

THE THEAGES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

POLITICAL WISDOM.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE THEAGES.

IN order to understand the design of this Dialogue, it is necessary to observe that wisdom is two-fold, the one absolute, the other conditional. The absolute is that which is denominated wisdom simply, and without any addition; but the conditional is that which is not simply called wisdom, but a certain wisdom. The former of these is defined to be the knowledge of those things which are the objects of science, and the objects of science are things which possess a necessary eternal and invariable subsistence, such as are those luminous causes and principles of things resident in a divine intellect, which Plato denominates ideas, and Aristotle ¹ things most honourable by nature. But conditional wisdom is common to all arts: for the summit or perfection of every art is called a certain wisdom. Of all those arts however, which possess conditional wisdom, the principal is political wisdom, to which the rest are ministrant. This is called as well the political as the royal discipline; of which the subject is a city, the end the common good, and its servants all the arts.

As this political wisdom, the subject of this Dialogue, forms an important part of virtue considered as a whole, Socrates, conformably to what he had delivered in the Meno, indicates that it can only be obtained by a *divine deliv-*

¹ Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, defines wisdom absolutely considered to be "Science, and the intellect of things most honourable by nature, and the intellect of principles." Η σοφία ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῆ φύσει, καὶ νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν.

(*ἄει μάλιστα*), without which all the endeavours of the most consummate masters are useless; and this he confirms by various examples.

This conversation, according to Dacier, passed that year in which the Athenians were vanquished at Ephesus by Tisaphernus; which was the 4th year of the 92d Olympiad, and 470 years before the birth of Christ. Plato being twenty years of age, was then the disciple of Socrates.

THE THEAGES.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

DEMODOCUS, SOCRATES, THEAGES.

DEMODOCUS.

I WANT, Socrates, to speak with you in private about certain things, if you are at leisure; and if you are not, unless your business is of great importance, make leisure for my sake.

Soc. But I am indeed at leisure, and very much at your service. You have my permission therefore to speak, if you wish to say any thing.

DEM. Are you willing therefore that we should retire from this place into the porch of Jupiter Eleutherius, which is very near?

Soc. If you please.

DEM. Let us go then, Socrates. All plants, whatever is produced from the earth, other animals, and man, appear to subsist after the same manner. For in plants this thing is easy to such of us as cultivate the earth, viz. to prepare every thing prior to planting, and the planting itself; but when that which is planted lives, then the attention which the plant requires is great and very difficult. The same thing also appears to take place respecting men. For I form a conjecture of other things from my own affairs. For of this my son, the planting, or the procreating, or whatever else it may be requisite to call it, is the easiest of all things; but his education is difficult, and occasions one to be in continual fear about him. With respect to other things, therefore, much might be said; but the desire which he now possesses very much terrifies me. It is not indeed ignoble, but it is dangerous. For he desires, Socrates, as he says, to become a wise man. And as it appears to me, certain plebeians of the same age with him, coming to this city, and re-

peating certain discourses which they have heard, have very much disturbed him. Of these he is emulous, and some time ago was troublesome to me, thinking it fit that I should pay attention to him, and give a sum of money to some one of the sophists, who might make him a wife man. I am not indeed much concerned about the expense; but I think that the object of his pursuit will lead him into no small danger. Hitherto, therefore, I have restrained by soothing him; but as I am no longer able to effect this, I have thought it best to comply with his wishes, lest by frequently associating with others without me he should be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very purpose, that I may place him with some one of those who appear to be sophists. Our meeting with you, therefore, is a fortunate circumstance: for as I am going to engage in affairs of this kind, I wish very much to consult you about them. If then you have any advice to give respecting what you have heard from me, it is both lawful and proper for you to give it.

Soc. Counsel, however, O Demodocus, is said to be a sacred thing. If therefore any other thing whatever is sacred, this will be so which is now the object of your consultation: for it is not possible for man to consult about any thing more divine than about the erudition of himself and of those that belong to him. In the first place, therefore, you and I should mutually agree, what we think this thing to be about which we consult; lest I should frequently apprehend it to be one thing, and you another, and afterwards very much dissenting from each other in our conference, we should perceive ourselves to be ridiculous: I who give, and you who request, advice not agreeing in any one thing.

DEM. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak rightly, and it is proper so to do.

Soc. I do say right, and yet not entirely, since I make an alteration in a certain trifling particular: for I am thinking that perhaps this youth may not desire that which we think he desires, but something else. And if something else is the object of his wishes, we shall act absurdly in consulting about that which is different from them. It appears therefore to me to be most right to begin by inquiring of him what it is which he desires.

DEM. It appears indeed, as you say, to be best to do so.

Soc. But tell me what the name is of this fine youth: what must we call him?

DEM.

DEM. His name, Socrates, is Theages.

Soc. You have given to your son, O Demodocus, a beautiful and sacred name. But tell us, O Theages, do you say that you desire to become a wife man, and do you think it is fit that this your father should find out a man, who by associating with you may make you wife.

THEA. I do.

Soc. But whether do you call those men wife, who are scientifically knowing, whatever that may be about which they possess this knowledge; or do you call those wife who do not possess scientific knowledge?

THEA. I call the scientific wife.

Soc. What then? Has not your father taught and instructed you in those things, in which others here are instructed who are the sons of respectable fathers; viz. letters, to play on the harp, to wrestle, and other exercises?

THEA. He has.

Soc. Do you think, then, that there is still a certain science wanting, which it is proper your father should pay attention to for your sake?

THEA. I do.

Soc. What is it? Tell us also, that we may gratify you.

THEA. My father also knows what it is, Socrates: for I have often mentioned it to him. But he designedly says these things to you, as if he did not know what I desire: for in other things also he similarly opposes me, and is not willing to place me with any one.

Soc. But all that you have hitherto said to him has been said without witnesses: now therefore make me a witness, and before me say what the wisdom is which you desire: for come now, if you should desire that wisdom by which men steer ships, and I should ask you, O Theages, what is the wisdom, of which being in want, you blame your father as unwilling to place you with a man through whom you might become wife? what answer would you give me? What would you say this wisdom is? Is it not that of piloting?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But if you desired to be wife according to that wisdom by which they drive chariots, and afterwards blamed your father, on my asking you what this wisdom is, what answer would you give me? Would you not say it is the charioteering art?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But with respect to the wisdom which you now desire, whether is it without a name, or has it a name?

THEA. I think it has a name.

Soc. Whether therefore do you know the thing itself, but not its name? Or do you also know its name?

THEA. I also know its name.

Soc. Say, therefore, what it is.

THEA. What other name, Socrates, can any one say it has than that of wisdom?

Soc. Is not then the charioteering art also wisdom? Or does it appear to you to be ignorance?

THEA. It does not.

Soc. But wisdom?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. What is the use of it? Is it not that we may know how to manage horses when yoked to a chariot?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Is not therefore the piloting art also wisdom?

THEA. To me it appears to be so.

Soc. Is it not that by which we know how to manage ships?

THEA. It is.

Soc. But what is the wisdom of which you are desirous? Or, what is that which, when we obtain it, we shall know how to govern?

THEA. To me it appears to be that by which we know how to govern men.

Soc. What, sick men?

THEA. No.

Soc. For that wisdom is the medicinal art. Is it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Is it that, then, by which we know how to regulate fingers in choirs?

THEA. It is not.

Soc. For this is music.

THEA. Certainly.

Soc.

Soc. But is it that by which we know how to govern those that engage in gymnastic exercises?

THEA. It is not.

Soc. For this is gymnastic.

THEA. It is.

Soc. Is it the wisdom by which those who do something effect their purpose? Endeavour to tell me, in the same manner as I have told you above.

THEA. It appears to me to be that wisdom by which we know how to govern those in a city.

Soc. Are there not, therefore, in a city also those that are sick?

THEA. Yes: but I do not speak of these only, but also of others in the city.

Soc. I understand then the art of which you speak. For you appear to me not to say, that it is that art by which we know how to govern mowers, vine-dressers, ploughmen, sowers, and threshers: for that by which we know how to govern these is agriculture. Is it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Nor is it that by which we know how to govern those that handle the saw, the plane, and the lathe; for this belongs to the carpenter's art. Does it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But perhaps you speak of that wisdom by which we govern all these, viz. husbandmen, carpenters, all artificers, and private persons, both men and women.

THEA. It is this wisdom, Socrates, of which I wished to speak some time ago.

Soc. Are you, therefore, disposed to say that Ægisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, had dominion over these things of which you speak, viz. all artificers and private persons, both men and women, or over certain other things?

THEA. He only had dominion over such as these.

Soc. But what? Did not Peleus, the son of Acacus, have dominion over these very things in Phthia?

THEA. Yes.

Soc.

Soc. And have you not heard that Periander, the son of Cypselus, governed Corinth.

THEA. I have.

Soc. And did he not rule over these very same things in his city?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But what? Do you not think that Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who lately governed ¹ in Macedonia, had dominion over these very things?

THEA. I do.

Soc. But over what things do you think Hippias ², the son of Pisistratus, who rules in this city, has dominion? Is it not over these things?

THEA. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Can you tell me, then, what Bacis ³ and the Sibyl, and our Amphilytus, are called?

THEA. What else, Socrates, than diviners?

Soc. You speak rightly. Endeavour, therefore, also to tell me what name you give to Hippias and Periander through the same dominion?

THEA. I think they are tyrants: for what else can they be called?

Soc. Whoever, therefore, desires to have dominion over all the men in the city, desires this very same dominion, the tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.

THEA. So it appears.

Soc. Do you therefore say that you desire this dominion?

THEA. It seems so from what I have said.

Soc. O you wicked one! Do you desire to tyrannise over us? And did you some time ago blame your father because he did not send you to some tyrannic preceptor? And are not you, O Demodocus, ashamed; who, having for some time known what your son desires, and having likewise the

¹ It was five or six years before. He was killed at the end of this very year.—Dacier.

² Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, was tyrant of Athens four years. According to Thucydides he succeeded his father, and not Hipparchus. After he had reigned four years he was banished; and twenty years after his exile was slain at the battle of Marathon, where he bore arms for the Persians.—Dacier.

³ Bacis was a prophet, who, long before Xerxes made a descent into Greece, predicted to the people all that would befall them. Herodotus relates some of his prophecies in his 8th book, and considers them to be so formal and plain, since their accomplishment, that he says he neither dares accuse those oracles of falsehood himself, nor suffer others to do so, or to refuse to give credit to them. Aristophanes speaks of this prophet in his comedy of Peace.—Dacier.

ability of sending him to be made that artist in wisdom which he aspires to be, have, notwithstanding, envied him this object of his wishes, and have not been willing to send him to obtain it? Now, however, since he accuses you before me, let us consult in common, you and I, whither we should send him; and through associating with whom he may become a wise tyrant.

DEM. Let us indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates, consult: for it appears to me that no despicable counsel is requisite about this affair.

SOC. Permit us first, O good man, to make inquiry of him sufficiently.

DEM. Interrogate him.

SOC. What then, O Theages, if we should make use of Euripides? For he somewhere says,

Tyrants are wise that with the wise converse.

If, therefore, some one should ask Euripides, In what, O Euripides, do you say tyrants become wise by the conversation of the wise? just as if he had said,

Farmers are wise that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what are they rendered wise? What answer would he give us? Would he reply that they are rendered wise in any thing else than in things pertaining to agriculture?

THEA. He would not.

SOC. But what? If he had said,

Wise are the cooks that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what they become wise? What do you think he would answer? Would it not be, that they become wise in things pertaining to cooking?

THEA. Yes.

SOC. Again, if he had said,

Wrestlers are wise that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what they are rendered wise? Would he not say in things pertaining to wrestling?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But since he says,

Tyrants are wife that with the wife converse:

if we should ask him, In what do you say they become wife, O Euripides? What would be his answer?

THEA. By Jupiter, I do not know.

Soc. Are you willing, then, I should tell you?

THEA. If you please.

Soc. These are the things which Anacreon, says Callicrete¹, knew. Or are you not acquainted with the verse?

THEA. I am.

Soc. What then? Do you also desire to associate with a man of this kind, who possesses the same art with Callicrete the daughter of Cyane, and who knows tyrannic concerns, in the same manner as the poet says she did; and this, that you may become a tyrant to us and the city?

THEA. You have for some time, Socrates, derided and jested with me.

Soc. But what? Do you not say that you desire this wisdom, by which you may have dominion over all the citizens? And doing this, will you be any thing else than a tyrant?

THEA. I think, indeed, that I should pray to become the tyrant of all men, or, if not of all, of the greater part; and I think that you, and all other men, would do the same. Or, perhaps, *you* would rather pray that you might become a god². But I did not say that *I* desired this.

Soc. But what then, after all, is this which you desire? Do you not say that you desire to govern the citizens?

THEA. Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I desire to govern the willing, in the same manner as other excellent men in the city.

Soc. Do you speak of such men as Themistocles, and Pericles, and Cimon, and such as were skilful in political affairs?

¹ This was a virgin who employed herself in teaching politics, as Aspasia, Diotima, and some others, did after her. The verses which Anacreon made on her are lost.—Dacier.

² Theages here alludes to what Socrates was wont to say, that men should endeavour to become similar to divinity.

THEA.

THEA. By Jupiter, I speak of these.

Soc. What then, if you desired to become wise in equestrian affairs, would you obtain the object of your wish, by going to any other than those who are skilled in the management of horses?

THEA. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. But you would go to these very men who are skilled in these things, who possess horses, and who continually use both their own and many that are the property of others.

THEA. Certainly.

Soc. But what! If you desired to become wise in things pertaining to the throwing of darts, would you not go to those who are skilled in these affairs, and who continually use many darts, both those belonging to others and their own?

THEA. It appears so to me.

Soc. Tell me then, since you wish to become wise in political affairs, do you think you will become wise by going to any others than these politicians, who are skilful in political affairs, who continually use their own city, and many others, and who are conversant both with Grecian and Barbarian cities? Or do you think, that by associating with certain other persons you will become wise in those things in which they are wise, but not in these very things?

THEA. I have heard assertions, which they say are yours; that the sons of these political men are in no respect better than the sons of shoe-makers; and you appear to me to have spoken most truly, from what I am able to perceive. I should be stupid, therefore, if I should think that any one of these could impart to me his wisdom, when he cannot in any respect benefit his own son; or if I should suppose that he could in these things benefit any other man.

Soc. What then would you do, O best of men, if you had a son who caused you molestation of this kind; and who should say that he desired to become a good painter; and should blame you, his father, because you are not willing to be at any expense for the sake of these things; while he, on the other hand, despised those artists, the painters, and was unwilling to learn from them; or, if he acted in this manner towards pipers or harpers, being at the same time desirous to become a piper or harper? What would

you do with him, and where would you send him, being thus unwilling to learn from these persons ?

THEA. By Jupiter, I do not know.

SOC. Now, therefore, doing these very things to your father, can you wonder at and blame him, if he is dubious what he should do with you, and where he should send you ? For, if you are willing, he will immediately place you with those Athenians that are most skilled in political affairs : and with these you will not be at any expense, and at the same time will be much more generally renowned than by associating with any others.

THEA. What then, Socrates ; are not you among the number of excellent and worthy men ? For if you are willing to associate with me, it is sufficient, and I shall seek for no other.

SOC. Why do you say this, Theages ?

DEM. O Socrates, he does not speak badly ; and at the same time by doing this you will gratify me. For there is not any thing which I should consider to be a greater gain, than for my son to be pleased with your conversation ; and for you to be willing to associate with him. And indeed I am ashamed to say how very much I wish this to take place. I therefore entreat both of you ; you, Socrates, that you will be willing to associate with him ; and you, my son, that you do not seek to associate with any other than Socrates ; and you will thus liberate me from many and dreadful cares. For I now very much fear lest my son should meet with some other person who may corrupt him.

THEA. You need not fear any longer, O father, for me, if you can but persuade Socrates to permit me to associate with him.

DEM. You speak very well. And after this, all the conversation, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, in short, to give up myself to you, and whatever is most dear to me that you may require, if you will love this my Theages, and benefit him to the utmost of your ability.

SOC. O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are so importunate, if you think that your son can be especially benefited by me. For I do not know any thing about which he who is endued with intellect ought to be more anxious, than how his son may become the best of men. But whence it has appeared to you that I am more able to assist your son in becoming a
good

good citizen, than you yourself, and whence you have thought that I can benefit him more than you, I very much wonder. For you, in the first place, are older than I am; and in the next place, you have exercised the principal offices among the Athenians; nor is any one more honoured than you by the Anagyrufian populace and the rest of the city. But neither of you fees any one of these things in me. If herefore Theages, here, despises the associating with political men, and seeks after certain others who profess to give instruction, there and here, Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias the Leontine, Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are so wise, that going into cities they persuade the noblest and most wealthy of the youth, who are permitted to associate gratis with any one of the citizens they please,—they persuade these, I say, to renounce those of their own city, and adhere to them, though the youth give them a considerable sum of money, and thanks besides, for their instruction. It is fit, therefore, that you and your son should choose some one of these; but it is not fit that you should choose me: for I know none of these blessed and beautiful disciplines; though I wish I did; but I always profess to know nothing, as I may say, except a certain small discipline of amatory affairs. In this discipline, I acknowledge myself to be more skilful than any one of the past or present age.

THEA. Do you not see, O father, that Socrates does not appear to be very willing to associate with me. For, as to myself, I am ready, if he is willing; but he says these things in jest to us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and others who are a little older, who before they were familiar with him were of no worth, but when they associated with him, in a very little time appeared to be the best of all men, and surpassed those to whom they were before inferior.

Soc. Do you know, therefore, O son of Demodocus, how this comes to pass?

THEA. Yes, by Jupiter, I do; and if you were willing, I also should become such as they were.

Soc. Not so, O excellent youth; but you are ignorant in what manner this takes place. However, I will tell you how it happens:—There is a certain dæmoniacal power¹ which has followed me by a divine allotment from childhood.

¹ This passage incontestably proves that the dæmon of Socrates was not the intellect of that philosopher.

childhood. This is a voice, which when it takes place always signifies to me that I should abandon what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if any one of my friends communicates any thing to me, and I hear the voice, it dissuades me from this thing, and does not suffer me to do it. Of these things I will adduce to you witnesses: You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of Glauco; he once came to me, in order to communicate to me his intention of contending in the Nemean games¹; and immediately, on his beginning to tell me that he meant to contend, I heard the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While you was speaking to me, I heard the voice of the dæmoniacal power; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice signified to you that I should not conquer; but, though I should not be victorious, yet by exercising myself at this time I shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the contest. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire of him what happened to him from contending in these games. If you are willing also, ask Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus², what Timarchus said to him when he was about to die, for having despised the admonition of the dæmonical power. For he and Euathlus, who was famous for running races, and who received Timarchus when he fled, will tell you what he then said.

THEA. What did he say?

SOC. O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates. But why Timarchus said this I will tell you. When Timarchus rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son of Philemonides, in order to kill Nicias the son of Herofcomander, for none but they two were in the conspiracy,—Timarchus, as he rose, said to me, What do you say, Socrates? Do you indeed continue drinking; but it is necessary that I should depart. I will, however, return shortly, if I can. I then heard the voice, and I said to him, By no means should

philosopher, nor any part of his soul, as has been rashly asserted by some moderns unskilled in the writings and philosophy of Plato. For a full account of this dæmon see the note at the beginning of the first Alcibiades.

¹ One of the four famous games of Greece, which were celebrated once in three years.

² I suppose this is Timarchus of Cheronea, who desired to be interred near one of the sons of Socrates, who died a little before. I could never find any footsteps of this history elsewhere.—
Dacier.

you

you leave us; for I have heard the accustomed dæmoniacal signal. Upon this he stayed; and having remained with us for a time, he again rose up to depart, and said, Socrates, I am going: and again I heard the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to stay. The third time wishing to escape me unnoticed, he rose without saying any thing to me, when my attention was otherwise engaged, and thus departing he did that which was the cause of his death. Whence he said this to his brother, which I have now told you, viz. that he was going to die, because he would not believe me. Further still, you may also learn from many in Sicily, what I said concerning the destruction of the army. And with respect to things that are past, you may hear them from those that know them; but you may now make trial of the dæmoniacal signal, if it says any thing to the purpose. For Sannion, the son of Calus, is gone to the army; and on his going, I heard the dæmoniacal signal. But he is now gone with Thrafylus¹, in order to wage war immediately with Ephesus and Ionia; and I think that he will either die, or that some misfortune will befall him. And I very much fear² for the rest of the enterprise. I have said all these things to you, because this power of the dæmon is able to effect every thing with respect to the conversations of those that associate with me. For it is adverse to many, nor can those be benefited by associating with me whom the dæmon opposes: so that it is not possible for me to live with these. With many, however, he does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they are not all benefited by associating with me. But those whose conversation with me is favoured by the power of the dæmon, these are they whom you have noticed: for in a short time they make a proficiency. And of these, some possess this advantage with firmness and stability; but many, as long as they are with me, advance in a wonderful manner, but when they leave me, they again differ in no respect from other men. This Aristides, the son of Lyfimachus and grandson of Aristides, once experienced: for, associating with me, he made a very great proficiency in a short

¹ Thrafylus was chosen general with Thrafybulus, the fourth year of the ninety-second Olympiad.—Dacier.

² Indeed the Athenians were vanquished at Ephesus. Xenoph. lib. i. Hence Plutarch says, in the life of Alcibiades, that the army of Thrafylus was terribly galled under the walls of Ephesus; and that in memory of this defeat the Ephesians erected a trophy of brass, to the shame of the Athenians.—Dacier.

time; but afterwards he failed from hence, in order to engage in some military expedition. When he returned, he found Thucydides, the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides¹, associating with me. But this Thucydides, the day before, had quarrelled with me in a certain conference. Aristides, therefore, seeing me, after he had saluted me, and some conversation had passed between us, said,—I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, with respect to some things, and is angry with you, as if he were an extraordinary person. It is so, said I. But what? said he, does he not know what a slave he was before he associated with you? It does not seem that he does, said I, by the gods. But a ridiculous circumstance, said he, has happened to me, Socrates. What is it, said I. It is this, said he, that before I went to the army, I was able to converse with any man whoever he might be, nor did I appear to be inferior to any one in argument, so that I sought after the company of the most elegant men; but now, on the contrary, I shun any one whom I perceive to be learned, so ashamed am I of my own vileness. But, said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly, or by degrees? By degrees, he replied. When was it present with you, said I? Was it present while you was learning something from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you, said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true: for I never, at any time, learnt any thing from you, as you know, but I made a proficiency when I associated with you, even if I was only in the same house that you were, though not in the same room; but my proficiency was greater when I was in the same room with you. I also appeared to myself to improve much more when, being in the same room with you, I looked at you when you spoke, than when I looked another way. But I made by far the greatest proficiency when I sat near you and touched you. Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely fled. Such, therefore, O Theages, is the association with me: for if it pleases divinity, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but you will not, if he does not please. See then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some one of those who have power over the benefit which they impart to men, than by me who benefit, or not, just as it may happen.

¹ This grandson of Thucydides rivalled Pericles in the government.

THEA. It appears to me, therefore, Socrates, that we should act in this manner, viz. that we should make trial of this dæmoniacal power by associating together. And, if he is favourable to us, the best consequences will ensue; but if he is not, then let us immediately consult what is to be done, whether we should associate with some other, or endeavour to appease the divine power, that is present with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other means which our diviners teach.

DEM. Do not oppose the lad any longer, Socrates, in these things: for Theages speaks well.

Soc. If it appears proper thus to act, let us do so.

THE END OF THE THEAGES.