

THE CRITO:

OR

CONCERNING TRUE AND JUST OPINION.

THE CRITO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND CRITO.

SCENE.—*The Prison of SOCRATES.*

SOCRATES.

WHY came you at this early hour, Crito? Or is it not yet morning?

CRITO. It is.

SOC. But what time of the morning is it?

CRITO. It is now the break of day.

SOC. I wonder how the keeper of the prison came to admit you.

CRITO. He is accustomed to me, Socrates, in consequence of my frequently coming hither; and he is also in a certain respect under obligations to me.

SOC. Did you come just now, or some time ago?

CRITO. It is a considerable time since I came.

SOC. But why did you not immediately call me, and not sit down in silence?

CRITO. Not so, by Jupiter, Socrates; nor should I myself be willing to be so long a time awake and in sorrow. But I have for some time admired you, on perceiving how sweetly you slept. And I designedly did not call you, that you might continue in that pleasant condition. Indeed I have often

¹ The Crito is disposed after a manner so regular and plain, that it requires no Introduction. I shall therefore only observe, that it admirably teaches us to despise the opinions of the vulgar, to endure calamities patiently, and to consider the good of the whole as incomparably more important than that of a part.

and

and formerly through the whole of your life considered you as happy on account of your manners, but far more so in the present calamity, because you bear it so easily and mildly.

SOC. But it would be absurd, Crito, if a man of my age were to be indignant when it is necessary for him to die.

CRIT. And yet others, Socrates, equally old, when they have been involved in such-like calamities, have notwithstanding their age been indignant with their present fortune.

SOC. It is so. But why did you come to me so early?

CRIT. I come, Socrates, bearing a message not unpleasant to you, as it appears to me, but bitter and weighty to me and to all your associates; and which I indeed shall bear most heavily.

SOC. What is it? Is the ship¹ come from Delos, on the arrival of which it is necessary I should die?

CRIT. Not yet; but it appears to me, from what certain persons coming from Sunium have announced, and who left it there, that it will arrive to-day. From these messengers, therefore, it is evident that it will be here to-day; and consequently it will be necessary for you, Socrates, to die to-morrow.

SOC. But with good fortune, Crito: and if it please the Gods, be it so. Yet I do not think that it will arrive here to-day.

CRIT. Whence do you infer this?

SOC. I will tell you. For on the day after, or on the very day in which the ship arrives, it is necessary that I should die.

CRIT. Those that have power over these things say so.

SOC. I do not, therefore, think it will come this, but the next day. But I infer this from a certain dream which I saw this night a little before you came; and you appear very opportunely not to have disturbed me.

CRIT. But what was this dream?

SOC. A certain woman, beautiful, of a pleasing aspect and in white raiment, seemed to approach, and calling me to say, The third day hence, O Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia².

CRIT.

¹ See The Phædo, near the beginning.

² What this woman said to Socrates in a dream is taken from the ninth book of the Iliad, and belongs to the speech of Achilles on the embassy to him from Agamemnon. The original is

CRI. What a strange dream, Socrates !

Soc. Manifest however, as it appears to me, O Crito.

CRI. Very much so, as it seems. But, O blessed Socrates, be now persuaded by me, and save yourself. For, if you die, not one calamity only will befall me ; but, exclusively of being deprived of you, an associate so necessary as I never have found any other to be, those who do not well know me and you, will think that I might have saved you if I had been willing to spend my money, but that I neglected to do so. Though what can be more base than such an opinion, by which I should appear to value riches more than my friends ? For the multitude will not be persuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence, though we endeavoured to effect your escape.

Soc. But why, O blessed Crito, should we so much respect the opinion of the multitude ? For the most worthy men, whose opinion ought rather to be regarded, will think these things to have been so transacted as they were.

CRI. Nevertheless you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude. For the present circumstances now evince that the multitude can effect not the smallest of evils, but nearly the greatest, if any one is calumniated by them.

Soc. I wish, O Crito, the multitude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good : for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man wise, nor destitute of wisdom ; but they do whatever casually takes place.

CRI. Let these things be so. But answer me, Socrates, whether your concern for me and the rest of your associates prevents you from escaping hence, lest we should be molested by calumniators, as having fraudulently taken you from hence, and be forced either to lose all our property, or a great sum of money, or to suffer something else besides this ? For, if you fear any such thing, bid farewell to it. For we shall be just in saving you from this danger, and, if it were requisite, from one even greater than this. But be persuaded by me, and do not act otherwise.

Soc. I pay attention to these things, Crito, and also to many others.

ἤματι κινεῖται τριτάτῃ Φθίνε εὐρέσθων ἰσχυμν. As Socrates applied what is here said in the dream to a returning to his true country, the intelligible world, he confirms the explanation of the Trojan war which we have given from Proclus in the Notes on the Phædrus.

CRI.

CRI. Do not, therefore, dread these things. For those who have agreed to save you, and to take you from hence, demand no great sum for this purpose. And, in the next place, do you not see how poor your calumniators are, and that on this account your liberty may be purchased at a small expense? My property too, which I think is sufficient, is at your service. And if, out of regard to me, you do not think fit to accept my offer, these guests here are readily disposed to pay what may be necessary. One also among them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with him a sum of money sufficient for this purpose. Cebes, too, and very many others are ready to do the same: so that, as I said, neither fearing these things, should you hesitate to save yourself, nor should you be troubled on leaving the city (as in court you said you should) from not knowing how to conduct yourself. For in many other places, wherever you may go, you will be beloved. And if you are disposed to go to Thessaly, you will there find my guests, who will pay you every attention, and will render your abode there so secure, that no one in Thessaly will molest you. Besides this, Socrates, neither do you appear to me to attempt a just thing, in betraying when you might save yourself; and in endeavouring to promote the earnest wishes of your enemies, who strive to destroy you. To this I may also add, that you appear to me to betray your own children, whom it is incumbent on you to maintain and educate; and, as far as pertains to you, leave them to the guidance of chance; though it is likely that such things will happen to them as orphans are wont to experience. However, either it is not proper to beget children, or it is requisite to labour in rearing and instructing them when begotten. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent mode of conduct; though it is proper that you should choose such things as a good and brave man would adopt, especially as you profess to have made virtue the object of your attention through the whole of life. I am, therefore, ashamed both for you, and those familiars who are our associates as well as yours, lest the whole affair concerning you should appear to have been accomplished through a certain cowardice on our part. And in the first place, your standing a trial which might have been prevented; in the next place, your defence; and, in the last place, the extremity to which you are now brought, will be placed to the account of our viciousness and cowardice, and will be considered as so many ridiculous circumstances which

might have been avoided, if we had exerted ourselves even in a trifling degree. See, therefore, O Socrates, whether these things, besides being evil, will not also be disgraceful both to you and us. Advise then with yourself quickly, though indeed there is no time for consultation; for on the following night all this must be done. But, if we delay, it will be impossible to effect your escape. By all means, therefore, be persuaded by me, Socrates, and do not in any respect otherwise.

Soc. My dear Crito, your alacrity is very commendable, if it is attended with a certain rectitude; but if not, by how much the greater it is, by so much is it the more blameable. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether these things ought to be done or not. For I am a man of that kind, not only now but always, who acts in obedience to that reason which appears to me on mature deliberation to be the best. And the reasons which I have formerly adopted, I am not able now to reject in my present fortune, but they nearly appear to me to be similar: and I venerate and honour the same principles as formerly; so that, unless we have any thing better to adduce at present than these, be well assured that I shall not comply with your request, not though the power of the multitude should endeavour to terrify us like children, by threatening more bonds and deaths, and ablations of property.

CRIT. How, therefore, may we consider these things in the best manner?

Soc. If, in the first place, we resume that which you said concerning opinions, considering whether it was well said by us or not, that to some opinions we ought to pay attention, and to others not; or rather indeed, before it was necessary that I should die, it was well said, but now it becomes evident that it was asserted for the sake of discussion, though in reality it was merely a jest and a trifle. I desire, however, O Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether that assertion appears to me in my present condition to be different, or the same, and whether we shall bid farewell to or be persuaded by it. But thus I think it is every where said by those who appear to say any thing pertinently, that, as I just now asserted of the opinions which men opine, some ought to be very much attended to, and others not. By the Gods, Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? For you, so far as relates to human power, are out of danger of dying to-morrow, and such a calamity as the present will not seduce you into

a false decision. Consider then: does it not appear to you to have been asserted with sufficient rectitude, that it is not fit to reverence all the opinions of men, but that some should be honoured and others not? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but those of some and not those of others? What do you say? Are not these things well said?

CRIT. Well.

SOC. Are not worthy opinions, therefore, to be honoured, but base opinions not?

CRIT. They are.

SOC. And are not worthy opinions those of wise men; but base opinions those of the unwise?

CRIT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Come then, let us again consider how things of this kind were asserted. Whether does he who is conversant in gymnastic exercises pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of that one man alone who is a physician, or the preceptor of boys in their bodily exercises?

CRIT. Of that one alone.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, proper that he should fear the blame and embrace the praise of that one, but not the praise and blame of the multitude?

CRIT. Evidently.

SOC. In this manner, therefore, he ought to act and exercise himself, and also to eat and drink, which appears fit to the one who presides and knows, rather than in that which may appear to be proper to all others.

CRIT. Certainly.

SOC. Be it so. But if he is disobedient to that one, and disregards his opinion and his praise, but honours the opinion and praise of the multitude, who know nothing, will he not suffer some evil?

CRIT. How is it possible he should not?

SOC. But what is this evil, whither does it tend, and to which of the things pertaining to him who is disobedient?

CRIT. Evidently to his body, for this it corrupts.

SOC. You speak well. We must form the same conclusion, therefore, Crito, in other things, that we may not run through all of them. With respect,

respect, therefore, to things just and unjust, base and beautiful, good and evil, and which are now the subjects of our consultation, whether ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to dread it, or that of one man if there is any one knowing in these things, whom we ought to reverence and fear rather than all others; to whom if we are not obedient, we shall corrupt and injure that which becomes better by the just, but is destroyed by the unjust? Or is this nothing?

CRI. I think, Socrates, we ought to follow the opinion of that one.

Soc. Come then, if not being persuaded by the opinion of those that are judges, we destroy that which becomes better by the salubrious, but is corrupted by the insalubrious, can we live after this destruction? But is not this very thing of which we are speaking the body?

CRI. Yes.

Soc. Can we, therefore, live after the body is depraved and corrupted?

CRI. By no means.

Soc. But can we live when that is corrupted which is injured by the unjust, but benefited by the just? Or shall we think that to be viler than the body, whatever it may be, pertaining to us, about which justice and injustice subsist?

CRI. By no means.

Soc. It is, therefore, more honourable.

CRI. By far.

Soc. We should not, therefore, O best of men, be so very much concerned about what the multitude say of us, but what that one man who knows what is just and unjust, and what truth itself is, asserts respecting us. So that you did not act rightly at first, in introducing the opinion of the multitude concerning things just, beautiful and good, and the contraries of these, as that to which we ought to pay attention. Though some one may say that the multitude are able to destroy us.

CRI. Some one, Socrates, may indeed say so.

Soc. True. But, O wonderful man, the assertion which we have discussed appears to me to be dissimilar and prior to this: and again consider whether this is still granted by us, that we are not to admit the merely living, but living well, to be a thing of the greatest consequence.

CRI. It is granted.

Soc. And is this also granted, or not, that it is the same thing to live well, beautifully, and justly?

CRIT. It is.

Soc. From what has been assented to, therefore, this must be considered, whether it is just for me to endeavour to depart hence, the Athenians not dismissing me, or whether it is not just. And if it should appear to be just indeed, we should endeavour to accomplish it; but if not, we must bid farewell to the attempt. For as to the considerations which you adduce concerning money, opinion, and the education of children, see, Crito, whether these are not in reality the reflections of the vulgar, who rashly put men to death, and if it were in their power would recall them to life, and this without being at all guided by intellect. But by us, since reason requires it, nothing else is to be considered than as we just now said, whether we shall act justly in giving money and thanks to those who may lead me hence; or whether in reality, both we that are led from hence and those that lead us, shall not in all these things act unjustly. And if it should appear that we in so doing shall act unjustly, we must by no means pay attention to these things, rather than to the consideration whether we shall do any thing unjustly, not even if it should be necessary for us to die, staying here and being quiet, or to suffer any thing else whatever.

CRIT. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak well; but see what is to be done.

Soc. Let us consider, O good man, in common; and if you can in any respect contradict what I say, contradict me, and I will assent to you; but if you cannot, cease, O blessed man, to repeat often to me the same thing, that I ought to depart hence, though the Athenians are unwilling. For I shall think it a great thing if you can persuade me thus to act, but not if you attempt this contrary to my will. See then, whether the beginning of this consideration satisfies you, and endeavour to answer the interrogation in such a way as you especially think it is proper.

CRIT. I will endeavour.

Soc. Shall we say then, that we should by no means willingly act unjustly? Or may we in a certain respect act unjustly, and in a certain respect not? Or is to act unjustly by no means neither good nor beautiful, as we have often confessed before, and as we just now said? Or are all those things which we formerly

formerly assented to dissipated in these few days; and has it for some time been concealed from us, that though we are so old, yet in seriously discoursing with each other, we have in no respect differed from children? Or does it not thus subsist more than any thing, as we then said, whether the multitude admit it or not? And whether it be necessary that we should suffer things still more grievous, or such as are milder than these, at the same time shall we say or not that to act unjustly is evil and base to him who thus acts?

CRIT. We shall say so.

SOC. By no means, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.

CRIT. We ought not.

SOC. Neither, therefore, ought he who is injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is by no means proper to act unjustly.

CRIT. So it appears.

SOC. But what then? Is it proper to do evil to any one, O Crito, or not?

CRIT. It is not proper, Socrates.

SOC. But what? Is it just to repay evil with evil, as the multitude say, or is it not just?

CRIT. By no means.

SOC. For he who does evil to men, differs in no respect from him who acts unjustly.

CRIT. Your assertion is true.

SOC. Neither, therefore, is it proper to return an injury, nor to do evil to any man, however you may be injured by him. But see, Crito, while you acknowledge these things, that you do not assent to them contrary to your opinion. For I know that these things appear to and are opined by very few. But those to whom these things appear, and those to whom they do not, disagree with each other in their decisions; and it is necessary that these should despise each other, while they look to each other's deliberations. Do you therefore consider, and very diligently, whether it thus appears to you in common with me, and whether deliberating we should begin from hence, that it is never right either to do an injury, or to return an injury, or when suffering evil to revenge it by doing evil in return; or, whether you will depart and not agree with us in this principle. For it thus appears to me both formerly and now; but if it in any respect appears otherwise

to you, speak and inform me. And if you acquiesce in what has been said above, hear what follows.

CRI. But I do acquiesce and accord with you. Speak, therefore.

Soc. I will say then that which is consequent to this, or rather I will ask you, whether when a man has promised to do things that are just, he ought to do them, or to break his promise.

CRI. He ought to do them.

Soc. From these things then thus consider. If we should depart hence without the consent of the city, shall we do evil to certain persons, and those such as we ought not in the smallest degree to injure, or shall we not? And shall we acquiesce in those things which we assented to as being just; or shall we not?

CRI. I cannot reply to your question, Socrates: for I do not understand it.

Soc. But thus consider. If to us, intending to escape from hence, or in whatever manner it may be requisite to denominate it, the Laws and the Republic should present themselves in a body, and thus address us,—Tell us, O Socrates, what is it you intend to do? Do you conceive that by this thing which you attempt, you will destroy any thing else than, as far as you are able, us the Laws, and the whole city? Or does it appear to you to be possible for that city to subsist and not be subverted, in which Justice is not only without strength, but is likewise divested of its authority and corrupted by private persons?—What should we say, Crito, to these things, and to others of a similar kind? For much might be said, and particularly by rhetoricians, on the subversion of that law which provides that sentences once passed shall not be infringed. Shall we say to them that the city has not passed an equitable sentence upon us? Shall we say this, or something else?

CRI. This, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. Will not the Laws then thus address us? O Socrates, has it not been admitted by us and you, that you should acquiesce in the sentence which the city has passed? If, therefore, we should wonder at the Laws thus speaking, perhaps they would say, Be not surprised, O Socrates, at what we have asserted, but answer, since you are accustomed both to interrogate and reply. For what is the charge against us and the city, for which you endeavour

endeavour to destroy you? Did we not first beget you? And was it not through us that your father married your mother, and planted you? Tell us, therefore, whether you blame these laws of ours concerning marriage as improper? I should say I do not blame them. But do you blame those laws concerning the nurture and education of children in which you were yourself instructed? Or did not the laws framed for this purpose order in a becoming manner when they commanded your father to instruct you in music and gymnastic? I should say they ordered well. Since then we begot and nourished and educated you, can you deny that both you and your progenitors are our offspring and servants? And if this be the case, do you think that there is an equality² of justice between us and you, and that it is just for you to attempt to do those things to us which we endeavour to do to you? Or will you admit that there is no equality of justice between you and your father, or master, if you happen to have either of them, so that you are not to return to these any evil you may suffer from them, nor, when they reproach you, contradict them, nor, when they strike you, strike them again, nor do many other things of a similar nature; but that against your country and the Laws it is lawful for you to act in this manner, so that if we endeavour to destroy you, thinking it to be just, you also should endeavour, as far as you are able, to destroy in return, us the Laws and your country, and should say that in so doing you act justly,—you who in reality make virtue the object of your care? Or, are you so wise as to be ignorant that your country is more honourable, venerable and holy, than your mother and father, and all the rest of your progenitors, and ranks higher both among the Gods and among men endued with intellect? That it is also more necessary for a man to venerate, obey and assent to his country, when conducting itself with severity, than to his father? Likewise that he should be persuaded by it, and do what it orders? That he should quietly suffer, if it orders him to suffer? And that, if it commands him to be beaten, or confined in bonds, or sends him to battle to be wounded or slain, he should do these things, and that it is just to comply? And that he should neither decline nor recede from nor desert his rank; but in war, in a court

² Wholes in the order of nature are more excellent than parts; and in consequence of this, as being more honourable, there is no reciprocity of obligation between the two.

of justice, and every where, the commands of the city and his country should be obeyed; or he should persuade his country to that which is naturally just; but that it is not holy to offer violence either to a mother or a father, and much less to one's country?—What shall we say to these things, Crito? Shall we acknowledge that the Laws speak the truth or not?

CRI. To me it appears that they do.

Soc. Consider, therefore, O Socrates, perhaps the Laws will say, whether our assertion is true, that your present attempt against us is unjust. For we are the authors of your birth, we nourished, we educated you, imparting both to you and all the other citizens all the good in our power, at the same time proclaiming, that every Athenian who is willing has the liberty of departing wherever he pleases, with all his property, if after having explored and seen the affairs of the city, and us the Laws, we should not be constituted according to his wishes. Nor does any one of us the Laws impede or forbid any one of you from migrating into some colony, or any other place, with all his property, if we and the city do not please him. But, on the other hand, if any one of you continues to live here after he has seen the manner in which we administer justice, and govern the city in other particulars, we now say, that he in reality acknowledges to us, that he will do such things as we may command. We also say, that he who is not obedient is triply unjust, because he is disobedient to his begetters, and to those by whom he was educated; and because, having promised to be persuaded by us, he is neither persuaded, nor does he persuade us, if we do any thing improperly; though at the same time we only propose, and do not fiercely command him to do what we order, but leave to his choice one of two things, either to persuade us, or to obey our mandates; and yet he does neither of these.

And we say that you also, O Socrates, will be obnoxious to these crimes if you execute what you intend to do; nor will you be the least, but the most obnoxious of all the Athenians. If, therefore, I should ask them the reason of this, they would perhaps justly reproach me by saying, that I promised to submit to all these conditions beyond the rest of the Athenians. For they would say, This, O Socrates, is a great argument with us, that both we and the city were pleasing to you; that you especially of all the Athenians would never have dwelt in it, if it had not been particularly agreeable to you. For you never left the city for any of the public spectacles except once, when you went

went to the Isthmian games, nor did you ever go elsewhere, except in your military expeditions. You never went any other journey like other men; nor had you ever any desire of seeing any other city, or becoming acquainted with any other laws; but we and our city were sufficient for you, so exceedingly were you attached to us, and so much did you consent to be governed by our mandates. Besides, you have procreated children in this city, in consequence of being pleased with it. Further still, in this very judicial process, you might have been condemned to exile, if you had been willing, and might then have executed with the consent of the city what you now attempt without it. Then however you carried yourself loftily, as one who would not be indignant, if it were requisite that you should die; but you preferred, as you said, death to exile. But now you are neither ashamed of those assertions, nor do you revere us the Laws, since you endeavour to destroy us. You also do that which the most vile slave would do, by endeavouring to make your escape contrary to the compacts and agreements according to which you consented to become a member of this community. In the first place, therefore, answer us this very thing, whether we speak the truth in asserting, that you consented to be governed by us in reality, and not merely in words? Do we in asserting this speak the truth? What shall we say to these things, Crito? Can we say any thing else than that we assent to them?

CRIT. It is necessary so to do, Socrates.

SOC. Do you not then, they will say, violate these compacts and agreements between us; which you consented to neither from necessity nor through deception, nor in consequence of being compelled to deliberate in a short time; but during the space of seventy years, in which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied with us, and the compacts had appeared to you to be unjust? You however neither preferred Lacedæmon nor Crete, which you are perpetually saying are governed by good laws, nor any other city of the Greeks or Barbarians; but you have been less out of Athens than the lame and the blind, and other mutilated persons. So much did the city and we the Laws please you beyond the rest of the Athenians. For who can be pleased with a city without the laws? But now you do not abide by the compacts. You will however abide by them if you are persuaded by us, Socrates, and do not become ridiculous by escaping from the city.

For consider what advantage can be derived either to yourself or your friends by violating those compacts. For in consequence of your escaping from hence, it is nearly evident that your friends will be exposed to the danger either of banishment, or of the loss of their property. And as for yourself, if you retire to any neighbouring city, whether Thebes or Megara (for both are governed by good laws), you will be considered, Socrates, as an enemy to their polity. And such as have any regard for their country will look upon you as a corrupter of the laws. You will also confirm them in their good opinion of your judges, who will appear to have very properly condemned you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws will very much appear to be a corrupter of youth and of stupid men. Will you then avoid these well-governed cities, and men of the most elegant manners? Supposing you should, will it, therefore, be worth while for you to live? Or, should you go to these cities, will you not blush, Socrates, to discourse about the same things as you did here, viz. that virtue and justice, legal institutes, and the laws, should be objects of the greatest attention to men? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You must necessarily think so. But perhaps, avoiding these cities, you will go to Theffaly, to the guests of Crito. For there there is the greatest disorder and intemperance. And perhaps they will willingly hear you relating how ridiculously you escaped from prison, investing yourself with a certain apparatus, such as a skin, or something else which those that make their escape are accustomed to provide, and thus altering your usual appearance.

Do you think no one will say, that you, though an old man, and likely to live but a very little longer, have dared to desire life with such sordid avidity, and to transgress the greatest laws? Perhaps this will be the case, though you should not have offended any one. But if you should, you will hear, Socrates, many things unworthy of you. You will however live obnoxious, and in subjection to all men. But what will you do in Theffaly besides feasting? having come to Theffaly as to a supper. And where shall we find those discourses concerning justice, and the other virtues?—But do you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may nurture and instruct them? What then? Bringing them to Theffaly, will you there educate them, making them to be stranger guests, that they may also derive this advantage from you? Or, if you should not do this, but should leave them here, will they be better nurtured and

educated in your absence? for your friends will take care of them. Do you suppose then that your children will be taken care of by your friends if you go to Theffaly, and that they will be neglected by them if you depart to Hades? If indeed any advantage is to be derived from those that call themselves your friends, it is proper to think that they will not.

But, O Socrates, being persuaded by us your nurses, neither pay more attention to your children, nor to life, nor to any thing else than to justice, that, when you arrive at Hades, you may be able to defend all these particulars to the rulers there. For if, transgressing the laws, you should thus act, it will neither be better, nor more just, nor more holy to yourself, nor to any one of your friends; nor will it be more advantageous to you when you arrive at Hades. But you will depart, if you do depart, not injured by us the Laws, but by men. If however you should so disgracefully escape, returning injury for injury, and evil for evil, transgressing your agreements and compacts with us, and injuring those whom you ought not to injure in the smallest degree, viz. yourself, your friends, your country, and us;—in this case, we shall be indignant with you as long as you live; and in another life, our brothers the Laws who reside in Hades will not benevolently receive you; knowing that you attempted, as far as you was able, to destroy us. Let not Crito, therefore, rather than us, persuade you to do what he says.

Be well assured, my dear friend Crito, that I seem to hear these things, just as those who are agitated with Corybantic fury appear to hear the melody of pipes. And the sound of these words, like the humming of bees, in my ears, renders me incapable of hearing any thing else. You see then what appears to me at present; and if you should say any thing contrary to these things, you will speak in vain. At the same time, if you think that any thing more should be done, tell me.

CRITO. But, Socrates, I have nothing further to say.

SOC. Desist, therefore, Crito, and let us adopt this conduct, since Divinity persuades us thus to act.

THE END OF THE CRITO.