

THE LACHES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

FORTITUDE.

THE LACHES¹.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

LYSIMACHUS², || Nicias³,
MELESIAS, || LACHES⁴,

The Sons of LYSIMACHUS and MELESIAS, and SOCRATES.

¹ We have already observed, in the introduction to the *Parmenides*, that the dialectic energy is triple; either subsisting through opposite arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falsehood. As the design of the present dialogue, therefore, is to confute the false opinions of Laches and Nicias concerning fortitude, and thus to liberate them from two-fold ignorance, the reader must not expect to find in it an accurate definition of fortitude. As, however, he will doubtless be anxious to obtain this definition, I shall present him with the luminous conceptions of the divine Jamblichus on this subject.

Fortitude, considered according to its most principal subsistence, is an immutable intellectual power, and a most vigorous intellectual energy; or, in other words, it is a firmness and stable habit of intellect in itself. And of this kind will the species of fortitude be, which are beheld about life, whether they are considered as subsisting by themselves, or as imparting their strength to the firm stability of reasoning. But from these, those species of fortitude proceed, which are seen in the passions, about things dreadful and the contrary, and in fear and boldness; which generously resist pleasure and pain, and always preserve the same right opinions, and commensurate and moderate manners. In common with these, manifold species of fortitude arise from passion, reason, and free deliberation, through which human life derives a strenuousness of action, incapable of being subdued. This strenuous energy likewise voluntarily performs whatever is beautiful, and to be chosen for its own sake; and for the sake of good, endures all labours and dangers. It also cheerfully and readily gives itself to things which appear to be difficult; boldly encounters and meditates on death; and easily bears pain and calamity of every kind.

This Dialogue is supposed to have been written soon after the defeat of the Athenians at Delium, which happened in the first year of the 89th Olympiad.

² The son of Aristides the Just.

³ The general of the Athenians.

⁴ Another Athenian general.

LYSIMACHUS.

YOU have seen, O Nicias and Laches, this man fighting in armour¹: and indeed we did not then tell you on what account I and Melesias here called you to see him; but now we will tell you; for we think it is proper to speak freely to you. There are, indeed, some who laugh at things of this kind; and if any one consults them, they will not tell you what they think; but conjecturing the thing about which their advice is asked, they speak contrary to their own opinion. Thinking, however, that you are sufficiently qualified to know, and that knowing you will in short say what you think, we have made you our associates in the subject of our deliberation. The thing, therefore, about which I have for a long time prefaced so much is this:—These are our sons. That youth, the son of Melesias, is called Thucydides, by his grandfather's name; and this which is mine, is called Aristides, after my father. It has appeared therefore to us, that we should pay all the attention to them in our power, and that we should not act in the same manner as many do, who, when their children become lads², suffer them to do as they please, but we now begin to take all the care of them we are able. Seeing, therefore, that you also have children, we thought that you especially must have considered how they may be educated so as to become the best of men. If, however, you have not frequently paid much attention to this thing, we now remind you that it is not proper to be negligent of it, and we call upon you to deliberate, in common with us, concerning the education of children. But whence we have been led to think in this manner, O Nicias and Laches, it is proper you should hear, though the narration may be somewhat prolix.

I and Melesias, here, have but one table, and these lads eat with us. As I told you therefore at first, we shall speak freely to you. For both of us are able to relate to the youths many beautiful deeds of our fathers, both in war and peace, during the time that they managed the affairs of their allies

¹ It is well observed by Dacier, that this fighting in armour appears to have been similar to the exercise which is at present taught in fencing schools.

² In the original *μετρακια*, which seems to correspond to our English word *lads*. For according to the anonymous Greek interpreter of Ptolemy's books *De Judiciis*, p. 166, the seven ages of man are *βρεφος, παις, μετρακιος, νεος, ανηρ, προσευτης, γερων*. i. e. an infant, a boy, a lad, a youth, a man, an elderly man, an old man.

and

and of the city; but we cannot relate to them any deeds of our own. This covers us with shame, and we accuse our fathers for suffering us to live delicately when we became lads, while they in the mean time were busily employed about the affairs of others. These very things we point out to these youths, telling them that if they neglect themselves, and are not persuaded by us, they will become ignoble; but that, if they pay attention to themselves, they may quickly become worthy of the name which they bear. They therefore say that they will obey us; but we consider what that is through which they by learning or studying may become the best of men. Hence, a certain person recommended to us, that the young men should learn to fight in armour, and said that this was a beautiful discipline. He also praised him, whom you have just now beheld exhibiting, and advised us likewise to see him. It appeared to us, therefore, proper to come and take you along with us, that you might not only be spectators together with us, but might also assist us with your advice, if you were willing, concerning the attention which should be paid to children. These are the things which we wish to consider in common with you. It is now, therefore, your part to consult about this discipline, whether it appears proper to learn it or not; and with respect to other things, whether you have any discipline or study for the youths worthy of praise; and in short to tell us, what mode of conduct you intend to adopt for your own children.

NIC. I indeed, O Lyfimachus and Melesias, praise your conception, and am prepared to join with you in this deliberation, and I think that Laches here is prepared for the same purpose also.

LAC. You think with truth, O Nicias. And what Lyfimachus just now said about his father, and the father of Melesias, appears to me to have been very well said, both against them and us, and all such as engage in political affairs: for those things nearly happen to them which he said, both with respect to children and other domestic concerns, viz. that they are neglected and despised by them. These things, therefore, O Lyfimachus, you have well said. But I am surprised that you should call us to join with you in consulting about the education of youth, and should not call Socrates here: for, in the first place, he is our fellow-citizen; and in the next place, he is always busily employed in considering that which is the object of your investigation, viz. what discipline or pursuit is proper for youth.

Lys.

LYS. How do you say, O Laches? Does Socrates here pay attention to any thing of this kind?

LAC. Entirely so, Lyfimachus.

NIC. I also can assert this with no less confidence than Laches. For he lately introduced as a stranger to me, for the sake of instructing my son in music, Damon the disciple of Agathocles, a man most acceptable not only for his skill in music, but also for other things which qualify a man to associate with such youths as these.

LYS. Indeed, O Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, I, and such as are my equals in age, have no longer any acquaintance with younger persons, because we for the most part keep within doors on account of our age. But, O son of Sophroniscus, if you have any thing to advise for the good of this your fellow-citizen, it is proper that you should communicate it: for it is just that you should; since you are a paternal friend to us; for I and your father were always associates and friends; and our friendship lasted till his death without interruption. At present I have some recollection of the name of Socrates: for these lads, when discoursing with each other at home, frequently make mention of Socrates, and very much praise him; but I never have yet asked them whether they spoke of Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me, however, O boys, whether this is that Socrates of whom you so often make mention?

Sons of MEL. and LYS. Yes, O Father, it is the same.

LYS. It is well, by Juno, Socrates, that you do credit to your father, who was the best of men; and henceforward your interests shall be mine, and mine yours.

LAC. And, indeed, O Lyfimachus, you must not let this man go: for I have elsewhere seen him, not only doing credit to his father, but also to his country. For, at the defeat at Delium¹, he retired along with me; and I can assure you, that if the rest had conducted themselves as he did, our city would have stood firm, and would not then have suffered such a ruin.

LYS. O Socrates, this indeed is a beautiful praise, which is now given

¹ In this battle Socrates saved the life so Xenophon, who fell in consequence of his horse being killed under him; and Socrates being on foot, took him on his back, and carried him several miles.

to you by men who are worthy to be believed, and who deserve to be celebrated for the same things for which they praise you. Be well assured, therefore, that I, hearing these things, rejoice that you are renowned; and think that I am among the number of those who are most benevolently disposed towards you. Hence it is requisite that you should first come to us, and believe that we are your familiars, as it is just you should. Now, therefore, from this very day, since we have recognized each other, you should not do otherwise; but be familiar with us and these youths, that mutual friendship may be preserved between us. Do you therefore do these things, and we will again recall them to your memory. But with respect to the things which we began to inquire into, what do you say? Does it appear to you that this discipline is adapted to lads, or not; I mean the learning to fight in armour?

Soc. Concerning these things, O Lysimachus, I will endeavour to give you what advice I am able; and again, to do all that you request. It appears indeed to me to be most just, that I being the younger, and less experienced in these things, should first hear what these persons say, and learn from them. And if I should have any thing to say different from their opinion, then I will declare my sentiments, and endeavour to persuade you and them of their truth. But, O Nicias, why do not you speak the first?

Nic. Nothing hinders, Socrates; for it appears to me that the knowledge of this discipline is very generally useful to youth. For it is well not to be busily employed about those things with which young men love to be conversant when they are at leisure, but to engage in this whence the body necessarily acquires a better condition. For it is not inferior to any of the exercises, nor has it less labour; and at the same time this exercise and equestrian skill are especially proper for a liberal man. Indeed, in the contest in which we are athletæ, and in those exercises in which a contest is proposed to us, those alone contend who are exercised in these warlike instruments. In the next place, this discipline is of advantage in battle itself, when it is necessary to fight in rank with many others. But it is most beneficial when the ranks are broken, and when it is necessary, in single combat, either to pursue one resisting, or in flight to repel one attacking. For he who is skilled in this art, will not be vanquished by one, nor perhaps by many

many enemies, but will every where through this be superior to his opponent. Further still, a thing of this kind incites a desire of another beautiful discipline. For every one who has learnt to fight in armour, will also desire the discipline consequent to this, viz. that concerning the ranks of an army; and having received these disciplines, and being ambitious of excelling in them, he will be impelled to every thing which concerns the command of an army. And this being the case, it is evident that he will apply himself to those beautiful disciplines and studies consequent to these, which it is well worth while for a man to learn and study, and of which this discipline is the leader. We may also add to it this, which is no trifling addition, that this science will make every man in no small degree more daring and brave in battle than he was before. Nor is this also to be passed over in silence (though it may appear to be very trifling), that it gives a man a graceful carriage, in those places where it is proper he should appear to possess it; and where also through this gracefulness of carriage he will at the same time appear more terrible to his enemies. To me therefore, O Lysimachus, as I have said, it appears to be necessary to teach young men these things, and for the reasons which I have assigned. But I shall be glad to hear if Laches has any thing to say in opposition to what I have advanced.

LAC. But it is difficult, O Nicias, to say with respect to any discipline, that it is not proper to learn it: for it appears to be good to know all things. And indeed, as to this art respecting arms, if it is a discipline, (as those say it is who teach it, and if it is such as Nicias asserts it to be,) it is necessary to learn it; but if it is not a discipline, and those deceive us who promise to teach it us as such, or if being a discipline, it is not of much worth, why is it necessary to learn it? But I say these things concerning it, looking to this circumstance, viz. that if it were of any value, I think it would not have been concealed from the Lacedæmonians, who are concerned for nothing else in life than to seek and study that by which they may surpass others in war. And if this art were concealed from them, yet it could not be concealed from the teachers of it, that the Lacedæmonians, the most of all the Greeks, pay attention to things of this kind, and that he who is renowned for these things, will accumulate much wealth both from them and from others, just as a tragic poet when he is renowned among us. For indeed, he who thinks that he can compose excellent tragedies, does not, wandering out of Attica, make

make the circuit of other cities, in order to attract notice, but immediately comes hither, and very properly exhibits himself to our citizens. But I see that those who fight in armour consider Lacedæmon as an inaccessible temple, and do not enter into it even on tip-toe, but they wander round it, and rather exhibit themselves to others, and especially to those who acknowledge themselves to be inferior to many others in warlike concerns. In the next place, O Lyfimachus, I have been present with not a few of these men in the work itself, and I have seen what kind of men they are. But we may form a judgment of them from this circumstance, that no man who has applied himself to armorial concerns has ever become illustrious in war; though in all other things men have been celebrated for their skill in their respective professions. But these men, as it seems, are particularly unfortunate in this respect beyond others. For this very same Stefileus, whom you beheld together with me exhibiting himself in so great a crowd, I have seen truly displaying himself elsewhere, in a far better manner, though unwillingly. For when the ship he was in attacked a merchantman, he fought with a spear headed with a scythe that his arms might be as different as himself was from the rest of the combatants. Other particulars therefore respecting the man do not deserve to be related; but the success of this stratagem of heading a spear with a scythe must not be passed over in silence: for while he was fighting, his scythe became entangled in the tackling of the enemy's ship; Stefileus therefore pulled in order to disengage it, but was not able to effect his purpose; and the one ship passed by the other. In the mean time he followed the course of the ship holding his spear. But when the enemy's ship steered off, and was drawing him in, as he was still holding his spear, he suffered it to slip through his hands, till he had only hold of it by the small end. The crew of the merchantman laughed and shouted at this circumstance of his being drawn by his spear, and at the figure which he made. At length some one having thrown a stone that fell just at his feet, on one of the rowers' seats, he quitted his spear. Then, indeed, those that were in the three-banked galley were no longer able to restrain their laughter on seeing that spear headed with a scythe hanging from the ship. Perhaps therefore, this art may be of some use, as Nicias says; such however are the particulars of which I was a spectator. Hence, as I said at first, if it be a discipline, it possesses but little utility; and if it be not, but they dissemble who say it is, it is not worth while

to endeavour to learn it. For it appears to me, that if any coward should think he ought to learn this art, acquiring confidence through it, his cowardice would become more apparent; but that if a brave man should learn it, in consequence of being observed by every one, if he erred but in a small degree he must endure great calumnies. For the profession of this science is attended with envy; so that unless he surpasses others in virtue in a wonderful degree, he who acknowledges that he possesses this science cannot avoid becoming ridiculous. Such, O Lysimachus, does the pursuit of this discipline appear to me. But it is requisite, as I said at first, not to dismiss this Socrates, but to request him to give his opinion on this subject.

Lys. But I indeed request, O Socrates, that you will do so: for it appears to me that we want an umpire to decide the difference. Had these indeed agreed in opinion, a thing of this kind would have been less necessary. But now (for you see that Laches dissents from Nicias) it will be well to hear from you to which of the men you give your suffrage.

Soc. But what, O Lysimachus? If many praise us, will you make use of them?

Lys. What else can any one do, O Socrates?

Soc. And will you also, O Melesias, act in this manner? And if it were necessary for you to consult about exercise for your son, would you rather be persuaded by the many, than by one who had learned under a skilful master, and who had exercised himself?

MEL. It is fit, Socrates, I should be persuaded by the latter.

Soc. You would rather, therefore, be persuaded by him than by us four?

MEL. Perhaps so.

Soc. For it is necessary, I think, to judge by science, and not by multitude, if a man intends to judge well.

MEL. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Now, therefore, it is necessary to consider this very thing in the first place, viz. whether any one of us is an artist, in the thing about which we consult, or not. And if any of us is, we should be persuaded by him being one, dismissing the rest. But if no one of us is an artist in this particular, we must seek after some other person. Or, do you and Lysimachus think that this is an affair of small consequence, and that it is not concerning

cerning that which is the greatest of all your possessions? For the government of the whole paternal house will be according as the children are worthy, or the contrary.

MEL. You speak the truth.

Soc. It is necessary, therefore, to pay much attention to this subject.

MEL. Certainly.

Soc. How then should we consider that which I just now mentioned, if we wished to find which of us is most expert in contest? Should we not consult him who had learned and studied this art of contending, and who had been instructed in it by good masters?

MEL. To me it appears that we should.

Soc. Should we not, therefore, prior to this, consider what this thing is in which we seek for masters?

MEL. How do you say?

Soc. Thus, perhaps, what I say will be more manifest. It does not appear to me, to have been acknowledged by us at first what that is about which we consult and speculate, in order to know which of us is most skilled in it, and has had masters for the sake of this, and which of us is not.

Nic. Did we not, O Socrates, consider about fighting in armour, whether it was proper lads should learn it or not?

Soc. Entirely so, O Nicias: but when any one considers about a remedy for the eyes, whether it is proper to apply it or not, whether do you think the consultation should then be about the remedy, or about the eyes?

Nic. About the eyes.

Soc. Hence also, when any one considers about a bridle for a horse, whether it should be used or not, and when it should be used, he will then consult about the horse, and not about the bridle.

Nic. True.

Soc. In one word, therefore, when any one considers a certain thing for the sake of something, his consultation will be about that thing for the sake of which he speculates, and not about that which he seeks for the sake of something else¹.

¹ Thus, in the above instance of the bridle and the horse, the horse is that for the sake of which a man considers about a bridle; but the bridle is that which is sought for the sake of the horse.

NIC. Necessarily so:

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether the person whose advice we ask is skilled in that thing for the sake of which we engage in the present inquiry.

MEL. Certainly.

SOC. Do we not therefore say, that we now inquire concerning discipline for the sake of the soul of youth?

NIC. Yes.

SOC. Whether, therefore, any one of us is skilled in the art of taking care of the soul, and is able to accomplish this employment well, and has had good masters in this art himself, must be considered.

LAC. But what, O Socrates, have you never yet seen some persons become more skilful in a certain thing without than with masters?

SOC. I have, O Laches; whom, however, you would not be willing to believe, if they said that they were good artists, unless they could show you some excellent production of their art, and not only one but many.

NIC. What you say is true.

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, O Laches and Nicias, since Lysimachus and Melesias have called upon us to consult with them concerning their sons, in consequence of being anxious that their souls may become most excellent,—I say, it is necessary that we, if we acknowledge that we have had masters, should show who they were, they in the first place being good masters, and having cultivated the souls of many youths; and in the next place, who shall appear to have also instructed us. Or, if any one of us shall say that he has had no master, he ought to be able to speak of the works which he has performed, and to show what Athenians or foreigners, what slaves or freemen, have acknowledged themselves to have been benefited by him. But if we can do neither of these, we must order them to seek for advice from others, and not subject ourselves to the danger of corrupting the sons of other men, and thus be exposed to the greatest reproach from those with whom we are most familiar. I therefore, O Lysimachus and Melesias, in the first place, say concerning myself, that I have had no preceptor of this thing, though my desire has always tended to it from my youth. But I am not able to give a reward to the sophists, who alone profess themselves to be capable of making me a worthy man; and even now I am unable to discover this

this art myself. If, however, Nicias or Laches shall have either discovered or learned it, I shall not wonder : for they are richer than I am, so that they might learn it from others ; and they are at the same time older, so that they may now have discovered it. But they appear to me to be able to instruct a man : for they never would so intrepidly have decided concerning worthy and base pursuits, unless they had believed that they had a sufficient knowledge of them. I believe them, therefore, as to other things ; but I wonder that they differ from each other. Hence, as Laches just now ordered that you should not dismiss but interrogate me ; in like manner I now call upon you not to dismiss Laches and Nicias, but to interrogate them ; at the same time telling them, that Socrates says he has no knowledge of the thing, and is not qualified to judge which of you speaks the truth ; for he is neither the inventor nor the disciple of any one about things of this kind. But do you, O Laches and Nicias, tell us what man you have met with most skilled in the education of youth ; and whether you know these things in consequence of having learnt them from some one, or from having discovered them yourselves. And, if you have learnt them, tell us who was your master, and who those are that are similar artists ; that if the affairs of the city should not afford you leisure sufficient to attend to us, we may go to those masters, and may persuade them, either by gifts or caresses, or both, to take care of our children and yours, that they may not, through becoming depraved characters, be a disgrace to their ancestors. But if you yourselves discovered this art, give us instances of those who by your care have, from being depraved, become worthy characters. For if you now begin to give instruction for the first time, it is requisite to consider that you will be exposed to the danger, not of making trial in Car¹, but upon your sons, and the sons of your friends, and, in short, according to the proverb, that you will teach a potter² in a tub. Tell us, then, what you can do, and what not. Inquire these things of them, O Lyfmachus, and do not dismiss the men till they have answered.

Lys. Socrates, my friends, appears to me to speak well ; wherefore, O Nicias and Laches, consider whether it will be agreeable to you to be interro-

¹ This is said of those that engage in perilous concerns, and in the affairs of others, when they are attended with danger.

² See this explained in a note on the Gorgias.

gated about, and reply to such like particulars. For to me and Melesias here, it will certainly be very agreeable, if you are willing to discuss all that Socrates may ask. For I said from the first, that we called upon you for advice, because we thought that you would pay attention to these things in a becoming manner, and because your sons, as well as ours, are now nearly arrived at that age in which they ought to be instructed. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you, speak, and consider the affair in common with Socrates, giving and receiving arguments from each other: for this was well said by him, that we are now consulting about the most important of our concerns. See, therefore, whether it appears to you that this ought to be done.

NIC. O Lysimachus, you seem to me to know Socrates only from his father, and not to have associated with him; unless, perhaps, when he was a boy, you may have met with him in public assemblies following his father, or in a temple, or some other convention of the people; but it is evident that you never had any correspondence with him since he came to be a man.

LYS. Why do you say this, O Nicias?

NIC. You seem to me not to know that whoever draws near to Socrates by discourse, as if by family alliance, and converses with him, although he may begin to discourse about something else, will not cease to be led about by his arguments, till he falls on the necessity of giving an account of his present mode of life, and the manner in which his past life has been spent. And when he has fallen on this necessity, Socrates will not dismiss him till he has well and properly examined all these particulars. But I am accustomed to his manner, and I know that it is necessary to suffer these things from him; and I also well know that I must suffer them now: for I rejoice, O Lysimachus, to draw near to the man; and I think it is no bad thing to be reminded that we have acted or shall act in an improper manner. But, indeed, he who is not averse to this must necessarily be more cautious in future, being willing and thinking it worth while, according to the saying of Solon, to learn as long as he lives, and not expecting that age, when it comes, will bring intellect along with it. To me, therefore, it is neither unusual nor unpleasant to be examined by Socrates; but, indeed, I have nearly for some time perceived that our discourse, as Socrates is present, would not be about the lads, but about ourselves. As I said, therefore, as to myself nothing hinders

ders me from discoursing with Socrates in whatever manner he pleases. But see how Laches here is disposed about a thing of this kind.

LAC. The manner in which I am affected, O Nicias, with respect to discourse, is simple, or, if you will, is not simple, but double: for to some one I may appear to be a philologist, and not a misologist. For when I hear a man discoursing concerning virtue, or concerning a certain wisdom, he being one who is truly a man, and worthy the arguments which he uses, I rejoice transcendently, contemplating at the same time him who speaks and what is said, how they fit and harmonize with each other. And, indeed, such a man appears to me to be a musician, and one who produces the most beautiful harmony; not that he is harmonized according to the melody of the lyre, or instruments of sport; but in reality he attunes his life. Such a one too lives in concord with himself both in words and deeds, not indeed according to the Ionic¹, or Phrygian, or Lydian harmony, but according to the Dorian, which is alone the Grecian harmony. Such a man, therefore, when he speaks, causes me to rejoice, and to seem to be a lover of words, with such avidity do I receive what he says. But he who acts in a manner contrary to this man pains me, and by how much the better he appears to speak, by so much the more does he make me seem to be a hater of words. I have not yet, indeed, had any experience of the words of Socrates; but of his works, as it seems, I formerly have; and there I found him a man worthy of beautiful assertions and of all liberty of speech. If, therefore, he is such a man, I will consult him, and most willingly shall I be interrogated by, and not be averse to learn from him. I also assent to the saying of Solon, with the addition only of one thing: for I wish to learn as I grow old, but from the worthy alone. Let this then be granted to me that he is a worthy preceptor, lest while I learn unpleasantly, I should appear to be indocile. For it is with me a thing of no consequence, if he who teaches me should be younger than I am, or should not yet be renowned, and the like. I announce to you, therefore, O Socrates, that you may confute and teach me whatever you please: for I am favourably disposed towards you from that day,

¹ The Ionic harmony was effeminate and soft; the Lydian was doleful and adapted to lamentation; the Phrygian vehement, and capable of producing ecstasy, and on this account Proclus informs us that it was used in the mysteries; and the Dorian was grave and masculine, and on this account was preferred by Plato to all the rest. See the third book of the Republic.

in which you was my companion in danger, and in which you gave such a specimen of your virtue, as it became a just man to give. Say therefore whatever you please, and pay no attention to our age.

Soc. We cannot then accuse you, as it seems, that you are not ready jointly to consult and investigate with us.

Lys. This is our business, Socrates; for I regard you as one of us. Consider, therefore, instead of me, for the sake of the youths, what we ought to inquire of them, and consult by conversing with them. For I have forgotten many things, through my age, which I had intended to ask them; and again, I do not very well remember what I hear, if any other conversation intervenes. Do you therefore speak about, and discuss among yourselves, the things which we have proposed to be investigated; and when I have heard what you have to say, I will do, together with Melesias here, whatever shall appear to you proper to be done.

Soc. O Nicias and Laches, we must obey Lysimachus and Melesias. The things then which we just now endeavoured to consider, viz. who were our masters in a discipline of this kind, or what other persons we had made better, it will not perhaps be improper to investigate among ourselves. But I think that such a consideration as this tends to the same thing; or nearly it will be something which rather flows as from a principle. For if we have a scientific knowledge of any thing, which when communicated to another renders him better, and if we are also able to communicate it to another, it is evident that we know the thing itself, and also how it may be acquired in the easiest and best manner. Perhaps you do not understand what I say, but thus you will easily comprehend my meaning. If we know that sight, when present to the eyes, makes those eyes to which it is present better, and if besides this we have the power of making it present to the eyes, it is evident that we know what the sight is, and can inform him who consults us for this purpose how it may be acquired in the easiest and best manner. For if we have no knowledge of this very thing, what the sight is, or what the hearing is, we cannot be counsellors or physicians worthy of any regard, either about the eyes or the ears, with respect to the manner in which either the hearing or the sight may be most beautifully obtained.

Lys. You speak the truth, O Socrates.

Soc. Do not therefore these persons, O Laches, now call upon us to consult with

with them after what manner virtue, being present to the souls of their sons, may render them better?

LAC. Entirely so.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, essentially necessary to know this, what virtue is? For if we are entirely ignorant what virtue is, how can we become advisers to any one, so as that he may be able to acquire it in the most beautiful manner?

LAC. By no means can we, as it appears to me, Socrates.

SOC. Shall we say then, O Laches, that we know what virtue is?

LAC. We shall certainly say so.

SOC. If, therefore, we know, cannot we also tell what it is?

LAC. Undoubtedly.

SOC. We will not, therefore, O best of men, immediately speculate concerning the whole of virtue (for that perhaps would be a very laborious work); but let us first see with respect to a certain part of it, if we are sufficiently able to know it, and thus, as it is probable, the speculation will be easy to us.

LAC. Let us do so, Socrates, since it is agreeable to you.

SOC. Which of the parts of virtue then shall we select? Is it not evident that it must be this, to which the discipline of arms appears to tend? But it appears to the many to tend to fortitude. Or does it not?

LAC. And very much does it appear so.

SOC. In the first place, therefore, O Laches, let us endeavour to say what fortitude is; and in the next place let us after this consider how it may be acquired by youth, so far as it is possible for it to be acquired by studies and disciplines. But endeavour to say what fortitude is.

LAC. By Jupiter, Socrates, it is not difficult to say what it is. For if any one is willing, keeping in his rank, to oppose the enemy, and does not fly, I well know that he will be a brave man.

SOC. You speak well, O Laches; but perhaps I, from not speaking clearly, am the cause of my perceiving that you do not answer that which I asked, but something else.

LAC. Why do you say this, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you, if I am able. A brave man, as you say, is one who, keeping in his rank, fights the enemy.

LAC. So I say.

Soc. And I also. But is not he likewise a brave man, who flying and not keeping in his rank fights the enemy?

LAC. How flying?

Soc. Just as the Scythians are said to fight no less flying than pursuing. And Homer, praising the horses of Æneas, says,

Swiftly they every where pursue and fly.

And for this very thing he praises Æneas himself, viz. for his being skilled in flying, and says, that he was expert in retreating.

LAC. And very properly, Socrates: for he there speaks concerning chariots; but you speak concerning the horse of the Scythians. For their cavalry fight in this manner; but the infantry of Greece fight as I said.

Soc. Except perhaps the Lacedæmonians, O Laches. For they say that the Lacedæmonians, in the battle of Platæa, when they were engaged with the *Gerropbori*¹, were not willing to fight standing their ground against them, but fled; but that after the ranks of the Persians were broken, they rallied and fought like cavalry, and thus became conquerors in that battle.

LAC. You speak the truth.

Soc. On this account, therefore, I said that I was the cause that you did not answer well, because I did not interrogate you well. For I wished to ask you not only concerning those who are brave in the infantry, but also concerning those who are brave in the cavalry, and in all the forms of war; and not only concerning those that are brave in battle, but also concerning those that are brave in dangers on the sea,—in diseases,—in poverty,—and in political affairs: and again, not only concerning those who are brave in pains or fears, but also concerning those who are powerful in contending against desires or pleasures, both by standing their attacks, or retreating from them: for some men, O Laches, are also brave in things of this kind.

LAC. And very much so, O Socrates.

Soc. All these, therefore, are brave; but some of them possess fortitude in pleasures, others in pains, others in desires, and others in fears; and others, I think, possess timidity in these very same things.

¹ These were Persian troops armed with bucklers of willows.

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. What then each of these is, this is the thing which I ask. Again, therefore, endeavour to tell me, in the first place, what fortitude is which is the same in all these. Or do you not yet understand what I say?

LAC. Not very much.

Soc. But I say, just as if I should ask what swiftnes is, which is present with us in running, in playing on the harp, in speaking, in learning, and in many other things. For we nearly possess it in such things as the following, which it is worth while to mention, viz. either in the actions of the hands or feet, or mouth and voice, or in those of the dianoëtic part. Or do not you also say so?

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, any one should ask me, O Socrates, What do you call this thing which you denominate swiftnes in all things? I should say to him, that I call that power swiftnes which accomplishes many things in a short time, about the voice, and about the course, and about all other things.

LAC. And you would say rightly.

Soc. Do you also endeavour, O Laches, thus to define fortitude, and tell us what that power is which is the same in pleasure and in pain, and in all the above-mentioned cases, and which in all these is called fortitude.

LAC. It appears, therefore, to me to be a certain endurance of the soul, if it is necessary to speak of that which accords with fortitude in all things.

Soc. But this indeed is necessary, if we are to reply to the question that was asked us. This therefore appears to me, that you do not consider every kind of endurance to be fortitude. But I infer this from hence: for I nearly know, O Laches, that you think fortitude to be among the number of things which are very beautiful.

LAC. I do indeed, and I also think that it ranks among things the most beautiful.

Soc. Is not, therefore, that endurance which subsists in conjunction with prudence beautiful and good?

LAC. Entirely so. But what of that endurance which subsists with folly? Is it not on the contrary bad and pernicious?

LAC. Yes,

Soc. Do you then say that a thing of this kind is beautiful, though it is bad and pernicious?

LAC. This would not be just, O Socrates.

Soc. You do not, therefore, acknowledge such an endurance as this to be fortitude, since it is not beautiful; but fortitude is beautiful.

LAC. That is true.

Soc. Prudent endurance, therefore, according to your assertion, will be fortitude.

LAC. So it seems.

Soc. Let us see then in what this endurance is prudent; or whether it is prudent in all things both great and small. Thus, for instance, if some one endures to spend his money prudently, knowing that he shall be enriched by thus spending it, would you call him a brave man?

LAC. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. And if some one, being a physician, had a son or some other patient ill with an inflammation in his breast, and this patient should request him to give him something to eat or drink, but the physician should inflexibly persist in denying his request, would you call this endurance fortitude?

LAC. I should not.

Soc. But in war; here is a man of endurance who is willing to fight; and he prudently reasons with himself, that others will give him assistance, and that he fights against those who are fewer and more despicable than those of his own party, and still further that he has the advantage of the ground: will you say that this man, enduring with such like prudence and advantage, is braver than him in the contrary army who is willing to stand his ground and endure?

LAC. The man in the contrary army, O Socrates, appears to me to be the braver.

Soc. And yet the endurance of the one is more imprudent than that of the other.

LAC. That is true.

Soc. Will you, therefore, say that a man who endures in an equestrian contest with equestrian science, is less brave than him who endures without science?

LAC. To me it appears that he is.

Soc. And will you also say the same of a slinger, or an archer, or of any other who endures in any other art?

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. And with respect to such as are willing to descend into a well, and there to endure swimming in it, though they are not skilled in this employment, or in any thing else of this kind,—will you say that such men are braver than those that are skilled in these things?

LAC. What else can one say, O Socrates?

Soc. Nothing, if he thinks so.

LAC. But I, indeed, do think so.

Soc. And yet, O Laches, such men encounter danger, and endure more imprudently than those who do this in conjunction with art.

LAC. So it appears.

Soc. Did not, therefore, base and imprudent boldness and endurance appear to us to be noxious in our former conclusions?

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. But fortitude was acknowledged by us to be something beautiful.

LAC. It was acknowledged.

Soc. But now again we say that that base and imprudent endurance is fortitude.

LAC. So it appears.

Soc. Do we therefore appear to you to speak well?

LAC. By Jupiter, Socrates, to me we do not.

Soc. In your own language, therefore, O Laches, you and I are not Dorically harmonized: for our works do not accord with our words. For some one, as it seems, may say that we participate of fortitude in our deeds; but not, as I think, in our words, if he should hear us now discoursing.

LAC. You speak most truly.

Soc. What then? Does it appear to you to be beautiful that we should be in this condition?

LAC. By no means.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we should yield our assent to what we said?

LAC. To what assertion of ours do you allude?

Soc.

Soc. To that which ordered us to endure. If you are willing, therefore, let us persevere in our inquiry, and endure, lest fortitude itself should deride us for not bravely investigating what it is; if, indeed, endurance itself is often fortitude.

LAC. I, indeed, O Socrates, am ready to stand my ground, though I am unaccustomed to such like conferences. But a certain pertinacity instigates me against what has been said, and I am in reality indignant that I am so incapable of telling my conceptions. For I seem to myself to know what fortitude is; but I know not how it just now fled from me, so that I cannot comprehend in words and say what it is.

Soc. But a good huntsman, my friend, ought to run after the beast he hunts, and not remit his pursuit.

LAC. By all means he ought.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we call Nicias also to this hunting, that we may try if he is in any respect more sagacious than us?

LAC. I am willing: for why should I not?

Soc. Come then, O Nicias, gratify your friends, and assist them in their doubts in this conference, if you possess any power; for you see how we are embarrassed. Do you, therefore, tell us what you think fortitude is, free us from this doubt, and confirm by argument what you conceive it to be.

NIC. You have appeared to me, for some time past, Socrates, not to have well defined fortitude; for you make no use of that which I have heard you so well assert.

Soc. What is that, O Nicias?

NIC. I have often heard you assert that every one of us is good with respect to those things in which he is wise, but bad with respect to those of which he is ignorant.

Soc. By Jupiter, what you say is true, O Nicias.

NIC. If, therefore, a brave is a good man, he is clearly a wise man.

Soc. Do you hear, O Laches?

LAC. I do, but I do not very much understand what he says.

Soc. But I seem to understand him, and he appears to me to call fortitude a certain wisdom.

LAC. What kind of wisdom, O Socrates?

Soc. Will you not therefore inquire this of him?

LAC.

LAC. I will.

Soc. Come then, O Nicias, tell him what kind of wisdom fortitude will be according to you : for it is not that which belongs to the pipe.

Nic. By no means.

Soc. Nor yet that which belongs to the harp.

Nic. It is not.

Soc. But what is it then, or of what is it the science ?

LAC. You very rightly interrogate him, Socrates ; and let him tell us what wisdom it is.

Nic. I say then, O Laches, that it is the science of things dreadful and daring, both in war and in all other things.

LAC. How absurdly he speaks, Socrates !

Soc. Looking to what do you say this, O Laches ?

LAC. To what ? Why wisdom is separate from fortitude.

Soc. Nicias does not say so.

LAC. He does not, by Jupiter ; and therefore he raves.

Soc. Let us therefore teach and not revile him.

Nic. He does not revile me ; but it seems to me, O Socrates, that Laches is desirous that I also may appear to say nothing, because this was just now the case with him.

LAC. Entirely so, O Nicias ; and I will endeavour to evince this : for you say nothing. Without going any further, in diseases do not physicians know things that are dreadful ? Or do brave men appear to you to know this ? Or do you call physicians brave men ?

Nic. By no means.

LAC. Neither do you give that name, I think, to husbandmen, though they know things that are dreadful in agriculture ; and all other artificers know things that are dreadful and daring in their own arts, and yet they are not in any respect the more brave for this.

Soc. What does Laches, O Nicias, appear to you to say ? for he certainly appears to say something.

Nic. He does indeed say something, and yet not what is true.

Soc. How so ?

Nic. Because he thinks that physicians know something more about the sick than the being able to say that a thing is healthful or unhealthful ; but they,

they alone know this. But whether to be well is a thing dreadful to any one rather than to be ill; do you think, O Laches, that physicians have any knowledge of this? Or do you not think that it is better to many for them not to recover from disease than to recover? For tell me this: Do you say that it is better to all men to live, and that it is not more advantageous to many to die?

LAC. I do say this.

NIC. To those, therefore, to whom it is advantageous to die, do you think the same things are dreadful, as to those to whom it is better to live?

LAC. Not I.

NIC. But do you allow that physicians know this, or that it is known by any other artificer than the man who is skilled in things dreadful, and whom I call a brave man?

SOC. Do you understand, O Laches, what he says?

LAC. I do; and I perceive that he calls prophets brave men: for who else knows to whom it is better to live than to die? And I ask you, O Nicias, whether you acknowledge yourself to be a prophet, or to be neither a prophet nor a brave man?

NIC. But what? Do you think it belongs to a prophet to know things dreadful and daring?

LAC. I do; for to whom else does it belong?

NIC. Much more, O best of men, to him of whom I speak; since it is necessary that a prophet should only know the signs of future events, whether they portend death to any one, or disease, or the loss of riches, or victory, or the being vanquished in battle or in any other contest. But, why does it rather belong to a prophet, than any other, to judge for whom it is better to suffer or not suffer any one of these things?

LAC. I do not understand, Socrates, what he means to say: for he does not render it manifest that it is either a prophet, or a physician, or any other person, whom he calls brave, unless he says that this brave person is a certain god. Nicias, therefore, appears to me to be unwilling ingenuously to confess that he says nothing, but he is rolled upwards and downwards, concealing his perplexity; though you and I might have been similarly rolled, if we had wished not to appear to contradict ourselves. If, indeed, we were
pleading

pleading in a court of justice, it might be reasonable to act in this manner; but now in such a conference as this, why should any one vainly adorn himself with empty words?

Soc. For no reason, as it appears to me, O Laches. But let us see; perhaps Nicias thinks that he says something to the purpose, and does not assert these things merely for the sake of speaking. Let us, therefore, inquire of him more clearly what he means; and if it shall appear that he says any thing pertinent, let us assent to him; if not, we will teach him better.

LAC. Do you, therefore, O Socrates, if you will, ask him; for I have interrogated him sufficiently.

Soc. Nothing will hinder me: for the interrogation will be in common to me and you.

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. Tell me then, O Nicias, (for I and Laches unite in this question,) Do you say that fortitude is rather the science of things dreadful and daring, than of any thing else?

NIC. I do.

Soc. But it is not the province of every man to know this, since neither a physician nor a prophet possesses this knowledge; nor will a man be brave, unless he acquires this science. Do you not say so?

NIC. I do.

Soc. According to the proverb, therefore, in reality, every hog does not know this, nor will every hog be valiant.

NIC. It does not appear to me that it will.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, O Nicias, that neither do you believe that the Crommyonian sow was brave. But I do not say this in jest: for I think it is necessary that he who asserts these things should admit that no brute is brave; nor ought he to grant that any wild beast is so wise, that what few men know through the difficulty of acquiring knowledge, *that* a lion, or a leopard, or a certain boar knows. But he who defines fortitude, as you have done, must necessarily say that a lion and a stag, a bull and an ape, are similarly formed by nature with respect to fortitude.

LAC. By the gods, Socrates, you speak well: and in reality inform us, O Nicias, whether you say that these wild beasts, which we all of us acknow-

ledge to be brave, are wiser than we are, or, contrary to the opinion of all men, will you dare to deny that they are brave ?

NIC. Indeed, Laches, I do not call either a wild beast, or any thing else brave, which through ignorance is not terrified at things dreadful, but is fearless and stupid. Or, do you think, that I call all boys brave, who through ignorance fear nothing? But I am of opinion, that *the fearless* is not the same with *the brave*. For, I think, that fortitude and forethought are to be found in very few; but that confidence and boldness, and a privation of fear, together with the want of forethought, may be seen in very many men and women, boys and wild beasts. That, therefore, which you and the many call fortitude, I call rashness; but I call the brave, the prudent and the wise, about whom I now speak.

LAC. You see, Socrates, how well this man decorates himself, as he thinks, with words; but those whom all men acknowledge to be brave he endeavours to deprive of this honour.

NIC. Not I indeed, Laches; but take courage. For I say that you and Lammachus¹ are wise, if you are brave; and that this is also true of many others of the Athenians.

LAC. I say nothing against these things, though I could reply to them, lest you should say that I am in reality a slanderer.

SOC. Nor should you speak against them, O Laches; for you appear to me not to have perceived that Nicias here received this wisdom from our associate Damon; and Damon is very intimate with Prodicus, who appears to distinguish appellations of this kind in a manner superior to the other sophists.

LAC. For it rather becomes a sophist, O Socrates, to think highly of himself on account of things of this kind, than a man whom the city thinks worthy to be its governor.

SOC. It becomes indeed him, O blessed man, who presides over things of the greatest consequence, to participate of the greatest wisdom. But it appears to me to be worth while to consider with a view to what Nicias thus defines fortitude.

¹ This Lammachus was general of the Athenians, with Nicias and Alcibiades, in the expedition of Sicily, where he was killed.

LAC. Consider this then, Socrates, yourself.

Soc. I shall do this, O best of men. Do not, however, think that you are to be excluded from this conference, but attend and consider what is said.

LAC. Let these things be so if it appears to be proper.

Soc. But it does appear to be so. And do you, Nicias, tell us again from the beginning; for you know that at the beginning of our conference we considered fortitude as a part of virtue.

Nic. Entirely so.

Soc. Did not you, therefore, also answer, that it was a part of virtue, there being likewise other parts, all which are called virtue?

Nic. For how is it possible I should not?

Soc. Do you, therefore, call the same things the parts of virtue as I do? For I, besides fortitude, call temperance and justice, and certain other such like things, parts of virtue. And do not you also?

Nic. Entirely so.

Soc. Attend then: for these things are granted by us. But let us consider concerning things terrible and daring, lest you should form one opinion of them, and we another. For we will tell you what we think concerning them; and do you, if you do not accord with us, teach us better. We then think those things to be dreadful which occasion fear, and that those things are daring, or may be dared, which do not occasion fear. Neither, however, past nor present evils occasion fear, but those which are expected: for fear is the expectation of a future evil. Or does it not likewise appear so to you, O Laches?

LAC. Very much so, Socrates.

Soc. Do you, therefore, O Nicias, hear our assertions, that things dreadful are future evils; but that things which may be dared are future goods, or at least are not evils. Do you say this, or something else about these things?

Nic. I say this.

Soc. But do you call the science of these things fortitude?

Nic. I do.

Soc. Let us then still further consider whether a third thing appears the same to you as to us.

Nic. What is that?

Soc. I will tell you. For it appears to me and Laches, that of whatever things there is science, there is not one science of a thing which is past, by which we know that it was made, another concerning things present, by which we know that they are made, and another concerning that which is not yet made, by which we know that it may and will be made in the most beautiful manner; but to know all these is the province of the same science. Thus, for instance, with respect to that which is salubrious at all times, there is no other science than medicine, which being one and the same, sees what has been, what is, and what will be salubrious. And agriculture subsists in a similar manner with respect to things which grow out of the earth. Thus too, in warlike concerns, you yourselves can testify that the science of commanding an army, provides in the most beautiful manner for other things and for what will happen in future. For this art does not think it fit that it should be subservient to divination, but preside over it, as better knowing things which do and will take place about wars. And the law also orders this, not that the diviner shall command the general, but that the general shall command the diviner. Shall we assert these things, O Laches?

LAC. We must assert them.

Soc. But what? Do you agree with us, O Nicias, that it is the province of the same science to possess a knowledge of the same things, whether they be considered as past, or as present, or as future?

NIC. I do: for thus it appears to me, O Socrates.

Soc. Is not, therefore, O best of men, fortitude, as you say, the science of things dreadful and daring?

NIC. It is.

Soc. But it has been acknowledged that things dreadful are future evils, and things daring future goods.

NIC. Entirely so.

Soc. But the same science has a knowledge of things past, present, and future.

NIC. It has.

Soc. Fortitude, therefore, is not only the science of things dreadful and daring: for it not only has a knowledge of future goods and evils, but also of such as are past and present and in short it surveys all things like the other sciences.

NIC.

Nic. So it seems.

Soc. You have, therefore, O Nicias, only defined to us in your answer the third part of fortitude, though we asked you what the whole of fortitude is. And now, as it seems, according to your assertion, fortitude is not only the science of things dreadful and daring, but nearly of all good and evil, and in short of all things, from your argument, in whatever manner they may subsist. Do you thus determine, or how do you say, O Nicias?

Nic. To me it appears to be so, O Socrates.

Soc. Does then such a virtue as this appear to you, O blessed man, to be deficient in any respect, if it knows all goods, and in what manner they have been, are, and will be produced, and in the same manner as to evils? And do you think that he is indigent of temperance, or justice, or piety, to whom alone it belongs to be cautious with respect to such things as are dreadful and such as are not, both concerning gods and men; who also knows how to obtain what is good, and to associate in a proper manner with others?

Nic. You appear to me, O Socrates, to say something.

Soc. That therefore, O Nicias, which is now adduced by you, will not be a part of virtue, but all virtue.

Nic. So it seems.

Soc. Nevertheless we said that fortitude is one of the parts of virtue.

Nic. We did say so.

Soc. But that which is now said does not appear to be a part of virtue.

Nic. It does not.

Soc. We have not, therefore, O Nicias, discovered what fortitude is.

Nic. It does not appear that we have.

Lac. And yet I should have thought, my dear Nicias, that you would have discovered it, by your contempt of me when I answered Socrates. And therefore I had very great hope that you would have discovered it from the wisdom of Damon.

Nic. Excellent indeed, O Laches, that you should think it a thing of no consequence, that you just now appeared to know nothing about fortitude; but should be alone concerned that I also may appear to be as ignorant as yourself: and as it seems you are satisfied, if I as well as you am ignorant of things, of which it becomes him to have a knowledge who wishes to be a man of any consequence. You therefore appear to me to act in reality
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after the manner of men, because you do not at all look to yourself but to others. I think, however, that I have spoken tolerably well on this subject; and if any thing that I have asserted is defective, I shall afterwards correct it, and this with the assistance of Damon, whom you think proper to deride, though you have never seen him. I shall also do this by calling in the aid of others: and when I have obtained a firm conviction of these things, I will likewise instruct you without envy; for you appear to me to be in very great want of instruction.

LAC. You are indeed wise, O Nicias: but, at the same time, I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to bid farewell to you and me concerning the education of youth; but not to dismiss this Socrates, as I said from the first: for I would thus act, if my children were of a proper age.

NIC. I also grant you, that if Socrates is willing to take the lads under his care, no other person should be sought after. Indeed, I should most gladly send Niceratus to him, if he were willing; but when I say any thing to him on this subject, he recommends others to me, and is unwilling to undertake this office himself. But see, O Lysimachus, whether Socrates will more willingly comply with your request.

LYS. It is just, O Nicias, since I also am willing to do many things for him, which I should not be very willing to do for many others. What then do you say, O Socrates? Will you comply with our request, and will you take charge of these lads, so that they may become most excellent characters?

SOC. It would certainly be a dreadful thing, O Lysimachus, not to be willing to endeavour that they may become most worthy. If, therefore, in the preceding conference, I have appeared to be skilful, but the other persons of the dialogue not, it will be just to call me especially to this employment; but now, since we are all similarly involved in doubt, which of us ought to be preferred? To me indeed it seems that no one of us should have the preference. And since this is the case, consider whether I appear to advise you rightly: for I say it is requisite, O men, (since our conference is only among ourselves,) that we should all of us in common inquire, in the first place, after the best master for ourselves, for we stand in need of one; and in the next place for these lads, sparing neither money nor any thing else; but I shall not advise our continuing in the condition in which we now are. And

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if any one should deride us for applying to teachers at these years, it appears to me that it will be proper to adduce Homer¹, who says,

“Shame ill-accompanies a man in need.”

We therefore, bidding farewell to reproach, will pay attention in common to ourselves and the lads.

Lys. What you say, Socrates, pleases me ; and by how much the older I am, by so much the more readily shall I desire to learn together with the youths. Do then as you have said : come to-morrow morning early to my house without fail, that we may consult about these very things : for it is now time that we should dissolve this conference.

Soc. I will do these things, O Lyfimachus ; and, if it please God, I will be with you to-morrow morning.

¹ In the 17th book of the Odyfsey.

THE END OF THE LACHES.