THE APOLOGY

OF

SOCRATES.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

THE elevation and greatneſs of mind for which Socrates was ſo juſtly celebrated by antiquity, are perhaps no where ſo conſpicuouſly diſplayed as in this his Apology. In a ſituation in which death itſelf was preſented to his view, he neither deviates from the moſt rigid veracity, nor has recourſe to any of thoſe abject arts, by which in ſimilar circumſtances pity is generally ſolicited and puniſhment ſometimes averted. His whole diſcourſe, indeed, is full of ſimplicity and noble grandeur, and is the energetic language of conſcious innocence and offended worth.

The cauſes that occaſioned this Apology were as follow :—Ariſtophanes, at the inſtigation of Melitus, undertook, in his comedy of The Clouds, to ridicule the venerable character of Socrates, on the ſtage; and the way being once open to calumny and defamation, the fickle and licentious populace paid no reverence to the philoſopher, whom they had before regarded as a being of a ſuperior order. When this had ſucceeded, Melitus ſtood forth to criminate him, together with Anytus and Lycon; and the philoſopher was ſummoned before the tribunal of the Five Hundred. He was accuſed of making innovations in the religion of his country, and corrupting the youth. But as both theſe accuſations muſt have been obviouſly falſe to an unprejudiced tribunal, the accuſers relied for the ſucceſs of their cauſe on perjured witneſſes, and the envy of the judges, whoſe ignorance would readily yield to miſrepreſentation, and be influenced and guided by falſe eloquence and fraudulent arts. That the perſonal enemies indeed of Socrates, vile cha-

racters, to whom his wiſdom and his virtue were equally offenſive, ſhould have accuſed him of making innovations in the religion of Greece, is by no means ſurpriſing; but that very many of modern times ſhould have believed that this accuſation was founded in truth, and that he endeavoured to ſubvert the doctrine of polytheiſm, is a circumſtance which by the truly learned reader muſt be ranked among the greateſt eccentricities of modern wit. For to ſuch a one it will moſt clearly appear from this very Apology, that Socrates was accuſed of impiety for aſſerting that he was connected in a very tranſcendant degree with a preſiding dæmon, to whoſe direction he confidently ſubmitted the conduct of his life. For the accuſation of Melitus, that he introduced other novel dæmoniacal natures, can admit of no other conſtruction. Beſides, in the courſe of this Apology he aſſerts, in the moſt unequivocal and ſolemn manner, his belief in polytheiſm; and this is indubitably confirmed in many places by Plato, the moſt genuine of his diſciples, and the moſt faithful recorder of his doctrines. The teſtimony of Xenophon too on this point is no leſs weighty than deciſive. "I have often wondered," ſays that hiſtorian and philoſopher [1], "by what arguments the Athenians who condemned Socrates perſuaded the city that he was worthy of death. For, in the firſt place, how could they prove that he did not believe in the Gods in which the city believed? ſince it was evident that he often ſacrificed at home, and often on the common altars of the city. It was alſo not unapparent that he employed divination. For a report was circulated, that ſignals were given to Socrates, according to his own aſſertion, by a dæmoniacal power; whence they eſpecially appear to me to have accuſed him of introducing new dæmoniacal natures. He however introduced nothing new, nor any thing different from the opinion of thoſe who, believing in divination, make uſe of auguries and oracles, ſymbols and ſacrifices. For theſe do not apprehend that either birds, or things which occur, know what is advan-

[1] Πολλακις εθαυμασα, τισι ποτε λογοις Αθηναιους επεισαν οι γραψαμενοι Σωκρατην, ως αξιος ειη θανατου τη πολει.—Πρωτον μεν ουν ως ουκ ενομιζεν ους η πολις νομιζει θεους, ποιω ποτ' εχρησατο τεκμηριω; θυων τε γαρ φανερος ην πολλακις μεν οικοι, πολλακις δε επι των κοινων της πολεως βωμων· και μαντικη χρωμενος, ουκ αφανης ην· διετετρυλητο γαρ, ως φαιη Σωκρατης το δαιμονιον εαυτω σημαινειν, οθεν δη και μαλιστα μοι δοκουσιν αυτον αιτιασασθαι, καινα δαιμονια εισφερειν. ο δ' ουδεν καινομενον εισεφερε των αλλων, οσοι μαντικην νομιζοντες, οιωνοις τε χρωνται, και φημαις, και συμβολοις, και θυσιαις. ουτοι τε γαρ υπολαμβανουσιν, ου τους ορνιθας, ουδε τους απαντωντας ειδεναι τα συμφεροντα τοις μαντευομενοις, αλλα τους θεους δια τουτων αυτα σημαινειν· κακεινος ουτως ενομιζεν. P. 441.

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tageous to the diviners; but they are of opinion that the Gods thus ſignify to them what is beneficial; and he alſo thought the ſame. Again, in another place, he obſerves as follows: "Socrates [1] thought that the Gods take care of men not in ſuch a way as the multitude conceive. For they think that the Gods know ſome things, but do not know others. But Socrates thought that the Gods know all things, as well things ſaid and done, as thoſe deliberated in ſilence. That they are alſo everywhere preſent, and ſignify to men concerning all human affairs. I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians could ever be perſuaded that Socrates was not of a ſound mind reſpecting the Gods, as he never ſaid or did any thing impious concerning them. But all his ſayings and all his actions pertaining to the Gods were ſuch as any one by ſaying and doing would be thought to be moſt pious." And laſtly, in another place he obſerves, "That it was evident that Socrates worſhipped the Gods the moſt of all men [2]."

After ſuch unequivocal teſtimony, no other reaſon can be aſſigned for that ſtrange poſition of the moderns, that Socrates ridiculed the religion of his country, than a profound ignorance of one of the moſt important tenets of the heathen religion, and which may alſo be conſidered as ranking among the firſt of the moſt magnificent, ſcientific, and divine conceptions of the human mind. The tenet I allude to is this, that the eſſential, which is the moſt perfect energy of deity, is deific; and that his firſt and immediate progeny muſt as neceſſarily be Gods, that is, beings tranſcendantly ſimilar to himſelf, and poſſeſſing thoſe characteriſtics *ſecondarily* which he poſſeſſes *primarily*, as heat is the immediate offſpring of fire, and coldneſs of ſnow. From being unacquainted with this mighty truth, which is coeval with the univerſe itſelf, modern theologiſts and ſophiſts have dared to defame the religion of Greece, and, by offering violence to the ſacred pages of antiquity,

[1] Και γαρ επιμελεισθαι θεους ενομιζεν ανθρωπων, ουχ ὁν τροπον οἱ πολλοι νομιζουσιν. αὐτοι μεν γαρ οιονται τους θεους τα μεν ειδεναι, τα δ' ουκ ειδεναι· Σωκρατης δε παντα μεν ηγειτο θεους ειδεναι, τα τε λεγομενα και πραττομενα, και τα σιγῃ βουλευομενα· πανταχου δε παρειναι και σημαινειν τοις ανθρωποις περι των ανθρωπειων παντων. Θαυμαζω ουν, ὁπως ποτε επεισθησαν Αθηναιοι, Σωκρατην περι τους θεους μη σωφρονειν, τον ασεβες μεν ουδεποτε περι τους θεους ουτ' ειποντα ουτε πραξαντα· τοιαυτα δε και λεγοντα και πραττοντα περι θεων, ὁια τις αν και λεγων και πραττων ειη τε και νομιζοιτο ευσεβεστατος. P. 443.

[2] Φανερος ην θεραπευων τους θεους, μαλιστα των αλλων ανθρωπων. P. 450.

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have made the great Socrates himſelf become the patron of their own ſhallow and diſtorted conceptions. But to return to the Apology.

Lyſias, one of the moſt celebrated orators of the age, compoſed an oration, in a laboured and pathetic ſtyle, which he offered to Socrates to be pronounced as his defence in the preſence of his judges. Socrates however refuſed it, obſerving, that a philoſopher ought to be conſpicuous for magnanimity and firmneſs of ſoul. Hence, in his Apology, he paid no attention to the ſplendor of diction, but truſted wholly to the intrinſic dignity of his ſentiments. He contented himſelf with ſpeaking to his judges as he uſed to do in common diſcourſe, and with propoſing queſtions to his accuſers. Hence his defence was entirely the ſpontaneous effuſions of his genius; ſimple and plain, yet nervous and dignified.

Several perſons who aſſiſted in the court upon this occaſion, beſides Plato, drew up the Apology of Socrates. Among the reſt Xenophon compiled one from the relation of Hermogenes the ſon of Hipponicus, for he himſelf was not then at Athens. None of them are extant, however, but thoſe of Plato and Xenophon. And of theſe, the firſt is in every reſpect worthy the greateſt diſciple of Socrates; but the other preſents us with an imperfect copy, becauſe compoſed by a diſciple that was abſent. This imperfect copy, however, ſufficiently proves that the ſubſtance of this Apology is accurate, how much ſoever it may have been amended by paſſing through ſuch a hand as that of Plato.

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I KNOW not, O Athenians, how you may be affected by my accuſers: I indeed have through them almoſt forgotten myſelf, ſo perſuaſively have they ſpoken; though, as I may ſay, they have not aſſerted any thing which is true. But among the multitude of their falſe aſſertions I am moſt ſurpriſed at this, in which they ſay that you ought to beware of being deceived by me, as if I were an eloquent ſpeaker. For that they ſhould not be aſhamed of aſſerting that which will be immediately confuted by me in reality, ſince in the preſent inſtance I ſhall appear to you to be by no means eloquent,—this ſeems to me to be the conſummation of impudence; unleſs they call him eloquent who ſpeaks the truth. For, if they aſſert this, I ſhall indeed acknowledge myſelf to be a rhetorician, though not according to their conceptions. They have not then, as I ſaid, aſſerted any thing which is true; but from me you will hear all the truth. Not, by Jupiter, O Athenians, that you will hear from me a diſcourſe ſplendidly decorated with nouns and verbs, and adorned in other reſpects, like the harangues of theſe men; but you will hear me ſpeaking in ſuch language as may caſually preſent itſelf. For I am confident that what I ſay will be juſt, nor let any one of you expect it will be otherwiſe: for it does not become one of my age to come before you like a lad with a ſtudied diſcourſe. And, indeed, I very much requeſt and beſeech you, O Athenians, that if you ſhould hear me apologizing in the ſame terms and modes of expreſſion which I am accuſtomed to uſe in the Forum, on the Exchange and public Banks, and in

other places, where many of you have heard me,—that you will neither wonder nor be diſturbed on this account; for the caſe is as follows:—I now for the firſt time come before this tribunal, though I am more than ſeventy years old; and conſequently I am a ſtranger to the mode of ſpeaking which is here adopted. As, therefore, if I were in reality a foreigner, you would pardon me for uſing the language and the manner in which I had been educated, ſo now I requeſt you, and this juſtly, as it appears to me, to ſuffer the mode of my diction, whether it be better or worſe, and to attend ſo this, whether I ſpeak what is juſt or not: for this is the virtue of a judge, as that of an orator is to ſpeak the truth.

In the firſt place, therefore, O Athenians, it is juſt that I ſhould anſwer the firſt falſe accuſations of me, and my firſt accuſers, and afterwards the latter accuſations, and the latter accuſers. For many have been accuſers of me to you for many years, and who have aſſerted nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his accomplices, though theſe indeed are powerful in perſuading; but thoſe are ſtill more ſo, who having been converſant with many of you from infancy, have perſuaded you, and accuſed me falſely. For they have ſaid, that there is one Socrates, a wiſe man, ſtudious of things on high, and exploring every thing under the earth, and who alſo can make the worſe to be the better argument. Theſe men, O Athenians, who ſpread this report are my dire accuſers. For thoſe who hear it think that ſuch as inveſtigate theſe things do not believe that there are Gods. In the next place, theſe accuſers are numerous, and have accuſed me for a long time. They alſo ſaid theſe things to you in that age in which you would moſt readily believe them, ſome of you being boys and lads; and they accuſed me quietly, no one ſpeaking in my defence. But that which is moſt irrational of all is this, that neither is it poſſible to know and tell their names, except ſome one of them ſhould be a comic [1] poet. Such however as have perſuaded you by employing envy and calumny, together with thoſe who being perſuaded themſelves have perſuaded others,—with reſpect to all theſe, the method to be adopted is moſt dubious. For it is not poſſible to call them to account here before you, nor to confute any one of them; but it is neceſſary, as if fighting with ſhadows, to make my defence and refutation without any to anſwer me. Conſider, therefore, as I have

[1] Meaning Ariſtophanes.

ſaid,

ſaid that my accuſers are twofold, ſome having accuſed me lately, and others formerly; and think that it is neceſſary I ſhould anſwer the latter of theſe firſt; for you alſo have heard theſe my accuſers, and much more than you have thoſe by whom I have been recently accuſed. Be it ſo. I muſt defend myſelf then, O Athenians, and endeavour in this ſo ſhort a ſpace of time to remove from you the calumny which you have ſo long entertained. I wiſh, therefore, that this my defence may effect ſomething better both for you and me, and that it may contribute to ſome more important end. I think however that it will be attended with difficulty, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is. At the ſame time let this terminate as Divinity pleaſes. It is my buſineſs to obey the law, and to make my apology.

Let us repeat, therefore, from the beginning what the accuſation was, the ſource of that calumny in which Melitus confiding brought this charge againſt me. Be it ſo. What then do my accuſers ſay? For their accuſation muſt be formally recited as if given upon oath. It is this: SOCRATES ACTS WICKEDLY, AND WITH CRIMINAL CURIOSITY INVESTIGATES THINGS UNDER THE EARTH, AND IN THE HEAVENS. HE ALSO MAKES THE WORSE TO BE THE BETTER ARGUMENT; AND HE TEACHES THESE THINGS TO OTHERS. Such is the accuſation: for things of this kind you alſo have yourſelves ſeen in the comedy of Ariſtophanes[1]: for there one Socrates is carried about, who affirms that he walks upon the air, and idly aſſerts many other trifles of this nature; of which things however I neither know much nor little. Nor do I ſay this as deſpiſing ſuch a ſcience, if there be any one wiſe about things of this kind, leſt Melitus ſhould charge me with this as a new crime; but becauſe, O Athenians, I have no ſuch knowledge. I adduce many of you as witneſſes of this, and I call upon ſuch of you as have at any time heard me diſcourſing, and there are many ſuch among you, to teach and declare to each other, if you have ever heard me ſpeak much or little about things of this kind. And from this you may know that other things alſo, which the multitude aſſert of me, are all of them of a ſimilar nature: for no one of them is true. For neither if you have heard any one aſſert that I attempt to teach men, and that I make money by ſo doing,—

[1] See The Clouds of that poet, ver. 112 et ſeq. et ver. 188.

neither is this true. This indeed appears to me to be a beautiful thing, if ſome one is able to inſtruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of theſe, in the ſeveral cities which he viſits, has the power of perſuading the young men, who are permitted to apply themſelves to ſuch of their own countrymen as they pleaſe without any charge, to adhere to them only, and to give them money and thanks beſides for their inſtruction. There is alſo another wiſe man, a Parian, who I hear has arrived hither. For it happened that I once met with a man who ſpends more money on the ſophiſts than all others,—I mean Callias the ſon of Hipponicus. I therefore aſked him, for he has two ſons, O Callias, ſaid I, if your two ſons were two colts or calves, ſhould we not have ſome one to take care of them, who would be paid for ſo doing, and who would make them beautiful, and the poſſeſſors of ſuch good qualities as belong to their nature? But now, ſince your ſons are men, what maſter do you intend to have for them? Who is there that is ſcientifically knowing in human and political virtue of this kind? For I think that you have conſidered this, ſince you have ſons. Is there ſuch a one, ſaid I, or not? There certainly is, he replied. Who is he? ſaid I. And whence is he? And for how much money does he teach? It is Evenus the Parian, ſaid he, Socrates, and he teaches for five minæ (15l.). And I indeed have conſidered Evenus as bleſſed, if he in reality poſſeſſes this art, and ſo elegantly teaches. I, therefore, ſhould alſo glory and think highly of myſelf, if I had a ſcientific knowledge of theſe things; but this, O Athenians, is certainly not the caſe.

Perhaps, however, ſome one may reply: But, Socrates, what have you done then? Whence have theſe calumnies againſt you ariſen? For unleſs you had more curiouſly employed yourſelf than others, and had done ſomething different from the multitude, ſo great a rumour would never have been raiſed againſt you. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not paſs an unadviſed ſentence againſt you. He who ſays theſe things appears to me to ſpeak juſtly, and I will endeavour to ſhow you what that is which has occaſioned me this appellation and calumny. Hear, therefore; and though perhaps I ſhall appear to ſome of you to jeſt, yet be well aſſured that I ſhall tell you all the truth. For I, O Athenians, have acquired this name through nothing elſe than a certain wiſdom. But of what kind is this wiſdom? Perhaps it is human wiſdom. For this in reality I appear to poſſeſs. Thoſe indeed

indeed whom I juſt now mentioned poſſeſſed perhaps more than human wiſdom, which I know not how to denominate: for I have no knowledge of it. And whoever ſays that I have, ſpeaks falſely, and aſſerts this to calumniate me. But, O Athenians, be not diſturbed if I appear to ſpeak ſomewhat magnificently of myſelf. For this which I ſay is not my own aſſertion, but I ſhall refer it to one who is conſidered by you as worthy of belief. For I ſhall adduce to you the Delphic Deity himſelf as a teſtimony of my wiſdom, if I have any, and of the quality it poſſeſſes. You certainly then know Chærepho: he was my aſſociate from a youth, was familiar with moſt of you, and accompanied you in and returned with you from your exile. You know, therefore, what kind of a man Chærepho was, and how eager in all his undertakings. He then, coming to Delphi, had the boldneſs to conſult the oracle about this particular. Be not, as I ſaid, O Athenians, diſturbed: for he aſked if there was any one more wiſe than I am. The Pythian prieſteſs, therefore, anſwered that there was not any one more wiſe. His brother can teſtify to you the truth of theſe things; for Chærepho himſelf is dead.

Conſider then on what account I aſſert theſe things: for I am going to inform you whence this calumny againſt me aroſe. When, therefore, I had heard this anſwer of the oracle, I thus conſidered with myſelf, What does the God ſay? and what does he obſcurely ſignify? For I am not conſcious to myſelf that I am wiſe, either in a great or in a ſmall degree. What then does he mean in ſaying that I am moſt wiſe? For he does not lie, ſince this is not lawful to him. And for a long time, indeed, I was dubious what he could mean. Afterwards with conſiderable difficulty I betook myſelf to the following mode of inveſtigating his meaning. I went to one of thoſe who appear to be wiſe men, that here if any where I might confute the prediction, and evince to the oracle that this man was more wiſe than I. Surveying, therefore, this man, (for there is no occaſion to mention his name, but he was a politician;) while I beheld him and diſcourſed with him, it ſo happened, O Athenians, that this man appeared to me to be wiſe in the opinion of many other men, and eſpecially in his own, but that he was not ſo. And afterwards I endeavoured to ſhow him that he fancied himſelf to be wiſe, but was not. Hence I became odious to him, and alſo to many others that were preſent. Departing,

therefore, I reaſoned with myſelf that I was wiſer than this man. For it appears that neither of us knows any thing beautiful or good: but ne indeed not knowing, thinks that he knows ſomething; but I, as I do not know any thing, neither do I think that I know. Hence in this trifling particular I appear to be wiſer than him, becauſe I do not think that I know things which I do not know. After this I went to another of thoſe who appeared to be wiſer than him; and of him alſo I formed the ſame opinion. Hence alſo I became odious to him and many others.

Afterwards however I went to others, ſuſpecting and grieving and fearing that I ſhould make enemies. At the ſame time however it appeared to me to be neceſſary to pay the greateſt attention to the oracle of the God, and that, conſidering what could be its meaning, I ſhould go to all that appeared to poſſeſs any knowledge. And by the dog [1], O Athenians, (for it is neceſſary to tell you the truth,) that which happened to me was as follows. Thoſe that were moſt celebrated for their wiſdom appeared to me to be moſt remote from it; but others who were conſidered as far inferior to them poſſeſſed more of intellect. But it is neceſſary to relate to you my wandering, and the labours as it were which I endured, that the oracle might become to me unconfuted. For after the politicians I went to the poets both tragic and dithyrambic, and alſo others, expecting that I ſhould here immediately find myſelf to be leſs wiſe than theſe. Taking up, therefore, ſome of their poems which appeared to me to be the moſt elaborately written, I aſked them what was their meaning, that at the ſame time I might learn ſomething from them. I am aſhamed indeed, O Athenians, to tell you the truth; but at the ſame time it muſt be told. For, as I may ſay, all that were preſent would have ſpoken better about the things which they had compoſed. I diſcovered this, therefore, in a ſhort time concerning the poets, that they did not effect by wiſdom that which they did, but by a certain genius and from enthuſiaſtic energy, like prophets and thoſe that utter oracles. For theſe alſo ſay many and beautiful things, but they underſtand nothing of what they ſay. Poets, therefore, appeared to me to be affected in a ſimilar manner. And at the ſame time I perceived

[1] Ῥαδαμανθυος ορκος ουτος, ὁ κατα κυνος, ἢ χηνος, ἢ πλατανου, ἢ κριου, ἢ τινος αλλου τοιουτου. Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 5. i. e. "This is the oath of Rhadamanthus, who ſwore by the dog, or the gooſe, or the plane tree, or the ram, or ſomething elſe of this kind."

that

that they conſidered themſelves, on account of their poetry, to be the wiſeſt of men in other things, in which they were not ſo. I departed, therefore, alſo from them, thinking that I ſurpaſſed them by the very ſame thing in which I ſurpaſſed the politicians.

In the laſt place, therefore, I went to the artificers. For I was conſcious to myſelf that I knew nothing, as I may ſay, but that theſe men poſſeſſed knowledge, becauſe I had found them acquainted with many and beautiful things. And in this indeed I was not deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this they were wiſer than I. But, O Athenians, good artificers alſo appeared to me to have the ſame fault as the poets. For each, in conſequence of performing well in his art, thought that he was alſo moſt wiſe in other things, and thoſe the greateſt. And this their error obſcured that very wiſdom which they did poſſeſs. I therefore aſked myſelf in behalf of the oracle, whether I would chooſe to be as I am, poſſeſſing no part either of their wiſdom or ignorance, or to have both which they poſſeſs. I anſwered, therefore, for myſelf and for the oracle, that it was advantageous for me to be as I am.

From this my inveſtigation, O Athenians, many enmities were excited againſt me, and ſuch as were moſt grievous and weighty, ſo that many calumnies were produced from them; and hence I obtained the appellation of *the wiſe man*. For thoſe that hear me think that I am wiſe in theſe things, the ignorance of which I confute in others. It appears however, O Athenians, that Divinity is wiſe in reality, and that in this oracle he ſays this, that human wiſdom [1] is but of little, or indeed of no worth; and it ſeems that he uſed my name, making me an example, as if he had ſaid, He, O men, is the wiſeſt among you, who, like Socrates, *knows* that he is in reality of no worth with reſpect to wiſdom. Theſe things, therefore, going about, I even now inquire and explore in obedience to the God, both among citizens and ſtrangers, if any one of them appears to me to be wiſe; and when I find he is not, giving aſſiſtance to the God, I demonſtrate that he is not wiſe. And in conſequence of this employment I have no leiſure

[1] This is the key to the profound meaning of Socrates when he ſaid that he *knew* that he knew nothing. For, as I have elſewhere obſerved, he only intended by this to ſignify the nothingneſs of human when compared with divine knowledge.

worth

worth mentioning either for public or private tranſactions; but I am in great poverty through my religious cultivation of the God.

Beſides, the youth that ſpontaneouſly follow me, who eſpecially abound in leiſure, as being the ſons of the moſt wealthy, rejoice on hearing men confuted by me; and often imitating me, they afterwards endeavour to make trial of others. In which attempt I think they find a numerous multitude of men who fancy that they know ſomething, but who know little or nothing. Hence, therefore, thoſe who are tried by them are angry with me, and not with them, and ſay that there is one Socrates a moſt wicked perſon, and who corrupts the youth. And when ſome one aſks them what he does, and what he teaches, they have nothing to ſay, but are ignorant. That they may not however appear to be dubious, they aſſert things which may be readily adduced againſt all that philoſophize, as, that he explores things on high and under the earth, that he does not think there are Gods, and that he makes the worſe to be the better reaſon. For I think they are not willing to ſpeak the truth, that they clearly pretend to be knowing, but know nothing. Hence, as it appears to me, being ambitious and vehement and numerous, and ſpeaking in an elegant and perſuaſive manner about me, they fill your ears, both before and now calumniating in the extreme. Among theſe, Melitus, Anytus, and Lycon, have attacked me; Melitus indeed being my enemy on account of the poets; but Anytus on account of the artificers and politicians; and Lycon on account of the orators. So that, as I ſaid in the beginning, I ſhould wonder if I could remove ſuch an abundant calumny from your minds in ſo ſhort a time. Theſe things, O Athenians, are true; and I thus ſpeak, neither concealing nor ſubtracting any thing from you, either great or ſmall; though I nearly know that I ſhall make enemies by what I have ſaid. This however is an argument that I ſpeak the truth, that this is the calumny which is raiſed againſt me, and that the cauſes of it are theſe. And whether now or hereafter you inveſtigate theſe things, you will find them to be as I have ſaid. Concerning the particulars, therefore, which my firſt accuſers urged againſt me, let this be a ſufficient apology to you.

In the next place, I ſhall endeavour to reply to Melitus, that good man and lover of his country, as he ſays, and alſo to my latter accuſers. For again, as being different from the former accuſers, let us take the oath

of theſe men for calumny. The accuſation then is as follows: Socrates, it ſays, acts unjuſtly, corrupting the youth; and not believing in thoſe Gods in which the city believes, he introduces other novel dæmoniacal natures. Such then is the accuſation; of which let us examine every part. It ſays, therefore, that I act unjuſtly by corrupting the youth. But I, O Athenians, ſay that Melitus acts unjuſtly, becauſe he intentionally trifles, raſhly bringing men into danger, and pretending to be ſtudious and ſolicitous about things which were never the objects of his care. But that this is the caſe I will endeavour to ſhow you.

Tell me then, O Melitus, whether you conſider it as a thing of the greateſt conſequence, for the youth to become the beſt of men?—I do.—Come, then, do you therefore tell them what will make them better? For it is evident that you know, ſince it is the object of your care. For, having found me to be a corrupter of youth, as you ſay, you have brought me hither, and are my accuſer; but come, inform me who it is that makes them better, and ſignify it to this aſſembly. Do you ſee, O Melitus, that you are ſilent, and have not any thing to ſay? Though, does it not appear to you to be ſhameful, and a ſufficient argument of what I ſay, that this is not the object of your attention? But tell me, O good man, who it is that makes them better.—The laws.—I do not, however, aſk this, O beſt of men, but what man it is that firſt knows this very thing, the laws.—Theſe men, Socrates, are the judges.—How do you ſay, Melitus? Do they know how to inſtruct the youth, and to make them better?—Eſpecially ſo.—But whether do all of them know how? or do ſome of them know, and others not?—All of them.—You ſpeak well, by Juno, and adduce a great abundance of thoſe that benefit. But what? Can theſe auditors alſo make the youth better, or not?—Theſe alſo.—And what of the ſenators?—The ſenators alſo can effect this.—But, O Melitus, do ſome of thoſe that harangue the people in an aſſembly corrupt the more juvenile; or do all theſe make them better?—All theſe.—All the Athenians therefore, as it ſeems, make them to be worthy and good, except me, but I alone corrupt them. Do you ſay ſo?—Theſe very things I ſtrenuouſly aſſert.—You charge me with a very great infelicity. But anſwer me: Does this alſo appear to you to be the caſe reſpecting horſes, viz. that all men can make them better, but that there is only one perſon

that

that corrupts them? or does the perfect contrary of this take place, ſo that it is one perſon who can make them better, or, at leaſt, that thoſe poſſeſſed of equeſtrian ſkill are very few; but the multitude, if they meddle with and make uſe of horſes, corrupt them? Is not this the caſe, O Melitus, both with reſpect to horſes and all other animals? It certainly is ſo, whether you and Anytus ſay ſo, or not. For a great felicity would take place concerning youth if only one perſon corrupted, and the reſt benefited them. However, you have ſufficiently ſhown, O Melitus, that you never beſtowed any care upon youth; and you clearly evince your negligence, and that you pay no attention to the particulars for which you accuſe me.

Further ſtill, tell me, by Jupiter, O Melitus, whether it is better to dwell in good or in bad polities? Anſwer, my friend: for I aſk you nothing difficult. Do not the depraved always procure ſome evil to thoſe that continually reſide near them; and do not the good procure ſome good?—Entirely ſo.—Is there then any one who wiſhes to be injured by his aſſociates, rather than to be benefited? Anſwer, O good man: for the law orders you to anſwer. Is there any one who wiſhes to be injured?—There is not.—Come then, whether do you bring me hither, as one that corrupts the youth, and makes them depraved willingly, or as one who does this unwillingly?—I ſay that you do it willingly.—But what, O Melitus, is it poſſible that you, who are ſo much younger than I am, ſhould well know that the depraved always procure ſome evil to thoſe that are moſt near to them, and the good ſome good; but that I ſhould have arrived at ſuch ignorance as not to know that, if I make any one of my aſſociates depraved, I ſhall be in danger of receiving ſome evil from him; and that I, therefore, do this ſo great an evil willingly, as you ſay? I cannot be perſuaded by you, O Melitus, as to theſe things, nor do I think that any other man would: but either I do not corrupt the youth, or I corrupt them unwillingly. So that you ſpeak falſely in both aſſertions. But if I unwillingly corrupt them, the law does not order me to be brought hither for ſuch-like involuntary offences, but that I ſhould be taken and privately taught and admoniſhed. For it is evident that, if I am taught better, I ſhall ceaſe doing that which I unwillingly do. But you, indeed, have avoided me, and have not been willing to aſſociate with and inſtruct me; but you have brought me hither, where the law orders thoſe who require

require puniſhment, and not diſcipline, to be brought. Wherefore, O Athenians, this now is manifeſt which I have ſaid, that Melitus never paid the ſmalleſt attention to this affair.

At the ſame time, however, tell us, O Melitus, how you ſay I corrupt the youth. Or is it not evident, from your written accuſation, that I teach them not to believe in the Gods in which the city believes, but in other new divine powers? Do you not ſay that, teaching theſe things, I corrupt the youth?—Perfectly ſo: I ſtrenuouſly aſſert theſe things.—By thoſe very Gods, therefore, Melitus, of whom we are now ſpeaking, ſpeak in a ſtill clearer manner both to me and to theſe men. For I cannot learn whether you ſay that I teach them to think that there are not certain Gods, (though I myſelf believe that there are Gods, for I am by no means an atheiſt, nor in this reſpect do I act unjuſtly,) not, indeed, ſuch as the city believes in, but others, and that this it is for which you accuſe me, that I introduce other Gods; or whether you altogether ſay that I do not believe there are Gods, and that I teach this doctrine alſo to others.—I ſay this, that you do not believe that there are Gods.—O wonderful Melitus, why do you thus ſpeak? Do I then think, unlike the reſt of mankind, that the ſun and moon are not Gods?—He does not, by Jupiter, O judges: for he ſays that the ſun is a ſtone, and that the moon is earth.—O friend Melitus, you think that you accuſe Anaxagoras; and you ſo deſpiſe theſe judges, and think them to be ſo illiterate, as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of theſe aſſertions. Beſides, would the youth learn thoſe things from me, which they might buy for a drachma at moſt in the orcheſtra, and thus might deride Socrates if he pretended they were his own, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY ARE LIKEWISE SO ABSURD[1]? But, by Jupiter, do I then appear to you to think that there is no God?—None whatever, by Jupiter.—What you ſay, O Melitus, is incredible, and, as it appears to me, is ſo even to yourſelf. Indeed, O Athenians, this man appears to me to be perfectly inſolent and intemperate in his ſpeech, and to have in reality written this accuſation, impelled by a certain inſolence, wantonneſs, and youthfulneſs. For he ſeems, as it were, to have compoſed an ænigma in order to try me, and to have ſaid

[1] This aſſertion, among many others, affords an inconteſtable proof that Socrates believed in the religion of his country: for he here clearly ſays, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras, which made the ſun and moon to be no Gods, is *abſurd*.

to himſelf, Will the wiſe Socrates know that I am jeſting, and ſpeaking contrary to myſelf? Or ſhall I deceive him, together with the other hearers? For he appears to me to contradict himſelf in his accuſation, as if he had ſaid, Socrates is impious in not believing that there are Gods, but believing that there are Gods. And this, indeed, muſt be the aſſertion of one in jeſt.

But let us jointly conſider, O Athenians, how he appears to me to have aſſerted theſe things. And do you, O Melitus, anſwer us, and, as I requeſted you at firſt, be mindful not to diſturb me if I diſcourſe after my uſual manner. Is there then any man, O Melitus, who thinks that there are human affairs, but does not think that there are men? Pray anſwer me, and do not make ſo much noiſe. And is there any one who does not think that there are horſes, but yet thinks that there are equeſtrian affairs? or who does not think that there are pipers, but yet that there are things pertaining to pipers? There is not, O beſt of men. For I will ſpeak for you, ſince you are not willing to anſwer yourſelf. But anſwer alſo to this: Is there any one who thinks that there are dæmoniacal affairs, but yet does not think that there are dæmons?—There is not.—How averſe you are to ſpeak! ſo that you ſcarcely anſwer, compelled by theſe things. Do you not, therefore, ſay that I believe in and teach things dæmoniacal, whether they are new or old? But indeed you acknowledge that I believe in things dæmoniacal, and to this you have ſworn in your accuſation. If then I believe in dæmoniacal affairs, there is an abundant neceſſity that I ſhould alſo believe in the exiſtence of dæmons. Is it not ſo?—It is.—For I ſuppoſe you to aſſent, ſince you do not anſwer. But with reſpect to dæmons [1], do we not think either that they are Gods, or the ſons of Gods? Will you acknowledge this or not?—Entirely ſo.—If, therefore, I believe that there are dæmons as you ſay, if dæmons are certain Gods, will it not be as I ſay, that you ſpeak ænigmatically and in jeſt, ſince you aſſert that I do not think there are Gods, and yet again think that there are, ſince I believe in dæmons? But if dæmons are certain ſpurious ſons of the Gods, either from Nymphs, or from certain others, of whom they are ſaid to be the offſpring, what man can believe that there are ſons of the Gods, and yet that there are no Gods? For this would be juſt as abſurd, as if ſome one ſhould think that there are colts and mules, but

[1] For a copious account of dæmons, ſee the Notes on The Banquet.

ſhould

ſhould not think that there are horſes and aſſes. However, O Melitus, it cannot be otherwiſe but that you have written this accuſation, either to try me, or becauſe there was not any crime of which you could truly accuſe me. For it is impoſſible that you ſhould perſuade any man who has the ſmalleſt degree of intellect, that one and the ſame perſon can believe that there are dæmoniacal and divine affairs, and yet that there are neither dæmons, nor Gods, nor heroes. That I am not, therefore, impious, O Athenians, according to the accuſation of Melitus, does not appear to me to require a long apology; but what I have ſaid is ſufficient.

As to what I before obſerved, that there is a great enmity towards me among the vulgar, you may be well aſſured that it is true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I ſhould happen to be condemned, viz. the hatred and envy of the multitude, and not Melitus, nor Anytus; which indeed has alſo happened to many others, and thoſe good men, and will I think again happen in futurity. For there is no reaſon to expect that it will terminate in me. Perhaps, however, ſome one will ſay, Are you not aſhamed, Socrates, to have applied yourſelf to a ſtudy, through which you are now in danger of being put to death? To this perſon I ſhall juſtly reply, That you do not ſpeak well, O man, if you think that life or death ought to be regarded by the man who is capable of being uſeful though but in a ſmall degree; and that he ought not to conſider this alone when he acts, whether he acts juſtly, or unjuſtly, and like a good or a bad man. For thoſe demigods that died at Troy would, according to your reaſoning, be vile characters, as well others as the ſon of Thetis, who ſo much deſpiſed the danger of death when compared with diſgraceful conduct, that when his mother, who was a goddeſs, on his deſiring to kill Hector, thus I think addreſſed [1] him—My ſon, if you revenge the ſlaughter of your friend Patroclus, and kill Hector, you will yourſelf die, for ſaid ſhe, death awaits you as ſoon as Hector expires:—Notwithſtanding this, he conſidered the danger of death as a trifle, and much more dreaded living baſely, and not revenging his friends. For he ſays, May I immediately die, when I have inflicted juſt puniſhment on him who has acted unjuſtly, and not ſtay here an object of ridicule, by the crooked ſhips, and a burden to the ground? Do you think that he was

[1] Iliad. lib. xviii. ver. 94, &c.

ſolicitous about death and danger? For this, O Athenians, is in reality the caſe: wherever any one ranks himſelf, thinking it to be the beſt for him, or wherever he is ranked by the ruler, there as it appears to me he ought to abide, and encounter danger, neither paying attention to death nor to any thing elſe before that which is baſe.

I therefore, O Athenians, ſhould have acted in a dire manner, if, when thoſe rulers which you had placed over me had aſſigned me a rank at Potidea, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I ſhould then have remained where they ſtationed me, like any other perſon, and ſhould have encountered the danger of death; but that, when Divinity has ordered, as I think and apprehend, that I ought to live philoſophiſing, and exploring myſelf and others, I ſhould here through fear of death or any other thing deſert my rank. For this would be dire: and then in reality any one might juſtly bring me to a court of judicature, and accuſe me of not believing in the Gods, in conſequence of not obeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myſelf to be wiſe when I am not. For to dread death, O Athenians, is nothing elſe than to appear to be wiſe, without being ſo: ſince it is for a man to appear to know that which he does not know. For no one knows but that death may be to man the greateſt of goods; but they dread it, as if they well knew that it is the greateſt of evils. And how is it poſſible that this ſhould not be a moſt diſgraceful ignorance, I mean for a man to ſuſpect that he has a knowledge of that of which he is ignorant? But I, O Athenians, differ perhaps in this from the multitude of men; and if I ſhould ſay that I am wiſer than ſome one in any thing, it would be in this, that not having a ſufficient knowledge of the things in Hades, I alſo think that I have not this knowledge. But I know that to act unjuſtly, and to be diſobedient to one more excellent, whether God or man, is evil and baſe. I ſhall never, therefore, fear and avoid things which for aught I know may be good, before thoſe evils which I know to be evils. So that neither if you ſhould now diſmiſs me, (being unperſuaded by Anytus, who ſaid that either I ought not to have been brought hither at firſt, or that, when brought hither, it was impoſſible not to put me to death, telling you that if I eſcaped, all your ſons ſtudying what Socrates had taught them would be corrupted,) if beſides theſe things you ſhould ſay to me, O Socrates, we now indeed ſhall not be perſuaded by Anytus, but we ſhall diſmiſs you, though on this condition,

condition, that afterwards you no longer buſy yourſelf with this inveſtigation, nor philoſophiſe, and if hereafter you are detected in ſo doing, you ſhall die,—if, as I ſaid, you ſhould diſmiſs me on theſe terms, I ſhould thus addreſs you: O Athenians, I honour and love you: but I obey Divinity rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able, I ſhall not ceaſe to philoſophiſe, and to exhort and indicate to any one of you I may happen to meet, ſuch things as the following, after my uſual manner. O beſt of men, ſince you are an Athenian, of a city the greateſt and the moſt celebrated for wiſdom and ſtrength, are you not aſhamed of being attentive to the means of acquiring riches, glory and honour, in great abundance, but to beſtow no care nor any conſideration upon prudence [1] and truth, nor how your ſoul may ſubſiſt in the moſt excellent condition? And if any one of you ſhould contend with me, and ſay that theſe things are the objects of his care, I ſhould not immediately diſmiſs him, nor depart, but I ſhould interrogate, explore, and reaſon with him. And if he ſhould not appear to me to poſſeſs virtue, and yet pretend to the poſſeſſion of it, I ſhould reprove him as one who but little eſteems things of the greateſt worth, but conſiders things of a vile and abject nature as of great importance. In this manner I ſhould act by any one I might happen to meet, whether younger or older, a ſtranger or a citizen; but rather to citizens, becauſe ye are more allied to me. For be well aſſured that Divinity commands me thus to act. And I think that a greater good never happened to you in the city, than this my obedience to the will of Divinity. For I go about doing nothing elſe than perſuading both the younger and older among you, neither to pay attention to the body, nor to riches, nor any thing elſe prior to the ſoul; nor to be ſo much concerned for any thing, as how the ſoul may ſubſiſt in the moſt excellent condition. I alſo ſay that virtue is not produced from riches, but riches from virtue, as likewiſe all other human goods, both privately and publicly. If, therefore, aſſerting theſe things, I corrupt the youth, theſe things will be noxious; but if any one ſays that I aſſert other things than theſe, he ſays nothing. In addition to this I ſhall ſay, O Athenians, that whether you are perſuaded by Anytus or not, and whether you diſmiſs me or not, I ſhall not act otherwiſe, even though I ſhould die often.

[1] Meaning *intellectual prudence*, which is the contemplation of the forms contained in intellect.

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Be not diſturbed, O Athenians, but patiently hear what I ſhall requeſt of you; for I think it will be advantageous for you to hear. For I am about to mention certain other things to you, at which perhaps you will be clamorous; though let this on no account take place. Be well aſſured then, if you put me to death, being ſuch a man as I ſay I am, you will not injure me more than yourſelves. For neither Melitus nor Anytus injures me; for neither can they. Indeed, I think it is not lawful for a better to be injured by a worſe man. He may indeed perhaps condemn me to death, or exile, or diſgrace; and he or ſome other may conſider theſe as mighty evils. I however do not think ſo; but, in my opinion, it is much more an evil to act as he now acts, who endeavours to put a man to death unjuſtly. Now, therefore, O Athenians, it is far from my intention to defend myſelf, (as ſome one may think,) but I thus ſpeak for your ſake, leſt in condemning me you ſhould ſin againſt the gift of Divinity. For, if you ſhould put me to death, you will not eaſily find ſuch another (though the compariſon is ridiculous) whom Divinity has united to this city as to a great and generous horſe, but ſluggiſh through his magnitude, and requiring to be excited by a certain fly. In like manner Divinity appears to have united ſuch a one as I am to the city, that I might not ceaſe exciting, perſuading and reproving each of you, and every where ſitting among you through the whole day. Such another man, therefore, will not eaſily ariſe among you. And if you will be perſuaded by me, you will ſpare me. Perhaps, however, you, being indignant, like thoſe who are awakened from ſleep, will repulſe me, and, being perſuaded by Anytus, will inconſiderately put me to death. Should this be the caſe, you will paſs the reſt of your time in ſleep, unleſs Divinity ſhould ſend ſome other perſon to take care of you. But that I am ſuch a one as I have ſaid, one imparted to this city by Divinity, you may underſtand from hence. For my conduct does not appear to be human, in neglecting every thing pertaining to myſelf and my private affairs for ſo many years, and always attending to your concerns, addreſſing each of you ſeparately, like a father, or an elder brother, and perſuading you to the ſtudy of virtue. And if indeed I had obtained any emolument from this conduct, and receiving a recompenſe had exhorted you to theſe things, there might be ſome reaſon for aſſerting that I acted like other men; but now behold, even my accuſers themſelves, who have ſo ſhameleſsly calumniated me in every thing

elſe, have not been ſo impudent as to charge me with this, or to bring witneſſes to prove that I ever either demanded or ſolicited a reward. And that I ſpeak the truth, my poverty I think affords a ſufficient teſtimony.

Perhaps, therefore, it may appear abſurd, that, going about and involving myſelf in a multiplicity of affairs, I ſhould privately adviſe theſe things, but that I ſhould never dare to come to your convention, and conſult for the city. The cauſe of this is that which you have often heard me every where aſſerting, viz. becauſe a certain divine and dæmoniacal [1] voice is preſent with me, which alſo Melitus in his accuſation derided. This voice attended me from a child; and, when it is preſent, always *diſſuades* me from what I intended to do, but never *incites* me. This it is which oppoſed my engaging in political affairs; and to me its oppoſition appears to be all-beautiful. For be well aſſured, O Athenians, if I had formerly attempted to tranſact political affairs, I ſhould have periſhed long before this, and ſhould neither have benefited you in any reſpect, nor myſelf. And be not indignant with me for ſpeaking the truth. For it is not poſſible that any man can be ſafe, who ſincerely oppoſes either you, or any other multitude, and who prevents many unjuſt and illegal actions from taking place in the city; but it is neceſſary that he who in reality contends for the juſt, if he wiſhes even but for a little time to be ſafe, ſhould live privately, and not engage in public affairs.

I will preſent you with mighty proofs of theſe things, not words, which you honour, but deeds. Hear then the circumſtances which have happened to me, that you may know that I ſhall not yield to any one contrary to what is becoming, through dread of death; though at the ſame time by not yielding I ſhall periſh. For I, O Athenians, never bore the office of magiſtrate [2] in the city, but I have been a ſenator: and it happened that our Antiochean tribe governed, when you thought proper to condemn the ten generals collectively, for not taking up the bodies of thoſe that periſhed in the naval battle [3]; and in ſo doing acted illegally, as afterwards appeared to

[1] See the note at the beginning of the Firſt Alcibiades for a full account of the dæmon of Socrates.

[2] The people of Athens were divided into tribes, and fifty men were choſen by turns out of each, who governed thirty-five days, and were called Prytani or Senators.

[3] This battle was fought by Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, againſt the ten Athenian generals, who obtained the victory.

all

all of you. At that time I alone of the Prytaneans oppoſed you, that you might not act contrary to the laws, and my ſuffrage was contrary to yours. When the orators alſo were ready to point me out and condemn me, and you likewiſe were exhorting and vociferating to the ſame end, I thought that I ought rather to encounter danger with law and juſtice, than adhere to you, not eſtabliſhing what is juſt, through fear of bonds or death. And theſe things indeed happened while the city was yet a democracy; but when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty ſent for me and four others to the Tholus [1], and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, in order to be put to death [2]; for by theſe orders they meant to involve many others in guilt. Then indeed I, not in words but in deeds, ſhowed them, if the aſſertion is not too ruſtic, that I made no account of death; but that all my attention was directed to this, that I might do nothing unjuſt or unholy. For that dominion of the Thirty, though ſo ſtrong, did not terrify me into the perpetration of any unjuſt action. But when we departed from the Tholus, the four indeed went to Salamis, and brought with them Leon; but I returned home. And perhaps for this I ſhould have been put to death, if that government had not been rapidly diſſolved. Theſe things many of you can teſtify.

Do you think, therefore, that I could have lived for ſo many years, if I had engaged in public affairs, and had acted in a manner becoming a good man, giving aſſiſtance to juſtice, and doing this in the moſt eminent degree? Far otherwiſe, O Athenians: for neither could any other man. But I, through the whole of my life, if I do any thing publicly, ſhall appear to be ſuch a man; and being the ſame privately, I ſhall never grant any thing to any one contrary to juſtice, neither to any other, nor to any one of theſe whom my calumniators ſay are my diſciples. I however was never the preceptor of any one; but I never repulſed either the young or the old that were deſirous of hearing me ſpeak after my uſual manner. Nor do I diſcourſe when I receive money, but refrain from ſpeaking when I do not receive any; but I ſimilarly offer myſelf to be interrogated by the rich and the poor: and if any one is willing to anſwer, he hears what I have to ſay. Of

[1] The Tholus was a kind of clerks office, where the Prytani dined, and the clerks ſat.

[2] This happened in the ſecond year of the 39th Olympiad.

theſe

theſe too, whether any one becomes good or not, I cannot juſtly be ſaid to be the cauſe, becauſe I never either promiſed or taught them any diſcipline. But if any one ſays that he has ever learnt or heard any thing from me privately which all others have not, be well aſſured that he does not ſpeak the truth.

Why therefore ſome have delighted to aſſociate with me for a long time ye have heard, O Athenians. I have told you all the truth, that men are delighted on hearing thoſe interrogated who think themſelves to be wiſe, but who are not: for this is not unpleaſant. But, as I ſay, I am ordered to do this by Divinity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode by which any other divine deſtiny ever commanded any thing to be done by man. Theſe things, O Athenians, are true, and might eaſily be confuted if they were not. For if, with reſpect to the youth, I corrupt ſome, and have corrupted others, it is fit, if any of them have become old, that, knowing I gave them bad advice when they were young, they ſhould now riſe up, accuſe and take vengeance on me; but if they themſelves are unwilling to do this, that their fathers, or brothers, or others of their kindred, ſhould now call to mind and avenge the evil which their relatives ſuffered from me. But in ſhort many of them are here preſent, whom I ſee:—In the firſt place, Crito, who is of the ſame age and city that I am, and who is the father of this Critobulus: in the next place, Lyſanias the Sphecian, the father of this Æſchines; and further ſtill, Antipho the Cephiſian, the father of Epigenes. There are alſo others whoſe brothers are in this aſſembly, viz. Nicoſtratus the ſon of Zotidas, and the brother of Theodotus. And Theodotus indeed is dead, and ſo has no occaſion for his brother's aſſiſtance. Paralus alſo is here, the ſon of Demodochus, of whom Theages was the brother; likewiſe Adimantus the ſon of Ariſto, the brother of whom is this Plato; and Æantidorus, of whom Apollodorus is the brother. I could alſo mention many others, ſome one of whom Melitus, eſpecially in his oration, ought to have adduced as a witneſs. If however he then forgot to do ſo, let him now produce him, for he has my conſent; and if he has any thing of this kind to diſcloſe, let him declare it. However, you will find the very contrary of this to be the caſe, and that all theſe are ready to aſſiſt me who have corrupted and injured their kindred, as Melitus and Anytus ſay. It might indeed perhaps be reaſonable to ſuppoſe that thoſe whom I have corrupted would aſſiſt me; but what

other reaſon can the relatives of theſe have, who are not corrupted, and who are now advanced in age, for giving me aſſiſtance, except that which is right and juſt? For they know that Melitus lies, and that I ſpeak the truth. Be it ſo then, O Athenians: and theſe indeed, and perhaps other ſuch-like particulars, are what I have to urge in my defence.

Perhaps, however, ſome one among you will be indignant on recollecting that he, when engaged in a much leſs conteſt than this, ſuppliantly implored the judges with many tears; that he alſo brought his children hither, that by theſe he might eſpecially excite compaſſion, together with many others of his relatives and friends: but I do none of theſe things, though, as it may appear, I am brought to extreme danger. Perhaps, therefore, ſome one thus thinking may become more hoſtile towards me, and, being enraged with theſe very particulars, may give his vote with anger. If then any one of you is thus affected, I do not think it by any means right; but if he ſhould be, I ſhall appear to myſelf to ſpeak equitably to ſuch a one by ſaying that I alſo, O beſt of men, have certain relatives. For, as Homer ſays, I am not ſprung from an oak, nor from a rock, but from men. So that I alſo, O Athenians, have relations, and three ſons; one now a lad; but the other two, boys: I have not however brought any one of them hither, that I might ſupplicate you on that account to acquit me. Why is it then that I do none of theſe things? It is not, O Athenians, becauſe I am contumacious, nor is it in contempt of you. And as to my fearing or not fearing death, that is another queſtion. But it does not appear to me to be conſiſtent either with my own glory or yours, or that of the whole city, that I ſhould do any thing of this kind at my age, and with the reputation I have acquired, whether true or falſe. For it is admitted that Socrates ſurpaſſes in ſomething the multitude of mankind. If, therefore, thoſe among you who appear to excell either in wiſdom, in fortitude, or any other virtue, ſhould act in ſuch a manner as I have ſeen ſome when they have been judged, it would be ſhameful: for theſe, appearing indeed to be ſomething, have conducted themſelves in a wonderful manner, thinking they ſhould ſuffer ſomething dreadful by dying, as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. Theſe men, as it appears to me, would ſo diſgrace the city, that any ſtranger might apprehend that ſuch of the Athenians as excell in virtue, and who are promoted to the magiſtracy and other honours in

preference to the reſt, do not in any reſpect ſurpaſs women. For theſe things, O Athenians, ought not to be done by us who have gained ſome degree of reputation, nor ſhould you ſuffer us to do them, if we were willing; but you ſhould ſhow that you will much ſooner condemn him who introduces theſe lamentable dramas, and who thus makes the city ridiculous, than him who quietly expects your deciſion.

But excluſive of glory, O Athenians, neither does it appear to me to be juſt for a judge to be entreated, or to acquit any one in conſequence of being ſupplicated; but in my opinion he ought to teach and perſuade. For a judge does not ſit for the purpoſe of ſhowing favour, but that he may judge what is juſt: and he takes an oath that he will not ſhow favour to any, but that he will judge according to the laws. Hence it is neither fit that we ſhould accuſtom you, nor that you ſhould be accuſtomed to ſwear: for in ſo doing neither of us will act piouſly. Do not, therefore, think, O Athenians, that I ought to act in ſuch a manner towards you as I ſhould neither conceive to be beautiful, nor juſt, nor holy; and eſpecially, by Jupiter, ſince I am accuſed of impiety by this Melitus. For it clearly follows, that if I ſhould perſuade you, and, though you have taken an oath, force you to be favourable, I might then indeed teach that you do not think there are Gods; and in reality, while making my defence, I ſhould accuſe myſelf as not believing in the Gods. This however is far from being the caſe: *for I believe that there are* GODS *more than any one of my accuſers*; and I refer it to you and to Divinity to judge concerning me ſuch things as will be beſt both for me and you [1].

That I ſhould not, therefore, O Athenians, be indignant with you becauſe you have condemned me, there are many reaſons, and among others this, that it has not happened to me contrary to my expectation; but I much rather wonder that there ſhould have been ſo great a number of votes on both ſides. For I did not think that I ſhould have wanted ſuch a few additional votes for my acquittal. But now, as it ſeems, if there had been only three more votes, I ſhould have eſcaped condemnation. Indeed, as it

[1] After Socrates had thus ſpoken, votes were taken by the judges, and he was condemned by a majority of three voices. His ſpeech after his condemnation commences in the paragraph immediately following.

appears to me, I now have eſcaped Melitus; and I have not only eſcaped him, but it is perfectly evident that unleſs Anytus and Lyco had riſen to accuſe me, he had loſt his thouſand [1] drachmas, ſince he had not the fifth part of the votes on his ſide.

Melitus then thinks that I deſerve death. Be it ſo. But what puniſhment [2], O Athenians, ſhall I aſſign to myſelf? Is it not evident that it will be ſuch a one as I deſerve? What then do I deſerve to ſuffer or to pay, for not having during my life concealed what I have learned, but neglected all that the multitude eſteem, riches, domeſtic concerns, military command, authority in public aſſemblies, and other magiſtracies? for having avoided the conſpiracies and ſeditions which have happened in the city, thinking that I was in reality a more worthy character than to depend on theſe things for my ſafety? I have not, therefore, applied myſelf to thoſe purſuits, by which I could neither benefit you nor myſelf; but my whole endeavour has been to benefit every individual in the greateſt degree; ſtriving to perſuade each of you, that he ſhould pay no attention to any of his concerns, prior to that care of himſelf by which he may become a moſt worthy and wiſe man; that he ſhould not attend to the affairs of the city prior to the city itſelf; and that attention ſhould be paid to other things in a ſimilar manner. What then, being ſuch a man, do I deſerve to ſuffer? A certain good, O Athenians, if in reality you honour me according to my deſert; and this ſuch a good as it is proper for me to receive. What then is the good which is adapted to a poor man who is a benefactor, and who requires leiſure that he may exhort you to virtue? There is not any thing more adapted, O Athenians, than that ſuch a man ſhould be ſupported at the public expenſe in the Prytaneum; and this much more than if ſome

[1] An accuſer was obliged to have one half of the votes, and a fifth part more, or elſe he was fined in a thouſand drachmas, i. e. nearly 26l. 3s. 4d.

[2] When the criminal was found guilty, and the accuſer demanded a ſentence of death, the law allowed the priſoner to condemn himſelf to one of theſe three puniſhments, viz. perpetual impriſonment, a fine, or baniſhment. This privilege was firſt enacted on the behalf of the judges, that they might not heſitate to paſs ſentence on thoſe who, by condemning themſelves, owned their guilt. Socrates, therefore, in obedience to the laws, and in order to proclaim his innocence, inſtead of a puniſhment demanded a reward worthy of himſelf.

one of you had been victorious in the Olympic games with horſes, or in the two or four-yoked car. For ſuch a one makes you *appear* to be happy, but I cauſe you *to be* ſo: and he is not in want of ſupport, but I am. If, therefore, it is neceſſary that I ſhould be honoured according to what is juſtly my deſert, I ſhould be honoured with this ſupport in the Prytaneum.

Perhaps, therefore, in ſaying theſe things, I ſhall appear to you to ſpeak in the ſame manner as when I reprobated lamentations and ſupplications. A thing of this kind, however, O Athenians, is not the caſe, but rather the following. I am determined not to injure any man willingly; though I ſhall not perſuade you of this, becauſe the time in which we can diſcourſe with each other is but ſhort. For if there was the ſame law with you as with others, that in caſes of death the judicial proceſs ſhould not continue for one day only but for many, I think I ſhould be able to perſuade you. But now it is not eaſy in a ſhort time to diſſolve great calumnies. Being however determined to injure no one, I ſhall be very far from injuring myſelf, and of pronouncing againſt myſelf that I am worthy of evil and puniſhment. What then? Fearing leſt I ſhould ſuffer that which Melitus thinks I deſerve, which I ſay I know not whether it is good or evil, that I may avoid this, ſhall I chooſe that which I well know to be evil, and think that I deſerve this? Whether then ſhall I chooſe bonds? But why is it neceſſary that I ſhould live in priſon, in perpetual ſubjection to the eleven magiſtrates? Shall I pay a fine then, and remain in bonds till it is diſcharged? But this is what I juſt now ſaid: for I have not money to pay it. Shall I then chooſe exile? For perhaps I ſhall be thought worthy of this. I ſhould however, O Athenians, be a great lover of life, if I were ſo abſurd as not to be able to infer that if you, being my fellow citizens, could not endure my habits and diſcourſes, which have become to you ſo burthenſome and odious, that you now ſeek to be liberated from them, it is not likely that others would eaſily bear them. It is far otherwiſe, O Athenians. My life would be beautiful indeed were I at this advanced age to live in exile, changing and being driven from one city to another. For I well know that, wherever I may go, the youth will hear me when I diſcourſe, in the ſame manner as they do here. And if I ſhould repell them, they alſo would expell me, perſuading the more elderly to this effect. But if I ſhould not repell them, the fathers

and

and kindred of theſe would baniſh me on account of theſe very young men themſelves.

Perhaps however ſome one will ſay, Can you not, Socrates, live in exile ſilently and quietly? But it is the moſt difficult of all things to perſuade ſome among you, that this cannot take place. For if I ſay that in ſo doing I ſhould diſobey Divinity, and that on this account it is impoſſible for me to live a life of leiſure and quiet, you would not believe me, in conſequence of ſuppoſing that I ſpoke ironically. And if, again, I ſhould ſay that this is the greateſt good to man, to diſcourſe every day concerning virtue, and other things which you have heard me diſcuſſing, exploring both myſelf and others; and if I ſhould alſo aſſert that an uninveſtigating life is to be rejected by man, much leſs, were I thus to ſpeak, would you believe me. Theſe things however, O Athenians, are as I ſay; but it is not eaſy to perſuade you that they are ſo. And at the ſame time I am not accuſtomed to think myſelf deſerving of any ill. Indeed, if I were rich, I would amerce myſelf in ſuch a ſum as I might be able to pay; but now I am not in a condition to do this, unleſs you would allow the fine to be proportioned to what I am able to pay. For thus perhaps I might be able to pay a mina of ſilver (3l.). But Plato here, O Athenians, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, exhort me to pay thirty minæ, (90l.) for which they will be anſwerable. I amerce myſelf, therefore, in thirty minæ; and theſe will be my ſecurities for the payment[1].

Now, O Athenians, your impatience and precipitancy will draw upon you a great reproach, and give occaſion to thoſe who are ſo diſpoſed, to revile the city for having put that wiſe man Socrates to death. For thoſe who are willing to reproach you will call me a wiſe man, though I am not. If, therefore, you had waited but for a ſhort time, this very thing, my death, would have happened to you ſpontaneouſly. For behold my age, that it is far advanced in life, and is near to death. But I do not ſay this to all of you, but to thoſe only who have condemned me to die. This alſo I ſay to them:

[1] Socrates having amerced himſelf in obedience to the laws, the judges took the affair into conſideration, and, without any regard to the fine, condemned him to die. After the ſentence was pronounced, Socrates addreſſed them as in the next paragraph.

Perhaps

Perhaps you think, O Athenians, that I was condemned through the want of ſuch language, by which I might have perſuaded you, if I had thought it requiſite, to ſay and do any thing, ſo that I might eſcape puniſhment. Far otherwiſe: for I am condemned through want indeed, yet not of words, but of audacity and impudence, and becauſe I was unwilling to ſay ſuch things to you as you would have been much gratified in hearing, I at the ſame time weeping and lamenting, and doing and ſaying many other things unworthy of me, as I ſay, but ſuch as you are accuſtomed to hear and ſee in others. But neither then did I think it was neceſſary, for the ſake of avoiding danger, to do any thing illiberal, nor do I now repent that I have thus defended myſelf; but I ſhould much rather chooſe to die, after having made this apology, than to live after that manner. For neither in a judicial proceſs, nor in battle, is it proper that I or any other ſhould deviſe how he may by any means avoid death; ſince in battle it is frequently evident that a man might eaſily avoid death by throwing away his arms, and ſuppliantly converting himſelf to his purſuers. There are alſo many other devices in other dangers, by which he who dares to do and ſay any thing may eſcape death. To fly from death however, O Athenians, is not difficult, but it is much more difficult to fly from depravity; for it runs ſwifter than death. And now I indeed, as being ſlow and old, am caught by the ſlower; but my accuſers, as being ſkilful and ſwift, are caught by the ſwifter of theſe two, improbity. Now too, I indeed depart, condemned by you to death; but they being condemned by truth, depart to depravity and injuſtice. And I acquieſce in this decition, and they alſo. Perhaps, therefore, it is neceſſary that theſe things ſhould ſubſiſt in this manner, and I think they ſubſiſt properly.

In the next place, I deſire to predict to you who have condemned me, what will be your fate. For I am now in that ſituation in which men eſpecially prophely [1], viz. when they are about to die. For I ſay, that you, my murderers, will immediately after my death be puniſhed [2], by dying in a

[1] That men are often prophetic at the point of death is an opinion which may be traced as far as to the time of Homer, and is doubtleſs of infinite antiquity.

[2] This prediction was fulfilled almoſt immediately after the death of Socrates. The Athenians repented of their cruelty; and his accuſers were univerſally deſpiſed and ſhunned. One of them, Melitus, was torn in pieces; another, Anytus, was expelled the Heraclea, to which he fled for ſhelter; and others deſtroyed themſelves. And, in addition to this, a raging plague ſoon after deſolated Athens.

manner,

manner, by Jupiter, much more ſevere than I ſhall. For now you have done this, thinking you ſhould be liberated from the neceſſity of giving an account of your life. The very contrary however, as I ſay, will happen to you: for many will be your accuſers, whom I have reſtrained, though you did not perceive it. Theſe too will be more troubleſome, becauſe they are younger, and will be more indignant againſt you. For, if you think that by putting men to death you will reſtrain others from upbraiding you that you do not live well, you are much miſtaken; ſince this mode of liberation is neither ſufficiently efficacious nor becoming. But this is the moſt beautiful and the moſt eaſy mode, not to diſturb others, but to act in ſuch a manner that you may be moſt excellent characters. And thus much I propheſy to thoſe of you who condemned me.

But to you who have acquitted me by your deciſion, I would willingly ſpeak concerning this affair during the time that the magiſtrates are at leiſure, and before I am brought to the place where it is neceſſary I ſhould die. Attend to me, therefore, O Athenians, during that time. For nothing hinders our converſing with each other, as long as we are permitted ſo to do; ſince I wiſh to demonſtrate to you, as friends, the meaning of that which has juſt now happened to me. To me then, O my judges, (and in calling you judges I rightly denominate you,) a certain wonderful circumſtance has happened. For the prophetic voice of the dæmon, which oppoſed me in the moſt trifling affairs, if I was about to act in any thing improperly, prior to this, I was continually accuſtomed to hear; but now, though theſe things have happened to me which you ſee, and which ſome one would think to be the extremity of evils, yet neither when I departed from home in the morning was the ſignal of the God adverſe to me, nor when I aſcended hither to the place of judgment, nor when I was about to ſpeak,—though at other times it frequently reſtrained me in the midſt of ſpeaking. But now, in this affair, it has never been adverſe to me, either in word or deed. I will now, therefore, tell you what I apprehend to be the cauſe of this. For this thing which has happened appears to me to be good; nor do thoſe of us apprehend rightly who think death to be an evil; of which this appears to me to be a great argument, that the accuſtomed ſignal would have oppoſed me, unleſs I had been about to do ſomething good.

After this manner too we may conceive that there is abundant hope that death

death is good. For to die is one of two things. For it is either to be as it were nothing [1], and to be deprived of all ſenſation; or, as it is ſaid, it is a certain mutation and migration of the ſoul from this to another place. And whether no ſenſation remains, but death is like ſleep when unattended with any dreams, in this caſe death will be a gain. For, if any one compares ſuch a night as this, in which he ſo profoundly ſleeps as not even to ſee a dream, with the other nights and days of his life, and ſhould declare how many he had paſſed better and more pleaſantly than this night, I think that not only a private man, but even the great king himſelf, would find ſo ſmall a number that they might be eaſily counted. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I ſay it is a gain: for thus the whole of future time appears to be nothing more than one night. But if again death is a migration from hence to another place, and the aſſertion is true that all the dead are there, what greater good, O my judges, can there be than this? For if ſome one arriving at Hades, being liberated from theſe who pretend to be judges, ſhould find thoſe who are true judges, and who are ſaid to judge there, viz. Minos and Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and ſuch others of the demigods as lived juſtly, would this be a vile journey? At what rate would you not purchaſe a conference with Orpheus and Muſæus, with Heſiod and Homer? I indeed ſhould be willing to die often, if theſe things are true. For to me the aſſociation will be admirable, when I ſhall meet with Palamedes, and Ajax the ſon of Telamon, and any other of the antients who died through an unjuſt deciſion. The comparing my caſe with theirs will, I think, be no unpleaſing employment to me. But the greateſt pleaſure will conſiſt in paſſing my time there, as I have done here, in interrogating and exploring who among them is wiſe, and who fancies himſelf to be but is not ſo. What, O my judges, would not any one give for a conference with him who led that mighty army againſt Troy, or with Ulyſſes, or Siſyphus, or ten thouſand others, both men and women, that might be mentioned? For to converſe and aſſociate with theſe would be an ineſtimable felicity. For I ſhould not be capitally condemned on this account by thoſe that dwell there; ſince they are in other reſpects more happy than thoſe that

[1] The reader muſt not imagine by this that Socrates calls in queſtion the immortality of the ſoul; for this, as he will ſee, he demonſtrates in the Phædo.

live here, and are for the reſt of time immortal, if the aſſertions reſpecting theſe things are true.

You, therefore, O my judges, ought to entertain good hopes with reſpect to death, and to be firmly perſuaded of this one thing, that to a good man nothing is evil, neither while living nor when dead, and that his concerns are never neglected by the Gods. Nor is my preſent condition the effect of chance; but this is evident to me, that now to die, and be liberated from the affairs of life, is better for me. On this account the accuſtomed ſignal did not in this affair oppoſe me. Nor am I very indignant with thoſe that accuſed and condemned me, though their intention in ſo doing was to injure me; and for this they deſerve to be blamed. Thus much however I requeſt of them: That you will puniſh my ſons when they grow up, if they cauſe you the ſame moleſtation that I have; and if they ſhall appear to you to pay more attention to riches or any thing elſe than to virtue, and ſhall think themſelves to be ſomething when they are nothing, that you will reprobate them as I do you, as neglecting the care of things to which they ought to attend, and conceiving themſelves to be of ſome conſequence when they are of no worth. If ye do theſe things, your conduct both towards me and my ſons will be juſt. But it is now time to depart hence,—for me indeed to die, but for you to live. Which of us however will arrive at a better[1] thing, is perfectly immaniſeſt except to Divinity.

[1] It is always good for a good man to die with reſpect to himſelf; but it is often better for the community that he ſhould live. It is likewiſe frequently better for a bad man to live than to die, in order that his latent vices may be called forth into energy; and beſides this, he is frequently an inſtrument in the hand of Divinity of good to others. Socrates, therefore, with no leſs accuracy than profundity ſays, that Divinity only knows whether it is better for him to die, than for his accuſers to live; for this could only be aſcertained by a very extenſive knowledge of futurity; and conſequently could only be manifeſt to Divinity.

THE END OF THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

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