

THE GORGIAS:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE PRINCIPLES WHICH LEAD TO POLITICAL FELICITY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE GORGIAS.

IT is necessary in the first place, says Olympiodorus¹, to investigate the dramatic apparatus of the dialogue; in the second place, its scope; in the third place, the division of it; in the fourth place, the persons in it, and the analogy of the persons; and in the fifth place, (that which is investigated by many, though it does not deserve to be discussed, and was not doubted by men of greater antiquity,) on what account Plato introduces Gorgias here, who was very far from being contemporary with Socrates.

The dramatic apparatus then is as follows: Gorgias, the Leontine, came from the Leontines in Sicily, as an ambassador to the Athenians, respecting a confederation, and the war against the Syracusians. He had also with him Polus, who delighted in rhetoric; and he dwelt in the house of Callicles, the public orator of the Athenians. This Callicles, too, was delighted with skilful rhetoricians, but made pleasure the end of life, and deceived the Athenians, always addressing them in the language of Demosthenes, "What do you wish? What shall I write? In what can I gratify you?" Gorgias, therefore, displayed his art, and so captivated the Athenian people, that they called the days in which he exhibited *festivals*, and his periods *lamps*. Whence Socrates, perceiving the people thus deceived, and being able to extend good to all the youth, formed the design of saving the souls both of the Athenians and of Gorgias himself. Taking, therefore, with him Chærepho the philosopher, who is mentioned by Aristophanes, they went to the house of Callicles, and there their conferences and investigations of theorems took place.

¹ In his MS. Scholia on this Dialogue.

But he went with Chærepho, and did not go alone, that he might show how scientific men conducted themselves and discoursed. And thus much for the apparatus of the dialogue.

With respect to its scope, it has appeared to be different to different persons. For some say that the design of Plato was to discourse concerning rhetoric; and they inscribe it "Gorgias, or concerning Rhetoric;" but improperly: for they characterize the whole from a part. Others again say, that the dialogue is concerning justice and injustice; showing that the just are happy, and the unjust unfortunate and miserable. Likewise, that by how much the more unjust a man is, by so much the more is he miserable; that in proportion as his injustice is extended by time, in such proportion is he more miserable; and that if it were immortal, he would be most miserable. These too receive the scope of the dialogue from a part, viz. from the arguments against Polus. Others say that its scope is to speak concerning the demiurgus. But these also collect the scope from a part; because in the fable in the latter part of this dialogue the demiurgus is mentioned. These, however, speak absurdly, and foreign from the purpose. We say, therefore, that its scope is *to discourse concerning the principles which conduct us to political felicity.*

Since, then, we have mentioned principles and a polity, let us speak concerning principles universally, and concerning political felicity, and also what the principles are of the political science. The principles, therefore, of every thing are six. *Matter*, as with a carpenter wood. *Form*, the writing table, or something of this kind. *That which makes*, as the carpenter himself. *The paradigm*, that to which directing his phantasy, he made the table. *The instrument*, the saw perhaps, or the axe. And *the end*, that on account of which it was made. The multitude, therefore, and rhetoricians, not looking to truth, say that *the matter* of the political science is the body which is preserved; *the form*, luxury; *the producing cause*, rhetoric; *the paradigm*, a tyranny; *the instrument*, persuasion; and *the end*, pleasure. And such are their assertions. We however say that the *matter* is soul, and this not the rational, but that which consists of three¹ parts: for it imitates a polity. And as in cities there are governors, soldiers, and mercenaries; so, in us,

¹ i. e. Of reason, anger, and desire.

reason is analogous to the governor; anger to the soldier, subsisting as a medium, and being obedient to reason, but commanding and ranking the mercenaries, that is desire. The *matter*, therefore, is the soul considered as divided into three parts. For the political character wishes to be angry and to desire, with respect to such things as are proper, and when it is proper. Just as the lowest string of a musical instrument accords with the highest, and emits the same sound with it, though more acute. For thus desire is conjoined with reason. But *the form* is justice and temperance. *The producing cause* is a philosophic life. But *the paradigm* is the world. For the political philosopher arranges all things in imitation of the universe, which is replete with excellent order. For this universe is *order* (*κοσμος*) according to Plato, and not disorder (*ακοσμια*). Manners and discipline are *the instrument*. And *the end* is good. It must, however, be observed, that good is twofold, one of which pertains to us in the present life, but the other we possess hereafter¹. *Political good*, therefore, belongs to us in the present, but *theoretic good* will be our portion in another life. To Gorgias, therefore, the discourse is about the *producing cause*; to Polus, about the *formal*; and to Callicles, about the *final*. Nor is it wonderful if all appear to be in all. For in the producing cause the rest are found, and in the others all: for there is a certain communion among them, and they pervade through each other. But they derive their order from that which abounds.

Hence, therefore, the division of the dialogue becomes apparent. For it is divided into three parts: into the discourse with Gorgias; into that with Polus; and into that with Callicles. It is necessary also to observe, that justice and temperance are peculiarly said to be the form of the political science. For it is necessary to know that all the virtues contribute to political felicity, but especially these two. Hence Plato always makes mention of these, as being neglected by men. For they wish to know the other two, though not perfectly, yet fictitiously, and under a false appellation. Hence they say, Such a one is a prudent man; he knows how to enrich himself. And in a similar manner with respect to fortitude; but they neglect the other two. There is, however, occasion for these, since they proceed through all

¹ Though a few are able to exercise the *theoretic* as well as the *political* virtues in the present life, yet we can only possess the good of the former in perfection hereafter.—For an accurate account of these virtues, see the Notes on the Phædo.

the parts of the soul. For as he who in the city performs his proper work, and gives to every man that which is his due, is said to be just; in like manner justice rules in the soul, when reason, anger, and desire, respectively perform the office accommodated to each. If this be the case, temperance then subsists in the soul, when each part does not desire that which is foreign to its nature.

In the next place, it is worth while to inquire into the number and analogy of the persons. Five persons, therefore, are introduced, viz. Socrates, Chærepho, Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. Of these, Socrates is analogous to that which is intellectual and scientific; Chærepho to right opinion; Gorgias to distorted opinion; for he was not entirely vanquished by injustice, but was dubious whether he should be persuaded or not. But Polus is analogous to injustice, and to one who is alone ambitious; and Callicles is analogous to a swinish nature, and which is a lover of pleasure. Some, however, doubt on what account the orators are three, but the philosophers two; and why the number of the orators is indivisible¹, but that of the philosophers divisible. We say, however, that this is not true. For Socrates imitates the *monad*² looking to *the one*. And divinity (or *the one*) is simple, produced from nothing. Hence the hymn to him says, "From whom all things emerge into light; but thy subsistence alone is not on account of any thing³." Chærepho also imitates the monad, but that which is material and inseparable from matter; but Socrates the separate monad. And as subordinate do not proceed to better, or better to subordinate natures, without a medium, on this account Chærepho has a middle order; and consequently it is incumbent on him to transmit that which the extremes possess.

It now remains to inquire how Plato makes mention of Gorgias. I say, therefore, in the first place, that there is nothing absurd in a writer recording unknown men, and introducing them as discoursing with each other. And, in the second place, we say that Socrates and Gorgias were contemporaries. For Socrates lived in the third year of the 77th Olympiad: and Empedocles the Pythagorean, the preceptor of Gorgias, associated with him. To which we may add, that Gorgias wrote a treatise concerning Nature, not

¹ For three, being an odd number, is indivisible.

² The *monad* is the united subsistence of separated multitude; but *the one* is the summit of multitude.

³ Εξ ὧ πάντα πεφυνηί σου δ' ουδενος ουνενα μονος.

inelegant, in the 84th Olympiad; so that this was twenty-eight or a few more years before Socrates. Besides, Plato, in the *Theætetus*, says that Socrates, when a very young man, met with Parmenides, when he was very much advanced in years, and found him to be a most profound man. But Parmenides was the preceptor of Empedocles, who was the preceptor of Gorgias. And Gorgias was very old: for, according to history, he died in the one-hundred-and-ninth year of his age. So that these two lived about the same time.

I shall only observe, in addition to what Olympiodorus has said, that Plato does not condemn all orators, but those only who study to persuade their hearers to embrace whatever they please, whether it be good or bad, false or true; such as were Lysias the Theban, Tisias, and Gorgias. But, in the *Phædrus*, he prefers Pericles and Isocrates to all the other orators, because they combined eloquence with philosophy. He also adds, that a legitimate orator ought to understand the reasons of things, the laws of manners, the powers of words, and the different dispositions of men; that he should know how to compose words adapted, as much as possible, to the genius of his hearers; and that he should not be so anxious that what he says may be pleasing to men, as that it may be acceptable to Divinity.

THE GORGIAS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CALLICLES, || CHÆREPHO,
SOCRATES, || GORGIAS,
 And POLUS.

CALLICLES.

IN this manner, Socrates, they say it is requisite to engage in war and contention.

SOC. But have we not, according to the proverb, come after the festival? and are we not late?

CAL. And, indeed, after a very elegant festival. For Gorgias, a little before, exhibited to us many and beautiful things.

SOC. But Chærepho, O Calicles, was the cause of our being so late: for he compelled us to waste our time in the forum.

CHÆR. It is, however, of no consequence, Socrates: for I can apply a remedy, as Gorgias is my friend, who either now, or at some future time, will, if you please, exhibit the same things to us.

CAL. But what, Chærepho, does Socrates desire to hear Gorgias?

CHÆR. We are certainly come hither for this very purpose.

CAL. Whenever, therefore, you please, come to me at my house: for Gorgias resides with me, and will exhibit to you whatever you desire.

SOC. You speak well, Calicles. But will he be willing to discourse with us now? For I wish to inquire of the man what the power of his art is, and what it is he professes and teaches. But the other things which you speak of, he may show us some other time.

CAL. There is nothing like asking ¹ him, Socrates : for this is one of the things which he exhibited. He, therefore, just now promised all that are in the house, that he would answer any question that might be asked him.

Soc. You certainly speak well. Ask him, therefore, Chærepho.

CHÆR. What must I ask him ?

Soc. What he is.

CHÆR. How do you say ?

¹ Rhetoric, says Olympiodorus, is twofold ; the one being art, and the other skill. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire, on what account skill is not art ? It is justly then observed in the Phædrus, that he who intends to discourse about any thing should first define, and afterwards teach : for he who does not do this must necessarily totally err. Thus, for instance, in investigating if the soul is immortal, we ought not immediately to show that it is immortal ; but, previous to this, we should make a division, and say that soul is not one thing, but many things. For there is both rational and irrational soul : and there is also a plantal soul,—whence likewise we say that plants live. We say, then, that the rational soul is both immortal and not immortal. It is not immortal, indeed, if we consider the immortal according to a subsistence perpetual and uniform ; but it is immortal both in its essence and energy.

Again, the definition of art is twofold. For art is a method proceeding in an orderly path in conjunction with phantasy. Olympiodorus adds in conjunction with phantasy, in order to distinguish it from nature. For nature also proceeds in an orderly way, but not with phantasy. Again, art is a system of conclusions, coexercised to a certain end, beneficial to some of the purposes of life. According to the first definition, therefore, rhetoric, falsely so denominated, may be called an art. For it proceeds in an orderly path ; in the first place, arranging the proem ; and afterwards the state or condition (*καταστάσις*), and what is consequent to this. But it is not an art according to the second definition, since this can only apply to true rhetoric, which assigns the causes of what it asserts. Indeed, not only rhetoric, falsely so called, is an art, according to the first definition, but also cookery, and the dressing of hair. For to cook is not the province of any casual person, but of one who possesses skill, and proceeds in a certain way. In like manner, the decoration of the hair has a knowledge of ointments, and knows how to adorn the hairs. The rhetoric, therefore, which knows not how to assign the cause of what it asserts, but proceeds to both fides, i. e. to the true and the false, is not an art. For art is that which has one good end. But true rhetoric, which subsists under the political character, is an art. For, as the rational physician knows how to cure an ophthalmus, so likewise the empiric. But the former, who also acts according to art, can assign the causes of what he does, which the empiric cannot. Again, if some one should ask in what art differs from science, since art also assigns causes, we reply, that science produces the knowledge of things whose subsistence is perpetual and uniform, but art the knowledge of things flowing. Shall we say, therefore, that the physiologist is not scientific who investigates things flowing and material ? By no means : for his investigation is not of things material, but he refers them to universals, and explores the hypothesis of universal physical natures. So that Plato reprobrates false and not true rhetoric.

Soc.

SOC. Just as, if he should happen to be an artificer of shoes, he would answer you that he was a shoemaker. Or do you not understand what I say?

CHÆR. I do; and I will ask him. Tell me, O Gorgias, did Callicles here say true, that you promised to answer whatever should be asked you?

GORG. He spoke the truth, Chærepho: for I just now made this promise: and I say that no one has asked me any thing new for many years.

CHÆR. You will, therefore, answer easily, Gorgias.

GORG. We shall make trial of this, Chærepho.

POL. Do so, by Jupiter: but if you please, Chærepho, discourse with me: for Gorgias appears to me to be weary; as he has just now discussed many particulars.

CHÆR. But what, Polus, do you think that you can answer better than Gorgias?

POL. Of what consequence is 'it, if you are answered sufficiently?

CHÆR. It is of no consequence: but, since you are willing, answer me.

POL. Ask.

CHÆR. I ask you then, if Gorgias were knowing in that art¹ in which his brother Herodicus is skilled, by what name we might justly call him? Might we not call him the same as his brother?

POL. Entirely so.

CHÆR. Calling him, therefore, a physician, we should rightly denominate him?

POL. We should.

CHÆR. But if he were skilled in that art in which Aristopho, the son of Aglaophon, is skilled, or his brother, what should we then rightly call him?

¹ There are two kinds of rhetoric, says Olympiodorus; but of these the genera, and the ends, and the ways, are different. For the genus of true rhetoric is art; but, of the false, skill. Again, the end of the true is good; but, of the false, persuasion, whether the thing persuaded to be done, or not, be good or bad. And again, the way of the true is to know the powers of the soul; but, of the false, not to know them. *Doctrinal* faith also is the way of the true; but *credible* that of the false. For the geometrician wishes to persuade, but in a demonstrative way, and not from credibility, as the rhetorician. As, therefore, the medicinal art announces health through different auxiliaries, so rhetorics proceed through different forms. As a knife, therefore, is not of itself either good or bad, but is beneficial, or the contrary, to him who uses it; so rhetoric is not of itself beautiful, but is beneficial to him who uses it.

POL. Evidently, a painter.

CHÆR. But now, since he is knowing in a certain art, what can we properly call him?

POL. O Chærepho! there are many arts in men which are from skill¹ skilfully discovered. For skill causes our life to proceed according to art; but unskilfulness according to fortune. Of each of these, different persons differently participate: but the best participate of the best; in the number of which is Gorgias here, who participates of the most beautiful of arts.

Soc. Polus, Gorgias appears to be very well furnished for discourse; but he does not fulfil his promise to Chærepho.

GORG. In what principally, Socrates?

Soc. He does not appear to me altogether to answer what he was asked.

GORG. But do you, if you please, ask him.

Soc. Not if you yourself would be willing to answer me; for this would be much more agreeable to me. For it is evident to me that Polus, from what he said, has applied himself more to what is called the rhetoric art than to the art of discourse.

POL. Why do you say so, Socrates?

Soc. Because, Polus, when Chærepho asked you in what art Gorgias was skilled, you praised indeed his art, as if any one had blamed it, but you did not say what the art itself is.

POL. Did I not answer, that it was the most beautiful of arts?

Soc. Very much so. But no one asked you concerning the quality of the art of Gorgias, but what it was, and what Gorgias ought to be called; in

¹ Experiment (*πειρα*), says Olympiodorus, differs from skill (*εμπειρια*). For skill is asserted of actions, but experiment of things artificial according to a part. And again, experiment is conversant with things partial, but skill with things more universal. Skill, therefore, does not produce art, if skill is of things subordinate; for, if it did, superior would be produced from inferior natures. But it may be said, Do we not arrive at skill from experiment, and at art from skill? We reply, that experiment, indeed, contributes to skill, and skill to art; but they are not producing causes. This, however, takes place from our possessing the gnostic reasons of things, and being excited by sensibles. As, therefore, he who makes the sparks which have for a long time been concealed in ashes apparent, is not said to have made light, but to have rendered it manifest; and in like manner, he who purifies the eye from an ophthalmia does not produce light, but contributes to the presence of it to the eye: so the reasons in us require that which may cause us to recollect. For we are analogous to a geometrician sleeping. So that skill is not effective.

the same manner as Chærepho proposed to you before, and you answered him beautifully, and with brevity. Now, therefore, inform me in the same manner, what the art of Gorgias is, and what we ought to call Gorgias. Or rather, do you, O Gorgias, tell us yourself what we ought to call you, as knowing in a certain art.

GORG. A person skilled in rhetoric.

SOC. Ought we, therefore, to call you a rhetorician?

GORG. And a good one, Socrates, if you wish to give me a name; which, as Homer says, I pray may be the case.

SOC. But I do wish.

GORG. Denominate me, therefore.

SOC. Shall we say too, that you are able to make others rhetoricians?

GORG. I profess this not only here, but elsewhere.

SOC. Are you willing therefore, Gorgias, we should proceed in the mode of discourse we just now adopted, viz. by question and answer, employing on some other occasion that prolixity of speech which Polus just now began to use? But do not deceive me in what you promised, but be willing to answer with brevity what is asked you.

GORG. There are, Socrates, certain answers which must necessarily be prolix: however, I will endeavour to answer you in the shortest manner possible. For this is one of the things which I profess, viz. that no one can say the same things in fewer words than myself.

SOC. I have occasion, Gorgias, for this brevity: and I request that you will now give me a specimen of it, reserving prolixity of speech for another time.

GORG. I will give you a specimen; and such a one that you will say you never heard a shorter discourse.

SOC. Come, then (for you say that you are knowing in the rhetorical art, and that you can make others rhetoricians), is not rhetoric conversant with a certain thing, in the same manner as the weaving art is employed about the making of garments?

GORG. It is.

SOC. And is not music, therefore, conversant with the production of melodies?

GORG. Yes.

SOC.

Soc. By Juno, Gorgias, I am delighted with your answers, because they are the shortest possible.

GORG. I entirely think, Socrates, that I shall give you satisfaction in this respect.

Soc. You speak well. But answer me in this manner respecting the rhetorical art, and inform me of what thing it is the science.

GORG. Of discourses.

Soc. Of what discourses, Gorgias? Is it of such discourses as those employ who show the sick by what mode of living they may become well?

GORG. It is not.

Soc. The rhetorical art, therefore, is not conversant with all discourses.

GORG. It certainly is not.

Soc. But yet it enables men to speak.

GORG. It does.

Soc. Does it impart the power of intellect in those things in which it imparts the ability of speaking?

GORG. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Does not, therefore, the medicinal art, of which we just now spoke, render us able to understand and speak about the maladies of the sick?

GORG. Necessarily so.

Soc. The medicinal art, therefore, as it appears, is conversant with discourses.

GORG. It is.

Soc. And is it not conversant with discourses about diseases?

GORG. Especially so.

Soc. The gymnastic art, therefore, is also conversant with discourses about the good and bad habit of bodies.

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. And, indeed, other arts, O Gorgias, will subsist in this manner. For each of them will be conversant with those discourses which are employed about that particular thing of which each is the art.

GORG. It appears so.

Soc. Why, therefore, do you not call other arts rhetorical, since they are conversant with discourses, and you call this very thing which is employed about discourses, rhetoric?

GORG. Because, Socrates, all the science of other arts is conversant, as I may say, with manual and such-like operations; but nothing belonging to the rhetorical art is manual, since all its action and authority subsist through discourses. On this account, I think that the rhetorical art is conversant with discourses, and I affirm that in this I speak rightly.

SOC. I understand what kind of an art you wish to call it; but perhaps I may comprehend it yet still more clearly. However, answer me. Have we not arts?

GORG. Yes.

SOC. I think that, with respect to all the arts, some are very much employed in operation, and stand very little in need of discourse; but others do not require it at all, but accomplish their design in silence; such as the arts of painting and statuary, and many others. You appear, therefore, to me to say that the rhetorical art is not conversant with such arts as these. Or do you not?

GORG. You apprehend my meaning very well, Socrates.

SOC. But there are other arts which accomplish the whole of their intention through discourse, and either require, as I may say, nothing of operation, or very little, such as the arithmetic, logic, ¹ and many other arts; some of which have discourses nearly equal to their operations; but with many the discourses surpass the operations: and, universally, all their action and authority subsist through discourses. You appear to me to say that rhetoric ranks among things of this last kind.

GORG. You speak the truth.

SOC. Yet I do not think you are willing to call rhetoric any one of these, though you said that the rhetorical art was that which possessed its authority through discourse. For some one disposed to be troublesome might ask, Do you therefore, Gorgias, say that the arithmetical is the rhetorical art? But I do not think that you call either the arithmetical, or the geometrical, the rhetorical art.

GORG. You think rightly, Socrates, and apprehend me perfectly well.

SOC. Now, therefore, complete the answer to my question. For, since rhetoric is one of those arts which very much use discourse, and there are

¹ The art of chess.

other arts of this kind, endeavour to tell us about what particular thing in discourse the authority of rhetoric is exercised. Just as if any one should ask me respecting the arts which I lately mentioned, O Socrates, what is the arithmetical art, I should say as you did just now, that it is one of the arts which possesses all its power through discourse. And if he should again ask me about what it is conversant, I should answer, About the knowledge of the even and the odd, viz. what the nature is of each. But if he should further ask me, What do you call the logistick art? I should answer, that this also is one of those arts which possess all their authority through discourse. And if he should ask me about what it is conversant, I should answer, like those who write decrees in the Senate-house, that the logistick in other respects subsists in the same manner as the arithmetical art (for each is employed about the even and the odd); but that it differs in this, that it considers the amount of the even and odd, both with respect to themselves and to each other. And if any one should ask me about what the discourses of astronomy are employed, in consequence of my saying that it ranked among those arts the whole of whose authority consists in discourse, I should say that they are employed about the lation of the stars, of the sun and the moon, viz. how they are related to each other with respect to swiftness.

GORG. And you would answer very properly, Socrates.

SOC. Now then do you answer, Gorgias. For rhetoric is one of those arts which accomplish every thing, and derive all their authority through discourse. Is it not?

GORG. It is.

SOC. Tell me then, what that particular thing is, about which the discourses are conversant which rhetoric employs.

GORG. The greatest and the best, Socrates, of human concerns.

SOC. But, Gorgias, what you now say is ambiguous, and in no respect clear. For I think you have heard that convivial song, which is sung at banquets, in which the singers thus enumerate: that to be well is the best thing; but to be beautiful ranks in the second place; and, as the author of the song says, to be rich without fraud, in the third place¹.

GORG.

¹ These verses, according to the Greek Scholia of Ruhnkenius, are by some ascribed to Simonides, and by others to Epicharmus. But they form a part of one of those songs which were

GORG. I have heard it; but why do you say this?

Soc. Because there those artificers will immediately present themselves to you, who are celebrated by the author of this song; viz. the physician,

were sung at entertainments, and were called *σκολια*, *scolia*. They mostly consisted of short verses, and were sung by the few of the company that were best skilled in music. These *scolia* were chiefly used by the Athenians; yet they were not unknown in other parts of Greece, where several celebrated writers of *scolia* lived, such as Anacreon of Teos, Alcæus of Lesbos, Praxilla of Sicyon, and others. Their arguments were of various kinds; some of them being ludicrous and satirical, others amorous, and many of them serious. Those of a serious nature sometimes contained a practical exhortation or sentence, such as that which is now cited by Plato. And sometimes they consisted of the praises and illustrious actions of great men.

But the following additional information on this subject, from the MS. Scholia of Olympiodorus on this dialogue, will I doubt not be gratefully received by all lovers of antiquity, as the whole of it is not to be found in any other writer.

Olympiodorus then, after observing that Plato admitted music in his republic, though not the popular, but that which adorns the soul, adds as follows: "The antients especially used music in their banquets; since banquets excite the passions. A choir, therefore, was formed. And if they danced from the left hand to the right hand part, a thing of this kind was called *προσσοδία* (*προσσοδος*); but if to the left hand, *επισσοδος* (*επισσοδος*); and if to the middle, it was called *μεσσοδος* (*μεσσοδος*). Again, if, turning in a backward direction, they went to the right hand part, it was called *στροφη* (*στροφή*); but if to the middle, *μεσσοδος* (*μεσσοδος*); and if to the more left hand parts, *αντιστροφη* (*αντιστροφή*). Of these also Stesichorus makes mention. But these things were symbolical: for they imitated the celestial motions. For the motion from the left to the right hand parts is western; but that from the right to the left, eastern. In like manner those that began to sing, and who moved to the middle, and ended the dance, obscurely signified by all this the earth, which is a certain *beginning*, as being the centre; a *middle*, through its position; and an *end*, as being the dregs of the universe. When, therefore, the music partially ceased, they used wine mixed with myrtle; and some one taking it, and singing, did not give it to the person next to him, but to the one opposite to him. Afterwards, he gave it to the first, and he again to the second, and the communication became *scolia*. And the part here is called *scolion*. Μαλιστα τουνυ εν τοις συμπουσις μουσικη εκεχρητο* επειδη τα συμπουσια υατε ην εις παθος κησση* χορος ουν ευγενετο* και ει μεν απο αριστερων επι το δεξιον μερος εφεροντο. εκαλειτο προσσοδος το τουντον* ει δε επι το αριστερον επισσοδος* ει δε επι το μεσον, μεσσοδος. και παλιη, ει επι το οπισθεν στραφειτες επι το δεξιον μερος μεσαν, στροφή εκαλειτο* ει δε επι το μεσον, μεσσοδος* ει δε επι το αριστερον αντιστροφή* τουντων μεν ουν και Στεσιχορος μεμνηται* συμβολικα δε ταυτα ησαν* επιμυνηνται γαρ τας ουρανιαις κησσεις* η μεν γαρ απα των αριστερων εις τα δεξια δυτικη εστιν* η δε απο των δεξιων επι τα αριστερα ανατολικη* ωσαντως και οι αρχομενοι αδειν και μεσσουτες και ληγοντες, την γην ηνιττοντο, η τις αρχη μεν εστιν ως κεντρον* μεση δε δια την θεσιν* τελευτη δε ως υποσταθμη του παντος* επει τουνυ εξελιμνηκη κατα μερος η μουσικη, μυρρινας εκεχρητο. και ελαμβανε τις αυτην, και αδων ου παρειχετο μερ* αυτων, αλλα τη κατα αντικρυ αυτου* ειτα εκεινος τη πρωτη* και παλιη εκεινος τη δευτερη* και σκολια η μεταδοσις ευγενετο* και ενταυθα το σκολιον μερος ειρηται.

Information similar to the above may be found in the Greek Scholia on Hephæstion, but by no means so complete.

the

the master of gymnastic, and the collector of wealth. And, in the first place, the physician will say: Gorgias, O Socrates, deceives you. For his art is not employed about that which procures the greatest good to men, but this is the province of my art. If, therefore, I should ask him, What are you who assert these things? he would perhaps say that he is a physician. What then do you say? Or is the employment of your art the greatest good? How is it possible, perhaps he will say, Socrates, it should not, since the work of my art is health? For what can be a greater good to men than health? But if after this the master of gymnastic should say, I should wonder, Socrates, if Gorgias could show you that there is greater good in his art than I can evince there is in mine, I should again say to him, And what are you, O man? and what is your work? he would say, I am a master of gymnastic, and my employment consists in rendering the bodies of men beautiful and strong. But after the master of gymnastic, the collector of wealth would say, despising all others, as it appears to me, Consider, Socrates, whether there is any greater good than riches, either with Gorgias, or any other person? I should therefore say to him, What then, are you the artificer of this good? He would say that he is. And what are you? A collector of money. What then? Do you think that riches are the greatest good to men? Undoubtedly, he will say. To this we shall reply, Gorgias here contends that his art is the cause of greater good than yours. It is evident, therefore, that after this he will say, And what is this good? Let Gorgias answer. Think then, Gorgias, that you are thus interrogated by them and me, and answer, What is this, which you say is the greatest good to men, and of which you are the artificer?

GORG. That which is in reality, Socrates, the greatest good, and is at the same time the cause of liberty to men, and of their being able to rule over others in their own city.

Soc. What then do you say this is?

GORG. The ability of persuading by words in a court of justice judges, in the senate-house senators, and in a public assembly the hearers, and in every other convention of a political nature. Likewise through this art you will make the physician and the master of gymnastic your slaves. And as to the collector of money, it will appear that he exercises his employment, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak, and persuade the multitude.

Soc.

Soc. Now you appear to me, Gorgias, very nearly to evince what kind of an art rhetoric is in your opinion : and if I understand you, you say that the rhetorical art is the artificer of persuasion, and that the whole of its employment and its very summit terminate in this. Or are you able to say any thing further respecting rhetoric, than that it is able to cause persuasion in the souls of the hearers ?

GORG. I have nothing further to say, Socrates ; but you appear to me to have sufficiently defined it. For this is its summit.

Soc. But hear, Gorgias. For I well know, as I persuade myself, that if ever any one, discoursing with another, wished to know that about which he discoursed, this is my case. And I think that you are likewise affected in the same manner.

GORG. But to what purpose is all this, Socrates ?

Soc. I will now tell you. I very clearly perceive that I do not know what the rhetorical persuasion is which you speak of, or with what particulars it is conversant : and though I conjecture what I think you say, and about what you speak, yet I do not the less cease to ask you, what you assert rhetorical persuasion to be, and about what it is employed. Though I, therefore, suspect that for the sake of which it subsists, yet I do not ask on your account, but for the sake of discourse, that it may proceed in such a manner as to render apparent in the highest degree the subject of the present discussion. For consider whether I appear to interrogate you justly : just as, if I should ask you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis, and you should answer me that he paints animals,—might I not justly inquire of you, what are the animals which he paints, and how he paints them ?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. And would not my inquiry be made on this account, because there are many other painters who paint many other animals ?

GORG. It would.

Soc. But if there were no one besides Zeuxis that painted animals, you would have answered properly.

GORG. Undoubtedly.

Soc. This being the case, then, inform me respecting rhetoric, whether it appears to you that the rhetorical art alone produces persuasion, or whether

this

this is effected by other arts? But my meaning is this: Does he who teaches any thing persuade that which he teaches, or not?

GORG. He does persuade, Socrates, and the most of all things.

Soc. Again, if we should speak respecting the same arts as we did just now, does not the arithmetical art teach us such things as pertain to number; and does not an arithmetician do the same?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. Does he not, therefore, also persuade?

GORG. He does.

Soc. The arithmetical art, therefore, is the artificer of persuasion.

GORG. It appears so.

Soc. If, therefore, any one should ask us what persuasions it produces, and about what, we should reply, that it produces preceptive persuasions about the quantity of the even and the odd. And in like manner we might show, that the other arts which we just now mentioned are effective of persuasions, and what these persuasions are, and about what they are employed. Or might we not?

GORG. We might.

Soc. The rhetorical art, therefore, is not alone effective of persuasion.

GORG. True.

Soc. Since, therefore, it does not alone effect this, but likewise other arts accomplish the same thing, we may justly after this make the same inquiry concerning the rhetorical art as we did about the painter; viz. what kind of persuasion rhetoric produces, and about what its persuasion is employed. Or does it not appear to you to be just to make such inquiry?

GORG. It does.

Soc. Answer then, Gorgias, since this appears to you to be the case.

GORG. I say, therefore, Socrates, that rhetoric is the cause of the persuasion which is produced in courts of justice, and in other public associations, as I just now said; and likewise that this persuasion is employed about things just and unjust.

Soc. And I likewise did suspect, Gorgias, that you would give this answer respecting rhetorical persuasion. But do not wonder if a little after this I shall ask you a thing of such a kind as indeed appears to be evident, but which I shall notwithstanding repeat. For, as I before observed, I ask not

for your sake, but that the discourse may be brought to a conclusion in an orderly manner, that we may not accustom ourselves by conjecture to snatch from each other what is said. But do you finish your hypothesis in such a manner as is most agreeable to you.

GORG. You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates.

Soc. Come then, let us also consider this. Do you say that to learn is any thing?

GORG. I do.

Soc. Again, do you say that to believe is any thing?

GORG. I do.

Soc. Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to believe are the same, and likewise that discipline and faith are the same, or that they differ from each other?

GORG. I think, Socrates, that they differ from each other.

Soc. And you think well: but you may know that you do so from hence. For if any one should ask you, Are there such things, Gorgias, as false and true belief? you would, I think, say there are.

GORG. I should.

Soc. But what, is there such a thing as true and false science?

GORG. There is not.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, that true and false science are not the same.

GORG. True.

Soc. But those that learn, and those that believe, are persuaded.

GORG. They are.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we should establish two species of persuasion, one of which produces faith without knowledge, but the other science?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. Whether, therefore, does the rhetorical art produce persuasion in courts of justice, and other numerous assemblies, respecting things just and unjust? And is it that persuasion from which faith without knowledge is produced, or that from which knowledge arises?

GORG. It is evident, Socrates, that it is that from which faith is produced.

Soc. The rhetorical art, therefore, as it seems, is the artificer of the persuasion

persuasion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches respecting the just and unjust.

GORG. It is so.

SOC. A rhetorician, therefore, does not teach courts of justice, and other numerous assemblies, respecting things just and unjust, but only procures belief concerning these. For he, doubtless, is not able to teach so great a multitude in a short time things of such great importance.

GORG. He, doubtless, is not.

SOC. But come, let us see what we should say concerning the rhetorical art. For I, indeed, as yet, am not able to understand what I say. When an assembly, then, is held in a city, respecting the choice of physicians, or shipwrights, or any other kind of artists, does the rhetorician then do any thing else than refrain from giving his advice? For it is evident that, in each election, he who is the most consummate artist ought to be chosen. Nor in consultations respecting the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, will any other advice be attended to but that of architects. Nor, again, in the election of commanders, or any military order, in times of war, or in deliberations respecting the capture of certain places, will rhetoricians be consulted, but those that are skilled in military affairs. Or how do you say, Gorgias, respecting things of this kind? For since you say that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make others rhetoricians, it is very proper to inquire of you about the things pertaining to your art. And believe that I shall benefit you by acting in this manner. For, perhaps, some one who is now within the house may wish to become your disciple: and I nearly perceive a collected multitude who, perhaps, are ashamed to interrogate you. These, therefore, being interrogated by me, think that you also are asked by them, What would be the consequence, Gorgias, if we should associate with you? About what particulars shall we be able to give advice to the city? Whether about the just alone and the unjust; or respecting those things which Socrates just now mentioned? Endeavour, therefore, to answer them.

GORG. But I will endeavour, Socrates, clearly to unfold to you all the power of the rhetorical art. For you have beautifully led the way. For you doubtless know that these docks and walls of the Athenians, and the structure of the ports, were partly the consequence of the advice of Themis-

toles, and partly of Pericles, but were not built from the advice of artificers.

Soc. These things are said, Gorgias, respecting Themistocles: but I myself heard Pericles when he gave us his advice respecting the middle wall.

GORG. And when an election is made respecting the particulars of which you speak, you see, Socrates, that rhetoricians are the persons that give advice, and whose opinion respecting these things vanquishes.

Soc. Wondering, therefore, that this is the case, Gorgias, I some time ago asked you, what the power of the rhetorical art is. For, while I consider it in this manner, it appears to me to be something divine with respect to its magnitude.

GORG. If you knew all, Socrates, you would find, as I may say, that it comprehends under itself all powers. But of this I will give you a great example. For I have often, with my brother, and other physicians, visited certain sick persons, who were unwilling either to drink the medicine, or suffer themselves to be cut or burnt by the physician, in consequence of the inability of the physician to persuade them; but these I have persuaded by no other art than the rhetorical. I say further, that if a rhetorician and a physician should in any city verbally contend with each other in a place of disputation, or any other assembly, which ought to be chosen in preference, a rhetorician or a physician, the decision would by no means be given in favour of the physician, but of the rhetorician, if he was willing to be chosen. And if the rhetorician should contend with any other artist, he would persuade his hearers that he ought to be chosen in preference to any other. For there is not any thing about which the rhetorician will not speak more persuasively to the multitude than any other artist. Such, therefore, and so great is the power of this art. Indeed, Socrates, the rhetorical art ought to be used like every other contest. For in other contests it is not proper for any one to strike, pierce, and slay his friends, because he has learned to contend in boxing, in the pancratium, and with arms, so as to be superior both to friends and enemies. Nor, by Jupiter, if some one going to the palæstra, whose body is in a flourishing condition, and becoming a pugilist, should afterwards strike his father and mother, or any other of his kindred or friends, it would not on this account be proper to hate, and expel from cities, the masters of gymnastics,

gymnastics, and those who instruct men to fight with arms. For they impart these arts to their pupils, in order that they may use them justly against enemies, and those that injure others, defending themselves, but not offering violence to others. But such a one, as I have just mentioned, acting perversely, does not rightly employ his strength and art. The teachers, therefore, are not base characters, nor is art to be blamed, nor is it to be considered as on this account base: but I think those are to be considered so who do not use these arts properly. The same may be said of the rhetorical art. For a rhetorician is able to speak against all men, and about every thing; so that, in short, he can persuade the multitude respecting whatever he pleases more than any other: but yet physicians ought not to suffer in our opinion, nor other artificers, because this can be done by rhetoricians. But the rhetorical art, as well as that pertaining to contest, is to be used justly. In my opinion, however, if any one becoming a rhetorician acts unjustly through this power and art, it is not proper to hate and expel from cities the teacher of rhetoric; for he imparts the knowledge of it for just purposes, but the other applies it to contrary purposes. It is just, therefore, to hate, banish, and slay him who does not use rhetoric properly, but not him by whom it is taught.

Soc. I think, Gorgias, that you are skilled in a multitude of arguments, and that you have perceived this in them, that it is not easy for men to dissolve their conference respecting things of which they endeavour to discourse, by mutually defining, learning from others, and teaching themselves: but that, if they contend about any thing, and the one says that the other does not speak with rectitude or clearness, they are indignant, and think it is said through envy of themselves, and through a desire of victory, and not in consequence of exploring the thing proposed in the disputation: and that some, indeed, depart in a shameful manner, after they have reviled others, and spoken and heard such things about themselves as cause those that are present to be indignant, that they have deigned to become auditors of such men as these. But on what account do I assert these things? Because you now appear to me to speak not altogether conformably to what you first said respecting the rhetorical art. I am afraid, therefore, to confute you, lest you should think that I do not speak with an ardent desire that the thing itself may

may become manifest, but that my discourse is directed to you. If, therefore, you are such a man as I am, I shall willingly interrogate you; but if not, I shall cease my interrogations. But among what kind of men do I rank? Among those who are willingly confuted, if they do not speak the truth, and who willingly confute others when they assert what is false; and who are not less pleased when they are confuted than when they confute. For I consider the former to be as much a greater good than the latter, as for a man to liberate himself from the greatest evil rather than another. For I do not think that any evil happens to men of such a magnitude as false opinion respecting the things which are the subject of our present discourse. If, therefore, you say that you are a man of this kind, let us converse; but if it appears to you that we ought to desist, let us bid farewell to our discussion, and dissolve the discourse.

GORG. But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you have mentioned. Perhaps, however, it is proper to attend to those that are present. For, some time since, before I came to you, I evinced many things to the persons now present: and now, perhaps, if we discourse, we shall extend our discussion to a great length. Some attention, therefore, ought to be paid to the persons present, lest we should detain any of them, when at the same time they wish to do something else.

CHÆR. Do but attend, Gorgias and Socrates, to the clamour of these men, who wish to hear if you say any thing. As to myself, therefore, I am not so engaged, that, leaving these and the former discourses, I can do any thing better.

CAL. By the Gods, Chærepho, I also have been present at many conferences; but I do not know that I was ever so delighted as with the present disputation: so that you will gratify me, should you be even willing to discourse the whole day.

SOC. But indeed, Callicles, nothing prevents, with respect to myself, if Gorgias is willing.

GORG. After this, Socrates, it would be shameful that I should not be willing, especially as I have announced that any one might ask what he pleased. But, if it is agreeable to these men, discourse, and ask any question you please.

SOC. Hear then, Gorgias, the particulars which I wondered at in the discourse

course which you just now made. For, perhaps, what you said is right, and I did not rightly apprehend you. Did you not say that you could make any one a rhetorician, who was willing to be instructed by you?

GORG. I did.

Soc. And, therefore, that you could enable him to speak in a persuasive manner about every thing to the multitude, not by teaching but persuading?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. You say, therefore, that a rhetorician is more capable of persuading with respect to what pertains to the health of the body, than a physician.

GORG. I did say that this was the case in a crowd.

Soc. Is not, therefore, that which takes place in a crowd the same as that which takes place among the ignorant? For, doubtless, among those endued with knowledge, the rhetorician will not be more capable of persuading than the physician.

GORG. You speak the truth.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, follow, that if the rhetorician is more capable of persuading than the physician, he will be more capable of persuading than one endued with knowledge?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. And this, not being a physician?

GORG. Yes.

Soc. But he who is not a physician must, doubtless, be ignorant of those things in which a physician is skilled.

GORG. It is evident.

Soc. He, therefore, who is ignorant will be more capable of persuading among the ignorant than he who is endued with knowledge, since a rhetorician is more capable of persuading than a physician. Does this happen to be the case, or any thing else?

GORG. In this instance this happens to be the case.

Soc. Can the same thing, therefore, be said respecting a rhetorician and the rhetorical art, in all the other arts? I mean, that the rhetorical art has no occasion to know how things themselves are circumstanced, but that it discovers a certain device of persuasion, so as that a rhetorician may appear to the ignorant to know more than those endued with knowledge.

GORG. Is there not great facility in this, Socrates, that a man who has not learned

learned the other arts, but has learned this one, may become in no respect inferior to artificers ?

Soc. Whether, from this being the case, a rhetorician is inferior, or not, to others, we will shortly consider, if it contributes any thing to our disputation. But let us now first of all consider this : Whether a rhetorician is affected in the same manner respecting the just and the unjust, the base and the becoming, good and evil, as respecting that which pertains to health, and other things of which there are other arts : I mean, that he does not know what is good, or what is evil, what is becoming, or what is base, what is just, or what is unjust ; but is able to devise persuasion respecting them, so as among the ignorant to appear more knowing than one endued with knowledge, at the same time that he is himself ignorant ? Or is it necessary that he should know these ? and is it requisite that he who is about to learn the rhetorical art should, when he comes to you, previously possess a knowledge of these ? But if he does not, shall we say that you, who are a teacher of rhetoric, will not instruct such a one in any of these things (for it is not your province), but that you will cause him to appear knowing in such particulars among the multitude, at the same time that he is ignorant of them, and to seem to be a good man when he is not good ? Or, in short, are you not able to teach him the rhetorical art, unless he previously knows the truth respecting these things ? Or how do such-like particulars take place, Gorgias ? And, by Jupiter, as you just now said, unfold to me what the power is of the rhetorical art.

GORG. But I think, Socrates, that if such a one should happen to be ignorant, he would learn these things from me.

Soc. Granted : for you speak well. And if you make any one a rhetorician, it is necessary that he should know things just and unjust, either before he is under your tuition, or afterwards, in consequence of being instructed by you.

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. What then ? Is he who learns things pertaining to building, tonic, or not ?

GORG. He is.

Soc. And is he, therefore, who learns things pertaining to music, a musician ?

GORG.

GORG. Yes.

SOC. And he who learns things pertaining to medicine, a physician? And so, according to the same reasoning, in other things, he who learns any thing is such as science renders its votaries.

GORG. Entirely so.

SOC. Does it not, therefore, follow from this reasoning, that he who learns just things is just?

GORG. Entirely so.

SOC. But does not he who is just act justly?

GORG. Yes.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, necessary that a rhetorician should be just, and that he who is just should be willing to act justly?

GORG. It appears so.

SOC. A just man, therefore, will never be willing to act unjustly.

GORG. It is necessary.

SOC. But, from what has been said, it is necessary that a rhetorician should be just.

GORG. It is.

SOC. A rhetorician, therefore, will never be willing to act unjustly.

GORG. It does not appear that he will.

SOC. Do you remember, therefore, that you said a little before, that the preceptors of youth ought not to be called to account, nor expelled from cities, if a pugilist does not use in a becoming manner the pugilistic art, and acts unjustly? And that, in a similar manner, if a rhetorician unjustly uses the rhetoric art, the preceptor is not to be called to account, nor expelled from the city, but he who acts unjustly, and does not properly use the rhetorical art? Were these things said, or not?

GORG. They were said.

SOC. But now it appears that this very same rhetorician will never act unjustly. Or does it not?

GORG. It appears so.

SOC. And in the former part of our discourse, Gorgias, it was said that the rhetorical art is conversant with discourses, not those respecting the even and the odd, but those respecting the just and the unjust. Was not this asserted?

GORG. It was.

Soc. I, therefore, in consequence of your asserting these things, thought that the rhetorical art could never be an unjust thing, as it always discourages concerning justice. But, since a little after you said that a rhetorician might use the rhetorical art unjustly, I wondered at the assertion; and thinking that what was said did not accord with itself, I said, that if you should think it a gain to be confuted, as it is in my opinion, then it would be worth while to discourse, but if not, we should bid farewell to discussion. Afterwards, however, while we were considering, you seem to have again confessed that it was impossible a rhetorician could use the rhetorical art unjustly, and be willing to do an injury. To determine, therefore, sufficiently, how these things take place, requires, by the dog, Gorgias, no brief discussion.

POL. But what, Socrates? Do you really form such an opinion of the rhetorical art as you now say? Or do you think Gorgias is ashamed that he has not acknowledged to you, that a rhetorician knows things just, beautiful, and good, and that, if any one goes to him who is ignorant of these things, he will instruct him in them? From this confession, something contrary will, perhaps, take place in the discourse. This, however, is what you love, since you lead interrogations to things of this kind. But what man do you think will deny that he knows things just, and teaches them to others? To bring the discourse, therefore, to things of this kind, is very rustic.

Soc. O most excellent Polus! we designedly procure associates and children, that when, through being advanced in years, we fall into error, you that are younger being present may correct our life both in words and deeds. And now, if I and Gorgias err in any respect in what we have asserted, do you who are present correct us: for it is just so to do. And I wish you would retract any thing that has been granted, if it appears to you that it has not been properly admitted, if you only take care of one thing for me.

POL. What is that?

Soc. That you would avoid in future prolixity of discourse, which at first you attempted to use.

POL. But what, may I not be permitted to speak as much as I please?

Soc. O best of men, you would be used very unworthily, if, having come to Athens, where liberty of speech is permitted more than in any part of Greece, you alone should here be deprived of this liberty. But, on the contrary, consider, if you should speak in a prolix manner, and be unwilling

to

to answer what is asked you, should not I be used unworthily, if it is not permitted me to depart, and not hear you? But if you are at all concerned for what has been said, and wish to correct it (as you just now said), then, retracting whatever you think fit, and alternately asking and being asked, confute in the same manner as I and Gorgias. For, indeed, you say that you know the same things as Gorgias. Or do you not?

POL. I do.

SOC. Will not you, therefore, also exhort any one to ask you whatever he pleases, as knowing how to answer him?

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. And now you may do whichever of these you please, viz. either ask or answer.

POL. I shall do so. And do you answer me, Socrates. Since Gorgias appears to you to doubt respecting the rhetorical art, what do you say he is?

SOC. Do you ask me what his art is?

POL. I do.

SOC. It does not appear to me to be any art, that I may speak the truth to you.

POL. But what does the rhetorical art appear to you to be?

SOC. A thing which you say produces art, in the book which I just now read.

POL. What do you call this thing?

SOC. A certain skill.

POL. Does the rhetorical art, therefore, appear to you to be skill?

SOC. To me it does, unless you say otherwise.

POL. But of what is it the skill?

SOC. Of procuring a certain grace and pleasure.

POL. Does not the rhetorical art, therefore, appear to you to be a beautiful thing, since it is capable of imparting delight to mankind?

SOC. But what, O Polus? Have you already heard me saying what the rhetorical art is, that you after this ask me, if it does not appear to me to be a beautiful thing?

POL. Have I not heard you say that it is a certain skill?

SOC. Are you willing, therefore, since you honour gratification, to gratify me in a trifling thing?

POL. I am.

SOC. Ask me then now, whether cooking appears to me to be an art ?

POL. I ask you then, what kind of an art is cooking ?

SOC. It is no art, Polus.

POL. But tell me what it is.

SOC. I say, then, it is a certain skill.

POL. Inform me what skill.

SOC. I say it is the skill of procuring grace and pleasure, Polus.

POL. But is cooking the same as rhetoric ?

SOC. By no means, but a part of the same study.

POL. Of what study are you speaking ?

SOC. Left it should be too rustic to speak the truth, I am averse to speak, on account of Gorgias, lest he should think that I deride his pursuit. But I do not know whether this is that rhetoric which Gorgias studies. For just now, it was by no means apparent to us, from the disputation, what is his opinion. But that which I call rhetoric, is a part of a certain thing which does not rank among things becoming.

GORG. Tell me, Socrates, what this thing is ; and do not be in the least ashamed because I am present.

SOC. This thing therefore, Gorgias, appears to me to be a certain study, not of a technical nature, but belonging to a soul which sagaciously conjectures, which is virile, and endued with a natural skill of conversing with men. But I call the summit of it adulation. It likewise appears to me that there are many other parts of this study, and that one of these is cookery ; which, indeed, appears to be an art, but, according to my doctrine, is not an art, but skill and exercise. I likewise call rhetoric a part of this study, together with the sophistic artifice, and that which pertains to the allurements of outward form. And these four parts belong to four things. If, therefore, Polus wishes to inquire, let him ; for he has not yet heard what part of adulation I assert rhetoric to be : but he does not perceive that I have not yet answered, and asks me if I do not think that rhetoric is beautiful. But I shall not answer him, whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or base, till I have first of all answered what rhetoric is. For it will not be just, Polus, to do otherwise. But if you wish to hear, ask me what part of adulation I assert rhetoric to be.

POL.

POL. I ask, then, and do you answer me what part it is.

SOC. Will you, therefore, understand when I have answered? For rhetoric, according to my doctrine, is an image of the politic part.

POL. What then? Do you say that it is something beautiful, or that it is something base?

SOC. I say that it is something base: for I call things evil base; since it is requisite I should answer you, as now knowing what I assert.

GORG. By Jupiter, Socrates, but neither do I myself understand what you say.

SOC. It is likely, Gorgias: for I do not yet speak any thing clearly. But Polus here is a young man and acute.

GORG. However, dismiss him; and inform me how it is you say that rhetoric is an image of the politic part.

SOC. But I will endeavour to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be. And if it is not what I assert it to be, let Polus here confute me. Do you not call body something, and likewise soul?

GORG. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Do you not, therefore, think that there is a certain good habit of each of these?

GORG. I do.

SOC. But what? Is this only a habit which appears to be good, but which is not in reality? As, for instance, many appear to have their bodies in a good condition, when at the same time no one, except a physician, and some one skilled in gymnastics, can easily perceive that these are not in a good condition.

GORG. You speak the truth.

SOC. I say that a thing of this kind takes place both in body and soul, which causes both body and soul to appear to be in a good condition, when at the same time they are not so.

GORG. These things take place.

SOC. But come, I will explain to you in a still clearer manner, if I am able, what I say. As there are two things, I say there are two arts: and one of them, which pertains to the soul, I call politic; but the other, belonging to the body, I cannot in like manner distinguish by one appellation. But since the culture of the body is one, I call the two parts gymnastic and

dicine. But in the politic art I establish legislation, as corresponding to gymnastic, and justice as reciprocating with medicine. These communicate with each other, as subsisting about the same thing, viz. medicine communicates with gymnastic, and justice with legislation; but at the same time they differ in a certain respect from each other. But since these are four, and always procure remedies, looking to that which is best, one part of them curing the body, and the other the soul, the adulatory power perceiving this, I do not say knowing, but conjecturing it, in consequence of giving to itself a fourfold distribution, and entering under each of the parts, it feigns itself to be that under which it enters. And it is not, indeed, in the least concerned for that which is best; but always, through that which is pleasant, hunts after folly, and deceives; so as to appear to be of great worth. Cookery, therefore, enters under medicine, and feigns that it knows the best aliment for the body. So that if a cook and a physician should contend with each other among boys, or among men as stupid as boys, which of them possessed the knowledge of good and bad aliment, the physician would die through hunger. This, therefore, I call adulation; and I say, O Polus, that a thing of this kind is base. For this I say to you, that it looks to the pleasant without regarding that which is best. But I do not call it an art, but skill, because it has no reason by which it can show what the nature is of the things which it introduces; so that it is unable to tell the cause of each. But I do not call that an art which is an irrational thing. If you are doubtful respecting these things, I am willing to give you a reason for them. The adulation, therefore, pertaining to cookery is, as I have said, placed under medicine; but, after the same manner, the artifice respecting the allurements of outward form is placed under gymnastic: and this artifice is productive of evil, is deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal, deceiving by figures and colours, by smoothness and the senses; so as to cause those who attract to themselves foreign beauty, to neglect that which is properly their own, and which is procured through gymnastic. That I may not, therefore, be prolix, I wish to tell you, after the manner of geometricians (for perhaps you can now follow me), that the artifice respecting the allurements of outward form is to gymnastic as cookery to medicine. Or rather thus, that the artifice respecting the allurements of outward form is to gymnastic as the sophistical to the legislative power: and that cookery is to medicine as rhetoric to

justice. As I have said, they are thus distinguished by nature : but as sophists and rhetoricians are proximate to each other, they are mingled in the same, and about the same things, and do not possess any thing by which they can benefit themselves, or be benefited by other men. For, if the soul did not preside over the body, but the body over itself, and cookery and medicine were not considered and judged of by the soul, but the body itself judged, estimating things by its own gratifications; then, friend Polus, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would abundantly take place, (for you are skilled in these things,) viz. that all things would be mingled together in the same, things salubrious, medicinal, and pertaining to cookery, subsisting undistinguished from each other. You have heard, therefore, what I assert rhetoric to be, viz. that it is a thing reciprocating with cookery in the soul, as that in the body. Perhaps, therefore, I have acted absurdly, since, not permitting you to use prolixity of discourse, I myself have made a long oration. I deserve however to be pardoned : for, if I had spoken with brevity, you would not have understood me, nor have been able to make any use of my answer to you, but would have required an exposition. If, therefore, when you answer, I in my turn am not able to reply, do you also extend your discourse : but, if I can, suffer me to reply ; for it is just. And now, if you can make any use of this answer, do so.

POL. What then do you say? Does rhetoric appear to you to be adulation?

SOC. I said, indeed, that it was a part of adulation. But cannot you remember, Polus, though so young? What then will you do when you become advanced in years?

POL. Do, therefore, good rhetoricians appear to you to be considered in the same place as vile flatterers in cities?

SOC. Do you propose this as a question, or as the beginning of a certain discourse?

POL. As a question.

SOC. They do not then appear to me to be considered in the same place as vile flatterers in cities.

POL. How not *to be considered*? Are they not able to accomplish the greatest things in cities?

SOC.

Soc. They are not, if you allow that to be endued with power is good to him who is endued with it.

Pol. But this indeed I do say.

Soc. Rhetoricians, therefore, appear to me to possess the least power of all men in cities.

Pol. But what, do they not like tyrants slay, take away possessions, and banish from cities whomever they please?

Soc. By the dog, Polus, I am doubtful with respect to each of the things said by you, whether you assert these things yourself, and exhibit your own opinion, or interrogate me.

Pol. But I interrogate you.

Soc. Be it so, my friend. But do you not ask me two things at once?

Pol. How two things?

Soc. Did you not just now say, that rhetoricians like tyrants slew whomever they pleased, deprived them of their possessions, and expelled them from cities?

Pol. I did.

Soc. I therefore say to you that these are two questions, and I shall give you an answer to both. For I say, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants possess the least power of all men, in cities, as I just now said. For, in short, they accomplish nothing which they wish to accomplish; and yet they do that which appears to them to be best.

Pol. Is not this, therefore, to possess the power of accomplishing great things?

Soc. It is not, as says Polus.

Pol. Do I say not? On the contrary, I say it is.

Soc. By Jupiter, not you. For you said that to be able to do great things is good to him who possesses this power.

Pol. And I now say so.

Soc. Do you think, therefore, it is a good thing, if any one void of intellect does that which appears to him to be best? And do you call this the ability of accomplishing something great?

Pol. Not I.

Soc. Will you not, therefore, evince that rhetoricians are endued with intellect,

intellect, and, confuting me, show that rhetoric is an art, and not adulation? For, if you do not confute me, rhetoricians and tyrants, who do in cities whatever they please, will not by so doing obtain any thing good. But power is, as you say, good; though, for a man to do without intellect whatever he pleases, you also have acknowledged to be evil. Or have you not?

POL. I have.

SOC. How then can rhetoricians or tyrants be able to accomplish any thing great in cities, unless Polus evinces, against Socrates, that they do whatever they please?

POL. Is it possible any one can speak so absurdly?

SOC. I do not say that they accomplish what they wish: but confute me if you can.

POL. Did you not just now acknowledge, that they accomplished things which appeared to them to be best?

SOC. And I now acknowledge this.

POL. Do they not, therefore, do that which they wish to do?

SOC. I say they do not.

POL. But do they do that which they think fit?

SOC. I say they do.

POL. You speak importunately and unnaturally.

SOC. Do not accuse me, most excellent Polus, that I may speak to you in your own way; but, if you are capable of interrogating me any further, evince in what it is I am deceived; but if not, do you yourself answer.

POL. But I am willing to answer, that I may also know what you say.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do men appear to you to wish this, which every individual accomplishes, or that for the sake of which they accomplish this which they accomplish? As for instance, whether do those who take medicines from a physician appear to you to wish this which they do, viz. to drink the medicine, and suffer pain; or do they wish to be well, for the sake of which they take the medicine?

POL. They doubtless wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine.

SOC. Does not the like happen to navigators, and to those who are engaged in other employments, viz. that the object of their wishes is not that which

each of them does (for who would wish to fail, to encounter dangers, and to be entangled with a multiplicity of affairs?); but, in my opinion, the object of their wishes is that for the sake of which they venture on the sea, viz. to acquire riches. For they fail for the sake of wealth.

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. In like manner, with respect to all other things, he who does any thing for the sake of some particular thing does not wish this which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

POL. It is so.

SOC. Is there any thing, therefore, in the whole of existence, which is neither good nor evil? Or is there a medium between these, which is neither good nor evil?

POL. It is abundantly necessary, Socrates, that there should.

SOC. Do you not, therefore, say that wisdom and health, riches, and other things of this kind, are good, but the contraries of these evil?

POL. I do.

SOC. But do you say that things which are neither good nor evil are of such a kind, that they sometimes partake of good, sometimes of evil, and sometimes of neither; such as to sit, to run, to walk, and to fail; and again, such things as stones, wood, and other things of this kind? Are not these the things which you speak of? Or do you denominate other certain things neither good nor evil?

POL. I do not: but these are the things.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do men, when they act, accomplish these things which subsist as media, for the sake of things good, or things good for the sake of these media?

POL. Doubtless, the media for the sake of things good.

SOC. Pursuing good, therefore, we both walk when we walk, thinking it is better so to do; and, on the contrary, we stand when we stand, for the sake of the same good. Or is it not so?

POL. It is.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, when we slay, or banish or deprive any one of his possessions, think that it is better for us to do these things than not to do them?

POL.

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. Those, therefore, that do all these things do them for the sake of good.

POL. I say so.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, grant, that we do not wish those things which we do for the sake of something, but that for the sake of which we do these things?

POL. We especially admit this.

SOC. We do not, therefore, simply wish to slay, exterminate, or deprive any one of his possessions; but if these things are useful we wish to do them, but by no means if they are noxious. For we desire good things, as you say, but not such as are neither good nor evil, nor yet such as are evil. Do I, therefore, Polus, appear to you to speak the truth, or not? Why do you not answer?

POL. You speak the truth.

SOC. Does it not follow, therefore, if we assent to these things, that if any one slays, exterminates from a city, or takes away the possessions of another, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him so to do, though it is worse,—does it not follow, that in so doing he acts in a manner which to him seems fit?

POL. Yes.

SOC. Does he, therefore, do the things which he wishes to do, if these things are evil? Why do you not answer?

POL. But he does not appear to me to do the things which he wishes.

SOC. Will, therefore, a man of this kind be able to accomplish great things in a city, if to be able to accomplish great things is something good, according to your confession?

POL. He will not.

SOC. I therefore said true, when I said that a man might do that in a city which seemed fit to him, and yet not be able to accomplish great things, nor do that which he wished to do.

POL. As if, Socrates, you would not admit, that it is possible for you to do what you please in a city, rather than that it is not possible, and that you would not be envious when you saw any one slaying or taking away the possessions of another, or confining in bonds whomever he pleased.

Soc. Do you speak justly or unjustly ?

Pol. Whichever of these he may do, is he not in each of these actions to be envied ?

Soc. Good words, I beseech you, Polus.

Pol. But why ?

Soc. Because it is not proper, either to envy those that are not to be envied, or the unhappy ; but they ought to be pitied.

Pol. But what ? Does this appear to you to be the case respecting the men of whom I speak ?

Soc. Undoubtedly.

Pol. Does he, therefore, who justly slays any one whom he thinks fit, appear to you to be miserable, and an object of pity ?

Soc. He does not to me, indeed ; nor does he appear to me to be an object of envy.

Pol. Did you not just now say that he was miserable ?

Soc. I said, my friend, that he was miserable who slew another unjustly, and that, besides this, he was to be pitied ; but that he who slew another justly was not to be envied.

Pol. He indeed who dies unjustly is an object of pity, and is miserable.

Soc. But less so, Polus, than he who slays another ; and less than he who dies justly.

Pol. How so, Socrates ?

Soc. Thus : because to do an injury is the greatest of evils.

Pol. But is this really the greatest of evils ? Is it not a greater evil to suffer an injury ?

Soc. By no means.

Pol. Would you, therefore, rather be injured than do an injury ?

Soc. I should rather indeed have no concern with either of these. But if it were necessary that I should either do an injury, or be injured, I should choose the latter in preference to the former.

Pol. Would you not, therefore, receive the power of a tyrant ?

Soc. I would not, if you say that to tyrannize is what I say it is.

Pol. But I say it is that which I just now mentioned, viz. for a man to

do in a city whatever he pleases; to slay or banish any one, and do every thing according to his own opinion.

Soc. O blessed man, attend to what I say. If in a crowded forum, taking a dagger under my arm, I should say to you, O Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has just now fallen to my lot: for, if it appears to me that any one of these men whom you see ought immediately to die, he dies; and if it appears to me that any one of them ought to lose his head, he is immediately beheaded; or if his garment should be torn asunder, it is immediately torn. Such mighty power do I possess in this city. If, therefore, in consequence of your not believing me, I should show you the dagger, perhaps on seeing it you would say: After this manner, Socrates, all men are capable of effecting great things, since thus armed you may burn any house that you please, all the docks and three-banked galleys of the Athenians, together with all their ships as well public as private. But this is not to possess the ability of effecting great things,—I mean, for a man to do whatever he pleases. Or does it appear to you that it is?

POL. It does not after this manner.

Soc. Can you, therefore, tell me why you blame a power of this kind?

POL. I can.

Soc. Tell me then.

POL. Because it is necessary that he who acts in this manner should be punished.

Soc. But is not the being punished an evil?

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, O wonderful man, again appear to you, on the contrary, that to be able to accomplish great things is good, if acting in a useful manner follows him who does what he pleases? And this, as it appears, is to be able to effect great things: but the contrary to this is evil, and the ability of accomplishing small things. But let us also consider this. Have we not acknowledged that it is sometimes better to do the things which we just now spoke of, viz. to slay, exterminate, and deprive men of their possessions, and sometimes not?

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. This then, as it appears, is acknowledged both by you and me.

POL. It is.

Soc.

SOC. When, then, do you say it is better to do these things? Inform me what boundary you establish.

POL. Answer yourself, Socrates, to this question.

SOC. I say therefore, Polus, if it is more agreeable to you to hear it from me, that it is better when any one does these things justly, but worse when he does them unjustly.

POL. It is difficult to confute you, Socrates; but may not even a boy convince you that you do not speak the truth?

SOC. I shall give the boy, therefore, great thanks, and I shall be equally thankful to you if you can confute me, and liberate me from my nugacity. But be not weary in benefiting a man who is your friend, but confute me.

POL. But, Socrates, there is no occasion to confute you by antient examples. For those things which happened lately, and even but yesterday, are sufficient to convince you, and to show that many unjust men are happy.

SOC. Who are these?

POL. Do you not see Archelaus here, the son of Perdiccas, governing Macedonia?

SOC. If I do not, at least I hear so.

POL. Does he, therefore, appear to you to be happy or miserable?

SOC. I do not know, Polus: for I have not yet associated with the man.

POL. What then? if you associated with him, would you know this? And would you not otherwise immediately know that he is happy?

SOC. I should not, by Jupiter.

POL. It is evident then, Socrates, you would say, that neither do you know that the great king¹ is happy.

SOC. And I should say the truth. For I do not know how he is affected with respect to discipline and justice.

POL. But what? Is all felicity placed in this?

SOC. As I say, it is, Polus. For I say that a worthy and good man and woman are happy; but such as are unjust and base, miserable.

POL. This Archelaus, therefore, according to your doctrine, is miserable.

SOC. If, my friend, he is unjust.

POL. But how is it possible he should not be unjust, to whom nothing of

¹ i. e. The king of Persia.

the government which he now possesses belongs? as he was born of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas; who according to justice was himself the slave of Alcetas; and, if he had been willing to act justly, would have served Alcetas in the capacity of a slave; and thus, according to your doctrine, would have been happy. But now he is become miserable in a wonderful degree, since he has committed the greatest injuries. For, in the first place, sending for his master and uncle, as if he would restore the government which Perdiccas had taken from him, and entertaining and intoxicating both him, and his son Alexander, who was his uncle, and nearly his equal in age, he afterwards hurled them into a cart, and, causing them to be taken away by night, destroyed both of them by cutting their throats. And though he has committed these injuries, he is ignorant that he is become most miserable, and does not repent of his conduct. But, a little after, he was unwilling to nurture and restore the government to his brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven years of age, and who had a just right to the government, though by so doing he would have been happy: but hurling the youth into a well, and there suffocating him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he fell into the well and died, through pursuing a goose. This man, therefore, as having acted the most unjustly of all in Macedonia, is the most miserable, and not the most blessed, of all the Macedonians. And, perhaps, every one of the Athenians, beginning from you, would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.

Soc. In the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praised you, because you appeared to me to be well instructed in rhetoric, but to have neglected the art of discourse. And now, without relating any thing further, this is a discourse by which even a boy might convince me. And, as you think, I am now convicted, by this narration, of having said that he who acts unjustly is not happy. But whence, good man? For, indeed, I did not grant you any of the particulars which you mention.

POL. You are not willing to grant them. For the thing appears to you as I say.

Soc. O blessed man! For you endeavour to confute me in a rhetorical manner, like those who in courts of justice are thought to confute. For there some appear to confute others, when they procure many respectable witnesses of what they say; but he who opposes them procures one certain witness,

witnefs, or none at all. But this mode of confutation is of no worth with refpect to truth. For fometimes falfe witnefs may be given againft a man, by many men of great reputation. And now, refpecting what you fay, nearly all Athenians and ftrangers accord with you in thefe things. And if you were willing to procure witneffes againft me to prove that I do not fpeak the truth, Nicias, the fon of Niceratus, and his brothers with him, would teftify for you, by whom there are tripods placed in an orderly fucceffion in the temple of Bacchus. Or, if you wifh it, Ariftocrates the fon of Scellius, of whom there is that beautiful offering in the Pythian temple. Or again, if you wifh it, the whole family of Pericles, or any other family, that you may think proper to choofe out of this city, will teftify for you. But I, who am but one, do not affent to you. For you do not force me, but, procuring many falfe witneffes againft me, you endeavour to ejeft me from my poffeffions and the truth. But I, unlefs I can procure you being one, to teftify the truth of what I fay, fhall think that I have not accomplished any thing worthy to be mentioned refpecting the things which are the fubjeft of our difcourfe. Nor fhall I think that you have accomplished any thing, unlefs I being one, alone teftify for you, and all thofe others are difmiffed by you. This, therefore, is a certain mode of confutation, as you and many others think : but there is alfo another mode, which I on the contrary adopt. Comparing, therefore, thefe with each other, we will confider whether they differ in any refpect from each other. For the fubjefts of our controverfy are not altogether trifling ; but they are nearly fomething the knowledge of which is moft beautiful, but not to know it moft bafe. For the fummit of thefe things is to know, or to be ignorant, who is happy, and who is not. As, for inftance, in the firft place, refpecting that which is the fubjeft of our prefent difcourfe, you think that a man can be bleffed who afts unjuftly and is unjuft ; fince you are of opinion that Archelaus is, indeed, unjuft, but happy. For, unlefs you fay to the contrary, we muft confider you as thinking in this manner.

POL. Entirely fo.

SOC. But I fay that this is impoffible. And this one thing is the fubjeft of our controverfy. Be it fo then. But will he who afts unjuftly be happy if he is juftly punifhed ?

POL. In the fmalleft degree ; fince he would thus be moft miferable.

SOC.

Soc. If, therefore, he who acts unjustly happens not to be punished, according to your opinion he is happy.

POL. So I say.

Soc. But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly, and is unjust, is miserable. And, indeed, he is more miserable if, when acting unjustly, he is not justly punished; but he is less miserable if he is punished, and justice is inflicted on him both by Gods and men.

POL. You endeavour, Socrates, to assert wonderful things.

Soc. And I shall also endeavour, my associate, to make you say the same things as I do: for I consider you as a friend. Now, therefore, the things about which we differ are these. But do you also consider. I have already said in some former part of our discourse, that to do an injury is worse than to be injured.

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. But you say that it is worse to be injured.

POL. I do.

Soc. And I say that those who do an injury are miserable; and I am confuted by you.

POL. You are so, by Jupiter.

Soc. As you think, Polus.

POL. And perhaps I think the truth.

Soc. But, on the contrary, you think that those who act unjustly are happy, if they escape punishment.

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. But I say that they are most miserable: and that those who suffer punishment for acting unjustly are less miserable. Are you willing to confute this also?

POL. But it is more difficult to confute this than that, Socrates.

Soc. By no means, Polus: but it is impossible that this should be the case. For that which is true can never be confuted.

POL. How do you say? If a man acting unjustly is detected in attempting to acquire absolute power by stratagem, and in consequence of being detected is put on the rack, is castrated, and has his eyes burnt; and after he has suffered many other mighty and all-various torments, sees his wife and children suffering the same, and at last is either crucified, or incrufted

with pitch ; will he be more happy, than if, having escaped punishment, he obtains despotic power, and passes through life ruling in the city, doing whatever he pleases, and envied, and accounted happy, both by his citizens and strangers ? Do you say that these things cannot be confuted ?

Soc. You terrify, and do not confute us, generous Polus : but just now you testified for us. At the same time remind me of a small particular, whether you say that such a one endeavours to gain absolute power unjustly ?

POL. I do.

Soc. By no means, therefore, will either of these be more happy, neither he who has unjustly obtained the tyranny, nor he who is punished. For, of two that are miserable, one cannot be more happy than the other ; but he is the more miserable of the two who escapes punishment, and obtains the tyranny. Why do you laugh at this, Polus ? Is this another species of confutation, to laugh when any one asserts something, and not confute him ?

POL. Do you not think you are confuted, Socrates, when you say such things as no man would say ? For only ask any man if he would.

Soc. O Polus, I am not among the number of politicians. And last year, when I happened to be elected to the office of a senator, in consequence of my tribe possessing the chief authority, and it was requisite I should give sentence, I excited laughter, through not knowing how to give sentence. Do not, therefore, now order me to pass sentence on those who are present. But if you have no better modes of confutation than these (as I just now said), assign to me a part of the discourse, and make trial of that mode of confutation which I think ought to be adopted. For I know how to procure one witness of what I say, viz. him with whom I discourse ; but I bid farewell to the multitude. And I know how to decide with one person, but I do not discourse with the multitude. See, therefore, whether you are willing to give me my part in the argument, by answering to the interrogations. For I think that you and I, and other men, are of opinion, that to do an injury is worse than to be injured ; and not to suffer, than to suffer punishment.

POL. But I, on the contrary, think that neither myself nor any other man is of this opinion. For would you rather be injured than do an injury ?

Soc. Yes ; and so would you, and all other men.

POL. Very far from it : for neither I, nor you, nor any other, would say so.

Soc.

Soc. Will you not, therefore, answer?

POL. By all means. For I am anxious to know what you will say.

Soc. Tell me then, that you may know, as if I asked you from the beginning: Whether does it appear to you, Polus, worse to do an injury, or to be injured?

POL. It appears to me it is worse to be injured.

Soc. But which is the more base? To do, or to suffer, an injury? Answer me.

POL. To do an injury.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, worse, since it is more base?

POL. By no means.

Soc. I understand. You do not think, as it seems, that the beautiful and the good are the same, and likewise the evil and the base.

POL. I do not.

Soc. But what will you say to this? Do you not call all beautiful things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, and pursuits, beautiful, without looking to any thing else? As, for instance, in the first place, with respect to beautiful bodies, do you not say that they are beautiful, either according to their usefulness to that particular thing to which each is useful, or according to a certain pleasure, if the view of them gratifies the beholders? Have you any thing else besides this to say, respecting the beauty of body?

POL. I have not.

Soc. Do you not, therefore, denominate other things beautiful after this manner, such as figures and colours, either through a certain pleasure, or utility, or through both?

POL. I do.

Soc. And do you not in a similar manner denominate sounds, and every thing pertaining to music?

POL. Yes.

Soc. And further still, things which pertain to laws and pursuits are certainly not beautiful, unless they are either advantageous or pleasant, or both.

POL. It does not appear to me that they are.

Soc. And does not the beauty of disciplines subsist in a similar manner?

POL. Entirely so. And now, Socrates, you define beautifully, since you define the beautiful by pleasure and good.

SOC. Must not, therefore, the base be defined by the contrary, viz. by pain and evil?

POL. Necessarily so.

SOC. When, therefore, of two beautiful things, one is more beautiful than the other, or when some other thing transcends in beauty either one or both of these, it must be more beautiful either through pleasure, or advantage, or both.

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. And when, of two things, one is more base, it must be more base through transcending either in pain or evil. Or is not this necessary?

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. But, in the first place, let us consider whether to do an injury surpasses in pain the being injured; and whether those suffer greater pain that injure, than those that are injured.

POL. This is by no means the case, Socrates.

SOC. The former, therefore, does not transcend the latter in pain.

POL. Certainly not.

SOC. Will it not therefore follow, that, if it does not transcend in pain, it will no longer transcend in both?

POL. It does not appear that this will be the case.

SOC. Must it not, therefore, transcend in the other?

POL. Yes.

SOC. In evil?

POL. So it appears.

SOC. Will it not therefore follow, that to do an injury, since it transcends in evil, is worse than to be injured?

POL. Evidently so.

SOC. If, therefore, something else were not admitted by the multitude of mankind, and by you formerly, it would follow that to do an injury is worse than to be injured.

POL. It would.

SOC. Now, however, it appears to be worse.

POL. So it seems.

SOC. Would you, therefore, admit that which is worse and more base, rather than that which is less so? Do not hesitate to answer, Polus (for you will

will not be injured by so doing), but answer generously, committing yourself to discourse as to a physician; and either admit or reject what I ask.

POL. But I should not, Socrates, prefer that which is worse and more base to that which is less so.

Soc. But would any other man?

POL. It does not appear to me that he would, according to this reasoning.

Soc. I therefore spoke the truth when I asserted, that neither I, nor you, nor any other man, would rather do an injury than be injured; for it would be worse to do so.

POL. So it appears.

Soc. Do you not therefore see, Polus, that, when argument is compared with argument, they do not in any respect accord? But all others assent to you, except myself. However, you, who are only one, are sufficient for my purpose, both in assenting and testifying; and I, while I ask your opinion alone, bid farewell to others. And thus is this affair circumstanced with respect to us. But, after this, let us consider that which was the occasion of doubt to us in the second place, viz. whether it is the greatest of evils for him to be punished who acts unjustly, as you think, or whether it is not a greater evil not to be punished in this case, as I, on the contrary, think. But let us consider this affair in the following manner: Do you call it the same thing for him to suffer punishment who has acted unjustly, and to be justly punished?

POL. I do.

Soc. Can you therefore deny that all just things are beautiful, so far as they are just? Consider the affair, and answer me.

POL. It appears to me that they are, Socrates.

Soc. Consider also this: When a man performs any thing, must there not necessarily be something which is passive to him as an agent?

POL. It appears so to me.

Soc. Does it, therefore, suffer that which the agent performs, and of the same kind as that which he performs? But my meaning is this: If any one strikes, is it not necessary that something should be struck?

POL. It is necessary.

Soc. And if he who strikes, strikes vehemently and swiftly, must not that which is struck be in the same manner struck?

POL. Yes.

Soc. A passion, therefore, of such a kind is in that which is struck, as the striker produces.

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, any one burns, is it not necessary that something should be burned?

POL. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And if he burns vehemently, or so as to cause pain, must not that which is burned be burned in such a manner as he who burns burns?

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. And will not the same reasoning take place if any one cuts? For something will be cut.

POL. Yes.

Soc. And if the cut is great or deep, or attended with pain, that which is cut will be cut with such a cleft as the cutter cuts.

POL. It appears so.

Soc. In short, see if you grant what I just now said respecting all things, viz. that such as the agent produces, such does the patient suffer.

POL. I do grant it.

Soc. These things, therefore, being admitted, whether is the being punished, to suffer, or to do something?

POL. Necessarily, Socrates, it is to suffer something.

Soc. Must it not, therefore, be by some agent?

POL. Undoubtedly. And by him who punishes.

Soc. But does not he who rightly punishes, punish justly?

POL. Yes.

Soc. Does he act justly, or not, by so doing?

POL. Justly.

Soc. Must not, therefore, he who is punished, in consequence of being punished, suffer justly?

POL. It appears so.

Soc. But is it not acknowledged that just things are beautiful?

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. Of these, therefore, the one does, and the other (who is punished) suffers, that which is beautiful.

POL. Yes.

Soc.

Soc. But if things are beautiful, are they not also good? For they are either pleasant or useful.

Pol. It is necessary they should.

Soc. He therefore who is punished suffers that which is good.

Pol. It appears so.

Soc. He is benefited, therefore.

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Does it not, therefore, follow (as I understand advantage), that the soul becomes better if it is punished justly?

Pol. It is probable.

Soc. The soul, therefore, of him who is punished is liberated from vice.

Pol. It is.

Soc. And hence it is liberated from the greatest evil. But consider this: In the acquisition of wealth, do you perceive any other human evil than poverty?

Pol. No other.

Soc. But what, in the constitution of the body? do you call imbecility, disease, deformity, and things of this kind, evils, or not?

Pol. I do.

Soc. Do you think, therefore, that in the soul also there is a certain depravity?

Pol. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Do you not then call this injustice, ignorance, timidity, and the like?

Pol. Entirely so.

Soc. Since, therefore, riches, body, and soul, are three things, will you not say that there are three depravities, want, disease, injustice?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Which, therefore, of these depravities is the most base? Is it not injustice, and, in short, the depravity of the soul?

Pol. Very much so.

Soc. But, if it is most base, is it not also the worst?

Pol. How do you say, Socrates?

Soc. Thus. That which is most base is always so either by procuring the

the greatest pain, or injury, or both, from what has been previously acknowledged by us.

POL. Especially so.

SOC. But is it not at present acknowledged by us, that injustice, and the whole depravity of the soul, are most base?

POL. It is.

SOC. Are not these, therefore, either most troublesome, and most base, through transcending in molestation, or from the injury which attends them, or from both?

POL. It is necessary.

SOC. Is therefore to be unjust, intemperate, timid, and unlearned, the cause of greater pain than to be poor and diseased?

POL. It does not appear to me, Socrates, to be so, from what has been said.

SOC. Another depravity of the soul, therefore, transcending in a certain mighty detriment, and wonderful evil, is the most base of all things; since, according to your assertion, it is not so, from transcending in pain.

POL. So it appears.

SOC. But, indeed, that which transcends in the greatest of all detriments must be the greatest evil of all things.

POL. It must.

SOC. Injustice, therefore, intemperance, and the other depravity of the soul, are each of them the greatest evil of all things.

POL. So it appears.

SOC. What is the art, therefore, which liberates from poverty? Is it not that which procures money?

POL. Yes.

SOC. But what is that art which liberates from disease? Is it not the medicinal?

POL. Necessarily so.

SOC. And what is that which liberates from depravity and injustice? If you cannot answer this question with the like facility, consider thus: Whither, and to whom, do we conduct those that are diseased in body?

POL: To physicians, Socrates.

Soc.

Soc. But whither do we conduct those who act unjustly, and live intemperately?

POL. You say, to the judges.

Soc. And is it not, therefore, that they may be punished?

POL. I say so.

Soc. Do not then those that punish rightly punish by employing a certain justice?

POL. It is evident they do.

Soc. The art, therefore, which procures money liberates from poverty; the medicinal art, from disease; and punishment, from intemperance and injustice.

POL. So it appears.

Soc. Which, therefore, of these do you consider as the most beautiful?

POL. Of what things are you speaking?

Soc. Of the art of procuring money, the medicinal art, and punishment.

POL. Punishment, Socrates, excels by far.

Soc. Does it not, therefore, again produce either abundant pleasure, or advantage, or both, since it is the most beautiful?

POL. Yes.

Soc. Is it, therefore, pleasant to be cured by a physician? and do those who are cured rejoice?

POL. It does not appear to me that they do.

Soc. But it is beneficial to be cured. Is it not?

POL. Yes.

Soc. For it liberates from a great evil: so that it is advantageous to endure pain, and be well.

POL. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Will the man, therefore, who is cured by a physician be thus most happy with respect to his body, or ought this to be said of him who has never been diseased?

POL. Evidently of him who has never been diseased.

Soc. For, as it seems, a liberation from disease would not be felicity; but, on the contrary, this is to be asserted of the non-possession of it from the first.

POL. It is so.

Soc. But what? Which of two men is the more miserable, he who is diseased in body, or he who is diseased in soul? He who is cured by a physician, and liberated from disease, or he who is not cured, and is diseased?

Pol. He who is not cured, as it appears to me.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, follow, that to suffer punishment will be a liberation from the greatest of evils, depravity?

Pol. It will.

Soc. For punishment produces a sound mind, makes men more just, and becomes the medicine of depravity.

Pol. It does.

Soc. He, therefore, is most happy who possesses no vice in his soul, since this appears to be the greatest of evils.

Pol. It is evident.

Soc. But he doubtless ranks in the second degree of felicity, who is liberated from vice.

Pol. It is likely.

Soc. But this is the man who is admonished, reproved, and who suffers punishment.

Pol. He is.

Soc. He, therefore, lives in the worst manner who possesses injustice, and is not liberated from it.

Pol. It appears so.

Soc. Is not, therefore, such a one, a man who, having committed the greatest injuries, and employing the greatest injustice, causes it to come to pass, that he is neither admonished, nor restrained in his conduct, nor punished; just as you said was the case with Archelaus, and other tyrants, rhetoricians, and powerful noblemen?

Pol. It seems so.

Soc. For the conduct of these, O best of men, is nearly just as if some one afflicted with the greatest diseases should prevent the physicians from inflicting on him the punishment of his bodily maladies, fearing as if he were a child to be burned and cut, because these operations are attended with pain. Or does it not appear so to you?

Pol. It does.

Soc. And this through being ignorant, as it seems, of the nature of health,
and

and the virtue of the body. For, from what has been now acknowledged by us, those who escape punishment, Polus, appear to do something of this kind; viz. they look to the pain attending punishment, but are blind to its utility; and are ignorant how much more miserable it is to dwell with a foul not healthy, but corrupt, unjust and impious, than to have the body diseased. Hence they do every thing that they may escape punishment, but are not liberated from the greatest evil; and procure for themselves riches and friends, and the ability of speaking in the most persuasive manner. But if we have assented to the truth, Polus, do you perceive what consequences follow from our discourse? Or are you willing that we should collect them?

POL. I am, if agreeable to you.

SOC. Does it, therefore, happen that injustice and to act unjustly are the greatest evil?

POL. It appears so.

SOC. And it likewise appears that to suffer punishment is a liberation from this evil.

POL. It does appear.

SOC. But not to suffer punishment is a continuance of the evil.

POL. Yes.

SOC. To act unjustly, therefore, ranks in the second degree of evils, as to magnitude; but, when acting unjustly, not to suffer punishment is naturally the greatest and the first of all evils.

POL. It is likely.

SOC. Are we not, therefore, my friend, dubious about this thing? you considering Archelaus as happy, who commits the greatest injustice, and suffers no punishment; but I on the contrary thinking, that whether it is Archelaus, or any other man whatever, who when acting unjustly is not punished, it is proper that such a one should surpass in misery other men; and that always he who does an injury should be more wretched than he who is injured, and he who escapes than he who suffers punishment. Are not these the things which were said by me?

POL. Yes.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, shown that these assertions are true?

POL. It appears so.

SOC. Be it so. If these things then are true, Polus, what is the great utility

utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now assented to by us, every one ought especially to guard himself from acting unjustly, as that through which he will possess a sufficiency of evil. Is it not so?

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. But if any man acts unjustly himself, or some one committed to his care, he ought willingly to betake himself thither, where with the utmost celerity he may be punished by a judge, just as if he was hastening to a physician; lest, the disease of injustice becoming inveterate, it should render the soul insincere and incurable. Or how must we say, Polus, if the things before acknowledged by us remain? Is it not necessary that these things should after this manner accord with those, but not in any other way?

POL. For what else can we say, Socrates?

SOC. For the purpose, therefore, of apologizing, either for our own injustice, or that of our parents, or associates, or children, or country, rhetoric affords us, Polus, no utility. Unless, on the contrary, any one apprehends that he ought especially to accuse himself, and afterwards his domestic associates, and any other of his friends, whom he may find acting unjustly; and that conduct of this kind ought not to be concealed, but should be led forth into light, that he by whom it is committed may be punished, and restored to health. Likewise, that he should compel both himself and others to lay aside fear, and with his eyes shut, and in a virile manner, deliver himself up, as to a physician, to be cut and burnt, pursuing the good and the beautiful, without paying any regard to pain: delivering himself to be beaten, if he has acted in such a manner as to deserve this chastisement; and in like manner to bonds, to fines, to exile, and even to death; being the first accuser of himself, and all his familiars, without sparing either himself or them, but employing rhetoric for this very purpose; that, the crimes becoming manifest, they may be liberated from the greatest of evils, injustice. Shall we speak in this manner, Polus, or not?

POL. These things appear to me, Socrates, to be absurd; but, from what has been before said, they will, perhaps, be assented to by you.

SOC. Must not, therefore, either those objections be solved, or these things necessarily follow?

POL. This, indeed, must be the case.

SOC. But again, let us transfer the affair to the contrary side, if it is requisite that
that

that any one should act basely, whether he is an enemy, or some other person, only admitting that he is not injured by an enemy; for this is to be guarded against. If, then, an enemy injures another, we should endeavour by all possible means, both by actions and words, that he may not be punished, nor brought before a judge: but, if he is brought before him, we should devise some method by which he may escape, and not suffer punishment. And if this enemy has by force taken away a great quantity of gold, he should not restore it, but, possessing, spend it on himself and his associates in an unjust and impious manner. Likewise, if he acts in such a manner as to deserve death, we should be careful that he does not die at any time, but, that being a depraved character, he may be immortal; but, as this is not possible, that he may live being such for an extended period of time. Rhetoric, Polus, appears to me to be useful for purposes of this kind; since to him who has no intention to act unjustly, its utility, if it has any, is not, in my opinion, great: for it certainly has not at all appeared in the former part of our discourse.

CAL. Inform me, Chærepho, does Socrates assert these things seriously, or in jest?

CHÆR. He appears to me, Callicles, to jest in a transcendent degree: but there is nothing like asking him.

CAL. There is not, by the Gods! and I desire to do it. Tell me, Socrates, whether we must say that you are now in earnest, or in jest? For, if you are in earnest, and these things which you say are true, is not our human life subverted, and are not all our actions, as it seems, contrary to what they ought to be?

SOC. If there were not a certain passion which, remaining the same, is different in different men, but some one of us should suffer a certain passion different from others, it would not be easy for such a one to exhibit his own passion to another. I speak in this manner from considering, that I and you now happen to suffer the same thing; for, being two, we each of us love two things: I, indeed, Alcibiades the son of Clinias, and Philosophy; and you likewise two, the Athenian people, and Demus the son of Pylilampes. I continually, therefore, perceive you, though you are skilful, unable to contradict the objects of your love, however they may oppose you, and in whatever manner they may assert a thing to take place; but you are changed by them upwards and downwards. For, in the convention, if, when you say any thing,

thing, the Athenian people says it is not so,—changing your own opinion, you speak conformably to theirs: and you are affected in the same manner towards the beautiful son of Pyrilampes; for you cannot oppose the wishes and discourses of the objects of your love. So that, if any one, in consequence of what you say being the effect of compulsion through these, should wonder at its absurdity, perhaps you would say to him, if you wished to speak the truth, that unless some one causes the objects of your love to desist from such assertions, neither can you desist from them. Think, therefore, that it is proper to hear other things of this kind from me; and do not wonder that I speak in this manner; but cause Philosophy, the object of my love, to desist from such assertions. For she says, my friend, what you now hear from me; and she is much less insane than the other object of my love. For Clinicus, here, says different things at different times; but the assertions of Philosophy are always the same. But she says things which will now cause you to wonder: you have, however, been present at her discourses. Either, therefore, confute her for what I just now said, and evince, that to act unjustly, and when acting unjustly not to suffer punishment, is not the extremity of all evils: or, if you suffer this to remain unconfuted, then, by the dog, one of the deities of the Egyptians, Callicles will not accord with you, O Callicles, but will dissent from you through the whole of life: though I think, O best of men, that it is better for my lyre to be unharmonized and dissonant, and the choir of which I might be the leader (for many men do not assent to but oppose what I say), than that I, being one, should be dissonant with and contradict myself.

CAL. You appear, Socrates, to employ a juvenile audacity in your discourses, as being in reality a popular orator: and now you assert these things in a popular manner, suffering that same passion of Polus, which he accused Gorgias of suffering from you. For he said that Gorgias, when asked by you, whether if any one ignorant of things just, and willing to learn rhetoric, should come to him, he would teach him, was ashamed, and said that he would teach him; and this because men are accustomed to be indignant if any one denies a thing of this kind. Through this concession, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself. But you were delighted with this very circumstance; for which he then very properly, as it appeared to me, derided you. And now he again suffers the very same thing. But I,

indeed, do not praise Polus for granting you, that to do an injury is more base than to be injured. For, from this concession, he being impeded by you in his discourse, had not any thing further to say, being ashamed to mention what he thought. For you in reality, Socrates, lead to these troublesome and popular assertions, while you profess to be in search of truth; assertions which are not naturally, but only legally beautiful. For these for the most part are contrary to each other, viz. nature and law. If any one, therefore, is ashamed, and dares not say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself. But you, perceiving this subtle artifice, act fraudulently in discourses. For, if any one asserts that things which are according to nature are according to law, you privately ask him, if things which belong to nature belong to law; as in the present disputation respecting doing an injury and being injured, when Polus spoke of that which is more base according to nature, you pursued that which is more base according to law. For, by nature, every thing is more base which is worse, as to be injured; but, by law, it is worse to do an injury. For to be injured is not the passion of a man, but of some slave, to whom to die is better than to live; and who, being injured and disgraced, is incapable of defending either himself or any other person committed to his care. But I think that those who establish laws are imbecil men, and the multitude. Hence they establish laws with a view to themselves and their own advantage, and make some things laudable, and others blamable, with the same intention. They likewise terrify such men as are more robust, and who are able to possess more than others, by asserting that to surpass others in possessions is base and unjust; and that to endeavour to possess more than others is to act unjustly. For, in my opinion, these men are satisfied with possessing an equal portion, in consequence of being of a more abject nature. Hence, to endeavour to possess more than the multitude is, according to law, unjust and base; and they call this committing an injury. But I think nature herself evinces, that the better should possess more than the worse, and the more powerful than the more imbecil. But she manifests in many places, both in other animals, and in whole cities and families of men, that the just should be established in such a manner, as that the more excellent may rule over, and possess more than, the less excellent. For, with what kind of justice did Xerxes war upon Greece? or his father on the Scythians? or ten thousand other things of this kind which might be adduced?

adduced? But I think that they do these things according to the nature of the just, and indeed, by Jupiter, according to the law of nature; not, perhaps, according to that law which we establish, while we fashion the best and most robust of our fellow-citizens, receiving them from their childhood like lions, and enslaving them by incantations and fascination; at the same time asserting that the equal ought to be preserved, and that this is beautiful and just. But, in my opinion, if there should be any man found with sufficient strength of mind,—such a one, shaking off these things, and breaking them in pieces, abandoning and trampling upon your writings, magical allurements, incantations, and laws contrary to nature, will, by rebelling, from being a slave, appear to be our master; and in this case, that which is just according to nature will shine forth. It appears to me that Pindar also evinces the truth of what I assert, in the verses in which he says, that “Law is the king of all mortals and immortals; and that he does that which is most just violently, and with a most lofty hand. And this, he adds, I infer from the deeds of Hercules, who drove away the oxen of Geryon unbought¹.” He nearly speaks in this manner; for I do not perfectly remember the verses. He says then, that Hercules drove away the oxen of Geryon, without having either purchased them, or received them as a gift; as if this was naturally just, that oxen, and all other possessions, when the property of the worse and inferior, should yield to the better and more excellent. Such then is the truth of the case: but you will know that it is so, if, dismissing philosophy, you betake yourself to greater things. For philosophy, Socrates, is an elegant thing, if any one moderately meddles with it in his youth; but, if he is conversant with it more than is becoming, it corrupts the man. For, if he is naturally of a good disposition, and philosophizes at an advanced period of life, he must necessarily become unskilled in all things in which he ought to be skilled, who designs to be a worthy, good, and illustrious man. For these men are unskilled in the laws of the city, and in those arguments which he ought to use, who is conversant with the compacts of men, both in public and private. They are likewise entirely unskilled in human pleasures and desires, and, in short, in the manners of men. When, therefore, they engage in any private or political undertaking, they become ridiculous. Just as, in my opi-

¹ These words are cited from some one of the lost writings of Pindar.

nion, politicians are ridiculous when they meddle with your disputations and arguments. For that saying of Euripides here takes place: "Every one shines in this, and to this hastens; consuming the greater part of the day, in order that he may become better than himself¹." But that in which a man is inferior he avoids and slanders; and praises that in which he excells, through his benevolence towards himself, thinking that after this manner he praises himself. But I think it is most right to partake of both these. Of philosophy, indeed, it is beautiful to participate, so far as pertains to discipline, nor is it base for any one to philosophize while he is a youth: but it is a ridiculous thing, Socrates, for a man still to philosophize when he is advanced in years. And I own myself similarly affected towards those who philosophize, as to those who stammer and sport. For when I see a boy whom it yet becomes to discourse, thus stammering and engaged in play, I rejoice, and his conduct appears to me to be elegant and liberal, and such as is proper to the age of a boy. But when I hear a little boy discoursing with perspicuity, it appears to me to be an unpleasant circumstance, offends my ears, and is, in my opinion, an illiberal thing. And when any one hears a man stammering, or sees him engaged in play, he appears to be ridiculous, unmanly, and deserving chastisement. I therefore am affected in the same manner towards those who philosophize. For, when I see philosophy in a young man, I am delighted, and it appears to me becoming, and I consider the young man as liberal; but when I find a youth not philosophizing, such a one appears to me illiberal, and who will never think himself worthy of any beautiful or generous thing. But when I behold a man advanced in years, yet philosophizing, and not liberated from philosophy, such a one, Socrates, appears to me to require chastisement. For to this man, as I just now said, it happens that he becomes effeminate, though born with the best disposition, in consequence of his avoiding the middle of the city, and the forum, in which, as the poet says, men become greatly illustrious; and that, concealing himself from the public view, he passes the remainder of his life with three or four lads, muttering in a corner; but he never utters any thing liberal, great, and sufficient. But I, Socrates, am affected in an equitable and friendly manner towards you. For it seems that the same thing now happens to me

¹ These verses are taken from the *Antiope* of Euripides, and are edited by Barnes among the fragments of that tragedy.

which happened to Zethus towards Amphion in Euripides, whom I have already mentioned; since it occurs to me to say to you what he said to his brother: that you neglect, Socrates, what you ought to attend to, and destroy the generous nature of your soul, by adorning it with a certain juvenile form; and that in consultations pertaining to justice you do not speak with rectitude, nor apprehend what is probable and persuasive, nor consult for others in a strenuous manner. Though, friend Socrates, (do not be angry with me, for I speak to you with benevolence,) does it not appear to you shameful, that any one should be affected in such a manner as I think you are, and others who always make great advances in philosophy? For now, if some one arresting you, or any other, should lead you to prison, asserting that you had acted unjustly, when you had not, you know you would not be able in any respect to benefit yourself; but, being seized with a giddiness, you would yawn, and not have any thing to say: and that ascending to a court of justice, and meeting with an accuser perfectly vile and base, you would die, if he wished to punish you with death. And indeed, Socrates, how can that art possess any wisdom, which, when possessed by a man of a naturally good disposition, renders him worse, and neither able to assist himself, nor preserve either himself or any other from the greatest dangers, but causes him to be plundered by enemies of all his possessions, and live in the city devoid of honour? Indeed (if I may speak in a more rustic manner), it may be allowable to slap the face of such a man with impunity. But, good man, be persuaded by me, and desist from confuting. Cultivate an elegant knowledge of things, and employ yourself in studies which will cause you to appear wise, leaving to *others* these graceful subtilties, whether it is proper to call them deliriums, or mere trifles,

“Which leave *you* nothing but an empty house:”

and emulating, not those men who are able to confute such trifling things as these, but those with whom there are possessions, renown, and many other goods.

Soc. If, Callicles, I should happen to have a golden soul, do you not think I should gladly find one of those stones by which they try gold, particularly if it was one of the best sort; to which if I should introduce my soul, and it should acknowledge to me my soul was well cultivated, should I not then

then well know that I was sufficiently good, and that it was not necessary any further trial should be made of me ?

CAL. Why do you ask this, Socrates ?

SOC. I will now tell you. I think that I, in meeting with you, met with a gain of this kind.

CAL. Why so ?

SOC. I well know that you agree with me in those opinions which my soul entertains of certain particulars, and that you acknowledge them to be true. For I perceive that he who intends sufficiently to explore, whether the soul lives uprightly or not, ought to possess three things, all which you possess, viz. science, benevolence, and freedom of speech. For I meet with many who are not able to make trial of me, through not being wise as you are ; but others are wise, indeed, but are unwilling to speak the truth to me, because they are not concerned about me as you are. But these two guests, Gorgias and Polus, are indeed wise, and my friends, but are deficient in freedom of speech, and are more bashful than is becoming. For how should it be otherwise ? since they are so very bashful that each dares to contradict himself, before many men, and this too about things of the greatest consequence. But you possess all these requisites, which others have not. And you are both well instructed, as many of the Athenians affirm, and are benevolent to me. I will tell you what argument I use. I know that you four, Callicles, mutually partake of wisdom, viz. you, and Tisander the Aphidnan¹, Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes the Cholargean. I likewise once heard you deliberating how far wisdom is to be exercised : and I know that this opinion prevailed among you, that we should not strenuously endeavour to philosophize with accuracy ; but you admonished each other to be cautious, lest, through being more wise than is proper, you should be corrupted without perceiving it. Since, therefore, I hear you giving me the very same advice as you gave your most intimate associates, it is to me a sufficient argument, that you are truly benevolent to me. And besides this, that you can use freedom of speech, and not be ashamed, both you yourself say, and the oration, which you a little before made, testifies. But the case is this : If, in the things which are now discussed by us, you in any particular consent with

¹ Aphidnæ and Cholargæ were two Attic villages.

me, this may be considered as sufficiently explored by you and me, and as no longer requiring any further examination. For you would never have assented to such a thing, either through a defect of wisdom, or too much bashfulness. Nor yet, again, would you have assented in order to deceive me: for you are, as you acknowledge, my friend. In reality, therefore, your and my assent has now its true end. But the consideration, Callicles, of those things respecting which you reproved me, is of all things the most beautiful, viz. what kind of person a man ought to be, what he ought to study, and how far he should study, both when an elderly and a young man. For, with respect to myself, if there is any thing pertaining to my life in which I do not act rightly, I well know that I do not voluntarily err, but that this happens through my ignorance. Do you, therefore, as you began to admonish me, not desist, but sufficiently show me what this is which I ought to study, and after what manner I may accomplish it. And if you find me now assenting to you, but afterwards not acting conformably to the concessions which I have made, then consider me as perfectly indolent: and in this case, as being a man of no worth, you should afterwards no longer admonish me. But, resuming the subject from the beginning, inform me how you and Pindar say, that it is naturally just for the more excellent to take away by force the possessions of the less excellent, and for the better to rule over the worse, and possess more than the depraved. Do you say that the just is any thing else than this? Or do I rightly remember?

CAL. These things I then said, and I now say.

Soc. But whether do you call the same thing better and more excellent? For I could not then understand what you said: whether you call the stronger the more excellent, and say it is requisite that the more imbecil should listen to the more strong; just as you then appeared to show me, that great invaded small cities, according to natural justice, because they are more excellent and strong; (as if the more excellent, the stronger, and the better, were the same;) or is it possible that a thing can be better, and at the same time inferior and more imbecil? and that it can be more excellent, and at the same time more depraved? or is there the same definition of the better and the more excellent? Define this for me clearly, whether the more excellent, the better, and the more strong, are the same, or different?

CAL. But I clearly say to you, that they are the same.

Soc.

Soc. Are not, therefore, the multitude naturally more excellent than one person; since they establish laws for one, as you just now said?

CAL. Undoubtedly.

Soc. The laws, therefore, of the multitude are the laws of such as are more excellent.

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. Are they not then the laws of such as are better? For the more excellent are, according to your assertion, far better.

CAL. Yes.

Soc. Are not, therefore, the legal institutions of these naturally beautiful, since those who establish them are more excellent?

CAL. I say so.

Soc. Do not, therefore, the multitude think (as you just now said) that it is just to possess the equal, and that it is more base to do an injury than to be injured? Are these things so, or not? And here take care that you are not caught through bashfulness. Do the multitude, or not, think that to possess the equal, but not more than others, is just? and that it is more base to do an injury than to be injured? Do not deny me an answer to this, Callicles; that, if you assent to me, I may be confirmed in my opinion by you, as being a man whose assent is sufficient to the clear knowledge of a thing.

CAL. The multitude, then, do think in this manner.

Soc. Not by law therefore only is it more base to do an injury than to be injured, or just to have equality of possessions, but likewise according to nature. So that you appear not to have spoken the truth above, nor to have rightly accused me, in saying that law and nature are contrary to each other; which I also perceiving, I have acted fraudulently in my discourse with you, by leading him to law, who says a thing is according to nature; and to nature, who says a thing is according to law.

CAL. This man will not cease to trifle. Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed, at your time of life, to hunt after names, and, if any one errs in a word, to make it an unexpected gain? For, did you think I said any thing else than that the more excellent were better? Did I not some time since tell you, that I considered the better and the more excellent as the same? Or did you suppose I said, that if a crowd of slaves, and all sorts of men of no worth,

worth, except perhaps they might possess bodily strength, should be collected together, and establish certain things, that these would be legal institutions?

Soc. Be it so, most wise Callicles: do you mean as you say?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. But I, O divine man, some time since conjectured that you said something better than this; and therefore I asked you, desiring clearly to know what you said. For you doubtless do not think that two are better than one, nor that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger. But again from the beginning tell me who those are which you say are better, when at the same time they are not stronger. And, O wonderful man, previously instruct me in a milder manner, that I may not leave you.

CAL. You speak ironically, Socrates.

Soc. By Zethus, Callicles, your familiar, you have now said many things ironically to me. But come, tell me who you say are better.

CAL. Those that are more worthy.

Soc. You see, therefore, that you yourself mention names, but evince nothing. Will you not tell me whether you say that the better and more excellent are more prudent, or that this is the case with certain others?

CAL. But, by Jupiter, I say that these are more prudent, and very much so.

Soc. Often, therefore, according to your assertion, one wise man is better than ten thousand men that are unwise; and it is proper that he should govern, but the others be governed, and that the governor should possess more than the governed. For you appear to me to wish to say this (for I do not hunt after words), if one man is more excellent than ten thousand.

CAL. But these are the things which I say. For I am of opinion that this is the just according to nature, viz. that he who is better and more prudent should rule over and possess more than such as are depraved.

Soc. I attend to what you say. But what will you again now say? If we, who are many, were crowded together in the same place as at present, and abundance of food and drink was placed for us in common, but we were men of all-various descriptions, some of us being strong, and others weak, and one of us should happen to be more skillful respecting these things, as being a physician, but at the same time should be (as is likely)

stronger than some, and weaker than others,—would not this man, since he excels us in prudence, be better and more excellent with respect to these things?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. Ought he, therefore, to have more of this food than us, because he is better? Or is it proper that in governing he should distribute all things; but that, in consuming and using them for his own body, he should not possess more than others, unless with detriment to himself? But that he should possess more than some, and less than others. But if he is the most imbecil of all, then he who is best should possess the least of all. Is it not so, O good man?

CAL. You speak of meat and drink, and physicians, and trifles; but I do not speak of these.

Soc. Whether, therefore, do you say that a more prudent is a better man? Do you say so, or not?

CAL. I do.

Soc. And do you not say that he who is better than others ought not to possess more than others?

CAL. He ought not to possess more of meat and drink.

Soc. I understand you. But perhaps he ought of clothes: and it will be proper that he who is most skilled in weaving should have the largest garment, and should walk about invested with garments more numerous and more beautiful than those of others.

CAL. What kind of garments do you mean?

Soc. But with respect to shoes, indeed, it is requisite that he who is more prudent than others, and is the best of men, should have more of them than others. And a shoemaker perhaps ought to walk with the largest shoes on his feet, and to have them in the greatest abundance.

CAL. About what kind of shoes do you talk in this trifling manner?

Soc. But if you will not assert such things as these, perhaps you will the following: for instance, perhaps it will be requisite that a husbandman who in cultivating the land is a prudent, worthy and good man, should possess more seeds than others, and sow them more abundantly in his own ground.

CAL.

CAL. How you always say the same things, Socrates!

Soc. Not only the same things, Callicles, but likewise respecting the same things.

CAL. Sincerely, by the Gods, you are always speaking about shoemakers, fullers, cooks, and physicians, as if these were the subject of our discourse.

Soc. Will not you, therefore, tell me, what the things are of which he who is better and more prudent than others, by possessing more than others, possesses justly? Or will you neither endure me suggesting, nor speak yourself?

CAL. But I said some time since what these particulars are. And in the first place, I do not call those that are better than others shoemakers, or cooks, but those who are skilled in the affairs of a city, so as to know after what manner it will be well inhabited, and who are not only prudent but likewise brave, able to accomplish what they conceive to be best, and are not wearied through effeminacy of soul.

Soc. You see, most excellent Callicles, that you and I do not reason about the same things. For you say that I always assert the same things; and I, on the contrary, that you never say the same things about the same. But at one time you define the better and more excellent to be the stronger, but at another time those that are more prudent: and now again you come with something else; for certain persons that are braver are said by you to be better and more excellent characters. But, O good man, tell me at length, who you say those better and more excellent characters are, and about what they are conversant.

CAL. But I have said that they are such as are prudent and brave, with respect to the affairs of a city. For it is fit that these should govern cities: and this is the just, that these should have more than others, the governors than the governed.

Soc. But what of these governors considered with respect to themselves? Ought they to have more, as governors, or as governed?

CAL. How do you say?

Soc. I speak of every one as governing himself. Or is there no occasion for a man to govern himself, but only others?

CAL. What do you mean by a man governing himself?

Soc.

Soc. Nothing various, but just as the vulgar call a man who is temperate, and master of himself, one that governs his pleasures and desires.

CAL. How pleasant you are ! You speak of the foolishly temperate.

Soc. How so? There is not any one who is ignorant that this is not what I say.

CAL. But this is very much what you say, Socrates ; since how can that man be happy who is a slave to any one? But this which I now freely tell you, is becoming and just according to nature ; viz. that he who intends to live properly, should suffer his desires to be as great as possible, and should not restrain them : but to these, as the greatest possible, it will be sufficient to be subservient, through fortitude and prudence, and always to fill them with such things as they require. This, however, I think, is not possible to the multitude. And hence they blame such persons as I have mentioned, concealing their own impotency through shame ; and say that intemperance is base, enslaving, as I said before, men of a better nature than themselves ; and in consequence of their inability to satisfy their own pleasures, they praise through their slothfulness temperance and justice. For what in reality can be more base and evil than temperance, to men who from the first happen to be either the sons of kings, or who are naturally sufficient to procure for themselves a tyranny, or a dynasty? who, when it is lawful for them to enjoy good things without any impediment, impose a master on themselves, viz. the law, discourse, and the censure of the multitude? Or how is it possible that they should not become miserable through the beauty of justice and temperance, while they impart no more to their friends than to their enemies ; and this while they possess the supreme authority in their own city? But in reality, Socrates, that which you say you pursue subsists in the following manner : Luxury, intemperance, and liberty, if attended with proper assistance, are virtue and felicity ; but these other things are nothing more than ornaments, compacts contrary to nature, the nugacities of men, and of no worth.

Soc. In no ignoble manner, Callicles, do you freely attack the discourse : for you now clearly say what others think, indeed, but are unwilling to say. I beg, therefore, that you would not by any means relax, that it may in reality become evident how we ought to live. Tell me then : do you say that desires ought not to be repressed, if any one intends to be that which he

ought to be? and that, suffering them to be as great as possible, he ought to procure their full satisfaction from some other person? and that this constitutes virtue?

CAL. I do say these things.

SOC. Those, therefore, that are not in want of any thing are not rightly said to be happy.

CAL. For thus stones and dead bodies would be most happy.

SOC. But, indeed, as you also say, life is a grievous thing. For I should not wonder if Euripides¹ spoke the truth when he says: "Who knows whether to live is not to die, and to die, is not to live?" And we, perhaps, are in reality dead. For I have heard from one of the wise, that we are now dead; and that the body is our sepulchre; but that the part of the soul in which the desires are contained is of such a nature that it can be persuaded, and hurled upwards and downwards. Hence, a certain elegant man, perhaps a Sicilian, or an Italian, denominated, mythologizing, this part of the soul a tub, by a derivation from the probable and the persuasive; and like-

¹ Euripides (in Phryxo) says, that to live is to die, and to die to live. For the soul coming hither, as she imparts life to the body, so she partakes of a certain privation of life; but this is an evil. When separated, therefore, from the body, she lives in reality: for she dies here, through participating a privation of life, because the body becomes the cause of evils. And hence it is necessary to subdue the body.

The meaning of the Pythagoric fable which is here introduced by Plato is as follows: We are said then to be dead, because, as we have before observed, we partake of a privation of life. The sepulchre which we carry about with us is, as Plato himself explains it, the body. But Hades is the unapparent, because we are situated in obscurity, the soul being in a state of servitude to the body. The tubs are the desires, whether they are so called from hastening to fill them as if they were tubs, or from desire persuading us that it is beautiful. The initiated, therefore, i. e. those that have a perfect knowledge, pour into the entire tub: for these have their tub full, or, in other words, have perfect virtue. But the uninitiated, viz. those that possess nothing perfect, have perforated tubs. For those that are in a state of servitude to desire always wish to fill it, and are more inflamed; and on this account they have perforated tubs, as being never full. But the sieve is the rational soul mingled with the irrational. For the soul is called a circle, because it seeks itself, and is itself sought; finds itself, and is itself found. But the irrational soul imitates a right line, since it does not revert to itself like a circle. So far, therefore, as the sieve is circular, it is an image of the rational soul, but, as it is placed under the right lines formed from the holes, it is assumed for the irrational soul. Right lines, therefore, are in the middle of the cavities. Hence, by the sieve, Plato signifies the rational in subjection to the irrational soul. The water is the flux of nature: for, as Heraclitus says, moisture is the death of the soul.

wife

wife he called those that are stupid, or deprived of intellect, uninitiated. He further said, that the intemperate and uncovered nature of that part of the soul in which the desires are contained was like a pierced tub, through its insatiable greediness. But this man, Callicles, evinced, directly contrary to you, that of such as were in Hades (which he called *aides*, or the invisible) those were most miserable who were not initiated, and that their employment consisted in carrying water to a pierced tub in a similarly pierced sieve. The sieve, therefore, as he who spoke with me said, is the soul. But he assimilated the soul of the unwise to a sieve, because, as this is full of holes, so their soul is unable to contain any thing, through incredulity and oblivion. These assertions may, indeed, in a certain respect, be very justly considered as unusual; but they evince what I wish to show you, if I could but persuade you to change your opinion, that, instead of having an insatiable and intemperate life, you would choose one that is moderate, and which is sufficiently and abundantly replete with things perpetually present. But can I in any respect persuade you? And will you, changing your opinion, say that the moderate are more happy than the intemperate? Or shall I not at all persuade you? And will you nothing the more alter your opinion, though I should deliver in fables many things of this kind?

CAL. You have spoken this more truly, Socrates.

SOC. But come, I will exhibit to you another image from the same gymnasium, as that which I just now exhibited to you. For consider, whether you would speak in this manner concerning the life of a temperate and intemperate man,—I mean, as if two men had each of them many tubs; and that the tubs belonging to one of these were entire and full, one of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and many others of them with a multitude of many other things. Likewise, that each of these various liquors was rare and difficult to be obtained, and was procured with many labours and difficulties. Let us suppose, therefore, that this man whose tubs are thus full neither draws any liquor from them, nor is at all concerned about them, but, with respect to them, is at rest. Let it be possible also to procure liquors for the other, though with difficulty; but let his vessels be pierced, and defective, and let him always be compelled, both night and day, to fill them, or, if he does not, to suffer the most extreme pain. Will you therefore say, since such is the life of each, that the life of the intemperate is more happy than that

of the moderate man? Can I in any respect persuade you by these things, that a moderate is better than an intemperate life? Or shall I not persuade you?

CAL. You will not persuade me, Socrates. For he whose vessel is full has not any pleasure whatever: but this is, as I just now said, to live like a stone, when once filled, neither rejoicing nor grieving: but living pleasantly consists in an abundant influx.

Soc. Is it not therefore necessary, if there is an influx of many things, that there should also be an abundant efflux? and that there should be certain large holes as passages for the effluxions?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. On the contrary, therefore, you speak of a certain life of the bird called Charadrius, and not of that of a dead body, or a stone. But tell me, do you speak of any such thing as the being hungry, and, when hungry, of eating?

CAL. I do.

Soc. And of the being thirsty, and, when thirsty, of drinking?

CAL. I say so; and likewise that he who possesses all other desires, and is able to satisfy them, will live rejoicing in a happy manner.

Soc. Well done, O best of men! Proceed as you have begun, and do not be hindered by shame. But it is likewise requisite, as it seems, that neither should I be restrained by shame. And, in the first place, inform me whether he who is scabby, and itches, who has abundantly the power of, and passes his life in, scratching, lives happily?

CAL. How absurd you are, Socrates, and perfectly vulgar!

Soc. Hence it is, Callicles, that I have astonished Polus and Gorgias, and made them ashamed. But do not you be astonished, nor ashamed: for you are brave: but only answer.

CAL. I say, then, that he who scratches himself lives pleasantly.

Soc. Does he not, therefore, live happily, if he lives pleasantly?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. I again ask you, whether this will be the case if he only itches in his head, or any other part of the body. See, Callicles, what you should answer, if any one asks you respecting all the parts of the body in succession. And all the parts being thus affected, would not, in short, this life of catamites be
dire,

dire, base, and miserable? Or will you also dare to call these happy, if they possess in abundance what they require?

CAL. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to bring the discourse to things of this kind?

SOC. Do I bring it hither, O generous man? Or does not he rather, who says in so shameless a manner, that such as rejoice, however they may rejoice, are happy; and does not define what pleasures are good, and what are evil? But further still, now tell me, whether you say that the pleasant and the good are the same: or that there is something pleasant which is not good?

CAL. But my assertion would not differ from itself, if that which I say is different I should also say is the same.

SOC. You subvert, Callicles, what was said in the first part of our discourse; nor can you any longer sufficiently investigate things with me, if you speak contrary to your opinion.

CAL. But you, Socrates, do the same.

SOC. Neither, therefore, do I, nor you, act rightly in so doing. But, O blessed man, see whether it is not a good thing to rejoice in perfection. For many base consequences, and a multitude of other things, appear to attend the particulars which I just now obscurely signified, if they should take place.

CAL. It is as you think, Socrates.

SOC. But do you in reality, Callicles, strenuously assert these things?

CAL. I do.

SOC. Let us, therefore, enter on the discussion, as if you were serious.

CAL. And extremely so.

SOC. Come, then, since it is agreeable to you, divide as follows: Do you call science any thing?

CAL. I do.

SOC. And did you not just now say, that there is a certain fortitude, together with science?

CAL. I did say so.

SOC. You spoke, therefore, of these two, as if fortitude was something different from science.

CAL. Very much so.

SOC. But what? Are pleasure and science the same, or different?

CAL.

CAL. They are certainly different, O most wise man.

SOC. Is fortitude also different from pleasure?

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Come, then, that we may remember these things, viz. that Callicles of Acharne said that the pleasant and the good are the same; but that science and fortitude are both different from each other and the good; and that Socrates of Alopecia did not assent to these things. Or did he assent to them?

CAL. He did not assent.

SOC. But I think that neither will Callicles when he rightly beholds himself. For tell me, do you not think that those who do well are affected in a manner entirely contrary to those who do ill?

CAL. I do.

SOC. If these, therefore, are contrary to each other, must they not necessarily subsist in the same manner as health and disease? For, certainly, a man is not at the same time well and diseased, nor at the same time liberated from health and disease.

CAL. How do you say?

SOC. Taking any part of the body you please, as, for instance, the eyes, consider whether some man is diseased with an ophthalmy.

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. He certainly is not, if at the same time his eyes are well.

CAL. By no means.

SOC. But what? When he is liberated from the ophthalmy, is he then also liberated from the health of his eyes, and, lastly, at the same time liberated from both?

CAL. In the least degree.

SOC. For I think this would be wonderful and absurd. Or would it not?

CAL. Very much so.

SOC. But I think he will alternately receive one, and lose the other.

CAL. So I say.

SOC. And will he not, therefore, in a similar manner receive and lose strength and weakness?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. And swiftness and slowness?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And with respect to things good, and felicity, and the contraries of these things, evil and infelicity, will he alternately receive and be liberated from each of these?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. If, therefore, we should find certain things from which a man is at the same time liberated, and which he at the same time possesses, certainly these would not be good and evil. Do we mutually assent to these things? Well consider, and answer me.

CAL. But I assent in a transcendent degree.

SOC. Let us then recur to what we assented to before. Do you say that to be hungry is pleasant, or troublesome? I say, to be hungry.

CAL. That it is troublesome.

SOC. But it is pleasant for him who is hungry to eat?

CAL. It is.

SOC. I understand you: but to be hungry you say is troublesome. Do you not?

CAL. I do.

SOC. And is it not likewise troublesome to be thirsty?

CAL. Very much so.

SOC. Whether, therefore, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do you acknowledge that all indigence and desire is troublesome?

CAL. I do acknowledge it: but do not ask me.

SOC. Be it so. But do you say it is any thing else than pleasant, for a man who is thirsty to drink?

CAL. I say it is nothing else.

SOC. In this thing, therefore, which you speak of, to be thirsty is, doubtless, painful. Is it not?

CAL. It is.

SOC. But is not to drink a repletion of indigence, and a pleasure?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do you not therefore say that drinking is attended with joy?

CAL. Very much so.

SOC. And do you not say that to be thirsty is painful?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do you, therefore, perceive what follows? I mean, that you say he who is in pain at the same time rejoices; when you say that he who is thirsty drinks. Or does not this happen together, according to the same place and time, whether you consider the soul or the body? For I think it is of no consequence which of these you consider. Are these things so, or not?

CAL. They are.

SOC. But you say it is impossible that he who is happy should at the same time be unhappy.

CAL. I do say so.

SOC. But you have granted that he who is disquieted may rejoice.

CAL. It appears so.

SOC. To rejoice, therefore, is not felicity, nor to be disquieted, infelicity? So that the pleasant is something different from the good?

CAL. I know not what these particulars are, Socrates, which you sophistically devise.

SOC. You know, though you pretend not, Callicles. In consequence of trifling, too, you proceed to what was before said; that you may know how wise you are that admonish me. Does not each of us at the same time cease from being thirsty, and at the same time receive pleasure from drinking?

CAL. I do not know what you say.

GORG. By no means, Callicles, act in this manner; but answer at least for our sakes, that the discourse may be brought to a conclusion.

CAL. But this is always the way with Socrates, Gorgias, viz. he asks and confutes trifling things, and such as are of no worth.

GORG. But of what consequence is this to you? This is altogether no concern of yours: but suffer Socrates to argue in whatever manner he pleases.

CAL. Ask, then, since Gorgias thinks proper, these trifling and vile questions.

SOC. You are happy, Callicles, because you are initiated in great mysteries prior to the small: but I do not think this is lawful. Answer me, therefore, the question which you left unanswered, viz. whether each of us does not at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive delight?

CAL.

CAL. I say so.

Soc. And with respect to hunger, and other desires, do we not at the same time cease to feel them, and to receive delight?

CAL. We do.

Soc. Do we not, therefore, at one and the same time experience a cessation of pains and pleasures?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. But we do not at one and the same time experience a cessation of things good and evil, as you did acknowledge: but now do you not acknowledge this?

CAL. I do. But what then?

Soc. That things good are not the same with such as are pleasant, nor things evil with such as procure molestation. For, from these we are liberated at once, but not from those, because they are different. How, therefore, can things pleasant be the same with such as are good, or things troublesome with such as are evil? But, if you please, consider the affair thus: for I think that neither in this will you accord with yourself. Consider now. Do you not call the good good, from the presence of good things, in the same manner as you call those beautiful to whom beauty is present?

CAL. I do.

Soc. But what? Do you call those good men who are foolish and timid? For you did not just now; but you said that good men were brave and prudent. Or do you not call the brave and prudent, good?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. But what? Have you ever seen a stupid boy rejoicing?

CAL. I have.

Soc. And have you not also seen a stupid man rejoicing?

CAL. I think I have. But to what purpose is this?

Soc. To none: but answer.

CAL. I have seen such a one.

Soc. But have you seen a man endued with intellect grieving and rejoicing?

CAL. I say I have.

Soc. But which rejoice and grieve the more; the wife, or the foolish?

CAL. I do not think there is much difference.

Soc. This is sufficient. But have you ever in war seen a coward?

CAL. Undoubtedly I have.

Soc. What then? On the departure of the enemies, which have appeared to you to rejoice the more, cowards or the brave?

CAL. Both have appeared to me to rejoice more: or, if not, certainly in nearly the same degree.

Soc. It is of no consequence. Cowards, therefore, also rejoice?

CAL. And very much so.

Soc. And those that are stupid, likewise, as it seems?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. But, when enemies approach, do cowards only grieve? or is this also the case with the brave?

CAL. With both.

Soc. Do they, therefore, similarly grieve?

CAL. Perhaps cowards grieve more.

Soc. But, when the enemies depart, do they rejoice more?

CAL. Perhaps so.

Soc. Do not, therefore, as you say, the stupid and the wife, cowards and the brave, similarly grieve and rejoice, but cowards more than the brave?

CAL. I say so.

Soc. But the wife and brave are good, but cowards and the stupid, bad?

CAL. They are.

Soc. The good and the bad, therefore, rejoice and grieve similarly?

CAL. I say so.

Soc. Are, therefore, the good and the bad similarly good and bad? or are the good yet more good, and the bad more bad?

CAL. But, by Jupiter, I do not know what you say.

Soc. Do you not know that you said the good were good, through the presence of things good, and the bad through the presence of things evil? And that pleasures were good things, and pains bad?

CAL. I do know it.

Soc. Are not, therefore, good things, viz. pleasures, present with those that rejoice, if they rejoice?

CAL.

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Are not, therefore, those that rejoice good, in consequence of things good being present?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But what? Are not things evil, viz. pains, present with those that are disquieted?

CAL. They are present.

SOC. But do you not say that the evil are evil, through the presence of things evil? Or do you no longer say so?

CAL. I do.

SOC. Those, therefore, that rejoice, are good; but those that are disquieted are evil?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And those that are more so, more, but those that are less so, less? and those that are similarly so, similarly?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do you say, therefore, that the wise and the stupid rejoice and grieve similarly; and that this is likewise the case with cowards and the brave? Or that cowards rejoice and grieve more than the brave?

CAL. I do.

SOC. Collect, therefore, in common with me, what will be the consequence of what we have assented to. For, as it is said, it is beautiful to speak and confide twice, and even thrice, beautiful things. Do we say, then, that he who is prudent and brave is good, or not?

CAL. We do.

SOC. But that he is a bad man who is stupid and a coward?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And again, that he who rejoices is good?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But that he is a bad man who is disquieted?

CAL. Necessarily so.

SOC. Likewise, that to be disquieted, and rejoice, are similarly good and evil; but perhaps more evil than good?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Does not, therefore, a bad man become similarly bad and good, with

the good man, or even more good? Do not these things follow, and likewise those prior things, if any one says that the same things are pleasant and good? Are not these consequences necessary, Callicles?

CAL. A while ago, Socrates, I said that I listened and assented to you, considering that if any one grants you any thing, though in jest, this you gladly lay hold of after the manner of lads. Just as if you could think that either I or any other person did not believe that some pleasures are better, and others worse.

SOC. Hey-day, Callicles, how crafty you are! And you use me as if I were a boy; at one time asserting that these things subsist in this manner, and at another in a different manner; and thus deceiving me. Though, from the first, I did not think that I should be voluntarily deceived by you, because you are my friend. But now I am deceived. And now, as it seems, it is necessary, according to the antient proverb, that I should make good use of the present opportunity, and receive what you give. But it appears that what you now say is this, that with respect to pleasures some are good, and others bad. Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Are, therefore, the profitable good, but the noxious evil?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And are those profitable which accomplish a certain good, but those evil, which effect a certain evil?

CAL. I say so.

SOC. Do you, therefore, speak of such things as the following; as, for instance, in the body, those pleasures of eating and drinking which we just now spoke of; and do you think that if some of these produce in the body health or strength, or some other corporeal virtue, they are good, but that the contraries of these are evil?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And in like manner, with respect to pains, are you of opinion that some are worthy, and others base?

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Are not, therefore, such pleasures and pains as are worthy, to be chosen and embraced?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc.

SOC. But such as are base, not ?

CAL. It is evident.

SOC. For it appeared, if you remember, that all things are done by us, viz. by me and Polus, for the sake of things good. Does it, therefore, appear also to you, that the good is the end of all actions ? Likewise, that all other things ought to be done for its sake ; but that it is not to be obtained for the sake of other things ? Will you then make a third with us in the same opinion ?

CAL. I will.

SOC. Both other things, therefore, and such as are pleasant, ought to be done for the sake of things good, but not things good for the sake of such as are pleasant ?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Is every man, therefore, able to choose such pleasant things as are good, and likewise such as are evil ? Or must this be the province of a man endued with art ?

CAL. Of a man endued with art.

SOC. But let us again recall to our memory what I said to Polus and Gorgias. For I said (if you remember) that there were certain preparations, some as far as pleasure, preparing this alone, but ignorant of the better and the worse ; but others that knew the nature both of good and evil. I likewise placed among the preparations respecting pleasures, cooking as a skill pertaining to the body, but not an art ; but among the preparations respecting the good I placed the medicinal art. And, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendship, Callicles, do not think that you ought to jest with me, nor answer me casually contrary to your opinion, nor again receive my assertions as if I was in jest. For you see that our discourse is about this, after what manner it is proper to live, than which, what can any man endued with the smallest degree of intellect more seriously discuss ? I mean, whether we should adopt that mode of life to which you exhort me, engaging in such employments of a man, as speaking among the people, cultivating rhetoric, and managing political affairs, after the manner which you adopt ; or whether we should betake ourselves to a philosophic life, and consider what it is in which it differs from the former life. Perhaps, therefore, as I just now said, it is best to make a division ; and after we have divided, and assented

affented to each other, to consider, if these two species of life have an existence, in what they differ from each other, and which of them ought to be pursued. But perhaps you do not yet understand what I say.

CAL. I do not.

Soc. But I will speak to you still more clearly. Since you and I have agreed that there is something good, and likewise something pleasant, and that the pleasant is different from the good, but that in each of them there is a certain exercise and preparation of acquisition, one being the hunting after the pleasant, and the other of the good; do you, in the first place, grant me this, or do you not grant it?

CAL. I do grant it.

Soc. But come, consent with me in what I said to these men, if I then appeared to you to speak the truth. But I said that cooking did not appear to me to be an art, but skill; and that medicine is an art. For I said that medicine considers the nature of that which it cures, and the cause of the things which it does, and that it is able to give an account of each of these: but that cooking very inartificially proceeds to pleasure, to which all its attention is directed, neither considering in any respect the nature nor the cause of pleasure, but being entirely irrational, numbering nothing (as I may say), depending wholly on use and skill, and only preserving the memory of that which usually takes place, by which also it may impart pleasures. In the first place, therefore, consider whether these things appear to you to have been sufficiently said, and that there are also certain other studies of this kind respecting the soul, some of which depend on art, and bestow a certain attention to that which is best in the soul; but others neglect this, considering, in the same manner as cooking with respect to the body, only the pleasure of the soul, and in what manner it may be procured; neither considering which is the better or the worse of pleasures, nor attending to any thing else than gratification only, whether it is better or worse. For to me, Callicles, these things appear to take place; and I say that a thing of this kind is flattery, both respecting body and soul, and any thing else the pleasure of which is sedulously attended to by any one, without paying any regard to the better and the worse. But whether do you entertain the same opinion respecting these things with us, or do you oppose them?

CAL.

CAL. I do not, but grant them, that your discourse may come to an end, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.

Soc. But whether does this take place respecting one soul, but not respecting two and many souls?

CAL. It does not. But it takes place respecting both two and many souls.

Soc. May it not, therefore, be lawful to gratify souls collected together, without paying any attention to what is best?

CAL. I think so.

Soc. Can you, therefore, tell me what those studies are which effect this? Or rather, if you are willing, on my asking, assent to whichever appears to you to be one of these, but to that which does not do not assent. And, in the first place, let us consider the piper's art. Does it not appear to you to be a thing of this kind, Callicles; viz. which only pursues our pleasure, but cares for nothing else?

CAL. It does appear to me.

Soc. Are not, therefore, all such studies as these like the harper's art in contests?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. But what? Does not the erudition of choirs, and the dithyrambic poetry, appear to you to be a thing of this kind? Or do you think that Cineas¹ the son of Meles is in the smallest degree solicitous that he may say any thing by which his hearers may become better? Or is he not rather solicitous about that which may gratify the crowd of spectators?

CAL. It is evident, Socrates, that this latter is the case respecting Cineas.

Soc. But what with respect to his father Meles? Does he appear to you to play on the harp, looking to that which is best? Or does not he also regard that which is most pleasant? For in singing he pleasingly pains the spectators. But consider, does not the whole of the harper's art, and dithyrambic poetry, appear to you to have been invented for the sake of pleasure?

CAL. To me it does.

Soc. But what of the venerable and wonderful poetry of tragedy? What does it strive to accomplish? Do its endeavour and study, as appears to you, alone consist in gratifying spectators? or also in striving not to say any thing which may be pleasing and grateful to them, but at the same

¹ A bad dithyrambic poet, according to the Scholiast ad *Ranas* Aristoph.

time base ; and that, if any thing happens to be unpleasant and useful, this it may say and sing, whether it gratifies the spectators or not? According to which of these modes does the poetry of tragedy appear to you to consist?

CAL. It is evident, Socrates, that it is more impelled to pleasure, and the gratification of the spectators.

SOC. Did we not, therefore, Callicles, just now say that a thing of this kind is flattery?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Come then, if any one should take from all poetry, melody, rhythm, and measure, would any thing else than discourses remain?

CAL. Necessarily nothing else.

SOC. Are not, therefore, these discourses delivered to a great multitude of people?

CAL. I say so.

SOC. Poetry, therefore, is a certain popular speech. Or do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?

CAL. To me they do.

SOC. Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among a people consisting of boys, and at the same time women and men, slaves and the free-born; and which we do not altogether approve. For we said that it was adulation.

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Be it so. But what shall we say that rhetoric is, which subsists among the Athenian people, and the people consisting of free-born men in other cities? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to speak with a view to that which is best, directing their attention to this, that the citizens through their discourses may become the best of men? Or are they also impelled to the gratification of the citizens? and, neglecting public for the sake of private advantage, do they converse with the people as with boys, alone endeavouring to gratify them, without being in the least concerned whether through this they become better or worse?

CAL. This which you ask is not a simple thing. For some rhetoricians are solicitous in what they say for the good of the citizens: but others are such as you represent them.

SOC. It is sufficient. For, if this also is twofold, one part of it will be adulation,

adulation, and base harangue; but the other, which causes the souls of the citizens to become most excellent, will be beautiful; and will always strive to speak such things as are best, whether they are more pleasant or more unpleasant to the hearers. But you never have seen this kind of rhetoric. Or, if you can say that some one of the rhetoricians is a character of this kind, why have you not informed me who he is?

CAL. But, by Jupiter, I cannot instance to you any rhetorician of the present day.

SOC. But what? Can you instance any one of the antient rhetoricians, who was the means of rendering the Athenians better, after he began to harangue them, when previous to this they had been worse? For I do not know who such a one is.

CAL. But what? Have you not heard that Themistocles was a good man, and likewise Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles here, who died lately, and whose harangues you also have heard?

SOC. Yes; if that virtue, Callicles, which you before spoke of is true, viz. for a man to replenish both his own desires and those of others. But if this is not the case, but, as we were afterwards compelled to confess, those desires are to be embraced, the replenishing of which renders a man better, but not those which render him worse, and if there is a certain art of this, as we also acknowledged, can you say that any one of these was a man of this kind?

CAL. I have not any thing to say.

SOC. But if you seek in a becoming manner you will find. Let us however, sedately considering, see if any one of these was a character of this kind. Is it not true that a good man, who says what he says with a view to the best, does not speak casually, but looking to something? in the same manner as all other artists, each of whom regards his own work, and does not rashly choose what he introduces to his work, but so that the subject of his operation may have a certain form—as, for instance, if you are willing to look to painters, architects, shipwrights, and all other artificers, and to consider how, whichever of them you please, places whatever he places in a certain order, and compels one thing to be adapted to and harmonize with another, until the whole thing is constituted with regularity and ornament. And indeed, both other artificers, and those which I just now mentioned, who are employed about the body, viz. the masters of gymnastic, and physicians,

adorn in a certain respect, and orderly dispose the body. Do we grant that this is the case, or not?

CAL. It is the case.

SOC. A house, therefore, when it acquires order and ornament, will be a good house, but a bad one, when it is without order?

CAL. I say so.

SOC. And will not this in like manner be the case with a ship?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. And may we not assert the same things also respecting our bodies?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. But what with respect to the soul? Will it be in a good condition, when it acquires disorder, or when it acquires a certain order and ornament?

CAL. It is necessary, from what has been said, to grant that the latter must be the case.

SOC. What then, in the body, is the name of that which subsists from order and ornament? Perhaps you will say it is health and strength.

CAL. I do.

SOC. But what again is the name of that which subsists in the soul from order and ornament? Endeavour to find and mention it, in the same manner as the former name.

CAL. But why do not you say what it is, Socrates?

SOC. If you had rather, I will. But, if I speak well, do you assent to me; if not, confute, and do not indulge me. To me then it appears that the name belonging to the orderly disposition of the body is the healthful, from which health and every other virtue of the body are produced in the body. Is it so, or not?

CAL. It is.

SOC. But the name belonging to the orderly disposition and ornament of the soul is the legitimate and law; whence also souls become legitimate and adorned with modest manners: but these are justice and temperance. Do you assent, or not?

CAL. Be it so.

SOC. Will not, therefore, that good rhetorician who is endued with art, looking to these things, introduce all his orations and actions to souls? and, if he should bestow a gift, bestow it, and, if he should take any thing away, take

take it; always directing his attention to this, that justice may be produced in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and that they may be liberated from injustice: likewise that temperance may be produced in them, and that they may be liberated from intemperance: and, in short, that every virtue may be planted in them, but vice expelled? Do you grant this, or not?

CAL. I do grant it.

SOC. For where is the utility, Callicles, in giving a body diseased, and in a miserable condition, abundance of the most agreeable food or drink, or any thing else, which will not be more profitable to it than the contrary, but even less, according to a just mode of reasoning? Is this the case?

CAL. Be it so.

SOC. For I think it is not advantageous for a man to live with a miserable body; for thus it would be necessary to live miserably. Or would it not?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do not, therefore, physicians for the most part permit a man in health to satisfy his desires, (as, for instance, when hungry to eat as much as he pleases, or when thirsty to drink,) but never permit, as I may say, a diseased man to be satiated with things which he desires? Do you also grant this?

CAL. I do.

SOC. But is not the same mode, O most excellent man, to be adopted respecting the soul; viz. that as long as it is depraved, in consequence of being stupid, intemperate, unjust and unholy, it ought to be restrained from desires, and not permitted to do any thing else than what will render it better? Do you say so, or not?

CAL. I say so.

SOC. For such a mode of conduct will indeed be better for the soul.

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not, therefore, to restrain any one from what he desires to punish him?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. To be punished, therefore, is better for the soul than intemperance, contrary to what you just now thought.

CAL. I do not know what you say, Socrates: but ask something else.

Soc. This man will not suffer himself to be benefited by suffering this of which we are speaking, viz. punishment.

CAL. I am not at all concerned about any thing which you say; and I have answered you these things for the sake of Gorgias.

Soc. Be it so. But what then shall we do? Shall we dissolve the conference in the midst?

CAL. You know best.

Soc. But they say it is not lawful to leave even fables in the midst, but that a head should be placed on them, that they may not wander without a head.

CAL. How importunate you are, Socrates! But, if you will be persuaded by me, you will bid farewell to this discourse, or carry it on with some other person.

Soc. What other, then, is willing? for we must not leave the discourse unfinished.

CAL. Cannot you yourself finish the discourse, by either speaking to yourself, or answering yourself?

Soc. In order, I suppose, that the saying of Epicharmus may be verified, viz. I being one am sufficient to accomplish what was before said by two. And it appears most necessary that it should be so. But, if we do this, I think it will be proper that all of us should in a friendly manner strive to understand what is true, and what false, respecting the subjects of our discourse. For it will be a common good to all for this to become manifest. I will, therefore, run over the affair in the manner in which it appears to me to take place. But, if I shall seem to any of you not to grant myself things which truly are, it will be proper that you should apprehend and confute me. For I do not say what I do say as one endued with knowledge, but I investigate in common with you. So that, if he who contends with me appears to say any thing to the purpose, I will be the first to concede to him. But I say these things on condition that you think it fit the discourse should be completed: but if you do not assent to this, let us bid farewell to it, and depart.

GORG. But it does not appear to me, Socrates, proper to depart yet, but that you should pursue the discourse. It likewise seems to me that this is the opinion of the rest of the company. For I also am willing to hear you discussing what remains.

Soc.

Soc. But indeed, Gorgias, I should willingly have discoursed still longer with Callicles here, till I had recompensed him with the oration of Amphion, instead of that of Zethus. But as you are not willing, Callicles, to finish the discussion in conjunction with me, at least attend to me, and expose me if I shall appear to you to assert any thing in an unbecoming manner. And if you confute me, I shall not be indignant with you, as you are with me, but you will be considered by me as my greatest benefactor.

CAL. Speak then yourself, good man, and finish the discourse.

Soc. Hear me then repeating the discourse from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same?—They are not the same, as I and Callicles have mutually agreed.—But whether is the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant?—The pleasant for the sake of the good.—But is the pleasant that, with which when present we are delighted; and the good that, through which when present we are good?—Entirely so.—But we are good, both ourselves, and all other things that are good, when a certain virtue is present.—To me this appears to be necessary, Callicles.—But, indeed, the virtue of each thing, of an instrument, and of the body, and again of the soul, and every animal, does not fortuitously become thus beautiful, but from order, rectitude, and art, which are attributed to each of them.—Are these things, therefore, so? For I say they are.—The virtue of every thing, therefore, is disposed and adorned by order.—So, indeed, I say.—Hence, in each thing, a certain order becoming inherent, which is domestic to each, renders each thing good.—It appears so to me.—The soul, therefore, which has a certain order of its own, is better than the soul which is without order.—It is necessary.—But the soul which has order is orderly.—For how is it possible it should not?—But an orderly soul is temperate.—This is very necessary.—A temperate soul, therefore, is good. I, indeed, am not able to say any thing besides these things, O friend Callicles. But do you, if you have any thing else, teach me.

CAL. Proceed, good man.

Soc. I say, then, if a temperate soul is good, the soul which is affected in a manner contrary to that of the temperate is vicious. But such a soul will be destitute of intellect, and intemperate.—Entirely so.—And, indeed, a temperate man acts in a proper manner, both towards Gods and men. For he would not be temperate if he acted in an improper manner.—It is necessary that these things

things should be so.—And besides this, by acting in a proper manner towards men he will act justly, and by a proper conduct towards the Gods he will act piously. But it is necessary that he should be just and holy, who acts in a just and holy manner.—It must be so.—It is likewise necessary that such a one should be brave. For it is not the province of a temperate man either to pursue or avoid things which ought neither to be pursued nor avoided: but it is proper that he should both avoid and pursue things and men, pleasures and pains, and bravely endure when it is requisite. So that there is an abundant necessity, Callicles, that the temperate man, being just, brave, and pious, as we have described him, should be a perfectly good man: likewise, that a good man should do in a becoming and beautiful manner whatever he does; and that he who acts well should be blessed and happy. And lastly, it is necessary that the unworthy man, and who acts ill, should be miserable. But such a man will be one who is directly contrary to the temperate man, viz. he will be the intemperate character which you praised. I, therefore, lay down these things, and assert that they are true. But if they are true, temperance must be pursued and cultivated, as it appears, by him who wishes to be happy, and he must fly from intemperance with the utmost celerity. He must likewise endeavour to live in such a manner as not to require any degree of punishment: but if he does require it, or any other of his family,—or if this is the case with a private person, or a city,—justice must be administered, and punishment inflicted, if such wish to be happy. This appears to me to be the mark with our eye directed to which it is proper to live: and all concerns, both private and public, should tend to this, viz. if any one wishes to be happy, to act in such a manner that justice and temperance may be ever present with him; not suffering his desires to be unrestrained, and endeavouring to fill them; which is an infinite evil, and causes a man to live the life of a robber. For a character of this kind can neither be dear to any other man, nor to Divinity. For it is impossible there can be any communion between them: but where there is no communion there can be no friendship. The wise too, Callicles, say that communion, friendship, decorum, temperance, and justice, connectedly comprehend heaven and earth; Gods and men. And on this account, my friend, they call this universe *kosmos*, or *order*, and not *akosmia*, or *disorder*, and *akolasia*, or *intemperance*. However, you appear to me not to attend to these things, and this though you
are

are wise. But you are ignorant that geometric equality is able to accomplish great things, both among Gods and men. On the contrary, you think that every one should strive to possess more than others: for you neglect geometry.—Be it so, then.—However, this our discourse must either be confuted, viz. it must be shown that those who are happy are not happy from the possession of justice and temperance, and that those who are miserable are not miserable from the possession of vice; or, if our discourse is true, we must consider what consequences result from it. Indeed, Callicles, all those former things are the consequences concerning which you asked me if I was speaking in earnest. For I said that a man should accuse himself, his son, and his friend, if he acted in any respect unjustly, and that rhetoric was to be used for this purpose. Hence, those things which you thought Polus granted through shame are true, viz. that by how much it is more base to do an injury than to be injured, by so much is it the worse; and that he who would be rightly skilled in rhetoric ought to be just, and endued with a scientific knowledge of things just; which, again, Polus said that Gorgias acknowledged through shame.

This then being the case, let us consider what are the things for which you reprove me, and whether they are well said, or not. You assert, then, that I can neither assist myself, nor any of my friends or domestics, nor save myself from the greatest dangers: but that I am obnoxious to the arbitrary will of any one, like men of infamous characters (though this is nothing more than the juvenile ardour of your discourse), so as either to be struck in the face, or deprived of my property, or expelled from the city, or, which is the extremity of injustice, to be slain. And to be thus circumstanced, according to your doctrine, is the most shameful of all things. But, according to my doctrine, (which has indeed been often mentioned, yet nothing hinders but that it may again be repeated,) I do not say, Callicles, that to be struck in the face unjustly is a most shameful thing; nor yet for my body, or my purse, to be cut; but that to strike and cut unjustly me and mine, is a thing more shameful and base. And that to defraud, enslave, break open the house, and, in short, to injure in any respect me and mine, is to him who does the injury more base and shameful than to me who am injured. These things, which appeared to us to subsist in this manner in the former part of our

discourse, are contained and bound in adamantine reasons, though it is somewhat rustic to make such an assertion. However, unless you can dissolve these reasons, or some one more robust than yourself, it is impossible that he who speaks otherwise than I now speak can speak in a becoming manner. For I always assert the same thing, viz. that I know not how these things subsist: and that no one of those whom I have ever met with, as at present, if unable to say otherwise, would be ridiculous. I therefore again determine that these things thus subsist. But, if this is the case, and injustice is the greatest of evils to him that acts unjustly; and it is still a greater evil, if possible, though this is the greatest, for him who acts unjustly not to be punished; what assistance will that be, which, when a man is unable to afford himself, he is in reality ridiculous? Will it not be that which averts from us the greatest detriment? But there is an abundant necessity that this should be the most shameful assistance, viz. for a man to be incapable of assisting either himself, or his friends and domestics; that the next to this should be that which pertains to the second evil; and the third, that which pertains to the third evil; and thus in succession, according to the magnitude of each evil. Thus also does the beauty of being able to give assistance, and the deformity of not being able, subsist. Does the thing take place in this manner, or otherwise, Callicles?

CAL. No otherwise.

SOC. Since, therefore, these things are two, to do an injury, and to be injured, we say that to do an injury is a greater, but to be injured, a less evil. By what means, then, may a man so assist himself as to possess both these advantages—I mean, that which arises from not doing an injury, and that which is the consequence of not being injured? Is it by power, or will? But I say thus: Will a man, if he is unwilling to be injured, not be injured? Or, if he has procured the power of not being injured, will he not be injured?

CAL. It is evident that he will not, if he has procured the power.

SOC. But what with respect to acting unjustly? Whether, if any one is unwilling to do an injury, is this sufficient (for in this case he will not commit an injury), or is it requisite that for this purpose he should procure a certain power and art, as one who will do an injury, unless he has learned and cultivated these? Why do you not answer me this question, Callicles: whether

ther I and Polus appear to you to be rightly compelled to acknowledge this, or not? since we confess that no one is willing to act unjustly, but that those who injure others do it unwillingly.

CAL. Let it be so, Socrates, that your discourse may be brought to a conclusion.

SOC. For this purpose, therefore, a certain power and art, as it appears, are to be procured, in order that we may not act unjustly.

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. What then is the art which will enable a man not to be injured in any respect, or at least in the smallest degree? Consider, if it appears to you in the same manner as to me. For to me it appears thus: that he ought either to govern in a city, or obtain the tyranny, or be the associate of the most powerful person in a polity.

CAL. Do you see, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you, if you say any thing beautifully? This you appear to me to have said in a manner entirely beautiful.

SOC. Consider also, whether I appear to you to speak well in what follows: Those seem to me to be friends in the highest degree, concerning whom ancient and wise men say, "similar to similar." Does it not also appear so to you?

CAL. To me it does.

SOC. Does it not therefore follow, that when a tyrant who is rustic and unlearned governs, if there is any one in the city much better than him, the tyrant will fear such a one, and will never be able to be cordially his friend?

CAL. It does follow.

SOC. Nor yet, if any one in the city should be much worse than the tyrant, would he be able to be his friend. For the tyrant would despise him, nor ever pay attention to him as a friend.

CAL. This also is true.

SOC. It remains, therefore, that he alone would be a friend to such a one deserving to be mentioned, who, in consequence of being endued with similar manners, would praise and blame him, be willing to be governed, and to be subject to him that governs. Such a one in this city will be able to accomplish great things, and no one will injure him with impunity. Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. If, therefore, any young man in this city should thus think with himself, "After what manner may I be able to accomplish great things, and be injured by no one?" this, as it appears, must be the way, viz. he must immediately from his youth be accustomed to rejoice and be afflicted with the same things as his master, and render himself in the highest degree similar to him. Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. Will it not therefore follow, that such a man will not be injured, and, as you say, that he will be able to accomplish great things in a city?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. Will he not, therefore, be able to refrain from acting unjustly? Or will this be far from being the case, if, when the governor is unjust, he is similar to him, and is able to accomplish great things with him? But I think that the very contrary will take place, and that such a one will render himself able to act unjustly in the highest degree, without being punished for his unjust conduct. Will he not?

CAL. It appears so.

Soc. Will not, therefore, the greatest evil be present with him, in consequence of being corrupted and depraved in his soul, through the imitation and power of his master?

CAL. I do not know whither you are always turning the discourse, Socrates, upwards and downwards. Or do you not know, that he who is imitated can, if he pleases, slay and take away the possessions of him who is not imitated?

Soc. I know it, good Callicles, unless I am deaf; for, a little before, I often heard this from you and Polus, and nearly, indeed, from all in the city. But do you also hear me: for he may indeed slay whom he pleases; but, being a depraved character, he may slay one who is worthy and good.

CAL. And is not this a circumstance grievous to be borne?

Soc. Not to a man endued with intellect, as the discourse evinces. Or do you think that a man should endeavour to live to a most extended period, and should apply himself to those arts which always preserve us from dangers—in the same manner as that rhetoric which preserves in courts of justice, and which you exhorted me to cultivate?

CAL. I do indeed, by Jupiter, and I rightly advised you.

Soc. But what, O best of men, does the science of swimming also appear to you to be a venerable thing?

CAL. By Jupiter, it does not.

Soc. And, indeed, this also saves men from death, when they fall into such a danger as requires the aid of this science. But if this science appears to you to be a small thing, I will mention to you a greater than this, viz. that of piloting a ship, which not only saves lives, but also bodies and possessions, from extreme danger, in the same manner as rhetoric. And this, indeed, is moderate and modest, and is not haughty with a grandeur of ornament, as if it accomplished something transcendent. But since it accomplishes the same things as the judicial art, if it saves any from Ægina hither, it demands, I think, two oboli; but if from Egypt, or Pontus, if it demands a great sum, on account of the great benefit it has conferred, through saving those I just now mentioned, viz. ourselves and children, our riches and wives, and conducting them to the port, this sum is usually two drachms. And the man who possesses this art, and accomplishes these things, going out of the ship, walks near the sea and the ship, in a moderate garb. For he knows, I think, how to reason with himself, that it is uncertain whom he may assist of those that sail with him, not suffering them to be merged in the sea, and whom he may injure, as knowing that neither the bodies nor souls of those who depart from his ship are in any respect better than they were when they entered into it. He will, therefore, reason with himself, that the case is not as if some one who is afflicted in his body with great and incurable diseases should happen not to be suffocated, because this man is indeed miserable for having escaped death, and has not derived any advantage from him; but that if any one labours under many and incurable diseases in that which is more honourable than body, viz. in his soul, such a one ought to live; and that he will benefit him, whether he saves him from the sea, or from a court of justice, or from any thing else. But he knows that it is not better for a depraved man to live; because he must necessarily live badly. On this account, it is not usual for a pilot to be arrogant, though he saves us; nor yet, O wonderful man, for an artificer of machines, who is sometimes able to save a multitude in no respect inferior to that which is saved by the general of an army, or a pilot, or any other person. For sometimes he saves whole cities. Does it appear to you that he is to be compared with a lawyer? Though, if he

should wish to speak, Callicles, such things as you are accustomed to speak, extolling his own art, he would overwhelm you with words, asserting and calling on you to consider that you ought to be the artificers of machines, as if other things were of no consequence. For he would have enough to say. But you nevertheless would despise him and his art, and would call him by way of reproach a maker of machines. Nor would you be willing to give your daughter to his son in marriage, nor his daughter to your son. Though, if you consider what the particulars are from which you praise your own profession, with what justice can you despise the artificer of machines, and the rest whom I have just now mentioned? I know you will say that your profession is better, and consists of better things. But if that which is better is not what I say it is, but this very thing is virtue, i. e. for a man to save himself and his possessions, whatever kind of man he may happen to be, then your reprehension of the artificer of machines, of the physician, and of other arts, which are instituted for the sake of preservation, is ridiculous.

But, O blessed man, see whether or not the generous and the good are not something else than to save and be saved. For perhaps to live for a period of time however extended, is not to be wished, nor too much sought after, by him who is truly a man; but leaving these things to the care of Divinity, and believing in prophetic women, that no one can avoid fate, he will afterwards consider by what means he may pass the remainder of his life in the most excellent manner. But will this be effected by rendering himself similar to the polity in which he dwells? If this then were the case, it is necessary that you should become most similar to the Athenian people, if you wish to be dear to them, and to be able to accomplish great things in the city. But consider whether this is advantageous to you and me; and whether we should not, O divine man, be exposed to the same misfortune which they say happened to the Thessalian¹ women in drawing down the moon. But, indeed, our choice of this power in the city should be with the most friendly. If however you think that any man whatever is able to deliver a certain

¹ According to Suidas (in Proverbio *ἐπι σαυτῶ τὴν σελήνην καθέλκεις*) the Thessalian women who drew down the moon are said to have been deprived of their eyes and feet. And hence, says he, the proverb is applied to those who draw down evils on themselves. It is necessary to observe that witches formerly were able to cause the *appearance* of drawing down the moon to take place. See my Notes on Pausanias, vol. iii. p. 324.

art of this kind, which will cause you to possess mighty power in this city, even when you are dissimilar to the polity, and whether this power is for the better, or the worse,—in this case you appear to me, Callicles, not to consider the affair in a proper light. For it is not requisite that you should be a mimic, but that you should be naturally similar to them, if you design to effect a genuine friendship with the Athenian people, and, by Jupiter, besides this with Demus the son of Ppyrilampes. Whoever, therefore, shall render you most similar to these will also render you, since you desire to be skilled in civil affairs, both a politician and a rhetorician. For every one is delighted with orations adapted to his own manners, but is indignant with such as are foreign from them; unless you, O beloved head, say otherwise. Can we say any thing against these things, Callicles?

CAL. I do not know how it is, but you appear to me, Socrates, to speak well. But yet that which happens to many happens also to me: for I am not entirely persuaded by you.

SOC. For the love of Demus, Callicles, which is resident in your soul, opposes me: but if we should often and in a better manner consider these things, you would perhaps be persuaded. Remember, therefore, that we said there were two preparations, which in every thing were subservient to the cultivation both of body and soul: one associating with these with a view to pleasure; but the other with a view to that which is best, not by gratifying, but opposing. Are not these the things which we then defined?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not, therefore, the one of these which looks to pleasure ignoble, and nothing else than adulation?

CAL. Let it be so, if you please.

SOC. But the other endeavours that this which we cultivate may be the best possible, whether it is body or soul.

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Whether, therefore, are we after this manner to take upon ourselves the care of a city and its citizens, I mean when the citizens are rendered the best possible? For without this, as we have found in what has been previously said, it is of no use to bestow any other benefit; viz. unless the dianoëtic part of those who are to receive either abundance of riches, or
dominion

dominion over certain persons, or any other power, is beautiful and good. Shall we lay this down, as being the case?

CAL. Entirely so, if it is more agreeable to you.

SOC. If, therefore, Callicles, when publicly transacting political affairs, we should publicly exhort each other to the art of building either walls, or docks, or temples, or, in short, buildings of the largest kind, whether would it be necessary that we should consider and examine ourselves, in the first place, if we knew or were ignorant of the art of building, and by whom we were instructed in it? Would this be requisite, or not?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. In the second place, therefore, this ought to be considered, whether we have ever built any private edifice, either for any one of our friends, or for ourselves; and whether this edifice is beautiful or deformed. And if on considering we find that our masters were good and illustrious, and that we have built, in conjunction with our masters, many beautiful edifices, and many without their assistance, after we left our masters,—if we find this to be the case, ought we not, if endued with intellect, to betake ourselves to public works? But if we can neither evince that we had a master, and have either raised no buildings, or many of no worth, would it not in this case be stupid in us to attempt public works, and to exhort each other to such an undertaking? Shall we say that these things are rightly asserted, or not?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And is not this the case with all other things? And if we should engage publicly in medical affairs, exhorting each other as if we were skilful physicians, ought not you and I to consider as follows: By the Gods, how is Socrates affected in his body with respect to health? Or is there any other person, whether a slave or free-born, who by the help of Socrates is liberated from disease? And indeed I think I may consider other things of this kind respecting you. And if we do not find any one, stranger or citizen, man or woman, whose body has been benefited by our assistance, will it not, by Jupiter, Callicles, be truly ridiculous, that we should proceed to that degree of folly as to attempt, according to the proverb¹, to

¹ This proverb, according to Zenobius, is applied to those who pass over the first disciplines, and immediately apply themselves to the greater. Just as if some one learning the potter's art should attempt to make a tub before he had learned how to make tables, or any other small utensil.

teach a potter in making a tub, before we have transacted many things privately, as they might happen to occur, and have happily accomplished many things, and been sufficiently exercised in the medical art, and should endeavour to exhort others like ourselves to exercise medicine publicly? Does it not appear to you that a conduct of this kind would be stupid?

CAL. It does.

Soc. But now, O best of men, since you have just begun to transact public affairs, and you exhort me to the same, reproaching me at the same time that I do not engage in them, ought we not mutually to consider as follows: What citizen has Callicles made a better man? Is there any one who, being before depraved, unjust, intemperate, and unwise, has through Callicles become a worthy and good man, whether he is a stranger or a citizen, a slave or free-born? Tell me, Callicles, if any one should ask you these things, what would you say? Whom would you assert to be a better man from associating with you? Are you averse to answer, if there is as yet any private work of this kind accomplished by you, before you engage in public affairs?

CAL. You are contentious, Socrates.

Soc. But I do not ask through a love of contention, but in consequence of really wishing to know, after what manner you think government ought to be conducted by us. Or would you, when applying yourself to public affairs, attend to any thing else than that we citizens may be rendered the best of men? Or have we not often acknowledged that this ought to be done by a politician? Have we, or not, acknowledged this? Answer. We have acknowledged it. I will answer for you. If, therefore, a good man ought to procure this for his city, now having recollected, inform me respecting those men whom you a little before mentioned, if they any longer appear to you to have been good citizens,—I mean Pericles and Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles.

CAL. To me they do.

Soc. If, therefore, they were good men, did not each of them render their fellow-citizens better instead of worse? Did they render them so, or not?

CAL. They did.

Soc.

Soc. When Pericles, therefore, began to speak to the people, were they not worse than when he addressed them for the last time?

CAL. Perhaps so.

Soc. It is not proper to say 'perhaps', O best of men; but this must be a necessary consequence from what has been granted, if he was a good citizen.

CAL. But what then?

Soc. Nothing. But besides this inform me, whether the Athenians are said to have become better men through Pericles, or on the contrary were corrupted by him. For I hear that Pericles rendered the Athenians indolent, timid, loquacious, and avaricious, having first of all rendered them mercenary.

CAL. You hear these things, Socrates, from those whose ears are broken.

Soc. However, I no longer hear these things; but both you and I clearly know that Pericles at first was much celebrated, and was not condemned by the Athenians by any ignominious sentence, at the very time when they were worse; but when he had made them worthy and good, then towards the close of his life they fraudulently condemned him, and were on the point of putting him to death as if he had been an unworthy man.

CAL. What then? Was Pericles on this account a bad man?

Soc. Indeed, a person of this kind who has the care of asses, horses, and oxen, appears to be a bad character, if, receiving these animals neither kicking backwards, nor pushing with their horns, nor biting, he causes them to do all these things through ferocity of disposition. Or does not every curator of an animal appear to you to be a bad man, who, having received it of a milder nature, renders it more savage than when he received it? Does he appear to you to be so, or not?

CAL. Entirely so, that I may gratify you.

Soc. Gratify me also in this, by answering whether man is an animal, or not.

CAL. Undoubtedly he is.

Soc. Did not Pericles, therefore, take care of men?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. What then? Is it not requisite, as we just now acknowledged, that they

they should become through him more just, instead of more unjust, if he, being a good politician, took care of them?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Are not, therefore, the just mild, as Homer[†] says? But what do you say? Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But, indeed, he rendered them more savage than when he received them: and this against himself; which was far from being his intention.

CAL. Are you willing I should assent to you?

SOC. If I appear to you to speak the truth.

CAL. Be it so, then.

SOC. If, therefore, he rendered them more savage, must he not also have rendered them more unjust, and worse characters?

CAL. Be it so.

SOC. From this reasoning, therefore, it follows, that Pericles was not a good politician.

CAL. You, indeed, say not.

SOC. And, by Jupiter, you say so too, from what you have acknowledged. But, again, tell me respecting Cimon. Did not those who were the objects of his care punish him by an ostracism, and so as that for ten years they might not hear his voice? And they acted in a similar manner towards Themistocles, and, besides this, punished him with exile. But they decreed that Miltiades, who fought at the battle of Marathon, should be hurled into the Barathrum; and unless the Prytanis had defended him, he would have fallen into it. Though these, if they had been good men, as as you say they were, would never have suffered these things. Indeed, it can never happen that good charioteers should at first not be thrown from their cars; but, when they have disciplined their horses, and have themselves become better charioteers, that they should then be thrown from them. This is never the case, either in driving a chariot, or in any other employment. Or does it appear to you that it is?

CAL. It does not.

SOC. Our former assertions, therefore, as it appears, are true, viz. that we

[†] Odyss. vii. ver. 120.

do not know any good politician in this city : but you acknowledge that you know of none at present, but that formerly there were some ; and the names of these you have mentioned : but these have appeared to be equal to the politicians of the present day. So that, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use rhetoric truly (for otherwise they would not have fallen into disgrace), nor yet did they employ adulation.

CAL. But indeed, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that any one of the present day will ever accomplish such undertakings as were accomplished by any one of those I mentioned.

Soc. Neither, O divine man, do I blame these men, so far as they were servants of the city ; but they appear to me to have been more skilful ministers than those of the present day, and more adapted to procure for the city such things as it desired. But in persuading, and at the same time compelling, the citizens to repress their desires, and not indulge them, by means of which they would become better men, in this those former politicians in no respect differed from such as exist at present ; for this, indeed, is alone the work of a good citizen. But, with respect to procuring ships, walls, and docks, and many other things of this kind, I also agree with you, that those were more skilful than these. I, therefore, and you, act ridiculously in this disputation. For during the whole time of our conversation we have not ceased to revolve about the same thing, and to be mutually ignorant of what we said. I think, therefore, that you have often acknowledged and known, that there is this twofold employment, both respecting the body and soul : and that the one is ministrant, by which we are enabled, if hungry, to procure food for our bodies, and, if thirsty, drink ; if cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and other things which the body requires. And I will designedly speak to you through the same images, that you may more easily understand. If any one then supplies these things, being either a victualler, or a merchant, or an artificer of some one of them, viz. a baker, or a cook, a weaver, shoemaker, or tanner, it is by no means wonderful that, being a person of this kind, he should appear, both to himself and others, to be a curator of the body ; I mean, to all those who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a certain gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body in reality pertains ; to which it belongs to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective works ; in consequence of knowing what is good and bad in solid or
liquid

liquid aliment, with respect to the virtue of the body, while all the other arts are ignorant of this. On this account, it is necessary that these arts should be servile, ministrant, and illiberal, respecting the concerns of the body; but that gymnastic and medicine should be justly the mistresses of these. That the very same things, likewise, take place in the soul, you appeared at the same time to grant me, as if knowing what I said; but a little after you asserted that there had been worthy and good citizens in this city. And when I asked you who they were, you appeared to me to exhibit just such men, with respect to political concerns, as if, in consequence of my asking about gymnastic affairs, who have been, or are at present, good curators of bodies, you should seriously answer me, that Thearion the baker, and Mithæcus, who wrote on the Sicilian art of cooking, and Sarambus the victualler, were wonderful curators of bodies; the first of whom made admirable bread; the second procured admirable food; and the third admirable wine. Perhaps, therefore, you will be indignant if I should say to you, O man, you understand nothing respecting gymnastic. You have told me of men who are the ministers and purveyors of desires, but you do not understand any thing beautiful and good concerning them; who, if it should so happen, while they fill the bodies of men, and render them gross, and are praised by them for so doing, at the same time destroy their antient flesh. These, therefore, through their unskilfulness, do not accuse men given to feasting, as the causes of the diseases with which they are infested, and of the loss of their antient flesh, but those who happen to be then present, and give them some advice. But, after a long time, when repletion introduces disease, in consequence of having taken place without the healthful, then they accuse and blame these advisers, and would injure them if they were able; but praise those ministers of their desires, and the causes of their maladies. And now you, O Callicles, act in a manner most similar to this; for you praise those who delight such-like men with feasting, and who satiate them with the objects of their desire, and say that they make the city great; but who do not perceive that the city is swollen, and inwardly in a bad condition, through those antient men. For, without temperance and justice, they have filled the city with ports and docks, with walls and tributes, and such-like trifles. When, therefore, this accession of imbecility arrived, they accused the advisers that were then present, but praised Themistocles,

Cimon, and Pericles, who were the causes of the maladies: but you perhaps, unless you are careful, they will apprehend, together with my associate Alcibiades, since they have destroyed those ancient particulars, besides those which they have acquired; though you are not the causes, but perhaps the con-causes, of the evils. Indeed, I perceive that a very stupid affair takes place at present, and I hear that it has taken place with respect to ancient men. For I see that when a city conducts itself towards any political character, as one that acts unjustly, such a one is indignant, and complains as suffering grievously, though he has conferred many benefits on the city. Are, therefore, such unjustly destroyed by the city, according to their assertion? But, indeed, their assertion is entirely false. For he who presides over a city can never be unjustly cut off by the city over which he presides. For those who profess themselves to be politicians, appear to be the same with those that call themselves sophists. For the sophists, though wise in other things, act absurdly in this respect. Proclaiming themselves to be teachers of virtue, they often accuse their disciples of acting unjustly towards them, by defrauding them of their wages, and other testimonies of gratitude for the benefits they receive from them. But what can be more irrational than such an accusation?—I mean, that men who have become good and just, being freed from injustice by their preceptor, and having obtained justice, should yet act unjustly from that very thing which they have not? Does not this, my friend, appear to you to be absurd? You compel me in reality, Callicles, to make a public harangue, because you are unwilling to answer me.

CAL. But cannot you speak unless some one answers you?

SOC. I seem, indeed, as if I could. For now I extend my discourses, since you are not willing to answer me. But, O good man, tell me, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendship, does it not appear to you irrational, that he who says he can make another person a good man, should blame this man, that, having become good through his instructions, and being so now, he is, notwithstanding, an unworthy character?

CAL. To me it appears so.

SOC. Do you not, therefore, hear those who profess to instruct men in virtue speaking in this manner?

CAL. I do. But why do you speak about men of no worth?

SOC. But what will you say respecting those men, who, while they assert that

that they preside over the city, and are careful that it may be the best possible, again accuse it, when it so happens, as the worst of cities? Do you think that these differ in any respect from those? O blessed man! a sophist and a rhetorician are the same, or they are something near and similar, as I and Polus have said. But you, through ignorance, think that rhetoric is something all-beautiful, and despise the sophistical art. In reality, however, the sophistical art is as much more beautiful than rhetoric, as the legislative than the judicial profession, and gymnastic than medicine. But I think public speakers and sophists alone ought not to complain that the thing which they teach is evil to themselves; or, if they do, that they must accuse themselves at the same time of not having in any respect benefited those whom they profess to have benefited. Is it not so?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. And, indeed, it will be proper to impart benefit to these alone, if they asserted what is true. For, if some one should receive any other benefit, as, for instance, the power of running swiftly, through the instructions of a master of gymnastic, perhaps he would be averse to recompense him, if the master of gymnastic benefited him without having made an agreement that he should be paid for his trouble as soon as he had enabled him to run swiftly. For men, I think, do not act unjustly through slowness, but through injustice. Or do they not?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. If, therefore, any one should take away this,—I mean injustice,—would it not follow, that there would be no occasion to fear lest he should suffer injustice; but that to him alone it would be safe to impart this benefit, if any one is in reality able to form good men? Is it not so?

CAL. I say so.

Soc. Hence, as it appears, there is nothing base in taking money for giving advice about other things, as, for instance, respecting building, or other arts.

CAL. So it appears.

Soc. But, with respect to this action,—I mean, how any one may be rendered the best of men, and may govern his own family, or the city, in the most excellent manner,—it is reckoned base to withhold advice, unless money is given to the adviser. Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. For it is evident that the reason is this: that, of all benefits, this alone renders him who is benefited desirous of making a recompense. So that it appears to be a beautiful sign, if he who imparts the benefit is in his turn benefited; but by no means if he is not. Are these things so, or not?

CAL. They are.

SOC. Define, therefore, to which mode of healing the maladies of a city you exhort me: whether to that of contending with the Athenians, that they may become the best of men, as if I were a physician; or to that by which I may minister to their wants, in order to obtain their favour. Tell me the truth, Callicles. For it is but just, that, as you began to speak to me freely, you should continue to impart your conceptions. And now speak well and generously.

CAL. I say, therefore, that I exhort you to act as ministrant to the city.

SOC. You exhort me, therefore, most generous man, to employ flattery.

CAL. Unless you had rather be the prey of the Myrians; which will be the case, if you do not act in this manner.

SOC. Do not say, what you often have said, that any one who is willing might slay me, lest I again should say, that an unworthy would slay a good man; nor yet that he might take away whatever I possessed, lest I also should again say, that after he has taken away my possessions he would not derive any advantage from them; but that, as he has unjustly deprived me of them, he will also, having received them, use them unjustly; and if unjustly, basely; and if basely, wickedly.

CAL. You appear to me, Socrates, to believe that you shall never suffer any of these things, as being one who lives at a distance, and that you shall never be brought before a court of justice by a man, perhaps, entirely depraved and vile.

SOC. I am therefore, O Callicles, in reality stupid, unless I think that any one in this city may suffer whatever may happen to take place. But this I well know, that if I was brought before a court of justice, and I should be in danger respecting any one of these particulars which you mention, he who brings me thither will be a depraved man. For no worthy man will bring one who is innocent before a court of justice. Nor would it be any thing wonderful,

wonderful, if in this case I should be condemned to death. Are you willing I should tell you why I should expect these things?

CAL. By all means.

SOC. I think that I, in conjunction with a few Athenians, (that I may not say alone,) apply myself to the true political art, and alone of those of the present day perform things political. As, therefore, the discourses which I make are not composed for the sake of popular favour, but with a view to that which is best, and not to that which is most pleasant,—and as I am not willing to do those elegant things which you now advise me to do,—I should not have any thing to say in a court of justice. But the same discourse occurs to me which I addressed to Polus. For I should be judged in the same manner as a physician would be judged among boys, when accused by a cook. For consider what would be the apology of such a man, when apprehended by these, if any one should accuse him, as follows: O boys, this man fabricates for you many evils, and corrupts both you and the youngest of you. For, by cutting, burning, emaciating, and almost suffocating you, he makes you desperate; and likewise by giving you the most bitter potions, and compelling you to be hungry and thirsty; not delighting you, as I do, with many pleasant and all-various dainties. What do you think the physician would have to say in such a bad situation? If he spoke the truth, would he not say, I have done all these things, boys, for the sake of health? But, upon this, in what manner do you think these judges would exclaim? Would they not loudly exclaim?

CAL. Perhaps it may be proper to think so.

SOC. Do you not think, therefore, that he would be perfectly at a loss what to say?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And I also know that I should be affected in the very same manner, on coming into a court of justice. For I should not be able to mention any pleasures which I had imparted to them, and which they consider as benefits and advantages. But I neither emulate those that impart them, nor those to whom they are imparted. And if any one should say that I corrupt young men, by causing them to doubt, or accuse elderly men, by employing bitter discourses, either privately or publicly, I should not be able to say that
which

which is the truth, that I assert and do all these things justly; and that it is your province, O judges, to act in this manner, and to do nothing else. So that, perhaps, I should suffer whatever might happen to be the consequence.

CAL. Does therefore, Socrates, that man appear to you to be in a good condition in a city who is thus circumstanced, and is unable to help himself?

SOC. He does, if he is in that condition, Callicles, which you have often allowed, viz. if he can assist himself, and has not either said or done any thing unjustly respecting men or Gods. For it has often been acknowledged by us, that this is the best aid which any one can impart to himself. If, therefore, any one can prove that I am incapable of affording this assistance either to myself or another, I shall be ashamed, whether I am convicted of this impotency before many, or a few, or alone, by myself alone. And if I should be punished with death on account of this impotency, I should be indignant. But if I should die through the want of adulatory rhetoric, I well know that you would behold me bearing death easily. For no one fears to die, who is not entirely irrational and effeminate: but he fears to act unjustly; since, for the soul to come to Hades full of unjust actions, is the extremity of all evils. But, if you please, I wish to show you by a certain narration that this is the case.

CAL. Since you have finished the other things which remained to be completed, finish this also.

SOC. Hear then, as they say, a very beautiful narration; which you indeed will, I think, consider as a fable; but I consider it as a relation of facts. For the particulars of the ensuing narration are true. As Homer says, then, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, divided¹ the government among themselves,
after

¹ The ineffable principle of things did not produce sensibles by his own *immediate* energy: for there would have been a privation of order, if we had been directly produced by the first cause. And, in the progression of things, the similar is always unfolded into subsistence prior to the dissimilar. By how much greater, therefore, one cause is than another, by so much does one effect surpass another. Hence, he who possesses science in a higher degree produces more illustrious disciples. It is necessary, therefore, that other powers greater than we are should be produced by the first cause, and thus that we afterwards should be generated from these: for we are the dregs of the universe. These mighty powers, from their surpassing similitude to the first God, were
very

after they had received it from their father. This law¹, therefore, respecting men subsisted under Saturn, and always was, and now is, established among the Gods,

very properly called by the antients Gods; and were considered by them as perpetually subsisting in the most admirable and profound union with each other, and the first cause; yet, so as amidst this union to preserve their own essence distinct from that of their ineffable cause.

But these mighty powers are called by the poets a *golden chain*, on account of their connection with each other, and incorruptible nature. One of these powers you may call *intellectual*; a second, *visific*; a third, *Pæonian*, and so on; which the antients desiring to signify to us by names, have symbolically denominated. Hence (says Olympiodorus, in MS. Comment. in Gorgiam) we ought not to be disturbed on hearing such names as a Saturnian power, the power of Jupiter, and such-like, but explore the things to which they allude. Thus, for instance, by a Saturnian power rooted in the first cause, understand a pure intellect: for Κρονος, or Saturn, is κρος νους, i. e. ὁ καθαρος, or, a *pure intellect*. Hence, those that are pure, and virgins, are called κραι. On this account, too, poets * say that Saturn devoured his children, and afterwards again sent them into the light, because intellect is converted to itself, seeks itself, and is itself sought: but he again refunds them, because intellect not only seeks and procreates, but produces into light and profits. On this account, too, he is called ἀγκυλομητις, or *inflected counsel*, because an inflected figure verges to itself. Again, as there is nothing disordered and novel in intellect, they represent Saturn as an old man, and as slow in his motion: and hence it is that astrologers say, that such as have Saturn well situated in their nativity are prudent, and ended with intellect.

Further still: the ancient theologists called life by the name of Jupiter, to whom they gave a twofold appellation, *δία* and *ζήνα*, signifying by these names that he gives *life through* himself. They also assert that the sun is drawn by four horses, and that he is perpetually young, signifying by this his power, which is motive of the whole of nature subject to his dominion, his fourfold conversions, and the vigour of his energies. But they say that the moon is drawn by two bulls: by *two*, on account of her increase and diminution; but by *bulls*, because, as these till the ground, so the moon governs all those parts which surround the earth.

Plato says, therefore, that Jupiter and Neptune distributed the government from Saturn; and since Plato does not fashion a political but a philosophical fable, he does not say, like the poets, that they received the kingdom of Saturn by violence, but that they divided it. What then are we to understand by receiving law from Saturn? We reply that law is the distribution of intellect; and we have before observed that Saturn signifies intellect. Hence law is thence derived.

Again, mundane natures, says Olympiodorus, are triple; for some are celestial, others terrestrial,

¹ Neither *was* nor *will be* can be asserted of a divine nature: for *was* is past, and no longer is, and *will be* is imperfect, and is not yet. But nothing of this kind can be conceived of Divinity. As, therefore, Plato introduces this as a fable, on this account he uses the term *was*; but since the fable is not poetic, but philosophic, he also introduces the word *always*.

* This is asserted by Hesiod in his Theogony.

Gods, viz. that the man who has passed through life in a just and holy manner, when he dies, departing to the islands of the blessed, shall dwell in all

reftrial, and others between these, viz. the fiery, aerial, aquatic. And of these, Jupiter possesses the celestial, Pluto the terrestrial, and Neptune those between. Again, through these things the powers presiding over these natures are signified. For Jupiter on this account has a sceptre, as signifying the judicial; but Neptune a trident, as presiding over the triple nature in the middle; and Pluto a helmet, on account of the obscure. For, as a helmet conceals the head, so this power (i. e. Pluto) belongs to things unapparent. Nor must it be thought that philosophers worship stones and images as things divine: but since, living according to sense, we are not able to arrive at an incorporeal and immaterial power, images are devised for the purpose of recalling to the memory divine natures; that, seeing and reverencing these, we may form a conception of incorporeal powers. This, therefore, is also said by the poets, that Jupiter mingling with Themis begot three daughters, Equity, Justice, and Peace. Equity, therefore, reigns in the inerratic sphere: for there the same motion subsists perpetually, and after the same manner, and nothing is there distributed. But Justice rules in the planetary spheres: for here there is a separation * of the stars; and where there is separation, there justice is necessary, that an harmonious distribution may be made according to desert. And Peace reigns over terrestrial natures, because contention is among these; and where there is contention, there peace is necessary. But there is a contention here of the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry. Hence they say that Ulysses wandered on the sea by the will of Neptune. For they signify by this, that the Odyssean life was neither terrestrial, nor yet celestial, but between these. Since, therefore, Neptune is the lord of the middle natures, on this account they say that Ulysses wandered through the will of Neptune, because he had the allotment of Neptune. Thus also they speak of the sons of Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, regarding the allotments of each. For we say that he who has a divine and celestial polity is the son of Jupiter; that he who has a terrestrial polity is the son of Pluto; and that he is the son of Neptune whose polity or allotment is between these. Again, Vulcan is a certain power presiding over bodies; and hence he says of himself in Homer:

All day I fell

because his attention to bodies is perpetual. On this account, also, he operates with bellowses (*εν φυσαις εργαζεται*) viz. in natures (*αντι του εν ταις φυσαις*). For this power leads forth nature to the care of bodies. Since, therefore, Plato makes mention here of the islands of the blessed, of punishment, and a prison, let us unfold what each of them is. Geographers then say that the islands of the blessed are about the ocean, and that souls depart thither that have lived well. This, however, is absurd, for souls thus would live a stormy life. What then shall we say? The solution is this: Philosophers assimilate the life of men to the sea, because it is turbulent, prolific, bitter, and laborious. But it is necessary to know that islands are raised above the sea, being more

* Viz. the planets are distributed into different spheres, and are not all of them contained in one sphere, like the fixed stars.

all felicity, removed from evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the prison of punishment and justice, which they call Tartarus. But the judges of these, during the reign of Saturn, and even recently, Jupiter possessing the government, were living judges of the living, judging on that very day on which any one happened to die. In consequence of this they judged badly. On this account, therefore, Pluto, and those to whom the care of the islands of the blessed was committed, went to Jupiter, and informed him that men came to them who were unworthy, whether they were accusers or the accused. But Jupiter said, I will prevent this in future. For now judgments are badly exercised; because those that are judged are judged clothed; for they are judged while living. Many, therefore, says he, whose souls are depraved are invested with beautiful bodies, are noble by birth, and rich; and when judgment of their conduct takes place, many witnesses appear in their behalf, testifying that they have lived justly. Hence the judges are astonished at these things, and are at the same time themselves clothed, while judging, as prior to their soul being concealed they have a veil before their eyes and ears, and the whole of their body¹. All these things, indeed, are placed before them, as well their own vestments

elevated. Hence, they call that polity which transcends the present life and generation, the islands of the blessed; and these are the same with the Elysian fields. On this account, also, Hercules accomplished his last labour in the Hesperian regions, signifying by this, that, having vanquished a dark and terrestrial life, he afterwards lived in day, that is, in truth and light.

Philosophers, then, are of opinion that the earth is cavernous, like a pumice stone, and that it is perforated as far as to its ultimate centre. They likewise think that about the centre there are different places, and certain fiery, cold, and Charonian powers, as the exhalations of the earth evince. The last place, therefore, is called Tartarus. Hence it is necessary to know that souls that have lived viciously remain in this place for a certain time, and are punished in their pneumatic vehicle: for those that have sinned through the sweetness of pleasure can only be purified by the bitterness of pain.

Again, souls that are hurled into Tartarus are no longer moved: for it is the centre of the earth, and there is not any place beneath it. For, if they were moved, they would again begin to ascend; since all beyond the centre is upwards. Hence, the prison is there of dæmons and terrestrial presiding powers: for by Cerberus, and things of this kind, they signify dæmoniacal powers.

¹ Such, says Olympiodorus, is the fable, which, agreeably to the nature of a fable, does not preserve *together* things which always subsist together, but divides them into prior and posterior. It also first speaks of the more imperfect, and afterwards of the perfect: for it is necessary to advance

vestments as the vestments of those that are judged. In the first place, therefore, says he, they must be deprived of the power of foreseeing death: for now they do foresee it. Hence, Prometheus¹ must be ordered to make this
faculty

vance from the imperfect to the perfect. When the fable, therefore, says that the judges were living judges of the living, judging on that very day in which any one happened to die, and that in consequence of this they judged badly; this signifies that we judge badly, but divine judges well. For they know who ought to be sent to Tartarus, and who to the islands of the blessed. The fable, therefore, looking to our judgment, and beginning from the imperfect, says that formerly they judged badly; but, proceeding to the perfect, it says that now they judge justly. Jupiter does not effect this from himself, but at the request of Pluto, because subordinate convert themselves to superior natures.

Again, let us show what is meant by the judges being formerly in bodies, but now naked. Here, therefore, again the fable divides, and calls us from the more imperfect to the perfect. It is necessary to know, therefore, that our life is obscurely signified by this, both in the present state of existence, and hereafter. For, in this life, both we and those that we judge are in bodies; and hence deception takes place. In consequence of this, from judging passively, we do not send to Tartarus a depraved character, as one who is miserable, but, on the contrary, to the islands of the blessed. But, in another life, both the judges and those that are judged are naked.

¹ *Prometheus*, says Olympiodorus, is the inspective guardian of the descent of rational souls: for to exert a *providential energy* is the employment of the rational soul, and, prior to any thing else, to know itself. Irrational natures, indeed, perceive through percussion, and prior to impulsion know nothing; but the rational nature is able, prior to information from another, to know what is useful. Hence, *Epimetheus* is the inspective guardian of the irrational soul, because it knows through percussion, and not prior to it. Prometheus, therefore, is that power which presides over the descent of rational souls. But *fire* signifies the rational soul itself; because, as fire tends upwards, so the rational soul pursues things on high. But you will say, Why is this fire said to have been stolen? Because that which is stolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is foreign. Since, therefore, the rational soul is sent from its proper place of abode on high, to earth, as to a foreign region, on this account the fire is said to be stolen. But why was it concealed in a reed? Because a reed is cavernous (*σπυργωδης*), and therefore signifies the flowing body (*το ρευστον σωμα*), in which the soul is carried. But why was the fire stolen, contrary to the will of Jupiter? Again, the fable speaks as a fable: for both Prometheus and Jupiter are willing that the soul should abide on high; but as it is requisite that she should descend, the fable fabricates particulars accommodated to the persons. And it represents, indeed, the superior character, which is Jupiter, as unwilling; for he wishes the soul always to abide on high: but the inferior character, Prometheus, obliges her to descend. Jupiter, therefore, ordered *Pandora* to be made. And what else is this than *the irrational soul**, which is of a feminine characteristic? For, as it was

* The reader must remember, that the true man, or the rational soul, consists of *intellect*, the *δianoētica* power, and *opinion*; but the summit of the irrational life is the *phantasy*, under which *desire*, like a many-headed savage beast, and *anger*, like a raging lion, subsist.

faculty in them cease: and afterwards they must be judged divested of all these things; for it is requisite that they should be judged when dead. It is likewise requisite that the judge should be naked and dead, speculating the soul itself, with the soul itself, every one dying suddenly, destitute of all his kindred, and leaving all that ornament on the earth, that the judgment may be just. I therefore having known these things before you, have made my sons judges; two indeed from Asia¹, Minos and Rhadamanthus; and one from Europe, Æacus. These then, after their death, shall judge in the meadow, in the highway, where two roads extend, the one to the islands of the blessed, and the other to Tartarus. And Rhadamanthus shall judge those from Asia, but Æacus those from Europe. But I will confer this additional dignity upon Minos, that he shall decide whatever may be inscrutable to the other judges, that the judgement respecting the path of men may be most just.

These are the things, O Callicles, which I have heard, and believe to be true: and from this narration I infer that a thing of the following kind must take place. Death, as it appears to me, is nothing else than the dissolution of two things, viz. of the soul and body from each other. But when

necessary that the soul should descend to these lower regions, but, being incorporeal and divine, it was impossible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium, hence she becomes united with it through the irrational soul. But this irrational soul was called Pandora, because each of the Gods bestowed on it some particular gift. And this signifies that the illuminations which terrestrial natures receive take place through the celestial bodies*.

¹ Asia is eastern, but Europe has a more western situation. But eastern parts are analogous to celestial natures, through light; but Europe through its curvature to terrestrial natures. Through these two, therefore, viz. Asia and Europe, a celestial and terrestrial polity are signified. There is also a middle polity, which Plato signifies through the doctrine of the extremes. For, having spoken of a celestial and terrestrial polity, he also manifests that which has a middle subsistence; just as above, having spoken of those that are sent to the islands of the blessed, and those that are hurled into Tartarus, he likewise manifests souls which are characterized by a middle life.

In the next place, in order to know what is meant by the meadow, and the roads in which they judge, it is necessary to observe that the ancients call generation moist, on account of its flowing nature, and because the mortal life flourishes here. The place of judgment, therefore, is said to be in æther, after the places under the moon, and this is called a meadow through its moisture and variety.

* For the irrational soul is an *immaterial body*, or, in other words, *vitalized extension*, such as the mathematical bodies which we frame in the phantasy; and the celestial bodies are of this kind.

they are mutually separated, each of them possesses its own habit, not much less than when the man was living; the body conspicuously retaining its own nature, attire, and passions. So that, for instance, if the body of any one while living was large by nature, or aliment, or from both, the body of such a one when dead will also be large; and if corpulent, it will be corpulent when dead; and so with respect to other things. And if any one while living was studious to obtain long hair, the hair also of the dead body of such a one will be long. Again, if any one while living had been whipped, and retained as vestiges of the blows in his body scars from scourges, or other wounds, his dead body also is seen to preserve the same marks. And if the limbs of any one were broken or distorted while he lived, these also will be conspicuous when he is dead. And, in short, whatever was the condition of the body of any one while living, such will be its condition entirely, or for the most part, for a certain time, when dead. The same thing also, Callicles, appears to me to take place respecting the soul; viz. that all things are conspicuous in the soul, after it is divested of body, as well whatever it possesses from nature¹, as those passions which the man acquired in his soul, from his various pursuits. When, therefore, they come to the judge², those from Asia to Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthus stopping them contemplates the soul of each, not knowing to whom it belongs; but often seizing the soul of the great king, or of any other king

¹ We must not think from this, says Olympiodorus, that vice is natural to the soul. For, since the soul is incorporeal and immortal, if it naturally possessed vice, vice also would be immortal; which is absurd. By the term *from nature*, therefore, Plato means the soul living in conjunction with things base; so that vice is as it were coessentialized with it, the soul becoming subservient to the temperaments of the body. The soul, therefore, suffers punishment for this, because, being in short self-motive, and connected with anger and desire, and certain corporeal temperaments, she does not harmonize these, and lead them to a better condition, by her self-motive power. For, as a physician very properly scourges him who has an ophthalmia, not because he labours under this disease, but because he has touched and agitated his eyes, and has not preserved the form enjoined by the physician; in like manner the demiurgus punishes souls, as not subduing by their self-motive power the passions which were imparted to them for their good: for it is necessary that they should be vanquished, and employed to a good and not to a bad purpose.

² Plato here presents us with a fable, but he does not suffer it to be poetical, but likewise adds demonstrations: for this is the peculiarity of philosophical fables. See the general Introduction to this work.

or potentate, he beholds nothing found in such a soul, but sees that it has been vehemently whipped, and that it is full of scars, through the perjuries and injustice impressed in it by its several actions; that all things in it are distorted¹ through falsehood and arrogance, and that nothing is right, in consequence of its having been educated without truth. He likewise sees that such a soul through power, luxury, and intemperate conduct, is full of inelegance and baseness. On seeing however a soul in this condition, he directly² sends it into custody with disgrace; whither when arrived, it will suffer

¹ For when the soul is defiled and wounded by the passions nothing in it is *straight*.

² Again, Olympiodorus observes as follows: It is necessary to know that souls which have moderately sinned, are punished but for a short time, and afterwards being purified ascend. But when I say they ascend, I do not mean locally, but vitally: for Plotinus says that the soul is elevated, not with feet, but by life. But souls that have committed the greatest crimes are *directly* sent to Tartarus; Plato using the word *εὐθύς*, *directly*, instead of *σφαιρίως*; a right line being the shortest of lines which have the same extremities. It is here however worth while to doubt why Plato says they are always judged, and are never purified. What then, is there never any cessation of their punishment? If however the soul is always punished, and never enjoys good, she is always in vice. But punishment regards some good. It is not proper, therefore, that the soul should always continue in a state contrary to nature, but that she should proceed to a condition according to nature. If, therefore, punishment does not in any respect benefit us, nor bring us to a better condition, it is inflicted in vain. Neither God, however, nor nature does any thing in vain.

What then are we to understand by the *ever*? We reply as follows: There are seven spheres, that of the moon, that of the sun, and those of the other planets; but the inerratic is the eighth sphere. The lunar sphere, therefore, makes a complete revolution more swiftly: for it is accomplished in thirty days. That of the sun is more slow: for it is accomplished in a year. That of Jupiter is still slower: for it is effected in twelve years. And much more that of Saturn; for it is completed in thirty years. The stars, therefore, are not conjoined with each other in their revolutions, except rarely. Thus, for instance, the sphere of Saturn and the sphere of Jupiter are conjoined with each other in their revolutions, in sixty years. For, if the sphere of Jupiter comes from the same to the same in twelve years, but that of Saturn in thirty years, it is evident that when Jupiter has made five, Saturn will have made two revolutions: for twice thirty is sixty, and so likewise is twelve times five; so that their revolutions will be conjoined in sixty years. Souls, therefore, are punished for such like periods. But the seven planetary spheres conjoin their revolutions with the inerratic sphere, through many myriads of years; and this is the period which Plato calls *τοὺς αἰῶνας ἄετι χρόνον*, *for ever*. Souls, therefore, that have been patricides or matricides, and universally souls of this description, are punished *for ever*, i. e. during this period. Should however some one say, If a soul that has been guilty of parricide should die to-day, and sixty months, or years, or days after, a conjunction of the revolutions of the seven planets with the inerratic sphere should take place,

for a man who has great power of acting unjustly, to pass through life justly. Yet there are a few men of this kind; for they have existed both here and elsewhere, and I think there will be hereafter worthy and good men, who will be endued with the virtue of administering justly things committed to their trust. A character of this kind, and of great celebrity among the other Greeks, was Aristides the son of Lyfimachus. But the greater part, O most excellent man, of potentates are bad men. As I said, therefore, after Rhadamanthus has taken any soul into his custody, he does not know any thing else respecting it, neither who it is, nor from whom it originated. But he only knows that it is a depraved soul; and seeing this, he sends it to Tartarus; signifying at the same time whether it appears to be curable or incurable. But the soul arriving thither suffers the punishments due to its offences. Sometimes, too, Rhadamanthus beholding the soul of one who has passed through life with truth, whether it is the soul of a private man, or of any other—but I say, Callicles, especially of a philosopher, who has transacted his own affairs, and has not been engaged in a multiplicity of concerns in life—when this is the case, Rhadamanthus is filled with admiration, and dismisses the soul to the islands of the blessed. The same things also are done by Æacus. And each of them judges, holding a rod¹ in his hand. But Minos, who is the inspector, is the only one that sits having a golden² sceptre, as the Ulysses of Homer³ says he saw him:

A golden sceptre in his hand he holds,
And laws promulgates to the dead.

I therefore, Callicles, am persuaded by these narrations, and consider how I may appear before my judge, with my soul in the most healthy condition. Wherefore, bidding farewell to the honours of the multitude, and looking to truth, I will endeavour to live in reality in the best manner I am able, and when I die to die so. I likewise call upon all other men, and you also I exhort to this life, and this contest, instead of that which you have adopted,

¹ By the *rod*, says Olympiodorus, the straight, and the equality of justice, are signified.

² Again, says Olympiodorus, the *sceptre* signifies equality, but *golden* the immaterial. For gold alone does not suit, to which all other material natures are subject.

³ *Od.* xi. ver. 755.

and

and which I say is to be preferred to all the contests here. And I upbraid you because you will not be able to assist yourself, when that judicial process shall take place of which I have just been speaking. But when you shall come before that judge who is the son of Ægina, and he laying hold of shall examine you, you will there yawn, and be seized with a giddiness, no less than I am here. Some one too, perhaps, will strike you ignominiously on the face, and treat you in a manner perfectly disgraceful. These things, however, perhaps appear to you to be nothing more than the tales of an old woman, and you accordingly despise them. Nor would it be at all wonderful that these things should indeed be despised by us, if by investigation we could find any thing better and more true. But now you three, who are the wisest of all the Greeks existing at present, viz. you, Polus, and Gorgias, see it cannot be shown that it is requisite to live any other life than this, which appears also to be advantageous hereafter. But among so many arguments, while others are confuted this alone remains unmoved, viz. that we ought to be more afraid of doing an injury than of being injured; and that a man ought more than any thing to endeavour not to appear to be good, but to be so in reality, both in private and public. Likewise, that if any one is in any respect vicious, he should be punished; and that this is the next good to the being just, viz. to become just, and to suffer through chastisement the punishment of guilt. And further, that all adulation, both respecting a man's self and others, and respecting a few and a many, is to be avoided; and that rhetoric, and every other action, is always to be employed with a view to the just. Being, therefore, persuaded by me, follow me to that place, whither when you arrive you will be happy, both when living and dead, as my discourse evinces. Suffer, too, any one to despise you as stupid, and to load you with disgrace if he pleases. And, by Jupiter, do you, being confident, permit him to strike this ignominious blow. For you will not suffer any thing dire, if you are in reality worthy and good, and cultivate virtue: and afterwards, when we have thus exercised ourselves in common, then, if it shall appear to be requisite, we will betake ourselves to political concerns, or deliberate on whatever we please, as we shall then be better qualified to deliberate than now. For it is shameful, in the condition we appear to be in at present, to boast of ourselves with juvenile audacity, as if we were some-

thing; we who are never unanimous about the same things, and things of the greatest consequence; at such a degree of unskilfulness have we arrived. Let us employ, therefore, as a leader, the reasoning which now presents itself to the view,—I mean, that which signifies to us that the best mode of life consists in cultivating justice and the other virtues. This, then, let us follow, and exhort others to the same, but not that, in which you confiding exhorted me: for it is, Callicles, of no worth.

THE END OF THE GORGIAS.

THE