THE PROTAGORAS:

OR,

THE SOPHISTS.

THE PROTAGORAS

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

An ASSOCIATE,	ALCIBIADES,
SOCRATES,	CALLIAS,
HIPPOCRATES,	CRITIAS,
PROTAGORAS,	PRODICUS[2],

And HIPPIAS.

ASSOCIATE.

WHENCE come you, Socrates? or is it not evident that you come from hunting about the beauty of Alcibiades? For to me, as I lately beheld him, the man appeared to be beautiful. I ſay the man: for between ourſelves, Socrates, he may be called ſo, ſince his beard begins now to make its appearance.

Soc. But what then? Do you not indeed praiſe Homer[3], who ſays, that the age of a young man when he begins to have a beard is moſt agreeable? And this is now the age of Alcibiades.

[1] As the ſame queſtion is diſcuſſed in this Dialogue, though not ſo fully as in the Meno, viz. Whether virtue can be taught, an introduction to it is unneceſſary. I ſhall therefore only obſerve, that the livelineſs and variety of the characters in it; the mirth and pleaſantry of Socrates; the ſimplicity and nobleneſs of the narratives; and the knowledge of antiquities it diſplays, are beauties no leſs obvious than inimitable. For an account of Protagoras, that prince of ſophiſts, ſee the Theætetus.

[2] This ſophiſt was of Cos, and flouriſhed about 396 years before Chriſt. Among his pupils were Euripides, Socrates, Theramenes, and Iſocrates. He made his auditors pay to hear him harangue, which has given occaſion to ſome of the antients to ſpeak of the orations of Prodicus, for 50 drachms. Among his numerous writings, he compoſed that beautiful epiſode in which virtue and pleaſure are introduced attempting to make Hercules one of their votaries.

[3] See the 10th Book of the Odyſſey, where Homer repreſents Mercury as aſſuming the ſhape of a young man that begins to have a beard.

4 Assoc.

Assoc. But do you not at prefent come from him? And how is the young man difpofed towards you?

Soc. He appears to be well affected towards me, and efpecially fo to-day; for he faid many things in defence of me; and I am juft now come from him. However, I wifh to tell you fomething very ftrange: though he was prefent I did not attend to him, and even forgot to look at him.

Assoc. What great affair then happened to both of you? for you could not meet with any other beautiful perfon in this city.

Soc. I did, however, and with one far more beautiful.

Assoc. What do you fay? Was he a citizen or a ftranger?

Soc. A ftranger.

Assoc. Whence came he.

Soc. From Abdera.

Assoc. And did this ftranger appear to you fo beautiful as to furpafs in beauty the fon of Clinias?

Soc. How can it be otherwife, O bleffed man, but that the wifeft muft appear to be the more beautiful perfon?

Assoc. Do you come to us then, Socrates, from a certain wife man?

Soc. I do, and from the wifeft indeed of thofe that exift at prefent; if Protagoras appears to you to be moft wife.

Assoc. What do you fay? Is Protagoras arrived hither?

Soc. He has been here thefe three days.

Assoc. And have you then juft now been with him?

Soc. I have; and I have alfo both fpoken and heard many things.

Assoc. Will you not therefore relate this converfation to us? For if nothing hinders, you may fit here, fince this boy will give you his place.

Soc. I will certainly relate it to you: and I fhall alfo thank you for attending to it.

Assoc. And we fhall thank you for the narration.

Soc. There will then be reciprocal thanks. Hear therefore:—This morning, while it was yet dark, Hippocrates, the fon of Apollodorus and the brother of Phafon, knocked very hard at my gate with his ftick, and as foon as it was opened he haftily came to my bedchamber, crying with a loud voice, Socrates, are you afleep?—And I knowing his voice faid, This is Hippocrates, do you bring any news?—None, he replied, but what is good.—You

 fpeak

ſpeak well, ſaid I, but what is it? and what brought you hither?—Protagoras, ſaid he, is come, and dwells near me.—He has been here, I replied, for ſome time; and have you only juſt heard it?—I only heard it, by the gods, ſaid he, this evening; and at the ſame time, taking a couch, he ſat down at my feet, and ſaid, I returned laſt night very late from the village of Oinoe; for my boy Satyrus had made his eſcape from me, and being deſirous to tell you that I ſhould purſue him, ſomething elſe occurring, I forgot it. But after I had returned, ſupped, and was going to bed, then my brother told me Protagoras was come. On hearing this, I immediately attempted to go to you; but afterwards it appeared to me that the night was already far advanced. Soon therefore falling aſleep from wearineſs, when I awoke, I came hither.—And I knowing the fortitude of Hippocrates, and ſeeing his aſtoniſhment, ſaid, What is this to you? Has Protagoras injured you in any reſpect?—By the gods, ſaid he laughing, he has, becauſe he alone is wiſe, and has not made me to be ſo.—But, by Jupiter, ſaid I, if you had given him money, and had perſuaded him, he would have made you alſo wiſe.—O Jupiter, and the other gods, he replied, I ſhould neither ſpare my own property, nor that of my friends, to accompliſh this, and I now come to you, that you may ſpeak to him in my behalf. For I am younger than you, and at the ſame time I never either ſaw or heard Protagoras; for I was a boy when he firſt came to this place. However, Socrates, all men praiſe him, and ſay that his diſcourſes are moſt wiſe. But why do we not go to him that we may find him within? And he reſides, as I have heard, with Callias [1] the ſon of Hipponicus. Let us then go.—To this I replied, We will not yet go thither, O good man, for it is too early; but let us go into our court, where we will walk and converſe till it is light; and afterwards we will pay a viſit to Protagoras. For, as he ſtays very much at home, we ſhall moſt probably find him within.—After this we roſe and went into the court, and I, in order to try the ſtrength of Hippocrates, looked at him attentively, and ſaid, Tell me, O Hippocrates, do you now endeavour to go to Protagoras, that by giving him money he may teach you ſomething? What kind of man do you ſuppoſe him to be? and what kind of a man would you wiſh him to make you? Juſt as if you

[1] This Callias was one of the firſt citizens of Athens, and his father Hipponicus had been general of the Athenians, together with Nicias, at the battle of Tanagre.

ſhould go to your nameſake, Hippocrates of Cos, who is a deſcendant of Eſculapius, and ſhould offer him money on your own account, if any one ſhould aſk you, O Hippocrates, to what kind of man do you give money, and on what account? what would you anſwer?—I ſhould ſay, he replied, that I give it as to a phyſician.—And with what view would you give it?—That I might become a phyſician, ſaid he.—But if you went to the Argive Polycletus, or the Athenian Phidias, and gave them a reward on your own account, ſhould any one aſk you to what kind of men, and for what purpoſe, you offered money to Polycletus and Phidias, what would you anſwer?—I ſhould anſwer, ſaid he, that I gave it as to ſtatuaries, and in order that I myſelf might become a ſtatuary.—Be it ſo, I replied. But we are now going, I and you, to Protagoras, and we are prepared to give him money on your account, if we have ſufficient for this purpoſe, and can perſuade him by this mean; but if it be not ſufficient, we muſt borrow from our friends. If therefore ſome one, on perceiving our great eagerneſs about theſe particulars, ſhould ſay, Tell me, O Socrates and Hippocrates, to what kind of man, and for what purpoſe do you intend to give money in offering it to Protagoras? what anſwer ſhould we give him? What other appellation have we heard reſpecting Protagoras, as with reſpect to Phidias we have heard him called a ſtatuary, and with reſpect to Homer, a poet? What thing of this kind have we heard concerning Protagoras?—They call this man, ſaid he, a ſophiſt, Socrates.—Shall we go therefore, and offer money as to a ſophiſt?—Certainly.—If then ſome one ſhould aſk you what do you deſign to become by going to Protagoras?—He replied, bluſhing (for there was now day-light ſufficient for me to ſee him), from what we have already admitted, it is evident that my deſign is to become a ſophiſt.—But, by the gods, ſaid I, will you not be aſhamed to proclaim yourſelf a ſophiſt among the Greeks?—I ſhall, by Jupiter, if it is requiſite to ſpeak what I think.—Your deſign then, Hippocrates, in acquiring the diſcipline of Protagoras, is not to become a ſophiſt, but you have the ſame intention as when you went to the ſchool of a grammarian, or that of a muſician, or of a maſter of gymnaſtic: for you went not to thoſe maſters to learn their art, that you might become a profeſſor yourſelf, but for the ſake of acquiring ſuch inſtruction as becomes a private and a free man.—The diſcipline which I ſhall receive from Protagoras, ſaid he, perfectly appears to me to be rather a thing of this kind.—Do you know therefore, I replied,

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what you now intend to do? or is it concealed from you?—About what?—That you are about to commit your ſoul to the care of a man, who, as you ſay, is a ſophiſt; and yet I ſhould wonder if you know what a ſophiſt is. Though if you are ignorant of this, neither do you know to whom you deliver your ſoul, nor if to a good or a bad thing.—But I think, ſaid he, that I know.—Tell me then what you think a ſophiſt is?—I think, ſaid he, as the name implies, that he is one knowing in things pertaining to wiſdom.—But, I replied, the ſame thing may alſo be ſaid of painters and architects, that they alſo are knowing in things pertaining to wiſdom. And if any one ſhould aſk us in what wiſe particulars painters are knowing, we ſhould anſwer him, that their wiſdom conſiſted in the production of images; and we ſhould reply in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to the reſt. But if ſome one ſhould aſk in what particulars is a ſophiſt wiſe; what ſhould we anſwer? Of what art is he the maſter?—He is maſter, Socrates, of the art which enables men to ſpeak eloquently.—Perhaps, ſaid I, we ſpeak the truth, yet we do not ſpeak ſufficiently. For this anſwer demands from us another interrogation, viz. in what a ſophiſt renders men eloquent. For does not a harper alſo enable thoſe that are inſtructed by him, to ſpeak about that in which he is knowing, viz. the playing on the harp? Is it not ſo?—It is.—Be it ſo then. But about what does a ſophiſt render men eloquent? For it is evident, that it muſt be about things of which he has a knowledge.—It is likely.—What then is that thing about which the ſophiſt is knowing, and which he teaches to others?—By Jupiter, he replied, I can no longer tell you.—And I ſaid after this, Do you know therefore to what danger you are going to expoſe your ſoul? or if you were going to ſubject your body to the hazard of becoming in a good or a bad condition, would you not diligently conſider whether you ſhould expoſe it to this danger or not? Would you not call your friends and relations to conſult with them? And would you not take more than one day to deliberate on the affair? But though you eſteem your ſoul far more than your body, and upon it depends your happineſs or unhappineſs, according as it is well or ill diſpoſed, yet, concerning this, you neither aſk advice of your father nor brother, nor of any one of us your aſſociates, whether you ſhould commit your ſoul to this ſtranger. But having heard of his arrival yeſterday evening, you come next morning before break of day, without conſidering whether it is proper to commit yourſelf to him or not, and are

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prepared to employ not only all your own riches for that purpofe, but alfo thofe of your friends, as if you already knew that you muft by all means affociate with Protagoras, whom, as you fay, you neither know nor have ever fpoken to. But you call him a fophift, though what a fophift is, to which you are about to deliver yourfelf, you are evidently ignorant.—And he having heard me, replied, What you fay, Socrates, appears to be the truth.—Whether or not, therefore, O Hippocrates, is a fophift a certain merchant and retailer of things by which the foul is nourifhed?—He appears to me, Socrates, to be a character of this kind; but with what is the foul nourifhed?—By difciplines, I replied. But we muft take care, my friend, left the fophift, while he praifes what he fells, deceive us, juft as thofe merchants and retailers do refpecting the food of the body. For they are ignorant whether the articles of their traffic are falubrious or noxious to the body, but at the fame time they praife all that they fell. Thofe alfo that buy thefe articles are alike ignorant in this refpect, unlefs the purchafer fhould happen to be a mafter of gymnaftic, or a phyfician. In like manner, thofe who carry about difciplines in cities, and who hawk and fell them to thofe that defire to buy them, praife indeed all that they fell, though perhaps fome of thefe alfo, O moft excellent youth, may be ignorant whether what they fell is beneficial or noxious to the foul. And this alfo may be the cafe with thofe that buy of them, unlefs the purchafer fhould happen to be a phyfician of the foul. If therefore you fcientifically know what among thefe is good or bad, you may fecurely buy difciplines from Protagoras, or any other; but if not, fee, O bleffed youth, whether you will not be in extreme danger with refpect to your deareft concerns. For there is much greater danger in the buying of difciplines than in that of food; fince he who buys meats and drinks of a victualler or merchant may take them away in other veffels, and, before he receives them into his body, may place them in his houfe, and calling in fome perfon fkilled in thefe things, may confult what fhould be eaten and drank, and what fhould not, and how much and when it is proper to eat and drink; fo that there is no great danger in buying provifions. Difciplines, however, cannot be taken away in another veffel; but it is neceffary that he who buys a difcipline, receiving and learning it in his foul, fhould depart either injured or benefited. Let us therefore confider thefe things with thofe that are older than we are: for we are too young to difcufs an affair of fuch great importance. Let us now,

now, however, go whither we intended, and hear the man; and after we have heard him, let us alſo communicate with others. For not only Protagoras is there, but Hippias the Elean, and Prodicus too, I think, and many other wiſe men.

This being agreed upon by us, we go on; but when we entered the porch, we ſtopt to diſcuſs ſomething which had occured to us in the way. That it might not therefore be unfiniſhed, but that being terminated we might thus enter the houſe, we ſtood diſcourſing in the porch, until we agreed with each other. It appears therefore to me that the porter, who was a eunuch, heard us; and that on account of the multitude of the ſophiſts he was enraged with thoſe that came to the houſe. When therefore we had knocked at the gate he opened it, and ſeeing us, Ha, ha, ſaid he, certain ſophiſts. He is not at leiſure. And at the ſame time taking the gate with both his hands, he ſhut it with all his force. We then knocked again, and he, without opening the gate, ſaid, Did not you hear me tell you that he is not at leiſure?—But, my good man, ſaid I, we are not come to Callias, nor are we ſophiſts. Take courage, therefore, for we come requeſting to ſee Protagoras. Announce this to him. Notwithſtanding this the man would ſcarcely open the gate to us. However, he opened it at length, and when we entered, we met with Protagoras walking in the veſtibule of the porch. Many followed him; on one ſide Callias the ſon of Hipponicus, and his brother by the mother; Paralus the ſon of Pericles; and Charmides the ſon of Glauco. On the other ſide of him were Xanthippus the other ſon of Pericles, and Philippides the ſon of Philomelus, and Antimocrus the Mendæan, who was the moſt illuſtrious of all the diſciples of Protagoras, and who is inſtructed in his art that he may become a ſophiſt. Of thoſe behind theſe, who followed them liſtening to what was ſaid, the greater part appeared to be ſtrangers, whom Protagoras brings with him from the ſeveral cities through which he paſſes, and whom he charms by his voice like another Orpheus: and they, allured by voice, follow him. Some of our countrymen alſo were in the choir. On ſeeing this choir I was very much delighted in obſerving how well they took care not to be an impediment to Protagoras in walking before him; but when he turned, and his company with him, theſe his auditors that followed him opened to the right and left in a becoming and orderly manner, and always beautifully ranged themſelves behind him. After Protagoras,

goras, as Homer[1] ſays, I ſaw Hippias the Elean ſeated on a throne in the oppoſite veſtibule of the porch, and round him on benches ſat Eryximachus, the ſon of Acumenus, Phædrus the Myrrhinuſian, Andron the ſon of Androtion, and ſome others, partly ſtrangers and partly his fellow citizens. They appeared, too, to be interrogating Hippias concerning the ſublime parts of nature, and certain aſtronomical particulars; but he, ſitting on a throne, conſidered and reſolved their queſtions. I likewiſe ſaw Tantalus: for Prodicus the Cean was there; but he was in a certain building which Hipponicus had before uſed for an office, but which Callias, on account of the multitude that came to his houſe, had given to the ſtrangers, after having prepared it for their reception. Prodicus therefore was ſtill in bed wrapt up in ſkins and coverings, and Pauſanias of Ceramis was ſeated by his bedſide; and with Pauſanias there was a youth, who appeared to me to be of a beautiful and excellent diſpoſition. His form indeed was perfectly beautiful; and his name, as I have heard, was Agatho. Nor did I wonder that he was beloved by Pauſanias. There were alſo the two Adimantes, the one the ſon of Cephis, and the other the ſon of Leucolophides, and many others. But as I was without, I was not able to learn what was the ſubject of their diſcourſe, though I very much deſired to hear Prodicus: for he appears to me to be a man perfectly wiſe and divine. But a certain humming ſound being produced in the chamber through the grave tone of his voice, prevented me from hearing diſtinctly what he ſaid. Juſt as we had entered, Alcibiades, the beautiful as you ſay, and as I am perſuaded he is, and Critias the ſon of Callaiſchrus, came after us.

After we had entered therefore, and had diſcuſſed certain trifling particulars, and conſidered what paſſed, we went to Protagoras; and I ſaid, O Protagoras, I and Hippocrates are come to ſee you.—Would you wiſh, ſaid he, to ſpeak with me alone, or in the preſence of others?—It makes no difference, I replied, to us; but when you hear on what account we come, you yourſelf ſhall determine this.—What is it then, ſaid he, that hath brought you?—Hippocrates here is our countryman, the ſon of Apollodorus, and is of a great

[1] See the 11th Book of the Odyſſey, where Ulyſſes is repreſented converſing with the ſhades of the dead in Hades. Plato, by alluding to this part of the Odyſſey, doubtleſs intended to inſinuate, as Dacier well obſerves, that theſe ſophiſts are not real men, but only the phantoms and ſhadows of men.

and happy family, and ſeems to contend with his equals in age for natural endowments. But he deſires to become illuſtrious in the city; and he thinks that he ſhall eſpecially effect this if he aſſociates with you. Conſider, therefore, whether it is proper for him to converſe alone with you about theſe particulars, or in conjunction with others.—Your forethought, ſaid he, Socrates, with reſpect to me is right. For a ſtranger who goes to great cities, and perſuades young people of the greateſt quality to leave the aſſociations both of their kindred and others, both the young and the old, and adhere to him alone, that they may become better men by his converſation, ought in doing this to be cautious. For things of this kind are attended with no ſmall envy, together with much malevolence and many ſtratagems. I ſay indeed that the ſophiſtic art is antient, but that thoſe men who firſt profeſſed it, fearing the hatred to which it would be expoſed, ſought to conceal it, ſome with the veil of poetry, as Homer, Heſiod, and Simonides, and others with that of the myſteries and prophecy, as Orpheus and Muſæus, and their followers. I perceive alſo, that ſome have called this art gymnaſtic, as Iccus of Tarentum, and as a ſophiſt at preſent does who is inferior to none, viz. Herodicus the Selymbrianian, who was originally of Megara. But your Agathocles, who was a great ſophiſt, Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others, concealed it under the veil of muſic. All theſe, as I ſaid, being afraid of envy, employed theſe arts as veils. I however, in this particular, do not accord with all theſe: for I think they did not effect any thing which they wiſhed to accompliſh; ſince theſe concealments are underſtood by men of great authority in cities. The vulgar indeed do not perceive them; but praiſe certain things which they hear from the ſophiſts. This ſubterfuge therefore, not being attended with any effect, but becoming apparent, neceſſarily ſhows the great folly of him that attempts it, and makes men much more inimical: for they think that a man of this kind is crafty in every thing. I therefore have taken an oppoſite path: for I acknowledge myſelf to be a ſophiſt, and a teacher of men: and I think that by this ingenuous confeſſion I avoid envy more ſafely than by diſſimulation. I alſo direct my attention to other things beſides this; ſo that, as I may ſay, with the aſſiſtance of Divinity, I have ſuffered nothing dire through confeſſing that I am a ſophiſt; though I have exerciſed this art many years: for my age is very great, and I am old enough to be the father of any one of you. So that it will be by far the moſt pleaſant

fant to me, if you difcourfe with me concerning thefe particulars in the prefence of all thofe that are in the houfe.

I then, fufpecting that he wifhed to exhibit himfelf to Prodicus and Hippias, and to boaft that we came to him as being enamoured of his wifdom, faid, Why may not Prodicus and Hippias be called, and thofe that are with him, that they may hear us?—By all means, faid Protagoras, let them be called.—Callias therefore faid, Shall we prepare feats for you, that you may difcourfe fitting?—It was agreed to be proper fo to do. And at the fame time all of us being pleafed, as thofe that were to hear wife men converfe, took hold of the benches and couches, and difpofed them near to Hippias; for the benches had been there previoufly placed. In the interim came Callias and Alcibiades, bringing with them Prodicus, who had then rifen from his bed, and thofe that were with him. When therefore we were all feated, Now, Socrates, faid Protagoras, you may tell me before all this company what you a little before mentioned to me about this youth. And I faid, My exordium, O Protagoras, is that which I employed before, viz. with what defign we came to you. Hippocrates then, here, is defirous of your converfe; and fays he fhall gladly hear what advantage he fhall derive from affociating with you. This is all we have to fay to you.—Protagoras then faid in reply, O young man, the advantage which you will derive from affociating with me is this, that on the day in which you come to me you will go home better than you was before; you will alfo be more improved on the fecond than on the firft day, and you will always find that you have every day advanced in improvement.—And I, hearing him, faid, O Protagoras, this is by no means wonderful, but it is fit that it fhould be fo; fince you alfo, though fo old and fo wife, would become better, if any one fhould teach you what you do not know. But that is not what we require. But juft as if Hippocrates here fhould immediately change his mind, and fhould defire to affociate with the youth lately arrived at this place, Zeuxippus the fon of Heracletus, and coming to him in the fame manner as he is now come to you, fhould hear from him the fame things as he has heard from you, that every day by affociating with him he would become better, and advance in improvement; if he fhould afk him, In what do you fay I fhall become better, and advance in proficiency, Zeuxippus would anfwer him, In the art of painting. And if he were to affociate with the Theban Orthagoras, and fhould hear from him the fame things

things as he has heard from you, and ſhould aſk him in what he would daily become better by aſſociating with him, he would reply, In the art of playing on the pipe. In like manner do you alſo reply to the youth, and to me aſking for him: for you ſay that Hippocrates here, by aſſociating with Protagoras, will daily become better and advance in improvement; tell us then, O Protagoras, in what he will make this proficiency?—Protagoras, on hearing me thus ſpeak, ſaid, You interrogate well, Socrates, and I rejoice to anſwer thoſe who aſk in a becoming manner. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not ſuffer that which he would ſuffer by aſſociating with any other of the ſophiſts. Other ſophiſts indeed injure youth: for they force them to apply to arts which they are unwilling to learn, by teaching them arithmetic, aſtronomy, geometry, and muſic. And at the ſame time looking at Hippias [1], he added, But he who comes to me, will not learn any thing elſe than that for the ſake of which he came. The diſcipline too which he acquires from me is the ability of conſulting well about his domeſtic affairs, ſo that he may govern his houſe in the beſt manner, and ſo that he may be capable of ſaying and doing all that is advantageous for his country.—I underſtand you, I replied: for you appear to me to ſpeak of the political art, and to profeſs to make men good citizens.—This, ſaid he, is the profeſſion which I announce.—What a beautiful artifice, ſaid I, you poſſeſs! if you do poſſeſs it. For nothing elſe is to be ſaid to you than that which I conceive. For I, O Protagoras, do not think that this can be taught, and yet I cannot diſbelieve what you ſay. It is juſt, however, that I ſhould inform you whence I think it cannot be taught, nor by men be procured for men. For I, as well as the other Greeks, ſay that the Athenians are wiſe. I ſee, therefore, when we are collected in the aſſembly, and when it is neceſſary to do ſomething reſpecting the building of houſes, that the architects being ſent for, are conſulted about the buſineſs; but that when ſomething is to be done concerning the building of ſhips, ſhipwrights are conſulted; and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other things which they think may be taught and learnt. But if any other perſon whom they do not think to be an artiſt attempts to give them advice in theſe particulars, though he may be very fine and rich and noble, they pay no more attention to him on this account, but

[1] Protagoras ſays this, becauſe Hippias profeſſed to be very ſkilful in theſe ſciences.

laugh and make a noiſe, until he either deſiſts from ſpeaking through the diſturbance, or till the archers, by order of the magiſtrates, lead or carry him out. In this manner therefore they act reſpecting things which pertain to art. But when it is requiſite to conſult about any thing which relates to the government of the city, then the builder, the brazier, the ſhoemaker, the merchant, and the ſailor, the rich and the poor, the noble and the ignoble, riſe, and ſimilarly give their advice, and no one diſturbs them, as was the caſe with the others, as perſons who, though they have never learnt nor have had a preceptor, yet attempt to give advice. For it is evident that they do not think this can be taught. Nor does this take place only in public affairs, but in private concerns alſo; the wiſeſt and beſt of the citizens are not able to impart to others the virtue which they poſſeſs. For Pericles, the father of theſe youths, has beautifully and well inſtructed them in thoſe things which are taught by maſters; but in thoſe things in which he is wiſe, he has neither himſelf inſtructed them, nor has he ſent them to another to be inſtructed; but they, feeding as it were without reſtraint, wander about, to ſee if they can caſually meet with virtue. If you will too, this very ſame man Pericles, being the tutor of Clinias the younger brother of this Alcibiades, ſeparated them, fearing the former ſhould be corrupted by the latter, and ſent Clinias to be educated by Ariphron. Before, however, ſix months had elapſed, Ariphron, not knowing what to do with him, returned him to Pericles. I could alſo mention many others to you, who being themſelves good men, never made any other man better, neither of their kindred nor ſtrangers. I therefore, O Protagoras, looking to theſe things, do not think that virtue can be taught. When, however, I hear you aſſerting theſe things, I waver, and am of opinion that you ſpeak to the purpoſe, becauſe I think that you are ſkilled in many things, and that you have learned many and diſcovered ſome things ourſelf. If, therefore, you can more clearly ſhow us, that virtue may be taught, do not be envious, but demonſtrate this to us.

Indeed, Socrates, ſaid he, I ſhall not be envious. But whether ſhall I ſhow you this by relating a fable, as an older to younger men, or ſhall I diſcuſs it by argument? Many, therefore, of thoſe that ſat with him, left it to his choice. It appears, therefore, to me, ſaid he, that it will be more agreeable to you to relate a fable.

"There was a time, then, when the gods were alone [1], but the mortal genera did not exist. But when the destined time of generation came to these, the gods fashioned them within the earth, by mixing earth and fire together; and such things as are mingled with these two elements. And when they were about to lead them into light, they commanded Prometheus and Epimetheus [2] to distribute to and adorn each with those powers which were adapted to their nature. But Epimetheus requested Prometheus that he might distribute these powers: And, said he, do you attend to my distribution. And having thus persuaded him, he distributed. But in his distributing, he gave to some strength without swiftness, and adorned with swiftness the more imbecile. Some he also armed; but giving to others an unarmed nature, he devised a certain other power for their security. For those whom he had invested with a small body, he either enabled to fly away through wings, or distributed them in a subterranean habitation; but those whom he had increased in magnitude he preserved by their bulk. And thus equalizing, he distributed other things, taking care that no genus should be deprived of the means of preservation.

"After, then, he had secured them from mutual destruction, he took care to defend them against the injuries of the air and seasons, by clothing them with thick hairs and solid skins, so that they might be sufficiently protected in the winter frosts and summer heats; and so that these very things might become appropriate and spontaneous beds to each when they went to rest. Under their feet, likewise, he partly added arms, and partly hairs and solid and bloodless skins. He also imparted to different animals different nutriment; to some, indeed, herbs from the earth, to others the fruits of trees, and to others roots. There were some also whom he permitted to feed on the flesh of other animals: and to some, indeed, he gave the power of generating but a few of their own species, but to those that are devoured by these he imparted fecundity, thus extending safety to the race. However, as Epimetheus

[1] By this nothing more is meant than that a divine is prior to a mortal nature, according to causal, but not according to temporal, priority. For, whatever Divinity produces, it produces continually; and hence every effect proceeding from a divine cause is consubsistent with that cause, in the same manner as shadow with its forming substance.

[2] Prometheus, as we have observed in the notes on the Gorgias, is the inspective guardian of the descent of the rational soul; and Epimetheus is the guardian of the irrational soul.

metheus was not very wife, he ignorantly beftowed all his powers on irrational animals; but the human race ftill remained unadorned by him. Prometheus, therefore, came to him while he was doubting, and confidered the diftribution which he had made. And he faw that other animals were well provided for, but that man was naked, without fhoes, without a bed, and unarmed. But now the fatal day was arrived, in which it was neceffary that man fhould emerge from the earth into light. Prometheus, therefore, being dubious what fafety he could find for man, ftole the artificial wifdom of Vulcan and Minerva [1], together with fire; fince it was impoffible that the poffeffion of this wifdom could be ufeful without fire; and thus he imparted it to man. By thefe means, therefore, man poffeffed the wifdom pertaining to life. He had not, however, political wifdom. For this was with Jupiter; and Prometheus was no longer permitted to afcend to the citadel, the habitation of Jupiter [2]. To which we may add, that the guards of Jupiter were terrible. Prometheus, therefore, fecretely entered into the common habitation of Minerva and Vulcan, in which the arts were exercifed; and ftealing the fiery art from Vulcan, and the other from Minerva, he gave them to man: and from this arifes the fertility of human life. But Prometheus afterwards, as it is faid, through Epimetheus, was punifhed for his theft. Since, however, man became a partaker of a divine allotment, in the firft place through this alliance with divinity, he alone of the other animals believed that there were gods, and endeavoured that the altars and ftatues of the gods fhould be eftablifhed. In the next place he articulately diftinguifhed by art, voice and

[1] In thefe two divinities the caufe of all arts is primarily comprehended: the former of thefe firft imparting the fabricative power which the arts poffefs; and the latter illuminating them with that which is gnoftic and intellectual.

[2] Prometheus was not permitted to afcend to the citadel of Jupiter, with whom the political fcience firft fubfifts, becaufe the guards of Jupiter, i. e. the Curetes, who are of an unpolluted guardian characteriftic, preferve him exempt from all partial caufes, among which Prometheus ranks. Through thefe guardians alfo, being firmly eftablifhed in himfelf, he pervades through all things without impediment, and being prefent to all his progeny, is expanded above wholes according to fupreme tranfcendency. The citadel alfo of Jupiter (fays Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 299), according to the rumours of theologifts, is a fymbol of intellectual circulation and of the higheft fummit of Olympus, which all the wife fufpend from Jupiter's intellectual place of furvey. To this place likewife (he adds) Jupiter extends all the mundane gods, thence imparting to them intellectual powers, divine light, and vivific illuminations.

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names, and invented houfes and garments, fhoes and beds, and nourifhment from the earth. But men, being thus provided for in the beginning, lived difperfed; for cities were not: hence they were deftroyed by wild beafts, through being every where more imbecile than them; and the fabricating art was indeed a fufficient aid to them for nutriment, but was inadequate to the war with wild beafts: for they had not yet the political art, of which the military is a part. They fought therefore to collect themfelves together, and to fave themfelves, building for this purpofe cities. When, however, they were thus collected in a body, they injured each other, as not poffeffing the political art; fo that, again being difperfed, they were deftroyed by the beafts. Jupiter, therefore, fearing for our race, left it fhould entirely perifh, fent Hermes, and ordered him to bring Shame and Juftice to men, that thefe two might be the ornaments and the bonds of cities, and the conciliators of friendfhip. Hermes, therefore, afked after what manner he fhould give Shame and Juftice to men. Whether, faid he, as the arts are diftributed, fo alfo fhall I diftribute thefe? for they are diftributed as follows:—One man who poffeffes the medicinal art is fufficient for many private perfons; and in a fimilar manner other artificers. Shall I, therefore, thus infert Shame and Juftice in men? or fhall I diftribute them to all?—To all, faid Jupiter, and let all be partakers of them: for cities will not fubfift, if a few only participate of thefe, as of the other arts. Publifh alfo this law in my name, that he who is incapable of partaking of Shame and Juftice fhall be punifhed as the peft of the city."

Thus, Socrates, and on this account, both others and the Athenians, when they difcourfe concerning building, or any other fabricative art, think that a few only fhould be confulted; and if any one unfkilled in thefe affairs offers to give advice, they do not allow him, as you fay; and it is reafonable, as I fay, that they fhould not. But when they proceed to a confultation concerning political virtue, the whole of which confifts from juftice and temperance, they very properly permit every man to fpeak; becaufe it is fit that every one fhould partake of this virtue, or there can be no cities. This, Socrates, is the caufe of that which was doubted. And that you may not think I deceive you in afferting that all men in reality think that every man participates of juftice, and of the reft of politic virtue, take this as an argument: in other arts, as you fay, if any one afferts that he is a good piper, or fkilled in any other

other art of which he is ignorant, thoſe that hear him either laugh at, or are indignant with him, and his friends admoniſh him as one inſane; but in juſtice and the other political virtue, though it be known that a certain perſon is unjuſt, yet if he aſſerts the truth of himſelf before the multitude, they think that he is inſane, and that he ſhould not unfold his iniquity; and they ſay that all men ſhould acknowledge themſelves to be juſt, whether they are or not; or that he who does not pretend that he is juſt muſt be mad; as if it were neceſſary that every one ſhould, in a certain reſpect, partake of juſtice, or no longer be a man. I ſay theſe things, to ſhow that every man is very properly permitted to give his advice concerning this virtue, becauſe every one is thought to be a partaker of it. But that men do not think that it ſubſiſts from nature, nor from chance, but that it may be taught and obtained by ſtudy, this I will in the next place endeavour to ſhow you. No one is enraged with another on account of thoſe evils which he thinks ariſe either from nature or art; nor does he admoniſh, or teach, or puniſh the poſſeſſors of theſe evils in order to make them otherwiſe than they are; but, on the contrary, he pities them. Thus, for inſtance, who would be ſo mad as to reprehend the deformed, or the little, or the diſeaſed? For I think they know that theſe things, viz. ſuch as are beautiful and the contrary, happen to men from nature and fortune. On the contrary, when they think that any one poſſeſſes certain evils from ſtudy, cuſtom, and learning, then they are indignant, admoniſh, and puniſh; among the number of which evils are injuſtice and impiety, and in ſhort every thing which is contrary to political virtue. And as this ſpecies of virtue is obtained by ſtudy and diſcipline, they are on this account indignant with and admoniſh every one who neglects to acquire it. For if you are willing, O Socrates, to conſider what the puniſhment of the unjuſt is able to effect, this very thing will teach you that men think virtue is to be acquired. For no one endued with intellect puniſhes him who has acted unjuſtly, merely becauſe he has ſo acted; for he who acts in this manner puniſhes like a wild beaſt, irrationally. But he who endeavours to puniſh with reaſon, does not puniſh for the ſake of paſt guilt (for that which has been done cannot be undone), but for the ſake of future injuſtice, that neither this offender himſelf, nor any other who ſees him puniſhed, may again act unjuſtly. And he who has this conception muſt be perſuaded that virtue may be taught: for puniſhment is inflicted for the

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ſake of turning others from guilt. All, therefore, that puniſh, as well privately as publicly, have this opinion. And both other men, and eſpecially the Athenians your fellow citizens, take vengeance on and puniſh thoſe whom they think have acted unjuſtly; ſo that, according to this reaſoning, the Athenians alſo are among the number of thoſe who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Very properly, therefore, do your fellow citizens admit the brazier and ſhoemaker to give advice in political concerns; and, as it appears to me, Socrates, it has been ſufficiently demonſtrated to you that they conſider virtue as a thing which may be taught and acquired.

There ſtill, however, remains the doubt which you introduced concerning illuſtrious men, viz. on what account they teach their ſons, and make them wiſe in things which may be obtained from preceptors, but do not render them better than others in the virtue for which they themſelves are renowned. In order to remove this doubt, Socrates, I ſhall no longer employ a fable, but argument. For thus conceive: whether is there any one thing or not, of which it is neceſſary all the citizens ſhould partake, or a city cannot ſubſiſt? In this thing your doubt is ſolved, but by no means otherwiſe. For if there is this one thing, which is neither the art of the architect, nor of the brazier, nor potter, but is juſtice, and temperance, and holineſs, and in ſhort the virtue of man; if this be the thing, of which it is neceſſary all ſhould partake, and together with which every man ſhould learn and perform whatever elſe he wiſhes to learn or do, but by no means without this; or if he does not partake of it, that he ſhould be taught and puniſhed, whether boy, or man, or woman, till through puniſhment he becomes better; and he who is not obedient, when puniſhed or taught, is baniſhed from the city, or put to death as one incurable; if this then be the caſe, and thoſe illuſtrious men teach their children other things, but not this, conſider in how wonderful a manner they become excellent men: for we have ſhown that they think virtue may be taught both privately and publicly. But ſince it may be taught, do you think that fathers teach their children other things, the ignorance of which is neither attended with death nor a penalty; but that in other things in which a penalty, death, and exile are the puniſhments attendant on their children, when they are not inſtructed nor exerciſed in virtue, and beſides death, the confiſcation of their goods, and in ſhort the ruin of their families, they neither teach them theſe things,

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nor uſe their utmoſt endeavours that they may acquire them? It is neceſſary to think, Socrates, that fathers, beginning with their children when they are very young, will teach and admoniſh them as long as they live. For as ſoon as a boy underſtands what is ſaid to him, his nurſe, mother, pedagogue, and the father himſelf, ſtrive to the utmoſt that the boy may become a moſt excellent character; teaching and pointing out to him, in every word and deed, that this is juſt, and that unjuſt; that this is beautiful and that baſe; and that this is holy, and that unholy: likewiſe that he ſhould do theſe things, and not thoſe. And if the boy is willingly perſuaded, they think they have done well; but if not, they form him to rectitude by threats and blows, as if he were a diſtorted and bent piece of wood. In the next place they ſend him to maſters, and theſe they much more enjoin to pay attention to the morals of the boys, than to the teaching them to read and play on the harp. The preceptors likewiſe take care of the children; and when the boys have learnt their letters, and their attention is directed to the meaning of what they read, inſtead of oral precepts, the maſters give them the compoſitions of the beſt poets to read, and compel them to commit them to memory; becauſe in theſe there are many admonitions, and many tranſactions, and praiſes, and encomiums, of antient illuſtrious men, that the boy may be zealous to imitate them, and may deſire to become a ſimilar character. The maſters of the harp alſo do other things of a like kind; for they pay attention to temperance, and take care that the boys do not commit any vice. Beſides this too, when they have learnt to play on the harp, they teach them the compoſitions of other good lyric poets, ſinging them to the harp; and they compel rhythms and harmonies to become familiar to the ſouls of the boys, that becoming milder, more orderly, and more harmonious, they may be more able both to ſpeak and act: for every life of man requires rhythm and harmony. Further ſtill, beſides theſe things, they ſend them to maſters of exerciſe, that their bodies being rendered better, may be uſefully ſubſervient to the rational part of the ſoul, and that they may not be compelled to cowardice, through the depravity of their bodies, in war and other actions. And theſe things are done by thoſe who are moſt able to do them: but the moſt able are the moſt wealthy; and the ſons of theſe begin their exerciſes the earlieſt, and continue them the longeſt. But when they leave their maſters, the city compels them to learn the laws, and to live according to the paradigm of theſe, that they may not

act cafually from themfelves; but in reality, juft as writing mafters give their fcholars, who have not yet learnt to write well, letters to be traced over by them which they have written, and thus compel them to write conformably to their copy; fo the city prefcribing laws which were the inventions of illuftrious and antient legiflators, compels them to govern and to be governed according to thefe. But it punifhes him who tranfgreffes thefe; and the name which is given to this punifhment, both by you, and in many other places, is ευθυναι, *corrections*, as if it were juftice *correcting* depravity.

As fo much attention therefore is paid, both privately and publicly, to virtue, can you ftill wonder and doubt, O Socrates, whether virtue may be taught? It is not, however, proper to wonder that it can be taught, but it would be much more wonderful if this were not the cafe. But why then are unworthy fons frequently the offspring of worthy fathers? Learn again the reafon of this. For this is not wonderful, if what I have before faid is true, that this thing virtue ought not to be peculiar to any one perfon, in order to the exiftence of a city. For if this be the cafe, as I fay (and it is fo the moft of all things), confider and felect any other ftudy and difcipline whatever. Thus, for inftance, fuppofe that this city could not fubfift unlefs we were all of us players on the pipe, fhould we not all apply ourfelves to this inftrument? and would not every one teach every one, both privately and publickly, to play on it? and would he not reprove him who played unfkilfully, and this without any envy? Juft as now, no one envies or conceals things juft and legal, as is the cafe in other arts. For mutual juftice and virtue are, I think, advantageous to us: and on this account every one moft willingly difcourfes about and teaches things juft and legal. If then in playing on the pipe we are thus difpofed, with all alacrity and without referve, to teach each other, do you think, Socrates, faid he, that the fons of the moft excellent players on the pipe would become good pipers, rather than the fons of bad players on this inftrument? I indeed think not; but the boy moft happily born for that art would be found to be him who made the greateft proficiency; and he who was not naturally adapted for it would purfue it without glory. And the fon of an excellent piper would often be unfkilled in that art; and again, a good piper would frequently be the offspring of a bad one. However, they would be all fufficiently excellent, if compared with the unfkilful, and with thofe who know nothing of the piper's art. In like manner think that the man

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who appears to you to be the moſt unjuſt of thoſe who are nurtured by the laws, and among men, is juſt and the artificer of this thing (juſtice), if he is compared with men, who have neither diſcipline, nor courts of juſtice, nor laws, nor any neceſſity which compels them to pay every attention to virtue, but are mere ſavages, ſuch as thoſe which Pherecrates the poet cauſed to be acted laſt year, during the feſtivals of Bacchus. And if you ſhould chance to be among ſuch men as the miſanthropes in that play, you would rejoice if you met with Eurybates and Phrynendas[1], and deploring your fortune, you would deſire the depravity of our men. But now you are delicate, Socrates, becauſe all men are teachers of virtue to the utmoſt of their abilities, though no one appears to you to be ſo. For if you ſhould ſearch for the man who taught us to ſpeak the Greek tongue, he would be no where to be found: nor, if you were to inquire who it is that can teach the ſons of manual artificers this very art which they have learnt from their father, and which both the father and the fellow artiſts his friends exerciſe, you would not, I think, O Socrates, eaſily find the preceptor of theſe; but it is every where eaſy to find teachers of the ignorant. And thus it is alſo with reſpect to virtue and every thing elſe. We ſhould likewiſe rejoice, if he who ſurpaſſes us cauſes us to advance in virtue, though but in a ſmall degree, among the number of which I think I am one, and that I know in a manner, ſuperior to other men, what will contribute to the beautiful and the good, and that I am worthy of the reward which I receive for my inſtruction, and indeed of more than I receive, as is alſo the opinion of my diſciples. Hence this is the bargain which I uſually make: when any one has learnt from me, if he is willing, he pays me the ſum of money which I require; but if not, going to a temple and ſwearing how much the diſciplines which I teach are worth, he depoſits the ſum which he is to pay me. And thus much, ſaid he, O Socrates, I, and the fable, and argument have aſſerted, to prove that virtue may be taught; and the Athenians alſo are of the ſame opinion. We have likewiſe ſhown that it is not in any reſpect wonderful that depraved ſons ſhould be the offspring of excellent fathers, ſince the ſons of Polycletus, who are of the ſame age with Paralus and Xanthippus, are nothing when compared with their father;

[1] Theſe were two notorious profligates, who had given occaſion for the proverbs, "An action of Eurybates: it is another Phrynendas."

and

and in like manner with reſpect to the ſons of other artiſts. Theſe, however, are not yet to be condemned; for they are young, and hope may be yet entertained of their making a proficiency.

Protagoras therefore, having pointed out theſe and ſimilar things, ceaſed to ſpeak; and I having been for a long time charmed, looked ſtill at him, as deſiring to hear him ſtill ſpeak. But when I perceived that he had in reality finiſhed his diſcourſe, and when I had with difficulty collected myſelf, looking to Hippocrates I ſaid, O ſon of Apollodorus, how much do I thank you for having brought me hither! For I make much of what I have heard from Protagoras; ſince before this, I thought that it was not human care by which worthy men become worthy, but now I am perſuaded that it is. There is however a ſmall impediment to my belief, which Protagoras will doubtleſs eaſily remove, ſince he has unfolded ſo much. For if ſome one ſhould diſcourſe with any one of the popular orators, perhaps he would hear arguments of this kind, ſuch as Pericles delivered, or ſome other eloquent man; but if ſome one ſhould aſk them concerning any thing, they like a book would have nothing to reply, nor any thing to ſay. And if a man ſhould aſk them any trifling particular reſpecting what was ſaid, they would reſemble braſs when ſtruck, which keeps and extends its ſound for a long time, unleſs ſome one lays hold of it. For thus rhetoricians, when aſked ſome trifling thing, reply in an extended ſpeech. But Protagoras here is ſufficient to deliver both long and beautiful diſcourſes, as he has juſt now made it appear; and he is alſo ſufficient, when interrogated, to anſwer with brevity, and interrogating, to wait for and receive an anſwer; which can be aſſerted but of a few. Now then, O Protagoras, I am in want of a certain trifling particular, and if you anſwer me this, I ſhall have all that I want. You ſay that virtue may be taught; and I, if I could be perſuaded by any man, ſhould be perſuaded by you. But I beſeech you to remove the wonder which you excited in my mind while you were ſpeaking. For you ſay that Jupiter ſent juſtice and ſhame to men; and afterwards, in many parts of your diſcourſe, you ſpeak of juſtice, temperance, and ſanctity, and of all theſe collectively, as if virtue were but one thing. Accurately explain to me, therefore, this very thing, whether virtue is one certain thing, but the parts of it are juſtice, temperance, and ſanctity; or whether all theſe which I have juſt now mentioned are names of one and the ſame thing. This it is

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which I ſtill deſire to know.—But it is eaſy, ſaid he, Socrates, to anſwer this queſtion, that virtue being one thing, the particulars which you have adduced are the parts of it.—But whether, ſaid I, are they parts, in the ſame manner as the mouth, noſtrils, eyes and ears are parts of the face? or are they parts like the parts of gold, which do not differ from each other and the whole, except in magnitude and parvitude?—It appears to me, Socrates, that the parts of virtue have the ſame relation to the whole, as the parts of the face to the whole face.—Whether then, ſaid I, do different men receive a different part of virtue? or is it neceſſary that he who receives one part ſhould poſſeſs all the parts of virtue?—By no means, ſaid he; ſince many men are brave, but unjuſt; and others again are juſt, but not wiſe.—But, ſaid I, are theſe parts of virtue, viz. wiſdom and fortitude?—Certainly, the moſt of all things, he replied; and the greateſt of all the parts, is wiſdom.—But, ſaid I, of theſe parts, is this one thing, and that another?—Yes.—Has each of them alſo its proper power; in the ſame manner as each of the parts of the face? As for inſtance, the eye is not ſimilar to the ears, nor is the power of it the ſame; nor do any of the other parts reſemble each other, nor are their powers the ſame, nor are they mutually ſimilar in any other reſpect. Is it therefore thus alſo with the parts of virtue, ſo that the one does not reſemble the other, neither in itſelf, nor in its power? Or is it not evident that it is ſo, ſince it is ſimilar to the paradigm which we have introduced?—But it does thus ſubſiſt, Socrates, ſaid he.—And I replied, no other part of virtue therefore, is ſuch as ſcience, nor ſuch as juſtice, nor ſuch as fortitude, nor ſuch as temperance, nor ſuch as ſanctity.—It is not, ſaid he.

But come, ſaid I, let us conſider in common what kind of a thing each of theſe is. And, in the firſt place, is juſtice a certain thing, or is it nothing? For to me it appears to be ſomething. But what does it appear to you to be?—That it is alſo ſomething.—What then? If ſome one ſhould aſk you and me, O Protagoras and Socrates, tell me with reſpect to this very thing which you have juſt now named juſtice, whether it is juſt or unjuſt? I indeed ſhould anſwer him that it is juſt. But what would you ſay? would your anſwer be the ſame with mine or not?—The ſame, ſaid he.—I therefore ſhould ſay that juſtice is a thing ſimilar to the being juſt, in reply to the interrogator. And would not you alſo aſſert the ſame?—Yes, ſaid he.—If then, after this, he ſhould aſk us, Do you alſo ſay that ſanctity is ſomething?

ſomething? we ſhould reply, I think, that we do.—We ſhould, ſaid he.—But whether do you ſay that this very thing ſanctity is actually adapted to be unholy, or to be holy? For my part, I ſhould be indignant with this queſtion, and ſhould ſay, Predict better things, O man: for by no means will any thing elſe be holy unleſs holineſs itſelf be holy. But what do you ſay? would not you thus anſwer?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—If then, after this he ſhould ſay, aſking us, How then have ye ſpoken a little before? Or have I not rightly underſtood you? For you appear to me to aſſert that the parts of virtue ſubſiſted in ſuch a manner with reſpect to each other, that one of them does not reſemble the other; I ſhould reply, that as to other things, you have underſtood rightly, but you are miſtaken in thinking that I alſo have ſaid this: for Protagoras gave this anſwer, but I interrogated him. If then he ſhould ſay, he ſpeaks the truth, Protagoras: for you ſay that one part of virtue does not reſemble another. This is your aſſertion. What would be your anſwer to him?—It is neceſſary, ſaid he, Socrates, to acknowledge it.—What then, O Protagoras, aſſenting to theſe things, ſhall we anſwer him, if he ſhould add, holineſs therefore is not of ſuch a nature as to be a juſt thing, nor is juſtice ſuch as a holy thing, but ſuch as that which is not holy; and holineſs is ſuch as that which is not juſt. So that what is juſt is unholy. What ſhall we ſay to him in reply? For I, for my own part, ſhould ſay that juſtice is holy, and that holineſs is juſt. And for you, if you will permit me, I ſhould reply this very thing, that either juſtice is the ſame with holineſs, or that it is moſt ſimilar to it; and that the moſt of all things, juſtice is ſuch as holineſs, and holineſs ſuch as juſtice. But ſee whether you hinder me from giving this anſwer; or does this alſo appear to you to be the caſe?—It does not entirely, ſaid he, Socrates, appear to me to be ſimply thus, ſo as to grant that juſtice is holy, and holineſs juſt; but there appears to me to be a certain difference between them. However, of what conſequence is this? For, if you will, let juſtice be holy, and let holineſs be juſt.—I have nothing to do, ſaid I, with *I will*; and if it is agreeable to you, let it be reprobated. And let us alſo be perſuaded that the ſubject of our converſation will be diſcuſſed in the beſt manner, when the particle *if* is removed from it.—But indeed, he replied, juſtice has ſomething ſimilar to holineſs. For one thing always reſembles another in a certain reſpect, contraries alone excepted: for white has no ſimilitude to black, nor hard to ſoft; and ſo with reſpect

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to other things which appear to be moſt contrary to each other, and which, as we before obſerved, poſſeſs another power, and of which one does not reſemble the other. But there are other things, ſuch as the parts of the face, in which the one is ſimilar to the other. So that although you ſhould confute theſe things after this manner, if you are of opinion that all things are ſimilar to each other, yet it is not juſt to call thoſe things ſimilar which poſſeſs a certain ſimilitude to each other; as neither is it juſt to call thoſe things which poſſeſs a certain diſſimilitude, diſſimilars, though they have but very little of the ſimilar.—And I wondering, ſaid to him, do the juſt and the holy appear to you to be ſo mutually related, as to poſſeſs but a ſmall degree of ſimilitude to each other?—Not entirely ſo, ſaid he; nor yet again, do I conſider them in the ſame way as you appear to me to conſider them.—But I replied, Since theſe things do not ſeem to be agreeable to you, we will diſmiſs them, and conſider this other thing which you ſay. What do you call folly? Do you not ſay that wiſdom is perfectly contrary to it?—To me it appears to be ſo, ſaid he.—But when men act rightly and profitably, do they then appear to you to act temperately; or when they act in a contrary manner?—They appear to me, ſaid he, to act temperately, when they act rightly and profitably.—And do they not act temperately by temperance?—It is neceſſary.—Do not therefore thoſe that act wrongly, act fooliſhly, and thus acting, not act by temperance?—I agree with you, ſaid he, that they do.—The acting fooliſhly, therefore, is the contrary to acting temperately.—He ſaid it was.—Are not, therefore, things which are done fooliſhly, ſo done by folly, but by temperance things which are done temperately?—He granted it.—If then any thing is done by ſtrength, is it not done ſtrongly, and if by weakneſs, weakly.—So it appears.—And if any thing is done with ſwiftneſs, is it not done ſwiftly, and if with ſlowneſs, ſlowly?—He ſaid it was.—And if any thing is done after the ſame manner, is it not done by the ſame, and if in a contrary manner by the contrary?—He granted it.—Come then, I replied, is there ſomething beautiful?—He admitted there was.—And is any thing contrary to this except the baſe?—There is not.—But what? Is there ſomething good? And is any thing contrary to this except evil?—There is not.—Is there alſo ſomething acute in voice?—He ſaid there is.—And is any thing contrary to this except the grave?—There is not, ſaid he.—To every one of contraries therefore, I replied, there is only one contrary, and not many.

many.—He granted it.—Let us then, ſaid I, repeat the particulars to which we have aſſented. We have acknowledged that there is only one contrary to one thing, but not more than one.—We have.—But that which is done contrarily is done by things contrary.—He admitted it.—We alſo granted that what is done fooliſhly is done in a manner contrary to that which is done temperately.—He ſaid we did.—But that which is done temperately is done by temperance, and that which is done fooliſhly, by folly.—He granted it.—But if a thing is done contrarily, is it not done by a contrary?—Yes.—And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly.—Yes.—And are they not done contrarily?—Entirely ſo.—Are they not therefore done by contraries?—Yes.—Folly therefore is contrary to temperance.—So it appears.—Do you remember, then, that it was before acknowledged by us, that folly is contrary to wiſdom?—He agreed that it was.—And did we not alſo ſay, that there is only one contrary to one thing.—We did.—Which therefore of theſe poſitions, O Protagoras, ſhall we reject? That which ſays there is only one contrary to one thing, or that in which it is aſſerted, that wiſdom is different from temperance? but that each is a part of virtue? And that beſides being different, both they and their powers are diſſimilar, in the ſame manner as the parts of the face? Which therefore of theſe ſhall we reject? for both of them are not very muſically aſſerted; ſince they do not accord, nor coharmonize with each other. For how can they accord, if it be neceſſary that there ſhould only be one contrary to one thing, but not to more than one? But to folly, which is one thing, wiſdom and temperance have appeared to be contrary. Is it ſo, ſaid I, O Protagoras, or not?—He acknowledged that it was ſo, but very unwillingly.—Will not, therefore, temperance and wiſdom be one thing? And again, prior to this, it appeared to us that juſtice and ſanctity were nearly the ſame thing. But come, ſaid I, Protarogas, let us not be weary, but conſider what remains. Does it then appear to you that a man who acts unjuſtly is wiſe, becauſe he acts unjuſtly?—I, ſaid he, Socrates, ſhould be aſhamed to acknowledge this, though it is aſſerted by many men.—Whether then ſhall we addreſs ourſelves to them, or to you?—If you are willing, ſaid he, ſpeak firſt to this aſſertion of the many.—But it makes no difference to me, if you only anſwer, whether theſe things appear to you or not; for I eſpecially direct my attention to the aſſertion. It may, however, perhaps happen, that I ſhall both explore myſelf interrogating, and him who anſwers.

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At firſt, therefore, Protagoras began to aſſume ſome conſequence (for he was averſe to diſcuſs this affair, and ſaid it was difficult); but afterwards he ſubmitted to anſwer.—Come then, ſaid I, anſwer me from the beginning: Do certain perſons who act unjuſtly, appear to you to be wiſe?—Let them be ſo, ſaid he.—And does not the being wiſe conſiſt in conſulting well, even when they act unjuſtly?—Be it ſo, ſaid he.—But whether, I replied, does this take place if they do well, acting unjuſtly, or if they do ill?—If they do well.—Do you then ſay that certain things are good?—I do.—Whether, therefore, ſaid I, are thoſe things good which are advantageous to men?—By Jupiter, ſaid he, they are; and I alſo call ſome things good, though they are not advantageous to men. And Protagoras, when he ſaid this, appeared to me to be ruffled, afraid, and averſe to anſwer. Seeing him, therefore, in this condition, I cautiouſly and gradually interrogated him; and I ſaid, Whether, O Protagoras, do you ſpeak of things which are advantageous to no *man*, or of thoſe which are in *no reſpect* advantageous? And do you call ſuch things as theſe good?—By no means, ſaid he; but I know many things which are uſeleſs to men, meats and drinks, and medical potions, and ten thouſand other things; and I alſo know ſome things which are advantageous to them. There are likewiſe ſome things which are by no means profitable to men, but are beneficial to horſes; ſome which are advantageous to oxen only; and others to dogs: others again which are beneficial to no one of theſe, but to trees; and others which are good to the roots of trees, but pernicious to their bloſſoms. Thus, for inſtance, dung is beneficial to the roots of all trees when thrown upon them; but if you were to throw it on their branches and ſhoots, you would deſtroy them all. Thus too, oil is a very excellent thing for all plants: but is moſt hoſtile to the hairs of all animals except man. For it is beneficial to the hairs of man, and to the reſt of his body. And ſo diverſified and all-various a thing is good, that this very thing, oil, is good to the external parts of the body of man, but is moſt pernicious to his inward parts. And on this account all phyſicians forbid the diſeaſed the uſe of oil; or at leaſt only permit them to uſe it in a very ſmall degree, and juſt ſufficient to correct the bad ſmell of the food which they take.

Protagoras having thus ſpoken, thoſe that were preſent loudly applauded him as one that had made a good ſpeech. And I ſaid, O Protagoras, I am a man naturally forgetful, and if any one makes a long diſcourſe to me, I forget

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what was the fubject of his difcourfe. As, therefore, if I were deaf, and you intended to difcourfe with me, it would be neceffary for you to fpeak a little louder to me than to others; fo now, fince you happen to have met with a forgetful man, cut your anfwers for me, and make them fhorter, if you wifh that I fhould follow you.—How would you have me fhorten my anfwers? Muft I anfwer you, faid he, fhorter than is neceffary?—By no means, I replied.—But as much as is proper, faid he?—Yes, faid I.—Whether, therefore, muft my reply be fuch as appears to me to be neceffary, or fuch as appears to be fo to you?—I have heard, I replied, that you can both fpeak with prolixity yourfelf about the fame things, and teach another to do the fame, fo as never to be in want of words; and again, that you can fpeak with brévity, fo that no one can deliver himfelf in fewer words than you. If, therefore, you intend to difcourfe with me, ufe the other method, that of fpeaking with brevity.—O Socrates, faid he, I have had verbal contefts with many men, and if I had done this which you urge me to do, viz. if I had fpoken as my antagonift ordered me to fpeak, I fhould not have appeared to excel any one; nor would the name of Protagoras have been celebrated in Greece.—And I (for I knew that the former anfwers did not pleafe him, and that he would not be willing to anfwer my interrogations) thought that I had no longer any bufinefs in the conference. I therefore faid, O Protagoras, I do not defire you to difcourfe with me contrary to your will; but if you are difpofed to converfe fo that I can follow you, then I will difcourfe with you. For you, according to report, and as you yourfelf fay, are able to fpeak both with prolixity and brevity: for you are wife. But I am unable to make thefe long fpeeches; though I wifh that I had the ability. It is fit, however, that you, who are capable of doing both, fhould yield to my inability, in order that converfation may take place. But now, as you are not willing to do this, and a certain bufinefs prevents me from ftaying to hear your long fpeeches, I muft depart whither it is requifite I fhould go; though perhaps it would not be unpleafant to me to hear thefe things from you.—And at the fame time having thus fpoken, I rofe in order to go. But as I was rifing, Callias taking hold of me with his right hand, and of my cloak with his left, faid, We fhall not difmifs you, Socrates: for if you depart, our converfation will be at an end. I befeech you, therefore, ftay with us: for there is not any one thing which I would more willingly hear than you and Protagoras difcourfing

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together. Gratify all of us therefore.—And I said (for I was now standing as being ready to go), O son of Hipponicus, I have always admired your philosophy; but I now both praise and love it; so that I should wish to gratify you, if you request of me possibilities. But at present, it is just as if you should desire me to run a race with Criso the Himeræan, who is now in the vigour of youth, or with one of those who run and accomplish the longest course, or with some diurnal courier; I should say to you, that I wish much more than you do that I could keep pace with these runners, but that I cannot. If, therefore, you would see me and Criso running a race together, you must request him to keep pace with me: for I am not able to run swiftly, but he is able to run slowly. In like manner, if you desire to hear me and Protagoras, you must request him, that as he at first answered me with brevity the questions that were asked, he will now also answer me in the same manner: for if he does not, what will be the mode of our discourse? I indeed thought that it is one thing to converse together, and another to harangue.—But you see Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras appears to speak justly, when he says that he ought to be permitted to speak as he pleases, and you as you please. Alcibiades, therefore, taking up the discourse, said, You do not speak well Callias: for Socrates here acknowledges that he cannot make a long speech, and in this yields to Protagoras. But in the ability of discoursing, and knowing how to question and answer, I should wonder if he yielded to any man. If, therefore, Protagoras confesses that he is inferior to Socrates in disputation, it is sufficient for Socrates; but if he denies it, let him dispute, both by questioning and answering, without making a long speech to every interrogation, and without deviating from the subject so as to prevent another from speaking, and lengthening his discourse till the greater part of the auditors forget what was the subject of investigation. For as for Socrates, I will be security for him that he will not forget any thing: since he only jests when he says he is forgetful. To me, therefore, Socrates appears to be more reasonable in what he demands: for it is fit that every one should declare his own opinion. But after Alcibiades, it was Critias, I think, who said, O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias indeed appears to me to be very much for Protagoras; but Alcibiades is always fond of contention in every thing to which he applies himself. We, however, ought not to contend with each other, either for Socrates or Protagoras, but we should request both of them

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in common not to diſſolve the conference in the middle. But he having thus ſpoken, Prodicus ſaid, You appear to me, Critias, to ſpeak well: for it is requiſite that thoſe who are preſent at theſe conferences ſhould be the common, but by no means equal auditors of both ſpeakers. For theſe two are not the ſame: for it is requiſite to hear both in common, but not to diſtribute equally to either; but to the wiſer more, and to the more unlearned leſs. I indeed, O Protagoras and Socrates, think that you ought to concede ſomething to each other, and to contend together, but not to quarrel: for friends contend with friends through benevolence; but adverſaries and enemies quarrel with each other. And thus this conference will be conducted in the moſt beautiful manner. For you, the ſpeakers, will be eſpecially approved, I do not ſay praiſed, by us the hearers: for auditors approve from their ſoul without deception; but praiſe is frequently beſtowed in words, falſely, contrary to the real opinion. And thus again, we, the hearers, ſhall be eſpecially delighted, but not pleaſurably affected: for he is delighted who learns any thing and participates of wiſdom in his dianoëtic part; but he is pleaſurably affected who eats ſomething, or is paſſive to ſome other pleaſant ſenſation in his body.

Prodicus having thus ſpoken, many of thoſe that were preſent approved what he ſaid. But after Prodicus, Hippias the wiſe thus addreſſed them:— I conſider all ye that are preſent as kinſmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by nature, and not by law: for the ſimilar is naturally allied to the ſimilar. But law being the tyrant of men, compels many things to be done contrary to nature. It would be diſgraceful, therefore, if we who know the nature of things, who are the wiſeſt of the Greeks, and who are now come for the purpoſe of diſplaying our knowledge into the very prytaneum itſelf of wiſdom, and into this houſe, which is the greateſt and moſt fortunate in the city, ſhould exhibit nothing worthy of this dignity, but diſagree with each other like the vileſt of men. I therefore both requeſt and adviſe you, O Protagoras and Socrates, to ſubmit yourſelves to us, as if we were arbitrators aſſembled for the purpoſe of bringing you to an agreement. Nor do you, Socrates, purſue this accurate form of dialogue, which is ſo very conciſe, unleſs it is agreeable to Protagoras; but give up the reins to diſcourſe, that it may appear to us to be more magnificent and elegant. Nor do you, Protagoras, extending all your ropes, fly with ſwelling ſails into the wide ſea of

difcourfe, and lofe fight of fhore: but let both endeavour to preferve a middle courfe. Be perfuaded alfo by me, and let fome moderator and prefident be chofen, who fhall oblige each of you to keep within bounds.—This expedient pleafed thofe that were prefent, and all of them praifed it. And Callias faid, that he would not fuffer me to go, and required me to choofe a moderator. I therefore faid, that it would be difgraceful to felect a judge of our difcourfes: for if he be our inferior, it will not be right that the fubordinate fhould prefide over the more excellent; and if he be our equal, neither thus will it be right. For he who is juft fuch a one as we are, will act fimilarly to us; fo that the choice will be vain. But to choofe one better than we are, is, I think, in reality impoffible: fince one wifer than Protagoras here cannot be chofen. And if you fhould choofe a man in no refpect more able, but whom you affert however to be fo, this alfo will be difgraceful to Protagoras, by fubjecting him to a prefident, as if he were fome contemptible perfon: for it makes no difference as to myfelf. I am willing, therefore, to act as follows, that converfation and dialogue may take place between us, which are the objects of your defire: If Protagoras is not willing to anfwer, let him interrogate, and I will anfwer; and at the fame time I will endeavour to fhow him in what manner I fay he who is interrogated ought to anfwer. But when I reply to that which he may be willing to afk, he again in a fimilar manner fhall reply to me. If, therefore, he fhall appear not to be cheerfully difpofed to anfwer the interrogation, both you and I in common muft demand of him, that which you now demand of me, not to diffolve the converfation. Nor for the fake of this is there any occafion to appoint a prefident: for all of you will be prefidents in common.—It appeared to all that this was what ought to be done. And Protagoras, indeed, was not very willing to comply; but at the fame time he was compelled to confent to interrogate; and that when he had fufficiently interrogated, he would in his turn anfwer with brevity. He began therefore as follows:

I think, faid he, O Socrates, that the greateft part of a man's erudition confifts in being fkilled in poetical compofitions. But this is the ability of knowing what is well or ill faid by the poets, fo as to be capable of affigning a reafon when interrogated concerning their poems. And now indeed let the queftion be refpecting virtue, the fubject of our prefent difcourfe; differing only in this, that the difquifition is transferred to poetry. Simonides then fays

ſays to Scopas, the ſon of Creon the Theſſalonian, "That it is difficult to become a truly good man, ſo as in hands, feet, and intellect, to be faſhioned a blameleſs ſquare." Do you know the verſe, or ſhall I repeat the whole paſſage to you?—And I ſaid, there is no neceſſity for this; for I know, and have paid great attention to the verſe.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he. Whether, therefore, does Simonides appear to you to have done well and rightly, or not?—Very well, ſaid I, and rightly.—But does the poet appear to you to have done well if he contradicts himſelf?—By no means, I replied.—Conſider more attentively, ſaid he.—But, my good man, I have ſufficiently conſidered it.—You know therefore, ſaid he, that in the courſe of the poem he ſays, "The aſſertion of Pittacus does not pleaſe me, though it was delivered by a wiſe man, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man." Do you underſtand that the ſame perſon made this and the former aſſertion?—I do, I replied.—Does it therefore, ſaid he, appear to you that theſe things accord with thoſe?—To me they do appear to accord. And at the ſame time fearing leſt he ſhould ſay any thing in addition, I ſaid, But do they not appear to do ſo to you?—How, he replied; can he who made both theſe aſſertions accord with himſelf, when he firſt ſays, that it is difficult to become a truly good man, and a little after, forgetting what he had aſſerted, he blames Pittacus for ſaying the ſame thing that he had ſaid, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man, though it is evident that in blaming him who ſaid this, he alſo blames himſelf? So that either the former or the latter aſſertion is not right.—Protagoras having thus ſpoken, many of the auditors made a noiſe, and applauded him. And I indeed at firſt, as if I had been ſtruck by a ſkilful pugiliſt, was incapable of ſeeing, and became giddy, on his ſaying theſe things, and the reſt making a tumult; but afterwards (to tell you the truth), that I might have time to conſider what the poet ſaid, I turned myſelf to Prodicus, and calling him, I ſaid, Simonides, O Prodicus, was your fellow-citizen, and it is juſt that you ſhould aſſiſt the man. I appear therefore to myſelf to call upon you, in the ſame manner as Homer[1] ſays Scamander called upon Simois when beſieged by Achilles, "Dear brother, let us both join to repel the prowess of this man." For I ſay the ſame to you, let us take care that Simonides be not ſubdued by Protagoras. For in order to aſſiſt Simonides, that elegant device of yours is requiſite, by which you diſtinguiſh between *to will*

[1] Iliad xxi. v. 308.

and

and *to desire*, as not being the same, and by which you have just now said many and beautiful things. And now consider whether the same thing appears to you as to me: for I do not think that Simonides contradicts himself. But do you, Prodicus, first declare your opinion. Does it appear to you that *to become* is the same as *to be*, or that it is something different?—Something different, by Jupiter, said Prodicus.—Does not Simonides then, said I, in the first assertion, declare his own opinion, that it is difficult to *become* a truly good man?—You speak the truth, said Prodicus.—But he blames Pittacus, I replied, not as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing that he had said, but for asserting something different from it. For Pittacus does not say this, that it is difficult to *become* a good man, as Simonides does, but that it is difficult to *continue* to *be* so. But as Prodicus says, *to be* is not the same as to *become*. And if this be the case, Simonides does not contradict himself. And perhaps Prodicus here, and many others, may say with Hesiod[1], "It is difficult to become good: for the gods have placed sweat before virtue. But he who has arrived at the summit will find that to be easy, which it was difficult to acquire." Prodicus therefore having heard these things, praised me; but Protagoras said, your emendation, Socrates, is more erroneous than that which you correct.—And I said, Then I have done ill, as it seems, O Protagoras, and I am a ridiculous physician; since by attempting to cure, I increase the disease.—Thus however it is, said he.—But how? I replied.—The poet, said he, would have been very ignorant, if he had asserted that virtue is so vile a thing that it may be easily acquired, though, as it appears to all men, its possession is the most difficult of all things.—And I said, by Jupiter, Prodicus, here, is opportunely present at our conference. For the wisdom of Prodicus appears, O Protagoras, to be of great antiquity, whether it originated from Simonides, or from a source still more antient. But you, who are skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and not skilled in it as I am, in consequence of being the disciple of this Prodicus. And now you appear to me not to understand that this thing which is said to be difficult, was not perhaps so apprehended by Simonides, as you apprehend it; but it is with that as with the word δεινος, *deinos*, concerning which Prodicus continually admonishes me, when in praising you, or any other, I say, that

[1] Op. et Dier.

Protagoras

Protagoras is a wise and *skilful* (δεινος) man, by asking me if I am not ashamed to call things excellent *dreadful* (δεινος). For το δεινον, says he, signifies something bad. Hence no one says *dreadful* riches, nor *dreadful* peace, nor *dreadful* health; but every one says *dreadful* disease, and *dreadful* war, and *dreadful* poverty, as if thatwhich is (δεινον) *deinon*, is *bad*. Perhaps, therefore, the inhabitants of Ceos and Simonides apprehended by the word *difficult* (χαλεπον) either that which is bad, or something different from what you conceive it to mean. Let us therefore inquire of Prodicus (for it is just to ask him the signification of words employed by Simonides); What, O Prodicus, does Simonides mean by the word *difficult*?—He meant, said he, *bad*.— On this account, therefore, I replied, he blames Pittacus for saying that it is *difficult* to continue to be good, just as if he had heard him saying, that it is *bad* to continue to be good.—But what else, Socrates, said he, do you think Simonides intended, than to blame Pittacus because he did not know how to distinguish terms rightly, as being a Lesbian, and educated in a barbarous language?—Do you hear Prodicus, said I, O Protagoras? And have you any thing to say to these things?—This is very far, O Prodicus, said Protagoras, from being the case; for I well know that Simonides meant by the word *difficult*, not that which is *bad*, but that which we and others mean by it, viz. a thing which is not easy, but is accomplished through many labours.— But I also think, I replied, that Simonides meant this, and that Prodicus knows that he did; but he jests, and is willing to try whether you can defend your assertion. For that Simonides did not by the word *difficult* mean any thing *bad*, is very much confirmed by what he adds immediately after: for he says, that Divinity alone possesses this honourable gift. He does not indeed say, that it is bad to continue to be good, and afterwards add that Divinity alone possesses this, and attribute this honour to Divinity alone: for if this were the case, Prodicus should have called Simonides a *profligate*, and not a divine man [1]. But I wish to tell you what Simonides appears to me to have understood in this verse, if you think proper to make trial of my poetical skill. Or, if it is agreeable to you, I will hear you.—Protagoras, therefore, hearing me thus speak, said, Do so, if you please, Socrates: but Prodicus, Hippias, and the rest, very much urged

[1] Instead of ουδαμως κειον, as in the printed text, it is necessary to read, as in our version, ουδαμως θειον; as Dacier also well observes.

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me to do it.—I will endeavour then, ſaid I, to explain to you my conceptions reſpecting this verſe.

Philoſophy is very antient among the Greeks, and particularly in Crete and Lacedæmon; and there are more ſophiſts there than in any other country. They diſſemble, however, and pretend that they are unlearned, in order that it may not be manifeſt that they ſurpaſs the reſt of the Greeks in wiſdom (juſt as Protagoras has ſaid reſpecting the ſophiſts); but that they may appear to excel in military ſkill and fortitude; thinking if their real character were known, that all men would engage in the ſame purſuit. But now, concealing this, they deceive thoſe who laconize in other cities. For there are ſome that in imitation of them cut their ears, have a cord for their girdle, are lovers of ſevere exerciſe, and uſe ſhort garments, as if the Lacedæmonians ſurpaſſed in theſe things the other Greeks. But the Lacedæmonians, when they wiſh to ſpeak freely with their own ſophiſts, and are weary of converſing with them privately, expel theſe laconic imitators, and then diſcourſe with their ſophiſts, without admitting any ſtrangers to be preſent at their converſations. Neither do they ſuffer any of their young men to travel into other cities, as neither do the Cretans, leſt they ſhould unlearn what they have learnt. But in theſe cities, there are not only men of profound erudition, but women alſo. And that I aſſert theſe things with truth, and that the Lacedæmonians are diſciplined in the beſt manner in philoſophy and diſcourſe, you may know from the following circumſtance: For if any one wiſhes to converſe with the meaneſt of the Lacedæmonians, he will at firſt find him, for the moſt part apparently deſpicable in converſation, but afterwards, when a proper opportunity preſents itſelf, this ſame mean perſon, like a ſkilful jaculator, will hurl a ſentence worthy of attention, ſhort, and contorted; ſo that he who converſes with him will appear to be in no reſpect ſuperior to a boy. That to laconize, therefore, conſiſts much more in philoſophiſing, than in the love of exerciſe, is underſtood by ſome of the preſent age, and was known to the antients; they being perſuaded that the ability of uttering ſuch ſentences as theſe is the province of a man perfectly learned. Among the number of thoſe who were thus perſuaded, were Thales the Mileſian, Pittacus the Mitylenæan, Bias the Prienean, our Solon, Cleobulus the Lindian, Miſo the Chenean, and the ſeventh of theſe is ſaid to be the Lacedæmonian Chilo. All theſe were emulators,

lators, lovers, and difciples of the Lacedæmonian erudition. And any one may learn that their wifdom was a thing of this kind, viz. fhort fentences uttered by each and worthy to be remembered. Thefe men alfo affembling together, confecrated to Apollo the firft fruits of their wifdom, writing in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi thofe fentences which are celebrated by all men, viz. "Know thyfelf," and "Nothing too much." But on what account do I mention thefe things? To fhow that the mode of philofophy among the antients was a certain laconic brevity of diction. But the fentence which is afcribed to Pittacus in particular, and which is celebrated by the wife, is this: "It is difficult to continue to be good." Simonides, therefore, as being ambitious of wifdom, knew that if he could overthrow this fentence, and triumph over it like a renowned athletic, he himfelf would be celebrated by the men of his own time. In oppofition to this fentence, therefore, and with a view to renown, he compofed the whole of this poem, as it appears to me. Let all of us, however, in common, confider whether what I affert is true.

In the firft place, then, the very beginning of the poem would indicate that its author was infane, if he, wifhing to fay that it is difficult to become a good man, had afterwards inferted the particle (μεν) *indeed.* For this would appear to have been inferted for no purpofe. Unlefs it fhould be faid, that Simonides in what he fays contends as it were againft the fentence of Pittacus: and that Pittacus, having afferted that it is difficult to continue to be good, Simonides difputing this, fays it is not difficult; but it is difficult *indeed*, O Pittacus, to become a good man, and to be *truly* good. For he does not ufe the word *truly*, as if there were fome men that are *truly* good, and others that are good indeed, but not truly fo (for this would have been ftupid and unworthy of Simonides); but it is neceffary to confider the word *truly* as an hyperbaton[1] in the verfe; and we muft fuppofe Pittacus fpeaking, as if there was a dialogue between him and Simonides, and faying, O men, it is difficult to continue to be good; but Simonides anfwering, O Pittacus, your affertion is not true: for it is not difficult to *be* truly good, but to *become* fo, in hands and feet, and intellect, being fafhioned a blamelefs fquare.

[1] An hyberbaton is a rhetorical figure, and fignifies the tranfpofition of words from their plain grammatical order.

And thus it appears that the particle *indeed* is introduced with reafon, and that the word *truly* is rightly added in the laft place. All that follows likewife teftifies that this is the meaning of the paffage. There are alfo many fentences in this poem, each of which might be proved to be well written; for it is very elegantly and accurately compofed. To evince this, however, would take up too much time; but let us fummarily confider the whole form and intention of the poem, that we may fhow that the defign of it throughout is more than any thing to confute that fentence of Pittacus. For a little after he fays, as follows: " It is indeed truly difficult to *become* a good man; yet for a certain time it is poffible to *be* fo. But *having become* a good man, to continue in this habit, and to *be* a good man, (as you fay[1], O Pittacus,) is impoffible. For this is not human, but Divinity alone poffeffes this honourable gift. For man, who may be overwhelmed by unexpected calamity, cannot continue free from vice.

Whom, then, does an unexpected calamity overwhelm in the government of a fhip? Evidently not an idiot; for the idiot is always overwhelmed. As therefore no one throws to the ground him who is lying on it, but fometimes he who ftands upright is thrown down, fo as to be proftrate; but this is never the cafe with him who is already proftrate; fo an unexpected calamity may fometimes overwhelm a fkilful man, but never him who is always unfkilful. And a mighty ftorm burfting on the head of the pilot may render him unfkilful; bad feafons may confound the hufbandman; and things fimilar to thefe may be applied to the phyfician: for a good may indeed become a bad man. And this is alfo teftified by another poet, who fays, "A good man is fometimes bad, and fometimes worthy." But it is not poffible for a bad man to become bad, but it is always neceffary that he fhould be fo. So that when an unexpected calamity overwhelms a fkilful, wife, and good man, it is not poffible for him not to be wicked. But you, O Pittacus, fay, that it is difficult to continue to be good. The truth however is this, that it is difficult indeed, but poffible, to *become* good; but impoffible to *continue* to be good. For every man who acts well is good; but bad if he acts ill. What then is a good action with refpect to literature? and what makes a man excellent in literature? Evidently the being difciplined in it. What

[1] Meaning that it is impoffible for man in the prefent life to continue invariably good.

good

good action likewife makes a good phyfician? Evidently the learning the art of curing the fick. For a good phyfician cures properly[1], but a bad one improperly. Who is it then that becomes a bad phyfician? Evidently the man to whom it belongs in the firft place to be a phyfician, and in the next place to be a good phyfician; for he may become a bad phyfician. But we who are ignorant of the medicinal art, can never by acting ill become bad phyficians; nor being ignorant of architecture can we become bad architects, or any thing elfe of this kind. But whoever does not become a phyfician by acting ill, it is evident that neither is he a bad phyfician. Thus alfo a good man may fometimes become a bad man, either from time, or labour, or difeafe, or from fome other circumftance (for this alone is a bad action to be deprived of fcience); but a bad man can never become bad (for he is always fo); but if he is to become bad, it is neceffary that prior to this he fhould have been good. So that to this alfo the verfes of Simonides tend, that it is not poffible to be a good man, fo as to be perfeveringly good; but that it is poffible to become a good man, and for this fame good to become a bad man. And alfo that for the moft part, thofe are the beft men whom the gods love. All thefe things therefore are faid againft Pittacus, which the verfes following thefe ftill more clearly evince. For he fays, " Wherefore I fhall not explore in vain and hope for that which cannot be found, viz. a man nourifhed by the fruits of the earth, who lives a blamelefs life and is perpetually good." Afterwards he adds, " I will tell you when I have found him." So vehemently, and through the whole of the poem, does he attack the faying of Pittacus. He alfo adds, " I willingly praife and love the man, who does nothing bafe; and the gods themfelves are not able to contend with neceffity." And this likewife is faid in oppofition to Pittacus. For Simonides was not fo unlearned as to fay that he praifed him who willingly did nothing bad, as if there were fome who committed bafe actions willingly. For I nearly think this, that no wife man confiders any man as erring voluntarily, and as acting bafely and wickedly with the concurrence of his will; but he well knows that all thofe who act bafely and wickedly, do fo involuntarily. But

[1] In the original here there is nothing more than κακος δε κακως; but from the verfion of Ficinus, it appears that the words αγαθος γαρ ιατρος θεραπευει καλως muft be fupplied as in our tranflation. The fenfe indeed evidently requires this addition.

Simonides does not ſpeak as if he ſaid, that he praiſes the man who does not willingly do wrong, but he ſays this word *willingly* of himſelf. For he thought that a worthy and good man is frequently compelled to love and praiſe a certain perſon. Thus, for inſtance, it often happens that a man has a monſtrous father, or mother, or country, or ſomething elſe of this kind. Depraved characters, therefore, when any thing of this nature happens to them, are in the firſt place glad to ſee it, and in the next place blame and every where divulge the depravity of their parents or country, that they may not be accuſed of having neglected theſe, nor fall into diſgrace for their neglect. Hence they blame their parents or country in a ſtill greater degree, and add voluntary to neceſſary enmity. But the worthy man conceals the faults of his parents or country, and if any unjuſt conduct has led him to be enraged with them, he is their mediator to himſelf, and compels them to love and praiſe their own offspring. I alſo think that Simonides himſelf frequently praiſed and was the encomiaſt of a tyrant, or ſome other character of this kind; and this not willingly, but by compulſion. This, then, is what he ſays to Pittacus; "I, O Pittacus, do not blame you, from being myſelf one who loves to blame: for I am ſatisfied if a man is not wicked, nor very indolent, as knowing that a ſane man benefits his country. Nor will I find fault; ſince I am not a lover of detraction. For the race of fools is infinite; ſo that he who delights in blaming will be ſatiated with it. All things, indeed, are beautiful with which ſuch as are baſe are not mingled." His meaning however in this, is not as if he had ſaid, all things are white with which black is not mingled (for this would be very ridiculous), but he intends to ſignify that he admits mediocrity, ſo as not to blame it. "And I do not ſeek," ſays he, "a man perfectly blameleſs, or expect to find him among ſuch as gather the fruits of the wide-boſomed earth: for I will tell you when I find ſuch a one. So that on this account I ſhall praiſe no one as perfect. But I am ſatisfied with a man of moderate excellence, and who does no ill: and all ſuch as theſe I both love and praiſe." Here too he uſes the language of the Mitylenæans as ſpeaking to Pittacus, and ſaying, "I willingly praiſe and love all theſe." But here it is neceſſary to conſider the word *willingly* as connected with the words "Who does nothing baſe," and to ſeparate it from the verſe in which he ſays, "There are alſo thoſe whom I unwillingly praiſe and love. You therefore, O Pittacus, I ſhould never have blamed,

blamed, if you had ſpoken of that equitable and true mediocrity ; but now, though you are very much miſtaken about things of the greateſt moment, yet you *appear* to ſpeak the truth, and on this account I blame you."—It appears to me, ſaid I, O Prodicus and Protagoras, that Simonides compoſed this poem in conſequence of theſe conceptions.

Then Hippias anſwering ſaid, You ſeem to me, Socrates, to have well explained theſe verſes: and I alſo have ſomething pertinent to ſay concerning them, which, if you pleaſe, I will point out to you.—Do ſo, O Hippias, ſaid Alcibiades, but let it be at another time; for now it is juſt to attend to the coincidence in opinion of Protagoras and Socrates with each other. And indeed, if Protagoras wiſhes ſtill to interrogate, Socrates ſhould anſwer ; but if he wiſhes to reply to Socrates, then Socrates ſhould interrogate.— And I ſaid, I leave it to Protagoras to do whichever of the two is more agreeable to him : but if he is willing, let us diſmiſs any further conſideration about the verſes. And I would gladly, O Protagoras, complete with you the diſcuſſion of thoſe things, concerning which I at firſt interrogated you. For it appears to me, that a diſcourſe about poetry is moſt ſimilar to the banquets of vile and ruſtic men ; ſince theſe, not being able, through the want of education, to converſe with each other while they are drinking, in their own language, and with their own words, introduce the players on the flute as honourable perſons, hire at a great expenſe a foreign voice, viz. that of flutes, and through the ſound of theſe aſſociate with each other. But when worthy, good, and well-educated men feaſt together, you will ſee neither pipers, nor dancers, nor ſingers, but they being ſufficient to converſe with themſelves, without theſe trifles and ſportive amuſements, ſpeak in their own language, and in a becoming manner reciprocally hear each other, even though they have drank a conſiderable quantity of wine. In like manner, ſuch converſations as the preſent, when they are between men ſuch as moſt of us aſſert ourſelves to be, require no foreign voice, nor poets, of whom it is impoſſible to aſk the meaning of what they ſay, and to whom moſt of thoſe by whom they are cited attribute different conceptions, without being able to explain their real meaning. Wiſe men, therefore, bid farewell to ſuch conferences as theſe, but converſe with each other through themſelves, and in their diſcourſes make trial of each other's ſkill. It appears to me, that you and I ought rather to imitate conferences

conferences of this kind, laying aside the poets, and difcourfing with each other through ourfelves, make trial of the truth of ourfelves. And if you wifh ftill to interrogate, I am prepared to anfwer you; but if you do not wifh it, impart yourfelf to me, and affift me in giving completion to thofe things, the difcuffion of which we left unfinifhed.—When I had faid thefe and other fuch like things, Protagoras did not clearly fignify what part he would take. Alcibiades, therefore, looking to Callias, faid, Does Protagoras, O Callias, appear to you to do well, in not now being willing to fay clearly, whether he will anfwer or not? For to me he does not; but let him fay, whether he is willing or not willing to converfe, that we may know this from him, and that Socrates may converfe with fome other perfon, or that fome one of the company who is fo difpofed may difcourfe with fome other.—And Protagoras, as it feemed to me, being afhamed in confequence of Alcibiades thus fpeaking, and Callias, and nearly all thofe that were prefent, foliciting him, fcarcely at length agreed to difpute, and defired me to interrogate him that he might anfwer.

I then faid to him, O Protagoras, do not think that I fhall converfe with you with any other defign, than that thofe things may be difcuffed of which I am continually in doubt. For I think that Homer fpeaks very much to the purpofe, when he fays, "When two come together, the one apprehends prior to the other." For with refpect to us men, we are all of us more prompt in every deed, and word, and conception, when collected together. But he who thinks of any thing by himfelf alone, immediately fearches for fome one to whom he may communicate it, and from whom he may derive ftability till he meets with the object of his fearch. Juft as I, alfo, for the fake of this, more willingly converfe with you than with any other, thinking that you difcriminate the beft of all men, both about other things which it is likely a worthy man would make the object of his confideration, and alfo concerning virtue. For what other perfon can do this befides you? Since you not only think yourfelf to be a worthy and good man, as fome others alfo are indeed themfelves worthy, but are not able to make others fo; but you are both worthy yourfelf, and are able to make others good. And you have fuch confidence in yourfelf, that while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourfelf to all the Greeks to be a fophift, declare that you are a mafter of erudition and virtue, and you are the firft that has thought

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ſit to ſet a price on his inſtructions. Is it not proper, therefore, to call upon you to the conſideration of theſe things, and to interrogate and communicate with you concerning them?—There is no reaſon why this ſhould not be done.—And now, with reſpect to thoſe things which were the ſubject of my former interrogations, I again deſire from the beginning, partly to be reminded of them by you, and partly to conſider them in conjunction with you. But the queſtion, I think, was this, whether wiſdom, temperance, fortitude, juſtice, and ſanctity, which are five names, belong to one thing, or whether a certain proper eſſence pertains to each of theſe names, ſo that each is a thing having a power of its own, and no one of them poſſeſſes a quality ſimilar to the other. You ſaid, therefore, that theſe were not names belonging to one thing, but that each of theſe names pertained to a proper thing. You likewiſe obſerved, that all theſe are parts of virtue, not in the ſame manner as the parts of gold are ſimilar to each other, and to the whole of which they are parts, but juſt as the parts of the face are diſſimilar to the whole of which they are parts, and to each other, and each poſſeſſes a proper power of its own. Inform me if theſe things ſtill appear to you as they did then; or if you think otherwiſe concerning them. For I ſhall not accuſe you, if you now ſpeak differently; ſince I ſhould not wonder if you ſaid theſe things for the purpoſe of trying me.—But, Socrates, he replied, I ſay that all theſe are parts of virtue; and that four of them may juſtly be conſidered as ſimilar to each other, but that fortitude very much differs from all theſe. By the following circumſtance you may know that I ſpeak the truth. You will find men who are moſt unjuſt, moſt unholy, moſt intemperate, and moſt unlearned, who are notwithſtanding remarkably brave.—Stop, ſaid I; for what you ſay deſerves to be conſidered. Whether do you call brave men, daring men, or any thing elſe?—I do, he replied, and I likewiſe ſay that they ruſh headlong on things, which the multitude are afraid to approach.—Come then; Do you ſay, that virtue is ſomething beautiful; and that you are a teacher of it, as of a thing beautiful?—Yes, ſaid he, and a thing moſt beautiful, unleſs I am inſane.—Whether then, ſaid I, is one thing belonging to it baſe, and another beautiful? Or, is the whole beautiful?—The whole is as much as poſſible beautiful.—Do you not know, then, that there are ſome who boldly merge themſelves in wells?—I know that divers do.—Whether do they do this in conſequence of poſſeſſing knowledge, or on account of ſomething

thing elfe?—In confequence of poffeffing knowledge.—But who are they that fight boldly on horfeback? Are they horfemen, or thofe that are unfkilled in horfemanfhip?—They are horfemen.—And who are they that fight boldly with fhort fhields? Are they thofe that are fkilled in the ufe of fuch fhields, or thofe that are not fkilled?—Thofe that are fkilled. And in every thing elfe, faid he, you will find that thofe who poffefs knowledge, are bolder than the ignorant; and the fame men after they have been difciplined are bolder than they were before.—But did you ever fee any, I faid, who being ignorant of all thefe things, were yet daring with refpect to each of thefe?—I have, he replied, and fuch as were very daring.—Are, therefore, thofe daring perfons brave alfo?—If they were, faid he, fortitude would be a bafe thing, fince thefe men are infane.—What then, faid I, have you afferted of the brave? Is it not that they are bold?—I have, faid he, and now alfo I affert the fame.—But, I replied, do not thofe who are thus bold appear, not to be brave, but infane? And again, did not the moft wife appear to us to be alfo the moft daring? And being moft daring, were they not alfo moft brave? And according to this reafoning, will not wifdom be fortitude?—You do not well remember, Socrates, faid he, what I faid, and what was my anfwer to you? For being afked by you if the brave were bold, I acknowledged that they were; but you did not alfo afk me if the bold were brave. For if you had afked me this, I fhould have faid that all the bold were not brave. But you have by no means fhown that I was not right in granting that the brave are bold. In the next place, you fhow that men, when they poffefs knowledge, are bolder than when they were ignorant, and than others who are ignorant; and in confequence of this, you think that fortitude and wifdom are the fame. But from this mode of reafoning, you may alfo think that ftrength is wifdom. For in the firft place, if you fhould in like manner inquire of me, if the ftrong are powerful, I fhould fay that they are; and in the next place, if you fhould afk me, if thofe who know how to wreftle are more powerful than thofe who do not poffefs this knowledge, and if they are more powerful after they have learnt than before, I fhould fay that they are. But from my acknowledging thefe things, it will be poffible for you, by ufing the fame arguments, to fay that, by my own confeffion, wifdom is ftrength. I, however, fhall by no means here acknowledge that the powerful are ftrong; but I fhall admit, indeed,

indeed, that the ſtrong are powerful; ſince power and ſtrength are not the ſame. For, indeed, power may be produced from inſanity, and from anger; but ſtrength derives its ſubſiſtence from nature, and the proper nutrition of bodies. In like manner, boldneſs and fortitude are not the ſame; ſo that it will happen, that the brave are bold, but not that all the bold are brave. For boldneſs is produced in men from anger, and from inſanity, in the ſame manner as we obſerved of power; but fortitude ariſes from nature, and the proper nutrition of ſouls.—But do you ſay, O Protagoras, that ſome men live well, and others ill?—I do, ſaid he.—Does, therefore, a man appear to you to live well, if he lives in moleſtation and ſorrow?—He does not, ſaid he.—But what, if he has lived pleaſantly to the end of life, will he not thus appear to you to have lived well?—To me he will, ſaid he.—To live pleaſantly, therefore, is a good, but unpleaſantly a bad thing.—If, ſaid he, he has lived delighted with worthy things.—But what, O Protagoras, Do you, like the multitude, call certain things that are pleaſant bad, and ſome things that are diſagreeable good?—I do.—How do you ſay?—So far as they are agreeable, are theſe things according to this not good, unleſs ſomething elſe happens from them?—And again, is this alſo the caſe with things diſagreeable? —It is.—Are they not then bad ſo far as they are diſagreeable?—I do not know, Socrates, ſaid he, whether I ſhould ſimply anſwer as you aſk me, that all pleaſant things are good, and all diſagreeable things evil; but it appears to me to be more ſafe to anſwer, not only to the preſent queſtion, but alſo to every other during the reſt of my life, that there are ſome pleaſant things which are not good, and again, that there are ſome diſagreeable things which are not evil; and that there are alſo a third ſort, which are neither good nor evil.—But do you not call, I ſaid, thoſe things pleaſant, which either participate of pleaſure, or produce pleaſure?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—I aſk, therefore, whether they are not good, ſo far as they are pleaſant; aſking with reſpect to pleaſure itſelf, if it is not good?—Juſt as you continually ſay, Socrates, he replied, we muſt examine it, and if it ſhall ſeem to be conformable to reaſon, and the ſame thing ſhall appear to be pleaſant and good, we muſt acquieſce in it; but if not, we muſt controvert it.—Whether, therefore, ſaid I, are you willing to be the leader of the inquiry? or ſhall I lead?—It is juſt, ſaid he, that you ſhould lead: for you began the conference.—Perhaps then, ſaid I, that which we inveſtigate will become

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manifeſt after the following manner: for juſt as if any one, directing his attention to the form or health of a man, or any other of the works of his body, on beholding his countenance and his hands, ſhould ſay, Come, ſtrip yourſelf, and ſhow me your breaſt and back, that I may ſee more clearly; I alſo deſire ſomething of this kind in the preſent inquiry, perceiving that you being ſo affected as you ſay you are, with reſpect to the good and the pleaſant, it is requiſite I ſhould ſay to you ſome ſuch thing as this, Come, Protagoras, lay your mind open to me, and inform me what are your conceptions with reſpect to ſcience. Does the ſame thing appear to you concerning it as to other men, or not? But a thing of this kind appears to the many concerning ſcience; that it is not ſtrong, and that it neither poſſeſſes a leading nor a governing power; nor is it conceived to be a thing of this kind: but ſcience being frequently inherent in man, they are of opinion, that it is not ſcience that governs him, but ſomething elſe; at one time anger, at another pleaſure, and at another pain: and that he is ſometimes governed by love, and frequently by fear. And, in ſhort, their conceptions of ſcience are, as if it were a ſlave dragged about by every thing elſe. Does, therefore, a thing of this kind appear to you alſo reſpecting it? Or, do you think that ſcience is ſomething beautiful, and as it were the governor of man? And, that he who knows good and evil, will never be ſubdued by any thing, ſo as to act contrary to the mandates of ſcience, but that intellectual prudence will be a ſufficient aid to ſuch a man?—It appears to me alſo, he replied, Socrates, as you ſay: and it would be baſe in me, if it ever were ſo in any man, not to aſſert that wiſdom and ſcience are the moſt powerful of all human affairs.—You ſpeak well, and with truth, I ſaid.—You know, therefore, that the multitude of men are not perſuaded by you and me, but ſay that many who know what is beſt, are unwilling to do it, when they have the power of acting in the beſt manner, but do other things. And ſuch as I have aſked what is the cauſe of this, have replied, that being vanquiſhed by pleaſure or pain, or ſome one of the things which I have juſt now mentioned, they have acted in this manner. For I think, ſaid he, Socrates, that men aſſert many other things erroneouſly.

Come then, ſaid I, endeavour with me to perſuade and teach men what this paſſion is, which they call the being vanquiſhed by pleaſures, and through which they do not perform the moſt excellent things, though they have a knowledge

knowledge of them. For, perhaps, if we ſhould ſay, you ſpeak erroneouſly, O men, and are deceived, they would aſk us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this paſſion is not the being vanquiſhed by pleaſure, but ſomething elſe, tell us what you ſay it is?—But, why is it neceſſary, Socrates, that we ſhould conſider the opinion of the multitude, who ſpeak that which caſually preſents itſelf?—But I think, I replied, that this will contribute to our diſcovering how fortitude is related to the other parts of virtue. If, therefore, you are willing to abide by that which was juſt now agreed upon by us, that I ſhould be the leader, follow me in that in which I think this thing will become moſt beautifully apparent; but if you are not willing, diſmiſs it, if you think fit.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he; but proceed as you begun.—Again, therefore, ſaid I, if the multitude ſhould aſk us, What then do you aſſert this thing to be, which we call the being vanquiſhed by pleaſures? I ſhould anſwer them as follows: Hear then, for I and Protagoras ſhall endeavour to tell you, Do you, O men, ſay that any thing elſe happens to you in this caſe, than that which often happens to thoſe who are ſubdued by meats and drinks, and venereal pleaſures; who, though they know that theſe things are baneful, yet at the ſame time they do them becauſe they are pleaſant? They will ſay, that nothing elſe happens. You and I, therefore, will again aſk them, Do you ſay that theſe things are baneful? Whether, therefore, is it becauſe they immediately impart pleaſure, and each of them is pleaſant? Or is it becauſe that in ſome future time they produce diſeaſes and poverty, and procure many other things of this kind? Or, though they ſhould be followed by nothing of this kind, are they bad in conſequence of cauſing men to rejoice? Shall we think, O Protagoras, that they will anſwer any thing elſe than that they are not evil from the immediate pleaſure which they produce, but from the diſeaſes and other things with which they are followed?—I indeed think, ſaid Protagoras, that the multitude would thus anſwer. If they cauſe diſeaſes, therefore, and poverty, do they not alſo cauſe ſorrow?—I think they would acknowledge that they did.—Protagoras aſſented.—It appears, therefore, O men, as I and Protagoras ſay, that theſe things are bad, for no other reaſon than becauſe they end in ſorrow, and deprive their votaries of other pleaſures.—It appeared to both of us, that they would acknowledge this to be the caſe.—Again, therefore, if, taking the contrary ſide, we ſhould aſk them, O men! ye who ſay that diſagreeable things are good, do you not ſpeak of ſuch

things as gymnaſtic exerciſes, military labours, and things which are effected through burnings, and inciſions, and medicines, and faſting? And do you not ſay, that theſe things are indeed good, but diſagreeable? They would ſay ſo.—It alſo appeared to Protagoras, that they would.—Whether, therefore, do you call theſe things good, becauſe they immediately impart extreme pain and torment; or becauſe they are followed by health, and a good habit of body, together with the ſafety of cities, dominion and wealth? They would ſay, becauſe of the latter conſequence.—And to this alſo Protagoras aſſented.—But are theſe things good through any thing elſe, than becauſe they end in pleaſures, and liberations from pain? Or can you mention any other end than pleaſures and pains to which looking they call theſe things good? They will ſay, I think, that they cannot.—So, likewiſe, it appears to me, ſaid Protagoras.—Do you, therefore, purſue pleaſure as being good, and avoid pain as an evil? They will ſay, that they do.—And to this alſo Protagoras aſſented.—You, therefore, are of opinion, that this thing is evil, viz. pain, and that pleaſure is good; ſince delight alſo is then ſaid to be evil, when it deprives us of greater pleaſures than it poſſeſſes, or when it procures pains greater than the pleaſures which it contains. For if you call delight an evil on any other account, and look to any other end, you would alſo be able to inform us; but you cannot.—Nor do they appear to me, ſaid Protagoras, to regard any other end.—Again, therefore, after the ſame manner with reſpect to pain, do you not then call the being in pain a good, when it liberates from pains greater than thoſe which it contains, or when it procures pleaſures greater than the pains? For if you looked to any other end, when you call the being in pain a good, than that which I have mentioned, you would be able to inform us; but you cannot.—You ſpeak the truth, ſaid Protagoras.—Again, therefore, ſaid I, if you ſhould aſk me, O men, on what account I ſpeak ſo much and ſo frequently about this, I ſhould ſay, Pardon me. For, in the firſt place, it is not eaſy to ſhow what this thing is which you call the being ſubdued by pleaſures; and, in the next place, all demonſtrations are contained in this. But now, alſo, you are at liberty to inform me, if you have any thing elſe which you aſſert to be good beſides pleaſure, or any thing elſe beſides pain, which you call evil. Or are you ſatisfied with paſſing your life pleaſantly without pain? For if you are ſatisfied with this, and if you cannot mention any good or evil which does

does not end in these things, hear what follows: I say, then, that, if this be the case, the assertion is ridiculous when you say that frequently, though a man knows that evil things are evil, he at the same time does them (though he has the power of not doing them), in consequence of being led and astonished by pleasure: and again, when you say that a man, knowing what is good, is not willing to do it, in consequence of being vanquished by immediate pleasure. For it will be manifest that these things are ridiculous, unless we employ a multitude of names; such as *pleasant* and *disagreeable*, *good* and *evil*. But since it appears that there are these two things, we must also call them by two names; in the first place by *good* and *evil*, and in the next place by *pleasant* and *disagreeable*. These things, therefore, being admitted, we will say that a man, knowing things evil to be evil, at the same time does them. If, then, some one should ask us why he does them, we must say, because he is vanquished. By what? he will say to us. But we are no longer permitted to say, by pleasure; for it assumes another name in the place of pleasure, viz. good. We must, however, answer him, and say that he does it because he is vanquished. By what? he will say. By good, we must say, by Jupiter. If it should happen, therefore, that he who interrogates us is an insolent man, he will laugh and say, You speak of a ridiculous thing when you assert that any one does evil, knowing that it is evil (and it is not proper to do it), in consequence of being vanquished by good. For he will say, Is such a one vanquished because the good in him is not worthy to vanquish the evil? Or is it because it is worthy? We shall evidently say in reply, that it is because it is not worthy. For otherwise he would not err whom we say is subdued by pleasure. But perhaps he will say, Why is the good in such a one unworthy to vanquish the evil? Or the evil to vanquish the good? Is it for any other reason than because the one is greater, and the other lesser? or because the one is more, and the other fewer in number? Have we any other cause to assign than this? It is evident, therefore, he will say, that this thing which is called the being vanquished, is to receive greater evils instead of lesser goods. And thus much for these particulars.

Let us then again change the names, and introduce in these very same things the pleasant and disagreeable, as follows: We formerly said that a man does evil; let us now say that he does things disagreeable, knowing that

they

they are disagreeable, in consequence of being vanquished by pleasures, viz. by such as are unworthy to conquer. And what other unworthiness is there in pleasure with respect to pain, than the excess and defect of each other; that is, when they become greater and lesser, more or less numerous? For if any one should say, Immediate pleasure, O Socrates, very much differs from future pleasure and pain, I indeed should reply by asking, Whether it differs in any thing else than in pleasure and pain? For it cannot differ in any thing else. But it is just as if a man who is skilful in weighing, having collected together things pleasant and painful, and placed those which are near, and those which are remote, in the balance, should say which are the more numerous. For if you weigh pleasures with pleasures, the greater and more numerous must always be chosen; but, if you weigh pains with pains, the fewer and the smaller must be selected. If likewise you weigh pleasures with pains, if the disagreeables are surpassed by the pleasures, those that are near by those that are remote, or those that are remote by those that are near, we must yield to the more weighty; but if the pleasures are surpassed by the disagreeables, this conduct must not be adopted. Is it not so, O men, with respect to these things? I know that they will not be able to say otherwise. It also appeared to Protagoras that they would not. Since, therefore, this is the case, I will thus interrogate them, Do the same magnitudes appear to your sight greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say, that they do. And is not this the case also with things bulky, and with things numerous? And are not equal voices greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say that they are. If therefore our acting well consisted in this, viz. in making and receiving great masses, but rejecting and not making such as are small, what would appear to be the safety of our life? Would it be the art of measuring, or the power of sight which judges of that which is apparent? Or rather would not the latter deceive us, and involving us in error, often compel us to judge differently at different times of the same thing, and change our opinion in the actions and elections of things great and small? But the art of measuring would make this phantasm void, and manifesting the truth, would cause the soul, by abiding in reality, to be at rest, and would preserve our life. Would the men assent to these things, and acknowledge that the art of measuring preserves us, or that this is effected by any other art? They would acknowledge that we should be preserved

ſerved by the meaſuring art. But what, if the ſafety of our life conſiſted in choosing the even and the odd, ſo as to know when more ought to be rightly choſen, and when leſs, either one of theſe with reſpect to itſelf, or one with reſpect to the other, whether they be near or at a diſtance, what is it that in this caſe would preſerve our life? Is it not ſcience? For it would no longer be the art of meaſuring, ſince this is the art of exceſs and defect. But ſince that of which we are ſpeaking is the art of the even and the odd, is it any thing elſe than arithmetic? The men would acknowledge that it is nothing elſe: or would they not? It appeared alſo to Protagoras that they would. Be it ſo, O men; but ſince the ſafety of our life has appeared to conſiſt in the right choice of pleaſure and pain, and in the choice of the more and the leſs, of the greater and the ſmaller, of the more diſtant and the nearer; of theſe, in the firſt place, does not the art of meaſuring appear to be the conſideration of the exceſs and defect, and alſo of the equality of theſe to each other? Neceſſarily ſo. But ſince it is converſant with meaſuring, it is neceſſary that it ſhould be both an art and a ſcience. They will agree to this. What then this art and ſcience may be, we will conſider hereafter; but that it is a ſcience is ſufficient to the demonſtration which it is neceſſary that Protagoras and I ſhould give to your queſtion. And, if you remember, when we mutually agreed that nothing is ſuperior to ſcience, but that this always governs, wherever it may be, both pleaſure and every thing elſe, then you ſaid that pleaſure frequently ſubdues a man, even though he poſſeſſes ſcience. But as we did not agree with you, after this you aſked us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this paſſion is not to be vanquiſhed by pleaſure, tell us what it is, and what you aſſert it to be? If, therefore, we then had immediately ſaid to you that it is ignorance, you would have derided us. For ye have acknowledged that thoſe that err in the choice of pleaſures and pains (and theſe are things good and evil) err through the want of ſcience; and not only through the want of ſcience, but, ye have alſo added, of the ſcience of meaſuring. But an erroneous action without ſcience, is, as ye alſo know, performed through ignorance. So that to be vanquiſhed by pleaſure is the greateſt ignorance; of which Protagoras here, Prodicus and Hippias, ſay they are the phyſician. But ye, becauſe ye think this is ſomething elſe than ignorance, neither go yourſelves, nor ſend your children to the ſophiſts, the teachers of theſe things, as if this ſcience of meaſuring could

not

not be taught: and by saving your money, and not giving it to these men, ye act badly both in private and public. And in this manner we should answer the multitude.

Together with Protagoras, however, I ask you, O Hippias, and you, O Prodicus (for let my discourse be in common to you), whether I appear to speak the truth, or that which is false?—It appeared to all that what had been said was transcendently true.—You confess, therefore, I said, that the pleasant is good, but the disagreeable evil. But I request Prodicus to excuse my adopting his division of names. For whether you call it pleasant, or delightful, or joyful, or in whatever way you may think fit to denominate things of this kind, O most excellent Prodicus, only answer what I wish to ask you.—Prodicus therefore laughing assented, and so likewise did the rest.—I then said, But what, my friends, as to this particular, are not all actions which contribute to the living well and pleasantly, beautiful and profitable? And is not a beautiful deed good and profitable?—They granted this.—If, therefore, I said, the pleasant is good, no one either knowing or thinking that other things are better than those which he does, and is able to do, will afterwards do these things, when he has the power of doing those that are better. Nor when a man is inferior to himself, is it any thing else than ignorance; nor, when he is superior to himself, is it any thing else than wisdom.—To this all of them assented.—But what? Do you say that ignorance is a thing of this kind, viz. to have a false opinion, and to be deceived about things of great importance?—And to this, likewise, all of them assented.—Does it not then follow, said I, that no one willingly betakes himself to things evil, or to those things which he thinks are evil? For, as it appears, it is not in the nature of man to betake himself to things which he considers as evil, instead of applying himself to such as are good. And when it is necessary to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater if he has it in his power to choose the lesser.—All these things were assented to by all of us.—What then, said I, do you call dread and fear? Is it that which I say it is to you, O Prodicus, viz. a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread?—It appeared to Protagoras and Hippias that dread and fear were this; but to Prodicus it appeared that dread was this, but not fear.—It is, however, said I, O Prodicus, of no consequence; but this is of importance, whether what has been formerly asserted is true. Is, therefore, any man

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willing to betake himfelf to thofe things which he dreads, when he has the power of betaking himfelf to things which he does not dread? Or is not this impoffible from what we have granted? For we have granted that he thinks thofe things to be evil which he dreads; and that no one betakes himfelf to, or willingly receives things which he confiders as evil.—Thefe things, likewife, were affented to by all of them.—This, then, being admitted, faid I, O Prodicus and Hippias, let Protagoras, here, defend to us the rectitude of his firft anfwer. For then, there being five parts of virtue, he faid that no one of them refembled the other, but that each had a peculiar power of its own. I do not, however, urge this at prefent, but I fpeak of that which he afterwards faid, viz. that four of the parts might juftly be confidered as fimilar to each other, but that one of them, fortitude, very much differed from the reft. He alfo faid that this might be known from the following circumftance. You will find, faid he, Socrates, men that are moft unholy, moft unjuft, moft intemperate, and moft undifciplined, but who are, at the fame time, moft brave; by which you may know that fortitude very much differs from the other parts of virtue. And I indeed, at that time, immediately very much wondered at the anfwer, and my furprife has been greatly increafed fince I have difcuffed thefe things with you. I therefore afked him this, If he called brave men bold men? He faid he did, and likewife impetuous. Do you remember, Protagoras, that this was your anfwer?—I do, faid he.—Tell us, then, faid I, in what, according to you, the brave are impetuous? Is it in things which the timid attempt?—It is not, faid he.—In other things, therefore.—Yes.—But whether do the timid engage in bold attempts, but the brave in fuch as are dreadful?—It is fo faid, Socrates, by the multitude.—You fpeak the truth, I replied. I do not, however, afk this: but in what do you fay the brave are impetuous? Is it in dreadful things, thinking that they are dreadful, or in things that are not dreadful?—But, faid he, this, in what you juft now faid, has been fhown to be impoffible.—And in this, alfo, I replied, you fpeak the truth. So that if this is rightly demonftrated, no one betakes himfelf to things which he thinks are dreadful, fince it has been found that it is ignorance for a man to be inferior to himfelf.—He acknowledged it.—All men, however, both the timid and the brave, engage in things in which they boldly confide; and, in confequence of this, both the timid and the brave engage in the fame things.—But indeed, Socrates, faid

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he, the things in which the timid and the brave engage are perfectly contrary to each other; for the latter wiſh, but the former are unwilling to engage in war.—But whether, ſaid I, is it a beautiful, or a baſe thing to engage in war?—A beautiful thing, ſaid he.—If, therefore, it is a beautiful thing, we have above agreed that it is a good thing. For we have acknowledged that all beautiful are good actions.—You ſpeak the truth, and to me this has always appeared to be the caſe.—Right, ſaid I. But which of the two do you ſay is unwilling to engage in war, though it is a beautiful and good thing.—The timid, he replied.—If, therefore, ſaid I, it be beautiful and good, is it not alſo pleaſant?—It is granted, ſaid he.—Are the timid, therefore, unwilling to proceed to that which is beautiful, better, and more pleaſant, knowing it to be ſuch?—But, ſaid he, if we aſſented to this, we ſhould deſtroy what we have before acknowledged.—But what with reſpect to the brave man? Does he not engage in that which is more beautiful, more excellent, and more pleaſant?—It is neceſſary, ſaid he, to acknowledge that he does.—Hence, in ſhort, the brave have not any baſe fears when they are afraid; nor when they are bold, are they baſely daring.—True, ſaid he.—But if they are not baſely, does it not follow that they are beautifully daring?—He aſſented.—And if their boldneſs is beautiful, is it not alſo good?—Yes.—Are not, therefore, the timid, and the raſh, and the inſane, on the contrary, baſely afraid, and baſely bold?—He agreed they were.—But are they baſely and wickedly bold, through any thing elſe than ignorance and the want of diſcipline?—It is ſo, ſaid he.—What then? Do you then call this thing, through which the timid are timid, timidity or fortitude?—Timidity, ſaid he.—But have not the timid appeared to be what they are, through the ignorance of things dreadful?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—They are timid, therefore, through this ignorance.—He acknowledged it.—But that through which they are timid, you have granted to be timidity.—He ſaid, he had.—Will not, therefore, the ignorance of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be timidity?—He aſſented.—But, ſaid I, fortitude is contrary to timidity.—It is.—Will not then the wiſdom of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be contrary to the ignorance of theſe things?—To this alſo he aſſented.—But is not the ignorance of theſe things timidity?—He, with great difficulty, aſſented to this.—The wiſdom, therefore, of things dreadful, and not dreadful, is fortitude, being contrary to the ignorance of theſe.—Here, however, he was no

longer willing to aſſent, but was ſilent.—And I ſaid, Why, O Protagoras, do you neither aſſent to, nor deny what I ſay?—Come to a concluſion, ſaid he.—Immediately, ſaid I; let me only firſt aſk you, if it ſtill appears to you as it did before, that there are certain men who are moſt ignorant, and yet moſt brave?—You ſtill, Socrates, ſeem to be very anxious that I ſhould anſwer you. I will therefore gratify you; and I ſay, that from what has been granted, it appears to me impoſſible that this ſhould be the caſe.—But, ſaid I, I do not aſk you all theſe particulars on any other account, than becauſe I wiſh to conſider how the things pertaining to virtue ſubſiſt, and what virtue itſelf is. For I know that this becoming apparent, that which has been the ſubject of a long diſcuſſion to you and me will be made manifeſt; I indeed, aſſerting, that virtue cannot be taught, but you that it can. And it ſeems to me, that the concluſion of our arguments, as if it were a man, reviles and derides us; and that if it had a voice, it would thus addreſs us:—You are abſurd, O Socrates, and Protagoras; you indeed, in aſſerting in the former part of your diſcourſe, that virtue cannot be taught, and now, being anxious to contradict yourſelf, by endeavouring to ſhow that all theſe things, viz. juſtice, temperance, and fortitude, are ſcience; by which mode of proceeding virtue will eſpecially appear to be a thing which may be taught. For if virtue were any thing elſe than ſcience [1], as Protagoras endeavours to evince it is, it clearly could not be taught; but now, if it ſhould appear that it is ſcience, as you, Socrates, are anxious to infer, it will be wonderful if it cannot be taught. Again, Protagoras at firſt admitted that it could be taught, but now, on the contrary, he ſeems earneſtly to endeavour that virtue may appear to be any thing elſe rather than ſcience; and thus it will be a thing in the ſmalleſt degree capable of being taught. I therefore, O Protagoras, ſeeing all theſe things agitated upwards and downwards with ſuch dire confuſion, am in the higheſt degree anxious that they may become apparent. And I could wiſh that we, in conſequence of diſcuſſing theſe things, might diſcover what virtue is: and again, that we might ſpeculate concerning it, whether it can be taught, or whether it can-

[1] Inſtead of ει γαρ αλλο τι ην ἡ επιστημη ἥ αρετη, as in the printed text, the ſenſe requires we ſhould read ει γαρ αλλο τι ην ἥ επιστημη ἡ αρετη. Ficinus in his verſion has adopted the error of the original; for he renders this paſſage, "Si enim aliud quiddam eſſet ſcientia quam virtus."

 not.

not. For I fear that your Epimetheus has frequently deceived us in our inquiry, juſt as you ſay he neglected us in the diſtribution which he made. I am more pleaſed, therefore, with Prometheus in the fable, than with Epimetheus. Hence, following his example, and paying a *providential attention* to the whole of my life, I diligently conſider all theſe things. And if you are willing, as I ſaid at the beginning, I would moſt gladly examine theſe particulars with you.—To this Protagoras ſaid—I, O Socrates, praiſe your alacrity, and the evolution of your diſcourſe. For I am not, in other reſpects, I think, a bad man, and I am envious the leaſt of all men: indeed I have often ſaid reſpecting you to many, that I admire you by far the moſt of thoſe with whom I aſſociate, and conſider you as greatly ſurpaſſing your equals in age. And I ſay, that I ſhall not wonder if you rank among the men renowned for wiſdom. And, with reſpect to theſe things, we will again diſcuſs them when you pleaſe; but it is now time for me to betake myſelf to ſomething elſe.—But, I replied, it is requiſite ſo to do, if it ſeems fit to you. For I ought to have gone elſewhere ſome time ago; but I ſtaid in order to gratify the beautiful Callias.—Having ſpoken and heard theſe things, we departed.

THE END OF THE PROTAGORAS.