

THE THEÆTETUS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

SCIENCE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE THEÆTETUS.

THE following very learned and admirable dialogue is on a subject which, to a rational being, is obviously of the utmost importance. For what can be more important to such a being than an accurate knowledge of things human and divine, practical and theoretic? And as such a knowledge cannot be obtained without science, the inquiry what science is, must consequently rank among those investigations that are the most useful and necessary to man.

As this dialogue is wholly of the maieutic kind, Socrates, with admirable skill, acts the part of a midwife towards Theætetus, one of the principal persons of the dialogue, in leading forth his conceptions concerning science into light. For this purpose, he, in the first place, asks him what science is? and Theætetus replies, that science is geometry and arithmetic, together with other disciplines of this kind, and the several arts. This answer is however rejected by Socrates, as by no means according with the question; because, when asked what science is, he replies by enumerating how many sciences there are, and on what subjects they are employed. In the next place, Socrates introduces the definition of Protagoras, that science is sense. For Protagoras asserted, that man is the measure of all things, and that every thing was to every man such as it appeared to him. This doctrine was, indeed, founded in the philosophy of Heraclitus, of which the principal dogma was this, that nothing is permanent, but that all things are in a continual flux. Socrates, however, confutes this opinion, because, if it were admitted, the perceptions of the intoxicated and insane, of those who dream, and of those whose senses are vitiated by disease, would be true, because they appear to be so, though at the same time they are evidently false. From this

hypothesis also, all men would be similarly wise, the opinions of the most illiterate in geometry would be as true as any geometrical theorems; and in the actions of human life the means of accomplishing any end would be indifferent, and consequently all deliberation and consultation would be vain¹.

In order to demonstrate that science is not sense, Socrates, in the first place, obtains this from Theætetus, that sense arises from the soul perceiving corporeal things externally situated, through several organs of the body. And secondly, that one sense, or organical perception, cannot take cognizance of the object of another; as sight cannot see sounds, nor the hearing hear light and colours. Hence he infers, that when we compare the objects of several senses together, and consider certain things which are common to them all, this cannot be sense, or organical perception, because one sense cannot consider the object of another. And if there is any thing common to both, it cannot perceive it by either organ. Thus, for instance, when we consider sound and colour together, and attribute several things to them in common, as, in the first place, essence, and in the next place, sameness in each with itself, and difference from the other; when we also consider that both of them are two, and each of them one, by what sense or organ does the soul perceive all these things which are common both to sound and colour? It cannot be by the senses of sight or hearing, because these cannot consider each other's objects; nor can any other corporeal organ be found by which the soul may passively perceive all these, and consider the objects of both those senses of sight and hearing. Hence, Theætetus is made to confess that the soul does not organically perceive these things by any sense, but by itself alone without any corporeal organ.

Theætetus, therefore, being convinced that science is not sense, in the next place defines it to be true opinion. This, however, is confuted by Socrates, because rhetoric also produces true opinion when its assertions are true, but yet cannot produce science. For there never can be any science of

¹ This absurd opinion is very subtly opposed by Sextus Empiricus. He, says he, every imagination be true, then the imagination that not every imagination is true will also be true, and so the assertion that every imagination is true will be false. *Εἰ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, κατὰ φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον ἔσται ἀληθές: καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ γενήσεται ψεῦδος.*

things which are perpetually in motion, and which subsist differently at different times. Such, however, are human affairs with which orators are conversant, especially when they induce their hearers to believe that of which they are themselves doubtful. After this, Theætetus adds the definition of Leucippus and Theodorus the Cyrenæan, that science is true opinion in conjunction with reason; and hence, that things which possess reason can be known, but by no means those which are deprived of it. This, however, is also confuted by Socrates, who shows, that whether reason (*logos*) signifies external speech, or a procession through the elements of a thing, or definition, science cannot be true opinion in conjunction with reason.

Though Socrates, therefore, confutes all these definitions of science, as being erroneous, yet he does not inform us what science is; for this would have been contrary to the character of the dialogue, which, as we have already observed, is entirely maieutic, and consequently can do no more than present us with the conceptions of Theætetus fairly unfolded into light. As all these conceptions, therefore, are found to be false, we must search elsewhere for an accurate definition of science.

What then shall we say science is, according to Plato? We reply, that considered according to its first subsistence, which is in intellect, it is *the eternal and uniform intelligence of eternal entities*; but in partial souls, such as ours, it is *a dianoëtic perception of eternal beings*; and is, consequently, a perception neither eternal nor uniform, because it is transitive, and accompanied with the intervention of oblivion.

THE THEÆTETUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUCLID¹, || SOCRATES,
TERPSIO, || THEODORUS,
And THEÆTETUS².

ARE you just now come, O Terpsio, or is it some time since you came from the country?

TER. I have left the country for a considerable time, and have been seeking for you about the forum, and wondered that I could not find you.

EUC. I was not in the city.

TER. Where then was you?

EUC. As I was going down to the port, I met with Theætetus, who was carried along from the camp at Corinth to Athens.

TER. Was he alive or dead?

EUC. He was living, but could hardly be said to be so: for he was in a very dangerous condition, through certain wounds: and, what is worse, he was afflicted with a disease while in the camp.

TER. Was it a dysentery?

EUC. It was.

¹ This Euclid was a celebrated philosopher and logician of Megara. The Athenians having prohibited the Megarians from entering their city on pain of death, this philosopher disguised himself in woman's clothes that he might attend the lectures of Socrates. After the death of Socrates, Plato and other philosophers went to Euclid at Megara to shelter themselves from the tyrants who governed Athens.

² This Theætetus is mentioned by Proclus on Euclid (lib. ii. p. 19), where he gives a short history of geometry prior to Euclid, and is ranked by him among those contemporary with Plato, by whom geometrical theorems were increased, and rendered more scientific.

TER. What a man do you speak of as in a dangerous condition !

EUC. A worthy and good man, O Terpsio : for I just now heard certain persons paying him very great encomiums for his military conduct.

TER. Nor is this wonderful : but it would be much more wonderful if this had not been the case. But why was he not carried to Megara ?

EUC. He hastened home ; for I both entreated and advised him to do so : but it was against his will. And besides this, attending him in his journey, when I again left him, I recollected, and was filled with admiration of Socrates, who often spoke in a prophetic manner about other things, and likewise about this. For a little before his death, if I am not mistaken, meeting with Theætetus, who was then a young man, and discoursing with him, he very much admired his disposition. Besides this, when I came to Athens, he related to me his discourses with Theætetus, which very much deserve to be heard ; and observed, that he would necessarily be renowned, if he lived to be a man. And it appears indeed that he spoke the truth.

TER. But can you relate what those discourses were ?

EUC. Not verbally, by Jupiter : but as soon as I returned home, I committed the substance of them to writing, and afterwards at my leisure wrote nearly the whole of them, through the assistance of memory. As often too as I came to Athens, I asked Socrates about such particulars as I could not remember, and, on my return hither, made such emendations as were necessary ; so that I have nearly written the whole discourse.

TER. True. For I have heard you assert the same thing before : and in consequence of always desiring to urge you to relate this discourse I am come hither. But what should hinder this from taking place at present ? For I am perfectly in need of rest, as coming from the country.

EUC. I likewise accompanied Theætetus as far as Erineus ; so that rest will not be unpleasant to me. Let us go, therefore, and while we rest a boy shall read to us.

TER. You speak well.

EUC. This then is the book, O Terpsio. But it was not composed by me, as if Socrates related it to me, as in reality he did, but as if he was discoursing with the persons with whom he said he discoursed. But he said that these were, the geometrician Theodorus, and Theætetus. That

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we may not, therefore, in the course of the writing, be troubled with the frequent repetition of I say, and He said, He assented, or He denied, I have introduced Socrates himself discoursing with them.

TER. And this is not at all improper, O Euclid.

EVCL. Here, boy, then, take the book and read.

SOC. If, O Theodorus, I was more attentive to those in Cyrene than to any others, I should inquire of you respecting them, if any young men there applied themselves to geometry, or any other philosophic study. But now, as I love those less than these, I am more desirous to know which of our young men are likely to become worthy characters. For such as these I explore myself as far as I am able, and inquire after them of others, with whom I see young men associating. But you have by no means a few followers: and this very justly. For you deserve to be followed, both for other things, and for the sake of geometry. If, therefore, you have met with any young man who deserves to be mentioned, it would give me pleasure to hear some particulars respecting him.

THEO. Indeed, Socrates, it is in every respect fit both that I should relate, and that you should hear, what a youth I have met with from among your citizens. And if he were beautiful, I should be very much afraid to mention him, lest I should appear to be enamoured with him. But, now, (do not be indignant with me,) he is not handsome. For he resembles you, having a flat nose, and prominent eyes: but he has these in a less degree than you. You see I speak freely to you. Know then, that I have never yet met with any young man (though I have associated with many) who naturally possesses a good disposition in such a wonderful degree. For it is difficult to find one who is docile, remarkably mild, and who besides this may compare with any one for fortitude. Indeed, I do not think there ever were any, nor do I see any with these qualifications. For some are acute indeed, as this one, sagacious, and of a good memory; but they are for the most part prone to anger, and are hurried along precipitately like ships without their ballast, and are rather naturally furious than brave. And again, those whose manners are more sedate are in a certain respect sluggish and full of oblivion, when they apply themselves to disciplines. But the young man I am speaking of applies himself to disciplines and investigations in so easy, blameless, and ready a manner, that it may be compared to the silent

flux of oil ; so that it is wonderful that such a great genius should accomplish these things in such a manner.

Soc. You announce well. But of which of our citizens is he the son ?

THEO. I have heard the name, but I do not remember it. But he is in the middle of those who are now approaching to us. For both he, and these who are his companions, were just now anointed beyond the stadium ; but now they appear to me, in consequence of having been anointed, to come hither. Consider, however, if you know him.

Soc. I do know him. He is the son of Euphronius the Suniensian, who was entirely such a man as you have just related the son to be ; and who, besides being a worthy character, left behind him a very large estate.

THEO. His name, O Socrates, is Theætetus. But certain of his guardians appear to me to have dissipated his estate. However, notwithstanding this, he is wonderfully liberal with respect to money, Socrates.

Soc. You speak of a generous man : Order him to come to me, and sit with us.

THEO. I will.—Theætetus, come hither to Socrates.

Soc. By all means come, Theætetus, that I may behold myself, and see what sort of a face I have. For Theodorus says it resembles yours. But if we had each of us a lyre, and he should say that they were similarly harmonized, ought we immediately to believe him, or should we consider whether he says this as being a musician ?

THEÆ. We should consider this.

Soc. On finding, therefore, this to be the case, should we not be persuaded by him ? but, if he was ignorant of music, should we not disbelieve him ?

THEÆ. True.

Soc. Now, therefore, I think, if we are at all careful respecting the similitude of our faces, that we should consider if he speaks as being a painter, or not.

THEÆ. So it appears to me.

Soc. Is, therefore, Theodorus a painter ?

THEÆ. Not that I know of.

Soc. Nor is he a geometrician ?

THEÆ. He is perfectly so, Socrates.

Soc. Is he also skilled in astronomy, logic, music, and such other disciplines as follow these?

THEÆ. He appears to be so to me.

Soc. If, therefore, he says that we resemble each other in a certain part of our body, at the same time praising or blaming this resemblance, it is not altogether worth while to pay much attention to him.

THEÆ, Entirely so, Socrates.

Soc. Take notice, therefore, O friend Theætetus, it is your business to evince, and mine to consider. For know, that Theodorus having praised in my hearing many strangers and citizens, has not praised any one of them so much as just now he did you.

THEÆ. It is well, Socrates; but consider whether he did not speak jokingly.

Soc. It is not usual for Theodorus to do so. But do not reject what is granted, in consequence of believing that he spoke this in jest, lest he should be compelled to bear witness. For no one can object to what he said. Persist, therefore, confidently in what is granted.

THEÆ. It is proper, indeed, to do so, if it seems fit to you.

Soc. Tell me, then,—Do you learn any geometry of Theodorus?

THEÆ, I do.

Soc. Do you, likewise, learn things pertaining to astronomy, harmony, and computation?

THEÆ. I endeavour to do so.

Soc. For I also, O boy, both from this man, and from others who appear to me to understand any thing of these particulars, endeavour to learn them; but, at the same time, I am but moderately skilled in them. There is, however, a certain trifling thing of which I am in doubt, and which I wish to consider along with you, and these that are present. Tell me, therefore, whether to learn is not to become wiser in that which any one learns?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But I think that the wise are wise by wisdom.

THEÆ. Certainly.

Soc. But does this in any respect differ from science?

THEÆ. What?

Soc.

Soc. Wisdom. Or are not those who have a scientific knowledge of any thing, also wise in this thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Is, therefore, science the same as wisdom?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. This, therefore, is that which I doubt; and I am not able sufficiently to determine by myself what science is. Have we then any thing to say to this? What do you say it is? And which of us can first give this information? But he who errs, and is perpetually detected in an error, shall sit as an ass, as the boys say when they play at ball. But he who shall be found to speak without error shall be our king, and shall order whatever he wishes us to answer. Why are you silent? Have I, O Theodorus, behaved in a rustic manner, through my love of conversation, and through my desire to make you discourse and become friends with each other?

THEO. A thing of this kind, O Socrates, is by no means rustic. But order some one of these young men to answer you. For I am unaccustomed to this mode of discourse; and my age does not permit me to become accustomed to it now. But a thing of this kind is adapted to these young men, and they will be greatly improved by it. For, in reality, youth is adapted to every kind of improvement. But, as you began with, do not dismiss Theætetus, but interrogate him.

Soc. Do you hear, Theætetus, what Theodorus says? whom I am of opinion you will not disobey. For you would neither be willing to do so, nor is it lawful for a young man to be unpersuaded by a wise man, when he commands in things of this kind. Tell me, therefore, in a proper and ingenuous manner, what science appears to you to be?

THEÆ. It is fit to comply, Socrates, since you command me. And if I in any respect err, do you correct me.

Soc. We shall by all means do so, if we are able.

THEÆ. It appears to me, then, that sciences are such things as any one may learn of Theodorus, such as geometry, and the other particulars which you just now enumerated. And besides these, the shoemaker's art, and the arts of other workmen; and that all and each of these are no other than science.

Soc. Generously and munificently, O friend, when asked by me concern-
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ing one thing, have you given many, and things various, instead of that which is simple.

THEÆ. How so? Why do you say this, Socrates?

Soc. Perhaps what I say is nothing: but I will tell you what I think. When you speak of the shoemaker's art, do you speak of any thing else than the science of making shoes?

THEÆ. Of nothing else.

Soc. But what when you speak of the carpenter's art? Do you speak of any thing else than the science of operations in wood?

THEÆ. Of nothing else than this.

Soc. In both therefore you define that of which each is the science.

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But that which we asked, O Theætetus, was not this, of what things there is science, nor how many sciences there are; for we did not inquire, wishing to enumerate them, but in order to know what science itself is. Or do I say nothing?

THEÆ. You speak with perfect rectitude.

Soc. But consider also this. If any one should interrogate us respecting any vile and obvious thing, as, for instance, clay, what it is, if we should answer him, that clay is that from which pans, puppets and tiles are made, or certain other artificial substances, should we not be ridiculous?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

Soc. In the first place, indeed, what can we think he who asks this question can understand from our answer, when we say that clay is that from which pans, puppets and tiles, or certain other artificial substances are made? Or do you think that any one can understand the name of a thing, when he does not know what that thing is?

THEÆ. By no means.

Soc. Neither, therefore, will he understand the science of shoes who does not know what science is.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor, again, will he understand the currier's art, nor any other art, who is ignorant of science.

THEÆ. It is so.

Soc. The answer, therefore, is ridiculous, when any one, being asked what science

science is, gives for an answer the name of any art. For he answers, that there is a science of a certain thing, when this is not what he was asked.

THEÆ. It seems so.

Soc. And, in the next place, when he might have given a short and simple answer, he wanders immensely. As in the question concerning clay, a short and simple answer might have been given, that clay is earth mingled with moisture. At the same time, dismissing the consideration of that which is composed of clay.

THEÆ. Now, indeed, Socrates, it thus appears to me to be easy. For you seem to ask that which lately came into my mind as I was discoursing with your namefake here, Socrates.

Soc. What was that, Theætetus?

THEÆ. Theodorus here has written a treatise on powers, concerning magnitudes of three and five feet, evincing that they are not commensurable in length¹ to a magnitude of one foot: and thus proceeding through every number as far as to a magnitude of seventeen feet, in this he stops his investigation. A thing of this kind, therefore, occurred to me, since there appear to be an infinite multitude of powers, we should endeavour to comprehend them in one thing, by which we may denominate all these powers.

Soc. Is a thing of this kind discovered?

THEÆ. It appears so to me. But do you also consider.

Soc. Speak then.

THEÆ. We give to the whole of number a twofold division: one, that which may become equally equal, and which we assimilate among figures to a square, calling it quadrangular and equilateral.

Soc. And very properly.

THEÆ. But that number which subsists between this², such as three and five, and every number which is incapable of becoming evenly even, but which is either more less, or less more, and always contains a greater and a lesser side, we assimilate to an oblong figure, and call it an oblong number.

¹ Magnitudes commensurable in length are such as have the proportion to each other of number to number. As the square roots, therefore, of 3 and 5 feet cannot be obtained, those roots are incommensurable in length with the square root of one foot.

² Equally equal, or square numbers, are such as 4, 9, 16, 25, &c. and the numbers which subsist between these, and which Plato calls oblong, are 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, &c.

Soc.

Soc. Most excellent. But what follows?

THEÆ. Such lines as square an equilateral and plane number, we define to be length; but such as square an oblong number, powers; as not being commensurate¹ to them in length, but to planes, which are capable of being commensurable. And about solids there is another thing of this kind.

Soc. Best of men, O boys: so that Theodorus cannot, as it appears to me, be accused of giving a false account.

THEÆ. But, indeed, Socrates, I am not able to answer you concerning science as I am concerning length and power; though you appear to me to inquire after a thing of this kind. So that again Theodorus appears to be false.

Soc. But what? If, praising you for running, he should say that he never met with any youth who ran so swift, and afterwards you should be vanquished in running by some adult who is a very rapid runner, do you think he would have less truly praised you?

THEÆ. I do not.

Soc. But with respect to science, (as I just now said,) do you think it is a trifling thing to find out what it is, and not in every respect arduous?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, I think it is arduous in the extreme.

Soc. Confide, therefore, in yourself, and think what Theodorus said. Endeavour, too, by all possible means to obtain a reason both of other things, and likewise of science, so as to know what it is.

THEÆ. It appears we should do so, O Socrates, for the sake of alacrity.

Soc. Come then: for you explained just now in a beautiful manner. Endeavour, imitating your answer respecting powers, that just as you comprehended these, which are many, in one species, so you may comprehend many sciences in one reason or definition.

THEÆ. But know, O Socrates, that I have often endeavoured to accomplish this, on hearing the questions which are discussed by you. But I can neither persuade myself that I can say any thing sufficient on this occasion, nor that I can hear any one discoursing as you advise; nor yet am I able to desist from investigation.

¹ That is to say, the sides or roots of oblong numbers, such as the above, are incommensurable in length, or are surds.

Soc. You are tormented with the pangs of labour, friend Theætetus, not because you are empty, but because you are full.

THEÆ. I do not know, Socrates: but I tell you what I suffer.

Soc. O ridiculous youth, have you not heard that I am the son of the generous, and at the same time severe, midwife Phænarete?

THEÆ. I have heard this.

Soc. And have you also heard that I study the same art?

THEÆ. By no means.

Soc. Know, however, that it is so: but do not betray me to others. For they are ignorant, my friend, that I possess this art; and in consequence of being ignorant of this, they do not assert this respecting me, but they say that I am a most absurd man, and that I cause men to doubt. Or have you not heard this?

THEÆ. I have.

Soc. Shall I tell you the reason of this?

THEÆ. By all means.

Soc. Conceive every thing pertaining to midwives, and you will easily understand what I mean. For you know, that none of them deliver others, while they yet conceive and bring forth themselves, but when they are no longer capable of conceiving,

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. But they say that Diana is the cause of this; who being herself a virgin takes care of births. She does not, therefore, permit those that are barren to be midwives, because human nature is too imbecil to undertake an art in which it is unexperienced: but she orders those to exercise this profession, who from their age are incapable of bearing children; by this honouring the similitude of herself.

THEÆ. It is likely.

Soc. And is not this also probable and necessary, that those who are pregnant, or not, should be more known by midwives than by others?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Midwives, likewise, by medicaments and enchantments, are able to excite and alleviate the pangs of parturition, to deliver those that bring forth with difficulty, and procure a miscarriage when the child appears to be abortive.

THEÆ. It is so.

Soc. Have you not also heard this concerning them, that they are most skilful bride-maids, as being perfectly wise, with respect to knowing what kind of man and woman ought to be united together, in order to produce the most excellent children?

THEÆ. I did not altogether know this.

Soc. But you know that they glory in this more than in cutting the navel. For do you think it belongs to the same, or to a different art, to take care of and collect the fruits of the earth, and again, to know in what ground any plant or seed ought to be sown?

THEÆ. To the same art.

Soc. But in women, my friend, do you think the art pertaining to the care of offspring differs from that of collecting them?

THEÆ. It is not likely that it does.

Soc. It is not. But through the unjust and absurd conjunction of man and woman, which is called bawdry, midwives as being chaste avoid acting in the capacity of bride-maids, fearing lest by this mean they should be branded with the appellation of bawds, since it alone belongs to legitimate midwives to act as bride-maids with rectitude.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Such then is the office of midwives; but it is less arduous than the part which I have to act. For it does not happen to women, that they sometimes bring forth images, and sometimes realities. But this is a thing not easy to discriminate. For, if it did happen, to distinguish what was true from what was false would be to midwives the greatest and the most beautiful of all works. Or do you not think it would?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But to my art other things belong which pertain to delivery; but it differs in this, that it delivers men and not women, and that it considers their souls as parturient, and not their bodies. But this is the greatest thing in our art, that it is able to explore in every possible way, whether the dianoëtic part of a young man brings forth an image, and that which is false, or something prolific and true. For that which happens to midwives happens also to me: for I am barren of wisdom. And that for which I am reproached by many, that I interrogate others, but that I do not give an answer

answer to any thing, is truly objected to me, owing to my possessing nothing of wisdom. But the cause of this is as follows: Divinity compels me to act as a midwife, but forbids me to generate. I am not, therefore, myself in any respect wise; nor is there any invention of mine of such a kind as to be the offspring of my soul. But of those who converse with me, some at first appear to be entirely void of discipline, but all to whom Divinity is propitious, during the course of the conversation, make a wonderful proficiency, as is evident both to themselves and others. This likewise is clear, that they do not learn any thing from me, but that they possess and discover many beautiful things in themselves: Divinity indeed, and I being the cause of the midwife's office. But this is evident from hence: Many, in consequence of not knowing this, but believing themselves to be the cause, and despising me, perhaps through the persuasions of others, have left me sooner than was proper; and after they have left me through associating with depraved characters, have become as to what remains abortive. Likewise, through badly nourishing what they have brought forth through my assistance they have destroyed it, in consequence of preferring things false and images to that which is true. Lastly, they have appeared both to themselves and others to be unlearned. One of these was Aristides the son of Lyfimachus, and many others; who when they again came to me, in consequence of wanting my conversation, and being affected in a wonderful manner, some of them my dæmoniacal power restrained me from conversing with, but with others he permitted me to converse, who at length made a considerable proficiency. For those that associate with me suffer this in common with the parturient; they are tormented, and filled with doubt and anxiety, and this in a far greater degree than the parturient. This torment my art is able both to excite and appease. And such is the manner in which they are affected. But sometimes, O Theætetus, I very benignantly unite in marriage with others those who do not appear to me to be pregnant, as I know that they do not require my assistance; and (as I may say in conjunction with Divinity) I very sufficiently conjecture with whom it will be advantageous to them to be united. And many of these indeed I have delivered to Prodicus, and many others to wise and divine men. For the sake of this, O most excellent youth, I have been thus prolix in relating these things to you. For I suspect, as you also think, that you are tormented in conse-

quence of being pregnant with something internally. Commit yourself therefore to me as being the son of a midwife, and as being myself skilled in what pertains to parturition. Endeavour, too, cheerfully to answer me what I shall ask you, and to the best of your ability. And if in consequence of considering what you say, it shall appear to me that you have conceived an image, and not that which is true, do not be angry with me, like women who are delivered of their first child, if I privately remove and throw it away. For many, O wonderful young man, are so affected towards me, that they are actually ready to bite me, when I throw aside any trifle of theirs, not thinking that I do this with a benevolent design; since they are very far from knowing that no divinity is malevolent to men, and that I do not perform any thing of this kind through malevolence. But it is by no means lawful for me to admit that which is false, and destroy that which is true. Again, therefore, from the beginning O Theætetus, endeavour to inform me what science is; but by no means endeavour to speak beyond your ability. For if Divinity is willing and affords you strength, you will be able.

THEÆ. Indeed, Socrates, since you thus urge me, it would be base for any one not to offer what he has to say, with the greatest alacrity. It appears then to me that he who has a scientific knowledge of any thing, perceives that which he thus knows; and, as it now seems, science is nothing else than sense.

SOC. Well and generously answered, O boy: for it is requisite thus to speak what appears to be the case. But come, let us consider this in common, whether this offspring is any thing solid or vain. Do you say that science is sense?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. You appear, indeed, to have given no despicable definition of science, but that which Protagoras¹ has given: though he has said the same thing, in a somewhat different manner. For he says that man is the measure of all things; of beings so far as they have a being, and of non-beings so far as they are not. Have you ever read this?

¹ This sophist was of Abdera in Thrace. He was the disciple of Democritus, and an atheist. This his absurd opinion that science is sense, may however be considered as the fountain of experimental philosophy.

THEÆ. I have read it often.

Soc. Does he not, therefore, speak thus : such as particulars appear to me, such are they to me ; and such as they appear to you, such are they to you : but you and I are men ?

THEÆ. He does speak in this manner.

Soc. But do you not think it probable that a wise man will not trifle, nor speak like one delirious ? Let us, therefore, follow him thus : When the same wind blows, is not sometimes one of us stiff with cold, and another not ? And one in a small degree, but another extremely cold ?

THEÆ. This is very much the case.

Soc. Whether, therefore, shall we say, that the wind at that time is in itself cold or not cold ? Or shall we be persuaded by Protagoras, that to him who is stiff with cold, the wind is cold ; but to him who is not, that it is not cold ?

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Does it, therefore, appear so to each ?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. But for a thing to appear, is it the same as to be perceived ?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. Phantasy, therefore, and sense are the same in things hot, and every thing else of this kind. For such as every one perceives things to be, such they are and appear to be to every one.

THEÆ. So it seems.

Soc. Sense, therefore, is always of that which has a being, and is without falsehood, as being science.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Whether or no, therefore, by the Graces, was Protagoras a man perfectly wise ; and did he obscurely signify this to us who rank among the vulgar, but speak the truth to his disciples in secret ?

THEÆ. Why, Socrates, do you say this ?

Soc. I will tell you, and it is by no means a despicable assertion. There is not any thing which is itself essentially one thing ¹ ; nor can you properly denominate

¹ This is true only of the sensible world ; nor does Socrates make this assertion with a view to any thing else than the flowing and unreal condition of matter and its inherent forms. For the sensible world, as I have before observed in a note on the Orphic hymn to Nature, from its

denominate any thing, as endued with some particular quality. But if you denominate it as great, it will appear to be small; and if heavy, light. And all things subsist in such a manner, as if nothing was one thing, or any thing particular, or endued with a certain quality. But from their lation, motion, and mixture with each other, all things become that which we said they were, and are not rightly denominated by us. For there is not any thing, which at any time *is*, but it is always in generation, or *becoming to be*. And in this all the wise in succession consent, except Parmenides¹; viz. Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles: and of the poets, those who rank the highest in each kind of poetry, in comedy, indeed, Epicharmus, and in tragedy, Homer. For when this latter calls Ocean² and mother Tethys the origin of the Gods, he asserts that all things are the progeny of flux and motion. Or does he not appear to say this?

THEÆ. To me he does.

Soc. Who then can contend against such an army, and which has Homer for its leader, without being ridiculous?

THEÆ. It is not easy, O Socrates.

Soc. It is not indeed, Theætetus. Since this may be a sufficient argument in favour of their assertion, that motion imparts to things the appearance of being, and of becoming to be; but rest of non-being, and perishing. For heat and fire, which generate and govern other things, are themselves generated from lation and friction. But these are motions. Or are not these the origin of fire?

material imperfection, cannot receive the whole of divine infinity at once; but can only partake of it gradually and partially, as it were by drops in a momentary succession. Hence it is in a continual state of flowing and formation, but never possesses real being; and is like the image of a lofty tree seen in a rapid torrent, which has the appearance of a tree without the reality; and which seems to endure perpetually the same, yet is continually renewed by the continual renovation of the stream.

¹ See the Sophista and Parmenides.

² Ocean, considered according to its first subsistence, as a deity, belongs, according to the Grecian theology, to that order of Gods which is called intellectual, and of which Saturn is the summit. This deity also is called a fountal God, *πηγαίος θεός*, and is said by Homer to be the origin of the Gods, because he gives birth to their procession into the sensible universe. In short he is the cause to all secondary natures of every kind of motion, whether intellectual, psychical, or natural: but Tethys is the cause of all the separation of the streams proceeding from Ocean, conferring on each a proper purity of natural motion. See more concerning these deities in the Notes on the Cratylus.

THEÆ. They are.

Soc. And besides this, the genus of animals originates from the same things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But what? Is not the habit of the body corrupted by rest and indolence, but for the most part preserved by exercise and motion?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. But does not habit in the soul possess disciplines through learning and meditation, which are motions; and is it not thus preserved and made better? But through rest, which is negligence and a privation of discipline, it does not learn any thing, or if it does, it forgets it. Is not this the case?

THEÆ. Very much so.

Soc. Motion, therefore, is good, both with respect to soul and body; but rest is the very contrary.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. I add further, with respect to times of serenity and tranquillity, and all such as these, that rest putrefies and destroys, but that other things preserve. And besides this, I will bring the affair to a conclusion by forcing the golden chain into my service. For Homer intended by this to signify nothing else than the sun¹; because, as long as the sun and its circulation are moved, all things will be, and will be preserved, both among Gods and men. But if this should stand still, as if it were bound, all things would be dissolved, and that which is proverbially said would take place, viz. all things would be upwards and downwards.

THEÆ. But Homer appears to me also, O Socrates, to signify that which you say.

Soc. In the first place, therefore, O best of young men, conceive thus respecting the eyes: that which you call a white colour is not any thing else external to your eyes, nor yet in your eyes; nor can you assign any place

¹ Agreeably to this explanation of Homer's golden chain, Plato, in the sixth book of his Republic, calls the light of the sun "a bond the most honourable of all bonds." Hence, according to Plato, the circulation of the sun connects and preserves all mundane natures, as well as its light; and as the sun has a supermundane as well as a mundane subsistence, as we shall show in the notes on the Cratylus, it must also be the source of connection to those Gods that are denominated supermundane.

to it. For, if you could, it would now have an orderly position, and would abide, and be no longer in generation.

THEÆ. But how?

Soc. Let us follow what we just now said, establishing nothing as essentially one thing; and thus black and white, and any other colour, will appear to us to be generated from the darting forth of the eyes to a convenient lation. And every thing which we denominate a colour, will neither be that which darts forth, nor that which is darted forth, but something between these, which becomes peculiar to every thing. Or do you strenuously contend, that such as every colour appears to you, such also it appears to a dog, and every other animal?

THEÆ. Not I, by Jupiter.

Soc. But what with respect to another man? Will you contend that any thing appears to him in a similar manner as to you? Or rather, that a thing does not appear the same to you, because you are never similar to yourself?

THEÆ. This appears to me to be the case rather than that.

Soc. If, therefore, that which we measure, or that which we touch, was great, or white, or hot, it would never, by falling upon any thing else, become a different thing, because it would not be in any respect changed. But if that which is measured or touched by us, was either great, or white, or hot, it would not, in consequence of something else approaching to it, or becoming passive, become itself any thing else, as it would not suffer any thing. Since now, my friend, we are in a certain respect easily compelled to assert things wonderful and ridiculous, as Protagoras himself would acknowledge, and every one who assents to his doctrines.

THEÆ. How is this, and what things do you speak of?

Soc. Take a small example, and you will understand all that I wish. If we compare four to six dice, we say that the six are more than four, and that the two are to each other in a sesquialter ratio: but if we compare twelve to the six, we say that the six are less than, and are the half of, twelve. Nor is it possible to say otherwise. Or can you endure to say otherwise?

THEÆ. Not I, indeed.

Soc. What then? If Protagoras, or any other, should say to you, O Theætetus, can any thing become greater or more in any other way than by being increased? What would you answer?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. If, O Socrates, I should answer to the present question, what appears to me to be the case, I should say that it cannot: but if I should reply to the former question, in order that I might not contradict myself, I should say that it might.

Soc. Well and divinely said, by Juno, my friend. But, (as it appears) if you should answer that it is so, that saying of Euripides might be adopted: for the tongue would be irreprehensible for us, but not the mind.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. If, therefore, I and you were skilful and wise, after we had examined every thing belonging to our minds, we should then make trial of each other from our abundance, and sophistically approaching to this contest, should make our arguments strike against each other. But now, as being rude and unskilful, we wish, in the first place, to contemplate the things themselves in themselves, that we may know what it is which we dianoëttically perceive, and whether we accord with each other, or not.

THEÆ. I wish this to be the case by all means.

Soc. And so do I. But since we are thus disposed, let us in a quiet manner, as being abundantly at leisure, again consider, not morosely, but examining ourselves in reality, what the nature is of these appearances within us. And, on the first consideration of these, we shall say (as I think) that nothing at any time ever becomes greater or lesser, neither in bulk, nor in number, as long as it is equal to itself. Is it not so?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. And, in the second place, that to which nothing is either added or taken away, will neither at any time ever be increased, or corrupted, but will always be equal.

THEÆ. And, indeed, very much so.

Soc. And shall we not also say, in the third place, that a thing which was not formerly, but subsists afterwards, cannot exist without making and being made?

THEÆ. So, indeed, it seems.

Soc. These three things, then, which are acknowledged by us, oppose each other in a hostile manner in our soul, when we speak about dice, as above, or when we say that I, who am so old, am neither increased, nor suffer a contrary passion in myself; while you, who are a young man, are now greater,

greater, and afterwards less, since nothing is taken away from my bulk, but yours is increased. For, through a length of time, I am what I was not formerly, being no longer in a state of progressive increase: for without making, it is impossible that a thing can be made. But losing nothing of my bulk, I do not at any time become less. And there are ten thousand other things of this kind, which happen to ten thousand other persons, if we admit these things. Speak, Theætetus: for you appear to me not to be unskilled in things of this kind.

THEÆ. By the Gods, Socrates, I wonder in a transcendent manner what these things are: and, truly, sometimes looking at them, I labour under a dark vertigo.

Soc. Theodorus, my friend, appears not to have badly conjectured concerning your disposition; since to wonder is very much the passion of a philosopher. For there is no other beginning of philosophy than this. And he who said¹ that Iris is the daughter of Thaumás², did not genealogize badly. But whether do you understand on what account these things, from which we say Protagoras speaks, are such as they are, or not?

THEÆ. I do not yet appear to myself to understand.

Soc. Will you not, therefore, thank me, if I unfold to you the concealed truth of the conceptions of this man, or rather, of celebrated men?

THEÆ. How is it possible I should not? Indeed, I should thank you exceedingly.

Soc. Looking, round, therefore, now see that no profane person hears us. But *those are profane who think there is nothing else than that which they are able to grasp with their hands; but do not admit that actions, and generations, and every thing which is invisible, are to be considered as belonging to a part of essence.*

THEÆ. You speak, Socrates, of hard and refractory men.

Soc. They are indeed, O boy, very much destitute of the Muses: but there are many others more elegant than these, whose mysteries I am about to relate to you. But the principle of these men, from which all that we

¹ i. e. Hesiod in Theog. v. 780.

² i. e. Of wonder. Iris, therefore, being the daughter of Wonder, is the exciting cause of this passion in souls.

have just now said is suspended, is this :—That this universe is motion[†]; and that besides motion there is nothing. Likewise, that of motion there are two species; each of which is infinite in multitude, but that one species has the power of acting, and the other of suffering. From the congress and mutual friction of these a progeny is produced, infinite in multitude, but two-fold in species: one, indeed, being that which is sensible, but the other sense, which always concurs and subsists together with sensible. And the senses, indeed, are denominated by us as follows, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and the touching things hot and cold. Pleasures and pains, desires and fears, innumerable other passions without a name, and an all-various multitude which are denominated, follow these. But to each of these the sensible genus is allied, viz. all-various colours to all-various sights; and in a similar manner, voices to hearings, and other sensibles are allied to other senses.

[†] Plato here presents us with the substance of the atomical or mechanical philosophy, which asserted that the universe was produced by nothing else but the motion of indivisible particles, by means of which all things are generated and corrupted. It likewise asserted that all these sensible qualities which are noticed by the several senses, such as colours, sounds, savors, odours, and the like, are not things really existing external to us, but passions or sensations in us, caused by local motions on the organs of sense. This atomical philosophy, according to Posidonius the Stoic, as we are informed by Strabo*, is more ancient than the times of the Trojan war, and was first invented by one Mofchus a Sidonian, or rather, if we prefer the testimony of Sextus Empiricus †, a Phœnician. This Mofchus is doubtless the same person with that Mofchus the physiologist, mentioned by Jamblichus ‡ in his Life of Pythagoras. For he there informs us that Pythagoras, during his residence at Sidon in Phœnicia, conversed with the prophets that were the successors of Mofchus the physiologist, and was instructed by them. Hence it appears that this physiology was not invented either by Epicurus or Democritus.

Plato, as may be collected from his Timæus, adopted this physiology: for he there resolves the differences of the four elements into the different geometrical figures of their insensible parts; and in so doing he likewise followed the Pythagoreans. However, he differed from the atomists in this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the Timæus, that he assigned commensuration and active fabricative powers to these insensible figures, which they did not; and he likewise differed from them in his arrangement of earth.

* 'Εἰ δὲ πιστεύεται τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀτομῶν δόγμα παλαιὸν ἐστίν, ἀνδρὸς Σιδωνίου Μοσχῶν προ τῶν Τροϊκῶν χρόνων γεγονότος. Lib. xvi.

† Advers. Mathemat. p. 367.

‡ Τοῖς τε Μοσχῶν τοῦ φυσιολογοῦ προφηταῖς ἀπογοναῖς καὶ τῶν ἁλλοῖς, καὶ Φοινικῶν ἱεροφανταῖς.

What then is the intention of this discourse, O Theætetus, with reference to the former? Do you understand what it is?

THEÆ. Not very much, Socrates.

SOC. But see whether it can in a certain respect be finished. For it wishes to assert that all these things are, as we have said, moved, and that there is swiftness and slowness in their motions. So far, therefore, as their motions are slow, they possess motion in the same, and towards things near, and thus generate. But things thus generated are more slow. And again, so far as their motions are swift, they possess a motion towards things at a distance, and thus generate: but the things thus generated are more swift. For they are borne along, and their motion naturally subsists in lation. When, therefore, the eye and any thing commensurate to this generate by approximation, whiteness, and the sense connate to this, which would never have been produced if each of these had been directed to something else, then, in the interim, sight tending to the eyes, and whiteness to that which together with it generates colour, the eye becomes filled with vision, and then sees, and becomes not sight, but an eye seeing. But that which in conjunction with it generates colour becomes filled with whiteness, and is made not whiteness, but a thing white; whether it is wood or stone, or any thing else which may happen to be coloured with a colour of this kind. And in a similar manner with respect to other things, such as the hot and the hard, &c. we must conceive that no one of these is essentially any thing; but, as we have already observed, that all things, and of all-various kinds, are generated in their congress with each other, from motion. Since, as they say, there is no stability in conceiving, that either that which acts, or that which suffers, is any one thing. For neither is that which acts any thing till it meets with that which is passive, nor that which is passive till it meets with that which acts. For that which meets with and produces any thing, when it falls upon another, then renders that which is passive apparent. So that from all this, that which we said in the beginning follows, that there is not any thing which is essentially one thing, but that it is always becoming to be something to some particular thing, but is itself entirely exempt from being. Indeed, just now we frequently used the term *being*, compelled to this by custom and ignorance; but, according to the assertions of the wise,

we ought not to predicate any thing, either of any other, or of myself, or of this, or that, or call it by any other name which signifies permanency, but we should affirm according to nature, that they are generated and made, corrupted and changed. For, if any one asserts that they stand still, he may easily be confuted. But it is requisite thus to speak of things separately, and of many things collected together; in which collection, man, a stone, every animal, and species are placed. Do not these things, O Theætetus, appear to you to be pleasant; and are they not agreeable to your taste?

THEÆ. I do not know, Socrates: for I cannot understand respecting yourself, whether you assert these things as appearing to be so to you, or in order to try me.

Soc. Do you not remember, my friend, that I neither know any of these particulars, nor make any of them my own, but that I am barren of them? Likewise, that I act the part of a midwife towards you, and that for the sake of this I enchant you, and place before you the doctrines of each of the wife, that you may taste them, till I lead forth your dogma into light? But when I have led it forth, I then examine whether it appears to be vain and empty, or prolific. But boldly and strenuously, in a becoming and manly manner, answer what appears to you to be the truth respecting the things I shall ask you.

THEÆ. Ask then.

Soc. Tell me then again, whether it is your opinion that nothing has a being, but that the good, and the beautiful, and every thing which we just now enumerated, always subsist in becoming to be?

THEÆ. When I hear you discoursing in this manner, the assertion appears to be wonderful, and it seems that what you discuss should be admitted.

Soc. Let us, therefore, not omit what remains. But it remains that we should speak concerning dreams, diseases, and, besides other things, of insanity; likewise, concerning whatever is seen or heard, or in any other way perceived perversely. For you know that in all these the doctrine which we just now related, will appear without any dispute to be confuted; since the senses in these are more deceived than in any thing else: and so far is it from being the case that things are such as they appear to every one, that, on the contrary, no one of those things which appear to have a being can in reality be said to be.

THEÆ. You speak with the greatest truth, Socrates.

Soc. What, then, O boy, can remain for him to say, who asserts that sense is science, and that things which appear to every one are to that individual what they appear to be?

THEÆ. I am averse to reply, Socrates, since I know not what to say; because just now when I was speaking you terrified me. For, in reality, I cannot hesitate to grant, that those who are insane, or dreaming, think falsely, since some among the former of these consider themselves as Gods, and those that dream think they fly like birds.

Soc. Whether or no, therefore, are you aware of this dubious question concerning these particulars, and especially concerning perceptions in sleep, and when we are awake?

THEÆ. What question is this?

Soc. That which I think you have often heard, when it is asked, as at present, by what arguments any one can evince, whether we are asleep, and all our thoughts are dreams, or whether we are in a vigilant¹ state, and in reality discourse with each other.

THEÆ. And indeed, Socrates, it is dubious by what arguments any one can evince this. For all things follow, as it were, reciprocally the same things. For, with respect to our present discourse, nothing hinders but that our appearing to converse with each other may be in a dream: and when in sleep we appear to relate our dreams, there is a wonderful similitude in this case to our conversation when awake.

Soc. You see, then, it is not difficult to doubt, since it is dubious whether things are dreams or vigilant perceptions; and especially since the time which we devote to sleep is equal to that which we devote to vigilance: and in each of these our soul anxiously contends, that the present dogmas are the most true. So that in an equal time we say that these things and those are true; and in a similar manner we strenuously contend for their reality in each.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. The same may be said, therefore, respecting disease and insanity, except that in these the time is not equal.

¹ Sense is nothing more than a dreaming perception of reality; for sensibles are merely the images of true beings.

THEÆ. Right.

Soc. What then, Shall truth be defined by the multitude and paucity of time?

THEÆ. But this, indeed, would be very ridiculous.

Soc. Have you any thing else by which you can clearly show which of these opinions are true?

THEÆ. It does not appear to me that I have.

Soc. Hear, therefore, from me, what they will say who define appearances to be always true to those to whom they appear. For I think they will say, interrogating you in this manner: O Theætetus, does that which is in every respect different, possess a certain power which is the same with another thing? And must we not admit, that a thing in every respect different is not partly the same, and partly different, but that it is wholly different?

THEÆ. It is impossible, therefore, that it should possess any thing the same, either in power, or in any thing else, since it is altogether different.

Soc. Must we not, therefore, necessarily confess, that a thing of this kind is dissimilar?

THEÆ. It appears so to me.

Soc. If, therefore, any thing happens to become similar or dissimilar to any thing, whether to itself or to another, so far as it is similar must we not say it becomes same, but, so far as dissimilar, different?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. Have we not said before, that there are many, and indeed an infinite number of things which act, and in a similar manner of things which suffer?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. And besides this, that when one thing is mingled with another and another, it does not generate things which are the same, but such as are different?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Shall we speak of me and you, and other things after the same manner? As, for instance, shall we say that Socrates when well is similar to Socrates when ill, or dissimilar?

THEÆ. Do you mean to ask whether the whole of Socrates when ill is similar or dissimilar to the whole of Socrates when well?

Soc. You understand me perfectly well. This is what I mean.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I answer, then, that it is dissimilar and different.

Soc. Whether, therefore, is it so, considered as dissimilar?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. And would you speak in a similar manner respecting those that are asleep, and all such particulars as we just now discussed?

THEÆ. I should.

Soc. But does not each of those things which are naturally capable of effecting any thing, when it receives Socrates as well, use me as a different man from what it does when it receives me as ill?

THEÆ. Is it possible it should not?

Soc. And do we not generate from each things that are different, I being the patient, and that thing the agent?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But when I drink wine, being well, it appears to me to be pleasant and sweet.

THEÆ. Certainly.

Soc. But, from what has been granted, an agent and a patient generate sweetness and sense, both being borne along together. And sense, indeed, existing from the patient, causes the tongue to perceive; but sweetness, from the wine being borne along about it, causes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to a healthy tongue.

THEÆ. The former particulars were entirely allowed by us to subsist in this manner.

Soc. But when I drink wine, being diseased, my tongue does not in reality receive it the same as before: for it now approaches to that which is dissimilar.

THEÆ. It does.

Soc. But Socrates thus affected, and the drinking the wine again generate other things; about the tongue a sensation of bitterness; but about the wine, bitterness generated and borne along. And the wine, indeed, is not bitterness, but bitter; and I am not sense, but that which is sentient.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. I therefore, thus perceiving, do not ever become any thing else. For of a different thing there is a different sense, which renders the perceiver various and different. Nor does that which thus affects me become a thing
of

of this kind, by concurring with another thing, and generating the same. For, generating another thing from another, it would become itself various.

THEÆ. These things are so.

Soc. Nor, indeed, am I such to myself, nor is that thing generated such to itself.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

Soc. But it is necessary that I should become sentient of something, when I become sentient: for it is impossible that I should be sentient, and yet sentient of nothing. And it is likewise necessary that that thing should become something to some one, when it becomes sweet or bitter, or any thing of this kind. For it is impossible that a thing can be sweet, and yet sweet to no one.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. It remains then, I think, that we should mutually be, if we are; and if we are becoming to be, that we should be mutually in generation; since necessity binds our essence. But it does not bind it to any other thing, nor yet to ourselves. It remains, therefore, that we are bound to each other. So that, if any one says a certain thing is, or is becoming to be, it must be understood that it is, or is becoming to be something, or of something, or to something. But it must not be said that it is in itself either that which is, or which is becoming to be. Nor must we suffer this to be said, either by the thing itself, or by any other, as the discourse we have already discussed evinces.

THEÆ. Entirely so, Socrates.

Soc. Since that which affects me, belongs to me and not to another, do not I also perceive it, and not another?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. My sense, therefore, is true to me. For it always belongs to my essence. And I, according to Protagoras, am a judge of things which have a being pertaining to myself, that they are, and of non-beings, that they are not.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. How then is it possible, since I am not deceived, and do not stagger in my dianoëtic part, either about things which are, or things in generation, that I should not possess scientific knowledge of things which I perceive?

THEÆ. There is no reason why you should not.

Soc. It was beautifully, therefore, said by you, that science is nothing else than sense. And the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus, and all of this

tribe,

tribe, that all things are moved like streams, accords with that of the most wise Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things; and with that of Theætetus, that, things subsisting in this manner, sense is science. For do we not, O Theætetus, say, that this is as it were your offspring recently born, but delivered by me by the midwife's art? Or how do you say?

THEÆ. It is necessary to say so, Socrates.

Soc. But this, as it appears, we have scarcely been able to generate, whatever it may be. Since however it is delivered, celebrating the usual solemnities on the fifth day after the nativity, let us run through a circle of disputations, considering whether it does not deceive us, and is not worthy of being educated, but is vain and false. Or do you think that you ought by all means to nourish your offspring, and not abandon it? Or could you endure to see it reprobated, and not be very much offended if any one should take it away from you, as being your first born?

THEO. Theætetus, Socrates, could endure this. For he is not morose. But by the Gods tell me, if this is not the case.

Soc. You are sincerely a philologist, and a good man, Theodorus: for you think I am a sack of discourse, out of which I can easily take words, and say that these things are not so. But you do not understand the truth of the case, that no assertions proceed from me, but always from him who discourses with me. Indeed I know nothing, except a small matter, viz. how to receive a reason from another wise man, and apprehend it sufficiently. And now I endeavour to determine this question, by means of Theætetus, and not from myself.

THEO. You speak well, Socrates; and, therefore, do as you say.

Soc. Do you know, Theodorus, what it is I admire in your associate Protagoras?

THEO. What is it?

Soc. In other respects his assertion, that a thing is that which it appears to any one, is, I think, a very pleasant one; but I wonder that at the beginning of his discourse, when he speaks of truth, he did not say, that a swine or a cynocephalus¹, or any other more unusual thing endued with sense, is the measure of all things, that he might begin to speak to us magnificently, and in a manner perfectly contemptuous; evincing that we should admire

¹ An animal which has nothing pertaining to a dog except the head.

him for his wisdom as if he were a God, when at the same time with respect to understanding, he is not at all superior to a little frog, much less to any other man. Or how shall we say, Theodorus? For if that of which each person forms an opinion through sense is true to each, and no other *passion*¹ of any one judges better than this, and one person is not better qualified to judge whether an opinion is true or false than another, but, as we have often said, every one is alone able to form an opinion of things pertaining to himself, and all these are right and true,—then why, my friend, is Protagoras so wise, that he is thought to be justly worthy of instructing others, and receiving a mighty reward for so doing, while we are considered as more unlearned, and are advised to become his disciples, though each person is the measure of his own wisdom? Or how is it possible not to say that Protagoras asserts these things in order to seduce the people? I pass over in silence, what laughter both myself and my obstetric art must excite; and besides this, as I think, the whole business of discourse. For will not the consideration and endeavour to confute the phantasies and opinions of others, since each is true, be nothing more than long and mighty trifles, if the truth² of Protagoras is true, and he does not in sport speak from the adytum of his book?

THEO. As I am a friend, Socrates, to Protagoras, as you just now said, I cannot suffer with my consent that he should be confuted, nor yet am I willing to oppose your opinion. Again, therefore, take to yourself Theætetus; for he appears to have attended to you in a very becoming manner.

SOC. If then, Theodorus, you should go to the palæstræ at Lacedæmon, and should see among those that are naked some of a base form, would you not think it worth while to exhibit your own naked figure?

THEO. But what do you think, if, complying with my request, they should permit me, as I hope you will at present, to be a spectator without being drawn to the gymnasium, my limbs being now stiff, and engaging in wrestling with one who is younger, and whose joints are more supple than mine?

SOC. But, if this be the case, Theodorus, and it is friendly to you, then, according to the proverb, it is not hostile to me. Let us, therefore, again go to the wise Theætetus. But answer me, in the first place, Theætetus, to what we just now discussed, Would you not wonder, if on a sudden you

¹ Socrates here very properly calls sense a *passion*; for it is a passive perception of things.

² Socrates says this in derision of what Protagoras calls the truth.

should appear to be not inferior in wisdom, either to any man or God? Or do you think that the Protagorean measure pertains less to Gods than to men?

THEÆ. I do not by Jupiter. And I very much wonder at your question. For when we discussed in what manner it might be said, that what appears to any one is true to any one, it appeared to me to be perfectly well said, but now the very contrary has rapidly taken place.

Soc. My dear boy, you are as yet a youth, and are therefore easily obedient to and persuaded by conversation. For to these things Protagoras or any one of his sect would say: O generous boys, and aged men, you here sit together, conversing and calling on the Gods, concerning whom, whether they are or are not, I do not think it proper either to speak or write. Likewise hearing the things which the multitude admit, these you assert: and among others, that it would be a dire thing if every man did not far surpass every brute in wisdom; but you do not adduce any demonstration, or necessity, that it should be so, but only employ probability. Which if Theodorus, or any other geometrician, should employ when geometrizing, he would be considered as undeserving of notice. Do you, therefore, and Theodorus consider, whether you should admit persuasion and probable arguments, when discoursing about things of such great consequence.

THEÆ. But, Socrates, both you and we should say that this would not be just.

Soc. Now, however, as it appears from your discourse, and that of Theodorus, another thing is to be considered.

THEÆ. Entirely another thing.

Soc. Let us, therefore, consider this, whether science is the same with sense, or different from it? For to this in a certain respect the whole of our discourse tends: and for the sake of this we have agitated these particulars, which are both numerous and wonderful. Is it not so?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Do we then acknowledge that all such things as we perceive by seeing and hearing, we at the same time scientifically know? So that for instance, shall we say, that we do not hear the Barbarians, when they speak, before we have learned their language or that, without this, we both hear them and at the same time know what they say? And again, whether

when

when ignorant of letters, but looking at them, we do not see them, or shall we strenuously contend that we know, if we see them?

THEÆ. We should say this, Socrates, that, if we see and hear things, we know them scientifically; and that in the latter of these instances, on perceiving the figure and colour we scientifically know the letters; and that in the former instance, we at the same time both hear and know the sharpness and flatness of the sounds: but that what grammarians and interpreters teach respecting these things, we neither perceive nor scientifically know by seeing or hearing.

Soc. Most excellently said, Theætetus. Nor is it worth while to oppose you in these things, that you may thence make a greater proficiency. But consider also this other thing which will take place, and see how it may be repelled.

THEÆ. What is that?

Soc. It is this: If any one should ask whether it is possible that a person can be ignorant of that which he has a scientific knowledge of, while he yet remembers it, and preserves it, then when he remembers it. But I shall be prolix, as it appears, through desiring to inquire whether any one does not know that which he has learnt and remembers.

THEÆ. But how is it possible he should not, Socrates? For, otherwise, what you say would be a prodigy.

Soc. Do I, therefore, rave or not? Consider. Do you not then say that to see is to perceive, and that sight is sense?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. Has not, therefore, he who sees any thing a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, according to the present discourse?

THEÆ. He has.

Soc. But what, do you not say that memory is something?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. But whether is it of nothing or something?

THEÆ. Of something, doubtless.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, of those things which he learns and perceives?

THEÆ. It is of such things as these.

Soc. But what, does any one ever remember that which he sees?

THEÆ. He does remember it.

Soc. Does he likewise when he shuts his eyes? or, when he does this, does he forget?

THEÆ. But this, Socrates, would be a dire thing to say.

Soc. And yet it is necessary to say so, if we would preserve the former discourse: but if not, it must perish.

THEÆ. And I indeed by Jupiter suspect so, though I do not sufficiently understand: but tell me in what respect it must be so.

Soc. In this. We say that he who sees any thing has a scientific knowledge of that which he sees: for it is confessed by us that sight and sense, and science are the same.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. But he who sees, and has a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, if he shuts his eyes, he remembers indeed that thing, but does not see it. Is it not so?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. But not to see is not to know scientifically; since to see is to have a scientific knowledge.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. It happens, therefore, that when any one has a scientific knowledge of any thing, and still remembers it, he does not know it scientifically, since he does not see it; which we say would be monstrous, if it should take place.

THEÆ. You speak most true.

Soc. But it appears that something impossible would happen, if any one should say that science and sense are the same.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Each, therefore, must be confessed to be different.

THEÆ. So it seems.

Soc. As it appears then, we must again say from the beginning what science is. Though what shall we do, Theætetus?

THEÆ. About what?

Soc. We appear to me, like dunghill cocks, to leap from our disputation, before we have gained the victory, and begin to crow.

THEÆ. How so?

Soc. Though we have assented to the established meaning of names, yet

we appear to have contradicted this meaning, and to have been delighted in so doing, in our discourse: and though we have confessed ourselves not to be contentious but wise, yet we are ignorant that we do the same as those skilful men.

THEÆ. I do not yet understand what you say.

Soc. But I will endeavour to explain what I understand about these things. For we inquired whether any one who has learnt and remembers a thing, has not a scientific knowledge of that thing: and we evinced that he who knows a thing, and with his eyes shut remembers it, but does not see it, at the same time is ignorant of and remembers it. But that this is impossible. And so the Protagorean fable is destroyed, and at the same time yours, which asserts that science and sense are the same.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. But this I think, my friend, would not be the case if the father of the other fable were alive, but he would very much defend it. But now, being an orphan, we reproachfully deride it. For the guardians which Protagoras left, and of which Theodorus is one, are unwilling to assist it. But we, for the sake of justice, should venture to give it assistance.

THEO. Indeed, Socrates, I am not one of the guardians of the doctrine of Protagoras, but this ought rather to be said of Callias the son of Hipponicus. For we very rapidly betook ourselves from mere words to geometry. Nevertheless, we shall thank you if you assist this doctrine.

Soc. You speak well, Theodorus. Consider, therefore, the assistance which I shall give. For he who does not attend to the power of words, by which, for the most part, we are accustomed to affirm or deny any thing, must assent to things more dire than those we have just mentioned. Shall I tell you in what respect, Theætetus?

THEO. Tell us in common, therefore: but let the younger answer. For, if he errs, it will be less disgraceful.

Soc. But I speak of a most dire question; and I think it is this. Is it possible that he who knows any thing can be ignorant of this thing which he knows?

THEO. What shall we answer, Theætetus?

THEÆ. I think it is not possible.

Soc. But this is not the case, if you admit: that to see is to know scientifically.

fically. For what ought you to reply to that inevitable question, which, as it is said, is shut up in a well, if any one should ask you, O intrepid man, whether, on covering one of your eyes with your hand, you can see your garment with the covered eye?

THEÆ. I think I should say, Not with this, but with the other eye.

Soc. Would you not, therefore, see, and at the same time not see, the same thing?

THEÆ. I should in a certain respect.

Soc. But he will say, I neither ordered you to answer thus, nor did I ask in what respect you might be said to see, but whether, if knowing a thing scientifically, you also did not scientifically know it. But now you confess that not seeing, you see: and prior to this you acknowledged, that to see was to have a scientific knowledge, and that not to see, was not to know scientifically. Think what will happen to you from these things.

THEÆ. I think the very contrary to what we admitted will take place.

Soc. But, perhaps, O wonderful youth, you will suffer many things of this kind, if any one should ask you whether it is possible to know scientifically, in an acute and dull manner, and near, but not at a distance; vehemently and with remission, and in ten thousand other ways. For an insidious man, armed with a shield, and led to discussion by hire, when you admit science and sense to be the same, will drive you to hearing, smelling, and such like senses, and there detaining, will confute you, and will not dismiss you, till having admired his exquisite wisdom you are bound by him. And being thus brought into captivity and bound, you will be obliged to redeem yourself for a sum of money which is agreed upon by him and you. But you will perhaps say, After what manner can Protagoras defend his opinions? Shall we endeavour to say something else?

THEÆ. By all means.

Soc. But all this which we have said in defence of him, will, I think, be ineffectual. For, despising us, he will say: That good man, Socrates, when he was asked by a boy, whether any one could at the same time remember a thing, and be ignorant of it, was frightened, and in his fear denied that any one could; and, through being unable to look straight forward, made me appear ridiculous in his discourses. But, most sluggish Socrates, the thing is thus: When by inquiry you consider any one of my assertions, if he whom
you

you interrogate answers in the same manner as I should answer, and is deceived, in this case I am confuted. But if he answers in a different manner, he alone whom you interrogate is deceived. For, in the first place, do you think that any one would grant you, that memory can be present to him who no longer suffers a passion of such a kind as he once suffered? It is far from being the case. Or do you think he would hesitate to acknowledge, that the same thing may at the same time be both known and not known? Or, if he should fear to assert this, do you think he would admit that any one thing is dissimilar to another, before it is itself made dissimilar to that which has a being? Or rather, that this is something, and not those; and that those will become infinite, if dissimilitude has a subsistence; admitting that it is requisite to avoid the mutual hunting of words. But, (he will say) O blessed man, approach in a still more generous manner to what I say, and confute, if you are able, my assertion, that peculiar senses do not belong to each of us; or that, if they are peculiar, that which appears will not any thing the more belong only to one individual. Or, if it is necessary it should exist, it may be denominated by him to whom it appears. But when you speak of swine and cynocephali, you not only grunt yourself, but you persuade those that hear you to do this at my writings; and in this respect do not act well. For I say, that the truth subsists, as I have written: for each of us is the measure both of beings and non-beings. But one thing differs widely from another, because they appear to one person different from what they do to another. I am likewise far from asserting, that there is any such thing as wisdom, or a wise man. But I call him a wise man who, changing the condition of him to whom things appear and are evil, causes them to appear and to be good to such a one. Do not, therefore, pursue my discourse in words only, but still in a clearer manner thus learn what I say. And in order to this, recollect what was said before, that to a sick man the things which he tastes appear and are bitter; but that to him who is well they are and appear to be the contrary. But it is not proper to make either of these the wiser on this account: (for this is impossible) nor must it be asserted, that he who is sick is an ignorant person, because he entertains such opinions, and that he who is well is wise, because he thinks differently; but that he is changed into a different habit. For one habit is better than another. In a similar manner, too, in erudition, there is a mutation from one habit to a better. But the physician

effects

effects a mutation by medicines, and the sophist by discourses. For no one can cause him who thinks falsely to think afterwards truly. For it is not possible for any one to have an opinion of things which are not, or of things different from what he suffers. But the things which he suffers are always true. And I think that he, who, through a depraved habit of soul, forms opinions of things allied to himself, may, through a good habit, be made to entertain opinions of different things, which some, through ignorance, denominate true phantasms. But I say that some things are better than others, but that they are by no means more true. Likewife, friend Socrates, I am far from calling the wise frogs. But I call those that are wise in things pertaining to bodies, physicians; and in things pertaining to plants, husbandmen. For I say that these men insert in their plants, when any one of them is diseased, useful, healthy, and true senses, instead of such as are depraved: but that wise men and good rhetoricians cause things that are good to appear just to cities, instead of such as are base. For such things as appear to each city to be just and beautiful, these are to that city such as it thinks them to be. But a wise man, instead of such particulars as are noxious to cities, causes them to become and to appear to be advantageous. After the same manner a sophist, when he is thus able to discipline those that are instructed, is a wise man, and deserves a great reward from those he instructs. And thus some are more wise than others, and yet no one entertains false opinions. And this must be admitted by you, whether you are willing or not, since you are the measure of things. For this assertion is preserved in these; against which, if you have any thing else which you can urge from the beginning, urge it, by adducing opposing arguments. But if you are willing to do this by interrogations, begin to interrogate. For neither is this to be avoided, but is to be pursued the most of all things, by him who is endued with intellect. Act, therefore, in this manner, lest you should be injurious in interrogating. For it is very absurd, that he, who, by his own confession, applies himself to the study of virtue, should in discourse accomplish nothing else than injustice. But he acts unjustly in a thing of this kind, who does not exercise himself separately in contending, and separately in discoursing: and who in the former jests and deceives as far as he is able, but in the latter acts seriously, and corrects him with whom he discourses; alone pointing out to him those errors by which he was deceived, both by himself and the
former

former discussions. If, therefore, you act in this manner, those who discourse with you will accuse themselves of their own perturbation and perplexity, but not you. They will likewise follow and love you, but hate themselves, and will fly from themselves to philosophy; that, becoming different from what they were, they may liberate themselves from their former habits. But if you act in a manner contrary to this, as is the case with the multitude, the very contrary will happen to you; and you will cause those that associate with you, when they become elderly, to hate this pursuit, instead of being philosophers. If, therefore, you will be persuaded by me, then, as was said before, bringing with you a mind neither morose nor hostile, but propitious and mild, you will truly consider our assertion, that all things are moved, and that whatever appears to any one, whether to an individual or a city, is that very thing which it appears to be. And from hence you will consider, whether science and sense are the same with, or different from, each other; nor will you, as was the case just now, discourse from the established custom of words and names, which drawing the multitude in a casual manner, mutually involve them in all-various doubts. Such, O Theodorus, is the assistance, which to the utmost of my power I have endeavoured to give to your associate. These are small things, indeed, from the small. But, if he were alive, he would more magnificently defend his own doctrines.

THEO. You jest, Socrates: for you have very strenuously assisted the man.

SOC. You speak well, my friend. But tell me: Do you take notice that Protagoras just now, when he was speaking, reproached us, that when we were discoursing with a boy, we opposed his doctrines with a puerile fear; and besides this, that forbidding us to jest, and venerating moderation in all things, he exhorted us to discuss his doctrines seriously?

THEO. How is it possible, Socrates, I should not take notice of this?

SOC. What then? Do you order us to obey him?

THEO. Very much.

SOC. Do you see, therefore, that all these, except you, are boys? If then we are persuaded by him, it is requisite that you and I, interrogating and answering each other, should seriously examine his doctrine, that he may not have to accuse us that we have again considered his assertion, jesting, as it were, with young men.

THEO. But what? Will not Theætetus much better follow you in your investigation than many that have long beards?

SOC. But not better than you, Theodorus. Do not, therefore, think that I ought by all possible means to assist your deceased associate, but not afford you any assistance. But come, best of men, follow me a little, till we see this, whether you ought to be the measure of diagrams, or whether all men are, like you, sufficient with respect to astronomy, and other things in which you deservedly appear to excel.

THEO. It is not easy for him, O Socrates, who sits with you, to refuse an answer to your questions. But I just now spoke like one delirious, when I said that you would permit me not to divest myself of my garments, and that you would not compel me like the Lacedæmonians. But you appear to me rather to tend to the manners of Sciron¹. For the Lacedæmonians order us either to strip or depart: but you seem to me rather to act like Antæus. For you do not dismiss him who engages with you, till you have compelled him to wrestle with you in arguments, naked.

SOC. You have most excellently, Theodorus, found out a resemblance of my disease. But I am, indeed, more robust than these. For an innumerable multitude of Herculeses and Theseuses, who were very powerful in discourse, have contended with me, and have been very much wearied: but, notwithstanding this, I have not in the least desisted; with so dire a love of this exercise am I seized. Do not, therefore, through envy, refrain from exercising yourself with me, and benefiting at the same time both me and yourself.

THEO. I shall no longer oppose you. Lead me, therefore, wherever you please. For it is perfectly necessary that he who is confuted should endure this fatal destiny which you have knit; yet I shall not attempt to exert myself beyond what I promised you.

SOC. This will be sufficient. But diligently observe this with respect to me, that I do not, through forgetfulness, adopt a puerile mode of discourse, so as that we may again be exposed to censure.

THEO. I will endeavour to do this, as far as I am able.

¹ This was a celebrated thief in Attica, who plundered the inhabitants of the country, and hurled them from the highest rocks into the sea, after he had obliged them to wait upon him, and to wash his feet. Theseus attacked him, and treated him as he had treated travellers.

Soc.

Soc. Let us, therefore, again resume this in the first place, which we discussed before, and see whether we properly or improperly reprobate the assertion of Protagoras, that every one is sufficient to himself with respect to wisdom. For Protagoras has granted us, that even some among the wise differ with respect to better and worse. Has he not?

THEO. Yes.

Soc. If, therefore, he being himself present acknowledges this, and we do not admit it through his assistance, there is no occasion to establish it by resuming the arguments in its favour. But now, since some one may consider us as not sufficient assertors of his doctrine, it will be better, as the case is, to assent to this position in a still clearer manner. For it is of no small consequence whether this takes place or not.

THEO. It is true.

Soc. Not from other things, therefore, but from his own assertions, we acquire our mutual assent in the shortest manner possible.

THEO. How so?

Soc. Thus. Does he not say that what appears to any one is that very thing to him to whom it appears?

THEO. He does say so.

Soc. Therefore, O Protagoras, we speak the opinions of a man, or rather of all men, and we say, that no one can partly think himself wiser than others, and others partly wiser than himself. But in the greatest dangers, when in armies, or in diseases, or in tempests at sea, do not men look to the governors in each of these as Gods, and consider them as their saviours; these governors at the same time being superior in nothing else than in knowledge? And in all human affairs, do not men seek after such teachers and governors, both of themselves and other animals, as are thought to be sufficient to all the purposes of teaching and governing? And in all these, what else shall we say, than that men are of opinion that there is wisdom and ignorance among themselves?

THEO. Nothing else.

Soc. Do they not, therefore, think that wisdom is true dianoëtic energy, but ignorance false opinion?

THEO. Undoubtedly.

Soc. What then, O Protagoras, shall we assert? Shall we say that men always form true opinions; or that their opinions are sometimes true and sometimes false? For, from both these assertions, it will happen that they do not always form true opinions, but both true and false. For consider, Theodorus, whether any one of the followers of Protagoras, or you yourself, will contend, that there is no one who thinks that there is not some one who is unlearned, and forms false opinions.

THEO. But this is incredible, Socrates.

Soc. But the assertion, that man is the measure of all things, necessarily leads to this.

THEO. How so?

Soc. When you judge any thing from yourself, and afterwards declare your opinion of that thing to me, then, according to the doctrine of Protagoras, your opinion is true to you; but, with respect to us, may we not become judges of your judgment? Or shall we judge that you always form true opinions? Or shall we not say that an innumerable multitude of men will continually oppose your opinions, and think that you judge and opine falsely?

THEO. By Jupiter, Socrates, there is, as Homer says, a very innumerable multitude who will afford me sufficient employment from human affairs.

Soc. But what? Are you willing to admit we should say, that you then form true opinions to yourself, but such as are false to an innumerable multitude of mankind?

THEO. This appears to be necessary, from the assertion of Protagoras.

Soc. But what with respect to Protagoras himself? Is it not necessary, that if neither he should think that man is the measure of all things, nor the multitude, (as, indeed, they do not think this,) that this truth which he has written should not be possessed by any one? But if he thinks that man is the measure, but the multitude do not accord with him in opinion, do you not know, in the first place, that by how much greater the multitude is to whom this does not appear to be the case, than to whom it does, by so much the more it is not than it is?

THEO. It is necessary; since, according to each opinion, it will be and will not be.

SOC. In the next place, this thing will subsist in the most elegant manner. For he, with respect to his own opinion, will admit, that the opinion of those that dissent from him, and by which they think that he is deceived, is in a certain degree true, while he acknowledges that all men form true opinions.

THEO. Entirely so.

SOC. Will he not, therefore, admit that his own opinion is false, if he allows that the judgment of those who think he errs is true?

THEO. It is necessary.

SOC. But others will never allow themselves to be deceived; or do you think they will?

THEO. They will not.

SOC. Protagoras, however, from what he has written, will acknowledge that this opinion is true.

THEO. It appears so.

SOC. From all, therefore, that Protagoras has asserted, it may be doubted, or rather will be granted by him, that when he admits that he who contradicts him forms a true opinion, neither a dog, nor any man, is the measure of all things, or of any one thing, which he has not learned. Is it not so?

THEO. It is.

SOC. Since, therefore, this is doubted by all men, the truth of Protagoras will not be true to any one, neither to any other, nor to himself.

THEO. We attack my associate, Socrates, in a very violent manner.

SOC. But it is immanifest, my friend, whether or not we are carried beyond rectitude. For it is likely that he, as being our elder, is wiser than we are. And if suddenly leaping forth he should seize me by the shoulders, it is probable that he would prove me to be delirious in many things, as likewise you who assent to me, and that afterwards he would immediately vanish. But I think it is necessary that we should make use of ourselves such as we are, and always speak what appears to us to be the truth. And now then shall we say that any one will grant us another thing, that one man is wiser or more ignorant than another?

THEO. It appears so to me.

SOC. Shall we say that our discourse ought especially to persist in this to which we have subscribed, in order to assist Protagoras,—I mean, that many things

things which are apparent are such as they appear to every one, viz. things hot, dry, sweet, and all of this kind? And if in some things it should be granted that one person differs from another, as about things salubrious and noxious, Protagoras would assert, that not every woman, boy, and brute, is sufficient to cure itself by knowing what is salubrious, but that in this case, if in any, one differs from another.

THEO. So it appears to me.

Soc. With respect to political concerns, therefore, such as things beautiful and base, just and unjust, holy and unholy, are such opinions respecting these, as each city legally establishes for itself, true opinions to each? And in these, is neither one individual, nor one city wiser than another? But in the establishment of what is advantageous, or the contrary, to a city, Protagoras would doubtless grant that one counsellor is better than another, and that the opinion of one city is more true than that of another. Nor will he by any means dare to say, that what a city establishes in consequence of thinking that it is advantageous to itself, is to be preferred before every thing. But cities, with respect to what is just and unjust, holy and unholy, are willing strenuously to contend, that none of these have naturally any essence of their own, but that what appears to be true in common is then true when it appears, and as long as it appears. And those who do not altogether speak the doctrine of Protagoras, after this manner lead forth their wisdom. But with respect to us, Theodorus, one discourse employs us emerging from another, a greater from a less.

THEO. We are not, therefore, idle, Socrates.

Soc. We do not appear to be so. And indeed, O blessed man, I have often as well as now taken notice, that those who have for a long time been conversant with philosophy, when they go to courts of justice deservedly appear to be ridiculous rhetoricians.

THEO. Why do you assert this?

Soc. Those who from their youth have been rolled like cylinders in courts of justice, and places of this kind, appear, when compared to those who have been nourished in philosophy and such-like pursuits, as slaves educated among the free-born.

THEO. In what respect?

Soc.

Soc. In this, that these latter, always, as you say, abound in leisure, and at leisure peaceably discourse, just as we at present engage in a digressive conversation for the third time. In like manner, they, if any question occurs more pleasing to them than the proposed subject of discussion, are not at all concerned whether they speak with brevity, or prolixity, if they can but be partakers of reality. But the others when they speak are always busily engaged; (for defluent water urges) nor is it permitted them to discourse about that which is the object of their desire; but their opponent places before them necessity, and the formula of a book, without which nothing is to be said, which they call an oath respecting calumny, on the part of the plaintiff and defendant. Their discourses too are always concerning a fellow slave, against the master, who sits holding the action in his hand. Their contests likewise never vary, but are always about the same thing: and their course is often respecting life itself. So that, from all these circumstances, they become vehement and sharp, knowing that the master may be flattered by words, and that they shall be rewarded for it in reality; and this because their souls are little and distorted. For slavery from childhood prevents the soul from increasing, and deprives it of rectitude and liberty; compelling it to act in a distorted manner, and hurls into tender souls mighty dangers and fears; which not being able to endure with justice and truth, they immediately betake themselves to falsehood and mutual injuries, and become much bent and twisted. So that, their dianoëtic part being in a diseased condition, they pass from youth to manhood, having rendered themselves as they think skilful and wise. And such are men of this description, O Theodorus. But are you willing that I should give you an account of men belonging to our choir, or that, dismissing them, we should again return to our proposed investigation; lest, as we just now said, we should too much digress?

THEO. By no means, Socrates. For you very properly observed, that we, as being in the choir of philosophers, were not subservient to discourse, but discourse to us, and that it should attend our pleasure for its completion. For neither a judge nor a spectator, who reproves and governs, presides over us, as is the case with the poets.

Soc. Let us speak then, since it is agreeable to you, about the Coryphæi-

phæi^r. For why should any one speak of those that are conversant with philosophy in a depraved manner? In the first place then, the Coryphæi, from their youth, neither know the way to the forum, nor where the court of justice or senate house is situated, or any other common place of assembly belonging to the city. They likewise neither hear nor see laws nor decrees, whether promulgated or written. And as to the ardent endeavours of their companions to obtain magistracies, the associations of these, their banquets, and wanton feastings accompanied with pipers, these they do not even dream of accomplishing. But whether any thing in the city has happened well or ill, or what evil has befallen any one from his progenitors, whether male or female, these are more concealed from such a one than, as it is said, how many measures called choes the sea contains. And besides this, he is even ignorant that he is ignorant^a of all these particulars. For he does not abstain from them for the sake of renown, but in reality his body only dwells and is conversant in the city; but his dianoëtic part considering all these as trifling, and of no value, he is borne away, according to Pindar, on all sides, geometrizing about things beneath, and upon the earth, astronomizing above the heavens, and perfectly investigating all the nature of the beings which every whole contains, but by no means applying himself to any thing which is near.

THEO. How is this, Socrates?

SOC. Just, O Theodorus, as a certain elegant and graceful Thracian

^r The virtues are either physical, which are mingled with the temperaments, and are common both to men and brutes; or they are ethical, which are produced from custom and right opinion, and are the virtues of well-educated children; or they are political, which are the virtues of reason adorning the rational part as its instrument; or they are cathartic, by which the soul is enabled to withdraw from other things to itself, and to free itself, as much as the condition of human nature permits, from the bonds of generation; or they are theoretic, through which the soul, by giving itself wholly to intellectual energy, hastens to become as it were intellect instead of soul. This last order of the virtues is that by which Plato now characterizes the Coryphæan philosophers. The other virtues are also mentioned by him in other dialogues, as we shall show in our notes on the Phædo.

^a The multitude, as I have elsewhere observed, are ignorant that they are ignorant with respect to objects of all others the most splendid and real; but the Coryphæan philosopher is ignorant that he is ignorant, with respect to objects most unsubstantial and obscure. The former ignorance is the consequence of a defect, but the latter of a transcendency of gnostic energy.

maid-

maid-servant, is reported to have said to Thales, when while astronomizing he fell into a well, that he was very desirous of knowing what the heavens contained, but that he was ignorant of what was before him, and close to his feet. In the same manner all such as are conversant in philosophy may be derided. For, in reality, a character of this kind is not only ignorant of what his neighbour does, but he scarcely knows whether he is a man or some other animal. But what man is, and what a nature of this kind ought principally to do or suffer, this he makes the object of his inquiry, and earnestly investigates. Do you understand, Theodorus, or not?

THEO. I do: and you speak the truth.

SOC. For in reality, my friend, when a man of this kind is compelled to speak (as I said before) either privately with any one, or publicly in a court of justice, or any where else, about things before his feet, and in his view, he excites laughter not only in Thracian maid-servants, but in the other vulgar, since through his unskilfulness he falls into wells and every kind of ambiguity. Dire deformity, too, causes him to be considered as a rustic. For when he is in the company of slanderers he has nothing to say reproachful, as he does not know any evil of any one, because he has not made individuals the objects of his attention. Hence, not having any thing to say, he appears to be ridiculous. But when he is in company with those that praise and boast of others, as he is not only silent, but openly laughs, he is considered as delirious. For, when he hears encomiums given to a tyrant, or a king, he thinks he hears some swineherd, or shepherd, or herdsman proclaimed as happy, because he milks abundantly; at the same time, he thinks that they feed and milk the animal under their command in a more morose and insidious manner. And that it is necessary a character of this kind should be no less rustic and undisciplined through his occupation, than shepherds; the one being enclosed in walls, and the other by a sheep-cot on a mountain. But when he hears any one proclaiming that he possesses ten thousand acres of land, or a still greater number, as if he possessed things wonderful in multitude, it appears to him that he hears of a very trifling thing, in consequence of being accustomed to survey the whole earth. As often, too, as any one celebrates the nobility of his family, evincing that he has seven wealthy grandfathers, he thinks that this is entirely the praise of a dull mind, and which surveys a thing of a trifling nature;

nature ; through want of discipline being incapable of always looking to the universe, and of inferring by a reasoning process, that every man has had innumerable myriads of grandfathers and progenitors, among which there has often been an innumerable multitude of rich and poor, kings and slaves, Barbarians and Grecians. But when any one celebrating his progenitors enumerates five-and-twenty of them, and refers their origin to Hercules the son of Amphitryon, it appears to him a thing unworthy to be mentioned. For, as it is entirely owing to fortune that any one is able to enumerate five-and-twenty progenitors from Hercules, he would laugh even if any one could enumerate fifty from the same origin ; considering such as unable to reason, and liberate themselves from the arrogance of an insane soul. But, in every thing of this kind, the coryphæus we are describing will be ridiculed by the vulgar, partly because he will be considered by them as arrogant, and partly because he is ignorant of and dubious about things before his feet.

THEO. You entirely, Socrates, speak of things which take place.

SOC. But when any one, my friend, draws him on high, and is willing that he should abandon the consideration of whether I injure you, or you me, for the speculation of justice and injustice, what each of them is, and in what they differ from all other things, or from each other ; or that, dismissing the inquiry whether a king is happy who possesses abundance of gold, he should ascend to the contemplation of a kingdom, and universally of human felicity and misery, of what kind they are to any one, and after what manner it is proper for human nature to acquire this thing and fly from that ;—about all these particulars, when that little sharp soul so conversant with law is required to give a reason, then he in his turn is affected worse than the coryphæus. For he becomes giddy, through being suspended from a lofty place of survey, and being unaccustomed to look so high. He is also terrified, filled with uncertainty, and speaks in a barbaric manner ; so that he does not, indeed, excite laughter in the Thracian vulgar, nor in any other undisciplined person (for they do not perceive his condition), but in all those whose education has been contrary to that of *slaves*. And such, O Theodorus, is the condition of each ; the one whom we call a philosopher, being in reality nourished in liberty and leisure ; and who, though he ought not to be blamed, yet appears to be stupid and of no value, when he engages in servile offices, since he neither knows how to bind together bundles of cover-

lids,

lids, nor to make sauce for banquets, nor compose flattering speeches. But the other of these characters is able to accomplish all these servile offices with celerity and ease, but knows not how to clothe himself dexterously in a liberal manner; nor how in harmonious language properly to celebrate the true life of the Gods and blessed men.

THEO. If, O Socrates, you could persuade all men to assent to what you say, as you have persuaded me, there would be more peace and less evil among men.

SOC. But it is impossible, Theodorus, that evils should be destroyed; (for it is necessary that there should be always something contrary to good) nor yet can they be established in the Gods; but they necessarily revolve about a mortal nature, and this place of our abode. On this account we ought to endeavour to fly from hence thither, with the utmost celerity. But this flight consists in becoming as much as possible similar to divinity. And this similitude is acquired by becoming just and holy, in conjunction with prudence. But, O best of men, it is not altogether easy to procure persuasion, that vice is not to be avoided, and virtue pursued, for the sake of those things which the vulgar adopt, viz. that we may not seem to be vicious, but may seem to be good: for these are, as it is said, the nugacities of old women, as it appears to me. The truth however is as follows: Divinity is never in any respect unjust, but is most just. And there is not any thing more similar to him, than a man when he becomes most just. About this, the true skill of a man, his nothingness and sloth are conversant. For the knowledge of this is wisdom and true virtue; but the ignorance of it, a privation of discipline, and manifest improbity. Every thing else which appears to be skill and wisdom, when it takes place in political dynasties, is troublesome, but when in arts illiberal. It will be by far the best, therefore, not to permit him who acts unjustly, and who speaks or acts impiously, to be skilled in any art, on account of his cunning. For a character of this kind will exult in his disgrace, and will not think that he is a mere trifle, and the burthen of the earth, but he will consider himself to be such a man as ought to be preserved in a city. The truth, therefore, must be spoken, that such men as these are by so much the more that which they think they are not, from their not thinking the truth respecting themselves. For they are ignorant of the punishment of injustice, of which

they ought by no means to be ignorant. For this punishment does not consist, as it appears to me, in stripes and death (which those who do not act unjustly sometimes suffer), but in that which it is impossible to avoid.

THEO. What do you mean?

Soc. Since, my friend, there are two paradigms in the order of things, one of a divine nature, which is most happy, the other of that which is destitute of divinity, and which is most miserable, these men, not perceiving that this is the case, through folly and extreme infamy, secretly become similar to one of these paradigms, through unjust actions, and dissimilar to the other. But for such conduct they are punished, while they lead a life correspondent to that to which they are assimilated. If, likewise, we should say that these men, unless they are liberated from their dire conduct, will not, when they die, be received into that place which is pure from evil, but that after death they will always retain the similitude of the life they have lived upon earth, the evil associating with the evil,—if we should thus speak, these dire and crafty men would say that they were hearing nothing but jargon and reverie.

THEO. And very much so, Socrates.

Soc. I know they would speak in this manner, my friend. But this one thing happens to them, that if at any time it is requisite for them to give a reason privately respecting the things which they blame; and if they are willing to continue disputing in a manly manner for a long time, without cowardly flying from the subject, then at length, O blessed man, this absurdity ensues, that they are not themselves pleased with their own assertions, and their rhetoric so entirely fails them, that they appear to differ in no respect from boys. Respecting men of this kind, therefore, let thus much suffice, since our discourse for some time has been entirely a digression. For, if we do not stop here, in consequence of more matter always flowing in, the subject which we proposed from the first to discuss will be overwhelmed. Let us, therefore, return to our former inquiry, if it is agreeable to you.

THEO. Things of this kind, Socrates, are not unpleasant to me to hear. For, in consequence of my age, I can easily follow you. But let us, if you please, resume our inquiry.

Soc. We were, therefore, arrived at that part of our discourse in which we said, that those who considered essence as subsisting in lation, and that a thing

thing which appeared to any one is always what it appears to be, to him to whom it appears, were willing strenuously to assert this in other things, and not less so respecting what is just; as that what any city establishes as appearing just to itself, this more than any thing is just, so far as it continues to be established. But, with respect to good, no one is so bold as to contend, that whatever a city establishes, through an opinion of its being useful to itself, will be useful to it as long as it is established, unless any one should assert this of a mere name. But this would be a scoff with respect to what we are saying. Or would it not?

THEO. Entirely so.

SOC. But does not a city consider the thing named, and not merely the name?

THEO. Undoubtedly.

SOC. But that which it denominates, that it doubtless regards in the business of legislation, and establishes all the laws, so far as it is able, most useful to itself. Or does it establish laws, looking to any thing else?

THEO. By no means.

SOC. Does it, therefore, always accomplish its purpose, or is it often deceived in its opinion?

THEO. I think it is often deceived.

SOC. If any one, however, should inquire respecting every species, in what the useful consists, he would still more readily acknowledge this. But the useful in the business of legislation is in a certain respect concerning the future time. For, when we establish laws, we establish them that they may be useful in futurity.

THEO. Entirely so.

SOC. Let us, therefore, thus interrogate Protagoras, or any one of his votaries. Man, as you say, O Protagoras, is the measure of all things, of things white, heavy, light, and the like. For, as he contains a criterion in himself, and thinks conformably to the manner in which he is acted upon, he forms an opinion of things true to himself, and which are true in reality. Is it not so?

THEO. It is.

SOC. Shall we also say, O Protagoras, that he contains in himself a criterion of things future; and that such things as he thinks will happen, such things

things do happen to him thinking so? So that, for instance, when any idiot thinks that he shall be attacked with a fever, and that a heat of this kind will take place, but a physician is of a different opinion, which of these opinions shall we say will be verified in futurity? Or shall we say that both will be verified? and that the physician will not be affected either with heat or fever, but that the idiot will suffer both?

THEO. This, indeed, would be ridiculous.

Soc. But I think, likewise, that the opinion of the husbandman, and not of the harper, would prevail, respecting the future sweetness or roughness of wine.

THEO. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Nor would a master of the gymnasium think better respecting that consonance, or dissonance, which would in future appear to him to be consonant or dissonant, than a musician.

THEO. By no means.

Soc. And when a banquet is to be prepared, will not the opinion of a cook respecting its future agreeableness be preferred to that of any other person who is unskilled in seasoning? For we do not oppose the assertion respecting that which is, or was, agreeable; but, respecting that which in future will appear, and will be agreeable to any one, whether is every one to himself the best judge, or whether are you, O Protagoras, better able to foresee what will probably take place in doubtful affairs than an idiot?

THEO. I think, Socrates, that Protagoras professes in these greatly to excel all men.

Soc. O miserable man! no one, by Jupiter, would have followed him, and given him a considerable sum of money, if he had not persuaded his disciples that in future it would happen, and would appear to be the case, that neither any diviner, nor other person, would judge better than himself.

THEO. Most true.

Soc. But does not the establishment of laws, and the useful, regard futurity? And does not every one acknowledge, that a city, though governed by laws, often necessarily wanders from that which is most useful?

THEO. Very much so.

Soc. We have, therefore, sufficiently urged against your preceptor, that he must necessarily confess, that one man is wiser than another, and that such

such a one is a measure; but that there is no necessity that I, who am void of science, should become a measure, as his discourse just now compelled me to be, since, whether I am willing or not, I am so.

THEO. From that, Socrates, it appears to me, that his doctrine is particularly convincing, and from this also, that it makes the opinions of others valid. But cities reprobate his assertions, and by no means think them to be true.

SOC. In many other things, Theodorus, it may be inferred, that not every opinion of every one is true. But, with respect to the passion present to every one, from which the senses and opinions according to these are produced, it is more difficult to apprehend that they are not true. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose. For, when they occur, they cannot be confuted: and those who say that they are clear and sciences, perhaps say the truth. And Theætetus here did not assert foreign from the purpose, that sense and science are the same. Let us, therefore, approach nearer, as the doctrine of Protagoras orders us, and consider whether this essence, which is thus borne along, emits an entire or a broken sound. For the contention about it is neither mean nor among a few.

THEO. It is very far, indeed, from being mean, but it is very much circulated about Ionia. For the followers of Heraclitus discourse about it very strenuously.

SOC. On this account, friend Theodorus, we should rather consider this affair from the beginning, in the same manner as it is discussed by them.

THEO. By all means, therefore. For, with respect to these Heraclitics, Socrates, or as you say Homeric, and such as are still more ancient than these, about Ephesus, and who wish to be considered as skilful persons, it is no more possible to discourse with them than with men raging mad. For their writings are indeed borne along. But as to waiting patiently in discourse and inquiry, and continuing quiet during questioning and answering, this is present with them less than nothing; or rather, these men are so far from possessing any rest, that their privation of it even transcends that which is less than nothing. But if any one asks them a question, they immediately draw, as from a quiver, certain dark ænigmatical words, and dart them at you. And if you ask the reason of this, they will again strike you with another dark shower of words, but with the names changed. But you will

never bring any thing to a conclusion with them, nor do they ever conclude any thing among themselves. Indeed, they take very good care that there shall not be any thing stable, either in their discourse, or in their souls; thinking, as it appears to me, that this very thing itself is stable. But these are the weapons with which they strenuously fight, and which, as far as they are able, they on all sides hurl forth.

Soc. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these men fighting, but have never seen them when peaceably disposed. For they are not your associates. But I think they speak such things as these, when at leisure, to their disciples, whom they wish to render similar to themselves.

THEO. What disciples, blessed man? For, among men of this kind, one is not the disciple of another, but they spring up spontaneously, wherever each of them happens to be seized with a fanatic fury; and at the same time each thinks that the other knows nothing. From these, therefore, as I just now said, neither willingly nor unwillingly will you ever receive a reason. But it is necessary that we should consider the affair as if it was a problem.

Soc. You speak to the purpose. But, with respect to the problem, we receive one thing from the ancients, (who concealed in verse their meaning from the multitude,) that Ocean and Tethys are the generation of all other things, that all things are streams, and that nothing abides. But from the moderns, as being more wise, the thing is so clearly demonstrated, that even carriers, on hearing them, are able to learn their wisdom, and lay aside their foolish opinion, that some things stand still, and others are moved. And learning that all things are moved, they venerate the authors of this doctrine. But we have almost forgotten, Theodorus, that others evince the very contrary to this opinion; I mean, that the proper name of the universe is the immovable, and such other assertions as the Melissæans and Parmenideans, opposing all these, strenuously defend—as, that all things are one, and that this one abides in itself, not having a place in which it can be moved. What then shall we say to all these, my friend? For, proceeding by small advances, we have secretly fallen into the midst of both of them. And if we fly, without in any respect resisting, we shall be punished like those in the palæstræ playing in a line, who, when they are caught on both sides, are drawn in contrary directions. It appears therefore to me, that we should first of all consider those with whom we began—I mean the flowing philosophers—and,

if they appear to say any thing to the purpose, that we should draw ourselves together with them, and endeavour to fly from the others. But if those who consider the universe as stable shall appear to have more truth on their side, we should fly to them from those who move even things immovable. And if it shall appear that neither of them assert any thing sufficient, we shall become ridiculous, in consequence of thinking that we, who are men of no importance, can say any thing to the purpose, when we only reprobate men very ancient, and perfectly wise. Consider therefore, Theodorus, whether it is expedient to proceed into such a mighty danger.

THEO. Nothing ought to prevent us, Socrates, from considering what each of these men say.

SOC. Let us consider their assertions then, since you so earnestly desire it. It appears, therefore, to me, that this speculation should commence from motion,—I mean, what that motion is by which they say all things are moved. But what I wish to say is this: whether they say there is one species of motion, or, as it appears to me, two. Nor do I alone wish to know this myself, but that you also may partake, together with me, of this information, that we may in common be affected in such a manner as is proper. Tell me, therefore, do you say a thing is moved when it changes one place for another, or is turned round in the same place?

THEO. I do.

SOC. Let this, therefore, be one species. But when any thing abiding in the same place becomes old, or, from being white, becomes black, or, from being soft, hard, or is changed by any other internal change, may not this be deservedly called another species of motion?

THEO. It appears so to me.

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be these two species of motion, viz. alliation, or internal change, and lation.

THEO. Rightly said.

SOC. Having, therefore, made this division, let us now discourse with those who assert that all things are moved, and thus interrogate them: Whether do you say that every thing is moved both ways, viz. according to lation and alliation, or that one thing is moved both ways, and another only in one way?

THEO. By Jupiter, I know not what to say, but I think they would reply, that every thing is moved both ways.

SOC. Otherwise, my friend, things would appear to them to be both moved and stand still, and it would not be in any respect more proper to assert that all things are moved, than that they stand still.

THEO. Most true.

SOC. Since, therefore, it is necessary they should be moved, and that no one thing should not be moved, all things will always be moved with every kind of motion.

THEO. It is necessary.

SOC. Consider, likewise, this respecting their assertions,—I mean concerning the generation of heat, or whiteness, or any thing else. Do we not say that they assert, that each of these is borne along, together with sense, between the agent and the patient? And that the patient, indeed, is sensible, but not yet become sense: but that the agent is that which effects something, but is not quality? Perhaps, therefore, quality may appear to you to be an unusual name, and you do not understand me thus speaking collectively. Hear me, then, according to parts. For the agent is neither heat nor whiteness, but becomes hot and white; and so with respect to other things. For do you not recollect that we have observed before, that nothing is any one thing essentially, neither that which is an agent, nor that which is a patient, but that from the concurrence of both with each other, sense, and things sensible, being generated, some things became certain qualities, but others sentient?

THEO. I recollect. For how is it possible I should not?

SOC. As to other things, therefore, we shall omit the consideration, whether they speak in this manner concerning them, or not. But let us alone attend to this thing, for the sake of which we are now discoursing; and let us ask them, are all things moved, and do they flow as you say? For is not this what they say?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Are they not, therefore, moved with both those motions which we enumerated, viz. lation and alliation?

THEO. Undoubtedly; since it is necessary that they should be perfectly moved.

Soc. If, therefore, they were only borne along, but were not internally changed, we might be able to say what kind of things flow that are borne along. Or how shall we say?

THEO. Thus.

Soc. But since neither a flowing white thing permanently continues to flow, but is changed, so that there is even a flux of its whiteness, and a transition into another colour, and we are not able to discover that it abides in this, can we with rectitude pronounce it to be any particular colour?

THEO. But how is it possible, Socrates, that we can pronounce this of a thing white, or of any thing else of a similar kind, since, while we speak about it, it is always privately departing, because continually flowing?

Soc. But what shall we say of any one of the senses, as of seeing or hearing? Does any thing in seeing or hearing ever abide?

THEO. This ought not to be the case, since all things are moved.

Soc. We must say, therefore, that neither does any one see more than not see, or use any other of the senses more than not use them, since all things are in every respect moved.

THEO. We must say so.

Soc. But sense is science, as we say, I and Theætetus.

THEO. You do say so.

Soc. On being asked, therefore, what science is, we must answer, that it is not more science than not science.

THEO. So it appears.

Soc. An emendation, therefore, of the answer will very opportunely present itself to us, when we desire to evince that all things are moved, in order that the answer may appear to be right. But this it seems will appear, that if all things are moved, every answer to every question will be similarly right which says, that a thing subsists and yet does not subsist in a certain particular manner, or, if you will, that it is in generation, that we may not stop them by our discourse.

THEO. Right.

Soc. Except in this, Theodorus, that we should say it is so, and yet is not so. But it is requisite not even to speak in this manner, (for neither will it be any longer moved thus, nor yet not thus,) but another word must be employed by those that speak in this manner, because they have no words by which

they can denominate things according to their hypothesis, unless, perhaps, they use the expression *not in any particular manner*. But this will be particularly adapted to them, when spoken an infinite number of times.

THEO. It will thus, indeed, be accommodated to them in the highest degree.

SOC. We have therefore, Theodorus, done with your friend, nor can we grant him, that every man is the measure of all things, or any man, unless he is endued with wisdom. Nor must we admit that science is sense, according to the doctrine that all things are moved; unless Theætetus here says otherwise.

THEO. You speak most excellently, Socrates. For, these things being brought to a conclusion, it is proper that I also should have done with Protagoras, according to our compact.

THEÆ. But not so, Theodorus, till you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who assert that the universe is immovable, as you just now mentioned.

THEO. As you are a young man, Theætetus, you teach those that are advanced in years to act unjustly, by transgressing compacts. But prepare yourself to answer Socrates in the remaining part of this inquiry.

THEÆ. Doubtless I shall, if he wishes it: yet it would give me great pleasure to hear what I mentioned.

THEO. You incite horses to the plain when you incite Socrates to discourse. Ask, therefore, and hear.

SOC. But, O Theodorus, I appear to myself as if I should not comply with Theætetus in his request.

THEO. But why should you not comply?

SOC. Though I should be ashamed to speak concerning Melissus and others, who assert that the universe is one and immovable, lest I should appear to revile them in an insolent manner, yet I should be less ashamed with respect to them than with respect to Parmenides. For, that I may use the words of Homer, Parmenides appears to me to be both venerable and skilful. For I was acquainted with him when I was very young and he was very much advanced in years, and he appeared to me to possess a certain profundity perfectly generous. I am afraid, therefore, lest we should neither understand the meaning of his words, and much more, lest we should be deficient

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in apprehending the conceptions contained in his writings: and what is greatest of all, left with respect to the subject of our present inquiry, what science is, we should leave the consideration of it unfinished, through employing contumelious language. Besides, the question which we have now excited, and which contains in itself an ineffable multitude of particulars, would be unworthily treated, if discussed in a careless manner; and on the other hand, if it is extended to too great a length, it will prevent the discovery of science. But it is proper that neither of these should take place, but that we should endeavour, by the obstetric art, to free from confinement the fœtus of Theætetus respecting science.

THEÆ. It is proper indeed to do so, if it seems requisite to you.

Soc. Again, therefore, Theætetus, in addition to what has been said above, consider this. Do you say that science is sense or not?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. If then any one should ask you, by what it is that a man sees things white and black, and hears sounds flat and sharp, you would answer, I think, that it is by the eyes and ears.

THEÆ. I should.

Soc. But to use nouns and verbs with facility, without entering into an accurate investigation of them, is for the most part a thing not ignoble; but rather the contrary to this is servile. Sometimes, however, this is necessary: as in the present case we are compelled to examine whether your answer is right or not. For, consider whether the answer is more right, that we see by, or that we see through, the eyes; and that we hear by, or that we hear through, the ears?

THEÆ. It appears to me, Socrates, that it is more proper to consider the eyes and ears as things through which, rather than as things by which, we perceive.

Soc. For it would be a dire thing, O boy, if many senses were seated in us, as in wooden horses, and did not all of them tend to one certain idea, whether this is soul, or whatever else it may be proper to call it; and by which, through the senses as organs, we perceive sensible objects.

THEÆ. This appears to me to be the case, rather than that.

Soc. On this account I diligently investigate these things with you, that we may discover whether by one certain thing belonging to us we perceive things

things black and white, through the eyes, but certain other particulars through the other organs of sense; and whether, when interrogated, you are able to refer all such things as these to the body. But perhaps it will be better that you should answer to these inquiries, than that I should be entangled with a multiplicity of questions from you. Tell me, therefore: Do you admit that the things through which you perceive the hot and the dry, the light and the sweet, belong each of them to the body, or to any thing else?

THEÆ. To nothing else.

SOC. Are you also willing to acknowledge that such things as you perceive through one power it is impossible to perceive through another? As, that what you perceive through hearing you cannot perceive through seeing, and that what you perceive through seeing you cannot perceive through hearing?

THEÆ. How is it possible I should not be willing?

SOC. If, therefore, you dianoëticallly perceive any thing about both these, you do not accomplish this through any other organ¹, nor yet through any other do you perceive respecting both of them.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly not.

SOC. But, with respect to sound and colour, do you not, in the first place, dianoëticallly conceive this concerning both of them, that both have a subsistence?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. And, therefore, that the one is different from the other, and the same with itself?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. And again that both are two, and each one?

THEÆ. And this also.

SOC. Are you also able to consider whether they are similar or dissimilar to each other?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

SOC. But through what is it that you dianoëticallly conceive all these things about them? For you can neither apprehend any thing common

¹ That is, this is not accomplished through any other organ than the dianoëtic power. Plato very properly here uses the word *dianoon*, because he is *scientifically* considering what *science* is.

respecting

respecting them, through the hearing, nor the sight. Further still, this also is an instance of what we say. For, if it were possible to consider this of both, whether or not they are salt, you know you would be able to assign that by which you considered this; and this would appear to be neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

THEÆ. But what should hinder this power from operating through the tongue?

SOC. You speak well. But with respect to that power which through a certain thing shows you that which is common to all things, and that which is common to these, and through which you denominate a thing to be, or not to be, through what instruments does it perceive the several particulars about which we were just now inquiring?

THEÆ. You speak of essence and non-being, similitude and dissimilitude, same and different, and the two species of numbers. For it is evident that you inquire through what instrument of the body we perceive by the soul, the even and the odd, and such other things as are consequent to these.

SOC. You follow, Theætetus, surpassingly well; for these are the very things about which I interrogate.

THEÆ. But by Jupiter, Socrates, I know not what to say, except that which appeared to me at first, that there is not any peculiar organ to these as there is to sensible particulars, but it appears to me that the soul itself considers by itself such things as are common in all things.

SOC. You are beautiful, Theætetus, and not, as Theodorus said, deformed. For he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But, besides being beautiful, you have done well with respect to me. For you have liberated me from a very copious discourse, since it appears to you that the soul considers some things by itself, and others through the powers of the body. For this was what appeared to me to be the case, and which I wished might likewise appear so to you.

THEÆ. It certainly does appear so to me.

SOC. Among what things, therefore, do you place essence? For this especially follows in all things.

THEÆ. I place it among those things which the soul itself by itself aspires after.

SOC.

Soc. Do you say the same of the similar and the dissimilar, of same and different?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But what of the beautiful and the base, good and evil?

THEÆ. It appears to me that the soul principally considers the essence of these in mutually comparing them with each other, and considering in itself things past and present with reference to such as are future.

Soc. Take notice also of this: the soul perceives the hardness of a thing hard, through the touch, and in a similar manner the softness of a thing soft; or does it not?

THEÆ. It does.

Soc. But the essence of these, what they are, their mutual contrariety, and the essence of this contrariety, the soul endeavours to discriminate by retiring into herself, and comparing them with each other.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. But is not a power of perceiving such passions as extend to the soul through the body naturally present both with men and brutes, as soon as they are born? And is not reasoning about the essence and utility of these, generated in those in whom it is generated, with difficulty, in a long course of time, through a variety of particulars, and through discipline?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Can we, therefore, apprehend the truth by that by which we cannot apprehend essence?

THEÆ. Impossible.

Soc. But can any one possess science of a thing, when at the same time he does not apprehend the truth of that thing?

THEÆ. But how can he, Socrates?

Soc. Science, therefore, is not inherent in passions, but is inherent in a reasoning process about them. For by this, as it appears, we may be able to touch upon essence and truth? But this cannot be effected by passions.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Can you, therefore, call passion and science the same thing, when there is such a great difference between them?

THEÆ. It would not be just to do so.

Soc. But what name do you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, becoming hot, and becoming cold?

THEÆ. I should give to all these the name of perception. For what other name can be given to them?

Soc. Do you, therefore, call the whole of this sense?

THEÆ. Necessarily so.

Soc. But we said that this was not capable of touching upon truth, because it could not apprehend the essence of a thing.

THEÆ. It certainly cannot.

Soc. Neither, therefore, can it touch upon science.

THEÆ. It cannot.

Soc. Science, therefore, and sense, Theætetus, can never be the same.

THEÆ. It appears, Socrates, they cannot.

Soc. And now it becomes most eminently apparent, that science is something different from sense. But we did not begin this conversation for the sake of finding out what science is not, but that we might discover what it is. At the same time, we have advanced thus far, as to be convinced that we must not at all seek for it in sense, but in that name which the soul then possesses when it is conversant with beings, itself by itself.

THEÆ. But this, Socrates, is I think called *to opine*.

Soc. You suspect¹ rightly, my friend. And now again consider from the beginning, obliterating all that has been already said, whether you can see more clearly, since we have proceeded thus far. And again tell me what science is.

THEÆ. It is impossible, Socrates, to say that every opinion is science, because there are false opinions. But it appears that true opinion is science. And this is my answer. But if in the course of the inquiry it shall not appear to be so, as it does at present, I shall endeavour to say something else.

¹ Socrates, in saying that Theætetus *suspects rightly*, indicates that he has not a dianoëtic and scientific conception of the name in which science is to be found. For this name is *dianoia*, or the dianoëtic power of the soul, whose very essence, as we have elsewhere observed, consists in reasoning scientifically. Hence he very properly says *ορθως γαρ οισι*, You suspect rightly. For his conception was nothing more than a vague conjecture or suspicion; at the same time that it was as *accurate* as could be obtained by mere suspicion.

Soc. In this manner, Theætetus, it is proper to act—I mean, to speak with alacrity, and not, as you were at first, be averse to answer. For, if we thus conduct ourselves, we shall either find that which is the object of our search, or we shall in a less degree think that we know that which we do not by any means know. Nor will a thing of this kind be a despicable gain. And now then what do you say? Since there are two species of opinion, one true, and the other false, do you define science to be true opinion?

THEÆ. I do. For this now appears to me to be the case.

Soc. Is it, therefore, worth while again to resume the discourse about opinion?

THEÆ. What do you mean?

Soc. I am now disturbed, and often have been, so that I am involved in much doubt, both with respect to myself and others, as I am not able to say what this passion in us is, and after what manner it is generated in the soul.

THEÆ. How is this?

Soc. I am now speaking of false opinion; and am considering whether we shall omit the discussion of it, or speculate about it in a different manner from what we did a little before.

THEÆ. But why should you be dubious in this affair, Socrates, if you see the manner in which it is proper to act? For you and Theodorus said just now not badly, respecting leisure, that nothing urges in inquiries of this kind.

Soc. You very properly remind me. For perhaps it will not be foreign from the purpose again to tread in the same steps. For it is better to finish a little well, than much insufficiently.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. What then shall we say? Shall we say that every opinion is false? or that some of us entertain false opinions, and others true—as if this was naturally the case with respect to opinions?

THEÆ. We should doubtless speak in this manner.

Soc. Does not this happen to us, as well about all things, as about each thing, that we either know or do not know? For at present I omit to speak of learning and forgetting, as subsisting between these, because it contributes nothing to our design.

THEÆ. But, Socrates, nothing else remains respecting every particular, except knowing or not knowing it.

Soc.

Soc. Is it not therefore necessary, that he who forms an opinion should either form an opinion of things of which he knows something, or of things of which he knows nothing?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. Is it not likewise impossible, that he who knows a thing should not know it, or that he who does not know it should know it?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Does, therefore, he who opines falsely respecting the things which he knows, opine that these are not the things which he knows, but different from them, but of which he has at the same time a knowledge? And though he knows both, is he ignorant of both?

THEÆ. But this, Socrates, is impossible.

Soc. Does he, therefore, think that the things of which he is ignorant are certain other things of which likewise he is ignorant? And can he who neither knows Theætetus nor Socrates ever be induced to think that Socrates is Theætetus, or Theætetus Socrates?

THEÆ. How is it possible he can?

Soc. Nor, again, can any one think that the things which he knows are the same as those of which he is ignorant; or that the things of which he is ignorant are the same as those which he knows.

THEÆ. For this would be monstrous.

Soc. How then can any one entertain false opinions? For it is impossible to opine in ways different from these; since we either know or do not know all things. But in these it by no means appears possible to opine falsely.

THEÆ. Most true.

Soc. Whether, therefore, ought we to consider the object of our inquiry, not by proceeding according to knowing and not knowing, but according to being and non-being?

THEÆ. How do you say?

Soc. It is not a simple thing; because he who, with respect to any thing, opines things which are not, must unavoidably opine falsely, in whatever manner the particulars pertaining to his dianoëtic part may subsist.

THEÆ. It is proper it should be so, Socrates.

Soc. How then shall we answer, Theætetus, if any one should ask us (but it is possible that what I say may take place), What man can opine that which is not, whether respecting beings themselves, or whether considered itself by itself? To this, as it appears, we should reply, that he can then opine about that which is not, when opining he does not opine the truth. Or how shall we say?

THEÆ. In this manner.

Soc. Does a thing of this kind, therefore, take place elsewhere?

THEÆ. Of what kind?

Soc. That some one sees something, and yet sees nothing.

THEÆ. But how can he?

Soc. But if he sees one certain thing, he sees something which ranks among beings. Or do you think that *the one* does not rank among beings?

THEÆ. I do not.

Soc. He, therefore, who sees one certain thing sees a certain being.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. And, therefore, he who hears a certain thing hears one certain thing, and a certain being.

THEÆ. He does so.

Soc. And does not he also who touches a certain thing touch one certain thing, and that which has a being, since it is one thing?

THEÆ. And this also.

Soc. And does not he who opines opine one certain thing?

THEÆ. I grant it.

Soc. He, therefore, who opines that which has no being opines nothing.

THEÆ. So it appears.

Soc. But he who opines nothing does not opine in any respect.

THEÆ. It is evident, as it appears.

Soc. It is impossible, therefore, to opine that which is not, either about beings, or itself by itself.

THEÆ. So it appears.

Soc. To opine falsely, therefore, differs from opining things which are not.

THEÆ. It appears that it differs.

Soc.

Soc. For neither is false opinion inherent in us in this manner, nor in the manner which we considered a little before.

THEÆ. It is not.

Soc. Perhaps, therefore, we may denominate this as follows.

THEÆ. How?

Soc. We say that a certain foreign opinion is a false opinion, when some one, by an alteration in his dianoëtic energy, says that a certain thing is a different thing. For thus he always opines that which has a being, but he opines one thing instead of another; and, in consequence of erring in that which he considers, he may be justly said to opine falsely.

THEÆ. You now appear to me to have spoken with the greatest rectitude. For, when any one opines that which is deformed instead of that which is beautiful, or that which is beautiful instead of that which is deformed, then he truly opines falsely.

Soc. It is evident, Theætetus, that you despise, and do not reverence me.

THEÆ. In what respect?

Soc. I do not think I appear to you to have apprehended that which is truly false, when asked whether the swift and the slow, the light and the heavy, or any other contraries, do not become contrary to themselves, according to their own nature, but according to the nature of things which are contrary to them. This, therefore, I dismiss, lest you should be confident in vain. But is it agreeable to you, as you say, that to opine falsely is the same as to opine foreign to the purpose?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. It is possible, therefore, according to your opinion, to establish by the dianoëtic power one thing as another, and not as that thing which it is¹.

THEÆ. It is possible.

Soc. When, therefore, the dianoëtic power does this, is it not necessary that it should either cogitate about both these, or about one of them?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. And, therefore, it must either cogitate about them both together, or separately.

¹ This is effected when the dianoëtic power converts itself to imagination, and in consequence of this produces false reasoning.

THEÆ. Most excellent.

SOC. But do you call dianoëtic energy the same as I do?

THEÆ. What do you call it?

SOC. The discourse which the soul itself evolves in itself about the objects of its consideration. I explain the thing to you like an unskilful person. For the soul, when it energizes dianoëticly, appears to me to do nothing else than discourse with itself¹, by interrogating and answering, affirming and denying. But when, having defined, it asserts without opposition, whether more slowly or more rapidly, then I call this opinion². So that I denominate to opine, to speak, and opinion, a discourse not directed to any other, nor accompanied with voice, but directed to itself. But what do you call it?

THEÆ. The same.

SOC. When any one, therefore, opines that one thing is another, he says to himself, as it appears, that one thing is another.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Recollect, whether if at any time you say to yourself, that the beautiful is more than any thing base, or that the unjust is just, or, which is the summit of all, whether you ever attempt to persuade yourself, that that which is one thing is more than any thing another thing. Or, on the contrary, have you never dared even in sleep to say to yourself, that things even are entirely odd, or any thing else of this kind?

THEÆ. Certainly never.

SOC. Do you think, then, that any other person, whether he is in a sane or an insane condition, will seriously dare to say to himself, and this accompanied with persuasion, that a horse is necessarily an ox, or two things one thing?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, I do not.

SOC. If, therefore, to opine is for a man to speak to himself, no one, while he says and opines both these, and touches upon both with his soul, will say and opine that one of those is the other. But we will dismiss, if you

¹ As the dianoëtic is accurately considered a scientific energy, it is very properly defined by Socrates to be a discourse of the soul with itself. Or, in other words, it is an energy of the rational soul, directed to itself, and not converted to the phantasy.

² Opinion is the conclusion of the dianoëtic energy. See the Sophista.

please, this word *the other*. For my meaning is this: that no one will opine that the base is the beautiful, or any thing else of this kind.

THEÆ. You have my permission, Socrates, to dismiss this word; and the case appears to me to be as you say.

Soc. He, therefore, who opines both these cannot opine that one of them is the other.

THEÆ. So it appears.

Soc. And again, he who only opines one of these, but by no means the other, can never opine that one of them is the other.

THEÆ. True. For he would be compelled to touch upon that about which he does not opine.

Soc. Neither, therefore, can he who opines both, nor he who only opines one of them, opine foreign to the purpose. So that he will say nothing, who defines false opinion to be heterodox. For neither will false opinion appear to reside in us in this manner, nor in that which we have already mentioned.

THEÆ. It does not appear that it will.

Soc. But, Theætetus, if this should not appear to be the case, we should be compelled to confess many things, and of an absurd nature.

THEÆ. What are these?

Soc. I will not tell you, till I have endeavoured to consider the affair in every possible way. For I should be ashamed, with respect to that of which we are in doubt, if we were compelled to confess what I now say. But if we shall discover the object of our search, and become free, then we may speak concerning others, as suffering these things, while we shall be raised beyond the reach of ridicule. But if we should be involved in inextricable doubts, and thus become abject, and filled with nausea, then, I think, we should permit our discourse to trample on us, and use us as it pleases. Hear, then, whether I have found out any passage to the object of our inquiry.

THEÆ. Only speak.

Soc. I shall not say that we rightly consented, when we acknowledged that it was impossible any one could opine that the things which he knows are things which he does not know, and thus be deceived: but I say that this is in a certain respect possible.

THEÆ. Do you say that which I suspected might be the case when we made this assertion, as that I knowing Socrates, and seeing another person at a distance whom I do not know, might think it was Socrates, whom I do know? For that which you say takes place in a thing of this kind.

Soc. Are we not, therefore, driven from the hypothesis which caused us to acknowledge, that, with respect to things which we know, we are ignorant of them, at the same time that we know them?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. We must not, therefore, establish this hypothesis, but the following: and perhaps some one will in a certain respect assent to us, or perhaps will oppose us. But we are now in that situation in which it is necessary to examine the discourse which perverts all things. Consider, therefore, whether I say any thing to the purpose. Is it then possible for any one who formerly was ignorant of something, afterwards to learn that thing?

THEÆ. It certainly is possible.

Soc. And can he not also learn another and another thing?

THEÆ. Why should he not?

Soc. Place for me, for the sake of an example, one waxen image[†] in our souls: in this soul a greater image, and in that a lesser: and in this of purer, but in that of impurer and harder wax: and in some again of a moister kind, but in others sufficiently tempered.

THEÆ. I place it.

Soc. We must say, then, that this is a gift of Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses; and that in this, whatever we wish to remember of things which we have seen, or heard, or understood, is impressed like images made by a seal, by insinuating itself into our senses and conceptions. And further, that we remember and know that which is impressed in this waxen image, as long as the impressed figure remains; but when it is destroyed, or can be no longer impressed, we forget and cease to know.

THEÆ. Be it so.

[†] What is here said must not be understood literally; for Plato was by no means of opinion that images are fashioned by external objects in the soul. But nothing more is here meant, than either that the soul naturally possesses these images, or that, taking occasion from external motions, and the passions of body, she conceives forms in herself by her own native power.

Soc. Consider, therefore, whether he who knows these impressions, and attends to what he either sees or hears, can after this manner opine falsely?

THEÆ. After what manner?

Soc. With respect to what he knows, at one time opining that he knows, and at another time that he does not know. For we improperly granted above, that it was impossible for this to happen.

THEÆ. But how do you now say?

Soc. It is requisite thus to speak about these things, defining them from the beginning: That it is impossible that he who knows any thing, and has a monument of it in his soul, but does not perceive it, can opine that it is something else which he knows, and the image of which he possesses, but does not perceive. And again, it is impossible that any one can opine that what he knows is that which he does not know, and of which he does not possess the image: or that what he does not know is that which he knows. It is likewise impossible for any one to opine that what he perceives is some other sensible object different from what he perceives: or that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is something which he does perceive. Nor, again, can any one opine that what he knows and perceives, and of which he has a sensible image, is something else which he knows and perceives, and of which he in like manner possesses a sensible image: or that what he knows and perceives, and of which he possesses an image in a proper manner, is the same as that which he simply knows: or that what he knows and perceives, and similarly retains, is that which he perceives: or again, that what he neither knows nor perceives is the same as that which he simply does not know: or that what he neither knows nor perceives is the same as that which he does not perceive. For in all these it is impossible to opine falsely. It remains, therefore, that false opinion must take place in some things of this kind, if it has any subsistence.

THEÆ. In what things, therefore? that I may see whether I can learn better from these. For at present I do not follow you.

Soc. In those things which any one knowing, opines that they are certain other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know,

but perceives; or which both knowing and perceiving, he opines that he knows and perceives.

THEÆ. I now leave you behind, at a greater distance than before.

Soc. Hear then again as follows: I knowing Theodorus, and remembering in myself what kind of man he is, and in like manner Theætetus, sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not: and sometimes I touch them, and sometimes not; and hear or perceive them with some other sense: but sometimes I do not apprehend any thing respecting you by any sense, yet nevertheless I remember you, and know you in myself.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Learn this, therefore, the first of the things which I wish to evince to you, that it is possible for a man not to perceive that which he knows, and that it is likewise possible for him to perceive it.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. Does it not often happen that a man does not perceive that which he does not know, and likewise often happen that he perceives it only?

THEÆ. This also is true.

Soc. See, then, if you can now follow me better. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theætetus, but sees neither of them, nor is any other sense present with him respecting them. Can he ever in this case opine in himself, that Theætetus is Theodorus? Do I say any thing, or nothing?

THEÆ. You speak pertinently; for he cannot thus opine.

Soc. This then was the first of those things which I said.

THEÆ. It was.

Soc. But the second was this, that while I know one of you, but do not know the other, and perceive neither of you, I can never opine that he whom I know is the man whom I do not know.

THEÆ. Right.

Soc. But the third was this, that while I neither know nor perceive either of them, I can never opine that he whom I do not know is some other person whom I do not know: and in a similar manner think that you again hear all that was said above, in which I can never opine falsely respecting you and Theodorus, neither while knowing nor while ignorant of both; nor while knowing one, and not knowing other. And the same may be said respecting the senses, if you apprehend me,

THEÆ. I do apprehend you.

Soc. It remains, therefore, that I must then opine falsely, when knowing you and Theodorus, and preserving in that waxen image, as in a seal ring, the impression of both of you for a long time, and not sufficiently seeing both of you, I endeavour, by attributing the proper impression of each to my particular sight, so to harmonize this impression to the vestige of sight, that a recognizance may take place: but afterwards failing in the attempt, and changing like those that change their shoes, I transfer the vision of each to a foreign impression, and err by being similarly affected to the passions of sight in mirrors, where things on the right hand flow back to those on the left hand. For then heterodoxy takes place, and I opine falsely.

THEÆ. It appears, Socrates, that the passion of opinion is such as in a wonderful manner you have represented it to be.

Soc. Still further, when knowing both of you, I besides this perceive one of you, and not the other, then I have a knowledge of him whom I do not perceive, but not according to sense; which is what I said before, but you did not then understand me.

THEÆ. I did not.

Soc. This however I said, that he who knows and perceives one of you, and has a knowledge of you according to sense, will never opine that this object of his knowledge and perception is some other person whom he knows and perceives, and of whom he has a knowledge according to sense. Was not this what I said?

THEÆ. It was.

Soc. But in a certain respect that which I just now said is omitted,—I mean, that false opinion then takes place, when any one knowing and seeing both of you, or possessing any other sense of both of you, and likewise retaining your images in his soul, has not a proper perception of either of you, but, like an unskilful archer, wanders from and misses the mark, which is therefore denominated a falsehood.

THEÆ. And very properly so.

Soc. When, therefore, sense is present to one of the impressions, and not to the other, and that which belongs to the absent sense is adapted to the sense then present, in this case the dianoëtic part is entirely deceived. And, in one word, it is not possible, as it appears, either to be deceived, or to have

a false opinion, respecting things which a man has neither ever known or perceived, if we now say any thing to the purpose. But respecting things which we know and perceive, in these opinion is rolled about and evolved, becoming both true and false. And when it collects and marks its proper resemblances in an opposite and straight forward direction, then it is true, but when in a transverse and oblique direction, false.

THEÆ. These things, therefore, Socrates, are beautifully said.

Soc. And you will much more say so, when you hear what follows. For to opine the truth is beautiful, but to lie is base.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. They say, therefore, that hence the following particulars take place. When that waxen image in the soul is profound, abundant, smooth, and sufficiently perfect, then the several particulars which proceed through the senses, being impressed in this heart ¹ of the soul, (as Homer calls it, obscurely signifying its similitude to wax,) so as to become pure signatures, and of sufficient profundity,—in this case they become lasting. And, in the first place, men with such impressions as these are docile: in the next place, they are endued with a good memory: and, in the third place, they do not change the impressions of the senses, but opine the truth. For, as these impressions are clear, and situated in an ample region, they swiftly distribute sensible particulars to their proper resemblances, which are called beings; and such men are denominated wise. Or does it not appear so to you?

THEÆ. It does in a transcendent degree.

Soc. When, therefore, any one's heart is hairy (which the perfectly wise poet has celebrated), or when it is of a muddy nature, and not of pure wax, or when it is very moist, or hard, then it is in a bad condition. For those in whom it is moist are indeed docile, but become oblivious; and those in whom it is hard are affected in a contrary manner. But men in whom it is hairy and rough, in consequence of its possessing something of a stony nature, mingled with earth or clay, these contain obscure resemblances. The resemblances too are obscure in those in whom this heart is hard: for in this case it has no profundity. This likewise happens to those in whom it is moist: for, in consequence of the impressions being confounded, they

¹ For *νῦν* or *κῆρ* is the heart, and *κῆρος* is wax.

swiftly become obscure. But if, besides all this, they fall on each other, through the narrowness of their receptacle, since it belongs to a little soul, then the resemblances become still more obscure. All such as these, therefore, opine falsely. For when they see, or hear, or think about any thing, as they are unable swiftly to attribute things to their resemblances, they judge erroneously; because they see, hear, and understand for the most part perversely. And such as these are called deceivers, and are said to be ignorant of things.

THEÆ. You speak with the greatest rectitude of all men, Socrates.

Soc. Shall we say, then, that false opinions reside in us?

THEÆ. Very much so.

Soc. And true opinions likewise?

THEÆ. And true opinions.

Soc. I think, therefore, it has been sufficiently acknowledged by us, that these two opinions have a subsistence more than any thing.

THEÆ. It has in a transcendent degree.

Soc. A loquacious man, Theætetus, appears in reality to be a dire and unpleasant man.

THEÆ. With reference to what do you speak in this manner?

Soc. With reference to my own indolence, and real loquacity, at which I am indignant. For what else than a loquacious man can he be called, who through his stupidity draws discourse upwards and downwards, not being able to procure persuasion, and who with difficulty abandons an assertion?

THEÆ. But why are you indignant?

Soc. I am not only indignant, but I am fearful what I should answer, if any one should ask me, O Socrates, have you found that false opinion is neither in the mutual energies of the senses, nor in dianoëtic energies, but in the conjunction of sense with the dianoëtic energy? But I think I should say, boasting, as if we had discovered something beautiful, that we had found it to be so.

THEÆ. What has been just now evinced appears to me, Socrates, to be no despicable thing.

Soc. Do you, therefore, he will say, assert that we can never opine, that a man whom we alone dianoëticly conceive, but do not see, is a horse,
which

which we neither at present see, nor touch, nor perceive by any other sense, but only dianoëticly conceive? I think I should say that I do assert these things.

THEÆ. And very properly.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, follow, he will say, according to this reason, that no one will ever think eleven, which he only dianoëticly perceives, to be twelve, which he only dianoëticly perceives? What answer would you give?

THEÆ. I should answer, that some one seeing or touching eleven things, might opine them to be twelve; but that he would never opine in this manner respecting the numbers which he possesses in his dianoëtic part.

Soc. But what, he will say, do you think that any one can speculate about five and seven—I do not mean five and seven men, or any thing else of this kind, but five and seven themselves, which we said were in his soul like impressions in wax—so as never to opine falsely respecting them? Or will not some men, when they consider these things by themselves, and inquire about their amount, opine that they are eleven, and others that they are twelve? Or will all men say and opine that they are twelve?

THEÆ. By Jupiter they will not; but the greater part will opine that they are eleven. And if any one should ask them the amount of more numbers, their answer would be still more erroneous. For I think that you rather speak about every number.

Soc. You think rightly. Consider, therefore, whether this ever happens, that any one opines that the twelve which are impressed in his soul are eleven?

THEÆ. It seems this does happen.

Soc. Does not this then revolve to the former assertions? For he who suffers that which he knows, opines that it is some other thing which he also knows, which we said was impossible: and from this very circumstance we are compelled to confess, that there is no such thing as false opinion, lest the same person should be forced to know and at the same time not to know the same things.

THEÆ. Most true.

Soc. Hence it appears that false opinion must be otherwise defined than a mutation of the dianoëtic energy with respect to sense. For, if this was a
true

true definition, we should never be deceived in dianoëtic conceptions themselves. But now there is either no such thing as false opinion, or, if there is, a man may be ignorant of that which at the same time he knows. And which of these will you choose?

THEÆ. You have proposed an ambiguous choice, Socrates.

SOC. But it appears that reason will not permit both these to take place. At the same time, however (for all things must be attempted), what if we should endeavour to divest ourselves of shame?

THEÆ. How?

SOC. By being willing to say what it is to have a scientific knowledge of a thing.

THEÆ. But why would this be impudent?

SOC. You do not appear to understand that the whole of our discourse from the beginning is an investigation of science, as if we did not know what it is.

THEÆ. I understand you.

SOC. But does it not appear to be the part of impudent persons, to show what it is to have a scientific knowledge, at the same time that they are ignorant what science is? But, Theætetus, it is now some time since we have not spoken with purity. For we have ten thousand times employed the terms, We know, and We do not know, We have a scientific knowledge, and We have not a scientific knowledge, as if we mutually understood something, in which at the same time we are ignorant what science is. But at present, if you are willing, we will use the terms, to be ignorant, and to understand, in such a manner as it is proper to use them, since we are destitute of science.

THEÆ. But how in this case, Socrates, shall we be able to discourse?

SOC. Not at all while I remain as I am. But I might be able, if I was contentious: and now, if any contentious person was present, he would say that he abstained from such terms, and would very much deter us from what I say. But, as we are bad, man, are you willing I should dare to say what it is to know scientifically? For it appears to me to be worth while.

THEÆ. Dare then, by Jupiter. For you will greatly deserve to be pardoned for the attempt.

SOC. Have you heard what at present they say it is to know scientifically?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Perhaps so; but at present I do not remember.

Soc. They say that it is the habit of science.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. We, therefore, shall make a trifling alteration, and say that it is the possession of science.

THEÆ. But in what do you say this differs from that?

Soc. Perhaps in nothing. But when you have heard that which appears to me to be the case, examine it together with me.

THEÆ. I will, if I can.

Soc. To *possess*, therefore, does not appear to me to be the same as to *have* a thing. Thus, if any one buys a garment, and, having the power of using it when he pleases, does not wear it, we should not say that he *has* the garment, but that he *possesses* it.

THEÆ. And very properly.

Soc. See then whether it is possible to possess science in this manner, without having it: just as if some one having caught certain wild doves¹, or other wild birds, and having constructed an aviary for them at home, should feed and nourish them. For in a certain respect we should say that he always *has*, because he *possesses* them. Should we not?

THEÆ. We should.

Soc. But in another respect we should say that he by no means *has* them, but that he has a power, since he has shut them up for his own use, in an inclosure of his own, of taking and having them when he pleases, and of again dismissing them: and that he can do this as often as it is agreeable to him.

THEÆ. Exactly so.

Soc. Again, as before we devised I know not what waxen figment in the fowl, so now let us place a certain aviary containing all sorts of birds in the fowl; some of which fly in flocks, apart from others; but others again fly in

¹ It is justly observed by Proclus, in his admirable Commentary on the first book of Euclid's Elements, p. 3, that Socrates here, mingling the jocular with the serious, assimilates the sciences which are in us to doves. He also says that they fly away, some in flocks, and others separate from the rest. For the sciences that are more common contain in themselves many that are more partial; and those that are distributed according to species, touching on the objects of their knowledge, are separated from, and unjoined with, each other, in consequence of originating from different primary principles.

small companies; and some fly alone, wherever they may happen to find a passage.

THEÆ. Let it be so: but what follows?

SOC. It is requisite to say, that this receptacle is empty in children: but in the place of birds we must understand sciences, and say, that he who possesses science, and confines it in this inclosure, learns or discovers that thing of which he possesses the science; and that this is to have a scientific knowledge.

THEÆ. Be it so.

SOC. But again, consider, when any one is willing to investigate sciences, and receiving to *have* them, and afterwards dismiss them, by what names all these particulars ought to be expressed. Shall we say by the same names as at first, when sciences were *possessed*, or by other names? But from what follows you will more clearly understand what I say. Do you not call arithmetic an art?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. Suppose this to be the hunting of the sciences of all the even and the odd.

THEÆ. I suppose it.

SOC. But I think by this art the arithmetician has the sciences of numbers in his power, and delivers them to others.

THEÆ. He does so.

SOC. And we say that he who delivers these sciences teaches, but that he who receives them learns; and that he who *has* them, in consequence of possessing them in that inclosure which we mentioned, knows scientifically.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

SOC. But attend to what follows. Does not he who is a perfect arithmetician know scientifically all numbers? For the sciences of all numbers are in his soul.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Does not a man of this kind sometimes enumerate with himself internally, and sometimes externally, such things as have number?

THEÆ. Certainly.

SOC. But to number is considered by us as nothing else than the speculation of the quantity of any number.

THEÆ. It is so.

Soc. He, therefore, who has a scientific knowledge, by thus speculating, appears not to know, though we have confessed that he knows every number. Do you hear these ambiguities?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. When, therefore, we assimilated sciences to the possession and fowling of doves, we said that fowling was twofold; one kind being prior to acquisition, and subsisting for the sake of possession; but the other being posterior to acquisition and possession, and subsisting for the sake of receiving and having in the hands things which were formerly possessed. So these sciences, which any one had formerly been endued with by learning, and which he had known before, may again be learnt, by resuming and retaining the science of every particular which he formerly possessed, but which he has not at hand in his dianoëtic part.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. On this account, I just now inquired how names respecting these things were to be used, as when an arithmetician numbers, or a grammarian reads. For, in either case, he who knows again applies himself to know by himself what he already knows.

THEÆ. But this is absurd, Socrates.

Soc. Shall we therefore say, that the grammarian reads, or the arithmetician numbers, things of which he is ignorant, though we have granted that the one knows all letters, and the other every number?

THEÆ. But this also is irrational.

Soc. Are you, therefore, willing we should say, that we are not at all concerned how any one may employ the names of knowing and learning? But since we have determined that it is one thing to *possess*, and another to *have*, science, we must say that it is impossible for any one not to possess that which he does possess. So that it will never happen that any one does not know that which he does know; though about this very thing false opinion may be received. For it may happen that we may take the science of one thing for the science of another, when, hunting after some one of our inward sciences, we erroneously receive instead of it some other that flies away. As when any one opines that eleven things are twelve: for then, receiving the science of eleven things instead of twelve, he takes out of his aviary a pigeon instead of a dove.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. It is reasonable to suppose so.

Soc. But when he receives that which he endeavours to receive, then he is free from falsehood, and opines things which are. And after this manner false and true opinion subsist: and thus none of the particulars which disturbed us before will be any longer an impediment to us. Perhaps, therefore, you assent to me: or how will you do?

THEÆ. Assent to you.

Soc. We are then now freed from the dilemma respecting a man knowing and at the same time not knowing a thing. For it will no longer happen that we shall not possess that which we do possess, whether we judge falsely or not. However, a more dire passion than this appears to me to present itself to the view.

THEÆ. What is that?

Soc. If the permutation of sciences should ever become false opinion.

THEÆ. But how?

Soc. In the first place, is it not absurd, that he who has the science of any thing should be ignorant of that thing, not through ignorance, but through the science of the thing? And in the next place, that he should opine this thing to be that, and that thing this? And is it not very irrational to suppose, that when science is present the soul should know nothing, but should be ignorant of all things? For, from this assertion, nothing hinders but that ignorance when present may enable a man to know something, and cause blindness to see, if science ever makes a man to be ignorant of any thing.

THEÆ. Perhaps, Socrates, we have not properly introduced birds, as we alone placed sciences in the soul, but we ought at the same time to have placed the various kinds of ignorance flying in companies; and a man employed in fowling, at one time receiving science, and at another time ignorance, about the same thing: through ignorance opining what is false, but through science the truth.

Soc. It is by no means easy, Theætetus, not to praise you. However, again consider what you have said. For let it be as you say. But he who receives ignorance, you will say, opines things false. Is it not so?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. But yet he will not think that he opines falsely.

THEÆ. He will not.

Soc. But that he opines truly. And he will be affected with respect to those things in which he errs, like one endued with knowledge.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. He will therefore opine that he has by fowling obtained science, and not ignorance.

THEÆ. It is evident.

Soc. Hence, after having made a long circuit, we have again fallen into the first doubt. For that reprover whom we mentioned before will laughing say to us, O best of men, whether can he who knows both science and ignorance opine that what he knows is some other thing which he also knows? or, knowing neither of these, can he opine that a thing which he does not know is some other thing which he does not know? or, knowing one of these, and not the other, can he opine that what he knows is that which he does not know? or that what he does not know is that which he does know? Or, again, tell me whether there are sciences of sciences, and of the various kinds of ignorance, which he who possesses, and incloses in other certain ridiculous aviaries, or waxen figments, knows so far as he possesses them, though he has them not at hand in his soul? And thus you will be compelled to revolve infinitely about the same thing, without making any proficiency. What shall we reply to these things, Theætetus?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, Socrates, I do not know what ought to be said.

Soc. Does not, therefore, O boy, the discourse of this man very properly reprove us, and evince that we have not done right in investigating false opinion prior to science, and leaving science undiscussed? But it is impossible to know this till we have sufficiently determined what science is.

THEÆ. It is necessary, Socrates, to suspect at present, as you say.

Soc. What then can any one again say from the beginning respecting science? For we are not yet weary of speaking.

THEÆ. Not in the least, if you do not forbid it.

Soc. Tell me, then, in what manner we can so speak concerning science as not to contradict ourselves.

THEÆ. In the same manner as we attempted before, Socrates; for I have not any thing else to offer.

Soc. In what manner do you mean?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. That true opinion is science. For to opine truly is without error; and every thing that proceeds from it is beautiful and good.

Soc. He who in fording a river, Theætetus, is the leader of others, if interrogated respecting the depth of the water, will answer that the water will show its own depth. In like manner, if, entering into the present subject, we inquire, the impediment to our passage will, perhaps, present to us the object of our search: but, if we remain where we are, nothing will become manifest.

THEÆ. You speak well: but let us proceed and consider.

Soc. Is not this, therefore, a thing of brief consideration? For the whole of art, and its professors, evince that art is not science.

THEÆ. How so? And who are these professors?

Soc. Those that excel all others in wisdom, and who are called orators and lawyers. For these persuade, but do not teach by their art, and cause their hearers to opine whatever they please. Or do you think there are any teachers so skilful, as to be able in cases of robbery; and other violences, to evince sufficiently the truth of the transactions by means of a little water?

THEÆ. I by no means think there are: but these men persuade.

Soc. But do you not say that to effect persuasion is the same thing as to produce opinion?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded respecting things which he who sees can alone know, but by no means otherwise, is it possible that thus judging by report, and receiving true opinion without science, they can judge rightly respecting things of which they are persuaded, if we admit that they judge well?

THEÆ. I entirely think they can.

Soc. But, my friend, if true opinion, judgment, and science are the same, that consummate judge can never opine with rectitude without science: but now each appears to be something different.

THEÆ. I had forgotten, Socrates, what I heard a certain person say concerning science, but I now remember. But he said that true opinion in conjunction with reason is science, but that without reason it is void of science; and that things cannot be known scientifically of which there is no reason, but that things may be thus known which have a reason.

Soc.

Soc. How well you speak ! But tell me how he divided things which may be scientifically known, and which cannot be so known, that we may see whether you and I similarly understand them.

THEÆ. I do not know that I can discover how he divided these ; but I can follow another person discoursing.

Soc. Hear, then, a dream for a dream. For I also appear to have heard from certain persons that the first elements ¹, as it were, from which we and other things are composed cannot be rationally described. For they say that each of these can alone be denominated by itself, but cannot be called any thing else, neither as that which is nor as that which is not ; because essence, or non-essence, would thus be assigned to it. But it is requisite to add nothing, if any one speaks of a thing itself alone. For neither the term this, nor that, nor each, nor alone, nor any other such appellations, should be employed, because these are applied to things in a circular progression, and are different from the things to which they are added. But it is necessary, if possible, to speak of the thing itself, and, if it has a proper definition, to assert something respecting it, without the addition of any thing else. Now, however, no one of things first can be made the subject of discourse ; for it does not admit of any thing else than a denomination. But the things composed from these, as they are themselves woven together, so from the weaving together of their names discourse is produced. For the connection of names is the essence of discourse. Hence, the elements themselves are ineffable and unknown, but at the same time are objects of sense : but syllables are known and effable, and may be apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one receives a true opinion of any thing, without reason, then his soul perceives the truth respecting it, but he does not know the thing ; because he who is incapable of giving and receiving a reason concerning a thing must be destitute of science respecting it. But when he receives a reason, then he may be able to know all these, and acquire science in perfection. Have you not, therefore, heard a dream, or is it any thing else ?

THEÆ. It is nothing else.

¹ Prodicus the Chian, imitating Leucippus, asserted that the elements of things, because they are simple, and therefore without definition, are unknown ; but that composites, since they can be defined, may be known.

Soc. Is it, therefore, agreeable to you that we should establish science to be true opinion in conjunction with reason ?

THEÆ. Very much so.

Soc. Have we, therefore, Theætetus, this very day detected that which formerly many wise men investigating grew old before they discovered ?

THEÆ. To me, Socrates, what was just now said appears to be well said.

Soc. And it is very fit it should: for what science can there be without reason and right opinion ? But one of the assertions does not please me.

THEÆ. What is that ?

Soc. That which appears to be very elegantly said ; that the elements of speech are unknown, but the genus of syllables known.

THEÆ. Is not this right ?

Soc. Take notice. For we have as hostages of discourse those very paradigms, which he employing said all that I have related.

THEÆ. What are these paradigms ?

Soc. The things pertaining to letters, viz. elements and syllables. Or do you think that he who said what we have related spoke in this manner looking to any thing else than these ?

THEÆ. To nothing else than these.

Soc. Let us, therefore, receiving these, examine them, or rather ourselves, whether we learn letters in this manner, or not. In the first place, then, have syllables a definition, but not the elements ?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

Soc. To me, also, it very much appears to be so. If, therefore, any one should thus ask respecting the first syllable of the word Socrates, O Theætetus, viz. what is *So* ? what would you answer ?

THEÆ. That it is *S* and *o*.

Soc. You have, therefore, this definition of the syllable.

THEÆ. I have.

Soc. But come, in a similar manner give me a definition of the letter *S*.

THEÆ. But how can any one speak of the elements of an element ? For *S*, Socrates, is only a certain sound of mute letters, the tongue, as it were, hissing : but of the letter *B* there is neither voice nor sound, nor of most of the elements. So that it is very well said that they are ineffable, among
which

which the well-known seven vowels are alone vocal, but have not any reason or definition.

SOC. This therefore, my friend, we have rightly asserted respecting science.

THEÆ. So it appears.

SOC. But have we rightly shown that a syllable is known, but not an element?

THEÆ. It is likely.

SOC. But with respect to this syllable, whether shall we say that it is both the elements; and, if there are more than two, that it is all those elements? Or shall we say that it is one certain idea produced from the composition of the elements?

THEÆ. It appears to me that we should say it is all the elements.

SOC. See, then, with respect to the two letters *S* and *o*, which form the first syllable of my name, whether he who knows this syllable knows both these letters?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. He knows, therefore, *S* and *o*.

THEÆ. Yes.

SOC. But what, if he knows each, and, knowing neither, knows both?

THEÆ. But this would be dire and absurd, Socrates.

SOC. But if it is necessary to know each, if any one knows both, it is necessary that he who in any future time knows a syllable should previously know all the elements: and so that beautiful assertion escaping from us will disappear.

THEÆ. And very suddenly too.

SOC. For we did not well secure it. For, perhaps, a syllable ought to have been adopted, and not the elements; but one certain species produced from them, and which is different from the elements.

THEÆ. Entirely so: and perhaps the thing takes place in this manner rather than in that.

SOC. We should consider, therefore, and not in so effeminate a manner betray a great and venerable assertion.

THEÆ. We ought not, indeed.

SOC. Let a syllable then, as we just now said, be one idea produced from several according elements, as well in letters as in all other things.

THEÆ. Ent rely so.

Soc.

Soc. It ought not, therefore, to have any parts.

THEÆ. Why not?

Soc. Because the whole of that which has parts must necessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole which is produced from parts is one certain species different from all the parts?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But with respect to the all, and the whole, whether do you call each of these the same, or different?

THEÆ. I have not any thing clear to say; yet since you order me to answer with alacrity, I will venture to say that each of these is different.

Soc. Your alacrity, Theætetus, is right; but whether your answer is so, we must consider.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. Does not the whole, therefore, differ from the all, according to your present assertion?

THEÆ. It does.

Soc. But do all things and the all differ in any respect? As when we say one, two, three, four, five, six: or twice three, or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, or five and one;—whether in all these do we say the same thing, or that which is different?

THEÆ. The same thing.

Soc. Do we say any thing else than six?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

Soc. According to each mode of speaking, therefore, we find that all are six.

THEÆ. We do.

Soc. Again, therefore, we do not say any one thing when we say all things.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. Do we say any thing else than six things?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

Soc. In things, therefore, which consist from number, we say that the all is the same with all things.

THEÆ. So it appears.

SOC. Should we not, therefore, say respecting them, that the number of an acre is the same as an acre?

THEÆ. We should.

SOC. And in a similar manner that the number of a stadium is a stadium?

THEÆ. Yes.

SOC. And so respecting the number of an army, and an army itself, and all other such like particulars? For every number, being an all, is each of these particulars.

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. But is the number of each of these any thing else than parts?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

SOC. Such things, therefore, as have parts consist of parts.

THEÆ. It appears so.

SOC. But it is acknowledged that all the parts are the all, since every number is the all.

THEÆ. It is so.

SOC. The whole, therefore, is not from parts: for it would be the all, in consequence of being all the parts.

THEÆ. It does not appear that it is.

SOC. But does a part belong to any thing else than to a whole?

THEÆ. It belongs to the all.

SOC. You fight strenuously, Theætetus. But is not the all, then this very thing the all, when nothing is wanting to it?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

SOC. And is not, after the same manner, the whole that which it is, when nothing is wanting to it? And is it not true, that that which is in want of any thing, in consequence of this deficiency, is neither the whole, nor the all?

THEÆ. It now appears to me, that the whole and the all in no respect differ from each other.

SOC. Do we not say that the whole and the all are all the parts of that of which they are the parts?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

SOC. Again, therefore, that we may resume what we attempted before,
if

if a syllable is not elements, must it not necessarily follow that it has not elements as parts of itself? or that, if it is the same with them, it must with them be similarly known?

THEÆ. It must.

Soc. Left, therefore, this should take place, we must establish the one to be different from the other.

THEÆ. We must.

Soc. But if elements are not parts of a syllable, can you assign any other things which are parts of a syllable, and yet are not the elements of it?

THEÆ. I should by no means grant, Socrates, that things which are not the elements can be the parts of a syllable. For it is ridiculous, neglecting the elements, to proceed in search of other things.

Soc. According to the present reasoning, therefore, Theætetus, a syllable will be in every respect one particular impartible idea.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Do you remember, therefore, my friend, that we admitted a little before, and thought it was well said, that there could be no reason or definition of things first, from which other things are composed, because each thing considered itself by itself is not a composite; and that neither the term 'to be' can with propriety be accommodated to it, nor the term 'this,' because these are asserted as things different and foreign; and that this very circumstance causes a thing to be ineffable and unknown?

THEÆ. I do remember.

Soc. Is any thing else, therefore, than this the cause of any thing being uniform and impartible? For I see no other cause.

THEÆ. It does not appear that there is any other.

Soc. Will not a syllable, therefore, be a species of this kind, since it has no parts, and is one idea?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, a syllable is many elements, and a certain whole, and these elements are its parts, syllables and elements may be similarly known, and are similarly effable, since all the parts appear to be the same with the whole.

THEÆ. And very much so.

Soc. But if a syllable is one impartible thing, a syllable and an element are equally ineffable and unknown. For the same cause renders them such.

THEÆ. I cannot say otherwise.

Soc. We must not, therefore, admit the assertion, that a syllable is a thing known and effable, but an element the contrary.

THEÆ. We must not, if we are persuaded by this reasoning.

Soc. But what again, if any one should assert the contrary, would you not rather admit it from those things of which you were conscious when you learnt your letters?

THEÆ. What things are those?

Soc. As that you endeavoured to learn nothing else than how to know the elements by your eyes and ears, each itself by itself, that the position of them, when they were pronounced or written, might not disturb you.

THEÆ. You speak most true.

Soc. But is the learning to play on the harp in perfection any thing else than the ability of knowing what sound belongs to every chord? For this every one agrees should be called the elements of music.

THEÆ. It is nothing else.

Soc. As, therefore, we are skilled in elements and syllables, if it was requisite to conjecture from these respecting other things, we should say that the genus of the elements possessed a much clearer and more principal knowledge than that of syllables, with respect to receiving each discipline in perfection. And if any one should say that a syllable is a thing known, but that an element is naturally unknown, we should think that he jested either voluntarily or involuntarily.

THEÆ. And very much so.

Soc. But, as it appears to me, there are yet other demonstrations of this thing. We must not, however, on account of these particulars, forget the thing proposed by us, viz. to investigate the assertion, that reason united with true opinion becomes most perfect science.

THEÆ. It is proper, therefore, to consider this.

Soc. Come then, inform me what is the signification of the word *logos*: for it appears to me to signify one of three things.

THEÆ. What are they?

Soc. The first will be to make its own dianoëtic conception apparent, through voice, in conjunction with verbs and nouns; thus impressing opinion in the flux through the mouth, as in a mirror, or in water. Or does not *logos* appear to you to be a thing of this kind?

THEÆ. It does: and we say that he who does this speaks.

Soc. Cannot, therefore, every one do this—I mean, point out with more or less swiftness what appears to him respecting particulars—unless he is either naturally deaf or dumb? And thus it will follow, that whoever opines any thing rightly will appear to opine in conjunction with *logos*; and true opinion will never subsist without science.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. We must not, therefore, easily condemn him who asserts science to be that which we just now mentioned, as if he said nothing. For perhaps this was not his meaning; but, being asked what each particular is, he might be able to answer the interrogator, through the elements.

THEÆ. How do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. The same as Hesiod¹, when he speaks of a chariot as composed of a hundred pieces of wood; which I am not able to say, nor do I think you are. But we should be contented, if, when asked what a chariot is, we were able to say that it is wheels, an axis, plankings, arches, and a yoke.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. But he perhaps would think we are ridiculous, just as if we were asked concerning your name, and should answer by a syllable; considering us indeed in what we say as thinking and speaking properly, but that we are grammarians, and that we possessed and spoke grammatically the definition of the name of Theætetus. He would likewise say, that no one can speak scientifically about any thing, till he has brought it to a conclusion through the elements, in conjunction with true opinion, as we observed before.

THEÆ. We did so.

Soc. After this manner, therefore, he would think we may possess true opinion respecting the chariot; but that he who is able to pervade its essence

¹ The future editors of Hesiod may increase the fragments of that poet with this part of a verse,

——— ἱκανὸν δὲ τι ἄμαξις.

through those hundred pieces of wood, can also comprehend its logos or definition, in conjunction with true opinion; and, instead of being one that opines, will thus possess art and science, respecting the essence of the chariot, determining the whole of it, through its elements.

THEÆ. Does not this appear to you, Socrates, to be well said?

Soc. If it appears so to you, my friend, and if you admit that this discursive process through an element respecting every thing is logos, or reason, and that this is the case with the process through syllables, or that it is something still greater, void of reason. Tell me what you think, that we may consider it.

THEÆ. But I very much admit this.

Soc. But do you admit it in such a manner as to think that any one has a scientific knowledge of any thing, when the same thing appears to him at different times to belong to different things; or when he opines different things at different times of the same thing?

THEO. Not I, by Jupiter.

Soc. Have you forgotten that both you and others thought in this manner, when you first learnt your letters?

THEÆ. Do you mean to say, that we thought that at one time one letter, and at another time another, belonged to the same syllable; and that the same letter was at one time to be referred to its proper syllable, and at another time to a different syllable?

Soc. This is what I mean.

THEÆ. By Jupiter, I do not forget; nor do I think that those who are thus affected possess a scientific knowledge.

Soc. What then, when any one at that time writing the word Theætetus, opines that he ought to write *Th* and *e*, and accordingly writes these letters; and again attempting to write Theodorus, opines that he ought to write *Th* and *e*, and writes these letters, shall we say that he knows scientifically the first syllable of your names?

THEÆ. But we just now acknowledged, that he who is affected in this manner does not yet know.

Soc. Does any thing, therefore, hinder the same person from being affected in the same manner respecting the second, third, and fourth syllable?

THEÆ. Nothing hinders.

Soc.

Soc. Will not such a one, therefore, in consequence of his discursive process through an element, write Theætetus with true opinion when he writes it in its proper order?

THEÆ. It is evident he will.

Soc. Will he not, therefore, be still void of science, but opine rightly, as we said?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. And will he not possess reason in conjunction with right opinion? For he wrote making a discursive process through an element, which we acknowledge is *logos* or reason.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. There is, therefore, my friend, such a thing as right opinion in conjunction with reason, which it is not yet proper to call science.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. We are enriched then, as it appears, with a dream, while we opine that we possess a most true definition of science.

THEÆ. Or we ought not yet to blame. For perhaps some one may not define *logos* in this manner, but may choose the remaining species of the three, one of which we said would be adopted by him who defined science to be right opinion in conjunction with reason.

Soc. You have very properly reminded me: for one species still remains. For the first species was an image as it were of dianoëtic conception in voice; and the second, that which we just now mentioned, a procession to the whole through an element.

THEÆ. But what do you say the third is?

Soc. That which the multitude would say it is, to be able to assign a certain mark by which the object of inquiry differs from all other things.

THEÆ. Can you give me as an instance a certain *logos* of this kind respecting any thing?

Soc. If you are willing, I think it will be sufficient for you to admit respecting the sun, that it is the most splendid of all the natures that revolve in the heavens round the earth.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Take then that for the sake of which this was said. But it is that which we just now mentioned: that when you receive the difference of any thing,

thing, by which it differs from other things, you will receive, as some say, the *logos* or definition : but as long as you touch upon any thing common, you will have the definition of those things to which this something common belongs.

THEÆ. I understand you : and it appears to me very proper to call a thing of this kind *logos*.

Soc. But he who, in conjunction with right opinion, receives the difference by which any thing whatever is distinguished from other things, will be endued with science respecting that of which he formerly possessed opinion.

THEÆ. We say it is so.

Soc. Now therefore, *Theætetus*, in consequence of approaching nearer to what is said, as to a certain adumbration, I find I do not in the least understand it ; but, while I beheld it at a distance, it appeared to me that something was spoken to the purpose.

THEÆ. But how is this ?

Soc. I will tell you, if I can. When I have a right opinion respecting you, if I likewise receive your definition, then I know you ; but if not, then I only opine. Is it not so ?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. But *logos*, or definition, was an interpretation of your difference.

THEÆ. It was.

Soc. When, therefore, I only opine, I do not perceive by the dianoëtic energy any one of those things by which you differ from others.

THEÆ. You do not, as it appears.

Soc. I, therefore, only dianoëticly perceive something common, which you possess no less than another.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. By *Jupiter*, then, inform me how, in a thing of this kind, I rather opine you than any other ? For, suppose me thus dianoëticly considering : This is *Theætetus*, who is a man, and has nostrils, eyes, and a mouth, and in like manner each of the other members. Does this dianoëtic conception cause me to perceive *Theætetus* more than *Theodorus* ? or, as it is said, more than the last of the *Myfians* ?

THEÆ. How should it ?

Soc. But if I not only dianoëticly consider that he has nostrils and eyes,
but

but likewise that he has a flat nose and prominent eyes, shall I opine you more than myself, or any other such person?

THEÆ. You will not.

Soc. But I think I shall not opine in myself, Theætetus, till a certain monument of his flat nose, exhibiting its difference from other flat noses which I perceive, is impressed in me, and in like manner other particulars from which you are composed; which, if I had met with you yesterday, would remind me, and cause me to form a right opinion respecting you.

THEÆ. Most true.

Soc. Right opinion, therefore, respecting every thing will be conversant with difference.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. What then will be the consequence if reason is assumed together with right opinion? For it would be ridiculous if any one should order us to opine in what it is that any thing differs from other things.

THEÆ. How so?

Soc. For, respecting things of which we have a right opinion, so far as they differ from others, he would order us to assume a right opinion of them, so far as they differ from others. And thus, like the circumvolution of a whip, or a pebble, or the like, from this mandate nothing would be said. For it might more justly be called the mandate of one blind; since it would order us to receive things which we possess, that we might learn things which we opine; and thus would be perfectly similar to the mandate of one deprived of sight.

THEÆ. Tell me what it is you just now asked.

Soc. If some one, O boy, ordering us to receive reason, should at the same time order us to know, but not opine difference, reason would be a pleasant thing, and the most beautiful of all things pertaining to science. For to know is in a certain respect to receive science. Is it not?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. When asked, therefore, as it appears, what science is, he would answer, that it is right opinion with the science of difference. For, according to him, this will be the assumption of reason.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. But it is in every respect foolish for us, who are investigating science, to say that it is right opinion with science, either of difference or of any thing else. Neither sense therefore, Theætetus, nor true opinion, nor reason in conjunction with true opinion, will be science.

THEÆ. It does not appear that they will.

Soc. Are we, therefore, pregnant and parturient, my friend, with any thing further respecting science, or have we brought forth every thing?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, through you I have already said more than I had in myself.

Soc. Does not, therefore, all this show that the obstetric art has brought for us that which is vain, and which does not deserve to be nourished?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, after this you should endeavour to become pregnant with other things, and your endeavour should be successful, you will, through the present discussion, be full of better things. But if you should be empty, you will be less troublesome to your companions, and more moderate and mild; in consequence of not thinking that you know things which you do not know. For thus much my art is able to accomplish, but nothing more. Nor do I know any thing of those particulars which are and have been known to great and wonderful men. But this obstetric art I and my mother are allotted from divinity; she about women, and I about ingenuous and beautiful youths. Now, therefore, I must go to the porch of the king, to answer to the accusation of Melitus. But to-morrow, Theodorus, we will again return hither.

THE END OF THE THEÆTETUS.

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