THE PHÆDO:

A

DIALOGUE

ON

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHÆDO.

THE following dialogue is no leſs remarkable for the maſterly manner of its compoſition, than for the different effects which the peruſal of it is related to have formerly produced. For the arguments which it contains for the immortality of the ſoul, are ſaid to have incited Cleombrotus to ſuicide, and to have diſſuaded Olympiodorus, an eminent Platonic philoſopher, from its perpetration. Indeed, it is by no means wonderful that a perſon like Cleombrotus, ignorant (as his conduct evinces) that the death ſo much inculcated in this dialogue is a philoſophic, and not a natural death, ſhould be led to an action which is in moſt caſes highly criminal. This ignorance however is not peculiar to Cleombrotus, ſince I am afraid there are ſcarcely any of the preſent day who know that it is one thing for the ſoul to be ſeparated from the body, and another for the body to be ſeparated from the ſoul, and that the former is by no means a neceſſary conſequence of the latter.

This philoſophic death, or ſeparation of the ſoul from the body, which forms one of the moſt leading particulars of the dialogue, is no other than the exerciſe of the cathartic virtues, of which the reader will find a copious explanation in the following notes. That theſe virtues are not figments of the latter Platoniſts, as ſome ignorant verbaliſts have raſhly aſſerted, is not only evident from the firſt part of this dialogue, but from the Golden Pythagorean verſes, which are certainly of greater antiquity than even the writings of Plato: for the following is one of the precepts in theſe verſes—

Αλλ' ειργου βρωτων, ὡν ειπομεν, εν τε καθαρμοις,
Εν τε γυσει ψυχης κριτων·

i. e. "Abſtain

i. e. "Abſtain from the foods of which we have ſpoken in the PURIFICATIONS and SOLUTION of the ſoul." And the employment of cathartic virtue entirely conſiſts in *purifying* the ſoul and liberating it from all attachment to the body, as far as the condition of its union with it will permit.

Of the arguments adduced by Socrates in this dialogue, ſome, as will be ſhown in the notes, only demonſtrate that the ſoul ſubſiſted prior to, and will ſurvive the diſſolution of, the body, but do not prove that it has a *perpetual* exiſtence; but others demonſtrate, and with an invincible force, that the ſoul is *truly immortal*. Should it ſeem ſtrange, and to thoſe who are not deeply ſkilled in the philoſophy of Plato it doubtleſs will, that Socrates in no part of this dialogue introduces that argument for the immortality of the ſoul which he adopts in the Phædrus, an argument drawn from the rational ſoul being the origin of motion, and which may be ſaid to poſſeſs adamantine ſtrength,—it is neceſſary to obſerve, in anſwer to this doubt, that, in the Phædrus, Socrates demonſtrates the immortality of every rational ſoul, viz. the human, dæmoniacal and divine; but in the Phædo he alone demonſtrates the immortality of the human ſoul.

But though ſome of the arguments in this dialogue are perfectly demonſtrative, yet certain modern writers, from not underſtanding, have not only attempted to invalidate them, but have been induced to imagine that Socrates himſelf, convinced of their inſufficiency, inſinuates in the courſe of the dialogue the neceſſity of a divine revelation in order to obtain a full conviction of this moſt important truth. As this is an opinion no leſs dangerous than erroneous, I ſhall preſent the reader with the paſſage that gave occaſion to it, and then unfold to him from antient ſources its genuine explanation.

About the middle of this dialogue, then, Simmias obſerves as follows:—"As to myſelf, Socrates, I am perhaps of the ſame opinion about theſe particulars as yourſelf; that to know them clearly in the preſent life is either impoſſible, or a thing very difficult to obtain. But not to argue about what has been ſaid in every poſſible way, and to deſiſt before, by an arduous inveſtigation on all ſides, wearineſs is produced, can only take place among indolent and effeminate men. For it is neceſſary in things of this kind either to learn or to diſcover the manner of their ſubſiſtence; or, if both theſe are impoſſible, then by receiving the beſt of human reaſons, and that which is

the moſt difficult of confutation, to venture upon this as on a raft, and ſail in it through the ocean of life, unleſs ſome one ſhould be able to be carried more ſafely and with leſs danger by means of a firmer vehicle, or a certain *divine reaſon*." Here, in the firſt place, it muſt be obſerved, that it is Simmias who thus ſpeaks, an imperfect diſciple of his great maſter, as is evident from many parts of this dialogue, and not Socrates himſelf. And, in the next place, though it ſhould be urged that Socrates himſelf is here ſaid by Simmias to have admitted that "to know theſe particulars [1] clearly in the preſent life is either impoſſible or a thing very difficult to obtain," it muſt be obſerved, that Socrates thus ſpeaks from a deep conviction that this ſublime truth, the immortality of the ſoul, could not be fully comprehended by his auditors, who were very far from being maſters in philoſophy, and that this muſt be the caſe with the multitude in general. Hence, he ſays, it is either impoſſible or very difficult to obtain this knowledge.—To the *multitude* it is impoſſible, and to the *few* very difficult, becauſe it requires many preparatory diſciplines, and a genius naturally adapted to ſublime ſpeculations.

In the third place, by *a firmer vehicle, or a certain divine reaſon*, Socrates does not allude to a divine tradition, ſince this affords no higher evidence than that of opinion. It is well obſerved, therefore, by Olympiodorus, in his MS. Scholia on this dialogue, that by this θειος λογος, or *divine reaſon*, we muſt underſtand *ſelf-beholding intellect*, which, agreeably to Plato's deſcription of it in the Phædrus, aſſociates with Deity itſelf. Τις ὁ ασφαλεστερος, και ακινδυνοτερος, και βεβαιοτερος, και θειος λογος; ου δηπου ὡς φασιν ὁ θεοθεν εκδοθεις, δοξαστικος γαρ ὁ γε τοιουτος· αλλ' εστιν ὁ ειρημενος αυτοπτικος νους, ὁ θεῳ τῳ οντι συνων, ὡς εν Φαιδρῳ. In order however to underſtand what Olympiodorus means by *ſelf-beholding intellect*, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that there are four modes of knowledge which we are able to acquire in the preſent life. The firſt of theſe reſults from opinion, by which we learn *that* a thing is, without knowing *the why*: and this conſtitutes that part of knowledge which was called by Ariſtotle and Plato παιδεια, or erudition; and which conſiſts in moral inſtructions, for the purpoſe of purifying ourſelves from immoderate paſſions. But the ſecond is produced by the ſciences; in which, from eſtabliſhing certain principles as hypotheſes, we educe neceſſary concluſions, and arrive

[1] Viz. the particulars pertaining to the paſt and future exiſtence of the ſoul.

at the knowledge of *the why* (as in the mathematical ſciences); but at the ſame time we are ignorant with reſpect to the principles of theſe concluſions, becauſe they are merely hypothetical. The third ſpecies of knowledge is that which reſults from Plato's dialectic; in which, by a progreſſion through all ideas, we arrive at the firſt principle of things, and at that which is no longer hypothetical; and this by dividing ſome things and analyſing others, by producing many things from one thing, and one thing from many. But the fourth ſpecies is ſtill more ſimple than this; becauſe it no longer uſes analyſations or compoſitions, definitions or demonſtrations, but by a ſimple and ſelf-viſive energy of intellect ſpeculates things themſelves, and by intuition and contact becomes one with the object of its perception; and this energy is the *divine reaſon* which Plato ſpeaks of in the preſent paſſage, and which far tranſcends the evidence of the moſt divine revelation; ſince this laſt is at beſt but founded in opinion, while the former ſurpaſſes even the indubitable certainty of ſcience.

In ſhort, that Socrates, and conſequently Plato, firmly believed in this moſt important truth, is evident from the Phædrus and the tenth book of the Republic; and in the ſeventh Epiſtle of Plato there is the following remarkable paſſage:—πειθεσθαι δε ουτως αει χρη τοις παλαιοις τε και ἱεροις λογοις ἡ δη μηνυουσιν ἡμιν αθανατον ψυχην ειναι, δικαστας τε ισχειν, και τινειν τας μεγιστας τιμωριας, ὁταν τις απαλλαχθη του σωματος. i. e. "It is proper indeed always to believe in *antient and ſacred diſcourſes*, which announce to us that the ſoul is immortal, and that it has judges of its conduct, and ſuffers the greateſt puniſhments when it is liberated from the body." From which paſſage we alſo learn, that the immortality of the ſoul is a doctrine of the higheſt antiquity, and that it was delivered in the ſacred writings of the heathens.

I ſhall only obſerve further, that the character of Socrates, as exhibited in this dialogue, in the Crito, and in the Apology, is ſo tranſcendently great, and diſplays ſuch a perfection of juſtice, fortitude and piety, that it may be conſidered as a moſt ſplendid inſtance of the moral and intellectual excellence which human nature is capable of attaining, and an example of conſummate wiſdom and virtue, which will be imitated by the few in all future ages.

THE PHÆDO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

ECHECRATES AND PHÆDO.

ECHECRATES.

WERE you preſent, Phædo, with Socrates that day when he drank the poiſon in priſon? or did you hear an account of it from any other?

PHÆD. I myſelf, Echecrates, was preſent.

ECHEC. What then was his diſcourſe previous to his death? and how did he die? for I ſhould be very glad to hear the account: for ſcarcely does any one of the Phliaſian [1] citizens now viſit Athens; and it is ſome time ſince any ſtranger has arrived from thence who might afford us ſome clear information about theſe particulars. All indeed that we heard was, that he died through drinking the poiſon; but he who acquainted us with this had nothing further to ſay about other particulars of his death.

PHÆD. What! did you not hear the manner in which he was tried?

ECHEC. Yes: a certain perſon related this to us; and we wondered, as his ſentence was paſſed ſo long ago, that he ſhould not die till a conſiderable time after. What then, Phædo, was the reaſon of this?

PHÆD. A certain fortune happened to him, Echecrates: for, the day before his trial, the ſtern of that ſhip was crowned which the Athenians ſend every year to Delos.

ECHEC. But what is the meaning of this?

[1] Phlius was a city of Peloponneſus ſituated not far from the Iſthmus. Vid. Strab. lib. viii. Pauſan. in Corinth. et Steph. de Urb. et Pop.

PHÆD. This is the ſhip, as the Athenians ſay, in which Theſeus formerly carried the twice ſeven young children to Crete, and preſerved both them and himſelf. The Athenians, therefore, as it is reported, then vowed to Apollo, that if the children were preſerved, they would lead every year a ſacred ſpectacle to Delos; which, from that time, they regularly ſend every year to the God. As ſoon, therefore, as the preparations for the ſacred ſpectacle commence, the law orders that the city ſhall be purified, and that no one ſhall be put to death by a public decree till the ſhip has arrived at Delos, and again returned to Athens. But this ſometimes takes a long time in accompliſhing, when the winds impede their paſſage; but the feſtival itſelf commences when the prieſt of Apollo has crowned the ſtern of the ſhip. Now this, as I told you, took place on the day preceding the trial; and on this account that length of time happened to Socrates in priſon between his ſentence and his death.

ECHEC. And what, Phædo, were the circumſtances reſpecting his death? what were his ſayings and actions? and who of his familiars were preſent with him? or would not the magiſtrates ſuffer that any ſhould be admitted to him, ſo that he died deprived of the preſence of his friends?

PHÆD. By no means; but ſome, and indeed many, were preſent with him.

ECHEC. Endeavour to relate all theſe particulars to us in the cleareſt manner, unleſs you have ſome buſineſs which may prevent you.

PHÆD. But I am at leiſure, and will endeavour to gratify your requeſt: for indeed to call to mind Socrates, whether I myſelf ſpeak or hear others, is to me always the moſt pleaſant of all things.

ECHEC. Truly, Phædo, others who hear you will be affected in the ſame manner: but endeavour, as much as you are able, to narrate every circumſtance in the moſt accurate manner.

PHÆD. And indeed I myſelf, who was preſent, was wonderfully affected; for I was not influenced with pity, like one preſent at the death of a familiar: for this man, O Echecrates, appeared to me to be bleſſed, when I conſidered his manner and diſcourſes, and his intrepid and generous death. Hence it appeared to me, that he did not deſcend to Hades without a divine deſtiny, but that there alſo he would be in a happy condition, if this can ever be aſſerted of any one. On this account I was entirely uninfluenced with

with pity, though apparently I ought not to have been, on ſo mournful an occaſion; nor yet again was I influenced by pleaſure through philoſophical converſe, as I uſed to be; for our diſcourſes were of this kind. But, to ſpeak ingenuouſly, a certain wonderful paſſion, and an unuſual mixture of pleaſure and grief, were preſent with me, produced by conſidering that he muſt in a very ſhort time die. And, indeed, all of us who were preſent were nearly affected in the ſame manner, at one time laughing, and at another weeping: but this was eminently the caſe with one of us, Apollodorus; for you know the man, and his manner of behaviour.

ECHEC. How is it poſſible that I ſhould not?

PHÆD. He, therefore, was remarkably affected in this manner; and I myſelf, and others, experienced great trouble and confuſion.

ECHEC. Who then, Phædo, happened to be preſent?

PHÆD. Of the natives, Apollodorus, Critobulus, and his father Crito, were preſent; likewiſe Hermogenes, Epigenes, Æſchines, and Antiſthenes [1]. And beſides theſe, Cteſippus [2] the Pœanian, Menexenus, and ſome other Athenians were preſent: but Plato I think was ſick.

ECHEC. Were there no ſtrangers?

PHÆD. Yes: Simmias the Theban, Cebes [3], and Phædondes; and among the Megarenſians, Euclid and Terpſion.

ECHEC. But what! were not Ariſtippus [4] and Cleombrotus there?

PHÆD. By no means: for they were ſaid to be at Ægina.

ECHEC. Was any other perſon preſent?

PHÆD. I think thoſe I have mentioned were nearly all.

ECHEC. Will you now then relate what were his diſcourſes?

[1] This Antiſthenes, as principally imitating Socrates in his endurance and contempt of pleaſure, was the author of the Cynic ſect, and the preceptor of Diogenes.

[2] See the Euthydemus, in which the diſpoſition of Cteſippus is deſcribed.

[3] This Cebes is the author of the allegorical table now extant.

[4] A philoſopher of Cyrene, and founder of the Cyrenaic ſect. What is here ſaid concerning the abſence of Ariſtippus and Cleombrotus is well explained by Demetrius in his book περὶ Ἑρμηνείας. "Plato, he obſerves, ſays this in order to reprove Ariſtippus and Cleombrotus, who were feaſting in Ægina at the time that Socrates was in priſon, and did not fail to ſee their friend and maſter, though they were then at the entrance of the Athenian harbour. Plato however does not clearly relate theſe particulars, becauſe his narration would have been an open defamation."

PHÆD.

PHÆD. I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For we were always accuſtomed to viſit Socrates, myſelf and others meeting in the morning at the place where he was tried, for it was very near to the priſon. Here we waited every day till the priſon was opened, diſcourſing among ourſelves, for it was not opened very early in the morning; but, as ſoon as we could be admitted, we went to Socrates, and generally ſpent the whole day with him. And then, indeed, we met together ſooner than uſual; for the day before, when we left the priſon, we heard that the ſhip from Delos was returned. We determined, therefore, among ourſelves, to come very early in the morning to the uſual place; and we met together accordingly: but when we arrived, the goaler, who uſed to attend upon us, told us to wait, and not enter till he called us. For, ſays he, the eleven magiſtrates are now freeing Socrates from his bonds, and announcing to him that he muſt die to-day. But not long after this he returned, and ordered us to enter. When we entered, we found Socrates juſt freed from his fetters, but Xantippe (you know her) holding one of his children, and ſitting by him. As ſoon, therefore, as Xantippe ſaw us, ſhe began to lament in a moſt violent manner, and ſaid ſuch things as are uſual with women in affliction; and among the reſt, Socrates (ſays ſhe), this is the laſt time your friends will ſpeak to you, or you to them. But Socrates looking upon Crito, Crito (ſays he), let ſome one take her home. Upon which ſome of Crito's domeſtics led her away, beating herſelf, and weeping bitterly. But Socrates, ſitting upright on the bed, drew up his leg, and, ſtroking it with his hand, ſaid at the ſame time, What a wonderful thing is this, my friends, which men call *the pleaſant and agreeable!* and how admirably is it affected by nature towards that which appears to be its contrary, *the painful!* for they are unwilling to be preſent with us both together; and yet, if any perſon purſues and receives the one, he is almoſt always under a neceſſity of receiving the other, as if both of them depended from one ſummit. And it ſeems to me (ſays he), that if Æſop had perceived this he would have compoſed a fable from it, and would have informed us, that Divinity, being willing to reconcile contending natures, but not being able to accompliſh this deſign, conjoined their ſummits in a nature one and the ſame; and that hence it comes to paſs, that whoever partakes of the one is ſoon after connected

nected with the other. And this, as it appears, is the caſe with myſelf at preſent; for the pain which was before in my leg, through the bond, is now ſucceeded by a pleaſant ſenſation.

But here Cebes replying, ſaid, By Jupiter, Socrates, you have very opportunely cauſed me to recollect: for certain perſons have aſked me concerning thoſe poems which you compoſed, viz. the Fables of Æſop which you verſified, and your exordium to Apollo, and other pieces of compoſition; and, among the reſt, Evenus lately inquired with what deſign you did this after coming here, when before you have never attempted any thing of the kind. If, therefore, you have any deſire that I may have an anſwer ready for Evenus, when he again interrogates me on this occaſion (and I am certain that he will do ſo), tell me what I muſt ſay to him. You may truly inform him (ſays he), Cebes, that I did not compoſe theſe verſes with any deſign of rivalling him, or his poems (for I knew that this would be no eaſy matter); but that I might try to explore the meaning of certain dreams, and that I might make a proper expiation, if this ſhould happen to be the muſic which they have often ordered me to exerciſe. For in the paſt part of my life the ſame dream has often occurred to me, exhibiting at different times a different appearance, yet always adviſing me the ſame thing; for it ſaid, Socrates, make and exerciſe muſic. And indeed, in the former part of my life, I conſidered that this dream perſuaded and exhorted me reſpecting what I ſhould do, in the ſame manner as thoſe in the races are exhorted; for, by perſuading me to exerciſe muſic, it ſignified that I ſhould labour in philoſophy, which is the greateſt muſic. But now ſince my ſentence has taken place, and the feſtival of the God has retarded my death, it appeared to me to be neceſſary, that, if the muſic which the dream has ſo often exhorted me to undertake ſhould happen to be of the popular ſort, I ſhould by no means reſiſt its perſuaſions, but comply with the exhortation: for I conſidered that it would be more ſafe for me not to depart from hence before I had made an expiation by compoſing verſes, and obeying the dream. Thus, in the firſt place, I compoſed ſome verſes in honour of the God to whom the preſent feſtival belongs; but after the God, conſidering it neceſſary that he who deſigns to be a poet ſhould make fables and not diſcourſes, and knowing that I myſelf was not a mythologiſt, on theſe accounts I verſified the fables of

Æſop,

Æſop, which were at hand, and were known to me; and began with thoſe firſt, that firſt preſented themſelves to my view.

Give this anſwer, Cebes, to Evenus: at the ſame time bid him farewell for me; and tell him, if he is wiſe he will follow me. But I ſhall depart, as it ſeems, to-day; for ſuch are the orders of the Athenians.—Upon this Simmias replied, What is this, Socrates, which you command me to tell Evenus? for I often meet with him; and from what I know of him, I am certain that he will never willingly comply with your requeſt.—What then (ſays Socrates), is not Evenus a philoſopher?—To me he appears to be ſo (ſays Simmias).—Both Evenus, therefore, will be willing to follow me, and every one who is worthy to partake of philoſophy; not perhaps indeed by violently [1] depriving himſelf of life, for this they ſay is unlawful. And at the

[1] Socrates ſays, that perhaps the philoſopher will not deſtroy himſelf, for this is not lawful. This the text ſhows through two arguments, the one mythical and Orphic, but the other dialectic and philoſophic. But before we conſider the text, ſays Olympiodorus, let us ſhow by appropriate arguments that ſuicide is not lawful. Divinity poſſeſſes twofold powers, anagogic and providential; and the powers which are providential of things ſecondary are not impeded by the anagogic, and which are converted to them, but he energizes at once according to both. In like manner, nothing hinders but that a philoſopher, ſince he is an imitator of Divinity, (for philoſophy is an aſſimilation to Deity,) may at once energize cathartically, and with a providential care of ſecondary natures: for there is nothing great in living cathartically when ſeparated from the body after death; but, while detained in the body, it is generous to be intent on purification. The ſecond argument is this: As a divine nature is always preſent to all things, and ſome things participate of it more or leſs, through their proper aptitude or inaptitude; ſo alſo it is neceſſary that the ſoul ſhould be preſent to the body, and ſhould not ſeparate itſelf from it. But the body participates or does not participate of it, through its proper aptitude or inaptitude. Thus, in the Theætetus, the Coryphæan philoſopher is repreſented as not knowing where the Forum is ſituated, but as being even ignorant that he is ignorant of ſenſible particulars; and this while he is in the body. The third argument is as follows: It is neceſſary that a voluntary bond ſhould be voluntarily diſſolved; but that an involuntary bond ſhould be diſſolved with an involuntary ſolution, and not in a promiſcuous manner. Hence a phyſical life, being involuntary, muſt be diſſolved with an involuntary ſolution, i. e. by a phyſical death; but the impaſſioned life in us, which ſubſiſts according to preelection or free will, muſt be diſſolved with a voluntary ſolution, i. e. with purification, or the exerciſe of the cathartic virtues.

With reſpect to the text, it ſhows through two arguments, as we have obſerved, that ſuicide is not lawful; and of theſe the mythical argument, according to Olympiodorus, is as follows:—According to Orpheus, there are four governments: the firſt that of Heaven, which Saturn received, cutting

the ſame time, as he thus ſpoke, he withdrew his leg from the bed, and placed it on the ground; and afterwards continued to diſcourſe with us, in a ſitting poſture,

cutting off the genitals of his father. After Saturn, Jupiter reigned, who hurled his father into Tartarus. And after Jupiter Bacchus reigned, who they ſay was lacerated by the Titans, through the ſtratagems of Juno. It is alſo ſaid that the Titans taſted his fleſh, and that Jupiter being enraged hurled his thunder at them; and that from the aſhes of their burnt bodies men were generated *. Suicide, therefore, is not proper, not, as the text ſeems to ſay, becauſe we are in a certain bond the body, (for this is evident, and he would not have called this arcane,) but ſuicide is not lawful, becauſe our body is Dionyſiacal: for we are a part of Bacchus, if we are compoſed from the aſhes of the Titans who taſted his fleſh. Socrates, therefore, fearful of diſcloſing this arcane narration, becauſe it pertained to the myſteries, adds nothing more than that we are in the body, as in a priſon ſecured by a guard; but the interpreters, when the myſteries were declining, and almoſt extinct, owing to the eſtabliſhment of a new religion, openly diſcloſed the fable.

But the allegory of this fable, ſays Olympiodorus, is of that kind as when Empedocles aſſerts that the intelligible and ſenſible worlds were generated according to parts; not that they were produced at different times, for they always are, but becauſe our ſoul at one time lives according to the intelligible, and then the intelligible world is ſaid to be generated, and at another time according to the ſenſible world, and then the ſenſible world is ſaid to be generated. So likewiſe with Orpheus, thoſe four governments do not ſubſiſt at one time, and at another not, for they always are; but they obſcurely ſignify the gradations of the virtues according to which our ſoul contains the ſymbols of all the virtues, the theoretic and cathartic, the politic and ethic. For it either energizes according to the theoretic virtues, the paradigm of which is the government of Heaven, and on this account Heaven receives its denomination παρα του τα ανω ορᾶν, *from beholding the things above*; or it lives cathartically, the paradigm of which is the kingdom of Saturn, and on this account Saturn is denominated as *a pure intellect, through beholding himſelf*, οἱον ὁ κορονους τις ὢν διὰ το ἑαυτον ορᾶν; and hence he is ſaid to devour his own offſpring, as converting himſelf to himſelf: or it energizes according to the political virtues, the ſymbol of which is the government of Jupiter; and hence Jupiter is the demiurgus, as energizing about ſecondary natures: or it lives according to the ethical and phyſical virtues, the ſymbol of which is the kingdom of Bacchus; and hence it is lacerated, becauſe the virtues do not alternately follow each other.

But Bacchus being lacerated by the Titans ſignifies his proceſſion to the laſt of things; for of theſe the Titans are the artificers, and Bacchus is the monad of the Titans. This was effected by the ſtratagems of Juno, becauſe this goddeſs is the inſpective guardian of motion and progreſſion; and hence, in the Iliad, ſhe continually excites Jupiter to a providential attention to ſecondary

* Παρα τῳ Ορφει τεσσαρες βασιλειαι παραδιδονται. πρωτη μεν ἡ του Ουρανου, ην ὁ Κρονος διεδεξατο εκτεμων τα αἰδοια του πατερος. μετα δε τον Κρονον ὁ Ζευς εβασιλευσε καταπαρταξας τον πατερα. επειτα τον Δια διεδεξατο ὁ Διονυσος, ὀν φασι κατ' επιβουλην της Ἡρας τους περι αυτον Τιτανας σπαραττειν, και των σαρκων αυτου απογευεσθαι· και τουτους οργισθεις ὁ Ζευς εκεραυνωσε, και εκ της αἰθαλης των ατμων των αναδοθεντων εξ αυτων ὑλης γενομενης γενεσθαι τους ανθρωπους.

poſture, the remaining part of the time. Cebes [1], therefore, inquired of him, How is this to be underſtood, Socrates, that it is not lawful to commit ſuicide,

[1] Socrates and Cebes are here ſpeaking about two different kinds of death; the latter about a phyſical, and the former about a pre-elective or free-will death.

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natures. Bacchus alſo, ſays Olympiodorus, preſides over generation, becauſe he preſides over life and death. Over life, becauſe over generation; but over death, becauſe wine produces an enthuſiaſtic energy, and at the time of death we become more enthuſiaſtic, as Proclus teſtifies together with Homer; for he became prophetic when he was dying. Tragedy and comedy alſo are referred to Bacchus; comedy from its being the ſport of life, and tragedy through the calamities and the death in it. Comic, therefore, do not properly accuſe tragic writers as not being Dionyſiacal, when they aſſert that theſe things do not pertain to Bacchus. But Jupiter hurled his thunder at the Titans, the thunder manifeſting converſion: for fire moves upwards. Jupiter, therefore, converts them to himſelf. And this is the mythical argument.

But the dialectic and philoſophic argument is as follows:—The Gods take care of us, and we are their poſſeſſions: it is not proper, therefore, to free ourſelves from life, but we ought to convert ourſelves to them. For if one of theſe two things took place, either that we are the poſſeſſions of the Gods, but they take no care of us; or, on the contrary, that we are not the poſſeſſions of the Gods, it might be rational to liberate ourſelves from the body: but now, as neither of theſe takes place, it is not proper to diſſolve our bonds.

On the contrary, however, it may be ſaid that ſuicide according to Plato is neceſſary. And, in the firſt place, he here ſays that a philoſopher will not *perhaps* commit ſuicide, unleſs Divinity ſends ſome great neceſſity, ſuch as the preſent: for the word *perhaps* affords a ſuſpicion that ſuicide may *ſometimes* be neceſſary. In the ſecond place, Plato admits that ſuicide may be proper to the worthy man, to him of a middle character, and to the multitude and depraved: to the worthy man, as in this place; to the middle character, as in the Republic, where he ſays that ſuicide is neceſſary to him who is afflicted with a long and incurable diſeaſe, as ſuch a one is uſeleſs to the city, becauſe Plato's intention was that his citizens ſhould be uſeful to the city, and not to themſelves; and to the vulgar character, as in the Laws, when he ſays that ſuicide is neceſſary to him who is poſſeſſed with certain incurable paſſions, ſuch as being in love with his mother, ſacrilege, or any thing elſe of this kind.

Again it may be ſaid, from the authority of Plotinus, that ſuicide is ſometimes neceſſary, and alſo from the authority of the Stoics, who ſaid that there were five ways in which ſuicide was rational. For they aſſimilated, ſays Olympiodorus, life to a banquet, and aſſerted that it is neceſſary to diſſolve life through ſuch-like cauſes as occaſion the diſſolution of a banquet. A banquet, therefore, is diſſolved either through a great neceſſity unexpectedly intervening, as through the preſence of a friend ſuddenly coming; or it is diſſolved through intoxication taking place; and through what is placed on the table being morbid. Further ſtill, it is diſſolved after another manner through a want of things neceſſary to the entertainment; and alſo through obſcene and baſe language. In like manner life may be diſſolved in five ways. And, in the firſt place,

ſuicide, and yet that a philoſopher ſhould be willing to follow one who is about to die?—What (ſays he), Cebes, have not you and Simmias heard your familiar Philolaus [1] diſcourſe concerning things of this kind?—We have

place, as at a banquet, it may be diſſolved through ſome great neceſſity, as when a man ſacrifices himſelf for the good of his country. In the ſecond place, as a banquet is diſſolved through intoxication, ſo likewiſe it is neceſſary to diſſolve life through a delirium following the body: for a delirium is a phyſical intoxication. In the third place, as a banquet is diſſolved through what is placed on the table being morbid, thus too it is neceſſary that life ſhould be diſſolved when the body labours under incurable diſeaſes, and is no longer capable of being miniſtrant to the ſoul. In the fourth place, as a banquet it diſſolved through a want of things neceſſary to the entertainment, ſo ſuicide is proper when the neceſſaries of life are wanting. For they are not to be received from depraved characters; ſince gifts from the defiled are ſmall, and it is not proper for a man to pollute himſelf with theſe. And, in the fifth place, as a banquet is diſſolved through obſcene language, ſo likewiſe it is neceſſary to diſſolve life when compelled by a tyrant to ſpeak things arcane, or belonging to the myſteries, which a certain female Pythagorean is ſaid to have done. For, being compelled to tell why ſhe did not eat beans, ſhe ſaid, I may eat them if I tell. And afterwards being compelled to eat them, ſhe ſaid, I may tell if I eat them; and at length bit off her tongue, as the organ of ſpeech and taſte.

What then ſhall we ſay? for the diſcourſe is brought to a contradiction. And how can it be admitted that ſuicide is unlawful? Or, may we not ſay that a liberation from life is not neceſſary ſo far as pertains to the body; but that it is rational when it contributes a greater good to the ſoul? Thus, for inſtance, ſuicide is lawful when the ſoul is injured by the body. As, therefore, it is unholy not to give aſſiſtance to a friend when he is ſcourged, but, if he is ſcourged by his father, it is not becoming to aſſiſt him; ſo here ſuicide is unlawful when committed for the ſake of the body, but rational when committed for the ſake of the ſoul; ſince this is ſometimes advantageous to it.

I only add, that according to Macrobius it is ſaid, in the arcane diſcourſes concerning the return of the ſoul, "that the wicked in this life reſemble thoſe who fall upon ſmooth ground, and who cannot riſe again without difficulty; but that ſouls departing from the preſent life with the defilements of guilt are to be compared to thoſe who fall from a lofty and precipitous place, from whence they are never able to riſe again." "Nam in arcanis de animæ reditu diſputationibus fertur, in hac vita delinquentes ſimiles eſſe ſuper æquale ſolum cadentibus, quibus denuo ſine difficultate præſto ſit ſurgere: animas vero ex hac vita cum delictorum ſordibus recedentes, æquandas his, qui in abruptum ex alto præcipitique delapſi ſunt, unde facultas nunquam ſit reſurgendi. Somn. Scip. cap. xiii. Suicide, therefore, is in general unlawful, becauſe it is not proper to depart from life in an unpurified ſtate.

[1] Philolaus, ſays Olympiodorus, was a Pythagorean, and it was uſual with the Pythagoreans to ſpeak through ænigmas. Hence ſilence was one of the peculiarities of this ſect; through ſilence indicating the arcane nature of Divinity, which it is neceſſary a philoſopher ſhould imitate. But Philolaus ſaid in ænigmas that ſuicide is not proper: for he ſays, we ought not to turn

have not, Socrates, heard any thing clearly on this ſubject.—But I (ſays Socrates) ſpeak in conſequence of having heard; and what I have heard I will not enviouſly conceal from you. And perhaps it is becoming in the moſt eminent degree, that he who is about to depart thither ſhould conſider and mythologize about this departure: I mean, what kind of a thing we ſhould think it to be. For what elſe can ſuch a one be more properly employed about, till the ſetting [1] of the ſun?

On what account then, Socrates, ſays Cebes, do they ſay that it is unlawful for a man to kill himſelf? for I myſelf have ſome time ſince heard from Philolaus, when he reſided with us, and from ſome others, that it was not proper to commit ſuch an action; but I never heard any thing clear upon the ſubject from any one.—Prepare yourſelf, then (ſays Socrates), for perhaps you may be ſatisfied in this particular: and perhaps it may appear to you wonderful, if this alone of everything elſe is ſomething ſimple, and by no means happens to a man like other events, but ſtill remains the ſame, even with reſpect to thoſe to whom it is better to die than to live; though,

back when going to a temple, nor cut wood in the way. By the latter of theſe he manifeſts that we ſhould not divide and cut life; for life is a way: and by the former he indicates the meditation of death. For the life of a future ſtate is ſacred; ſince our father and country are there. He ſays, therefore, that he who lives cathartically ſhould not turn back, i. e. ſhould not cut off the cathartic life. But Cebes met with Philolaus in Bœotia; for he aſſociated with him in Thebes. Olympiodorus alſo, after obſerving that it was the cuſtom of the Pythagoreans to live as in a common life, making all their poſſeſſions common, adds as follows:—"If, therefore, any one among them was found to be unadapted to philoſophy, they led him out together with his property, made a cenotaph or empty tomb, and lamented as if it were for one who was going a journey. But a certain perſon named Cylo coming among them, and experiencing this treatment, ſet fire to the ſchool, and all the diſciples were burnt except two, Philolaus and Hipparchus. Philolaus, therefore, came to Thebes in order to perform funeral ſacrifices to his deceaſed preceptor. He alſo performed them to Lyſias, who was there buried, and in whoſe name Plato has written a dialogue, which is inſcribed, Lyſias, or Concerning Friendſhip." Ει τις ουν ανεπιτηδειος ευρεθη προς φιλοσοφιαν, εξηγου αυτον μετα της ουσιας, και κενοταφιον εποιουν, και ωσπερ περι αποιχομενον αποδυροντο. Κυλων δε τις εισελθων και πεπονθως τουτο υφηψε πυρ τω διδασκαλειω, και παντες εκαυθησαν πλην δυο Φιλολαου και Ιππαρχου. ηλθεν ουν ὁ Φιλολαος εις Θηβας αφειλον χρεας τω οικειω διδασκαλω τεθνεοτι, και εκει τεθαμμενω ποιησασθαι τω Λυσιδι, ου και κατα ομωνυμιαν γεγραπται την Πλατωνι διαλογος, Λυσις ἡ Περι φιλιας.

[1] It was a law, ſays Olympiodorus, with the Athenians, to put no one to death in the day, juſt as it was an injunction with the Pythagoreans, not to ſleep in mid-day, when the ſun exhibits his moſt ſtrenuous energy.

perhaps,

perhaps, it may ſeem wonderful to you, that it ſhould be better for thoſe men to die, in whom it would be unholy to benefit themſelves by ſuicide, and who ought to expect ſome other, as a benefactor on this occaſion.—Then Cebes, gently laughing, Jupiter knows that (ſays he, ſpeaking in his own tongue).—For this indeed (ſays Socrates) appears to be irrational; and yet, perhaps, it is not ſo, but has a certain reaſon on its ſide. For the diſcourſe which is delivered about theſe particulars, in the arcana of the myſteries, *that we are placed as in a certain priſon ſecured by a guard, and that it is not proper for any one to free himſelf from this confinement, and make his eſcape*, appears to me to be an aſſertion of great moment, and not eaſy to be underſtood. But this appears to me, O Cebes, to be well ſaid, that the Gods take care of us, and that we who are men are one of the poſſeſſions belonging to the Gods. Or does not this appear to you to be the caſe?—It does to me (ſays Cebes).—Would not you, therefore, if any one of your ſervants [1] ſhould deſtroy himſelf, when at the ſame time you did not ſignify that you was willing he ſhould die, would you not be angry with him? and if you had any puniſhment, would you not chaſtiſe him?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—*Perhaps*, therefore, it is not irrational to aſſert, that a man ought not to kill himſelf before Divinity lays him under a certain neceſſity [2] of doing ſo, ſuch as I am ſubject to at preſent.

This, indeed (ſays Cebes), appears to be reaſonable. But that which you ſaid juſt now, Socrates, that philoſophers would very readily be willing to die, appears to be abſurd, if what we have aſſerted is agreeable to reaſon,

[1] How from human affairs, ſays Olympiodorus, do we conjecture that things pertaining to the Gods ſubſiſt in a ſimilar manner? For they are not like us, paſſive. May we not ſay that he aſſimilates them analogouſly, but politically and œconomically? For it is evident that the paradigms of every mundane providential care are previouſly comprehended in the Gods. But reconciliation and vengeance muſt be conceived to take place in a very different manner in the Gods. For the former is the riſing of their proper light when the darkneſs of guilt is diſperſed; and the latter is a ſecondary puniſhing providence, about the apoſtatizing ſoul.

[2] Neceſſity is four-fold: for one kind is internal, and the other external; and each of theſe is twofold, viz. good and evil. But the paradigms of that which is inwardly good are the will of Divinity, and that of the juſt man; and of that which is inwardly evil, the pre-election of the depraved man. But of that neceſſity which is externally good, the paradigm is the will of Fate imparting precedaneous goods; and of that which is externally evil, the beſtowing of things violent, contrary to nature, and corruptive.

that Divinity [1] takes care of us, and that we are one of his poſſeſſions; for it is irrational to ſuppoſe that the moſt prudent men ſhould not be grieved, when departing from that ſervitude in which they are taken care of by the Gods, who are the beſt of govenors. For ſuch a one will by no means think that he ſhall be better taken care of when he becomes free: but ſome one who is deprived of intellect may perhaps think that he ſhould fly from his maſter, and will not conſider that he ought not to fly from a good maſter, but that he ſhould by all means abide in his ſervice. Hence he will depart from him in a moſt irrational manner: but he who is endowed with intellect will deſire to live perpetually with one who is better than himſelf. And thus, Socrates, it is reaſonable that the contrary of what you juſt now ſaid ſhould take place: for it is proper that the prudent, when about to die, ſhould be ſorrowful, but that the fooliſh ſhould rejoice.—Socrates, therefore, upon hearing this, ſeemed mè to be pleaſed with the reaſoning of Cebes; and loking upon us, Cebes (ſays he) never ſuffers any thing to paſs without inveſtigation, and is by no means willing to admit immediately the truth of an aſſertion.—But indeed (ſays Simmias), Cebes, O Socrates, appears to me to ſay ſomething now to the purpoſe. For with what deſign can men, truly wiſe, fly from maſters who are better than themſelves, and, without any

[1] Every thing naturally provides for things ſubordinate; but the Gods exert a providential energy prior to all things, and according to hyparxis. For each is *a goodneſs*, becauſe the higheſt God is *the good*, and providence is the energy of goodneſs, and imparts eſſential good. Divinity too may be ſaid to take care of man, becauſe from being worſe he makes him better; but man cultivates Divinity becauſe he is made better by him. Obſerve too, that as, in the univerſe, intellect ſubſiſting after the Gods is firſt converted to them, ſo likewiſe in us *intellect* is extended to Divinity, but *ignorance* turns from a divine nature. By intellect, however, here, we muſt underſtand, not that alone which is gnoſtic, but alſo that which is orectic or appetitive, both in the univerſe and in us: for intellect poſſeſſes both deſire and knowledge, becauſe it is the firſt animal. This being admitted, we ſhall no longer be diſturbed by the doubt, whether orectic is better than gnoſtic perfection; or, in other words, whether virtue is better than ſcience: for the one is not perfect without the other.

Should it be inquired how the Gods are our maſters, ſince a *maſter*, ſo far as a maſter, does not conſider the good of his ſervant, but his own good; for in this he differs from a *governor*; and ſhould it alſo be ſaid, What good can the Gods derive from man? we reply with Olympiodorus, that the Gods make all things precedaneouſly on account of themſelves; and that they are excellent in proportion as they are exempt from other things. But they *govern* according to a certain coordination with us; and by how much the more we ſubject ourſelves to, by ſo much the more do we participate of them, as wholly giving ourſelves up to them, and neglecting that which is properly our own.

reluctance,

reluctance, free themſelves from their ſervitude? And Cebes appears to me to direct his diſcourſe to you, becauſe you ſo eaſily endure to leave us, and thoſe beneficent rulers the Gods, as you yourſelf confeſs.—You ſpeak juſtly (ſays Socrates); for I think you mean that I ought to make my defence, as if I was upon my trial.—By all means, ſays Simmias.

Be it ſo then (ſays Socrates): and I ſhall endeavour that this my apology may appear more reaſonable to you than it did to my judges. For, with reſpect to myſelf (ſays he), O Simmias and Cebes, unleſs I thought that I ſhould depart, in the firſt place, to other [1] Gods who are wiſe and good, and, in the next place, to men who have migrated from the preſent life, and are better than any among us, it would be unjuſt not to be troubled at death: but now believe for certain, that I hope to dwell with good men; though this, indeed, I will not confidently aſſert: but that I ſhall go to Gods who are perfectly good rulers, you may conſider as an aſſertion which, if any thing of the kind is ſo, will be ſtrenuouſly affirmed by me. So that, on this account, I ſhall not be afflicted at dying, but ſhall entertain a good hope that ſomething remains for the dead; and, as it was formerly ſaid, that it will be much better hereafter for the good than the evil.—What then, Socrates (ſays Simmias), would you have departed with ſuch a conception in your intellect, without communicating it to us? Or will you not render us alſo partakers of it? For it appears to me, that this will be a common good; and at the ſame time it will be an apology for you, if you can perſuade us to believe what you ſay.—I will endeavour to do ſo (ſays he). But let us firſt conſider what that is which it appears to me Crito ſome time ſince was deſirous of ſaying. What elſe (ſays Crito) ſhould it be, Socrates, except what he who is to give you the poiſon has long ago told me, that you ought to ſpeak as little as poſſible? For he ſays that thoſe who diſpute become too much heated, and that nothing of this kind ought to be introduced with the poiſon, ſince thoſe who do not obſerve this caution are ſometimes obliged to drink the poiſon twice or thrice.—Let him (ſays Socrates) only take care of his proper employment, as one who muſt adminiſter the poiſon twice; and even, if occaſion requires, thrice. I was almoſt certain

[1] By *other Gods*, Socrates means ſuch as are ſupermundane, or of an order ſuperior to the ruling divinities of the world. In ſhort, thoſe Gods are here ſignified that are unconnected with body.

(ſays Crito) that this would be your anſwer; but he enjoined me to do this, as I ſaid, ſome time ſince. Permit him to do ſo (ſays Socrates); but I am deſirous of rendering to you, as my judges, the reaſon, as it appears to me, why a man who has truly paſſed his life in the exerciſe of philoſophy ſhould with great propriety be confident when about to die, and ſhould poſſeſs good hopes of obtaining the greateſt advantages after death; and in what manner this takes place I will endeavour, Simmias and Cebes, to explain:

Thoſe who are converſant with philoſophy in a proper manner, ſeem to have concealed from others that the whole of their ſtudy is nothing elſe than how to die and be dead [1]. If this then is true, it would certainly be abſurd, that thoſe who have made this alone their ſtudy through the whole of life, ſhould when it arrives be afflicted at a circumſtance upon which they have before beſtowed all their attention and labour. But here Simmias laughing, By Jupiter (ſays he), Socrates, you cauſe me to laugh, though I am very far from deſiring to do ſo at preſent: for I think that the multitude, if they heard this, would conſider it as well ſaid reſpecting philoſophers; and that men of the preſent day would perfectly agree with you, that philoſophers ſhould in reality deſire death, and that they are by no means ignorant that men of this deſcription deſerve to ſuffer death. And indeed, Simmias, they would ſpeak the truth, except in aſſerting that they are not ignorant of it: for both the manner in which true philoſophers deſire to die, and how they are worthy of death, is concealed from them. But let us bid farewell to ſuch as theſe (ſays he), and diſcourſe among ourſelves: and to begin, Do you think that death is any thing? Simmias replied, Entirely ſo. Is it any thing elſe than a liberation of ſoul from body? and is not this to die [2], for the body to be liberated from the ſoul, and to ſubſiſt apart by itſelf? and likewiſe for the ſoul to be liberated from the body, and to be eſſentially

[1] It is well obſerved by Olympiodorus, that *to die* (αποθνησκειν) differs from *to be dead* (τεθναναι). For the cathartic philoſopher *dies* in conſequence of meditating death; but the theoretic philoſopher is *dead*, in conſequence of being ſeparated from the paſſions.

[2] Plato beautifully defines death to be a ſeparation of the body from the ſoul, and of the ſoul from the body. For, with reſpect to ſouls that are enamoured with body, the body is indeed ſeparated from the ſoul, but not the ſoul from the body, becauſe it is yet conjoined with it through habitude or alliance, from which thoſe ſhadowy phantaſms are produced that wander about ſepulchres.

ſeparate?

ſeparate? Is death any thing elſe but this?—It is no other (ſays Simmias).—Conſider then, excellent man, whether the ſame things appear to you as to me; for from hence I think we ſhall underſtand better the ſubjects of our inveſtigation. Does it appear to you that the philoſopher is a man who is anxiouſly concerned about things which are called pleaſures, ſuch as meats and drinks?—In the ſmalleſt degree, Socrates (ſays Simmias).—But what, is he ſedulouſly employed in venereal concerns?—By no means.—Or does ſuch a man appear to you to eſteem other particulars which regard the obſervance of the body, ſuch as the acquiſition of excellent garments and ſandals, and other ornaments of the body? whether does he appear to you to eſteem or deſpiſe ſuch particulars, employing them only ſo far as an abundant neceſſity requires?—A true philoſopher (ſays Simmias) appears to me to be one who will deſpiſe every thing of this kind.—Does it, therefore, appear to you (ſays Socrates), that the whole employment of ſuch a one will not conſiſt in things which regard the body, but in ſeparating himſelf from the body as much as poſſible, and in converting himſelf to his ſoul?—It does appear ſo to me.—Is it not, therefore, firſt of all evident, in things of this kind, that a philoſopher, in a manner far ſurpaſſing other men, ſeparates his ſoul in the higheſt degree from communion with the body?—It appears ſo.—And to *the many*, O Simmias, it appears that he who accounts nothing of this kind pleaſant, and who does not partake of them, is not worthy to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who is not concerned about the pleaſures which ſubſiſt through the body.—You entirely ſpeak the truth.

But what with reſpect to the acquiſition[1] of wiſdom? Is the body an impediment

[1] Socrates having ſhown from *life* that the philoſopher is willing to die, now proves this from *knowledge* as follows:—The philoſopher deſpiſes the ſenſes: he who does this deſpiſes alſo the body, in which the ſenſes reſide: he who deſpiſes the body is averſe to it: he who is averſe to it ſeparates himſelf from the body: and he who ſeparates himſelf from the body is willing to die; for death is nothing elſe than a ſeparation of the ſoul from the body.

But it is here neceſſary to obſerve, that there are three energies of the ſoul: for it either converts itſelf to things ſubordinate, and acquires a knowledge of ſenſibles; or it converts itſelf to itſelf, and ſees all things in itſelf, becauſe it is an omniform image containing the reaſons of all things; or it extends itſelf to the intelligible, and beholds ideas. As there are, therefore, three energies of the ſoul, we muſt not ſuppoſe that the politic, cathartic and theoretic characters differ from each other in this, that the political character knows ſenſibles; the cathartic, the reaſons in the

impediment or not, if any one aſſociates it in the inveſtigation of wiſdom? What I mean is this: Have ſight and hearing in men any truth[1]? or is the caſe ſuch as the poets perpetually ſing, that

"We nothing accurate or ſee or hear?"

Though if theſe corporeal ſenſes are neither accurate nor clear, by no means can the reſt be ſo: for all the others are in a certain reſpect more depraved than theſe. Or does it not appear ſo to you?—Entirely ſo, ſays he.—When then does the ſoul touch upon the truth? for, when it endeavours to conſider any thing in conjunction with the body, it is evidently then deceived by the body.—You ſpeak the truth.—Muſt not, therefore, ſomething of reality become manifeſt to the ſoul, in the energy of reaſoning, if this is ever the caſe?—It muſt.—But the ſoul then reaſons in the moſt beautiful manner, when it is diſturbed by nothing belonging to the body, neither by hearing, nor ſight, nor pain, nor any pleaſure, but ſubſiſts in the moſt eminent degree, itſelf by itſelf, bidding farewell to the body, and, as much as poſſible neither communicating nor being in contact with it, extends itſelf towards real being.—Theſe things are ſo.—Does not the ſoul of a philoſopher, therefore, in theſe employments, deſpiſe the body in the moſt eminent

ſoul; and the theoretic, ideas—ſince no one is in reality a philoſopher who has not a knowledge of all things: but they differ in this, that the political philoſopher is converſant with pleaſures and pains; for he attends to the body as an inſtrument, and his end is not a privation, but a moderation of the paſſions. But the cathartic and theoretic philoſophers attend to the body as a neighbouring trifle, that it may not become an impediment to their energies; and the end with them is a liberation from the paſſions.

[1] Plato ſays that there is no truth in the ſenſes, becauſe they do not properly know: for paſſion is mingled with their knowledge, in conſequence of being obtained through media. For intellect is ſaid to know accurately, becauſe that which underſtands is the ſame with the intelligible, or the object of intellection. Beſides, ſenſe cannot ſuſtain the accuracy of ſenſibles. Thus, for inſtance, the eye cannot bear to look at that which is white in the extreme. For ſenſible objects, when they are tranſcendent, deſtroy the ſenſes. Senſe, however, may be ſaid to be always true and accurate when it is compared with aſſimilative knowledge, ſuch as that of images in mirrors. When, therefore, ſenſe is ſaid, as it is by Ariſtotle, to be the principle of ſcience, it muſt not be conſidered as the producing principle, but as agitating the ſoul to a recollection of univerſals, and as performing the office of a meſſenger and herald, by exciting our ſoul to the evolution of the ſciences. The poets who aſſert that the ſenſes know nothing accurately are Parmenides, Empedocles, and Epicharmus.

degree,

degree, and, flying from it, ſeek to become eſſentially ſubſiſting by itſelf?—It appears ſo.—But what ſhall we ſay, Simmias, about ſuch things as the following? Do we ſay that the *juſt itſelf* [1] is ſomething or nothing?—By Jupiter, we ſay it is ſomething.—And do we not alſo ſay, that the *beautiful* and the *good* are each of them ſomething?—How is it poſſible we ſhould not?—But did you ever at any time behold any one of theſe with your eyes?—By no means, ſays he.—But did you ever touch upon theſe with any other corporeal ſenſe? (but I ſpeak concerning all of them; as for inſtance, about magnitude, health, ſtrength, and, in one word, about the eſſence of all the reſt, and which each truly poſſeſſes.) Is then the moſt true nature of theſe perceived through the miniſtry of the body? or rather ſhall we not ſay, that whoever among us prepares himſelf to think dianoëtically in the moſt eminent and accurate manner about each particular object of his ſpeculation, ſuch a one will accede the neareſt poſſible to the knowledge of each?—Entirely ſo.—Will not he, therefore, accompliſh this in the moſt pure manner, who in the higheſt degree betakes himſelf to each through his dianoëtic power, neither employing ſight in conjunction with the dianoëtic energy, nor attracting any other ſenſe, together with his reaſoning; but who, exerciſing a dianoëtic

[1] The energy of our ſoul, as we have before obſerved, is triple: for it either converts itſelf to things ſubordinate, obtaining a knowledge of and adorning them, or it converts itſelf to itſelf, and acquires a knowledge of itſelf, or it converts itſelf to natures more excellent than its own. Socrates, therefore, having ſhown that the philoſopher is willing to die, from a converſion to things ſubordinate, becauſe he flies from the body, deſpiſing it; and having alſo ſhown this from a converſion to himſelf, becauſe he attends to the body no further than extreme neceſſity obliges him; he now alſo ſhows that he is willing to die, from a converſion to things more excellent. For he wiſhes to know ideas; but it is impoſſible for the ſoul to know theſe while energizing with the body, or having this communicating with it in the inveſtigation of them. For, if ſenſe poſſeſſes ſomething impartible, as is evident from the collected nature of its perception: for it knows, for inſtance, at once, that this particular thing is white, and not black; ſince, if it knew this diviſibly, it would be juſt as if I ſhould perceive one part of a thing, and you another*;—much more therefore does the rational ſoul perceive impartibly. It differs however from ſenſe in this, that ſenſe knows, but does not know that it knows; for it is not converted to itſelf, ſince neither body, nor things which poſſeſs their being in body, are converted to themſelves; but the rational ſoul knows both ſenſibles and itſelf: for it knows that it knows. If this then be the caſe, the ſoul will not receive, as its aſſociate in inveſtigation, either the body or the ſenſes, or the inſtruments of ſenſe, if it wiſhes to know things accurately.

* For theſe partible perceptions would never produce a perception of that which is white, as one thing.

energy by itſelf ſincere, at the ſame time endeavours to hunt [1] after every thing which has true being ſubſiſting by itſelf ſeparate and pure; and who in the moſt eminent degree is liberated from the eyes and ears, and in ſhort from the whole body, as diſturbing the ſoul, and not ſuffering it to acquire truth and wiſdom by its conjunction? Will not ſuch a man, Simmias, procure for himſelf real being, if this can ever be aſſerted of any one?—You ſpeak the truth, Socrates (ſays Simmias), in a tranſcendent [2] manner.

Is it not neceſſary, therefore (ſays Socrates), from hence, that an opinion of this kind ſhould be preſent with genuine philoſophers in ſuch a manner, that they will ſpeak among themſelves as follows: In the conſideration of things, this opinion, like a certain path, leads us in conjunction with reaſon from the vulgar track, that, as long as we are connected with a body, and our ſoul is contaminated with ſuch an evil, we can never ſufficiently obtain the object of our deſire; and this object we have aſſerted to be truth? For the body [3] ſubjects us to innumerable occupations through neceſſary aliment,

[1] The term *hunting*, ſays Olympiodorus, is adapted to intelligibles, becauſe theſe are known by an unapparent power of the ſoul, in the ſame manner as hunters ſtudy to be inviſible to the objects of their purſuit. Οικειον το θηρευειν επι των νοητων, διοτι αφανει δυναμει της ψυχης γινωσκεται ταυτα, καθαπερ και οι θηραται αφανες σπουδουσιν ειναι τοις θηραμασιν.

[2] The word in the original is ὑπερφυως, which is literally *ſupernaturally*. And, as Olympiodorus ſays, it is very properly uſed here, becauſe the diſcourſe is about intelligibles.

[3] The *vital irrational* part of our nature is an impediment to the rational ſoul. But this is twofold: for it is either beheld about the body alone, as fears, deſires and loves, or about things external, as wars, and the accumulation of wealth. The *gnoſtic irrational* part alſo becomes an impediment, as, for inſtance, the phantaſy, which is always a hindrance to our intellectual conceptions. For there are two paſſions which it is difficult to wipe away; in knowledge the phantaſy, and in life ambition; ſince theſe are the things with which the ſoul becomes firſt inveſted, and which ſhe, in the laſt place, lays aſide. For the firſt vital vehicle of the ſoul is ambition, and the firſt gnoſtic is the phantaſy. Hence, ſays Olympiodorus, Ulyſſes required the aſſiſtance of the mercurial moly, and right reaſon, in order to fly from Calypſo, or the phantaſy which like a cloud becomes an impediment to reaſon, the ſun of the ſoul. For the phantaſy is a veil; and hence ſome one calls it *long veiled*. On this account, Ulyſſes firſt came to Circe, that is, Senſe, as being the daughter of the Sun. The phantaſy, therefore, is an impediment to our intellectual conceptions; and hence (Olympiodorus adds), when we are agitated by the inſpiring influence of Divinity, if the phantaſy intervenes, the enthuſiaſtic energy ceaſes: for enthuſiaſm and the phantaſy are contrary to each other. Should it be aſked, whether the ſoul is able to energize without the phantaſy? we reply, that its perceptions of univerſals prove that it is able. It has perceptions, therefore, independent of the phantaſy; at the ſame time, however, the phantaſy attends it in its energies, juſt as a ſtorm purſues him who ſails on the ſea.

and

and fills us with love, deſire, fear, all various images, and a multitude of trifling concerns; not to mention that, if we are invaded by certain diſeaſes, we are hindered by them in our hunting after real being; ſo that, as it is ſaid, *we can never truly, and in reality, acquire wiſdom through the body*. For nothing elſe but the body and its deſires cauſe wars, ſeditions, and conteſts, of every kind: for all wars ariſe through the poſſeſſion of wealth; and we are compelled to acquire riches through the body, becoming ſubſervient to its cultivation; ſo that on all theſe accounts we have no leiſure for the exerciſe of philoſophy. But this is the extremity of all evils, that if at any time we are at leiſure from its attendance, and betake ourſelves to the ſpeculation of any thing, then invading us on all ſides in our inveſtigations, it cauſes agitations and tumults, and ſo vehemently impels us, that we are not able through its preſence to perceive the truth; but it is in reality demonſtrated to us, that, if we are deſigned to know any thing purely, we muſt be liberated from the body, and behold things with the ſoul itſelf. And then, as it appears, we ſhall obtain the object of our deſire, and of which we profeſs ourſelves lovers, viz. wiſdom, when we are dead, as our diſcourſe evinces; but by no means [1] while we are alive: for, if we can know nothing purely in conjunction with the body, one of theſe two conſequences muſt enſue, either that we can never poſſeſs knowledge, or that we muſt obtain it after death; for then the ſoul will ſubſiſt apart by itſelf, ſeparate from the body, but never before this takes place; and while we live in the body, as it appears, we ſhall approach in the neareſt manner poſſible to knowledge, if in the moſt eminent degree we have no aſſociation with the body, nor any communication with it (except what the greateſt neceſſity [2] requires), nor are filled with its nature, but

[1] Socrates ſays this in conſequence of looking to the knowledge which the ſoul can participate in the preſent life, and to that which it poſſeſſes when it obtains hereafter the ſupreme perfection of its nature. For that it is poſſible according to Plato to live while connected with this body not only *cathartically* but *theoretically*, and this through the whole of life, is evident from his Coryphæan philoſopher in the Theætetus, who is repreſented as continually aſtronomizing above the heavens (τον ουρανον ὑπεραστρονομουντες), and inveſtigating the nature of every *whole* in the univerſe; and alſo from thoſe guardians in his Republic who aſcend through dialectic as far as to *the good* itſelf. To live here however *theoretically* in *perfection* is impoſſible, on account of the occupations and moleſtations of the body, which do not permit us to enjoy the theoretic energy without impediment and diſtracted attention.

[2] There are three energies pertaining to the irrational nature; viz. phyſical and neceſſary, as to be

but purify ourſelves from its defiling connection, till Divinity itſelf diſſolves our bonds. And thus being pure, and liberated from the madneſs of body, it is proper to believe that we ſhall then aſſociate with others who are ſimilarly pure, and ſhall through ourſelves know every thing genuine and ſincere: and this perhaps is the truth itſelf; for it is by no means lawful that the pure ſhould be touched by that which is impure. And ſuch, O Simmias, in my opinion, ought to be the diſcourſe and ſentiments of all ſuch as are lovers of learning in a proper manner. Or does it not ſeem ſo to you?—It does, Socrates, more ſo than any thing.

If all this then (ſays Socrates) is true, my friend, much hope remains for him who arrives at that place to which I am now departing, that he ſhall there, if ever any where, ſufficiently obtain that for the ſake of which we take ſo much pains in the preſent life: ſo that the journey which is now aſſigned me will be accompanied with good hope; as will likewiſe be the caſe with any other man who thinks that he ought to prepare his dianoëtic part in ſuch a manner that it may become as it were pure.—Entirely ſo (ſays Simmias).—But does not purification conſiſt in this, as we formerly aſſerted in our diſcourſe: I mean, in ſeparating the ſoul from the body in the moſt eminent degree, and in accuſtoming it to call together and collect itſelf eſſentially on all ſides from the body, and to dwell as much as poſſible, both now and hereafter, alone by itſelf, becoming by this mean liberated from the body as from detaining bonds?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—Is not death called a ſolution and ſeparation of the ſoul from body?—Perfectly ſo (ſays he).—But thoſe alone who philoſophize rightly[1], as we have ſaid, always and

be nouriſhed and to ſleep; phyſical but not neceſſary, as venereal enjoyments; and thoſe which are neither phyſical nor neceſſary, as the decoration of the body, and ſuch things as pertain to variety of clothing: for that theſe laſt are neither phyſical nor neceſſary is evident from their not being uſed by other animals. As there are, therefore, theſe three energies, the philoſopher, ſays Olympiodorus, neither uſes thoſe which are phyſical and not neceſſary, nor thoſe which are neither phyſical nor neceſſary. For emiſſions in ſleep are ſufficient to him for the diſcharge of the ſeed; and he pays no attention to external decoration. He likewiſe uſes thoſe which are phyſical and neceſſary, no further than neceſſity requires. This being the caſe, the philoſopher is willing to die, and conſequently meditates death.

[1] Thoſe only, ſays Olympiodorus, who philoſophize rightly, i. e. with an undeviating energy, *eſpecially* and *always providentially* attend to a ſolution from the body; poſſeſſing the *providential* energy

and eſpecially providentially attend to the ſolution of the ſoul: and this is the meditation of philoſophers, a ſolution and ſeparation of the ſoul from the body; or do you not think ſo?—I do.—Would it not, therefore, as I ſaid at firſt, be ridiculous for a man who has ſo prepared himſelf in the preſent life as to approach very near to death, to live indeed in the manner we have deſcribed, and yet, when death arrives, be afflicted? would not this this be ridiculous?—How indeed ſhould it not?—In reality, therefore (ſays he), O Simmias, thoſe who philoſophize rightly will meditate how to *die*; and *to be dead* will be to them of all men a thing the leaſt terrible. But from hence conſider as follows: for, if they are on all ſides enemies to the body, but deſire to poſſeſs the ſoul ſubſiſting by itſelf, would it not be very irrational for them to be terrified and troubled when death approaches, and to be unwilling to depart to that place, where when they have arrived they may hope to enjoy that which they were lovers of in the preſent life (but they were lovers of wiſdom), and to be liberated from the aſſociation of that nature to which they were always inimical? Or do you think it poſſible, that many ſhould be willing, of their own accord, to deſcend into Hades, allured by the hope of ſeeing and converſing with departed beautiful youths, wives and children whom they have loved; and that the true lover of wiſdom, who has exceedingly nouriſhed this hope, that he ſhall never poſſeſs wiſdom as he ought any where but in Hades, ſhould be afflicted when dying, and ſhould not depart thither with readineſs and delight? For it is neceſſary, my friend, to think in this manner of one who is a true philoſopher; ſince ſuch a one is very much of opinion, that he ſhall never any where, but in that place, acquire the poſſeſſion of wiſdom with purity; and if this be the

energy from Prometheus, but the *eſpecially* and the *always* from Hercules. For the never-failing and the ſtrenuous make the ſolution ſtrong. In conſequence, too, of being deprived of good we are afflicted, and fall into evil. We rejoice, therefore, when we are liberated from evil, and meet with good; ſo that, according to each of theſe, it is neceſſary to be delighted with death, both as liberating us from the hated body, and as affording us the enjoyment of what we truly deſire. As fire too tends downwards by violence and through a certain artifice, but ſpontaneouſly aſcends, becauſe its *wholeneſs** is on high; in like manner the ſoul's attention to the body is the effect of compulſion, and its aſcent to true being ſpontaneous, becauſe its ſeparate wholeneſs is there.

* See the Introduction to the Timæus.

caſe, would it not be very irrational, as we juſt now ſaid, for a man of this kind to be terrified at death?—Very much ſo, by Jupiter, ſays he.

This then will be an argument ſufficient to convince you, that he whom you behold afflicted, when about to die, is not a philoſopher, but a lover of body; and this ſame perſon is a lover of riches and honours, either deſiring the poſſeſſion of one of theſe, or of both.—The caſe is entirely ſo (ſays he) as you repreſent it.—Does not then, O Simmias, that which is called fortitude eminently belong to ſuch as are thus diſpoſed?—Entirely ſo, (ſays he).—Does not temperance alſo, which even the multitude thus denominate as a virtue, through which we are not agitated by deſires, but regard them with moderation and contempt; does it not, I ſay, belong to thoſe only who deſpiſe the body in the moſt eminent degree, and live in the exerciſe of philoſophy?—It is neceſſary, ſays he.—For, if you are willing (ſays Socrates) to conſider the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to be abſurdities.—But how, Socrates? You know (ſays he) that all others look upon death as the greateſt of evils.—In the higheſt degree ſo, ſays he.—Thoſe who are bold, therefore, among theſe, ſuſtain death when they do ſuſtain it, through the dread of greater evils.—They do ſo.—All men, therefore, except philoſophers, are bold through fearing and dread, though it is abſurd that any one ſhould be bold through fear or cowardice.—Entirely ſo.—But what, are not the moderate among theſe affected in the ſame manner? and are they not temperate by a certain intemperance? Though this is in a certain reſpect impoſſible, yet a paſſion ſimilar to this happens to them with reſpect to this fooliſh temperance: for, fearing to be deprived of other pleaſures which at the ſame time they deſire, they abſtain from others, by others being vanquiſhed. And though they call intemperance a ſubjection to pleaſures; yet at the ſame time it happens to them, that, being vanquiſhed by certain pleaſures, they rule over others; and this is ſimilar to what I juſt now ſaid, that after a certain manner they become temperate through intemperance.—It ſeems ſo, indeed.—But, O bleſſed Simmias, this is by no means the right road to virtue, to change pleaſures for pleaſures, pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the leſſer, like pieces of money: but that alone is the proper coin, I mean wiſdom, for which all theſe ought to be changed. And indeed, for the ſake of this, and with this every thing muſt in reality be bought and ſold, both fortitude and temperance, juſtice, and,

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in one word, true virtue, which ſubſiſts with wiſdom, whether pleaſures and pains, and every thing elſe of this kind, are preſent or abſent: but if theſe are ſeparated from wiſdom, and changed from one another, ſuch virtue does not merit to be called even a ſhadowy deſcription, but is in reality ſervile, and poſſeſſes nothing ſalutary and true. But that which is in reality true virtue [1] is a purification from every thing of this kind; and temperance and juſtice,

[1] The firſt of the virtues are the phyſical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the moſt part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be ſaid that they are illuminations from reaſon, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they are the reſult of energies in a former life. Of theſe Plato ſpeaks in the Politicus and the Laws. The ethical virtues, which are above theſe, are ingenerated by cuſtom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. Theſe virtues alſo are to be found in ſome brute animals. They likewiſe tranſcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. Theſe virtues Plato delivers in The Laws. They pertain however at the ſame time both to reaſon and the irrational nature. In the third rank above theſe are the political virtues, which pertain to reaſon alone; for they are ſcientific. But they are the virtues of reaſon adorning the irrational part as its inſtrument; through prudence adorning the gnoſtic, through fortitude the iraſcible, and through temperance the deſiderative power; but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through juſtice. And of theſe virtues Plato ſpeaks much in the Republic. Theſe virtues, too, follow each other. Above theſe are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reaſon alone, withdrawing from other things to itſelf, throwing aſide the inſtruments of ſenſe as vain, repreſſing alſo the energies through theſe inſtruments, and liberating the ſoul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly delivers to us theſe virtues in this dialogue. Prior to theſe, however, are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the ſoul, introducing itſelf to natures ſuperior to itſelf, not only gnoſtically, as ſome one may be induced to think from the name, but alſo orectically; for it haſtens to become, as it were, intellect inſtead of ſoul; and intellect, as we have before obſerved, poſſeſſes both deſire and knowledge. Theſe virtues are the converſe of the political: for, as the latter energize about things ſubordinate according to reaſon, ſo the former about things more excellent according to intellect. Theſe virtues Plato delivers in the Theætetus.

According to Plotinus, there is alſo another gradation of the virtues beſides theſe, viz. the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is firſt illuminated by the ſolar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain reſpect united and conjoined with it, and becomes as it were ſolar form; ſo alſo our ſoul at firſt indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the buſineſs indeed of philoſophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, ſo as that we may energize paradigmatically. And as, when poſſeſſing the phyſical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the ſubjects to virtues of this kind are bodies);

juſtice, fortitude, and prudence itſelf, are each of them a certain purification. And thoſe who inſtituted the myſteries for us appear to have been by no means

ſo, from poſſeſſing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the univerſe, becauſe fate is converſant with irrational lives. For the rational ſoul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic ſupermundane; but as poſſeſſing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible natures. Temperance alſo pertains to the ethical virtues; juſtice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Obſerve too, that Plato calls the phyſical virtues ſervile, becauſe they may ſubſiſt in ſervile ſouls; but he calls the ethical γνωσιγραφιαι, becauſe their poſſeſſors only know *that* the energies of ſuch virtues are right, but do not know *why* they are ſo. It is well obſerved too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, thoſe which are in reality true virtues. He alſo ſeparates them in another way, viz. that the politic are not teleſtic, i. e. do not pertain to myſtic ceremonies, but that the cathartic and theoretic are teleſtic. Hence, ſays Olympiodorus, the cathartic are denominated from the purification which is uſed in the myſteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine, απο του τα θεια οραν. On this account he accords with the Orphic verſes, that

The ſoul that uninitiated dies,
Plung'd in the blackeſt mire in Hades lies.

For initiation is the Bacchic myſteries of the virtues (τελετη γαρ εστιν η των αρετων βακχεια). Olympiodorus alſo further obſerves, that by the thyrſus-bearers, Plato means thoſe that energize according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuses thoſe that exerciſe the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we riſe from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at the time of death: and Bacchus is the inſpective guardian of death, becauſe he is likewiſe of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic ſacred rites.

It is here too neceſſary to obſerve, that all the virtues exhibit their proper characters, theſe being every where common, but ſubſiſting appropriately in each. For the characteriſtic property of fortitude is the not declining to things ſubordinate; of temperance, a converſion from an inferior nature; of juſtice, a proper energy, and adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and ſelection of things good and evil. Obſerve too, with Olympiodorus, that all the virtues are in the Gods: for many Gods, ſays he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodneſs originates from the Gods. Likewiſe prior to things which ſometimes participate the virtues, as is our caſe, it is neceſſary there ſhould be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues firſt appear? Shall we ſay in the pſychical? For virtue is the perfection of the ſoul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the ſoul. Hence the Chaldæan oracles conjoin ſontal virtue with ſontal ſoul, or, in other words, with ſoul ſubſiſting according to cauſe. But may it not alſo be ſaid, that the virtues naturally wiſh to give an orderly arrangement to diſorder? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order.

means contemptible perſons, but to have really ſignified formerly, in an obſcure manner, *that whoever deſcended* [t] *into Hades uninitiated, and without being a partaker of the myſteries, ſhould be plunged into mire; but that*

order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not ſay, that through the cathartic virtues conſidered according to their cauſal ſubſiſtence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is enabled to abide in his accuſtomed mode, as Plato ſays in the Timæus? And further ſtill, according to antient theologiſts, he aſcends to the tower of Saturn.

[t] It is requiſite, ſays Olympiodorus, that dialectic conceptions ſhould either begin from divine ænigmas, unfolding the arcane truth which they contain; or that they ſhould become eſtabliſhed in them as in a port, and reſt in the demonſtrations of them; or that they ſhould accompliſh both theſe. Olympiodorus further obſerves that what is here ſaid imitates the myſtic and mundane circle of ſouls; for theſe, ſays he, flying from an impartible and Bacchic life, and energizing according to that which is Titannic, become fettered and impriſoned. Abiding however in puniſhment, and attending to themſelves, they are purified from Titannic defilements, and, paſſing into a collected from a diſperſed ſubſiſtence, they become Bacchuſes, i. e. entire and perfect, according to the Bacchus that abides on high. In the myſteries too, ſays Olympiodorus, popular purifications firſt take the lead; in the next place, ſuch as are more arcane than theſe; in the third place, things permanently abiding are introduced; in the fourth place, perceptions with the eyes cloſed (μυησεις); and, in the laſt place, an inſpection of the things themſelves (εποπτειαι). ὁτι εν τοις ἱεροις ηγουντο μεν αἱ παυδημοι καθαρσεις· ειτα επι ταυταις απορρητοτεραι· μετα δε ταυτας συστασεις παρελαμβανοντο· και επι ταυταις μυησεις· εν τελει δε εποπτειαι. Hence, ſays he, the ethical and political virtues are analogous to the apparent purifications; but ſuch of the cathartic virtues as reject every thing external, to the more arcane purifications. The energies alſo which are theoretic about intelligibles, are analogous to the things which permanently abide; but the contractions of theſe energies into the impartible are analogous to the perceptions with the eyes cloſed; and the ſimple intuitive perceptions of ſimple forms, to epoptic viſion, or an inſpection of the things themſelves.

Olympiodorus further obſerves, that the ſcope of the myſteries is to lead back ſouls to that end from which as a principle they made their firſt deſcent; and in which alſo Bacchus eſtabliſhed them, ſeating them in the throne of his proper father; or, in other words, in the whole of that life of which Jupiter is the ſource. He, therefore, who is initiated, neceſſarily dwells with the Gods, according to the ſcope of the initiating deities. But the greateſt and moſt myſtical ſacrifices (τελεται), ſays he, are twofold; the one here, being certain preparations; and the other hereafter. The latter alſo, he adds, are in his opinion twofold; ſome taking place about the pneumatic vehicle, as here about the ſhelly body (περι τον οστρεινον), and others about the luciform vehicle. For there are three gradations of myſtic as well as of philoſophic aſcent. For philoſophers are led back to their priſtine condition in the three thouſandth year, as it is ſaid in the Phædrus; and a chiliad, or a thouſand, ſignifies a perfect and periodic life. He, therefore, who is uninitiated, as remaining moſt remote from his proper end, lies in mire here, and much more there; for he is merged in the impurity of matter.

whoever arrived there, purified and initiated, ſhould dwell with the Gods. For, as it is ſaid by thoſe who write about the myſteries,

" The thyrſus-bearers [1] numerous are ſeen,
" But few the Bacchuſes have always been."

Theſe few are, in my opinion, no other than thoſe who philoſophize rightly; and that I may be ranked in the number of theſe, I ſhall leave nothing unattempted, but exert myſelf in all poſſible ways. But whether or not my exertions will be properly directed, and whether I ſhall accompliſh any thing when I arrive thither, I ſhall clearly know, very ſhortly, if Divinity pleaſes, as it appears to me. And this (ſays he), Simmias and Cebes, is my apology [2], why upon leaving you, and the rulers of the preſent life, I ought not to be afflicted and indignant, ſince I am perſuaded that I ſhall there meet with maſters and compañions not leſs good than ſuch as are here. This indeed is incredible to many; but if my apology ſhall have more influence with you than with the judges of the Athenians, it will have a good effect.

[1] The thyrſus, ſays Olympiodorus, is a ſymbol of material and partible fabrication, on account of its divulſed continuity, whence alſo it is a Titannic plant. For it is extended before Bacchus inſtead of his paternal ſceptre, and through this they call him into a partial nature. Beſides, ſays he, the Titans are thyrſus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a reed, whether by this we are to underſtand that he draws down celeſtial light into generation, or impels ſoul into body, or calls forth divine illumination, the whole of which is ungenerated, into generation. Hence Socrates Orphically calls the multitude thyrſus-bearers, as living Titannically. Olympiodorus further adds, that he who lives Bacchically, now reſts from his labours, is liberated from his bonds, and diſmiſſes his guard, or rather his confined life; and ſuch a one is a cathartic philoſopher. Some too, ſays he, prefer *philoſophy*, as Porphyry and Plotinus, and many other philoſophers; but others prefer the *hieratic* diſcipline, or the diſcipline pertaining to ſacred ceremonies, as Jamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus, and all the *hieratic* philoſophers. Plato, however, knowing that much may be ſaid on both ſides, collects the arguments into one, by calling the philoſopher a Bacchus.

[2] The apology of Socrates is twofold, one to the Athenian judges, and the other to the moſt genuine of his aſſociates. The one contending for the ſafety of the animal, i. e. of the compoſite of ſoul and body, but the other for the ſeparate and proper life of the ſoul. The one alſo being a mixture of ſcience and opinion, but the other of intellect and ſcience. The one proceeding from the political life, but the other from the cathartic life. And the one evincing that the death which is apparent and known to all men is good; but the other, that this muſt be aſſerted of the true death, and which is only known to philoſophers.

When

When Socrates had thus ſpoken, Cebes, renewing the diſcourſe, ſaid, Other things, Socrates, appear to me to be well ſpoken; but what you have aſſerted about the ſoul will produce in men much incredulity, who think, when it is liberated from the body, that it is no longer any where, but that, on that very day in which a man dies, it is corrupted [1] and periſhes, and this immediately as it is freed from the body; and, beſides this, that on its departure it becomes diſſipated like wind or ſmoke, makes its eſcape, and flies away, and is no longer any where: for if it remained any where eſſentially collected in itſelf, and liberated from thoſe evils which you have now enumerated, there would be an abundant and fair hope, Socrates, that what you have aſſerted is true. But it will perhaps require no ſmall allurement and faith, in order to be perſuaded that the ſoul remains, though the man dies, and that it poſſeſſes a certain power and prudence.—You ſpeak the truth, Cebes (ſays Socrates); but what ſhall we do? Are you willing that we ſhould diſcourſe about theſe particulars, whether it is proper that this ſhould be the caſe with the ſoul, or not? —Indeed (ſays Cebes), I ſhall hear with great pleaſure your opinion on this ſubject. For I do not think (anſwered Socrates) that any one who ſhould hear this diſcuſſion, even though he ſhould be a comic poet, could ſay that I trifled, and diſcourſed about things not accommodated to my condition. If it is agreeable to you, therefore, and it is requiſite to inveſtigate theſe particulars, let us conſider whether the ſouls of dead men ſurvive in Hades, or not.

The aſſertion indeed, which we now call to mind, is an antient one, I mean that ſouls departing from hence exiſt in Hades, and that they again return hither, and are generated from the dead. And if the caſe is ſuch, that living [2] natures are again generated from the dead, can there be any other

[1] Some, ſays Olympiodorus, immortalize the ſoul from the rational part as far as to the animated habit, as the Pythagorean Numenius. Others as far as to nature, as Plotinus. Others as far as to the irrational part, as among the antients Xenocrates and Speuſippus, but among the moderns Jamblichus and Plutarch. Others again as far only as to the rational ſoul, as Proclus and Porphyry. Others as far only as to intellect; for they ſuppoſe that the doxaſtic part is corrupted, as many of the Peripatetics. And others as far as to the whole ſoul; for they admit that partial ſouls are corrupted into the whole ſoul of the univerſe.

[2] The deſign of what is here ſaid is not to ſhow that the ſoul is immortal, but that it continues for a certain time after the diſſolution of the body. Jamblichus, however, as we are informed by Olympiodorus,

other conſequence than that our ſouls are there? for they could not be again generated if they had no ſubſiſtence; and this will be a ſufficient argument that theſe things are ſo, if it is really evident that the living cannot be generated from any thing elſe than the dead. But, if this is not the caſe, it will be neceſſary to adduce ſome other reaſon.—Entirely ſo (ſays Cebes).—You ſhould not, therefore (ſays he), conſider this aſſertion with reſpect to men alone, if you wiſh to learn with facility; but we ſhould ſurvey it as connected with all animals and plants, and, in one word, with every thing which is endued with generation. Are not all things, therefore, ſo generated, that they are produced no otherwiſe than contraries from contraries, I mean thoſe to which any thing of this kind happens? as the beautiful is contrary to the baſe, and the juſt to the unjuſt; and a thouſand other particulars ſubſiſt in the ſame manner. We ſhould conſider, therefore, whether it is neceſſary, reſpecting every thing which has a contrary, that this contrary ſhould be generated from nothing elſe than that which is its contrary. As for inſtance, is it not neceſſary that, when any thing becomes greater, it ſhould become ſo from being before ſmaller?—It is ſo (ſays he).—And is not the weaker generated from the ſtronger, and the ſwifter from the ſlower?—Entirely ſo.—But what if any thing becomes worſe, muſt it

Olympiodorus, thought that each of the arguments in the Phædo demonſtrated the immortality of the ſoul. But, as Olympiodorus juſtly obſerves, Jamblichus ſaid this in conſequence of energizing according to intellect enthuſiaſtically, which, ſays he, was uſual with him.

Proclus, or rather Syrianus, as we learn from Olympiodorus, collects that life and death are generated from each other, becauſe life is a conjunction and death a disjunction. But theſe are contraries; and contraries change into each other; for that contraries change into each other, the text ſhows in a threefold reſpect. Firſt, from induction. Secondly, from generations themſelves, and the ways which lead to them: for if the ways change into each other, as for inſtance whitening into blackening, much more muſt the ends change into each other, viz. the white into the black. Thirdly, becauſe nature would be mutilated, if one of two contraries changed into the other, and the other not; and alſo becauſe in time the other would fail, and nothing would be contrary, the remainder not having any thing into which it can change. Juſt as if a vigilant ſhould be changed into a ſleepy ſtate, but not on the other hand a ſleepy into a vigilant ſtate, the deluſion of Endymion, as Socrates ſays, would take place; for not only he, but all things, would ſleep. Endymion, however, is ſaid to have ſlept perpetually, becauſe he applied himſelf in ſolitude to the ſtudy of aſtronomy. Hence, too, he is ſaid to have been beloved by the moon.

It is likewiſe neceſſary to obſerve that Plato here ſpeaks of things which are properly contraries; and that, if he alſo makes mention of relatives, theſe, from the participation of contraries, change into each other.

not become ſo from the better? and if more juſt, muſt it not be generated from the more unjuſt?—How ſhould it not?—We have then (ſays he) ſufficiently determined this, that every thing is thus generated, viz. contraries from contraries.—Entirely ſo.—But what, is there any thing among theſe which has a middle ſubſiſtence between both (ſince all contraries are two), ſo as to cauſe two generations from this to that, and from that again to this? for between a greater and a leſſer thing there is increaſe and diminution; and hence we ſay that the one is increaſed, but the other diminiſhed.—It is ſo (ſays he).—And muſt not to be ſeparated and mingled, to be cooled and heated, and every thing in the ſame manner, though ſometimes we do not diſtinguiſh the ſeveral particulars by names, muſt they not in reality be every where thus circumſtanced, be generated from each other, and be ſubject to a mutual generation of each into one another?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).

What then (ſays Socrates), is there any thing contrary to the being alive, as ſleeping is contrary to waking?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—But what is this contrary?—To be dead.—Are not theſe, therefore, generated from each other, ſince they are contraries? and ſince they are two, are there not two generations between them?—How ſhould there not?—I will, therefore (ſays Socrates), tell you what one of theſe conjunctions is which I have juſt now ſpoken of, and what its generations are; do you tell me what the other is. But I ſay, that the one of theſe is *to ſleep*, but the other *to awake*; and from ſleeping awaking is generated, and from awaking ſleeping; and the generations of theſe are on the one hand to be laid aſleep, and on the other to be rouſed. Have I ſufficiently explained this to you or not?—Perfectly ſo.—Do you, therefore (ſays he), inform me, in a ſimilar manner, concerning life and death.—Do you not ſay that *living* is the contrary of *to be dead?*—I do.—And that they are generated from each other?—Certainly.—What then is generated from that which is alive?—That which is dead (ſays he).—But what (ſays Socrates) is generated from *the dead?*—It is neceſſary to confeſs (ſays he) that this muſt be *the living*.—From the dead, therefore (ſays he), O Cebes, living things, and men who are alive, are generated.—It appears ſo, (ſays he).—Our ſouls therefore (ſays Socrates) ſubſiſt in Hades.—So it ſeems.—Is not, therefore, one of the generations ſubſiſting about theſe manifeſt? for *to die* is, I think, ſufficiently clear; is it not?—

Entirely

Entirely ſo (ſays he).—What then ſhall we do? ſhall we not render back a contrary generation in its turn, but ſay that nature is defective and lame in this particular? Or is it neceſſary to aſſign a certain contrary generation *to the being dead?*—Entirely ſo, ſays he.—But what is this?—*To be reſtored back again to life.*—But (ſays Socrates), if there is ſuch a thing as to revive again, will not this reviving be a generation from the dead to the living?—Perfectly ſo.—This then is agreed upon by us, that the living are generated from the dead no leſs than the dead from the living: but, this being the caſe, it is a ſufficient argument to prove that the ſouls of the dead muſt neceſſarily exiſt ſomewhere, from whence they may again be generated.—It appears to me (ſays he), Socrates, that this muſt neceſſarily follow from what has been admitted.

Take notice then (ſays he), O Cebes! that we have not unjuſtly made theſe conceſſions, as it appears to me: for if other things, when generated, were not always reſtored in the place of others, revolving as it were in a circle, but generation ſubſiſted according to a right line, proceeding from one thing alone into its oppoſite, without recurring again to the other, and making an inflection, you know that all things would at length poſſeſs the ſame form, would be affected with the ſame paſſion, and would ceaſe to be generated.—How do you ſay? (ſays he.)—It is by no means difficult (replies Socrates) to underſtand what I aſſert; but juſt as if there ſhould be ſuch a thing as falling aſleep without recurring again to a vigilant ſtate, generated from a ſleepy condition, you know that all things would at length exhibit the deluſions of Endymion, and would nowhere preſent themſelves to the view, becauſe every thing elſe would ſuffer the ſame as happened to him, viz. would be laid aſleep. And if all things were mingled together, without ever being ſeparated, the doctrine of Anaxagoras would ſoon be verified; for all things would be at once collected in a heap. In the ſame manner, my dear Simmias, if all ſuch things as participate of life ſhould die, and after they are dead ſhould abide in that lifeleſs form, and not revive again, would there not be a great neceſſity that all things ſhould at length die, and that nothing ſhould live? for if living beings are generated from other things, and living beings die, how can it be otherwiſe but that all things muſt be extinguiſhed through being dead?—It appears to me, Socrates (ſays Cebes), that it can not be otherwiſe; and in my opinion you perfectly ſpeak the truth:—for to me, Cebes (ſays Socrates), it ſeems to be ſo more than any thing,

thing, and that we have not aſſented to this through deception; but that there is ſuch a thing in reality as reviving again; that the living are generated from the dead; that the ſouls of the dead have a ſubſiſtence; and that the condition of the good after this life will be better than at preſent; but of the evil, worſe.

But (ſays Cebes, interrupting him), according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently accuſtomed to employ (if it is true), that learning, with reſpect to us, is nothing elſe than reminiſcence[1]; according to this, it is

[1] Socrates, having ſhown from life and death that the ſoul remains after its ſeparation from the body, now ſhows, from diſcipline being reminiſcence, that it ſubſiſted prior to the body; ſo that from both theſe poſitions it may be collected that the ſoul endures for a much longer time than the body. Olympiodorus however again informs us that Jamblichus thought that each of theſe poſitions evinced the immortality of the ſoul. For, ſays he, if life and death are always from each other, the ſoul is perpetual; and if alſo diſciplines are reminiſcences, according to this alſo the ſoul lives for ever. So that, by uniting both the arguments, he concludes that the ſoul is without generation and incorruptible. However, as Olympiodorus juſtly obſerves, neither nor both of theſe poſitions demonſtrate that the ſoul is immortal, but that it ſubſiſts for a certain time prior and poſterior to the body. Hence Plato, perceiving that he had not yet ſufficiently demonſtrated the thing propoſed, introduces other arguments in proof of it; and the fifth alone properly demonſtrates the immortality of the ſoul from its eſſence.

Since however, ſays Olympiodorus, the diſcourſe is now about reminiſcence, and memory is proximate to reminiſcence, and oblivion is oppoſed to memory, let us define what each of theſe three is, from their appellations. Reminiſcence, therefore, is renewed memory*, as its name evinces. But memory is permanency of intellect †. And oblivion is as it were a certain dimneſs of the ſight ‡. For as dimneſs is an impediment to the ſight, ſo oblivion is a dimneſs of our knowledge, as it were of our ſight. For memory, which is permanency of intellect, is firſt beheld in intellect; ſince it is a ſtable collection of knowledge: juſt as *the ever* is ſtability of being, and *immortality* is ſtability of life; for it is inextinguiſhable life. In like manner memory is ſtability of knowledge. As, therefore, our ſoul does not poſſeſs infinite power according to knowledge, though it does according to life, hence oblivion intervening, reminiſcence is a certain regeneration as it were of knowledge. Memory likewiſe firſt ſubſiſts in intellect, becauſe intellect always underſtands and abides in itſelf; but ſecondarily in divine ſouls, as poſſeſſing tranſitive intellections, and not knowing all things without time, and collectively; and it ſubſiſts, in the third place, in our ſouls, in which oblivion alſo intervenes. Memory likewiſe is ſimilar to eternity, perpetually ſubſiſting about the ſame; but reminiſcence, to time, through its tranſition.

But as Socrates ſhows from reminiſcence that the ſoul ſubſiſted prior to the body, the following Platonic arguments in defence of the ſoul's pre-exiſtence are offered to the earneſt conſideration of

* Αναμνησις εστι ανανεωσις μνημης. † Μνημη δε μονη του νου. ‡ Ληθη δε οιον κνημη τις.

is neceſſary that we muſt have learned the things which we now call to mind in ſome former period of time. But this is impoſſible, unleſs our ſoul ſub-

the reader. Unleſs the ſoul then had a being prior to her connexion with the preſent body, ſhe never would be led to ſearch after knowledge. For if the objects of her inveſtigation were things which ſhe had never before been acquainted with, how could ſhe ever be certain that ſhe detected them? Indeed it would be as impoſſible on this hypotheſis for the ſoul to know any thing about them, even when ſhe perceived them, as it would be to tell the meaning of the words of an unknown language on hearing them pronounced. The Peripatetics, in order to ſubvert this conſequence, have recourſe to an intellect in capacity, which is the paſſive recipient of all forms. The doubt however ſtill remains. For how does this intellect underſtand? For it muſt either underſtand the things which it already knows, or things which it does not know. But the Stoics aſſert, that natural conceptions are the cauſes of our inveſtigating and diſcovering truth. If, therefore, theſe conceptions are in capacity, we aſk the ſame queſtion as before; but if they are in energy, why do we inveſtigate things which we know? Laſtly, the Epicureans affirm that anticipations are the cauſes of our inveſtigations. If then they ſay that theſe anticipations ſubſiſt diſtinctly, inveſtigation muſt be vain; but if indiſtinctly, why do we ſeek after any thing beſides theſe anticipations? Or, in other words, why do we ſeek after diſtinct knowledge, of which we have no anticipation?

Again, there are numberleſs inſtances of perſons that are terrified at certain animals, ſuch as cats, lizards, and tortoiſes, without knowing the cauſe of their terror. Thus the nephews of Berius, ſays Olympiodorus, that were accuſtomed to hunt bears and lions, could not endure the ſight of a cock. The ſame author adds, that a certain apothecary could look undiſturbed at aſps and ſnakes, but was ſo exceedingly frightened at a waſp, that he would run from it crying aloud, and ſtupefied with terror. Thus too, ſays he, Themiſon the phyſician could apply himſelf to the cure of every diſeaſe except the hydrophobia; but if any perſon only mentioned this diſeaſe, he would be immediately agitated, and ſuffer in a manner ſimilar to thoſe afflicted with this malady. Now it is impoſſible to aſſign any other ſatisfactory cauſe of all this, than a reminiſcence of having ſuffered through theſe animals in a prior ſtate of exiſtence.

Further ſtill, infants are not ſeen to laugh for nearly three weeks after their birth, but paſs the greateſt part of this time in ſleep; however, in their ſleep they are often ſeen both to laugh and cry. But how is it poſſible that this can any otherwiſe happen than through the ſoul being agitated by the whirling motions of the animal nature, and moved in conformity to the paſſions which it had experienced in another life? Beſides, our looking into ourſelves, when we are endeavouring to diſcover any truth, evinces that we inwardly contain truth, though concealed in the darkneſs of oblivion. The delight too which attends our diſcovery of truth, ſufficiently proves that this diſcovery is nothing more than a recognition of ſomething moſt eminently allied to our nature, and which had been, as it were, loſt in the middle ſpace of time, between our former knowledge of the truth and the recovery of that knowledge. For the perception of a thing perfectly unknown and unconnected with our nature, would produce terrror inſtead of delight; and things are pleaſing only in proportion as they poſſeſs ſomething known and domeſtic to the natures by which they are known.

ſiſted

ſiſted ſomewhere before it took up its reſidence in this human form; ſo that from hence the ſoul will appear to be a certain immortal nature.—But, Cebes (ſays Simmias, interrupting him), recall into my memory what demonſtrations there are of theſe particulars; for I do not very much remember them at preſent.—The truth of this (ſays Cebes) is evinced by one argument, and that a moſt beautiful one; that men, when interrogated, if they are but interrogated properly, will ſpeak about every thing juſt as it is. At the ſame time, they could never do this unleſs ſcience and right reaſon reſided in their natures. And, in the ſecond place, if any one leads them to diagrams, or any thing of this kind, he will in theſe moſt clearly diſcover that this is really the caſe.—But if you are not perſuaded from this, Simmias (ſays Socrates), ſee if, from conſidering the ſubject in this manner, you will perceive as we do. For you do not believe how that which is called learning is reminiſcence.—I do not diſbelieve it (ſays Simmias); but I deſire to be informed concerning this, which is the ſubject of our diſcourſe, I mean reminiſcence; and indeed, from what Cebes has endeavoured to ſay, I almoſt now remember, and am perſuaded: but nevertheleſs I would at preſent hear how you attempt to ſupport this opinion.—We defend it then (ſays Socrates) as follows: we confeſs without doubt, that if any one calls any thing to mind, it is neceſſary that at ſome time or other he ſhould have previouſly known this.—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—Shall we not confeſs this alſo (ſays Socrates), that when ſcience is produced in us, after ſome particular manner, it is reminiſcence? But I mean by a particular manner, thus: If any one, upon ſeeing or hearing any thing, or apprehending it through the medium of any other ſenſe, ſhould not only know it, but ſhould alſo think upon ſomething elſe, of which there is not the ſame, but a different ſcience, ſhould we not juſtly ſay, that he recollects or remembers the particular, of which he receives a mental conception?—How do you mean?—Thus (ſays Socrates): In a certain reſpect the ſcience of a man is different from that of a lyre.—How ſhould it not?—Do you not, therefore, know that lovers when they ſee a lyre, or a veſtment, or any thing elſe which the objects of their affection were accuſtomed to uſe, no ſooner know the lyre, than they immediately receive in their dianoëtic part the form of the beloved perſon to whom the lyre belonged? But this is no other than reminiſcence: juſt as any one, upon ſeeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes; and

in a certain reſpect an infinite number of ſuch particulars continually occur.—An infinite number indeed, by Jupiter (ſays Simmias).—Is not then (ſays Socrates) ſomething of this kind a certain reminiſcence; and then eſpecially ſo, when any one experiences this affection about things which, through time, and ceaſing to conſider them, he has now forgotten?—Entirely ſo (ſays Simmias).—But what (ſays Socrates), does it happen, that when any one ſees a painted horſe and a painted lyre, he calls to mind a man? and that when he beholds a picture of Simmias, he recollects Cebes?—Entirely ſo.—And will it not alſo happen, that on ſeeing a picture of Simmias he will recollect Simmias himſelf?—It certainly will happen ſo (ſays he).

Does it not therefore follow, that in all theſe inſtances reminiſcence partly takes place from things ſimilar, and partly from ſuch as are diſſimilar?—It does.—But when any one recollects any thing from ſimilars, muſt it not alſo happen to him, that he muſt know whether this ſimilitude is deficient in any reſpect, as to likeneſs, from that particular of which he has the remembrance?—It is neceſſary (ſays he).—Conſider then (ſays Socrates) if the following particulars are thus circumſtanced: Do we ſay that any thing is in a certain reſpect equal? I do not ſay one piece of wood to another, nor one ſtone to another, nor any thing elſe of this kind; but do we ſay that equal itſelf, which is ſomething different from all theſe, is ſomething or nothing?—We ſay it is ſomething different, by Jupiter, Socrates (ſays Simmias), and that in a wonderful manner.—Have we alſo a ſcientific knowledge of that which is equal itſelf?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—But from whence do we receive the ſcience of it? Is it not from the particulars we have juſt now ſpoken of, viz. on ſeeing wood, ſtones, or other things of this kind, which are equals, do we not form a conception of that which is different from theſe? But conſider the affair in this manner: Do not equal ſtones and pieces of wood, which ſometimes remain the ſame, at one time appear equal, and at another not?—Entirely ſo.—But what, can *equals themſelves* ever appear to you unequal? or can equality ſeem to be inequality?—By no means, Socrates.—Theſe equals, therefore, are not the ſame with equal itſelf.—By no means, Socrates, as it appears to me.—But from theſe equals (ſays he), which are different from equal itſelf, you at the ſame time underſtand and receive the ſcience of *equal itſelf*.—You ſpeak moſt true (ſays he).—I it not, therefore, either ſimilar to theſe or diſſimilar?

milar?—Entirely ſo.—But indeed (ſays Socrates) this is of no conſequence: for while, in conſequence of ſeeing one thing, you underſtand another, from the view of this, whether it is diſſimilar or ſimilar, it is neceſſary that this conception of another thing ſhould be reminiſcence.—Entirely ſo.—But what will you determine concerning this (ſays Socrates)?—Do we ſuffer any thing of this kind reſpecting the equality in pieces of wood, and other ſuch equals as we have juſt now ſpoken of? and do they appear to us to be equal in the ſame manner as equal itſelf? and is ſomething or nothing wanting, through which they are leſs equal than equal itſelf?—There is much wanting (ſays he).—Muſt we not, therefore, confeſs, that when any one, on beholding ſome particular thing, underſtands that he wiſhes this which I now perceive to be ſuch as ſomething elſe is, but that it is deficient, and falls ſhort of its perfection; muſt we not confeſs that he who underſtands this, neceſſarily had a previous knowledge of that to which he aſſerts this to be ſimilar, but in a defective degree?—It is neceſſary.—What then, do we ſuffer ſomething of this kind or not about equals and equal itſelf?—Perfectly ſo.—It is neceſſary, therefore, that we muſt have previouſly known *equal itſelf* before that time, in which, from firſt ſeeing equal things, we underſtood that we deſired all theſe to be ſuch as *equal itſelf*, but that they had a defective ſubſiſtence.—It is ſo.—But this alſo we muſt confeſs, that we neither underſtood this, nor are able to underſtand it, by any other means than either by the ſight, or the touch, or ſome other of the ſenſes.—I ſpeak in the ſame manner about all theſe. For they are the ſame, Socrates, with reſpect to that which your diſcourſe wiſhes to evince. But indeed, from the ſenſes, it is neceſſary to underſtand that all equals in ſenſible objects aſpire after *equal itſelf*, and are deficient from its perfection. Or how ſhall we ſay?—In this manner: Before, therefore, we begin to ſee, or hear, and to perceive other things, it neceſſarily follows, that we muſt in a certain reſpect have received the ſcience of *equal itſelf*, ſo as to know what it is, or elſe we could never refer the equals among ſenſibles to *equal itſelf*, and be convinced that all theſe deſire to become ſuch as *equal itſelf*, but fall ſhort of its perfection.—This, Socrates, is neceſſary, from what has been previouſly ſaid.—But do we not, as ſoon as we are born, ſee and hear, and poſſeſs the other ſenſes?—Entirely ſo.—But we have ſaid it is neceſſary that prior to

theſe we ſhould have received the ſcience of *equal itſelf*.—Certainly.—We muſt neceſſarily, therefore, as it appears, have received it before we were born.—It appears ſo.

If, therefore, receiving this before we were born, we were born poſſeſſing it; we both knew prior to our birth, and as ſoon as we were born, not only *the equal*, *the greater*, and *the leſſer*, but every thing of this kind: for our diſcourſe at preſent is not more concerning *the equal* than *the beautiful*, *the good*, *the juſt*, and *the holy*, and in one word, about every thing which we mark with the ſignature of *that which is*, both in our interrogations when we interrogate, and in our anſwers when we reply: ſo that it is neceſſary we ſhould have received the ſcience of all theſe before we were born.—All this is true.—And if, ſince we receive theſe ſciences, we did not forget each of them, we ſhould always be born knowing, and ſhould always know them, through the whole courſe of our life: for to know is nothing elſe than this, to retain the ſcience which we have received, and not to loſe it. Or do we not call oblivion the loſs of ſcience?—Entirely ſo (ſays he), Socrates.—But if, receiving ſcience before we were born, we loſe it at the time of our birth, and afterwards, through exerciſing the ſenſes about theſe particulars, receive back again thoſe ſciences which we once before poſſeſſed, will not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own proper ſcience? and ſhall we not ſpeak rightly when we call this a certain reminiſcence?—Entirely ſo.—For this appears to be poſſible, that when any one perceives any thing, either by ſeeing or hearing, or employing any other ſenſe, he may at the ſame time know ſomething different from this, which he had forgotten, and to which this approaches, whether it is diſſimilar or ſimilar. So that, as I ſaid, one of theſe two things muſt be the conſequence: either that we were born knowing theſe, and poſſeſs a knowledge of all of them, through the whole of our life; or that we only remember what we are ſaid to learn afterwards; and thus learning will be reminiſcence.—The caſe is perfectly ſo, Socrates.

Which, therefore, will you chooſe, Simmias: that we are born knowing, or that we afterwards remember the particulars of which we formerly received the ſcience?—At preſent, Socrates, I have no choice.—But what will be your choice in the following inſtance, and what will be your opinion about

about it? Can a man, who poſſeſſes ſcience, render a reaſon concerning the objects of his knowledge, or not?—There is a great neceſſity (ſays he), Socrates, that he ſhould.—And does it alſo appear to you, that all men can render a reaſon of the particulars concerning which we have juſt now ſpoken?—I wiſh they could, ſays Simmias; but I am much more afraid, that to-morrow there will no longer be any one here who can accompliſh this in a becoming manner.—You do not therefore think, Simmias, that all men know theſe particulars?—By no means.—They remember, therefore, the things which they have once learned.—It is neceſſary.—But when did our ſouls receive this ſcience? for they did not receive them from thoſe from whom we are born men.—Certainly not.—Before this period, therefore.—Certainly.—Our ſouls therefore, Simmias, had a ſubſiſtence before they were in a human form, ſeparate from bodies, and poſſeſſed intellectual prudence.—Unleſs, Socrates, we received theſe ſciences while we were making our entrance into the preſent life; for that ſpace of time is yet left for us.—Let it be ſo, my friend. But in what other time did we loſe theſe? for we were not born poſſeſſing them, as we have juſt now acknowledged. Did we loſe them at the very time in which we received them? Or can you mention any other time?—By no means, Socrates: but I was ignorant that I ſpoke nothing to the purpoſe.

Will then the caſe remain thus for us, Simmias? For if thoſe things have a ſubſiſtence which we perpetually proclaim, viz. a certain ſomething beautiful and good, and every ſuch eſſence; and if we refer to this all ſenſible objects, as finding it to have a prior ſubſiſtence, and to be ours, and aſſimilate theſe to it, as images to their exemplar; it is neceſſary that, as theſe have a ſubſiſtence, ſo likewiſe that our ſoul ſhould have ſubſiſted before we were born: but if theſe are not, this diſcourſe will have been undertaken in vain. Is it not ſo? and is there not an equal neceſſity, both that theſe ſhould have a ſubſiſtence, and that our ſouls ſhould have had a being before we were born, and that the one cannot be without the other?—The ſame neceſſity, Socrates (ſays Simmias), appears to me to take place in a moſt tranſcendent manner; and the diſcourſe flies to a beautiful circumſtance, I mean that our ſoul ſubſiſted before we were born, in a manner ſimilar to that eſſence which you now ſpeak of. For I poſſeſs nothing which is ſo clear to me as this, that all ſuch things as the beautiful and the good ſubſiſt, in the moſt

moſt eminent degree, together with every thing elſe which you now mention; and, with reſpect to myſelf, it is ſufficiently demonſtrated.—But how does it appear to Cebes? ſays Socrates: for it is neceſſary that Cebes alſo ſhould be perſuaded.—In my opinion he is ſufficiently ſo (ſays Simmias), although he is the moſt reſolute of all men in not aſſenting to what is ſaid. Yet I think he is ſufficiently perſuaded that our ſoul had a ſubſiſtence before we were born. But whether or not the ſoul remains after death, does not appear to me, Socrates (ſays he), to be yet demonſtrated; but that doubt of the multitude, which Cebes mentioned, ſtill preſſes hard upon me, whether, when a man dies, the ſoul is not diſſipated, and this is the end of its exiſtence. For what hinders but that it may be born, and may have had a ſubſiſtence elſewhere, and this before it came into a human body; and yet, after it departs, and is liberated from this body, may then die and be corrupted?—You ſpeak well, Simmias (ſays Cebes); for it appears that the half only of what was neceſſary has been demonſtrated, I mean that our ſoul ſubſiſted before we were born: but it is neceſſary that you ſhould demonſtrate, beſides this, that it no leſs ſubſiſts after we are dead, than it did before we were born, in order that the demonſtration may be complete.—This, Simmias and Cebes (ſays Socrates), is even now demonſtrated, if you are only willing to connect into one and the ſame the preſent diſcourſe and that which we before aſſented to; I mean that every vital nature is generated from that which is dead. For if the ſoul had a prior ſubſiſtence, and it is neceſſary when it proceeds into the preſent life, and is generated man, that it ſhould be generated from nothing elſe than death, and to be dead; how is it not neceſſary that it ſhould alſo ſubſiſt after death, ſince it is requiſite that it ſhould be generated again? Its exiſtence therefore, after death, is even now, as I ſaid, demonſtrated. But you and Simmias appear to me ſtill more earneſtly to diſcuſs this aſſertion in a very pleaſant manner, and to be afraid like boys, leſt on the ſoul's departure from the body the winds ſhould tear it in pieces, and widely diſperſe it, eſpecially if any one ſhould die during a ſtormy blaſt, and not when the heavens are ſerene.—Upon this Cebes laughing, Endeavour (ſays he), O Socrates, to perſuade us of the contrary, as if we were afraid, or rather as if we were not afraid; though, perhaps, there is ſome boy among us, by whom circumſtances of this kind may be dreaded: him, therefore, we ſhould endeavour to perſuade not to be terrified at death,

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as if it was ſome dreadful ſpectre.—But it is neceſſary (ſays Socrates) to charm him every day till he becomes well.—But from whence (ſays he), O Socrates, can a man acquire ſkill in ſuch enchantment, ſince you are about to leave us?—Greece (ſays he), Cebes, is very ſpacious, in ſome part of which good men may be found: and there are many barbarous nations, all which muſt be wandered over, inquiring after an enchanter of this kind, without ſparing either riches or labour, as there is nothing for which wealth can be more ſeaſonably beſtowed. But it is neceſſary that you ſhould inquire among yourſelves; for perhaps you will not eaſily find any one who is more able to accompliſh this than yourſelves.—Let theſe things be ſo (ſays Cebes): but, if you pleaſe, let us return from whence we made this digreſſion. —It will be agreeable to me (ſays Socrates): for how ſhould it not be ſo?—You ſpeak well, ſays Cebes.

Some ſuch thing, therefore (ſays Socrates), we ought to inquire of ourſelves, viz. to what being the paſſion of becoming diſſipated belongs; and reſpecting what we ought to fear, leſt this ſhould take place; and to whom a fear of this kind is proper: and after this, we ſhould conſider whether it is ſoul or not; and, as the reſult of theſe ſpeculations, ſhould either be confident or fearful concerning our ſoul.—You ſpeak true (ſays he).—Is it not, therefore, a paſſion natural to that which is collected together, and a compoſite, that it ſhould be diſſolved ſo far as it is a compoſite; and that, if there is any thing without compoſition, to this alone, if to any other, it belongs not to ſuffer affections of this kind?—This (ſays Cebes) appears to me to be the caſe. But does it not follow, that things which always ſubſiſt according to the ſame, and in a ſimilar manner, are in the moſt eminent degree incompoſites; but that ſuch things as ſubſiſt differently at different times, and never according to the ſame, are compoſites?—To me it appears ſo.—Let us return, therefore (ſays he), to the particulars of our former diſcourſe: Whether is *eſſence itſelf* (which both in our inquiries and anſwers we eſtabliſhed as having a being) that which always ſubſiſts ſimilarly, and according to the ſame, or that which ſubſiſts differently at different times? And does *the equal itſelf*, *the beautiful itſelf*, and every thing which truly is, ever receive any kind of mutation? Or does not every thing which always truly is, and has a uniform ſubſiſtence, eſſentially abide in a ſimilar manner according to the ſame, and never in any reſpect receive any mutation?—It is

neceſſary, Socrates (ſays Cebes), that it ſhould ſubſiſt ſimilarly, and according to the ſame.—But what ſhall we ſay concerning many beautiful things, ſuch as men, horſes, garments, or other things of this kind, which are either equal, or beautiful; and of all ſuch as are ſynonymous to theſe? Do theſe alſo ſubſiſt according to the ſame, or rather are they not entirely contrary to thoſe, ſo that they neither ſubſiſt ſimilarly according to the ſame, either with reſpect to themſelves or to one another, or, in one word, in any manner whatever?—Theſe (ſays Cebes) never ſubſiſt in a ſimilar condition. Theſe, therefore, may be touched, may be ſeen and perceived by the other ſenſes; but thoſe natures which always ſubſiſt according to the ſame, cannot be apprehended by any other means than the diſcurſive energy of the dianoëtic power. But things of this kind are inviſible, and cannot be ſeen. Are you willing, therefore (ſays he), that we ſhould eſtabliſh two ſpecies of beings, the one viſible, and the other inviſible?—Let us eſtabliſh them (ſays he).—And that the inviſible ſubſiſts always according to the ſame, but the viſible never according to the ſame.—And this alſo (ſays he) we will eſtabliſh.—Come then (ſays Socrates), is there any thing elſe belonging to us, than on the one hand body, and on the other ſoul?—Nothing elſe (ſays he).—To which ſpecies, therefore, ſhall we ſay the body is more ſimilar and allied?—It is manifeſt to every one (ſays he), that it is allied to the viſible ſpecies.—But what ſhall we ſay of the ſoul? Is it viſible, or inviſible?—It is certainly not viſible to men, Socrates (ſays he).—But we ſpeak of things which are viſible or not ſo, with reſpect to the nature of men. Or do you think we ſpeak of things viſible to any other nature?—Of thoſe which regard the nature of men.—What then ſhall we ſay reſpecting the ſoul, that it is viſible, or cannot be ſeen?—That it cannot be ſeen.—The ſoul, therefore, is more ſimilar to the inviſible ſpecies than the body, but the body is more ſimilar to the viſible.—It is perfectly neceſſary it ſhould be ſo, Socrates.

And have we not alſo formerly aſſerted this, that the ſoul, when it employs the body in the ſpeculation of any thing, either through ſight, or hearing, or ſome other ſenſe (for to ſpeculate through ſenſe is to ſpeculate through body), then, indeed, it is drawn by the body to things which never ſubſiſt according to the ſame, wanders[1] and is agitated, and becomes giddy like one intoxicated, through

[1] The term *wandering*, ſays Olympiodorus, is common both to life and knowledge; but the term

through paſſing into contact with things of this kind?—Entirely ſo.—But when it ſpeculates any thing, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf, then it departs to that which is pure, eternal, and immortal, and which poſſeſſes a ſameneſs of ſubſiſtence: and, as being allied to ſuch a nature, it perpetually becomes united with it, when it ſubſiſts alone by itſelf, and as often as it is lawful for it to obtain ſuch a conjunction: and then, too, it reſts from its wanderings, and perpetually ſubſiſts ſimilarly according to the ſame, about ſuch natures, as paſſing into contact with them; and this paſſion [1] of the ſoul is denominated prudence.—You ſpeak (ſays he), Socrates, in every reſpect beautifully and true.—To which ſpecies, therefore, of things, formerly and now ſpoken of, does the ſoul appear to you to be more ſimilar and allied?—It appears to me, Socrates (ſays he), that every one, and even the moſt indocile, muſt admit, in conſequence of this method of reaſoning, that the ſoul is both totally and univerſally more ſimilar to that which ſubſiſts perpetually the ſame, than to that which does not ſo.—But to which is the body moſt ſimilar?—To the other ſpecies.

But conſider alſo as follows [2]: that, ſince ſoul and body ſubſiſt together, nature commands that the one ſhould be ſubſervient and obey, but that the other ſhould rule and poſſeſs dominion. And in conſequence of this, which again of theſe appears to you to be ſimilar to a divine nature, and which to the mortal nature? Or does it not appear to you that the divine nature is eſſentially adapted to govern and rule, but the mortal to be governed and be ſubſervient?—To me it does ſo.—To which, therefore, is the ſoul ſimilar?—It is manifeſt, Socrates, that the ſoul is ſimilar to the divine, but the

term *agitated* belongs to life alone; and the term *giddineſs* to knowledge alone. But giddineſs is an evil. For as thoſe who are thus affected, through the inward whirl which they experience, think that things external to them are in a ſimilar condition, ſo the ſoul, through alone beholding ſenſibles, thinks that all things flow and are in motion.

[1] Olympiodorus here inquires how Plato calls *prudence* a *paſſion* of the ſoul. To which he replies, that all the virtues are *paſſions*. For it is evident, ſays he, that things which participate *ſuffer*. Hence alſo *being*, conſidered as participating *the one*, is ſaid by Plato to *ſuffer* or be *paſſive* to *the one*. Since, therefore, the ſoul participates of the prudence which ſubſiſts in intellect, or, in other words, of intellectual prudence, on this account he calls prudence the paſſion of the ſoul. Or we may ſay, that ſince the whole ſoul is through the whole of itſelf ſelf-motive, ſo far as it *moves itſelf* it *acts*, but ſo far as it is *moved* it *ſuffers*.

[2] This is the third argument derived from life, that the ſoul rules over the body. For that which uſes an inſtrument poſſeſſes dominion over it.

body to the mortal nature.—But conſider (ſays he), Cebes, whether, from all that has been ſaid, theſe concluſions will reſult to us, that the ſoul is moſt ſimilar to the divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform and indiſſoluble nature, and which always ſubſiſts ſimilarly according to the ſame; but that the body is moſt ſimilar to the nature which is human, mortal, void of intellect, multiform, diſſoluble, and which never ſubſiſts according to the ſame. Can we, my dear Cebes, produce any arguments to ſhow that this is not the caſe?—We cannot.

What then? in conſequence of all this, muſt it not be the property of the body, to be ſwiftly diſſolved; but of the ſoul, on the contrary, to be entirely indiſſoluble, or ſomething bordering on ſuch an affection?—How ſhould it not?—Do you conceive, therefore (ſays he), that when a man dies, the viſible part of him, or the body, which is ſituated in a viſible region (and which we call a dead body ſubject to diſſolution, ruin, and diſſipation), does not immediately ſuffer any of theſe affections, but remains for a conſiderable ſpace of time; and if any one dies poſſeſſing a graceful body, that it very much retains its elegant form? for, when the body is bound and buried according to the manner in which the Egyptians bury their dead, it remains almoſt entire for an incredible ſpace of time; and though ſome parts of the body may become rotten, yet the bones and nerves, and every thing of this kind, are preſerved as one may ſay immortal. Is it not ſo?—Certainly.—Can the ſoul, therefore, which is inviſible, and which departs into another place of this kind, a place noble, pure, and inviſible, viz. into Hades[1], to a beneficent and prudent God (at which place, if Divinity is willing, my ſoul will ſhortly arrive); can the ſoul, I ſay, ſince it is naturally of this kind, be immediately diſſipated and periſh on its being liberated from the body, as is aſſerted by the many? This is certainly, my dear Cebes and Simmias, far from being the caſe. But this will much more abundantly take place, if it is liberated in a pure condition, attracting to itſelf nothing of the body, as not having willingly communicated with it in the preſent life, but fled from it and collected itſelf into itſelf; an employment of this kind having been the ſubject of its perpetual meditation. But this is nothing elſe than to phi-

[1] Pluto, ſays Olympiodorus, is celebrated as prudent and good, becauſe he imparts to ſouls the virtue and ſcience which they loſt in the realms of generation. He is alſo Hades, becauſe he wipes away the viſible, which is, as it were, burnt in in the nature of the ſoul.

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loſophize rightly, and to meditate with facility, how *to be dead in reality*. Or will not this be a meditation of death?—Entirely ſo.—Will not the ſoul, therefore, when in this condition, depart to that which is ſimilar to itſelf, a divine nature, and which is likewiſe immortal and prudent? and when it arrives thither, will it not become happy, being liberated from wandering and ignorance, terror and inſane love, and from all other evils belonging to the human nature; and ſo, as it is ſaid of the initiated [1], will in reality paſs the reſt of its time in the ſociety of the Gods? Shall we ſpeak in this manner, Cebes, or otherwiſe?—In this manner, by Jupiter (ſays Cebes).

But I think that if the ſoul departs polluted and impure from the body, as having always been its aſſociate, attending upon and loving the body, and becoming enchanted by it, through its deſires and pleaſures, in ſuch a manner as to think that nothing really is, except what is corporeal, which can be touched and ſeen, eaten and drunk, and employed for the purpoſes of venereal occupations, and at the ſame time is accuſtomed to hate, dread and avoid, that which is dark and inviſible to the eye of ſenſe, which is intelligible and apprehended by philoſophy; do you think that a ſoul thus affected can be liberated from the body, ſo as to ſubſiſt ſincerely by itſelf?—By no means (ſays he).—But I think that it will be contaminated by a corporeal nature, to which its converſe and familiarity with the body, through perpetual aſſociation and abundant meditation, have rendered it ſimilar and allied.—Entirely ſo.—But it is proper, my dear Cebes, to think that ſuch a nature is ponderous and heavy, terreſtrial and viſible [2]; and that a ſoul of this kind, through being connected with ſuch a nature, is rendered heavy, and drawn down again into the viſible region from its dread of that which is inviſible and Hades, and, as it is ſaid, wanders about monuments and tombs; about which

[1] The ſoul when living with Divinity may be ſaid to be truly initiated, as flying both to its own *one* or ſummit, and that of divine natures.

[2] The irrational nature is the image of the rational ſoul. This nature alſo is corporeal, conſiſting of a corporeal life, and a certain body more attenuated than this viſible body. This image, Plato ſays, becomes heavy, and is ſeen about ſepulchres. Hence ſouls that are ſtill bound to the viſible nature through a ſtrong propenſity to body, are ſaid to follow this phantom; and thus they become viſible through participation of the viſible, or ſympathy towards it. But ſuch ſouls, ſays Olympiodorus, are not only willing, but are compelled to wander about ſepulchres, as a puniſhment of their ſympathy about the body. He adds, that the image having a connate deſire towards the outward body, ſometimes alſo draws to it the ſoul, with the conſent of Juſtice.

indeed

indeed certain ſhadowy phantoms of ſouls appear, being the images produced by ſuch ſouls as have not been purely liberated from the body, but which participate of the viſible nature; and on this account they become viſible.—It is very reaſonable to ſuppoſe ſo, Socrates.—It is reaſonable indeed, Cebes: and likewiſe that theſe are not the ſouls of the worthy, but of the depraved, who are compelled to wander about ſuch places; by theſe means ſuffering the puniſhment of their former conduct, which was evil; and they are compelled thus to wander [1] till, through the deſire of a corporeal nature, which attends them, they are again bound to a body.

They are bound, however, as it is proper they ſhould be, to ſuch manners as they have exerciſed in the preſent life.—But what do you ſay theſe manners are, Socrates?—As for example, that ſuch as are addicted to gluttony, arrogant injuries, and drinking, and this without any fear of conſequences, ſhall enter into the tribes of aſſes and brutes of this kind. Or do you not think it proper that they ſhould?—You ſpeak in a manner perfectly becoming.—But ſhall we not ſay, that ſuch as held in the higheſt eſtimation injuſtice, tyranny, and rapine ſhall enter into the tribes of wolves, hawks, and kites? Or where elſe can we ſay ſuch ſouls depart?—Into tribes of this kind, certainly (ſays Cebes).—It will, therefore, be manifeſt concerning the reſt into what nature each departs, according to the ſimilitudes of manners which they have exerciſed.—It is manifeſt (ſays he); for how ſhould it not be ſo?—Are not, therefore (ſays he), thoſe among theſe the moſt happy, and ſuch as depart into the beſt place, who have made popular and political [2] virtue their ſtudy, which they call indeed temperance and juſtice, and which is produced from cuſtom and exerciſe, without philoſophy and intellect?—But how are theſe the moſt happy?—Becauſe it is fit that theſe ſhould again migrate into a political and mild tribe of this kind; ſuch as bees, waſps, or

[1] "Guilty ſouls," ſays the philoſopher Salluſt (De Diis et Mundo, cap. 19.), "are puniſhed on their departure from the preſent body; ſome by wandering about this part of the earth; others about certain of its hot or cold regions; and others are tormented by avenging dæmons. But, univerſally, the rational ſoul ſuffers puniſhment in conjunction with the irrational ſoul, the partner of its guilt; and through this that ſhadowy body derives its ſubſiſtence which is beheld about ſepulchres, and eſpecially about the tombs of ſuch as have lived an abandoned life."

[2] It muſt here be obvious to the moſt careleſs reader, that, according to Plato, the *political* are not the *true* virtues.

ants, or into the ſame human tribe again, and from theſe become moderate men.—It is fit.

But it is not lawful for any to paſs into the genus of Gods, except ſuch as, through a love of learning, have philoſophized, and departed from hence perfectly pure. And for the ſake of this, my dear Simmias and Cebes, thoſe who have philoſophized rightly abſtain from all deſires belonging to the body, and ſtrenuouſly perſevere in this abſtinence, without giving themſelves up to their dominion; nor is it becauſe they dread the ruin of their families, and poverty, like the multitude of the lovers of wealth; nor yet becauſe they are afraid of ignominy and the infamy of improbity, like thoſe who are lovers of dominion and honours, that they abſtain from theſe deſires.—For it would not, Socrates, become them ſo to do (ſays Cebes).—It would not, by Jupiter (ſays he).—Hence thoſe (ſays he), O Cebes! who take care of their ſoul, and do not live in a ſtate of ſubſerviency to their bodies, bidding farewell to all ſuch characters as we have mentioned above, do not proceed in the ſame path with theſe during the journey of life, becauſe ſuch characters are ignorant how they ſhould direct their courſe; but conſidering that they ought not to act contrary to philoſophy, and to its ſolution and purification, they give themſelves up to its direction, and follow wherever it leads.—In what manner, Socrates?—I will tell you (ſays he).

The lovers of learning well know, that when philoſophy receives their ſoul into her protection (and when ſhe does ſo, ſhe finds it vehemently bound and agglutinated to the body, and compelled to ſpeculate things through this, as through a place of confinement, inſtead of beholding herſelf through herſelf; and beſides this, rolled in every kind of ignorance: philoſophy likewiſe beholds the dire nature of the confinement, that it ariſes through deſire; ſo that he who is bound in an eminent degree aſſiſts in binding himſelf); the lovers of learning therefore, I ſay, know that philoſophy, receiving their ſoul in this condition, endeavours gently to exhort it, and diſſolve its bonds; and this ſhe attempts to accompliſh, by ſhowing that the inſpection of things through the eyes is full of deception, and that this is likewiſe the caſe with perception through the ears and the other ſenſes. Philoſophy too perſuades the ſoul to depart from all theſe fallacious informations, and to employ them no further than neceſſity requires; and exhorts her to call together and collect herſelf into one. And beſides this, to believe in no other than herſelf, with

reſpect to what ſhe underſtands, herſelf ſubſiſting by herſelf, of that which has likewiſe a real ſubſiſtence by itſelf; and not to conſider that as having a true being which ſhe ſpeculates through others, and which has its ſubſiſtence in others. And laſtly, that a thing of this kind is ſenſible and viſible; but that what ſhe herſelf perceives is intelligible and inviſible. The ſoul of a true philoſopher, therefore, thinking that he ought not to oppoſe this ſolution, abſtains as much as poſſible from pleaſures and deſires, griefs and fears, conſidering that when any one is vehemently delighted or terrified, afflicted or deſirous, he does not ſuffer any ſuch mighty evil from theſe as ſome one may perhaps conceive, I mean ſuch as diſeaſe and a conſumption of wealth, through indulging his deſires; but that he ſuffers that which is the greateſt, and the extremity of all evils, and this without apprehending that he does ſo.—But what is this evil, Socrates (ſays Cebes)?—That the ſoul of every man is compelled at the ſame time to be either vehemently delighted or afflicted about ſome particular thing, and to conſider that about which it is thus eminently paſſive, as having a moſt evident and true ſubſiſtence, though this is by no means the caſe; and that theſe are moſt eſpecially viſible objects. Is it not ſo?—Entirely.—In this paſſion, therefore, is not the ſoul in the higheſt degree bound to the body?—In what manner?—Becauſe every pleaſure and pain, as if armed with a nail, faſten and rivet the ſoul to the body, cauſe it to become corporeal, and fill it with an opinion, that whatever the body aſſerts is true. For, in conſequence of the ſoul forming the ſame opinions with the body, and being delighted with the ſame objects, it appears to me that it is compelled to poſſeſs ſimilar manners, and to be ſimilarly nouriſhed, and to become ſo affected, that it can never paſs into Hades in a pure condition; but always departs full of a corporeal nature; and thus ſwiftly falls again into another body, and, becoming as it were ſown, is engendered; and laſtly, that from theſe it becomes deſtitute of a divine, pure, and uniform aſſociation.—You ſpeak moſt true, Socrates (ſays Cebes).

For the ſake of theſe things therefore, O Cebes! thoſe who are juſtly lovers of learning are moderate and brave, and not for the ſake of ſuch as the multitude aſſert. Or do you think it is?—By no means; for it cannot be.—But the ſoul of a philoſopher reaſons in this manner; and does not think that philoſophy ought to free him from the body, but that when he is freed he may give himſelf up to pleaſures and pains, by which he will again be bound

bound to the body, and will undertake a work which it is impoſſible to finiſh, reweaving a certain web of Penelope [1]. But procuring tranquillity with reſpect to theſe, and following the guidance of the reaſoning power, and being always converſant with this, contemplating at the ſame time that which is true, divine, and not the ſubject of opinion, and being likewiſe nouriſhed by ſuch an object of contemplation, he will think that he ought to live in this manner while he lives, and that when he dies he ſhall depart to a kindred eſſence, and an eſſence of this kind, being liberated from the maladies of the human nature. But from a nutriment of this kind the ſoul has no occaſion to fear (while it makes theſe, O Simmias and Cebes! its ſtudy) leſt, in its liberation from the body, it ſhould be lacerated, and, being blown about and diſſipated by the winds, ſhould vaniſh, and no longer have anywhere a ſubſiſtence.

When Socrates had thus ſpoken, a long ſilence enſued; and Socrates ſeemed to revolve with himſelf what had been ſaid; as likewiſe did the greateſt part of us: but Cebes and Simmias diſcourſed a little with each other. And Socrates at length looking upon them, What (ſays he), do our aſſertions appear to you to have been not ſufficiently demonſtrated? for many doubts and ſuſpicions yet remain, if any one undertakes to inveſtigate them ſufficiently. If, therefore, you are conſidering ſomething elſe among yourſelves, I have nothing to ſay; but if you are doubting about thoſe particulars which we have juſt now made the ſubject of our diſcourſe, do not be remiſs in ſpeaking about and running over what has been ſaid, if it appears to you in any reſpect that we might have ſpoken better; and receive me again as your aſſociate, if you think that you can be any ways benefited by my aſſiſtance. Upon this Simmias ſaid, Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth: for ſome time ſince each of us being agitated with doubts, we impelled and exhorted one another to interrogate you, through our deſire of hearing them ſolved; but we were afraid of cauſing a debate, leſt it ſhould be diſagreeable to you in your preſent circumſtances. But Socrates, upon hearing this, gently laughed, and ſaid, This is ſtrange, indeed, Simmias; for

[1] As Penelope, who is the image of Philoſophy, unwove by night what ſhe had woven by day, ſo Ignorance reweaves what Philoſophy unweaves. Hence Philoſophy diſſolves the ſoul from, but Ignorance weaves it to, the body.

I ſhall with difficulty be able to perſuade other men that I do not conſider the preſent fortune as a calamity, ſince I am not able to perſuade even you; but you are afraid leſt I ſhould be more moroſe now than I was prior to the preſent event. And, as it ſeems, I appear to you to be more deſpicable than ſwans with reſpect to divination, who, when they perceive that it is neceſſary for them to die, ſing not only as uſual, but then more than ever; rejoicing that they are about to depart to that Deity in whoſe ſervice they are engaged. But men, becauſe they themſelves are afraid of death, falſely accuſe the ſwans, and aſſert that, in conſequence of their being afflicted at death, their ſong is the reſult of grief. Nor do they conſider that no bird ſings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted with any other malady; neither the nightingale, nor the ſwallow, nor the lapwing, all which they ſay ſing lamenting through diſtreſs. But neither do theſe birds, as it appears to me, ſing through ſorrow, nor yet the ſwans; but in my opinion theſe laſt are prophetic, as belonging to Apollo; and in conſequence of foreſeeing the good which Hades contains, they ſing and rejoice at that period more remarkably than at any preceding time. But I conſider myſelf as a fellow-ſervant of the ſwans, and ſacred to the ſame Divinity. I poſſeſs a divining power from our common maſter no leſs than they; nor ſhall I be more afflicted than the ſwan in being liberated from the preſent life. Hence it is proper that you ſhould both ſpeak and inquire about whatever you pleaſe, as long as the eleven magiſtrates will permit. You ſpeak excellently well (ſays Simmias); and as you give me permiſſion, I will both tell you what are my doubts, and how far Cebes does not admit what has been ſaid. For, as to myſelf, Socrates, I am perhaps of the ſame opinion about theſe particulars as yourſelf; that to know them clearly in the preſent life is either impoſſible, or a thing very difficult to obtain. But not to argue about what has been ſaid in every poſſible way, and to deſiſt before by an arduous inveſtigation on all ſides wearineſs is produced, can only take place among indolent and effeminate men. For it is neceſſary, in things of this kind, either to learn or to diſcover the manner of their ſubſiſtence; or, if both theſe are impoſſible, then, by receiving the beſt of human reaſons, and that which is the moſt difficult of confutation, to venture upon this as on a raft, and ſail in it through the ocean of life, unleſs ſome one ſhould be able to be carried more ſafely,

ſafely, and with leſs danger, by means of a firmer vehicle, or a certain *divine reaſon*[1]. I ſhall not, therefore, now be aſhamed to interrogate, in conſequence of the confeſſion which you have made; nor ſhall I blame myſelf hereafter, that I have not ſpoken what appears to me at preſent: for, upon conſidering what has been ſaid, both with myſelf and together with Cebes, your doctrine did not ſeem to be ſufficiently confirmed.

And perhaps, my friend (ſays Socrates), you have the truth on your ſide; but inform me in what reſpect it did not ſeem to be ſufficiently confirmed.—In this (ſays he); becauſe any one may aſſert the ſame about harmony[2], and a lyre, and its chords; that, for inſtance, harmony is ſomething inviſible and incorporeal, all-beautiful and divine, in a well-modulated lyre: but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of a corporeal nature; are compoſites and terreſtrial, and allied to that which is mortal. When any one, therefore, ſhall either have broken the lyre, or cut and burſt the chords, ſome perſon may contend from the ſame reaſoning as yours, that it is neceſſary the harmony ſhould yet remain, and not be deſtroyed (for it cannot in any reſpect be poſſible that the lyre ſhould ſubſiſt when the chords are burſt, and the chords themſelves are of a mortal nature; but the harmony, which is connate and allied to that which is divine and immortal, will become extinct, and periſh prior to the mortal nature itſelf); becauſe it is neceſſary that harmony ſhould be ſomewhere, and that the wood and chords muſt ſuffer putrefaction, before this can be ſubject to any paſſion. For I think, Socrates, that you yourſelf have alſo perceived this, that we conſider the ſoul in the moſt eminent degree, as ſomething of ſuch a kind as to become the temperament of hot and cold, moiſt and dry, and ſuch-like affections, for the reception of which our body is extended, and by which it is contained: and

[1] See the Introduction to this Dialogue.

[2] Harmony has a triple ſubſiſtence. For it is either harmony itſelf, or it is that which is firſt harmonized, and which is ſuch according to the whole of itſelf; or it is that which is ſecondarily harmonized, and which partially participates of harmony. The firſt of theſe muſt be aſſigned to intellect, the ſecond to ſoul, and the third to body. This laſt too is corruptible, becauſe it ſubſiſts in a ſubject; but the other two are incorruptible, becauſe they are neither compoſites, nor dependent on a ſubject. Simmias, therefore, reaſons falſely in what he here ſays, in conſequence of looking to the third ſpecies of harmony only. Hence, the rational ſoul is analogous to a muſician, but the animated body to harmonized chords: for the former has a ſubſiſtence ſeparate, but the latter inſeparable from the muſical inſtrument.

that the ſoul is the harmony of all theſe, when they are beautifully and moderately tempered with each other. If, therefore, the ſoul is a certain harmony, it is evident that when our body ſuffers either intenſion or remiſſion, through diſeaſes and other maladies, the ſoul muſt from neceſſity immediately periſh, though of the moſt divine nature (in the ſame manner as other harmonies periſh, which either ſubſiſt in ſounds or in the works of artificers); but the remaining parts of the body of each perſon muſt ſubſiſt for a long time, till they are either burnt or become rotten. Conſider then what we ſhall ſay to this diſcourſe, if any one ſhould think, ſince the ſoul is the temperament of things ſubſiſting in the body, that it periſhes the firſt, in that which is called death.

Socrates, therefore, beholding us, and laughing as he was accuſtomed to do very often, Simmias (ſays he) ſpeaks juſtly. If any one of you, therefore, is more prompt than I am, why does he not reply to theſe objections? for he ſeems not to have handled this affair badly. But it appears to me, that before we make our reply we ſhould firſt hear Cebes, and know what it is which he objects to our diſcourſe; that, in conſequence of ſome time intervening, we may deliberate what we ſhall ſay; and that afterwards, upon hearing the objections, we may either aſſent to them, if they appear to aſſert any thing becoming; or, if they do not, that we may defend the diſcourſe we have already delivered. But (ſays he) tell me, Cebes, what it is which ſo diſturbs you, as to cauſe your unbelief.—I will tell you (ſays Cebes): your diſcourſe ſeems to me to be yet in the ſame ſtate, and to be liable to the ſame accuſation as we mentioned before. For, that our ſoul had a ſubſiſtence before it came into the preſent form, is an aſſertion, I will not deny, of a very elegant kind, and (if it is not too much to ſay) ſufficiently demonſtrated: but that it ſtill remains when we are dead, does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I aſſent to the objection of Simmias, that the ſoul is not ſtronger and more laſting than the body, for it appears to me to be much more excellent than all theſe. Why then, ſays reaſon, do you yet diſbelieve? for, ſince you ſee that when a man dies that which is more imbecil ſtill remains, does it not appear to you to be neceſſary that the more laſting nature ſhould be preſerved during this period of time? Conſider, therefore, whether I ſhall ſay any thing to the purpoſe in reply. For I, as well as Simmias, as it ſeems, ſtand in need of a certain ſimilitude: for to me

theſe things appear to be aſſerted in the ſame manner, as if any one ſhould ſay concerning an aged dead weaver, that the man has not yet periſhed, but perhaps ſtill ſurvives ſomewhere; and ſhould exhibit as an argument in proof of this aſſertion a veſtment woven by himſelf, which he wore, and which is yet ſafe and entire. And if he ſhould aſk ſome one not crediting his aſſertion, which is the more laſting, the genus of man or of a garment, whoſe ſubſiſtence conſiſts in its uſe and in being worn; then ſhould it be replied, that the genus of man is much more laſting, he might think it demonſtrated, that the man is by a much ſtronger reaſon preſerved, ſince that which is of a ſhorter duration has not yet periſhed. But I do not think, Simmias, that this is the caſe. For conſider with yourſelf what I ſay: ſince every perſon muſt apprehend, that he who aſſerts this ſpeaks fooliſhly. For this weaver, having worn and woven many ſuch veſtments, died *after* them being many, but I think *before* the laſt; and yet it cannot be any thing the more inferred on this account, that the man is viler or more imbecil than a veſtment. And I think that the ſoul, with reſpect to the body, will receive the ſame ſimilitude; and he who ſhall aſſert the ſame concerning theſe, will appear to me to ſpeak in a very equitable manner; I mean that the ſoul is of a laſting nature, but the body more debile and leſs durable. But I ſhould ſay that each ſoul wears many bodies, eſpecially if it lives many years; for, if the body glides away like a ſtream, and is diſſolved while the man yet lives, but the ſoul perpetually re-weaves that which is worn and conſumed, it will be neceſſary indeed, that when the ſoul is deſtroyed it ſhould then be clothed with the laſt veſtment, and ſhould periſh prior to this alone. But the ſoul having periſhed, then the body will evince the nature of its imbecility, and, becoming rapidly rotten, will be perfectly diſſolved: ſo that, in conſequence of this reaſoning, it is not yet proper that we ſhould be perſuaded to believe with confidence, that our ſoul ſubſiſts ſomewhere after we are dead. For, if any one ſhould aſſent to him who aſſerts even more than you have done, and ſhould grant that not only our ſoul had an exiſtence before we were born into the preſent life, but that nothing hinders us from admitting that certain ſouls after death may ſtill have a ſubſiſtence, exiſt in ſome future period, and often be born, and again periſh (for ſo naturally ſtrong is the ſoul, that it will preſerve itſelf through frequent births); but this being granted, it may ſtill follow, that it will not only labour in

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thoſe many generations, but that, finiſhing its courſe, in ſome one of theſe deaths, it will entirely periſh. But no one ſhould ſay that this death and diſſolution of the body, which alſo introduces deſtruction to the ſoul, can be known: for it is impoſſible that it can be perceived by any one of us. If this, however, be the caſe, it will not follow that he who poſſeſſes the confidence of good hope concerning death is not fooliſhly confident, unleſs he can demonſtrate that the ſoul is perfectly immortal and undecaying: for otherwiſe it will be neceſſary, that he who is about to die ſhould always fear for his ſoul, leſt in the death, which is at hand, he ſhould entirely periſh through the ſeparation of his body.

When we heard them, therefore, ſpeak in this manner, we were all of us very diſagreeably affected, as we afterwards declared to each other; becauſe, as we were in the higheſt degree perſuaded by the former diſcourſe, they again ſeemed to diſturb us and to caſt us into unbelief; and this in ſuch a manner, as not only to cauſe us to deny our aſſent to the arguments which had been already adduced, but to ſuch as might afterwards be aſſerted, fearing leſt either we ſhould not be proper judges of any thing, or that the things themſelves ſhould be unworthy of belief.

Echec. By the Gods, Phædo, I can eaſily pardon you: for, while I am now hearing you, I cannot refrain from ſaying to myſelf, In what arguments can we any longer believe? For the diſcourſe of Socrates, which a little before was exceedingly credible, is now fallen into unbelief. For the aſſertion, that our ſoul is a certain harmony, gained my aſſent both now and always in a wonderful manner; and now it is mentioned, it recalls as it were into my memory a knowledge that I formerly was of the ſame opinion. And thus I am perfectly indigent again of ſome other reaſon, as if from the very beginning, which may perſuade me that the ſoul of a dead man does not die together with the body. Tell me therefore, by Jupiter, how Socrates purſued the diſcourſe; and whether he, as you confeſs was the caſe with yourſelf, ſeemed troubled at theſe objections; or, on the contrary, anſwered them with facility; and whether he defended his doctrine ſufficiently, or in a defective manner. Relate all theſe particulars to us as accurately as you can.

Phæd. Indeed, Echecrates, I have often admired Socrates; but never more ſo than at that time. That he ſhould be able indeed to ſay ſomething

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in reply, is perhaps not wonderful; but I eſpecially admired, in the firſt place, this in him, that he received the diſcourſe of the young men in ſuch a pleaſant, benevolent and wonderful manner; and, in the next place, that he ſo acutely perceived how we were affected by their objections; and laſtly, that he ſo well cured our diſturbance, recalled us, as if flying and vanquiſhed, and cauſed us, in conjunction with himſelf, to purſue and conſider the diſcourſe.

ECHEC. But how did he do this?

PHÆD. I will tell you: I happened at that time to ſit at his right hand, upon a low ſeat near his bed; but he himſelf ſat much higher than I did. Stroking me on the head, therefore, and compreſſing the hair which hung on my neck (for he uſed ſometimes to play with my hairs), To-morrow (ſays he), Phædo, you will perhaps cut off theſe beautiful locks.—It ſeems ſo, indeed (ſays I), Socrates.—But you will not (ſays he), if you will be perſuaded by me.—But why not (ſays I)?—For both you and I (ſays he) ought to cut off our hair to-day, if our diſcourſe muſt die, and we are not able to recall it to life again. And I indeed, if I was you, and I found that diſcourſe fled from me, would take an oath after the manner of the Argives, that I would never ſuffer my hair to grow, till, by conteſting in diſputation, I had vanquiſhed the objections of Simmias and Cebes.—But (ſays I) Hercules is reported not to have been ſufficient againſt two.—Call upon me, therefore (ſays he), as your Iolaus[1] while the light yet laſts.—I call then (ſays I), not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as Iolaus upon Hercules.—It is of no conſequence (ſays he).

But, in the firſt place, we muſt be careful that we are not influenced by a certain paſſion.—What paſſion (ſays I)?—That we do not become (ſays he) haters[2] of reaſon, in the ſame manner as ſome become haters of men. For no greater evil can happen to any one than to be a hater of reaſons. But a

[1] Iolaus was the ſon of Iphiclus king of Theſſaly. He aſſiſted Hercules in conquering the Hydra, and burnt with a hot iron the place where the heads had been cut off, to prevent the growth of others.

[2] Four inevitable conſequences attend the man who hates reaſon. In the firſt place, he muſt hate himſelf; for he is eſſentially rational. In the ſecond place, he muſt hate truth; for this can only be diſcovered by the exerciſe of reaſon. In the third place, he muſt be a lover of that which is irrational. And, in the fourth place, he muſt be brutalized, as far as this is poſſible to man.

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hatred of reaſon and a hatred of mankind are both produced in the ſame manner. For miſanthropy is produced in us through very much believing without art in ſome particular perſon, and conſidering him as a man true, ſincere, and faithful, whom in the courſe of a ſhort acquaintance we find to be depraved and unfaithful; and that this is the caſe again with another. And when any one often ſuffers this diſappointment, and eſpecially from thoſe whom he conſidered as his moſt intimate familiars and friends, at length, through finding himſelf thus frequently hurt, he hates all men, and thinks that there is nothing in any reſpect ſincere in any one. Or have you never perceived that this is the caſe?—Entirely ſo (ſays I).—But is not this baſe (ſays he)? and is it not evident that ſuch a one attempts to make uſe of men, without poſſeſſing the art which reſpects human affairs? For if, in a certain reſpect, he employed them with art, he would think, as the caſe really is, that men very good, or very bad, are but few in number; and that the greater part of mankind are thoſe which ſubſiſt between theſe.—How do you mean (ſays I)?—In the ſame manner (ſays he) as about things very ſmall and very great. Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large or a very ſmall man, or dog, or any thing elſe; and again any thing exceſſively ſwift or ſlow, beautiful or baſe, white or black? Or do you not perceive that the ſummits of the extremes of all theſe are rare and few, but that things ſubſiſting between theſe are copious and many?—Entirely ſo (ſays I).—Do you not, therefore, think (ſays he) that if a conteſt of improbity ſhould be propoſed, thoſe who hold the firſt rank among the baſe would be found to be but few?—It is agreeable to reaſon to think ſo (ſays I).—It is ſo, indeed (ſays he); but in this reſpect reaſons are not ſimilar to men (for I ſhall now follow you as the leader); but in this they are ſimilar, when any one, for inſtance, without poſſeſſing the art belonging to diſcourſe, believes that a certain diſcourſe is true, and ſhortly after it appears to him to be falſe, as it is ſometimes the one and ſometimes the other, and the ſame thing happens to him about different diſcourſes. And this is particularly the caſe with thoſe who are familiar with contradictory arguments; for theſe you know think that they at length become moſt wiſe, and alone perceive that there is nothing ſound and ſtable either in things or reaſons; but that every thing is whirled upwards and downwards, as if exiſting in the river Euripus, and does not abide in any one condition for

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any portion of time whatever.—You ſpeak perfectly true (ſays I).—Would it not then (ſays he), Phædo, be a paſſion worthy of commiſeration, if, when a certain reaſon is true and firm, and is capable of being underſtood, yet ſome one falling from this ſhould be involved in doubt, becauſe he has heard reaſons, which, though remaining the ſame, yet have at one time appeared to be true, and at another falſe; and ſhould not accuſe himſelf and his own want of ſkill, but at length through grief ſhould transfer all the blame from himſelf to the reaſons; and thus ſhould paſs the remainder of his life, hating and ſlandering reaſons, and deprived of the truth and ſcience of things?—By Jupiter (ſays I), ſuch a one would be miſerable indeed.

In the firſt place, therefore (ſays he), we ſhould be very careful againſt admitting an opinion, that no reaſoning appears to be valid; but we ſhould much rather think that we are not yet in a healthy condition, and that we ought vigorouſly and cheerfully to ſtudy how to be well. And this indeed ought to be the caſe with you and others, for the ſake of the whole remainder of your life, but with me, for the ſake of death itſelf; as there is danger at the preſent time, leſt I ſhould not behave philoſophically, but, like thoſe who are perfectly unſkilled, contentiouſly. For ſuch as theſe, when they controvert any particular, are not at all concerned how that ſubſiſts about which they diſpute; but are alone anxious, that what they have eſtabliſhed may appear to the perſons preſent to be true. And I ſeem to myſelf at preſent to differ alone in this reſpect from ſuch as theſe: for I am not ſolicitous that my diſcourſe may appear true to thoſe who are preſent (except juſt as it may happen in paſſing), but that it may appear to be ſo in the moſt eminent degree to me myſelf. For I thus reaſon, my dear friend (and ſee in how fraudulent a manner), that if my aſſertions are true, it will be a beautiful circumſtance to be perſuaded of their truth; but that if nothing remains for the dead, I ſhall at leaſt have the advantage of being leſs afflicted with my preſent condition than others. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long (for it would be bad if it ſhould), but ſhortly after this will be diſſolved; and being thus prepared (ſays he), Simmias and Cebes, I ſhall now return to the diſcourſe. But, that you may be perſuaded by me, pay no attention to the perſon of Socrates, but be much more ſolicitous in aſſenting to the truth, if I ſhould appear to you to aſſert any thing true; but if this ſhould not be the caſe, oppoſe me with all your might, and beware, leſt

through too much ardour I ſhould deceive both myſelf and you, and, acting in this reſpect like bees, ſhould depart from you, leaving my ſting behind.

But to begin (ſays he): In the firſt place, remind me of what you have ſaid, if it ſhould appear that I have forgotten it. For Simmias, I think, diſtruſted and was afraid leſt the ſoul, though it is at the ſame time more divine and beautiful than the body, ſhould periſh before it, as ſubſiſting in the form of harmony. But Cebes appears to me to have admitted this, that the ſoul is more laſting than the body; but yet that it is perfectly uncertain, whether after the ſoul has worn out many bodies, and this often, it may not at length, leaving body behind, itſelf alſo periſh; ſo that this will be death itſelf, I mean the deſtruction of the ſoul, ſince the body perpetually periſhes without ceaſing. Are not theſe the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we ought to conſider?—They both confeſſed that the particulars were theſe.—Whether, therefore (ſays he), do you reject the whole of our former diſcourſe, or do you reject ſome things and not others?—They replied, We admit ſome things, and not others.—What then (ſays he) do you ſay about that diſcourſe, in which we aſſerted that learning is reminiſcence; and that, this being the caſe, our ſoul muſt neceſſarily have ſubſiſted ſomewhere before it was bound in the body?—I indeed (ſays Cebes) was both then wonderfully perſuaded by that diſcourſe, and now firmly abide in the ſame opinion.—And I alſo (ſays Simmias) am affected in the ſame manner; and I ſhould very much wonder ſhould I ever conceive otherwiſe about this particular.—But (ſays Socrates) it is neceſſary, my Theban gueſt, that it ſhould appear otherwiſe to you, if you ſtill continue of the opinion, that harmony is ſomething compoſite, and that the ſoul is a certain harmony, compoſed from things extended through the body. For you will never aſſent to yourſelf aſſerting, that harmony was compoſed prior to the things from which it ought to be compoſed; or do you think you can?—By no means (ſays he), Socrates.—Do you perceive, therefore (ſays he), that you will not be conſiſtent in your aſſertions, when you ſay that the ſoul had a ſubſiſtence before it came into a human form and into body, but that at the ſame time it was compoſed from things which then had not a being? For neither is harmony ſuch as that to which you aſſimilate it; but the lyre, and the chords, and the ſounds yet unharmonized, have a prior exiſtence; but harmony is compoſed the laſt of all, and is the firſt diſſolved. How, therefore, can this diſcourſe be conſonant with that?—In no reſpect (ſays Simmias).—

mias).—But it certainly is proper (ſays he) that a diſcourſe about harmony ſhould be conſonant, if this can ever be aſſerted of any other.—It is proper, indeed (ſays Simmias).—But this diſcourſe of yours is not conſonant. Conſider, therefore, which of theſe aſſertions you will chooſe, that learning is reminiſcence, or that the ſoul is harmony. I prefer the former, Socrates, by much; for the latter gained my aſſent without a demonſtration, through nothing more than a certain probability and ſpecious appearance; from whence alſo it appears evident to the multitude of mankind. But I well know, that the diſcourſes which frame their demonſtrations from aſſimilative reaſons only are nothing more than empty boaſtings; and unleſs a man defends himſelf againſt them, they will very much deceive him, both in geometry and all other ſpeculations. But the diſcourſe about reminiſcence and learning was delivered through an hypotheſis highly worthy of reception. For in this it was ſaid that our ſoul had a ſubſiſtence ſomewhere before it came into the preſent body, as it is an eſſence poſſeſſing the appellation of that which truly is. But, as I perſuade myſelf, I aſſent to this doctrine in a manner ſufficient and proper; and hence it is neceſſary, as it appears to me, that I ſhould neither aſſent to myſelf nor to any other aſſerting that the ſoul is harmony.

But what (ſays he), Simmias? Does it appear to you that it can either belong to this harmony, or to any compoſition, to ſubſiſt differently from the things from which it is compoſed?—By no means.—And indeed, as it appears to me, it can neither perform nor ſuffer any thing elſe, beſides what theſe perform and ſuffer.—He agreed it could not.—It does not, therefore, belong to harmony to be the leader of the materials from which it is compoſed, but to follow them.—This alſo he granted.—It is far, therefore, from being the caſe, that harmony will either be moved or ſound contrary, or in any other reſpect be adverſe to its parts.—Very far, indeed, (ſays he).—But what, does not every harmony naturally ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner as to be harmony, ſo far as it receives a congruous temperament?—I do not underſtand you.—But (ſays he) if it were poſſible that it could be congruouſly tempered with ſtill greater vehemence, and more in quantity, would it not be more vehemently harmony and more in quantity; but if leſs vehemently and leſs in quantity, juſt the contrary?—Entirely ſo.—But can it be ſaid of the ſoul, that, even in the ſmalleſt circumſtance, one ſoul is more vehemently and

more in quantity, or leſs vehemently and leſs in quantity, ſoul, than another?—By no means (ſays he).—Conſider then (ſays he), by Jupiter, is it truly ſaid, that one ſoul poſſeſſes intellect and virtue, and is good; but that another is fooliſh and vicious, and is bad?—It is truly ſaid.—Among thoſe, therefore, who eſtabliſh the ſoul as harmony, what can any one call virtue and vice in the ſoul? Will he call the one harmony, and the other diſcord? And that the one, that is to ſay the good ſoul, is harmonized; and, as it is harmony, poſſeſſes another harmony in itſelf; but that the other is diſcord, and does not contain in itſelf another harmony?—I know not what to reply (ſays Simmias); but it is manifeſt, that he who eſtabliſhes this would make ſome ſuch reply. But it has been granted (ſays he), that one ſoul is not more or leſs ſoul than another; and this is no other than to confeſs, that one harmony is not more vehemently and more in quantity, nor leſs vehemently and leſs in quantity, harmony, than another: is it not ſo?—Entirely ſo.—But that which is neither more nor leſs harmony, is neither more nor leſs harmonized: is it not ſo?—It is.—But can that which is neither more nor leſs harmonized participate more or leſs of harmony[1]? or does it equally participate?—Equally.—The ſoul, therefore, ſince it is not more or leſs ſoul than another, is not more or leſs harmonized.—It is not.—But ſince it is thus affected, it will neither participate more of diſcord nor of harmony.—By no means.—And again, in conſequence of this paſſion, can one ſoul participate more of vice or virtue than another, ſince vice is diſcord, but virtue harmony?—It cannot.—But rather, Simmias, according to right reaſon, no ſoul will participate of vice, ſince it is harmony: for doubtleſs the harmony, which is perfectly ſuch, can never participate of diſcord.—It certainly cannot.—Neither, therefore, can the ſoul, which is perfectly

[1] As every rational ſoul is an incorporeal harmony ſeparate from a ſubject, it does not admit of intenſions and remiſſions; and, therefore, one rational ſoul is neither more nor leſs harmony than another, ſo far as each is *eſſentially* harmony. One ſoul, however, may be more ſimilar to intellect, or harmony itſelf, than another, and, ſo far as it is more ſimilar, will be more harmony in *energy*. Hence, virtue may be conſidered as the concord, and vice as the diſcord, of the rational and irrational nature; the former being produced from the rational harmonizing the irrational part, in conſequence of being a harmony more energetic; and the latter ariſing from the irrational being unharmonized by the rational part, becauſe in this caſe the eſſential harmony of the ſoul is more dormant than energetic. The reaſoning, therefore, of Socrates does not apply to that harmony which is ſeparate, but to that which is inſeparable from body.

ſoul,

ſoul, participate of vice: for how can it, in conſequence of what has been ſaid? In conſequence of this reaſoning, therefore, the ſouls of all animals will be ſimilarly good; ſince they are naturally ſimilarly ſouls, with reſpect to the eſſence of ſoul.—To me it appears ſo, Socrates (ſays he).—If the hypotheſis therefore was right, would it appear to you to be beautifully ſaid, and that this conſequence enſued, that the ſoul is harmony?—By no means (ſays he).

But what (ſays Socrates), among all the things which are inherent in man, would you ſay that any thing elſe governed except ſoul, if he be a prudent man?—I ſhould not.—But whether does the ſoul govern, by aſſenting to the paſſions belonging to the body, or by oppoſing them? My meaning is this, that when heat and thirſt are preſent, the ſoul, if it governs, will frequently draw the body to the contrary, i. e. not to drink; and hunger being preſent, that it ſhall not eat; and in a thouſand other inſtances we may behold the ſoul oppoſing the deſires of the body: may we not?—Entirely ſo.—Have we not above confeſſed, that if the ſoul was harmony, it would never ſound contrary to the intenſions, remiſſions, or vibrations, or any other paſſion belonging to its component parts, but that it would follow, and never rule over them?—We have granted this (ſays he); for how could we do otherwiſe?—But what, does not the ſoul now appear to act juſt the contrary to this, ruling over all thoſe particulars, from which it may be ſaid it ſubſiſts, nearly oppoſing all of them through the whole of life, and exerciſing abſolute dominion over them all manner of ways, puniſhing ſome of theſe indeed with greater difficulty, and accompanied with pain; ſome through gymnaſtic and medicine, and ſome by milder methods, and ſome again by threats, and others by admoniſhing deſire, anger, and fear; addreſſing that which it oppoſes, as being itſelf of a different nature? juſt as Homer does in the Odyſſey[1], where he ſays of Ulyſſes:

> "His breaſt he ſtruck, and cried, My heart, ſuſtain
> "This ill! for thou haſt borne far greater pain."

Do you think that Homer deviſed this in conſequence of thinking that the ſoul is harmony, and of ſuch a kind as to be led by the paſſions of the body,

[1] Lib. xix. ver. 15.

and not ſuch as is naturally adapted to lead and govern, and which is ſomething much more divine than harmony?—By Jupiter, Socrates, I do not think that he did.—By no means, therefore, moſt excellent man, ſhall we do well, in aſſerting that the ſoul is a *certain*[1] harmony: for by thus aſſerting, as it appears, we ſhall neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor be conſiſtent with ourſelves.—It is ſo, indeed (ſays he).

Let it then be ſo (ſays Socrates); and thus, as it appears, we have ſufficiently appeaſed the patrons of the Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what diſcourſe ſhall we appeaſe the patrons of Cadmus[2]?—You appear to me (ſays Cebes) to be likely to find out a way: for you have delivered this diſcourſe againſt harmony in a wonderful manner, and beyond what I expected. For, while Simmias related his doubts, I thought it would be a moſt admirable thing, ſhould any one be able to reply to his diſcourſe. He therefore appears to me, in a manner perfectly extraordinary, not to have ſuſtained the very firſt aſſault of your diſcourſe. I ſhould not, therefore, be ſurpriſed if the arguments of Cadmus met with the ſame fate.—My good friend (ſays Socrates), do not ſpeak ſo magnificently, leſt a certain envy ſhould ſubvert our future diſcourſe. Theſe things, indeed, will be taken care of by Divinity. But we, approaching near in an Homeric manner, will try whether you ſay any thing to the purpoſe. This then is the ſum of what you inquire: you think it proper to demonſtrate that our ſoul is without decay, and immortal; that a philoſopher who is about to die with all the confidence of hope, and who thinks that after death he ſhall be far more happy than in the preſent life, may not indulge a ſtupid and fooliſh confidence. But you

[1] That is, a harmony ſubſiſting in, and therefore inſeparable from, a ſubject.

[2] "Cadmus," ſays Olympiodorus, "is the ſublunary world, as being Dionyſiacal, on which account Harmony is united to the God, and as being the father of the four Bacchuſes. But they make the four elements to be Dionyſiacal, viz. *fire*, to be *Semele*; *earth*, *Agave*, tearing in pieces her own offſpring; *water*, *Ino*; and laſtly, *air*, *Autonoe*." There is great beauty in conjoining *Harmonia*, or *Harmony*, the daughter of Venus and Mars, with Cadmus. For Venus is the cauſe of all the harmony and analogy in the univerſe, and beautifully illuminates the order and communion of all mundane concerns. But Mars excites the contrarieties of the univerſe, that the world may exiſt perfect and entire from all its parts. The progeny, therefore, of theſe two Divinities muſt be the *concordant diſcord* or *harmony* of the ſublunary world. But Socrates (as Forſter well obſerves in his notes on this dialogue) repreſents Cebes as another Cadmus, becauſe, according to his doctrine, men after they are buried, like the teeth of the ſerpent ſlain by Cadmus, will revive in another form, and in a ſhort time like the Cadmæan men will entirely periſh.

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ſay, though it ſhould be ſhown that the ſoul is ſomething robuſt and deiform, and that it ſubſiſted before we were born, yet nothing hinders but that all theſe arguments may not evince its immortality, but only that the ſoul is more laſting than the body, that it formerly exiſted ſomewhere for an immenſe period of time, and that it knew and performed a multitude of things. But that, for all this, it will be nothing the more immortal; but that, entering into the body of a man, it will be the principle of deſtruction to itſelf, as if connected with a diſeaſe: ſo that it will both lead a miſerable life in the body, and at laſt will periſh in that which is called death. But you ſay it is of no conſequence whether it comes into body once or often, with reſpect to our occaſion of fear: for it is very proper that he who neither knows, nor is able to render a reaſon, why the ſoul is immortal, ſhould be afraid of death, unleſs he is deprived of intellect. This, I think, Cebes, is the ſum of what you ſay; and I have repeated it often, that nothing may eſcape our obſervation; and that, if you are willing, you may either add or take away from our ſtatement of the objections. But Cebes replied, I have nothing at preſent either to add or take away; but theſe are the objections which I make.

Socrates, therefore, after he had been ſilent for a long time, and conſidering ſomething by himſelf, ſaid, You require, Cebes, a thing of no ſmall importance: for it is perfectly neceſſary to treat concerning the cauſe of generation and corruption. If you are willing, therefore, I will relate to you what happened to me in this inveſtigation; and afterwards, if any thing which I ſhall ſay ſhall appear to you uſeful, with reſpect to perſuading you in the preſent inquiry, employ it for this purpoſe.—But I am moſt aſſuredly willing (ſays Cebes).—Hear then my narration: When I was a young man, Cebes, I was in a wonderful manner deſirous of that wiſdom which they call a hiſtory[1] of nature: for it appeared to me to be a very ſuperb affair to know the cauſes of each particular, on what account each is generated, why it periſhes, and why it exiſts. And I often toſſed myſelf as it were upwards and

[1] What Socrates here calls *a hiſtory of nature*, is what the moderns call *experimental philoſophy*. The danger of directing the attention ſolely to this ſtudy is, as Socrates juſtly obſerves, truly great. For by ſpeculating no other cauſes than ſuch as are inſtrumental, and which are involved in the darkneſs of matter, the mental eye becomes at length incapable of beholding true and primary cauſes, the ſplendid principles of all things.

downwards; conſidering, in the firſt place, whether after that which is hot and cold has received a certain rottenneſs, as ſome ſay, then animals are nouriſhed; and whether the blood is that through which we become prudent, or air, or fire; or whether none of theſe, but the brain, is that which affords the ſenſes of hearing, ſeeing, and ſmelling; ſo that memory and opinion are generated from theſe, and that from memory and opinion obtaining tranquillity, ſcience is accordingly produced? And again conſidering the corruptions of theſe, and the properties which take place about the heavens and the earth, I at length appeared to myſelf ſo unſkilful in the ſpeculation of theſe, as to receive no advantage from my inquiries. But I will give you a ſufficient proof of the truth of this: for I then became ſo very blind, with reſpect to things which I knew before with great clearneſs (as it appeared both to myſelf and others) through this ſpeculation, as to want inſtruction both in many particulars, which I thought I had known before, and in this, why a man is increaſed. For I thought it was evident to every one that this took place through eating and drinking: for when, from the aliment, fleſh accedes to fleſh, bone to bone, and every where kindred to kindred parts, then the bulk which was ſmall becomes afterwards great; and thus a little man becomes a large one. Such was then my opinion; does it appear to you a becoming one?—To me, indeed, it does (ſays Cebes).—But ſtill further, conſider as follows: for I thought that I ſeemed to myſelf ſufficiently right in my opinion, when, on ſeeing a tall man ſtanding by a ſhort one, I judged that he was taller by the head; and in like manner one horſe than another: and ſtill more evident than theſe, ten things appeared to me to be more than eight, becauſe two is added to them, and that a bicubital is greater than a cubital magnitude, through its ſurpaſſing it by the half.—But now (ſays Cebes) what appears to you reſpecting theſe?—By Jupiter (ſays he), I am ſo far from thinking that I know the cauſe of theſe, that I cannot even perſuade myſelf, when any perſon adds one to one, that then the one to which the addition was made becomes two; or that the added one, and that to which it is added, become two, through the addition of the one to the other. For I ſhould wonder, ſince each of theſe, when ſeparate from one another, was one, and not then two; if, after they have approached nearer to each other, this ſhould be the cauſe of their becoming two, viz. the aſſociation through which they are placed nearer to each other. Nor

yet

yet, if any perſon ſhould divide one, am I able to perſuade myſelf that this diviſion is the cauſe of its becoming two. For that former[1] cauſe of two being produced is contrary to this. For then this took place, becauſe they were collected near to each other, and the one was applied to the other; but now, becauſe the one is removed and ſeparated from the other. Nor do I any longer perſuade myſelf, that I know why one is produced; nor, in one word, why any thing elſe is either generated or corrupted, or is, according to this method of proceeding: but, in order to obtain this knowledge, I venture to mingle another method of my own, by no means admitting this which I have mentioned.

But having once heard a perſon reading from a certain book, compoſed, as he ſaid, by Anaxagoras[2]—when he came to that part, in which he ſays that intellect orders and is the cauſe of all things, I was delighted with this cauſe, and thought that, in *a certain reſpect*[3], it was an excellent thing for intellect to be the cauſe of all; and I conſidered that, if this was the caſe, diſpoſing intellect would adorn all things, and place every thing in that ſituation in which it would ſubſiſt in the beſt manner. If any one, therefore, ſhould be willing to diſcover the cauſe through which every thing is generated, or corrupted, or is, he ought to diſcover how it may ſubſiſt in the beſt manner, or ſuffer, or perform any thing elſe. In conſequence of this, therefore, it is proper that a man ſhould conſider nothing elſe, either about himſelf or about others, except that which is the moſt excellent and the beſt: but it is neceſſary that he who knows this ſhould alſo know that which is ſubordinate, ſince there is one and the ſame ſcience of both. But thus reaſoning with myſelf, I rejoiced, thinking that I had found a preceptor in Anaxagoras, who would inſtruct me in the cauſes of things agreeably to my own conceptions; and that he would inform me, in the firſt place, whether

[1] Addition is no more the proper cauſe of two than diviſion; but each of theſe is nothing but a concauſe. For one and one by junction become the ſubject or matter of the participation of the incorporeal duad; and this is likewiſe the caſe when one thing is divided.

[2] See an extract of ſome length from that work of Anaxagoras to which Plato here alludes, in the Notes on the firſt book of my tranſlation of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics.

[3] Socrates here uſes the words *in a certain reſpect* with the greateſt accuracy: for *intellect*, conſidered according to its higheſt ſubſiſtence in the intelligible order, may be ſaid to be the cauſe of all things poſterior to *the one*; but *the one*, being above intellect, is truly in every reſpect the cauſe of all.

the earth is flat or round; and afterwards explain the cauſe and neceſſity of its being ſo, adducing for this purpoſe that which is better, and ſhowing that it is better for the earth to exiſt in this manner. And if he ſhould ſay it is ſituated in the middle, that he would, beſides this, ſhow that it is better for it to be in the middle; and if he ſhould render all this apparent to me, I was ſo diſpoſed as not to require any other ſpecies of cauſe. I had likewiſe prepared myſelf in a ſimilar manner for an inquiry reſpecting the ſun, and moon, and the other ſtars, their velocities and revolutions about each other, and all their other properties; ſo as to be able to know why it is better for each to operate in a certain manner, and to ſuffer that which it ſuffers. For I by no means thought, after he had ſaid that all theſe were orderly diſpoſed by intellect, he would introduce any other cauſe of their ſubſiſtence, except that which ſhows[1] that it is beſt for them to exiſt as they do. Hence I thought that in aſſigning the cauſe common to each particular, and to all things, he would explain that which is beſt for each, and is the common good of all. And indeed I would not have exchanged theſe hopes for a mighty gain! but having obtained his books with prodigious eagerneſs, I read them with great celerity, that I might with great celerity know that which is the beſt, and that which is baſe.

From this admirable hope however, my friend, I was forced away, when, in the courſe of my reading, I ſaw him make no uſe of intellect, nor employ certain cauſes, for the purpoſe of orderly diſpoſing particulars, but aſſign air, æther, and water, and many other things equally abſurd, as the cauſes of things. And he appeared to me to be affected in a manner ſimilar to him who ſhould aſſert, that all the actions of Socrates are produced by intellect; and afterwards, endeavouring to relate the cauſes of each particular action, ſhould ſay, that, in the firſt place, I now ſit here becauſe my body is compoſed from bones and nerves, and that the bones are ſolid, and are ſeparated by intervals from each other; but that the nerves, which are of a nature capable of intenſion and remiſſion, cover the bones, together with the fleſh and ſkin by which they are contained. The bones, therefore, being ſuſpended from their joints, the nerves, by ſtraining and relaxing them, enable me to bend my limbs as at preſent; and through this cauſe I here ſit in an

[1] Concauſes can never ſhow that it is beſt for things to exiſt as they do; but this can only be effected by primary, viz. *effective*, *paradigmatic*, and *final* cauſes.

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inflected poſition—and again, ſhould aſſign other ſuch-like cauſes of my converſation with you, viz. voice, and air, and hearing, and a thouſand other ſuch particulars, neglecting to adduce the true cauſe, that ſince it appeared to the Athenians better to condemn me, on this account, it alſo appeared to me to be better and more juſt to ſit here, and, thus abiding, ſuſtain the puniſhment which they have ordained me. For otherwiſe, by the dog, as it appears to me, theſe nerves and bones would have been carried long ago either into Megara or Bœotia, through an opinion of that which is beſt, if I had not thought it more juſt and becoming to ſuſtain the puniſhment ordered by my country, whatever it might be, than to withdraw myſelf and run away. But to call things of this kind cauſes is extremely abſurd. Indeed, if any one ſhould ſay that without poſſeſſing ſuch things as bones and nerves, and other particulars which belong to me, I could not act in the manner I appear to do, he would ſpeak the truth: but to aſſert that I act as I do at preſent through theſe, and that I operate with this intellect, and not from the choice of that which is beſt, would be an aſſertion full of extreme negligence and ſloth. For this would be the conſequence of not being able to collect by diviſion, that the true cauſe of a thing is very different from that without which a cauſe would not be a cauſe. And this indeed appears to me to be the caſe with the multitude of mankind, who, handling things as it were in darkneſs, call them by names foreign from the truth, and thus denominate things cauſes which are not ſo. Hence, one placing round the earth a certain vortex, produced by the celeſtial motion, renders by this mean the earth fixt in the centre; but another places air under it, as if it was a baſis to a broad trough. But they neither inveſtigate that power through which things are now diſpoſed in the beſt manner poſſible, nor do they think that it is endued with any dæmoniacal ſtrength: but they fancy they have found a certain Atlas, more ſtrong and immortal than ſuch a ſtrength, and far more ſuſtaining all things; and they think that the good and the becoming do not in reality connect and ſuſtain any thing. With reſpect to myſelf, indeed, I would moſt willingly become the diſciple of any one; ſo that I might perceive in what manner a cauſe of this kind ſubſiſts. But ſince I am deprived of this advantage, and have neither been able to diſcover it myſelf, nor to learn it from another, are you willing, Cebes, that I ſhould ſhow you the manner in which I made a proſperous voyage to diſ-

cover the cauſe of things?—I am willing (ſays he) in a moſt tranſcendent degree.

It appeared to me therefore (ſays Socrates) afterwards, when I was wearied with ſuch ſpeculations, that I ought to take care leſt I ſhould be affected in the ſame manner as thoſe are who attentively behold the ſun in an eclipſe: for ſome would be deprived of their ſight, unleſs they beheld its image in water, or in a ſimilar medium. And ſomething of this kind I perceived with reſpect to myſelf, and was afraid leſt my ſoul ſhould be perfectly blinded through beholding things with the eyes of my body, and through endeavouring to apprehend them by means of the ſeveral ſenſes. Hence I conſidered that I ought to fly to reaſons, and in them ſurvey the truth of things. Perhaps, indeed, this ſimilitude of mine may not in a certain reſpect be proper: for I do not entirely admit that he who contemplates things in reaſons, ſurveys them in images, more than he who contemplates them in external effects. This method, therefore, I have adopted; and always eſtabliſhing that reaſon as an hypotheſis, which I judge to be the moſt valid, whatever appears to me to be conſonant to this, I fix upon as true, both concerning the cauſe of things and every thing elſe; but ſuch as are not conſonant I conſider as not true. But I wiſh to explain to you what I ſay in a clearer manner: for I think that you do not at preſent underſtand me.—Not very much, by Jupiter, ſays Cebes.

However (ſays he), I now aſſert nothing new, but what I have always aſſerted at other times, and in the preceding diſputation. For I ſhall now attempt to demonſtrate to you that ſpecies of cauſe which I have been diſcourſing about, and ſhall return again to thoſe particulars which are ſo much celebrated; beginning from theſe, and laying down as an hypotheſis, that there is a certain ſomething beautiful, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf; and a certain ſomething good and great, and ſo of all the reſt; which if you permit me to do, and allow that ſuch things have a ſubſiſtence, I hope that I ſhall be able from theſe to demonſtrate this cauſe to you, and diſcover that the ſoul is immortal.—But (ſays Cebes), in conſequence of having granted you this already, you cannot be hindered from drawing ſuch a concluſion.—But conſider (ſays he) the things conſequent to theſe, and ſee whether you will then likewiſe agree with me. For it appears to me, that if there be any thing elſe beautiful, beſides the beautiful itſelf, it cannot be beautiful on any other

other account than becauſe it participates of the beautiful itſelf; and I ſhould ſpeak in the ſame manner of all things. Do you admit ſuch a cauſe?—I admit it (ſays he).—I do not therefore (ſays Socrates) any longer perceive, nor am I able to underſtand, thoſe other *wiſe* cauſes; but if any one tells me why a certain thing is beautiful, and aſſigns as a reaſon, either its poſſeſſing a florid colour, or figure, or ſomething elſe of this kind, I bid farewell to other hypotheſes (for in all others I find myſelf diſturbed); but this I retain with myſelf, ſimply, unartificially, and perhaps fooliſhly, that nothing elſe cauſes it to be beautiful, than either the preſence, or communion, or in whatever manner the operations may take place, of the beautiful itſelf. For I cannot yet affirm how this takes place; but only this, that all beautiful things become ſuch through the beautiful itſelf. For it appears to me moſt ſafe thus to anſwer both myſelf and others; and adhering to this, I think that I can never fall, but that I ſhall be ſecure in anſwering, that all beautiful things are beautiful through the beautiful itſelf. Does it not alſo appear ſo to you?—It does.—And that great things, therefore, are great, and things greater, greater through magnitude itſelf; and things leſſer, leſſer through ſmallneſs itſelf?—Certainly.—Neither, therefore, would you aſſent, if it ſhould be ſaid that ſome one is larger than another by the head, and that he who is leſſer is leſſer by the very ſame thing, i. e. the head: but you would teſtify that you ſaid nothing elſe than that, with reſpect to every thing great, one thing is greater than another by nothing elſe than magnitude, and that through this it is greater, i. e. through magnitude; and that the leſſer is leſſer through nothing elſe than ſmallneſs, and that through this it is leſſer, i. e. through ſmallneſs. For you would be afraid, I think, leſt, if you ſhould ſay that any one is greater and leſſer by the head, you ſhould contradict yourſelf: firſt, in aſſerting that the greater is greater, and the leſſer leſſer, by the very ſame thing; and afterwards that the greater is greater by the head, which is a ſmall thing; and that it is monſtrous to ſuppoſe, that any thing which is great can become ſo through ſomething which is ſmall. Would you not be afraid of all this?—Indeed I ſhould (ſays Cebes, laughing).—Would you not alſo (ſays he) be afraid to ſay that ten things are more than eight by two, and that through this cauſe ten tranſcends eight, and not by multitude and through multitude? And in like manner, that a thing which

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is two cubits in length is greater than that which is but one cubit, by the half, and not by magnitude? for the dread is indeed the ſame.—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—But what? one being added to one, will the addition be the cauſe of their becoming two? or if one is divided, and two produced, would you not be afraid to aſſign diviſion as the cauſe? Indeed you would cry with a loud voice, that you know no other way by which any thing ſubſiſts, than by participating the proper eſſence of every thing which it participates; and that in theſe you can aſſign no other cauſe of their becoming two, than the participation of the duad; and that it is proper all ſuch things as are about to become two, ſhould participate of this, and of unity, whatever is about to become one. But you would bid farewell to theſe diviſions and additions, and other ſubtilties of this kind, and would leave them to be employed in anſwering, by thoſe who are wiſer than yourſelf. And fearing, as it is ſaid, your own ſhadow, and your own unſkilfulneſs, you would adhere to this ſafe hypotheſis, and anſwer in the manner I have deſcribed. But if any one ſhould adhere to this hypotheſis, you would refrain from anſwering him till you had conſidered the conſequences reſulting from thence, and whether they were conſonant or diſſonant to one another. But when it is neceſſary for you to aſſign a reaſon for your belief in this hypotheſis, you will aſſign it in a ſimilar manner, laying down again another hypotheſis, which ſhall appear to be the beſt among ſupernal natures, till you arrive at ſomething ſufficient. At the ſame time you will by no means confound things by mingling them together, after the manner of the contentious, when you diſcourſe concerning the principle and the conſequences ariſing from thence, if you are willing to diſcover any thing of true beings. For by ſuch as theſe, perhaps, no attention is paid to this. For theſe, through their wiſdom, are ſufficiently able to mingle all things together, and at the ſame time pleaſe themſelves. But you, if you rank among the philoſophers, will act, I think, in the manner I have deſcribed.—Both Simmias and Cebes ſaid, You ſpeak moſt truly.

Echec. By Jupiter, Phædo, they aſſented with great propriety: for he appears to me to have aſſerted this in a manner wonderfully clear; and this even to one endued with the ſmalleſt degree of intellect.

Phæd. And ſo indeed, Echecrates, it appeared in every reſpect to all who were preſent.

Echec.

ECHEC. And well it might: for it appears ſo to us, now we hear it, who were not preſent. But what was the diſcourſe after this?

If I remember right, after they had granted all this, and had confeſſed that each of the ſeveral ſpecies was ſomething, and that others participating of theſe received the ſame denomination, he afterwards interrogated them as follows: If then you allow that theſe things are ſo, when you ſay that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but leſs than Phædo, do you not then aſſert that both magnitude and parvitude are inherent in Simmias?—I do.—And yet (ſays he) you muſt confeſs, that this circumſtance of Simmias ſurpaſſing Socrates does not truly ſubſiſt in the manner which the words ſeem to imply. For Simmias is not naturally adapted to ſurpaſs Socrates, ſo far as he is Simmias, but by the magnitude which he poſſeſſes: nor, again, does he ſurpaſs Socrates ſo far as Socrates is Socrates, but becauſe Socrates poſſeſſes parvitude with reſpect to his magnitude.—True.—Nor, again, is Simmias ſurpaſſed by Phædo, becauſe Phædo is Phædo, but becauſe Phædo poſſeſſes magnitude with reſpect to the parvitude of Simmias.—It is ſo.—Simmias, therefore, is allotted the appellation of both ſmall and great, being ſituated in the middle of both; exhibiting his ſmallneſs to be ſurpaſſed by the greatneſs of the one, and his greatneſs to the other's ſmallneſs, which it ſurpaſſes. And at the ſame time, gently laughing, I ſeem (ſays he) to have ſpoken with all the preciſion of an hiſtorian; but, notwithſtanding this, it is as I ſay.—He allowed it.—But I have mentioned theſe things, in order that you may be of the ſame opinion as myſelf. For to me it appears, not only that magnitude is never willing to be at the ſame time both great and ſmall, but that the magnitude which we contain never deſires to receive that which is ſmall, nor be ſurpaſſed; but that it is willing to do one of theſe two things, either to fly away, and gradually withdraw itſelf, when its contrary the ſmall approaches to it, or to periſh when it arrives; but that it is unwilling, by ſuſtaining and receiving parvitude, to be different from what it was. In the ſame manner as I myſelf receiving and ſuſtaining parvitude, and ſtill remaining that which I am, am nevertheleſs ſmall. But that being great dares not to be ſmall. And in like manner *the ſmall*, which reſides in us, is not willing at any time *to ſubſiſt in becoming to be* great, or *to be* great: nor does any thing elſe among contraries, while it remains that which it was, wiſh at the ſame time *to ſubſiſt in becoming to be*, and *to be*, its contrary; but

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it either departs or periſhes in conſequence of this paſſion.—It appears ſo to me (ſays Cebes) in every reſpect.

But a certain perſon, who was preſent, upon hearing this (I do not clearly remember who it was), By the Gods (ſays he), was not the very contrary of what you now aſſert admitted by you in the former part of your diſcourſe, viz. that the greater was generated from the leſs, and the leſs from the greater; and that generation among contraries plainly took place from contraries? But now you appear to me to ſay, that this can never be the caſe. Upon this Socrates, after he had extended his head a little further, and had liſtened to his diſcourſe, ſaid, You very manfully put me in mind; yet you do not underſtand the difference between what is now and what was then aſſerted. For then it was ſaid, that a contrary thing was generated from a contrary; but now, that a contrary can never become contrary to itſelf, neither that contrary which ſubſiſts in us, nor that which ſubſiſts in nature. For then, my friend, we ſpoke concerning things which poſſeſs contraries, calling the contraries by the appellation of the things in which they reſide; but now we ſpeak of things which receive their denomination from the contraries reſiding in them. And we ſhould never be willing to aſſert that theſe contraries receive a generation from one another. And at the ſame time, beholding Cebes, he ſaid, Did any thing which has been ſaid by this perſon diſturb you alſo?—Indeed (ſays Cebes) it did not; and at ſuch a time as this there are not many things which can diſturb me.—We ingenuouſly, therefore (ſays he), aſſent to this, that a contrary can never become contrary to itſelf.—Entirely ſo (ſays Cebes).

But ſtill further (ſays he), conſider whether you agree with me in this alſo. Do you call *the hot* and *the cold* any thing?—I do.—Are they the ſame with ſnow and fire?—They are not, by Jupiter.—*The hot*, therefore, is ſomething different from *fire*, and *the cold* from *ſnow*.—Certainly.—But this alſo is, I think, apparent to you, that ſnow, as long as it is ſuch, can never, by receiving heat, remain what it was before, viz. ſnow, and at the ſame time become hot; but, on the acceſſion of heat, muſt either withdraw itſelf from it, or periſh.—Entirely ſo.—And again, that fire, when cold approaches to it, muſt either depart or periſh; but that it will never dare, by receiving coldneſs, ſtill to remain what it was, i. e. fire, and yet be at the ſame time cold.—You ſpeak truly (ſays he).—But (ſays Socrates) it happens to ſome

of theſe, that not only the ſpecies itſelf is always thought worthy of the ſame appellation, but likewiſe ſomething elſe, which is not indeed that ſpecies, but which perpetually poſſeſſes the form of it as long as it exiſts. But in the following inſtances my meaning will perhaps be more apparent: for the odd number ought always to poſſeſs that name by which we now call it: ſhould it not?—Entirely ſo.—But is this the caſe with the odd number alone (for this is what I inquire)? or is there any thing elſe which is not indeed the ſame with the odd, but yet which ought always to be called odd, together with its own proper name, becauſe it naturally ſubſiſts in ſuch a manner, that it can never deſert the form of the odd? But this is no other than what happens to the number three, and many other things. For conſider, does not the number three appear to you to be always called by its proper name, and at the ſame time by the name of the odd, though *the odd* is not the ſame as *the triad?* Yet the triad, and the pentad, and the entire half of number, naturally ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner, that though they are not the ſame as *the odd*, yet each of them is always odd. And again, two and four, and the whole other order of number, though they are not the ſame as *the even*, yet each of them is always even: do you admit this or not?—How ſhould I not (ſays he)?—See then (ſays Socrates) what I wiſh to evince. But it is as follows: It has appeared, not only that contraries do not receive one another, but that even ſuch things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always poſſeſs contraries, do not appear to receive that idea which is contrary to the idea which they contain; but that on its approach they either periſh or depart. Shall we not, therefore, ſay that three things would firſt periſh, and endure any thing whatever, ſooner than ſuſtain to be three things, and at the ſame time to be even?—Entirely ſo (ſays Cebes).—And yet (ſays Socrates) the duad is not contrary to the triad.—Certainly not.—Not only, therefore, do contrary ſpecies never ſuſtain the approach of each other, but certain other things likewiſe cannot ſuſtain the acceſſion of contraries.—You ſpeak moſt true (ſays he).

Are you willing, therefore (ſays he), that, if we are able, we ſhould define what kind of things theſe are?—Entirely ſo.—Will they not then, Cebes (ſays he), be ſuch things as compel whatever they occupy, not only to retain their idea, but likewiſe not to receive a contrary to it?—How do you mean?—Exactly as we juſt now ſaid. For you know it is neceſſary, that

whatever things the idea of three occupies ſhould not only be three, but likewiſe odd.—Entirely ſo.—To a thing of this kind, therefore, we aſſert, that an idea contrary to that form, through which it becomes what it is, will never approach.—It cannot.—But it becomes what it is through the odd: does it not?—Certainly.—But is not the contrary to this the idea of the even?—It is.—The idea of the even, therefore, will never accede to three things.—Never.—Are not three things, therefore, deſtitute of the even?—Deſtitute.—The triad, therefore, is an odd number.—It is.—The things which I mentioned then are defined, viz. ſuch things, which, though they are not contrary to ſome particular nature, yet do not at the ſame time receive that which is contrary; juſt as the triad in the preſent inſtance, though it is not contrary to the even, yet does not any thing more receive it on this account: for it always brings with it that which is contrary to the even; and in like manner the duad to the odd, and fire to cold, and an abundant multitude of other particulars. But ſee whether you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not receive a contrary, but likewiſe that the nature which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches, will never receive the contrariety of that which it introduces. But recollect again, for it will not be uſeleſs to hear it repeated often. Five things will not receive the form of the even; neither will ten things, which are the double of five, receive the form of the odd. This[1], therefore, though it is itſelf contrary to ſomething[2] elſe, yet will not receive the form of the odd; nor will the ſeſquialter, nor other things of this kind, ſuch as the half and the third part, ever receive the form of the whole, if you purſue and aſſent to theſe conſequences.—I moſt vehemently (ſays he) purſue and aſſent to them.

Again, therefore (ſays Socrates), ſpeak to me from the beginning; and this not by anſwering to what I inquire, but, in a different manner, imitating me. For I ſay this, in conſequence of perceiving another mode of anſwering, ariſing from what has now been ſaid, no leſs ſecure than that which was eſtabliſhed at firſt. For, if you ſhould aſk me what that is, which, when inherent in any body, cauſes the body to be hot, I ſhould not give you that cautious and unſkilful anſwer, that it is heat, but one more elegant deduced from what we have juſt now ſaid; I mean, that it is fire. Nor, if you

[1] That is, the double.

[2] That is, the half.

ſhould

ſhould aſk me what that is, which when inherent in a certain body, the body is diſeaſed, I ſhould not ſay that it is diſeaſe, but a fever. Nor, if you ſhould aſk what that is, which when inherent in a number, the number will be odd, I ſhould not ſay that it is imparity, but unity, and in a ſimilar manner in other particulars. But ſee whether you ſufficiently underſtand my meaning.—Perfectly ſo (ſays he).—Anſwer me then (ſays Socrates), what that is, which when inherent in the body, the body will be alive?—Soul [1] (ſays he).—Is this then always the caſe?—How ſhould it not (ſays he)?—Will ſoul, therefore, always introduce life to that which it occupies?—It will truly (ſays he).—But is there any thing contrary to life, or not?—There is.—But what?—Death.—The ſoul, therefore, will never receive the contrary to that which it introduces, in conſequence of what has been already admitted.—And this moſt vehemently ſo (ſays Cebes).

But what? how do we denominate that which does not receive the idea of the even?—Odd (ſays he).—And how do we call that which does not receive juſtice, and that which does not receive muſic?—We call (ſays he) the one unjuſt, and the other unmuſical.—Be it ſo.—But what do we call that which does not receive death?—Immortal (ſays he).—The ſoul does not receive death?—It does not.—The ſoul, therefore, is immortal.—Immortal.—Let it be ſo (ſays he).—And ſhall we ſay that this is now demonſtrated? Or how does it appear to you?—It appears to me, Socrates, to be moſt ſufficiently demonſtrated.—What then (ſays he), Cebes, if it were neceſſary to *the odd* that it ſhould be free from deſtruction, would not three things be indeſtructible?—How ſhould they not?—If, therefore, it was alſo neceſſary that a thing void of heat ſhould be indeſtructible, when any one ſhould introduce heat to ſnow, would not the ſnow withdraw itſelf, ſafe and unliqueſied? For it would not periſh; nor yet, abiding, would it receive the heat.—You ſpeak the truth (ſays he).—In like manner, I think if that which is void of cold was indeſtructible, that when any thing cold approached to fire, the fire would neither be extinguiſhed nor deſtroyed, but would depart free from damage.—It is neceſſary (ſays he).—Hence (ſays Socrates) it is neceſſary to ſpeak in this manner concerning that which is immortal: for, if that which is immortal is indeſtructible, it is impoſſible that the ſoul, when

[1] This, which is the fifth argument, properly and fully demonſtrates the immortality of the ſoul from its eſſence.

death approaches to it, ſhould periſh. For it follows, from what has been ſaid, that it does not receive death, and of courſe it will never be dead. Juſt as we ſaid, that three things will never be even, nor will this ever be the caſe with that which is odd: nor will fire ever be cold, nor yet the heat which is inherent in fire. But ſome one may ſay, What hinders but that the odd may never become the even, through the acceſſion of the even, as we have confeſſed; and yet, when the odd is deſtroyed, the even may ſucceed inſtead of it? We cannot contend with him who makes this objection, that it is not deſtroyed: for the odd is not free from deſtruction; ſince, if this was granted to us, we might eaſily oppoſe the objection, and obtain this conceſſion, that the odd and three things would depart, on the approach of the even; and we might contend in the ſame manner about fire and heat, and other particulars: might we not?—Entirely ſo.—And now, therefore, ſince we have confeſſed reſpecting that which is immortal, that it is indeſtructible, it muſt follow that the ſoul is, together with being immortal, likewiſe indeſtructible: but if this be not admitted, other arguments will be neceſſary for our conviction. But there is no occaſion for this (ſays he). For it is ſcarcely poſſible that any thing elſe ſhould be void of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is ſubject to diſſolution.

But I think (ſays Socrates) that Divinity, and the form itſelf of life, and if any thing elſe beſides this is immortal, muſt be confeſſed by all beings to be entirely free from diſſolution. All men, indeed (ſays he), by Jupiter, muſt acknowledge this; and much more, as it appears to me, muſt it be admitted by the Gods. Since, therefore, that which is immortal is alſo incorruptible, will not the ſoul, ſince it is immortal, be indeſtructible?—It is perfectly neceſſary.—When, therefore, death invades a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies; but the immortal part departs ſafe and uncorrupted, and withdraws itſelf from death.—It appears ſo.—The ſoul, therefore (ſays he), O Cebes, will, more [1] than any thing, be immortal and indeſtructible; and our ſouls will in reality ſubſiſt in Hades. And therefore (ſays he), Socrates, I have nothing further to object to theſe arguments, nor any reaſon why I ſhould diſbelieve their reality: but if either Simmias, or any perſon preſent, has any thing to ſay, he will do well not to be ſilent: for

[1] Socrates ſays, with great propriety, that the ſoul will be immortal *more than any thing*. For ſoul is *eſſentially vital*; and *immortality* is *ſtability of life*.

I know

I know not what other opportunity he can have, beſides the preſent, if he wiſhes either to ſpeak or hear about things of this kind.—But indeed (ſays Simmias) I have nothing which can hinder my belief in what has been ſaid. But yet on account of the magnitude [1] of the things about which we have diſcourſed, and through my deſpiſing human imbecility, I am compelled to retain with myſelf an unbelief about what has been aſſerted.—Indeed, Simmias (ſays Socrates), you not only ſpeak well in the preſent inſtance, but it is neceſſary that even thoſe firſt hypotheſes which we eſtabliſhed, and which are believed by us, ſhould at the ſame time be more clearly conſidered: and if you ſufficiently inveſtigate them, you will follow reaſon, as it appears to me, in as great a degree as is poſſible to man. And if this becomes manifeſt, you will no longer make any further inquiry.—You ſpeak true (ſays he).

But it is juſt, my friends (ſays he), to think that if the ſoul is immortal, it requires our care and attention, not only for the preſent time, in which we ſay it lives, but likewiſe with a view to the whole of time: and it will now appear, that he who neglects it muſt ſubject himſelf to a moſt dreadful danger. For, if death were the liberation of the whole man, it would be an unexpected gain to the wicked to be liberated at the ſame time from the body, and from their vices together with their ſoul: but now, ſince the ſoul appears to be immortal, no other flight from evils, and no other ſafety remains for it, than in becoming the beſt and moſt prudent poſſible. For when the ſoul arrives at Hades, it will poſſeſs nothing but diſcipline and education, which are ſaid to be of the greateſt advantage or detriment to the dead, in the very beginning of their progreſſion thither. For thus it is ſaid: that the dæmon [2] of each perſon, which was allotted to him while living, endeavours

[1] Simmias ſays this, in conſequence of not having arrived at the ſummit of philoſophical attainments, and, therefore, not ſeeing the full force of this fifth argument of Socrates. For it poſſeſſes a moſt wonderful and invincible ſtrength; and by thoſe that underſtand it will be acknowledged to have all the force of geometrical demonſtration. Socrates himſelf inſinuates as much as this, when he ſays in reply to Simmias, that by ſufficiently inveſtigating the hypotheſes on which this argument is founded, we ſhall follow reaſon in as great a degree as is poſſible to man, and at length make no further inquiry. That is, we ſhall at length perceive this truth by the projecting energies of intellect, which is a degree of evidence, as I have already obſerved in the Introduction to this dialogue, ſuperior to that of any tradition however divine.

[2] Since there are in the univerſe, ſays Olympiodorus, things which ſubſiſt differently at different times

endeavours [1] to lead each to a certain place, where it is neceſſary that all of them, being collected together, after they have been judged, ſhould proceed to Hades, together with their leader, who is ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there receiving the allotments proper to their condition, and abiding for a neceſſary time, another leader brings them back hither again, in many and long periods of time. The journey, therefore, is not ſuch as Telephus aſſerts it to be in Eſchylus. For he ſays that a ſimple path leads to Hades: but it appears to me that the path is neither ſimple nor one. For there would be no occaſion of leaders, nor could any one ever wander from the right road, if there was but one way. But now it appears to have many diviſions and dubious turnings: and this I conjecture from our holy and legal rites. The ſoul, therefore, which is properly adorned with virtue,

times, and ſince there are alſo natures which are conjoined with the ſupereſſential unities, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a certain middle genus, which is neither immediately ſuſpended from Deity, nor ſubſiſts differently at different times according to better and worſe, but which is always perfect, and does not depart from its proper virtue; and is immutable indeed, but is not conjoined with the ſupereſſential. The whole of this genus is dæmoniacal. There are alſo different genera of dæmons: for they are placed under the mundane Gods. The higheſt of theſe ſubſiſts according to *the one* of the Gods, which is called an unific and divine genus of dæmons. The next according to the intellect which is ſuſpended from Deity, and is called intellectual. The third ſubſiſts according to ſoul, and is called rational. The fourth according to nature, which is denominated phyſical. The fifth according to body, which is called corporeal-formed. And the ſixth according to matter, and this is denominated material. Or after another manner it may be ſaid, Olympiodorus adds, that ſome of theſe are celeſtial, others ethereal, others aërial, others aquatic, others terreſtrial, and others ſubterranean. With reſpect to this diviſion, it is evident that it is derived from the parts of the univerſe. But irrational dæmons originate from the aërial governors, whence alſo the Oracle ſays, "being the charioteer of the aërial, terreſtrial and aquatic dogs."

περιων ελατηρα κυνων χθονιων τε και ὑγρων.

Our guardian dæmons, however, belong to that order of dæmons which is arranged under the Gods that preſide over the aſcent and deſcent of ſouls.

[1] Olympiodorus obſerves here, that the dæmon endeavours to lead the ſoul, as exciting its conceptions and phantaſies; at the ſame time, however, yielding to the ſelf-motive power of the ſoul. But in conſequence of the dæmon exciting, one ſoul follows voluntarily, another violently, and another according to a mode ſubſiſting between theſe. Olympiodorus further obſerves that there is one dæmon who leads the ſoul to its judges from the preſent life; another, who is miniſtrant to the judges, giving completion, as it were, to the ſentence which is paſſed; and a third who is again allotted the guardianſhip of life.

and which poſſeſſes prudence, willingly follows its leader, and is not ignorant of its preſent condition: but the ſoul which ſtill adheres to body through deſire (as I ſaid before), being for a long ſpace of time terrified about it, and ſtruggling and ſuffering abundantly about the viſible place, is with violence and great difficulty led away by its preſiding dæmon. And when it arrives at that place where other ſouls are aſſembled, all the reſt fly from and avoid this unpurified ſoul, which has been guilty either of unjuſt ſlaughter, or has perpetrated ſuch deeds as are allied to this, and are the works of kindred ſouls; nor is any one willing to become either its companion or leader. But ſuch a ſoul wanders about, oppreſſed with every kind of anxiety and trouble, till certain periods of time are accompliſhed: and theſe being completed, it is driven by neceſſity to an abode accommodated to its nature. But the ſoul which has paſſed through life with purity and moderation, obtaining the Gods for its companions and leaders, will reſide in a place adapted to its purified condition.

There are indeed many and admirable places belonging to the earth [1]; and the earth itſelf is neither of ſuch a kind, nor of ſuch a magnitude, as thoſe

[1] With reſpect to the earth which is here mentioned, Olympiodorus informs us, that ſome of the antients conſidered it as incorporeal, others as corporeal, and each of theſe in a twofold reſpect. For thoſe who conſidered it as incorporeal ſaid that it was either an idea, or nature; but of thoſe who conſidered it as corporeal, ſome aſſerted that it was the whole world, and others the ſublunary region. Plato, however, as is evident from the text, appears to ſpeak of this our earth.

Olympiodorus adds, that as the earth is a *pleroma** of the univerſe, it is a God. For, if the univerſe is a God, it is evident that the parts from which it derives its completion muſt alſo be Gods. Beſides, if the earth contains Divinities, much more muſt it be itſelf a God, as Timæus alſo ſays. Hence, intellect and a rational ſoul muſt be ſuſpended from it, and conſequently it muſt have a luciform prior to this apparent body.

Again, that the univerſe is ſpherical, may be ſhown from its final cauſe. For a ſphere imitates *the one*, becauſe it is the beſt and moſt indiſſoluble of figures, as being free from angles, and the moſt capacious of all things. This is alſo evident from its paradigmatic cauſe, becauſe *animal itſelf*, or the extremity of the intelligible order, to which looking, the demiurgus fabricated the world, is all-perfect. And further ſtill, this is evident from its producing cauſe. For the demiurgus made it to be perpetual and indiſſoluble, and both the circle and ſphere are figures of this kind.

Further ſtill, as every part of the whole, which ranks as a whole, imitates the univerſe in the *whole* and the *all*, ſo likewiſe in figure. Every whole, therefore, in the univerſe, is ſpherical, and

* i. e. A whole, which gives completion to the univerſe.

conſequently

thoſe who are accuſtomed to ſpeak about it imagine, as I am perſuaded from a certain perſon's account.—How is this, Socrates (ſays Simmias)? For I myſelf alſo have heard many things about the earth; and yet perhaps not theſe particulars which have obtained your belief. I ſhould therefore be glad to hear you relate them.—Indeed, Simmias (ſays he), the art of Glaucus does not appear to me to be neceſſary, in order to relate theſe particulars; but to evince their truth, ſeems to me to be an undertaking beyond what the art of Glaucus can accompliſh. Beſides, I myſelf perhaps am not able to accompliſh this; and even though I ſhould know how, the time which is allotted me to live, Simmias, ſeems by no means ſufficient for the length of ſuch a diſcourſe. However, nothing hinders me from informing you what I am perſuaded is the truth, reſpecting the form of the earth, and the places which it contains.—And this information (ſays Simmias) will be ſufficient.—I am perſuaded, therefore (ſays he), in the firſt place, that if the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a ſpherical figure, it has no occaſion of air, nor of any other ſuch-like neceſſity, to prevent it from falling: but that the perfect ſimilitude of the heavens to themſelves, and the equilibrity of the earth, are ſufficient cauſes of its ſupport. For that which is equally inclined, when placed in the middle of a ſimilar nature, cannot tend more or leſs to one part than another; but, ſubſiſting on all ſides ſimilarly affected, it will remain free from all inclination. This is the firſt thing of which I am perſuaded.—And very properly ſo (ſays Cebes).—But yet further (ſays he), that the earth is prodigiouſly [1] great; that we who

conſequently this muſt alſo be true of the earth. It is likewiſe evident that the earth is in the middle. For, if the univerſe is ſpherical, it ſubſiſts about the centre: the parts of the univerſe, therefore, which rank as wholes will alſo ſubſiſt about centres, and conſequently this will be the caſe with the earth. Let it, however, be admitted, that it ſubſiſts about a centre, but whence is it evident that it ſubſiſts about the centre of the univerſe? We reply, that if it is the moſt groſs of all the bodies, it will be the laſt of them; for the moſt attenuated of bodies, as being able to pervade through each other, poſſeſs the higher place, conformably to the order of attenuation; and the earth the lower.

[1] That the earth is very great, ſays Olympiodorus, is evident from the Atlantic iſland ſurpaſſing in magnitude both Aſia and Libya. It is alſo evident from the putrefaction of the places which we inhabit, ſince ſuch places cannot rank as firſt. It is likewiſe evident from the ſummits of things ſecondary wiſhing to be aſſimilated to the extremities of things prior to them; ſo that the ſummit of earth muſt be attenuated and pellucid, ſimilar to the moſt precious ſtones and metals.

who dwell in places extending from Phaſis to the pillars of Hercules, inhabit only a certain ſmall portion of it, about the Mediterranean ſea, like ants or frogs about a marſh; and that there are many others elſewhere, who dwell in many ſuch-like places. For I am perſuaded, that there are every where about the earth many hollow places of all-various forms and magnitudes; into which there is a confluence of water, miſts, and air: but that the earth itſelf, which is of a pure nature, is ſituated in the pure heavens, in which the ſtars are contained, and which moſt of thoſe who are accuſtomed to ſpeak about ſuch particulars denominate æther. But the places which we inhabit are nothing more than the dregs of this pure earth, or cavities into which its dregs continually flow. We are ignorant, therefore, that we dwell in the cavities of this earth, and imagine that we inhabit its upper parts. Juſt as if ſome one dwelling in the middle bottom of the ſea, ſhould think that he reſided on its ſurface, and, beholding the ſun and the other ſtars through the water, ſhould imagine that the ſea is the heavens; but through ſloth and im-

metals. And laſtly, this is evident from the profundity of the hollows in which we dwell, and the height of the mountains; for theſe evince that the ſpheric ſuperficies of the earth is larger than that which is generally conſidered as its ſurface. On this ſummit of the earth, therefore, the true heavens are viſible. They are alſo ſeen near, and not through æther only, and with more beautiful eyes. According to Ammonius Hermeas, too, whom Olympiodorus calls the Interpreter, the ſtars themſelves, as I have before obſerved, are not ſeen by us here, but inflammations of them in the air. And perhaps, ſays he, this is the meaning of that aſſertion of Heraclitus, "enkindling meaſures and extinguiſhing meaſures." For he certainly did not ſay this of the ſun itſelf, but of the ſun with reference to us.

Olympiodorus further obſerves, that there is a triple diviſion of the earth, according to the three Saturnian deities Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto: for to theſe, ſays Homer, heaven and earth are common. But if common, it is evident that theſe two are divided among them. Hence, in the heavens, the inerratic ſphere belongs to Jupiter; from thence, as far as to the ſphere of the ſun, to Neptune; and the remaining part of the heavens to Pluto. If there is alſo a diviſion of the earth according to the univerſe, it muſt be divided into celeſtial, terreſtrial, and middle. For Olympian earth is honoured, as well as that which is properly terreſtrial. There muſt, therefore, be a certain middle earth. If, likewiſe, there is a diviſion of the earth conformably to that of an animal, for the earth is an animal, it muſt be divided into the head, middle parts, and feet.

It is alſo beautifully obſerved by Olympiodorus, that each of the elements has the dodecahedron in common, as preparatory to becoming a ſphere. Hence, ſays he, the earth has from itſelf the cubic, water the icoſahedric, air the octahedric, and fire the pyramid; but from the ſupermundane Gods the dodecahedron is imparted to all of them, as preparatory to intellectual participation, which is ſphericity, or the reception of a ſpherical figure.

becility having never aſcended to the top of the ſea, nor emerged from its deeps into this region, has never perceived how much purer and more beautiful it is than the place which he inhabits, nor has received this information from any other who has beheld this place of our abode. In the very ſame manner are we affected: for, dwelling in a certain hollow of the earth, we think that we reſide on its ſurface; and we call the air heaven, as if the ſtars paſſed through this, as through the heavens themſelves. And this likewiſe, in the ſame manner as in the above inſtance, happens to us through our imbecility and ſloth, which render us incapable of aſcending to the ſummit of the air. For, otherwiſe, if any one could arrive at its ſummit, or, becoming winged, could fly thither, he would be ſeen emerging from hence; and juſt as fiſhes, emerging hither from the ſea, perceive what our region contains, in the ſame manner would he behold the ſeveral particulars belonging to the ſummit of the earth. And beſides this, if his nature was ſufficient for ſuch an elevated ſurvey, he would know that the heavens which he there beheld were the true heavens, and that he perceived the true light and the true earth. For this earth which we inhabit, the ſtones which it contains, and the whole region of our abode, are all corrupted and gnawed, juſt as things in the ſea are corroded by the ſalt: for nothing worthy of eſtimation grows in the ſea, nor does it contain any thing perfect; but caverns and ſand, and immenſe quantities of mud and filth, are found in it wherever there is earth. Nor are its contents to be by any means compared with the beauty of the various particulars in our place of abode. But thoſe upper regions of the earth will appear to be yet far more excellent than theſe which we inhabit. For, if it is proper to tell you a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind of places thoſe are on the upper earth, ſituated under the heavens.

It is reported then, my friend (ſays he), in the firſt place, that this earth, if any one ſurveys it from on high, appears like globes covered with twelve ſkins, various[1], and diſtinguiſhed with colours; a pattern of which are the colours

[1] The earth is diſtinguiſhed with colours, ſays Olympiodorus, according to the *phyſical* variety of colours; according to the defluxions of celeſtial illuminations from Mars and the Sun; and according to incorporeal lives, which proceed as far as to ſenſible beauty. With reſpect to the elements likewiſe on the ſummit of the earth, water there is as vapour, and as moiſt air; but air is æther,

colours found among us, and which our painters uſe. But there the whole earth is compoſed from materials of this kind, and ſuch as are much more ſplendid and pure than our region contains: for they are partly, indeed, purple, and endued with a wonderful beauty; partly of a golden colour; and partly more white than plaſter or ſnow; and are compoſed from other colours in a ſimilar manner, and thoſe more in number and more beautiful than any we have ever beheld. For the hollow parts of this pure earth, being filled with water and air, exhibit a certain ſpecies of colour, ſhining among the variety of other colours in ſuch a manner, that one particular various form of the earth continually preſents itſelf to the view. Hence, whatever grows in this earth grows analogous to its nature, ſuch as trees, and flowers, and fruits: and again, its mountains and ſtones poſſeſs a ſimilar perfection and tranſparency, and are rendered beautiful through various colours; of which the ſtones ſo much honoured by us in this place of our abode are but ſmall parts, ſuch as ſardin-ſtones, jaſpers, and emeralds, and all of this kind. But there nothing ſubſiſts which is not of ſuch a nature as I have deſcribed; and there are other things far more beautiful than even theſe. But the reaſon of this is becauſe the ſtones there are pure, and not conſumed and corrupted, like ours, through rottenneſs and ſalt, from a conflux of various particulars, which in our places of abode cauſe filthineſs and diſeaſe to the ſtones and earth, animals and plants, which are found among us. But this pure earth is adorned with all theſe, and with gold and ſilver, and other things of a ſimilar nature: for all theſe are naturally apparent, ſince they are both numerous and large, and are diffuſed every where throughout the earth; ſo that to behold it is the ſpectacle of bleſſed ſpectators. This earth too contains many other animals [1] and men, ſome of whom inhabit its middle parts; others

æther, and æther is the ſummit of æther. If, alſo, there are mountains there, it is evident, ſays he, that from their nearneſs they reach the heavens. In ſhort, he adds, the æthers of the elements are there, as the Chaldæan oracles ſay.

[1] Theſe forms of life, ſays Olympiodorus, on the ſummit of the earth, ſubſiſt between the forms of perpetual animals and thoſe that live but for a ſhort time. For a medium is every where neceſſary. But the excellent temperature of the ſeaſons and the elements cauſes the inhabitants there to die eaſily, and to live long. And what is there wonderful in this, ſays Olympiodorus, ſince this in a certain reſpect is the caſe with the Æthiopians, through the ſymmetry of the air? He adds, if alſo Ariſtotle relates, that a man lived here without ſleep, and nouriſhed by the ſolar-form air

others dwell about the air, as we do about the ſea; and others reſide in iſlands which the air flows round, and which are ſituated not far from the continent. And in one word, what water and the ſea are to us, with reſpect to utility, that air is to them: but what air is to us, that æther is to the inhabitants of this pure earth. But the ſeaſons there are endued with ſuch an excellent temperament, that the inhabitants are never moleſted with diſeaſe, and live for a much longer time than thoſe who dwell in our regions; and they ſurpaſs us in ſight, hearing, and prudence, and every thing of this kind, as much as air excels water in purity—and æther, air. And beſides this, they have groves and temples of the Gods, in which the Gods dwell in reality; and likewiſe oracles and divinations, and ſenſible perceptions of the Gods, and ſuch-like aſſociations with them. The ſun too, and moon, and ſtars, are ſeen by them ſuch as they really are; and in every other reſpect their felicity is of a correſpondent nature.

And in this manner indeed the whole earth naturally ſubſiſts, and the parts which are ſituated about it. But it contains about the whole of its ambit many places in its concavities; ſome of which are more profound and extended than the region which we inhabit: but others are more profound, indeed, but yet have a leſs chaſm than the places of our abode; and there are certain parts which are leſs profound [1], but broader than ours. But all theſe are in many places perforated into one another under the earth, according to narrower and broader avenues, and have paſſages of communication through which a great quantity of water flows into the different hollows of the earth, as into bowls; and beſides this, there are immenſe bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth, and of hot and cold waters; likewiſe a great quantity of fire, mighty rivers of fire, and many of moiſt mire, ſome of which are purer, and others more muddy; as in Sicily there are rivers of mud, which flow before a ſtream of fire, which is itſelf a flaming torrent.

alone, what ought we to think of the inhabitants which are there? Και τι θαυμαστον, ὁτι και οἱ Αιθιοπες ὡδε πως εχουσι δια την των αἐρων συμμετριαν. και ει ενταυθα ἱστορει Αριστοτελης ανθρωπον αὐπνον και μονῳ τῳ ἡλιοειδει τρεφομενον αἐρι, τι χρη περι των εκει οιεσθαι.

[1] Plato, ſays Olympiodorus, directs his attention to the four quarters of the globe: for ſince there are two which we inhabit, viz. Europe and Aſia, there muſt alſo be two others according to the antipodes. Καταστοχαζεται δε των τεσσαρων τμηματων, επειδη δυο καθ' ἡμας εισιν, ἡ Ευρωπη και ἡ Ασια· ὡστε δυο αλλοι κατα τους αντιποδας.

And

And from theſe the ſeveral places are filled, into which each flows at particular times. But all theſe are moved upwards and downwards, like a hanging veſſel, ſituated in the earth. This hanging veſſel too, through a certain nature of this kind, is one of the chaſms of the earth; and this the greateſt, and totally perforated through the whole earth. And of this Homer[1] thus ſpeaks:

Far, very far, where under earth is found
A gulf, of every depth, the moſt profound:

which he elſewhere and many other poets denominate Tartarus[2]. For into this chaſm there is a conflux of all rivers, from which they again flow upwards. But each derives its quality from the earth through which it flows. And the reaſon why they all flow into, and again out of this chaſm, is becauſe this moiſture cannot find either a bottom or a baſis. Hence it becomes elevated, and fluctuates upwards and downwards: and this too is the caſe with the air and ſpirit[3] which are ſituated about it. For they follow this moiſture, both when they are impelled to more remote places of the earth, and when to the places of our abode. And as in reſpiration the flowing breath is perpetually expired and inſpired, ſo there the ſpirit, which is elevated together with the moiſture, cauſes certain vehement and immenſe winds during its ingreſs and departure. When the water, therefore, being impelled, flows into that place which we call downwards, then the rivers flow through the earth into different channels, and fill them; juſt as thoſe who pour into another veſſel

[1] Iliad. lib. viii.

[2] Tartarus, ſays Olympiodorus, is the extremity of the univerſe, and ſubſiſts oppoſitely to Olympus. But Tartarus is a deity, the inſpective guardian of that which is laſt in every order. Hence, ſays he, we have a celeſtial Tartarus, in which Heaven concealed his offspring; a Saturnian Tartarus, in which alſo Saturn concealed his offspring; and alſo a Jovian of this kind, which is demiurgic.

[3] As fire, water, and air, are in the middle of the earth, much vapour muſt be there, as Olympiodorus juſtly obſerves, water being analyſed into vapour through fire. Earth alſo being an animal, and living, muſt be willing to reſpire, as it were, and muſt make certain refluxes by its inſpirations and expirations. Further ſtill, its luciform muſt be its firſt vehicle, and its apparent muſt be this corporeal bulk. It muſt, therefore, require a middle, or aërial vehicle, the province of which is to cheriſh and move more attenuated bodies, through its all-various motion.

Olympiodorus further obſerves, that of Tartarus, and Earth which is conjoined with Heaven, Typhon, Echidna, and Python, form as it were a certain Chaldaïc triad, the inſpective guardian of all inordinate fabrication.

the

the water which they have drawn. But when this water, departing from thence, is impelled hither, it again fills the rivers on the earth; and theſe, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth; and when they have ſeverally paſſed through the avenues, which are open to each, they produce ſeas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. Flowing back again from hence under the earth, and ſome of them ſtreaming round longer and more numerous places, but others round ſuch as are ſhorter and leſs numerous, they again hurl themſelves into Tartarus; and ſome indeed much more profoundly, but others leſs ſo, than they were drawn: but the influxions of all of them are deeper than the places from which they flow upwards. And the effluxions of ſome are in a direction contrary to their influxions, but in others both take place according to the ſame part. There are ſome again which entirely flow round in a circle, folding themſelves like ſnakes, once or often about the earth; and being bent downwards as much as poſſible, they are again hurled forth on each ſide till they arrive at the middle, but never beyond this. For each part of the earth becomes ſteep to both theſe ſtreams.

The other rivers, indeed, are many, great, and various: but among this abundance there are certain ſtreams, four [1] in number, of which the greateſt, and which circularly flows round the earth the outermoſt of all, is called the Ocean. But that which flows oppoſite, and in a contrary direction to this, is Acheron; which, flowing through other ſolitary places, and under the earth, devolves its waters into the Acheruſian marſh, into which many ſouls

[1] The four rivers which are here mentioned are, ſays Olympiodorus, according to the Interpreter (i. e. Ammonius Hermeas), the four elements in Tartarus. Of theſe Ocean is water; Cocytus, or rather Styx, is earth; Pyriphlegethon is fire; and Acheron is air. But Styx is oppoſed to Pyriphlegethon, as heat to cold; and Acheron to Ocean, as air to water. Hence alſo Orpheus * calls the Acheruſian lake aërial. However, ſays Olympiodorus, the poſition of the rivers does not correſpond to this interpretation. For Ocean is firſt, and in the higher place. Under this is Acheron. Under this again, Pyriphlegethon; and in the laſt place, Cocytus. Beſides, all of them are called rivers, though the elements are different. It is better therefore, ſays he, to conſider the allotments, and the places themſelves of ſouls, as receiving a fourfold diviſion, according to depth. And prior to the places, we ſhould conſider the divine idioms, viz. the definitive, according to Ocean; the cathartic, according to Acheron; that which puniſhes through heat, according to Pyriphlegethon: and that which puniſhes through cold, according to Cocytus.

* Διο και Ορφευς την Αχεροισιαν λιμνην αέριαν καλει.

of

of the dead paſs; and abiding there for certain deſtined ſpaces of time, ſome of which are more and others leſs extended, they are again ſent into the generations of animals. The third river of theſe hurls itſelf forth in the middle, and near its ſource falls into a mighty place, burning with abundance of fire, and produces a lake greater than our ſea, and hot with water and mud. But it proceeds from hence in a circle, turbulent and miry, and, ſurrounding the earth, arrives both elſewhere and at the extremities of the Acheruſian marſh, with the water of which it does not become mingled; but, often revolving itſelf under the earth, flows into the more downward parts of Tartarus. And this is the river which they ſtill denominate Pyriphlegethon; the ſtreams of which ſend forth diſſevered rivers to various parts of the earth. But the fourth river, which is oppoſite to this, firſt falls as it is ſaid into a place dreadful and wild, and wholly tinged with an azure colour, which they denominate Styx: and the influxive ſtreams of this river form the Stygian marſh. But falling into this, and receiving vehement powers in its water, it hides itſelf under the earth, and, rolling round, proceeds contrary to Pyriphlegethon, and meets with it in the Acheruſian marſh, in a contrary direction. Nor is the water of this river mingled with any thing, but, revolving in a circle, it hurls itſelf into Tartarus, in a courſe oppoſite to Pyriphlegethon. But its name, according to the poets, is Cocytus.

Theſe being thus naturally conſtituted, when the dead arrive at that place into which the dæmon leads each, in the firſt place they are judged, as well thoſe who have lived in a becoming manner, and piouſly, and juſtly, as thoſe who have not. And thoſe who appear to have paſſed a middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and aſcending the vehicles [1] prepared for them, arrive in theſe at the Acheruſian lake, and dwell there; till being purified, and having ſuffered puniſhment for any injuries they may have committed, they are enlarged; and each receives the reward of his beneficence, according to his deſerts. But thoſe who appear to be incurable, through the magnitude of their offences, becauſe they have perpetrated either many and great ſacrileges, or many unjuſt ſlaughters, and ſuch as are contrary to law, or other things of this

[1] Theſe vehicles are aërial: for ſouls are moved locally according to the vehicles which are ſuſpended from them. And theſe aërial vehicles, as being corruptible, are naturally adapted to receive puniſhment.

kind—theſe, a deſtiny adapted to their guilt hurls into Tartarus, from which they will *never*[1] be diſcharged. But thoſe who are found to have committed curable, but yet mighty crimes, ſuch as thoſe who have been guilty through anger of any violence againſt their father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their lives penitent for the offence, or who have become homicides in any other ſimilar manner; with reſpect to theſe, it is neceſſary that they ſhould fall into Tartarus: but after they have fallen, and have dwelt there for a year, the waves hurl them out of Tartarus; and the homicides indeed into Cocytus, but the violators of fathers and mothers into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along by theſe rivers, they arrive at the Acheruſian marſh, they here bellow and invoke one part thoſe whom they have ſlaughtered, and another part thoſe whom they have injured. But, invoking theſe, they ſuppliantly entreat that they would ſuffer them to enter into the lake, and forgive them. And if they perſuade them to do this, they depart, and find an end to their maladies: but if they are unable to accompliſh this, they are carried back again into Tartarus, and from thence again into the rivers. And they do not ceaſe from ſuffering this, till they have perſuaded thoſe they have injured to forgiveneſs. For this puniſhment was ordained them by the judges. But thoſe who ſhall appear to have lived moſt excellently, with reſpect to piety—theſe are they, who, being liberated and diſmiſſed from theſe places in the earth, as from the abodes of a priſon, ſhall arrive at the pure habitation on high, and dwell on the ætherial earth[2]. And among theſe, thoſe who are ſufficiently purified by philoſophy ſhall live without bodies, through the whole of the ſucceeding time, and

[1] Let not the reader imagine, that by the word *never*, here, an eternal duration is implied; for Divinity does not puniſh the ſoul as if influenced by anger, but, like a good phyſician, for the ſake of healing the maladies which ſhe has contracted through guilt. We muſt ſay, therefore, as Olympiodorus well obſerves, that the incurable ſoul is puniſhed *eternally*, calling eternity her life and the partial period of her exiſtence. "For, in reality (ſays he), ſouls which have offended in the higheſt degree cannot be ſufficiently purified in one period, but are *continually* in life, as it were, in Tartarus; and this period is called by Plato eternity."

[2] Obſerve here, that thoſe who have lived a holy and guiltleſs life, without philoſophy, will after death dwell on the ſummit of the earth; and their bodies will conſequently conſiſt of the moſt attenuated air. Thoſe who have philoſophized politically, ſays Olympiodorus, will live in the heavens with luciform bodies. And thoſe that are perfectly purified will be reſtored to the ſupermundane place, without bodies.

ſhall

ſhall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than theſe, which it is neither eaſy to deſcribe, nor is the preſent time ſufficient for ſuch an undertaking.

But for the ſake of theſe particulars which we have related, we ſhould undertake every thing, Simmias, that we may participate of virtue and prudence in the preſent life. For the reward is beautiful, and the hope mighty. To affirm, indeed, that theſe things ſubſiſt exactly as I have deſcribed them, is not the province of a man endued with intellect. But to aſſert that either theſe or certain particulars of this kind take place, with reſpect to our ſouls and their habitations—ſince our ſoul appears to be immortal—this is, I think, both becoming, and deſerves to be hazarded by him who believes in its reality. For the danger is beautiful; and it is neceſſary to allure ourſelves with things of this kind, as with inchantments: and, on this account, I produced the fable which you have juſt now heard me relate. But, for the ſake of theſe, it is proper that the man ſhould be confident about his ſoul, who in the preſent life bidding farewell to thoſe pleaſures which regard the body and its ornaments, as things foreign from his nature, has earneſtly applied himſelf to diſciplines, as things of far greater conſequence; and who having adorned his ſoul not with a foreign but its own proper ornament, viz. with temperance and juſtice, fortitude, liberty and truth, expects a migration to Hades, as one who is ready to depart whenever he ſhall be called upon by Fate. You, therefore (ſays he), Simmias and Cebes, and the reſt who are here aſſembled, will each depart in ſome period of time poſterior to the preſent; but

Me now calling, Fate demands:

(as ſome tragic poet would ſay) and it is almoſt time that I ſhould betake myſelf to the bath. For it appears to me better to waſh myſelf before I drink the poiſon, and not to trouble the women with waſhing my dead body.

When, therefore, he had thus ſpoken,—Be it ſo, Socrates (ſays Crito): but what orders do you leave to theſe who are preſent, or to myſelf, or reſpecting your children, or any thing elſe in the execution of which we can particularly oblige you?—None ſuch as are new (ſays he), Crito, but that which I have always ſaid to you; that if you take care of yourſelves, you will always perform in whatever you do that which is acceptable to

myſelf, to my family, and to your own ſelves, though you ſhould not promiſe me any thing at preſent. But if you neglect yourſelves, and are unwilling to live according to what has been now and formerly ſaid, as veſtiges of direction in your courſe, you will accompliſh nothing, though you ſhould now promiſe many things, and in a very vehement manner.—We ſhall take care, therefore (ſays Crito), to act as you deſire. But how would you be buried?—Juſt as you pleaſe (ſays he), if you can but catch me, and I do not elude your purſuit. And at the ſame time gently laughing, and addreſſing himſelf to us, I cannot perſuade Crito (ſays he), my friends, that I am that Socrates who now diſputes with you, and methodizes every part of the diſcourſe; but he thinks that I am he whom he will ſhortly behold dead, and aſks how I ought to be buried. But all that long diſcourſe which ſome time ſince I addreſſed to you, in which I aſſerted that after I had drunk the poiſon I ſhould no longer remain with you, but ſhould depart to certain felicities of the bleſſed, this I ſeem to have declared to him in vain, though it was undertaken to conſole both you and myſelf. Promiſe, therefore (ſays he), for me to Crito, juſt the contrary of what he promiſed to my judges. For he promiſed that I ſhould not run away; but do you engage that when I die I ſhall not ſtay with you, but ſhall depart and entirely leave you; that Crito may more eaſily bear this ſeparation, and may not be afflicted when he ſees my body either burnt or buried, as if I ſuffered ſome dreadful misfortune; and that he may not ſay at my interment, that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried. For be well aſſured of this (ſays he), excellent Crito, that when we do not ſpeak in a becoming manner, we are not only culpable with reſpect to our ſpeech, but likewiſe affect our ſouls with a certain evil. But it is proper to be confident, and to ſay that my body will be buried, and in ſuch a manner as is pleaſing to you, and which you think is moſt agreeable to our laws.

When he had thus ſpoken he roſe, and went into a certain room, that he might waſh himſelf, and Crito followed him: but he ordered us to wait for him. We waited, therefore, accordingly, diſcourſing over and reviewing among ourſelves what had been ſaid; and ſometimes ſpeaking about his death, how great a calamity it would be to us; and ſincerely thinking that we, like thoſe who are deprived of their father, ſhould paſs the reſt of our life in the condition of orphans. But when he had waſhed himſelf, his ſons were brought to him

him (for he had two little ones, and one conſiderably advanced in age), and the women belonging to his family likewiſe came in to him: but when he had ſpoken to them before Crito, and had left them ſuch injunctions as he thought proper, he ordered the boys and women to depart; and he himſelf returned to us. And it was now near the ſetting of the ſun: for he had been abſent for a long time in the bathing-room. But when he came in from waſhing, he ſat down; and did not ſpeak much afterwards. For then the ſervant of the eleven magiſtrates came in, and ſtanding near him, I do not perceive that in you, Socrates, ſays he, which I have taken notice of in others; I mean, that they are angry with me, and curſe me, when, being compelled by the magiſtrates, I announce to them that they muſt drink the poiſon. But, on the contrary, I have found you at the preſent time to be the moſt generous, mild, and the beſt of all the men that ever came into this place: and, therefore, I am well convinced that you are not angry with me, but with the authors of your preſent condition. You know thoſe whom I allude to. Now, therefore (for you know what I came to tell you), farewell, and endeavour to bear this neceſſity as eaſily as poſſible. And at the ſame time burſting into tears, and turning himſelf away, he departed. But Socrates looking after him, And thou too (ſays he), farewell; and we ſhall take care to act as you adviſe. And at the ſame time turning to us, How courteous (ſays he) is the behaviour of that man! During the whole time of my abode here, he has viſited and often converſed with me, and proved himſelf to be the beſt of men; and now how generouſly he weeps on my account! But let us obey him, Crito, and let ſome one bring the poiſon, if it is bruiſed; but if not, let the man whoſe buſineſs it is bruiſe it himſelf. But, Socrates (ſays Crito), I think that the ſun ſtill hangs over the mountains, and is not yet ſet. And at the ſame time I have known others who have drunk the poiſon very late, after it was announced to them; who have ſupped and drunk abundantly; and who have enjoyed the objects of their love. Therefore, do not be in ſuch haſte; for there is yet time enough. Upon this Socrates replied, Such men, Crito, act with great propriety in the manner you have deſcribed (for they think to derive ſome advantage by ſo doing), and I alſo with great propriety ſhall not act in this manner. For I do not think I ſhall gain any thing by drinking it later, except becoming

ridiculous to myſelf through deſiring to live, and being ſparing of life when nothing of it any longer remains. Go, then (ſays he), be perſuaded, and comply with my requeſt.

Then Crito, hearing this, gave the ſign to the boy that ſtood near him. And the boy departing, and having ſtaid for ſome time, came, bringing with him the perſon that was to adminiſter the poiſon, and who brought it properly prepared in a cup. But Socrates, beholding the man—It is well, my friend (ſays he); but what is proper to do with it? for you are knowing in theſe affairs.—You have nothing elſe to do (ſays he), but when you have drunk it to walk about, till a heavineſs takes place in your legs; and afterwards lie down: this is the manner in which you ſhould act. And at the ſame time he extended the cup to Socrates. But Socrates received it from him—and indeed, Echecrates, with great cheerfulneſs; neither trembling, nor ſuffering any alteration for the worſe in his colour or countenance: but, as he was accuſtomed to do, beholding the man with a bull-like aſpect, What ſay you (ſays he) reſpecting this potion? Is it lawful to make a libation of it, or not?—We only bruiſe (ſays he), Socrates, as much as we think ſufficient for the purpoſe.—I underſtand you (ſays he): but it is certainly both lawful and proper to pray to the Gods, that my departure from hence thither may be attended with proſperous fortune; which I entreat them to grant may be the caſe. And at the ſame time ending his diſcourſe, he drank the poiſon with exceeding facility and alacrity. And thus far, indeed, the greater part of us were tolerably well able to refrain from weeping: but when we ſaw him drinking, and that he had drunk it, we could no longer reſtrain our tears. But from me, indeed, notwithſtanding the violence which I employed in checking them, they flowed abundantly; ſo that, covering myſelf with my mantle, I deplored my misfortune. I did not indeed weep for him, but for my own fortune; conſidering what an aſſociate I ſhould be deprived of. But Crito, who was not able to reſtrain his tears, was compelled to riſe before me. And Apollodorus, who during the whole time prior to this had not ceaſed from weeping, then wept aloud with great bitterneſs; ſo that he infected all who were preſent, except Socrates. But Socrates, upon ſeeing this, exclaimed—What are you doing, excellent men? For, indeed, I principally ſent away the women, leſt they ſhould produce a diſturbance of this

kind. For I have heard that it is proper[1] to die joyfully and with propitious omens. Be quiet, therefore, and ſummon fortitude to your aſſiſtance.—When we heard this we bluſhed, and reſtrained our tears. But he, when he found during his walking that his legs felt heavy, and had told us ſo, laid himſelf down in a ſupine poſition. For the man had ordered him to do ſo. And at the ſame time he who gave him the poiſon, touching him at intervals, conſidered his feet and legs. And after he had vehemently preſſed his foot, he aſked him if he felt it. But Socrates anſwered he did not. And after this he again preſſed his thighs: and thus aſcending with his hand, he ſhowed us that he was cold and ſtiff. And Socrates alſo touched himſelf, and ſaid, that when the poiſon reached his heart he ſhould then leave us. But now his lower belly was almoſt cold; when uncovering himſelf (for he was covered), he ſaid (which were his laſt words): Crito, we owe a cock[2] to Æſculapius. Diſcharge this debt, therefore, for me, and do not neglect it.—It ſhall be done (ſays Crito): but conſider whether you have any other commands. To this inquiry of Crito he made no reply; but ſhortly after moved himſelf, and the man covered him. And Socrates fixed his eyes. Which when Crito perceived, he cloſed[3] his mouth and eyes. This, Echecrates, was the end of

[1] The Pythagoreans, ſays Olympiodorus, thought it proper to die joyfully, becauſe death is a good and ſacred thing; and becauſe ſometimes a contrary conduct deſtroys that impulſe by which the ſoul is led back to her true felicity. Beſides this, when the ſoul departs in ſorrow, a crowd of dæmons who are lovers of body are by this mean evocated; and who, in conſequence of rejoicing in a life converſant with generation, render the pneumatic vehicle of the ſoul heavy.

[2] Should it be aſked, ſays Olympiodorus, why Socrates deſired that a cock might be offered for him to Æſculapius, we reply, that by this mean he might heal the diſeaſes which his ſoul had contracted in generation. Perhaps too, ſays he, according to the oracle, he was willing to return to his proper principles, celebrating Pæon. Olympiodorus adds, that Socrates is ſaid by Plato to have been the beſt of men, becauſe he was in every reſpect good; the moſt prudent, according to knowledge; and the moſt juſt, according to deſire.

[3] The meaning of the Attic ſymbols reſpecting thoſe that die is, according to Olympiodorus, as follows: The cloſing of the mouth and eyes ſignifies the ceſſation of external energy, and the converſion of the ſoul to that which is inward. The being laid on the earth recalls to our memory, that the ſoul is conjoined with wholes. The waſhing of the dead body indicates purification from generation. The anointing the parts of the body ſignifies a divulſion from the dark mire of matter, and that divine inſpiration is evocated. But the burning ſignifies the being led to that which is on high, and to an impartible nature. And the being laid in the earth indicates a conjunction

of our aſſociate; a man, as it appears to me, the beſt of thoſe whom we were acquainted with at that time, and, beſides this, the moſt prudent and juſt.

tion with intelligibles. Τινων συμβολα τα περι τους αποιχομενους πατρια αττικα. το μεν ουν καμμυειν, του παυειν μεν της εξω ενεργειας, προς δε την εισω επιστρεφειν. το δε επι γης τιθεναι του αναμιμνησκειν ὁπως αν τοις ὁλοις ἡ ψυχη συναφθειη. το δε λουειν, το αποκαθαιρειν της γενεσεως. το δε μυριζειν, το αποσπαν μεν του βορβορου της ὑλης, την δε θειαν επιπνοιαν προκαλειεσθαι. το δε καιειν, το περιαγειν εις το ανω, και το αμεριστον. το δε εντιθεναι τη γη το συναπτειν τοις νοητοις.

THE END OF THE PHÆDO.

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