—It ſeems ſo, ſaid he.—What then, I replied, is docility more beautiful than dulneſs?—It is.—But docility, I ſaid, is to learn ſwiftly; and dulneſs to learn quietly and ſlowly.—It is.—And is it not more beautiful to teach another ſwiftly and vehemently, than quietly and ſlowly. —Yes.—And which is the more beautiful to recollect and commit things to memory quietly and ſlowly, or vehemently and rapidly?—He replied, Vehemently and rapidly.—And with reſpect to ſagacity, is it not a certain acute energy, and not a quietneſs of the ſoul?—True.—Does it not therefore follow, that it is moſt beautiful in the grammatic art, in the art of playing on the harp, and in every thing elſe, to underſtand what is ſaid, in the moſt rapid, and not in the moſt quiet manner?—Yes.—And again, in the inveſtigations and conſultations of the ſoul, it does not appear to me that he who conſults and diſcovers in the moſt quiet manner, and with difficulty, is worthy of praiſe, but he who does this eaſily and rapidly.—To this alſo he aſſented.—Hence, I replied, in all things, both pertaining to the ſoul and the body, ſuch as are performed with celerity and vigour appear to be more beautiful than ſuch as are performed ſlowly and quietly.—It appears ſo, ſaid he.—Temperance, therefore, will not be quietneſs, nor will a temperate be a quiet life, from this reaſoning: ſince that which is temperate ought to be beautiful: for one of two things muſt take place, viz. quiet actions in life muſt either never, or very rarely, appear to be more beautiful than ſuch as are ſwift and ſtrenuous. If then, my friend, it were even found that not fewer quiet actions are beautiful than ſuch as are vehement and rapid,

neither would it follow from hence that temperance conſiſted rather in acting quietly, than in vehement and rapid energy, either in walking or in reading, or any thing elſe; nor would a quiet and orderly life be more temperate than one which is not orderly, ſince it has been admitted in our diſcourſe, that temperance is ſomething beautiful. But things ſwift have appeared to be no leſs beautiful than ſuch as are quiet.—What you have ſaid, Socrates, he replied, appears to me to be right.—Again, therefore, ſaid I, O Charmides, be ſtill more attentive, and looking to yourſelf, conſider what kind of a perſon temperance, when preſent, cauſes you to be, and what ſort of a thing it is itſelf while it accompliſhes this: reaſoning, therefore, on all theſe particulars, inform me well, and in a virile manner, what appears to you to be the truth.—But then Charmides, collecting and looking into himſelf, in a very manly manner ſaid, Temperance ſeems to me to make a man bluſh and be aſhamed; and I, therefore, conclude that temperance is ſhame.—Be it ſo, I replied: but did we not juſt now acknowledge that temperance is ſomething beautiful?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Are not therefore temperate, good men?—Yes.—Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good?—It will not.—Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful but good.—It appears ſo to me.—What then, I replied, will you not believe that Homer [1] ſpeaks well, when he ſays,

"Shame ill accompanies a man in need?"

I do, he replied.—Shame, therefore, as it ſeems, is both not good, and good.—It appears ſo.—But temperance is good; ſince it makes thoſe good, to whom it is preſent, but by no means evil.—The caſe appears to me to be as you ſay.—Temperance, therefore, will not be ſhame; ſince temperance is good, but ſhame is not in any reſpect more good than evil.—It appears to me, Socrates, ſaid he, that this is rightly aſſerted. But attend to what I ſhall adduce reſpecting temperance. For juſt now I recollected what I had heard a certain perſon aſſert, viz. that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Conſider, therefore, whether what I ſay appears to you to be well ſaid.—I replied, O vile youth! you have heard this from Critias, or from ſome other of the wiſe.—It ſeems, ſaid Critias, he muſt have heard it from ſome other perſon, for he did not hear it from me.—But of what

[1] Odyſſ. lib. 17.

conſequence

conſequence is it, Socrates, Charmides replied, from whom I heard it?—None at all, ſaid I. For we are not to conſider who ſaid it, but whether he has ſpoken the truth or not.—Now you ſpeak as you ought, he replied.—By Jupiter, I do, ſaid I. But if we diſcover how this thing ſubſiſts, I ſhall wonder: for it is ſimilar to a certain enigma.—On what account, ſaid he.—Becauſe, I replied, his meaning is not ſuch as the words ſeem to imply, when he ſays that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Or do you think that a grammarian does nothing when he writes or reads?—I think he does ſomething, ſaid he.—Does a grammarian, therefore, appear to you to write and read his own name only, or to inſtruct you boys? And do you in conſequence of his inſtructions no leſs write the names of your enemies than the names of your friends?—No leſs, ſaid he.—When, therefore, you do this, are you too buſily employed, and intemperate?—By no means.—And beſides this, you do not perform things pertaining to yourſelf, if to write, and alſo to read, is to do ſomething. But it certainly is. And beſides, my friend, to be healed, to build, to weave, and to accompliſh the work of any art, is certainly to do ſomething. Is it not?—Entirely ſo.—What then, I replied, does that city appear to you to be well inſtituted in which there is a law commanding every one to weave and waſh his own garment, to make his own ſhoes, oil-cruiſe, curry-comb, and every other neceſſary article, but not to touch things belonging to others, but to attend to his own affairs?—He replied, It does not appear to me that ſuch a city is well inſtituted.—But, ſaid I, if a city is temperately, it is well inſtituted.—Undoubtedly, he replied.—For a man, therefore, to do ſuch things as theſe, and to manage his own affairs, will not be temperance.—It does not appear that it will.—He, therefore, who ſaid, that for a man to do things pertaining to himſelf is temperance, ſpoke, as I juſt now obſerved, obſcurely: for he was not ſo ſtupid, as to mean that his words ſhould be taken in the literal ſenſe. Or did you hear ſome ſtupid perſon aſſert this, O Charmides?—By no means, ſaid he; ſince to me he appeared to be very wiſe.—More than any thing, therefore, as it ſeems to me, he propoſed this enigma, becauſe it is difficult to know what it is for a man to tranſact his own affairs.—Perhaps ſo, ſaid he.—Can you therefore tell me what it is to tranſact one's own affairs?—He replied, by Jupiter, I do not know. But perhaps nothing hinders, but that he who ſaid this did not know the meaning

of the aſſertion. And at the ſame time that he thus ſpoke, he laughed, and looked at Critias. But it was evident that Critias, who had formerly contended with, and was ſtimulated by ambition againſt Charmides, and thoſe that were preſent, and who could then ſcarcely contain himſelf, was now no longer able to do ſo. And it appeared to me that my former ſuſpicion was more than any thing true, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance from Critias. Charmides, therefore, not being willing to ſupport the definition himſelf, but being deſirous that this province ſhould fall to the lot of Critias, ſhewed as if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure, but appeared to me to be as much enraged with Charmides, as a poet with a player who acts his poems badly. So that, looking at him, he ſaid, Do you therefore think, O Charmides, that if you do not underſtand his meaning who ſaid, that temperance is for a man to tranſact his own affairs, neither does he know what he aſſerted?—But, I replied, O Critias, beſt of men, it is nothing wonderful that Charmides, who is but a youth, ſhould not underſtand this aſſertion; but it is fit that you ſhould underſtand it, both on account of your age and employment. If therefore you affirm that this is a true definition of temperance, I ſhall very gladly conſider with you, whether it is ſo or not.—But I entirely aſſent to it, ſaid he.—You do well then, I replied. But inform me whether you admit what I juſt now aſked: I mean, if all artiſts do ſomething?—I do.—Do they therefore appear to you to do things belonging to themſelves only, or things alſo belonging to others?—Things alſo belonging to others.—Do they act temperately, therefore, who only do things belonging to themſelves?—What ſhould hinder? ſaid he.—Nothing, ſo far as reſpects myſelf, I replied; but ſee whether there may not be a hindrance with reſpect to him who, defining temperance to be the tranſacting one's own affairs, afterwards ſays that nothing hinders but that thoſe who tranſact the affairs of others may alſo be temperate.—I indeed, he replied, have confeſſed that thoſe that *tranſact* the affairs of others may be temperate. But have I alſo acknowledged that this is the caſe with reſpect to thoſe that *make* things pertaining to others?—But inform me, ſaid I, do you not affirm that to *make* a thing is the ſame as to do it?—I do not indeed, ſaid he. Nor do I ſay that to *operate* is the ſame as to *make*. For I have learned to make this diſtinction from Heſiod [1],

[1] In his Works and Days.

who

who ſays, "No *work* is a diſgrace." Do you therefore think that if he had called by the names of *to operate* and *to do*, ſuch works as you now ſpeak of, he would have ſaid that no work is a diſgrace, whether it is that of the ſhoemaker, or of a ſalter of fiſh, or of one who ſits in a ſhop?—It is not proper to think he would, Socrates: but I think that he conſidered making as ſomething different from action and operation; and that a thing made ſometimes becomes a diſgrace, when it is not produced in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no work is ever a diſgrace. For things which are made beautifully and with utility he calls works, and denominates operations and actions certain makings of this kind. It is likewiſe proper to aſſert that he conſidered ſuch things as theſe, as alone domeſtic and allied, but every thing noxious as foreign. Hence, it is requiſite to think that Heſiod, and every other prudent perſon, calls him who tranſacts his own affairs temperate.—O Critias, I replied, as ſoon as you began to ſpeak, I almoſt immediately perceived, that you called things allied to a man, and which are his own good, and that you denominated the making of things good, actions. For I have ten thouſand times heard Prodicus dividing names: and I will allow you to uſe every name as you pleaſe, if you only evince what you mean to ſignify by any particular name. Now therefore again, from the beginning, define more clearly, whether you ſay that temperance is the doing, or the making, (or in whatever manner you may wiſh to denominate it,) of good things.—I do, ſaid he.—He therefore is not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.—He replied, Does it not, O beſt of men, appear ſo to you?—Diſmiſs this queſtion, I ſaid: for we do not conſider what appears to me to be the caſe, but what you now ſay.—But indeed, ſaid he, I do not aſſert that he is temperate, who does not do good but evil. For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the practice of things good. And perhaps nothing hinders but that you ſpeak the truth. But nevertheleſs I ſhould wonder if you thought that men who conduct themſelves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate.—But I do not think ſo, ſaid he.—To this I replied, Did you not ſay a little before, that nothing hindered but that artiſts who made things pertaining to others might be temperate?—It was aſſerted by me, ſaid he. But what then?—Nothing. But inform me whether he appears to you to be a phyſician, who, in making any one well, does that which is advantageous both to himſelf, and to him whom he cures?—To me he does.—Does not he, therefore, who acts in this manner,

manner, act well?—Yes.—And is not he temperate who acts well?—He is temperate.—Is it not therefore neceſſary that a phyſician ſhould know when he cures with advantage, and when not? And likewiſe that every artiſt ſhould know when he will be benefited by the work which he does, and when not?—Perhaps not, ſaid he.—Sometimes, therefore, I replied, when a phyſician acts profitably, or noxiouſly, he will not know that he acts in this manner; though, according to your doctrine, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately. Or do you not ſay ſo?—I do.—Does it not therefore ſeem, I replied, that ſometimes, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately, and is temperate, but is himſelf ignorant that he is temperate? But this, ſaid he, Socrates, can never take place. If you think that this neceſſarily follows from what I have admitted above, I will readily grant it you. For I ſhall not be aſhamed to confeſs, that ſomething has been improperly aſſerted, rather than admit that the man who is ignorant of himſelf is temperate. For I nearly ſay, that to know ourſelves, is temperance; and I agree with him who inſcribed this precept in the temple of Apollo at Delphi. For this precept appears to me to have been inſcribed as a ſalutation of Divinity, to be uſed by thoſe that enter the temple, inſtead of *hail!* So that this inſcription does not directly ſignify joy, or imply that we ſhould exhort each other to rejoice, but rather, to be temperate. For thus the God ſpeaks to thoſe that enter the temple; and addreſſes us otherwiſe than men are wont to do, as he alſo conceived, in my opinion, who placed this inſcription. It likewiſe ſays nothing elſe to thoſe that enter, than that they ſhould live temperately. But as ſpeaking prophetically, it ſays this in a more enigmatic manner. For "Know thyſelf," is the ſame as "Be temperate," as both the writings and I aſſert. But perhaps ſome one may think it has a different meaning, which appears to me to have been the caſe with thoſe who placed thoſe poſterior inſcriptions, "Nothing too much[1]", and "A ſurety is near to ſorrow[2]." For they thought that "Know thyſelf," was advice, and not an addreſs of the Divinity to thoſe that enter the temple. Afterwards, that they might ſuſpend advice in no reſpect inferior to this, they placed theſe inſcriptions. Hence, Socrates, that for the ſake of which I aſſert all theſe things is this, that I may grant you all that has been ſaid above. For perhaps you may have ſaid ſomething more right reſpecting them, and perhaps this may be the

[1] The ſaying of Solon. [2] The ſaying of Pittacus.

caſe

caſe with myſelf; but we have not advanced any thing clear. However, I now wiſh to give you the reaſon of this, if you do not grant that temperance is to know one's ſelf. But, I replied, O Critias, you act by me as if I acknowledged that I knew that which is the ſubject of your inquiry. But this is not the caſe. For I always inquire in conjunction with you, reſpecting that which is propoſed to be conſidered, in conſequence of being myſelf ignorant. I am conſidering, therefore, whether I ſhall aſſent or not. But ſtop till I have conſidered.—Conſider then, he replied.—I anſwered, I do. For if to know a certain thing is temperance, it is evident that temperance will be a certain ſcience, and a ſcience of ſomething. Or will it not?—It is, he replied, and of itſelf.—Is not therefore, I ſaid, medicine the ſcience of that which is healthy?—Entirely ſo.—If then, I ſaid, you ſhould aſk, ſince medicine is the ſcience of that which is healthy, of what advantage it is to us, and what it accompliſhes, I ſhould reply that it is of no ſmall advantage, becauſe it procures us health, the effecting of which is beautiful, if you admit this.—I do admit it.—If therefore you ſhould again aſk me, what architecture effects, which is the ſcience of building, I ſhould ſay, houſes; and I ſhould reply in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other arts: it is requiſite therefore, Critias, ſince you ſay that temperance is the ſcience of itſelf, that you ſhould be able to anſwer him who aſks you, what beautiful work temperance effects, and which deſerves to be named. Tell me therefore what it is?—But Socrates, ſaid he, you do not interrogate rightly. For temperance is not naturally ſimilar to other ſciences, nor are other ſciences ſimilar to other. But you make your inquiry as if they were ſimilar. For tell me, ſaid he, what work is there in the logiſtic [1], or geometric art, which is of the like nature with a houſe, the work of the architectural art, or with that of a garment, which is the work of the weaving art; and ſo in many other ſuch particulars belonging to the ſeveral arts. Can you in theſe exhibit to me any ſuch work? But you cannot.—I replied, You ſpeak the truth. But this I can ſhow you, of what each of theſe ſciences is the ſcience, and which is ſomething different from that ſcience. Thus, for in-

[1] Logiſtic is the contemplation of things numbered, but is not converſant with pure numbers. Hence it conſiders any one ſenſible *particular* as the monad, and that which is *numbered* as *number*; as for inſtance three things as the triad, and ten things as the decad. It is nothing elſe than vulgar practical arithmetic.

ſtance, the logiſtic ſcience is the ſcience of even and odd multitude, how they ſubſiſt with reſpect to themſelves and to each other. Is it not?—Entirely ſo, he replied.—Are not, therefore, the even and the odd different from the logiſtic ſcience?—Undoubtedly.—Staticks alſo is the ſcience of the weight of a heavier and lighter body. And the heavy and the light are different from ſtaticks itſelf. Do you admit this?—I do.—Tell me then, what that is of which temperance is the ſcience, and which is different from temperance itſelf?—This very thing, Socrates, ſaid he, which you are now ſeeking, is that by which temperance differs from all other ſciences: but you inquire after a certain ſimilitude of it to other ſciences. This however is not the caſe: for all other ſciences are ſciences of ſomething different from themſelves; but this alone is both the ſcience of other ſciences and of itſelf. And of theſe things you ought by no means to be ignorant. But I think that you do the very thing which you juſt now denied that you did; for you attempt to confute me, and diſmiſs that which is the ſubject of our diſcourſe.—What are you doing, I replied? Do you think that if I ſhould endeavour to confute you, I ſhould do it on any other account, than that I might diſcover the meaning of what I aſſert, as I am fearful, leſt whilſt I think myſelf knowing, when at the ſame time I am not, I ſhould be unconſcious of my ignorance? And now I ſay that I do this, viz. conſider the diſcourſe, principally indeed for my own ſake, but, perhaps alſo for the ſake of my other friends. Or do you not think it is a common good, for the condition of every thing to become apparent clearly to all men?—Very much ſo, he replied, Socrates.—Boldly therefore, ſaid I, O bleſſed man, give your opinion in anſwer to the queſtion, diſmiſſing the conſideration whether it is Critias or Socrates who is confuted; but attend to the diſcourſe itſelf, conſidering what will be the conſequence when either of us is confuted.—I ſhall do ſo, he replied; for you appear to me to ſpeak well.—Inform me therefore, ſaid I, what you ſay reſpecting temperance.—I ſay then, he replied, that this alone, of all other ſciences, is both the ſcience of itſelf and of other ſciences. Will it therefore, ſaid I, be the ſcience of ignorance[1], ſince it is of ſcience?—Entirely ſo.—The temperate man therefore alone

[1] Socrates aſks this, becauſe there is one and the ſame ſcience of contraries. Thus the medicinal ſcience, which knows health, knows alſo diſeaſe.

will

will know himſelf, and will be able to explore what it is he knows, and what it is he does not know. In a ſimilar manner likewiſe he will be able to conſider reſpecting others, what it is which any one knows, and thinks he knows; and what it is which he himſelf thinks he knows, but does not know. But no other perſon will be able to accompliſh this. Likewiſe this is to be temperate, and is temperance, and the knowledge of ourſelves, to know what we know, and what we do not know. Are theſe the things which you aſſert?—They are, he replied.—Again therefore, ſaid I, the third[1] to the Saviour, let us conſider as it were from the beginning. In the firſt place, whether this is poſſible or not, that with reſpect to what a man knows, and does not know, he may know that he knows and does not know. And, in the next place, if this is poſſible, what will be the utility of it to us who know it.—It is requiſite, ſaid he, to conſider this.—Come then, ſaid I, Critias, conſider whether you have any clear conceptions reſpecting theſe things. For I am dubious, and I will tell you in what.—By all means, ſaid he.—The following conſequence then, I replied, will enſue (if that is true which you juſt now aſſerted), that there is one ſcience which is not the ſcience of any thing elſe than of itſelf and other ſciences, and of ignorance. Will not this be the caſe?—Entirely ſo.—See then, my friend, how abſurdly we have endeavoured to ſpeak. For if you conſider this ſame thing in other things, it will, I think, appear to you to be impoſſible.—How and where?—In the following particulars. For conſider, whether it appears to you that there is a certain ſight, which is not the viſion of thoſe things which are the objects of other viſions, but is the viſion of itſelf and other viſions, and is likewiſe the viſion of that which is not viſion: and again, in a ſimilar manner, which does not ſee any colour, though it is ſight, but ſees itſelf and other viſions. Does it appear to you that there is ſuch a ſight as this?—By Jupiter, it does not.—What then? Can there be an auditory ſenſe, which does not hear any ſound, but hears itſelf, and other hearings, together with a privation of hearing?—Nor yet this.—In ſhort, therefore, conſider with reſpect to all the ſenſes, whether it appears to you that there is any ſenſe, which perceives other ſenſes and itſelf, but perceives none of thoſe things which are the objects of the other ſenſes.—This does not appear to me to

[1] See this explained in the Notes on the Philebus.

be the caſe.—But does it appear to you that there is any deſire, which is the deſire of no pleaſure, but is the deſire of itſelf and of other deſires?—It does not.—Nor, as I think, is there any will which wills no good, but alone wills itſelf and other wills.—There is not.—But will you ſay that there is a love of ſuch a kind, as to be the love of nothing beautiful, but which is the love of itſelf and other loves?—Not I, ſaid he.—Do you conceive then, that there is any fear which fears itſelf and other fears, but fears nothing dreadful?—I do not, ſaid he.—But is there any opinion which opines opinions and itſelf, but which forms no opinion reſpecting thoſe things which are the ſubjects of other opinions?—By no means.—But we ſay, as it ſeems, that there is a ſcience of ſuch a kind, as to be the ſcience of no diſcipline, but which is the ſcience of itſelf and of other ſciences.—We do ſay ſo.—Muſt it not therefore be wonderful if there is ſuch a ſcience? For we do not as yet ſtrenuouſly contend that there is not, but conſider if there is.—Right.—Come then, is this ſcience the ſcience of ſomething? And does it poſſeſs a certain power, by which it is enabled to be the ſcience of ſomething?—Entirely ſo.—And muſt we not alſo ſay that the greater poſſeſſes a certain power, by which it is greater than ſomething?—We muſt.—Muſt it not therefore be greater than ſomething leſſer, if it is greater?—It is neceſſary.—If therefore we ſhould find ſomething greater, which is greater than things greater, and than itſelf, but which is not greater than any of thoſe things than which other things are greater, would it not follow that a thing of this kind, ſince it is greater than itſelf, is alſo leſs than itſelf?—This is perfectly neceſſary, Socrates, ſaid he.—If therefore there is any thing which is double of other doubles, and of itſelf, it will be double of other doubles, and of itſelf, in conſequence of being half. For nothing can be double of any thing elſe than of half.—True.—But being more than itſelf, will it not alſo be leſs than itſelf? And will not a thing which is heavier than, be alſo lighter than, itſelf? And that which is older than, be alſo younger than, itſelf? And in every thing elſe, in a ſimiliar manner, will it not follow, that whatever has a power of its own with reſpect to itſelf, will alſo poſſeſs that eſſence to which this power is related? But my meaning is this: Do we not ſay, that hearing is nothing elſe than a hearing of ſound?—We do?—If therefore it could hear itſelf,

itſelf, would it not hear in conſequence of itſelf poſſeſſing a voice? For otherwiſe it would not hear.—It is perfectly neceſſary this ſhould be the caſe.—Sight likewiſe, O beſt of men, if it could itſelf ſee itſelf, muſt neceſſarily poſſeſs a certain colour. For without colour, ſight would never be able to perceive any thing.—It would not.—You ſee therefore, O Critias, that the particulars which we have diſcuſſed, appear to us to be partly altogether impoſſible, and partly dubious in the extreme, whether they poſſeſs a power of their own with reſpect to themſelves. For it is perfectly impoſſible that this can be the caſe with magnitude, multitude, and other things of this kind. Or is it not?—Entirely ſo.—Again, that hearing hears itſelf, and ſight ſees itſelf, and that motion moves itſelf, and heat burns itſelf, and all other ſuch like aſſertions, may be not credited by ſome, but may perhaps be believed by others. But there is occaſion, my friend, for ſome great man, who may be able to ſhow ſufficiently, by a diviſion through all things, whether nothing except ſcience naturally poſſeſſes a power of its own with reſpect to itſelf, and not a power only over ſomething elſe; or whether this is the caſe with ſome things, and not with others: and again, if there are certain things which poſſeſs a power with reſpect to themſelves, whether the ſcience which we ſay is temperance, ranks in the number of theſe. For I do not believe myſelf ſufficient for the diſcuſſion of theſe particulars: on which account I am not able ſtrenuouſly to affirm, whether it is poſſible there can be a ſcience of ſcience. Nor if there is, could I admit that temperance is this ſcience, till I had conſidered whether, being ſuch, it would be of any advantage to us, or not. For I propheſy that temperance is ſomething advantageous and good. Do you therefore, O ſon of Callæſchrus, (ſince you aſſert that temperance is this ſcience of ſcience, and likewiſe of ignorance,) in the firſt place evince this, that it is poſſible for you to prove that which I have juſt now mentioned; and in the next place, in addition to its being poſſible, ſhow that it is profitable: and thus perhaps you will ſatisfy me that what you have ſaid reſpecting temperance is right.—But, Critias, when he had heard theſe things, and ſaw that I was dubious, in the ſame manner as thoſe that look directly at others who are gaping, gape themſelves, ſo he appeared to me to be involved in doubt, in conſequence of my doubting. However, being very much

celebrated, he was aſhamed of thoſe that were preſent; and was neither willing to grant me that he was incapable of deciding the queſtion which I propoſed to him, nor yet did he aſſert any thing perſpicuous, but concealed his perplexity. But I, that the diſcourſe might proceed, ſaid, If it is agreeable to you, Critias, we will now grant this, that it is poſſible there may be a ſcience of ſcience. But again, let us conſider whether it is ſo or not. If therefore this is in the higheſt degree poſſible, why is it more poſſible to know what any one knows, and what he does not know? For we ſay that this is for a man to know himſelf, and to be temperate. Or do we not?—Entirely ſo, he replied, and this happens in a certain reſpect to be the caſe, Socrates. For if any one poſſeſſes that ſcience which knows itſelf, he will be ſuch as that is which he poſſeſſes. Juſt as when any one poſſeſſes ſwiftneſs, he is ſwift; when he poſſeſſes beauty, is beautiful; and when knowledge, is knowing. But when any one poſſeſſes a knowledge of himſelf, he will then become himſelf knowing himſelf.—To this I replied, I was not dubious, that when any one poſſeſſes the knowledge of himſelf, he then knows himſelf; but I was doubtful, what neceſſity compels the man who poſſeſſes this knowledge to know what he knows, and what he does not know.—Becauſe, Socrates, this is the ſame with that.—Perhaps ſo, I replied; but I ſeem to be always ſimilarly affected. For again, I do not underſtand how it is the ſame thing for a man to know what he knows, and to know what he does not know.—How do you mean? ſaid he.—Thus, I replied. Since there is a ſcience of ſcience, will this ſcience be able to divide any further than this, that of theſe things this is ſcience, and that is ignorance?—It will not; but thus far alone.—Is the ſcience therefore, and ignorance of that which is healthful, the ſame with the ſcience and ignorance of the juſt?—By no means.—But I think that the one is a medicinal, and the other a political ſcience; and that the ſcience of ſcience is nothing elſe than ſcience.—Undoubtedly.—He therefore who has not a ſcientific knowledge of the healthy and the juſt, but alone knows ſcience, as alone poſſeſſing ſcience of this, ſuch a one will know that he knows, and that he poſſeſſes a certain ſcience, both with reſpect to himſelf and other things. Or will he not?—Yes.—But how will he know that he knows through this ſcience? For he knows the healthful through the medicinal ſcience, and not through temperance; the harmonic

harmonic through the muſical ſcience, and not through temperance; and that which pertains to building through the architectural ſcience, and not through temperance; and ſo in every thing elſe. Is it not ſo?—So it appears.—But how can temperance, if it is the ſcience of ſciences, know that it knows the ſalubrious, or that which pertains to building?—It cannot by any means.—Being therefore ignorant of this, it will not know that which it knows, but will alone know that it knows.—So it ſeems.—To know therefore that which we know, and that of which we are ignorant, will not be to be temperate, nor yet will be temperance, but as it ſeems this will conſiſt alone in knowing that we know, and that we do not know.—It appears ſo.—Hence, he who poſſeſſes this ſcience of ſciences, will not be able to examine another, who profeſſes to have a ſcientific knowledge, whether he knows ſcientifically or not that which he ſays he knows; but as it ſeems he will alone know this, that he poſſeſſes a certain ſcience, but temperance will not enable him to know the object of this ſcience.—It does not appear that it will.—Neither therefore will he be able to diſtinguiſh one who pretends to be a phyſician, but is not, from one who is a true phyſician, nor any other who is from one who is not endued with ſcientific knowledge. But let us thus conſider; if a temperate man, or any other perſon, intends to diſcover a true and a falſe phyſician, will he not act as follows? He will not diſcourſe with him reſpecting the medicinal ſcience: for, as we have ſaid, a phyſician attends to nothing elſe than the healthy and the diſeaſed, the ſalubrious and the noxious. Is it not ſo?—It is.—But he knows nothing reſpecting ſcience; for this we have attributed to temperance alone.—We have.—The phyſician therefore will not know any thing about medicine, ſince medicine is a ſcience.—True.—And the temperate man will know that he poſſeſſes a certain ſcience; but it is neceſſary that of this ſcience the phyſician ſhould make trial; and to know what this ſcience is muſt be the province of ſome other perſon. Or is not every ſcience defined by this, not only that it is a ſcience, but by aſcertaining what ſcience it is, and what are its objects?—Yes.—The medicinal ſcience, therefore, is defined to be different from other ſciences in this, that it is the ſcience of the ſalubrious and the noxious.—It is.—Is it not therefore neceſſary, that he who wiſhes to conſider the medicinal ſcience, ſhould conſider the ſubjects with which it is converſant?

verſant? For it is not proper to contemplate it in things external, with which it is not converſant.—Certainly not.—He therefore who contemplates rightly, will contemplate a phyſician, ſo far as he is a phyſician, in things ſalubrious and noxious.—So it ſeems.—In words and actions therefore, will not ſuch a one conſider whether what is aſſerted is true, and whether what is done is done rightly?—It is neceſſary.—But can any one accompliſh this without the medicinal ſcience?—Certainly not.—Nor yet can any other, as it ſeems, except the phyſician; nor can this be accompliſhed by the temperate man. For, beſides being temperate, he would be a phyſician.—True.—More than any thing therefore will it follow, if temperance is alone the ſcience of ſcience, and the ſcience of ignorance, that neither can he who knows the medical art, nor he who does not, be able to diſtinguiſh the real or pretended phyſician, or one who thinks he is a phyſician, nor can any other perſon who is knowing in any thing whatever, be able to accompliſh this, except him who profeſſes the ſame art, as is the caſe with other artiſts.—It appears ſo, ſaid he.—What further utility then, Critias, ſhall we derive from temperance, if it is ſuch as we have aſſerted it to be? For if, as we ſuppoſed in the beginning, the temperate man knows that which he knows, and that of which he is ignorant, knowing with reſpect to the former *that* he knows, and with reſpect to the latter that he does not know, and is able to contemplate another perſon who is affected in the very ſame manner,—if this be the caſe, we muſt ſay that we derive a great advantage from being temperate. For both we who poſſeſs temperance, and all ſuch as are governed by us, ſhall paſs through life without guilt; ſince we ſhall neither ourſelves endeavour to do any thing which we do not know, but finding out ſkilful perſons, commit it to their care, nor ſhall we allow thoſe that are in ſubjection to us to do any thing elſe than what they will do well, but this will be that of which they poſſeſs a ſcientific knowledge. And thus through temperance we ſhall govern our families in a proper manner, well adminiſter the affairs of cities, and every thing elſe which is under the dominion of temperance. For erroneous conduct being taken away, and rectitude being the leader in every action, it is neceſſary that men with theſe qualifications ſhould act beautifully and well; and that thoſe that act well ſhould be happy. Should we not, O Critias, ſpeak in this manner reſpecting temperance;

temperance; aſſerting, how great a good it is to know what any one knows, and what he does not know?—Entirely ſo, he replied.—But now, ſaid I, you ſee that no ſuch ſcience has appeared to us any where.—I do ſee it, he replied.—Has not therefore, ſaid I, temperance, which we have now found to be that which knows both ſcience and the privation of ſcience, this good, that he who poſſeſſes it will eaſily learn whatever elſe he may attempt to learn, and all things will appear to him in a clearer point of view? Will not this likewiſe follow from his looking to ſcience in whatever he learns? And will he not examine others better, reſpecting things which he has learned? And muſt not thoſe who examine others without this, do it in a more imbecile and unbecoming manner? Are theſe the privileges, my friend, which we enjoy through the poſſeſſion of temperance? But at the ſame time, do we look to ſomething greater, and require temperance to be greater than it really is?—Perhaps, ſaid he, this is the caſe.—Perhaps ſo, I replied. And perhaps too we have inveſtigated nothing profitable. But I conjecture this from hence, that certain abſurd conſequences appear to me to enſue reſpecting temperance, if it is ſuch as we have defined it to be. For let us ſee, if you pleaſe admitting that it is poſſible to have a ſcientific knowledge of ſcience; and let us not deprive temperance of the power of knowing what it knows, and what it does not know, which we aſcribed to it at firſt, but let us confer upon it this power. And, admitting all theſe particulars, let us ſtill more diligently conſider, if being ſuch it will benefit us at preſent. For what we juſt now ſaid, I mean that temperance would be a great good, if it were of ſuch a nature as to govern families and cities, does not appear to me, O Critias, to have been properly granted.—How ſo, he replied.—Becauſe, ſaid I, we eaſily admitted, that it would be a great good to mankind, if each of us performed thoſe things which we knew, and committed to others endued with knowledge the management of things of which we are ignorant.—Did we not then, ſaid he, do right in aſſenting to theſe things?—It appears to me, I replied, that we did not.—You really ſpeak abſurdly, ſaid he, Socrates.—By the dog, ſaid I, thus it appears to me. And juſt now looking at theſe things, I ſaid, that they ſeemed to me to be abſurd, and that I was afraid we had not rightly conſidered them. For in reality, if temperance is ſuch as we have deſcribed it, it does not appear evident to

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me, what good it will produce for us.—Inform me, ſaid he, how this is, that we alſo may know what you ſay.—I think, I replied, that I am trifling; but at the ſame time, it is neceſſary to conſider that which preſents itſelf to our view, and not raſhly omit it, if any one pays to it the ſmalleſt degree of attention.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he.—Hear then, I replied, my dream, whether it has paſſed through the gate of horn [1], or through that of ivory. For if temperance ſhould govern us, being ſuch as we have now defined it to be, it would indeed act ſcientifically; nor would he who aſſerts himſelf to be a pilot, when he is not, deceive us; nor would a phyſician, nor a general of an army, nor any other who pretends to know that which he does not know, elude our penetration. But from theſe things thus ſubſiſting, ſomething elſe would happen to us; for our bodies would be more healthful than they are at preſent, and we ſhould be preſerved in the perils of the ſea and war. We ſhould likewiſe poſſeſs all our veſſels and inſtruments, together with our garments, ſhoes, and all the conveniences and neceſſaries of life, more artificially conſtructed than at preſent, becauſe we ſhould employ true artiſts. If alſo you are willing we ſhould grant that prophecy is the ſcience of that which is future, and that temperance preſiding over it, avoids arrogant diviners, but chooſes true prophets for the prediction of future events, I ſhould affirm that the human race, furniſhed with this, would act and live ſcientifically. For temperance being our guard, it will not ſuffer ignorance interfering to cooperate with us. But that we ſhall act well and be happy, in conſequence of acting ſcientifically, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to underſtand.—But indeed, he replied, you will not eaſily find any other end of acting well, if you deſpiſe acting ſcientifically.—In-

[1] Socrates here alludes to Homer's well-known deſcription of the two gates of dreams, of which the following explanation is given by Porphyry, as preſerved by Macrobius in Somn. Scip. cap. 3. "All truth, ſays he, is latent; but this the ſoul ſometimes beholds, when ſhe is a little liberated by ſleep from the employments of the body. And ſometimes ſhe extends her ſight, but never perfectly reaches the object of her viſion. Hence when ſhe beholds, ſhe does not ſee it with a free and direct light, but through an intervening veil, which the folds of darkening nature draw over her eye. This veil, when in ſleep it admits the ſight to extend as far as to truth, is ſaid to be of horn, whoſe nature is ſuch, from its tenuity, that it is pervious to the ſight. But when it dulls the ſight and repels it from the viſion of truth, it is ſaid to be of ivory, which is a body ſo naturally denſe, that, however thin it may be ſcraped, it cannot be penetrated by the viſual rays."

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ſtruct me therefore more particularly, I ſaid, what kind of ſcientific action you mean. Is it that of cutting leather?—It is not, by Jupiter.—Is it that of a brazier?—By no means.—Is it that of a wool-worker, or a turner, or any ſuch like artiſts?—It is not.—We muſt therefore, I replied, no longer perſiſt in the aſſertion, that he is happy who lives ſcientifically. For theſe artiſts, though they live ſcientifically, are not acknowledged by you to be happy; but it appears to me that the happy man ſhould be ranked among *certain* perſons that live ſcientifically. And perhaps you will aſſert the happy man to be him whom I juſt now mentioned, I mean the diviner, who knows all future events. Do you ſpeak of this, or of any other character?—Of this, ſaid he, and another.—What other? I replied. Do you ſpeak of the man who, beſides knowing future events, knows every thing paſt and preſent, and is not ignorant of any thing? For let us admit that there is ſuch a man: for I think you will not ſay that any one lives more ſcientifically than this man.—Certainly not.—But this alſo ſhould be added, Which of the ſciences makes him happy? Or do all the ſciences ſimilarly produce this effect?—By no means, ſaid he.—But which moſt eminently accompliſhes this? Is it that by which a man knows things paſt, preſent, and to come? And will it therefore be the ſcience of cheſs?—But why of cheſs? he replied.—Will it then be the logiſtic ſcience?—By no means.—Shall we ſay it is the ſcience by which health is procured.—Rather ſo, ſaid he.—But is it, I replied, eſpecially that ſcience by which we know ſome particular thing?—It is that, ſaid he, by which we know good and evil.—O vile man, I replied, ſome time ſince you drew me round in a circle, concealing from me that to act well, and be happy, did not conſiſt in living ſcientifically, and were not produced by the poſſeſſion of all the other ſciences, but are effected by one ſcience alone, which enables us to know good and evil. And if, O Critias, you were willing to take away this ſcience from the other ſciences, would the medicinal ſcience no leſs produce health, that of the leather-worker ſhoes, that of the weaver garments? And would the pilot's art no leſs prevent us from periſhing in the ſea, and the military ſcience from being killed in battle?—No leſs, ſaid he.—But, friend Critias, this ſcience, by which we know good and evil, being taken away, each of theſe other ſciences will no longer operate beneficially.—True.—But this ſcience, as it ſeems, is not temperance, but that, the employment of which is to benefit us: for it is not

the ſcience of ſciences, and their privations, but it is the ſcience of good and evil. So that if temperance is beneficial, it will be uſeful to us in ſome other reſpect.—But, he replied, is not temperance then beneficial? For if temperance is the ſcience of ſciences, and preſides over other ſciences, it will alſo benefit us by ruling over this ſcience which is converſant with the good.—But will temperance, I replied, give us health, and not the medicinal ſcience? And will this effect all that the other arts effect, ſo that each of theſe will no longer accompliſh its proper work? Or did we not ſome time ſince teſtify that temperance is the ſcience of ſcience, and ignorance alone, but of nothing elſe? Is it not ſo?—So it appears.—It is not therefore the artificer of health.—Clearly not.—For health is the production of another art. Is it not?—It is.—Hence, my friend, temperance is not the artificer of utility: for we attributed this effect to another art. Did we not?—Entirely ſo.—How therefore will temperance be beneficial, ſince it is the artificer of no utility.—By no means, Socrates, as it ſeems.—Do you not ſee, therefore, Critias, that I was very properly afraid ſome time ſince, and that I juſtly accuſed myſelf, becauſe I beheld nothing uſeful reſpecting temperance? For that which is acknowledged to be the moſt beautiful of all things, would not have appeared to us to be uſeleſs, if I were myſelf in any reſpect uſeful for the purpoſe of proper inveſtigation. But now we are every way vanquiſhed, and by no means able to diſcover with what deſign the legiſlator inſtituted this name temperance; although we have granted many things which by no means followed from our diſcourſe. For we admitted, that there is a ſcience of ſcience, though our diſcourſe neither ſuffers nor affirms this. We likewiſe granted that the works of other ſciences were known by this ſcience, though neither did our diſcourſe ſuffer this, in order that we might define a temperate man to be one who knows that he knows the things which he knows, and who likewiſe knows that he does not know the things of which he is ignorant. This indeed we granted in a manner perfectly magnificent, not conſidering that it is impoſſible, after a manner, for a man to know that which he in no reſpect knows. For we agreed that he who is ignorant of any thing may know [1] that he is ignorant of that thing,

[1] He who is paſſing from twofold ignorance, or the being ignorant that he is ignorant, to knowledge, ſubſiſts in a middle condition between ignorance and knowledge. Accurately ſpeaking,

thing, though in my opinion there is nothing which appears more irrational than this aſſertion. But at the ſame time, ſo ſilly were we, though not obſtinate in the purſuit of this inquiry, that we were not rendered in any reſpect more able to diſcover the truth. Indeed, ſo ridiculous was our inveſtigation, that what we had formerly acknowledged, and mutually deviſed to be temperance, this in a very inſolent manner has appeared to us to be uſeleſs. On my own account, therefore, I am leſs indignant; but for your ſake I replied, O Charmides, I am very indignant, if you who are ſo beautiful in your body, and moſt temperate with reſpect to your ſoul, derive no advantage from this temperance, and are not in any reſpect benefited in life by its preſence. But I am ſtill more indignant for the ſake of the incantation, which I learned from a Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have beſtowed ſo much labour in learning it to no purpoſe. I do not, therefore, by any means think that this is the caſe, but I am of opinion that I am a bad inveſtigator. For I conſider temperance as a certain mighty good; and I am perſuaded, that if you poſſeſs it, you are *bleſſed*. But ſee if you do poſſeſs it, and do not in any reſpect require the incantation. For if you poſſeſs it, I ſhall rather adviſe you to conſider me as a trifler, and one who is incapable of inveſtigating by diſcourſe; but I ſhall adviſe you to conſider yourſelf happy in proportion to the degree of temperance which you poſſeſs. And, O Charmides—— But, by Jupiter, Socrates, ſaid he, I do not know whether I poſſeſs it, or not. For how can I know that, the nature of which you, as you ſay, are unable to diſcover? I, indeed, am not very much perſuaded by you, and I conſider myſelf, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the incantation. I likewiſe am of opinion, ſo far as pertains to myſelf, that nothing hinders me from being daily enchanted by you, as long as you ſhall think it neceſſary.—Be it ſo, ſaid Critias: but, O Charmides, if you act in this manner, it will be to me as an argument that you are temperate, becauſe you will preſent yourſelf to Socrates to be enchanted, and will not deſert him for any occaſion, whether great or ſmall.—I ſhall follow, ſaid he, and not deſert him. For I ſhould act in a dire manner, if I were not perſuaded by you who are my tutor,

ing, therefore, he does not *know* that he is ignorant, but may be ſaid to have a confuſed conſciouſneſs, or a dreaming perception, that he is ſo. This is the key to the profound meaning of Socrates when he ſaid that he *knew* that he knew nothing, which I have explained in a note on the Apology, and elſewhere.

and did not do what you order.—But, ſaid Critias, I do order you.—I ſhall, therefore, act in this manner, Charmides replied, beginning from this very day.—But what are theſe, I replied, deliberating about?—Nothing, ſaid Charmides: but we have determined to act in this manner.—You have employed violence, therefore, ſaid I, and do not permit me to interrogate.—Conſider me as having uſed force, ſaid he, ſince Critias commands me to adopt this mode of conduct. Beſides this, do you alſo conſult what you are to do.—But, I replied, there is no place left for conſultation: for no man is able to oppoſe you, when you are endeavouring and compelling to do any thing.—Do not you, therefore, reſiſt, ſaid he.—I ſhall not indeed, ſaid I, oppoſe you.

THE END OF THE CHARMIDES.

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